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EUROPEAN ELECTIONS IN ITALIAN MEDIA: BETWEEN SECOND ORDER CAMPAIGN AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A EUROPEAN PUBLIC SPHERE

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Abstract

The European Parliament (EP) elections are usually a pretext to discuss domestic issues and this is a common feature in most member states. EP election campaigns play a secondary role in terms of political strategies and journalistic practices. Studying newspapers, newscasts and the Web, this article aims to investigate the Italian 2009 EP election campaign, within the wider European context, discussing three main questions: a) Will data relating to the interest of news media, issues discussed by politicians and electoral turnout, allow us to include this campaign among the examples of second-elections? Or does the great lack of interest suggest that it should be counted among the campaigns of third-rate? b) Will news coverage confirm the lack of newsworthiness of Europe and the importance of domestic issues and national political actors? And related to this trend, do several medium specificities stand out (daily press, television and the Web)? c) Studying this campaign, does some evidence support the hypothesis of a slow, but constant "transnationalization" of national public opinion?

Keywords: European elections, campaign coverage, political journalism, European public sphere

¹ The authors in every part have shared the article. Marinella Belluati is responsible for par. 2-3, Giuliano Bobba for par. 4. Both have written par. 1 and the conclusions.
1. European election campaign and political information

Analysis of the recent European Parliament (EP) elections campaign in Italy allowed us to verify which are the main developments affecting the relationship between political and media systems. In particular, it provided an opportunity to review and update the key assumptions related to the second-order election, EP campaign coverage and the construction of a European public sphere.

The Italian case - despite some well-known anomalies - maintains a high degree of significance at various levels. From a political and institutional point of view, because it is a consolidated democracy and one of the six founding members of the EU; and from a journalistic point of view, because it is considered part of the Mediterranean model (also called polarized pluralist model) as well as France, Greece, Portugal, Spain. Even the most recent findings on the news coverage of the EP election campaign do not consider Italy an exception. Moreover, in its relations with the EU, Italy has always been characterized by: a) faith in Europe for its citizens, as shown by the turnout and trust in European institutions that are among the highest of the older members states; b) lack of political entrepreneurs openly hostile to Europe and ready to exploit in election campaign antieuropean feeling; c) a media and journalistic system interested mainly on domestic aspects of political life, heavily dependent on political and business systems, focused on the coverage of the two major political parties leaders (Popolo della Libertà, Right, and Partito

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5 Eurobarometer 2009, 71.3.
Democratico, Left), and especially of the Prime Minister, Silvio Berlusconi.

The Italian case study is therefore relevant not only because it allows us to evaluate the progress of Europeanization in Italy, but it also provides useful data for deepening the study of all those member states where there is a general and broad support for the EU.

The recent European elections confirmed the marginal role of Europe within its member states’ political cycle: once again this deadline has proved to be a pretext to continue discussing national issues and to assess the level of consent to political parties\(^6\). Given the low electoral turnout\(^7\) and the limited campaigning effort shown by national parties, we must acknowledge that European elections represent a secondary deadline for citizens’ political life.

According to the well-known hypothesis of a “second-order election”\(^8\), also known as the “low-key campaign”\(^9\), the final results are deemed better determined by external factors, rather than by elements of the competition itself. The main features of this kind of campaign refer to (a) the more limited budget and the shorter duration of the campaign when compared to national elections\(^10\); (b) the small number of consultants and non-political

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7  Luxembourg and Belgium show the highest percentage of voters, more than 90%, while the Czech Republic, Slovenia, Romania, Poland, Lithuania, Slovakia stands at below 30% (source: www.europarl.europa.eu).
actors involved in the campaign c) the lower political participation as measured by turnout\textsuperscript{11}; d) the kind of candidates selected, who are recruited not among the leaders of parties but rather belong to the so-called civil society\textsuperscript{12}; e) the constant presence, within, the campaign, of national issues, or European issues framed in a national perspective so as to assess the popularity of the government.

European elections in Italy have even reinforced the negative outcomes of this process. Though increasing calls to vote launched by the EU institutions\textsuperscript{13}, the communication campaign has received little attention, especially by the right wing parties. Few TV spots have been devoted to European elections, posters have been slightly more consistent\textsuperscript{14}. The strong Berlusconi job approval recorded by polls, also induce a less engagement of the Government parties in the election campaign. To summarize, although this election is secondary to the national electoral cycle, it has nonetheless maintained a primary role insofar as national political balance is concerned: in Italy the stake for the leading parties, Popolo delle Libertà (PdL) and Lega Nord (LN), had to exceed 40% of the votes, the Partito Democratico (PD) had to remain above 25%, and minor parties had to overcome the election threshold of 4%.

Concerning more specifically the news coverage, most recent studies show that visibility of the EP elections in Italy is close to the old member states’ average, with a declining trend between 1999 and 2004. Furthermore, within the news, national actors


\textsuperscript{13} The 2009 elections have witnessed the first institutional campaign coordinated in all member states, and the organization of offline as well as online awareness raising events. The communication campaign by the European Parliament is published on www.europarl.europa.eu/elections_2009_package/default.htm.

\textsuperscript{14} A searchable database of Italian political parties’ campaigning materials, developed by The Osservatorio sulla Comunicazione Politica – University of Torino, is available at www.politicalcommunicationmonitor.eu.
and domestic focus prevail\textsuperscript{15}. The Italian 2009 EU elections - as data will show - confirm the low involvement and the scarce interest of mainstream media in the campaign election coverage. The low involvement in campaigning has been favored by mainstream media, scarcely interested in the elections, as data will show. While signaling a deficit of information, this highlights a contradictory representation of Europe within media. On the one hand, general support to an ideal European integration, well expressed in the "permissive consent"\textsuperscript{16}, is giving way to prevailing anti-Europeanism and euro-skepticism. In this perspective electoral campaigns may turn disaffection into explicit antagonism against European institutions\textsuperscript{17}. Moreover, the EU integration tends to be mainly perceived as a transnational process, with limited effects in the political contexts of its member states. The lack of a common language, persisting cultural differences, and the challenges posed by the enlargement of the Union prevented the formation of a shared public space, so that the very idea of a European public sphere is controversial\textsuperscript{18}.

\textsuperscript{15} de Vreese, Susan Banducci, Holli Semetko and Hajo A. Boomgaarden, "The news coverage of the 2004 European Parliamentary election campaign in 25 countries".


On the other hand, however, there are signals of a process of “Europeanization” of national public opinions\(^\text{19}\), which has an impact on public and political agendas. Though European issues tend to be combined with national problems, slow but relevant transformations, affecting politicians, journalists, institutions, stakeholders and minorities, are taking place. Indeed, though, media tend to frame reality according to cultural-specific categories, as widely recognized in the literature\(^\text{20}\), positive attitudes towards European issues persist also in the more adverse contexts. This trend is well explained by the findings of recent research on European journalism by Paul Statham\(^\text{21}\): information on European politics, as represented within the most influent national press, can be considered as the peak in the construction of the Europeanization process, and the prevailing frame on European integration is largely supportive of the process of European integration.

Given these assumptions, this article aims to investigate the Italian 2009 EP election campaign, within the wider European context, discussing three main questions: a) Will data relating to the interest of news media, issues discussed by politicians and electoral turnout, allow us to include this campaign among the examples of second-elections? Or does the great lack of interest suggest that it should be counted among the campaigns of third-rate\(^\text{22}\)? b) Will news coverage confirm the lack of newsworthiness of Europe and the importance of domestic issues and national political actors? And related to this trend, do several medium specificities stand out (daily press, television and the Web)? c) Studying this campaign, does some evidence support the


\(^{22}\) Karl Reif, “National Electoral Cycles and European Elections 1979 and 1984”, Electoral Studies, 3 (Fall 1984), 244-255.
hypothesis of a slow, but constant "transnationalization" of national public opinion?

2. Methodology and research design

The Osservatorio sulla Comunicazione Politica of the University of Turin (OCP), in the 14 weeks before EP elections - from 1st March to 6th June 2009 - conducted a systematic monitoring of Italian media coverage devoted to Europe. In order to examine the media coverage flow, the monitoring collected and analyzed all articles about Europe in the main national newspapers with a higher readership (Il Corriere della Sera, la Repubblica, la Stampa, il Giornale) and of all news stories in the most important national evening newscasts (3 newscasts of the public broadcaster, Rai, 3 of the private broadcasters Mediaset, and 1 of La7) which contained an explicit reference to European issues. The units of analysis were all single articles (2,712 on the newspaper), with explicit references - in title and text - to Europe and European elections, and all thematic news stories (644 on TV).

Given the increasing role of the Internet in postmodern campaigns, we also monitored four of the most important web sites: Google, Google News, YouTube and Facebook. The choice of these sources is justified by the fact that national television and newspapers remain the most important sources of information about the EU for citizens in Europe, while the web is becoming more important in the public opinion sphere.

The authors have coordinated a team of five junior researchers that selected, collected and catalogued newspapers articles. The Osservatorio di Pavia realized the television monitoring. Finally

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25 Eurobarometer 2009, 71.3.
26 http://www.osservatorio.it.
both authors analyzed data. The Holsti’s Formula\(^{27}\) was used to check the reliability of data set. For newspapers and TV a sub sample of 430 codes were selected and four coders were employed to test. The percentage of agreement was calculated as 0.91.

According to the quantitative content analysis framework, as method of analysis and classification of speeches applied to the manifest content of texts\(^{28}\) and creation of simple coding scheme to an elaborate computer-aided analysis of content\(^{29}\), all European and EP elections news have been classified to estimate the national trend of information and to show the relevant content items. Taking for granted the hypothesis that Europe and EP elections are not a relevant issue for domestic newsworthiness, we selected all European news. Only for the web the selection was limited to electoral units, because including the entire European units would have produced a large but not very significant result.

All units of analysis were encoded considering some structural indicators, used to construct the media barometer. Daily, the media barometer detects a value between 0 and 10, which corresponds to the sum of four indicators: a) attention (the number of daily European news compared with the total number of news for each media); b) degree of visibility (was the European news present on newspaper front pages or in news cast headlines?); c) degree of in-depth examination of news d) degree of focus on Europe (news that was – or not - focused on Europe). Size of articles and length of news stories were used to weigh up the value of the barometer. Each unit was also encoded about content assigning the general topics related to Europe (e.g. economy and finance; Italian politics; foreign affairs;

\(^{27}\) The Holsti’s Formula estimates the reliability coding \(\frac{2M}{(N1 + N2)}\) where M are the coding decisions for which coders were in agreement and N1 + N2 are the total number of coding decisions (in Michael Singletary, Mass communication Research: contemporary methods and application, New York: Longaman 1994: 295).


manufacturing; security and immigration, etc.) and the specific electoral topics (e.g. political programmes; lists and candidates, campaigning events; coalitions, etc.). The main national and international political actors mentioned in the news selected were classified too.

The visibility flow about EP election campaign issue on the web was monitored using the keywords “European election” in the search tab. A weekly data trend was drawn of web sites on Google, news on Google news, and user generated content on Youtube and Facebook.

3. The nevercampaign! The visibility of Europe in Italian media

The low electoral turnout confirmed a lack of interest on European issues in public opinion. It is hard to deny the lack of interest in the European campaign shown by both the Italian political system and the media. If on the media side it is a matter of newsworthiness, on the side of politicians it is the lack of a truly relevant stake. Deeper investigations are nonetheless needed.

Figure 1 The European electoral campaign barometers in the newspapers, television news and web

Source: Osservatorio sulla Comunicazione Politica di Torino
What strikes at first sight is a stable, if not high, tendency of the traditional media system in the treatment of European issues. Though different typologies of news are present, also concerning the social and cultural aspects of European Union, the main focus is on economic and financial issues, as well as the normative relations among member states. The printed press agenda shows a more stable presence of European news than television, thus reinforcing its function in the ‘Europeanization of political information’\(^{30}\). Encouraging as this may be, if we focus on the electoral campaign the previous assessment gets worse, due to the fact that the campaign has been almost absent from traditional media, apart from some peaks during the showgirls affair (ninth week) and the last calls to vote.

The web barometer, instead, shows a better performance, with a continuous growth in user-generated products, as well as in the institutional and news products. The relationship between politics, new media and citizenship is becoming more intense. Actually there are growing signs that public and political debate will increasingly be conducted on line. Most journalists, political parties, politicians, political action committees, organized interest groups and citizens are using the web to mobilize and promote awareness in the public\(^{31}\). In this part of the analysis, however, we have considered the web for its effect of framing\(^{32}\), rather than influencing public opinion and the ability to create a new collective identity.

Incremental data (Figure 2.) better show the almost exponential growth which interested YouTube in particular. The Internet has seemingly filled an information gap left by mainstream media, opening up new spaces for information and discussion on the European elections deadline. The question regarding the web

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potentials for mobilizing political participation has no plain answer. If we look at the turnout rate, we can claim that the Internet has had no mobilizing effect. If however, we take into account the quantity and quality of the discourses circulating online, as will be discussed later, the activation of a powerful frame on Europe emerges.

**Figure 2. The increase of interest about European electoral campaign on the web**

Source: Osservatorio sulla Comunicazione Politica di Torino.

**Table 1. European elections online**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sites</th>
<th>1 March first monitoring</th>
<th>7 June last monitoring</th>
<th>Weekly average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GOOGLE</td>
<td>277,000</td>
<td>588,000</td>
<td>416,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOOGLE NEWS</td>
<td>502</td>
<td>1,785</td>
<td>793</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YOUTUBE</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>1,270</td>
<td>366</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FACEBOOK</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>708</td>
<td>344</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Causes</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Groups</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>237</td>
<td>208</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Osservatorio sulla Comunicazione Politica di Torino

Going back to traditional media, we need to compare the various communication environments and media examined. The newspapers most involved in the European campaign have been “la Stampa” and “Corriere della Sera”. As far as “la Stampa” is concerned, this represents a shift in coverage due to a a new
editor[^33]; for “Corriere della Sera” this rather means a reinforcement of an already established editorial line. Neither “il Giornale” nor “la Repubblica”, two politically oriented newspapers – the former is right-wing, and published by Berlusconi’s brother, while the latter is left-wing oriented – did care much about Europe, nor about the European campaign. Both were more concerned with national politics issues, the first in order to defend Berlusconi, the second in order to press him about his affairs.

**Figure 3. The newspapers’ barometer**

![Barometer Chart](chart.png)

Source: Osservatorio sulla Comunicazione Politica di Torino.

The information provided by TV news was rather poor and superficial, able only to exercise a “spotlight” function: electoral issues are covered, but they are not deepened. The data show low interest in Europe and European elections from TV news – which are, however, more limited by the *par condicio* law[^34] – but also an increasing attention closer to election day, in times of last claims and calls. The less interested broadcaster is Mediaset, founded and controlled by Berlusconi, while the public broadcaster, Rai, has been strongly criticized by minor parties for not fulfilling its public service role. The commitment towards

[^33]: Mario Calabresi replaced Giulio Anselmi as la Stampa editor on 22nd April 2009.

[^34]: The *par condicio* law (28/2000) is aimed at promoting political plurality by guaranteeing all the main majority and opposition political forces to have equal media treatment in terms of space and time during campaigns.
political information by the third broadcaster, Tg7, is instead quite high. To summarize, the TV evening audience was provided insufficient information about European issues and the campaign in the 14 weeks before elections

**Figure 4. The broadcasters’ barometer**

![Figure 4](image)

Source: Osservatorio sulla Comunicazione Politica di Torino.

**Figure 5. The interest about Europe and European elections in the newspapers**

![Figure 5](image)

Source: Osservatorio sulla Comunicazione Politica di Torino.

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35 While the midday editions tended to be more rich of “European” news.
Figure 6. Interest about Europe and European elections in the television news

Source: Osservatorio sulla Comunicazione Politica di Torino.

When analyzed separately, the data on the flow of information products dedicated to Europe and the campaign reinforce the interpretative framework suggested by barometers. Italian political information, especially in the press, sees limited but continuous attention. What was really missing in the 14 weeks of our monitoring was the campaign (Figures 5, 6).

As for the relationship between media coverage and the construction of a public debate on Europe, it is better embedded in opinion journalism (Figure 7). According to the European coverage media trend, journalists in media organizations are fulfilling a ‘dual function’. First, they are seen as mediators of political information from external sources. Here their actions shape the crucial flow of information for national, supranational, and regional politicians. Secondly, journalists could be actors in

their own right, who contribute to processes of opinion-formation by commentating on political affairs. However, to arrive at these ‘outputs’ of political information, it is first necessary to examine the actor-relationships which produce them, both internal and external to the news production process.

The 19% of opinion articles and the 11% of interviews published in the monitored period not only confirm, but also highlight the focus of Italian journalism on Europe mainly directed at economic and intellectual elites and to experts and pundits – this helps explain the interest in opinion articles for economic and policy issues pertaining the EU. The journalism in Italy, however, continues to show a high degree of self-reference in its relation with the political system.\textsuperscript{38} The opinion press is seemingly more concerned with stimulating intra and inter-parties debate, which during campaigns turns into a preference for commenting the candidacies and the controversies on the Election day. Italian journalism is unable to exercise its autonomy concerning European debate.

\textbf{Figure 7. A typology of articles concerned with Europe}

Source: Osservatorio sulla Comunicazione Politica di Torino.

\textsuperscript{38} Carlo Sorrentino, “Italy”, Leen Haenens and Frieda Saeys eds., Western broadcasting at the dawn of the 21st century (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2001) 307-331..
A comparison of newspapers examined confirms the leading role of “Corriere della Sera” and “La Stampa” which encouraged the discussion with their 120 and 105 opinion articles respectively – more than one per day.

**Figure 8 The opinion articles about Europe and European election in the newspapers**

![Image of bar chart showing opinion articles about Europe and European election in newspapers.](image)

Source: Osservatorio sulla Comunicazione Politica di Torino.

Television is less involved in European news also because of its technical nature, complexity and incongruence with television pace; the elections, instead, are better suited for a visual format. Television bulletins are more prone to cover political news when it is met with sensationalism\(^{39}\), so that the facts and the pressure of a campaign offer good news material for television. This doesn’t result, in any growth in the amount of time dedicated to Europe\(^{40}\). The majority of news is short, lasting no longer than two minutes, suggesting once again the spotlight function of television news, which serves to highlight issues rather than frame them.


\(^{40}\) Due to balancing needs of the news product, the amount of time dedicated to European issues is around 5% of the total length, both in campaign and non-campaign periods.
Figure 9 The time of the broadcasters’ television news

Source: Osservatorio sulla Comunicazione Politica di Torino.

In Italy media coverage relating to Europe is slowly increasing. On the one hand there is a routinized news product that continuously monitors EU issues related to economic and legal aspects, and which relies on institutional sources of information. On the other hand, there is a significant interest in Europe found in opinion journalism, oriented at maintaining its role of advocacy, trying to exercise an influence on both the agenda and the political process. About Europe, media discourse doesn’t still focus on those news values that could determine prominence and salience of a news story within information flows. Italian journalism still shows difficulties in coding the European news, which is a substantial precondition for the development of a specific and well-determined genre of news product.

43 Paul Statham, Gray Emily., "Public Debates over Europe in Britain: Exceptional and Conflict-Driven”?, Innovation, 18, (Mar. 2005): 61-81
4. The neglected European election: issues and actors

Analyzing the European issues in the press coverage during the 14 weeks before the election\textsuperscript{45} (table 2) shows the relevance of economic and industry issues, also due to the ongoing crisis. Significant, however, is the number of European issues that functioned as a pretext to discussing Italian politics, confirming the high degree of self-reference between media and the political system. On television, the most covered issue, though superficially, was the campaign, followed by the economy, swine flu, immigration, and security, all themes that have a strong impact on the audience.

Table 2. Issues associated with Europe on press and TV news

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Press</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>TV</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economy and finance</td>
<td>23.17</td>
<td>EUROPEAN ELECTIONS</td>
<td>36.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italian politics</td>
<td>18.94</td>
<td>Economy and finance</td>
<td>15.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign affairs</td>
<td>11.91</td>
<td>Health and sanitary risks</td>
<td>13.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td></td>
<td>Security and immigration</td>
<td>11.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>8.27</td>
<td>Foreign affairs</td>
<td>7.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security and immigration</td>
<td>6.37</td>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>3.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European politics</td>
<td>4.12</td>
<td>European politics</td>
<td>2.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment policies</td>
<td>3.13</td>
<td>Welfare</td>
<td>2.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health and sanitary risks</td>
<td>2.49</td>
<td>Earthquake</td>
<td>2.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welfare</td>
<td>1.93</td>
<td>Employment policies</td>
<td>1.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transports and mobility</td>
<td>1.26</td>
<td>Environmental policies</td>
<td>0.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental policies</td>
<td>1.21</td>
<td>Agriculture and rural policies</td>
<td>0.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice</td>
<td>1.11</td>
<td>Transports and mobility</td>
<td>0.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture and rural policies</td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>Justice</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{45} Press and television data have been weighted according to the length of the article, its degree of elaboration and its visibility for the press; the time of the news for television.
The earthquake in Abruzzo, especially the reconstruction, as well as the debate around “Election Day”, have been framed as European issues. Turning the two into campaign issues, the opposition parties urged the government to include European, local elections and referendum in a single date, using the issue of saving money better employed in the reconstruction.

**Table 3. Elections issues on press and TV**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Press</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>TV</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lists and candidates</td>
<td>30.71</td>
<td>Political programmes</td>
<td>41.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Controversy on Election Day</td>
<td>22.96</td>
<td>Lists and candidates</td>
<td>27.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National politics</td>
<td>11.81</td>
<td>Campaigning events</td>
<td>10.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political programmes</td>
<td>6.84</td>
<td>Coalitions</td>
<td>7.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polls</td>
<td>5.74</td>
<td>Post-elections scenarios</td>
<td>5.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-elections scenarios</td>
<td>4.97</td>
<td>National politics</td>
<td>4.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information on vote</td>
<td>4.59</td>
<td>Information on vote</td>
<td>2.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coalitions</td>
<td>4.15</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaigning events</td>
<td>3.33</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral law</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>4.26</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.00</strong></td>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.00</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Osservatorio sulla Comunicazione Politica di Torino
Further observations when we compare data on political actors with the European issues. First of all, we must highlight how political actors constructing their careers on European issues, such as Emma Bonino of Partito Radicale (PR), were unable to attract media coverage. The Italian political tradition still lacks true political entrepreneurs who are able to influence the public agenda, and not only during campaigns.
The second reflection refers to the increasing bi-polarization, or bi-personalization of the political sphere, embedded in the head of government and the leader of the opposition, so that media are adapting and adopting this change. The result is a media space not evenly distributed between Silvio Berlusconi and Dario Franceschini; as far as Europe and campaign issues are concerned, these two leaders are the only ones to have been granted full coverage of their political communication. The highest rate of visibility of the center-right leader is explained by his institutional function and media charisma. It is also due to his ability (and means) to influence – or control – the Italian media system.

Di Pietro represents the only leadership exception, at least in the press, with his ability to take center stage in the media thanks to his provocative and largely propagandistic claims. The incumbency effect\textsuperscript{46} has offered Berlusconi the opportunity to express opinions not only on the campaign, but also on European and international issues, starting with the G20, where he was noticed, once again, for his gaffes. Finally, we must remark the low visibility of European political actors, which confirms the weak newsworthiness of Europe\textsuperscript{47}.

5. Conclusions

To summarize, the main results of this research could be considered almost contradictory. On the one hand, EP elections in Italy have confirmed the their domestic nature, but some elements suggest that change is taking place below the surface:

a) The Italian case confirms that the hypothesis of a second-order election - three decades after its first formulation - still explains the attitude of political parties, journalists and voters toward the EP elections. Italy is no exception, on the contrary it seems to stress this trend. Turnout rates – although higher than the European average – were 15 percentage points lower than the


\textsuperscript{47} de Vreese, Susan Banducci, Holli Semetko and Hajo A. Boomgaarden, "The news coverage of the 2004 European Parliamentary election campaign in 25 countries".
2008 general elections immediately preceding it, and the most visible political leaders showed scarce interest in dealing with Europe. The earthquake in Abruzzo, revelations about the personal life of Silvio Berlusconi and the combination of local elections in some major cities and regions were the most debated issues during the monitored period. These findings induce considering the 2009 elections among the examples of third-order elections\textsuperscript{48}, because they were even less important than local council elections performed in the same days.

\textit{b)} According with the results of other EU old member states, election news coverage confirms the importance of domestic issues and national political actors. At the same time, data collected and discussed here also show how Europe \textit{per se} has gained a place for itself within the media agenda, though its political dimension still maintains of low interest. Particularly in newspapers Europe \textit{per se} obtains notable coverage: every day an average of 5 articles were published, and about 1 of which being opinion articles. This points to two aspects: while Europe has become a cognitive horizon taken for granted by a significant number of journalists, the information on it remains largely confined to economic and institutional aspects, rather than political ones.

\textit{c)} Data on Italian newspapers, even in an election period, confirm a process of "transnationalization" of public opinion, defined as "an increasing tendency of journalistic circles and the media [...] to deal, in a European perspective, with events and issues of other national contexts"\textsuperscript{49}. However, looking at the newscast data it is evident that this process involves only the insiders and, at least, a competent and interested citizenship.

\textit{d)} Finally, the data on the Web - although further analysis is needed - show the existence of a new space for information and discussion growing alongside the classical coverage of the newspapers. If this trend is confirmed, the peculiarities of the

\textsuperscript{48} Reif, "National Electoral Cycles and European Elections 1979 and 1984".
\textsuperscript{49} Marletti and Mouchon, La costruzione mediatica dell’Europa.
Web access could promote more open access to information on Europe and European elections.

In summary, the analysis of the Italian case shows contrasting results: on the one hand, it confirms the general features of a second-order election, but it also shows that quality press and content gathered on the Web are creating a space of sharing of information on Europe that could involve broader audiences. Before these directions can be confirmed or generalized, it is necessary to verify if similar processes are occurring in other EU countries.

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EUROPEAN ELECTIONS IN THE ITALIAN WEB SPHERE: CAMPAIGNING 2.0?  

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Abstract  
This article investigates the use of web 2.0 during the European elections campaign in Italy. The research was articulated in two phases: an analysis of candidates’ websites and use of web 2.0 tools, on the one hand, and the monitoring of the campaign within social media (Facebook and YouTube). Though a persisting divide exists in the distribution of parties and coalitions online, most candidates who have a personal website have integrated web 2.0 tools. It is seemingly a strategic appropriation and adaptation of web 2.0, resulting in a hybrid communication model, in between 1.0 and 2.0. The campaigning activity on social media, instead, seems innovative insofar as it enables a re-embedding and re-localization of previously centralized and nationally coordinated campaigns.  

Keywords: Internet, web 2.0, Facebook, election campaigns  

1. Introduction  
During the 2008 presidential campaign in the United States, more than half the population (and three quarters of internet users) went online to get news on the campaign, and 59% of internet users received and shared information on the campaign and political messages via email, social network sites (SNS), instant
messaging and SMS\textsuperscript{51}. Although a systematic investigation of “online political users” and their practices during election campaigns is still lacking in the Italian context, nonetheless there are signs of a growing relevance of the internet as a source of political information, and of social network sites as a place for sharing political messages and mobilizing offline activities. As regards political information, according to a recent survey on news media consumption, 34.7\% of the entire population (58.9\% of those aged 15-24, and 60.2\% of those aged 25-34 years old) trusts the internet as the most independent source of information\textsuperscript{52}. Meanwhile, political uses of social network sites are also increasing, as the case of the No-B Day has recently shown\textsuperscript{53}.

These practices are part of the emerging “convergence culture”\textsuperscript{54} which is significantly altering the boundaries between the production and consumption of media content: thanks to the applications usually labelled as “web 2.0” and characterised by an “architecture of participation”\textsuperscript{55}, users are increasingly co-producers or “produsers”\textsuperscript{56} in that they tend to share, manipulate and re-assemble media content, or produce a consistent amount

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{52} Demos & Pi, XXIII Osservatorio sul Capitale Sociale degli Italiani. Gli italiani e l’informazione (Demos & Pi, 2009) [report online]; available at ww.demos.it/a00355.php  
\textsuperscript{53} No-B Day (No Berlusconi Day) was a demonstration organized by a group of bloggers through a Facebook group (called “Una manifestazione nazionale per chiedere le dimissioni di Berlusconi” and counting 370.519 members) and a website (www.noberlusconiday.org). It originated against the Prime Minister’s attempts to pass laws giving himself (and some other top Italian officials) immunity from prosecution, and called for Berlusconi’s resignation. The demonstration, which took place in several Italian cities and abroad on December 5th 2009, mobilized around one million people (350.000 only in Rome), gave rise to the so-called Purple Movement, still active in the defence of the Italian Constitution, and in reporting the Prime Minister’s involvement in several trials.  
\textsuperscript{54} Henry Jenkins, Convergence Culture: Where Old and New Media Collide, (New York: NYU Press, 2006).  
\textsuperscript{56} Alex Bruns, Blogs, Wikipedia, Second Life, and Beyond: From Production to Produsage (New York: Peter Lang, 2008).
\end{flushleft}
of user generated content (UGC) online. These grassroots practices are changing audiences’ relationships not only with cultural industries and their products, but also with politics and traditional social institutions57.

For politicians, web 2.0 and social media represent a further public space to disseminate their political messages and to reach the dispersed audiences: since the last presidential campaign in the U.S. a vast array of candidates and politicians in Western democracies have opened a profile in Facebook or Twitter and have incorporated web 2.0 tools in their websites. At the same time, nonetheless, these new media pose some challenges to the traditional styles and patterns of political communication. As some recent studies on the use of web 2.0 by political parties in European countries point out58, what is under threat is precisely the control over the flow of information traditionally held by parties or candidates in their top-down communication process.

Drawing on the robust literature on the use of new technologies during election campaigns59, and having its roots in the field of internet studies, this article aims to provide a picture of the electoral web sphere surrounding the 2009 European elections campaign. To answer this question, we investigated two related aspects of the relationship between social media and politics: on

57 Jenkins, Convergence Culture.
the one hand we provided an analysis of the online presence of candidates from the main parties and coalitions running for a seat in the European Parliament; on the other we mapped the social discourses around the campaign issues and political messages concerning the EP elections which were disseminated in social media, and especially on Facebook. The choice to focus on Facebook is stems from its wide adoption by Italian internet users: this social network site, the most popular in Italy, has grown exponentially in 2008, increasing its community from the 216,000 registered users at the end of January 2008 to the 10,047,580 members at June 2009.

Candidates’ websites and blogs have been monitored during the campaign (from the end of April to the first half of June) and then again between September and October, in order to distinguish among still active sites, inactive ones and those no longer online. We analysed the websites produced by political candidates for the EP elections following - and adapting to the Italian electoral system and campaign context - the features which Xenos and Foot recognize as distinctive of a “web campaigning activity” as opposed to a more traditional online transposition of offline campaigning tools and practices. The authors identify some specific features of political candidates’ online communication that manifest a deeper understanding of the web and a more sophisticated use of its potentials, while a variety of online campaigning activities represent still a mere adaptation of traditional campaigning to the web environment. Analysing and comparing how Italian candidates use the web and adopt web 2.0 tools leads to identify a continuum of political websites according to their degree of interactivity - and the degree of users’ participation to the production of content that

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60 The Facebook community is still growing: it reached 12,450,000 members at the end of October, half of the internet population in Italy. These data are provided by Facebook ads.

61 The final sample includes both active and inactive websites and blogs, with the exception of those which have been deactivated after summer 2009.


63 Michael Xenos and Kirsten Foot, “Not your father’s internet”, 58.
the sites affords - and multimediality – the extent to which they combine textual and audiovisual materials to form a multimodal communication.

Facebook data were identified on the basis of a search through the descriptor “European elections 2009” and monitored during a three month period (March - June 2009). The data collected consisted of Facebook groups, causes and events, and were analysed combining quantitative and qualitative analysis in order to draw a comprehensive picture of the representation of the campaign in Facebook. Our goal was to identify the issues, actors and voices represented, the relationship between issues debated online and those in the media agenda, and the involvement of Italian citizens in the EP elections.

2. The 2009 European Election in Italy: an overview

Italian citizens voted for electing the 72 Italian new members of the European Parliament (MEPs) the 6th and 7th of June. The electoral law foresees a proportional method with the possibility of indicating candidates’ names (the number of possible preferences is different among the five Italian electoral districts) and it also indicates the minimum percentage of vote (4%) necessary to a party to elect its candidates.

Only five parties obtained more than 4% of votes: Popolo della Libertà (PdL, the centre-right party of the Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi) 35.2% - 26 elected candidates – Partito Democratico (PD, the main centre-left party) 26.1% - 21 elected MEPs – Lega Nord (LN, the right party that governs together with PdL) 10.2 % - 9 elected candidates – Italia dei Valori (IdV, the single issue party manly focused on justice that is part of the opposition to the Government) 8% - 7 elected candidates – and Unione di Centro (Udc, the Catholic centre wing party opposing the Government) 6.51% - 5 elected MPs.

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We will focus here on Facebook groups, since events primarily promoted offline campaigns activities, while causes were only 16, poorly supported, and largely overlapped with the most debated issues in groups.
In our study we analysed also three other parties: Rifondazione Comunista\(^{65}\) (RC, the main left wing party, not represented in the Italian Parliament) 3,3%, Sinistra e Libertà (SeL, a left wing party, born from formerly Rifondazione Comunista, Comunisti Italiani, Verdi – the Green party – and left Pd members) 3,1%, Lista Bonino-Pannella (the Radical Party) 2,4%.

### 3. Lost in technology. Italian candidates on the web

#### Table 1. Online candidates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Online</th>
<th>Website</th>
<th>Blog</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PD</td>
<td>79,16%</td>
<td>78,94%</td>
<td>21,05%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDL</td>
<td>66,17%</td>
<td>91,11%</td>
<td>8,88%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDC</td>
<td>36,11%</td>
<td>88,46%</td>
<td>11,53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LN</td>
<td>22,72%</td>
<td>93,33%</td>
<td>6,66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IdV</td>
<td>75,92%</td>
<td>65,85%</td>
<td>34,14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SeL</td>
<td>40,90%</td>
<td>62,96%</td>
<td>37,03%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRC</td>
<td>26,47%</td>
<td>66,66%</td>
<td>33,33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radical</td>
<td>14,81%</td>
<td>25,00%</td>
<td>75,00%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The analysis of the online presence of candidates in the 2009 European election shows a scarce use of the Internet: a result that Italian candidates share with Italian and foreigners parties studied in previous works\(^{66}\). Nonetheless, there is a growth in comparison to the last European election in 2004, when only the 19.7% of the candidates were online\(^{67}\).

\(^{65}\) In 2009 European Election Rifondazione Comunista was part of a coalition in which there were also two other left wing parties, Sinistra Europea (European Left) and Comunisti Italiani (Italian Comunists).


\(^{67}\) Sara Bentivegna, Campagne elettorali: 14.
The low online presence of candidates is not homogeneous across different parties. This confirms, on the one hand, that parties which were already more present online are still the most represented on the Internet and so have a greater familiarity with the medium. This results in a kind of “political digital divide” among parties, already pointed out in other studies. On the other hand, our findings demonstrate that the relationship politicians have with the web still fits a traditional model of political communication, mainly focused on a top-down unidirectional diffusion of contents. Furthermore, the resistance, or scarcity, of direct interaction with the public is also confirmed by the infrequent use of blogs.

Table 3. The “web campaigning” (most relevant data)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>PDL</th>
<th>PD</th>
<th>IDV</th>
<th>UDC</th>
<th>LN</th>
<th>PRC</th>
<th>SeL</th>
<th>Radical</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
<th>% (n=257)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Link to the party’s web site</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>61,6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Link to external web sites</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>63,7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Link to candidate’s page on Facebook, Twitter</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>52,7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Audiovisual materials</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>64,1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capability of linking articles to visitors’ site/ Facebook/Twitter</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>9,2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Branding</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>7,1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The same communicative model persists when looking at the adoption of “web campaigning” tools. As a matter of fact there is a gap between a minority of candidates who use a variety of resources in a synergic and sophisticated and a majority of them who incorporate in their sites some web 2.0 tools and use them in a superficial way. In our sample, the most common tools of “web

68 Sara Bentivegna, Campagne elettorali.
70 Nigel Jackson and Darren Lilleker, “Building an architecture of participation?”; Cristian Vaccari, “Internet e partecipazione”.
71 The coding table included more aspects and features of candidates’ websites, but we preferred to focus here only on those related to web 2.0 and the level of participation afforded to users. For more information on the database, please write the authors.
campaigning” are the presence of links to external sites different from the one of the candidate’s party and the availability of audiovisual material (used in 63.7% of sites and blogs), the link to the party’s web site (61.6%), the link to the candidate’s profile on two of the most famous SNS, Facebook and Twitter (52.3%). This is an interesting element because it remarks the importance the SNS gained in a short period of time even among politicians. Nonetheless their use seems to be in relation with the need of creating the illusion of a closeness with citizens: in fact, only 9.28% of candidates fully exploits the capabilities of SNS to spread messages in a viral way by introducing the possibility of linking sites’ or blogs’ contents to visitors’ pages on Facebook and Twitter. Also the chance of branding other web pages with candidate’s promotional materials – that is part of the same viral diffusion mechanisms typical of the online “world of mouth” – is scarcely used (7.1%).

The “web campaign” is mostly used by PD’s candidates and, in a short distance, by those of IdV, while these tools are less common among PdL’s candidates. This result makes possible to hypothesize, at least in the case of PD, the existence of a centralized strategy in the candidates’ use of the Internet. The IdV’s performance on the web can be explained also by the “historical” online presence of its leader.

In evaluating the PdL’s online campaign it is important to point out that, since the party is characterised by a strong and well identified leadership, it has a strong interest in concentrating attention on its leader. In fact, Silvio Berlusconi does not have a personal web site since it coincides with the PdL’s site, but his name is present in a number of official fandom sites that echo the party line72.

72 Such examples are www.silvioberlusconifanclub.org and www.forzasilvio.it. The community www.forzasilvio.it had regular and intense activity during the electoral campaign. After the campaign, activity became more sporadic and linked to critical political moments such as the failure of Lodo Alfano (the law to guarantee immunity to the four most important offices of the State, including the Prime Minister) by the Constitutional Court (October 6th, 2009) and the wounding of Silvio Berlusconi in Milan (December 13th, 2009).
Finally, by analysing the distribution of the use of the web 2.0 among parties, we see that the most active candidates in online campaigning are those who already are the best known nationally: thus they reinforce their popularity also by using the Internet.

4. The discourses on the European Elections campaign in web 2.0

Table 3. Groups on Facebook

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group's typology</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>members at 3/03/09</th>
<th>members at 5/04/09</th>
<th>members at 3/05/09</th>
<th>members at 7/06/09</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>In support of candidates</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>369</td>
<td>1.360</td>
<td>11.097</td>
<td>19.778</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In support of political parties and movements</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>5.752</td>
<td>8.292</td>
<td>24.842</td>
<td>29.572</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>single issues</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>14.244</td>
<td>34.568</td>
<td>58.064</td>
<td>62.902</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

During the three month period of our monitoring, from the beginning of March to June the 7th, 410 groups concerning the European elections were born in Facebook: the vast majority (265 groups) were minor groups, counting less than one hundred members; 130 groups’ users were in between one hundred and one thousand; and only 22 groups could count on more than one thousand members. The above table shows the main categories of groups, with groups supporting single candidates and those debating single issues prevailing over groups campaigning for political parties or political movements. The remaining 72 groups were parodist or offensive groups, while others were only partially related to EP elections. The emerging picture, then, is that of a high fragmentation of the discourses related to the EP elections in a variety of groups and themes. A deeper analysis, nonetheless, highlights how the greater participation – that is the number of members joining groups - and the majority of groups deal with a few specific issues.

73 We labelled political movement associations – such as the Italian Movement for Disabled People, whose group was the fifth largest with 5,336 members – or ideological groups – such as the group calling for a single radical right-wing coalition- not referring to a single party.

74 It is the case of groups dealing with local elections, which took place in several cities and areas on the same day. Indeed many groups referred to the “European and local elections” while concerning the local dimension only.
The topics and actors represented in the single issue groups challenge the idea of social media as constituting an ‘alternative’ public sphere: indeed, the most discussed issues largely reproduce the media agenda in the weeks before elections. The largest groups, respectively the first (European Elections + Referendum: against waste75) and the third (Join elections and referendum on 6-7 June/let’s save 400 million euros!76), counting 19,081 and 11,611 members, were born just immediately after the earthquake in Abruzzo on April 6th to promote an election day which combined European elections, local elections and a referendum to devolve the conspicuous sum that could be saved for the reconstruction of L’Aquila and its surroundings. The earthquake represented a turning point in the discussions on the electoral campaign both offline and online.

A second major issue is represented by the controversial candidacy of the Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi, who chose to run for the European Parliament (EP) as leader of the PdL in spite of his institutional role. This choice produced a split in public opinion, divided among those supporting and those against his candidacy. On Facebook the opponents prevailed, with the group “we are not going to vote for Berlusconi at the European Elections”77 growing exponentially from 232 members registered in the first week of April to the 11,961 participants by June 7th and taking second place among the most popular groups, and the group “Those who will NOT vote for Silvio at next European elections”78 counting 3,904 members and being the seventh most populated group. Also popular was the quest for legality and opposition to political corruption, embodied in the groups in support of De Magistris79 or Rita Borsellino’s80 candidacies; in groups against the candidacy of convicted or investigated

75 The original title is: “Europee+referendum: contro gli sprechi”.
76 The original title is: “Unificare elezioni e referendum 6-7giugno! Risparmiamo 400Miliioni di euro!”
77 Original title: “Alle elezioni Europee noi NON VOTIAMO BERLUSCONI!!!!”
78 Original title: “Quelli che alle prossime elezioni europee NON voteranno per Silvio!”
79 Luigi de Magistris is a former prosecutor, well-known for his involvement in trials against political corruption which involved well-known civil society actors.
80 Rita Borsellino is the sister of a former judge killed by mafia.
politicians; and in the “meta-group” gathering all groups in support of Marco Travaglio. Overall, these data are consistent with much of the research on EP election campaigns, underscoring how the main focus in both the campaign and its media coverage tends to be on national issues, or on European issues framed in a national perspective. Once again this deadline has proven to be a pretext to continue discussion of national issues and to assess the popularity of the government.

Turning to the other two main typologies of groups, as in mainstream media, so in Facebook, the activity of campaigning in support of single candidacies or political parties gained visibility only in May. Among these more campaign-oriented groups, we can note a stronger success achieved by radical left-wing parties and extreme right-wing parties: the official group of Sinistra e Libertà reached 9,511 members, and the group supporting the Lista comunista e anticapitalista (PRC and PDCI) 4,570 members, while the group invoking a single extreme right list declined in popularity during the monitoring, stopping at 2,356. This means that minor and extra-parliamentary parties, and minor political orientations, were overrepresented compared to PdL, Pd, Lega Nord and Idv, whose candidates won a seat in the European Parliament. Therefore, the higher visibility and participation gained by the above mentioned groups suggests that Facebook users, at least those interested in the EP campaign, tended to clump around either the ‘radical left’ or the ‘radical right’ pole. These findings are consistent with studies on the representation of different political orientations in the blogosphere, which highlight the political polarization of internet political users, or, alternatively, the social media’s potential for reinforcing pre-existing political polarization.

81 He is a popular Italian journalist, whose main areas of interest have been political and judiciary issues. He became well-known for his participation in popular talk shows and for investigating Berlusconi’s business.
82 Giorgio Grossi, L’Europa degli italiani. L’Italia degli europei (Roma: Rai/Vqpt. 1996); Cees van der Eijk and Mark Franklin, eds., Choosing Europe? The European electorate and national politics in the face of Union (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1995).
Regarding single candidates’ campaigning, as already mentioned, strong visibility was reached by Rita Borsellino and De Magistris. Candidates from Pd and PdI were also well represented, as were candidates from Lega Nord and UDC, perhaps balancing their otherwise low effort in “institutional” web campaigning with profiles and groups in Facebook. This use of social network sites by otherwise invisible candidates, and the low membership their supporting groups reach – usually under one hundred members – also suggest that in political communication, as well as in interpersonal relationships, social network sites tend to be used to communicate with one’s extended social network, that is people with whom someone has an offline connection. These groups are strongly localized, thus enabling local candidates, who have limited, if any, visibility at the national level and in mainstream media, to manage a low-cost, highly personalized campaign. In this respect, the use of social media balances the trend of previous electoral campaigns, which have been deeply de-territorialized and centralized in recent years due to the transformations of the Italian electoral system and political communication, by re-localizing them. This is one side of the potential “e-ruption” enabled by the adoption of web 2.0 in political communication: a potentially disruptive effect in that it undermines the centralization of parties’ campaigning activities, coordinated and organized at a national level, while giving back to single candidates the management of a localized and personalized campaign now conducted both online and offline.

5. Conclusive remarks

The European elections campaign in Italy has been characterised by a persisting divide, at both a quantitative and qualitative level,


85 Sara Bentivegna, Campagne elettorali in rete, (Bari: Laterza, 2006).

86 Øyvind Kalnes, "Norwegian parties and web 2.0".
among political candidates and parties in their use of the web. Nonetheless, this campaign has also witnessed a strong popularity of social media tools, especially *Facebook* profiles, among candidates’ online activities.

The adoption of new media doesn’t imply, *per se*, more efficient communication nor improved or transformed campaigning communicative models\(^87\). Web 2.0 main features – namely the convergence of production and consumption, and the emerging participatory culture\(^88\) – are visibly conflicting with a traditional political communication model understood as a top-down one-way flow of information. Web 2.0 has the potential to radically change this well-established model at least along two lines: vertically, in that it creates a two-way flow of communication where citizens are empowered and become co-producers of content; and horizontally, in the management of the campaign activity, in that national organizations abdicate control and management of the campaign to local party branches. Considering these two potential disruptive impacts of social media on political communication, the monitoring of European elections online in Italy provides some evidence of the use of web 2.0 as a tool for re-localizing campaign and empowering less visible, local political candidates. As far as communication among political actors and citizens is concerned, instead, we can observe a persisting gap of interactivity and participation when comparing the online communication strategies produced by candidates and the grassroots practices that social media users usually engage in. As Coleman and Blumler put it, “one of the most common mistakes made by top-down political leaders is to imagine online communication as a form of broadcasting”\(^89\). Candidates seem to strategically adopt and adapt web 2.0 infrastructure and tools, without losing control over the communication flow: what emerges is a hybrid online presence, which has been successfully

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\(^{87}\) Sara Bentivegna, *Campagne elettorali in rete*, 36.

\(^{88}\) Henry Jenkins, *Convergence Culture*.

labelled as “web 1.5”\textsuperscript{90}. Web 1.5 refers to the “extensive use of the architecture of participation, but much less use of the community’s democratic structure”\textsuperscript{91}.

Looking at the EP elections’ representation in Facebook, we have seen that groups tend to replicate online the key issues of the campaign offline – and its coverage in mainstream media – and to mobilize participation only in relation to domestic problems. Besides the persistent use of the campaign as a pretext to discuss national issues, the analysis of Facebook groups reveals another characteristic of the “second-order”\textsuperscript{92} nature of the European elections: the limited involvement of citizens, reflected in the low number of members who joined these groups, when compared to other online mobilization\textsuperscript{93}.

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\textsuperscript{93} As the No-B Day movement, and the student movement in Autumn 2008.


“DOUBLE ELECTIONS” AS A CONTEXT OF POLITICAL COMMUNICATION
ANALYZING THE 2005 PARLIAMENTARY AND PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ADVERTISING IN POLAND.

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Abstract

While much scholarship on political advertising examines regular presidential or parliamentary campaigns, less is known about how a context of “double elections” may influence the format and content of political advertising. This study attempts to fill this gap through quantitative and qualitative content analysis of the 2005 Polish parliamentary and presidential campaign ads. Specifically, we examined strategies used by political parties and presidential candidates to take advantage of the simultaneous presidential and parliamentary campaigns. Previous studies on Polish parliamentary and presidential campaigns have revealed that political parties might influence not only the process of a candidate’s nomination, but also the way candidates are presented in campaign messages. This study shows that once these two types of the elections are set within the frame of a few weeks, parliamentary elections seem to be of greater significance to political actors, while presidential campaigns are perceived as just an additional opportunity for political parties to promote themselves.

Keywords: election campaign, political advertising, political communication, political actors.

1. Introduction

Although the history of modern democracy in post–communist countries is quite short, its mechanisms and instruments have been eagerly adopted by political actors. In Poland, political advertising was introduced as early as 1990, during the first free presidential election campaign after the communist regime collapsed in 1989. After almost five decades of a monopoly of the 202
Having none of their own traditions in modern political communication, Polish political actors quite frequently followed the patterns originating in the U.S., Great Britain, or France\(^1\). While in the 1990s some political actors were advised by foreign spin doctors (for example, in 1995 presidential candidate Aleksander Kwaśniewski was advised by Jacques Segue, previously employed by Francois Mitterand), nowadays they employ domestic political marketing advisers who were actually trained by foreign spin doctors\(^2\). Not surprisingly, a few Polish scholars in their analyses of the Polish political spots recognized several strategies and techniques previously used by American presidential candidates and the leaders of Western European political parties\(^3\).

On the other hand, in Poland one could observe some specific features of post-communist countries, namely instability of the

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political market and political identification of voters⁴. Furthermore, after a short period of social enthusiasm caused by the change of the political regime, a decent part of society felt disappointed and became fairly passive⁵. Since the late 1990s, more and more individuals have been loosing their interest and trust in political parties⁶. However, since other types of political and civic organizations are still underdeveloped, political parties have played a crucial role in political communication⁷.

Thus, a vast majority of previous studies on Polish political campaigns have explored the directions of political market development, the relations between political parties and candidates and the predominant influence of political parties on the content of campaign messages in every kind of election⁸.

In 2005, because of a particular schedule of parliamentary and presidential elections, both Polish political actors and society faced the challenge of “double elections” for the first time since the political system's transformation in 1989. The fact that two

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elections took place in the same year was a consequence of the simultaneous end of the president’s and parliament’s terms, while the accumulation of the campaigns was a result of the political decision made by two parties governing in 2005, namely Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej (Democratic Left Alliance) and Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe (Polish People’s Party). Specifically, the parliamentary election was set for the 25th of September 2005, with the presidential election on the 9th of October. Due to the Polish election law, parties could officially advertise from September 9th–23rd, and presidential candidates from September 24–October 7.

The idea of back-to-back elections were not popular in public opinion. Once the decision was announced, 62 percent of the voters felt disappointed and 76 percent agreed that politicians had made the decision exclusively according to their own interests. Voters had expected to have parliamentary elections in the spring of 2005, and the presidential election that fall9.

While much political advertising scholarship examines regular presidential or parliamentary elections, less is known about how the context of simultaneous campaigns may influence the format and content of political advertising. The 2005 elections case created an unprecedented opportunity to examine strategies used by political parties and presidential candidates to take advantage of an unusual situation. Thus, this study attempts to fill this gap through quantitative and qualitative content analysis of the 2005 Polish parliamentary and presidential campaign ads.

The aim of this study is to examine the impact of the 'double elections' on the content of Polish election campaign programs and spots. In particular, the analysis addresses two main research areas:

Q1: What strategies did political parties and presidential candidates use to take advantage of the ‘double elections’ situation used?

9 Krzysztof Pankowski, Polacy o jesiennym terminie wyborów [Polish people about voting in fall], Centrum Badań Opinii Społecznej, No. 3291/2005.
Q2: To what extent did political parties dominate the content of campaign messages?

In order to understand the results, we need to put them into a broader political context. Hence, in the next section, I will provide some basic information about political actors and a legal framework of political advertising. Then, I will present the theoretical background to my study and follow it with the results of the previous empirical studies of Polish political communication. Based on that background, I will suggest two major research questions and two hypotheses. In the following sections, I will present the results of the study, the limitations and conclusions, with directions for further research.

2. Context of Polish elections and campaigns

Political system and election system

One of the distinctive features of post-communist countries in the early 1990s was the rapid vivacity of the political market. Once the communist regime collapsed, numerous previously illegal political organizations decided to register themselves as regular political parties, and even more newly established political actors entered the scene. As a result, in 1991 as many as 24 parties or political organizations entered parliament. The next stage was the stabilization of the political scene resulting in only 8 political organizations having their representatives in Sejm (a lower chamber of the Polish parliament) in 1993. From 1997–2005, the number of political organizations represented in parliament was usually around 6.

It is worth mentioning that most of the current political parties have been built on previously existing coalitions or a single organizations operating under different labels. Today, with a broad spectrum of political orientations and several right and left-
wing political parties and a few more at the centre being represented in parliament, the Polish political market may be characterized as a stable multi-party system.

On the other hand, in the previous two decades of democratic regime in Poland, every single parliamentary election resulted in the opposition taking power, with Aleksander Kwaśniewski as the only president who has been re-elected (in 2000). It seems that Polish voters express their distrust and disappointment as soon as possible, giving no opportunity to those who in power to further their agendas. Not surprisingly though, political parties change their labels quite frequently and eagerly adapt their politics to the current social expectations and needs, hoping for a new chance\textsuperscript{13}. Consequently, the level of competition between political parties is high enough to discourage them from building a tradition of long-standing coalitions.

Despite the significant distrust of political parties in Poland, they are still dominant factors in all political processes. Since other political and civil organizations are still not well developed and established, individual political careers (including winning presidential elections) are almost unthinkable without support of a political party. Those political parties that have obtained at least 3\% of votes draw financial support from the state budget. Consequently, they can afford to establish themselves in most regions of the country (usually based in the offices of actual Members of Parliament). Therefore, political parties not only provide financial and logistic support for their candidates, they also play a crucial role in the process of candidate selection and nomination in all elections, including presidential ones\textsuperscript{14}.

Since political parties in Poland have not frequently used primary elections, a party leader, in a vast majority of cases, gets the nomination. Despite opinion polls that clearly show some candidates may have less than 1 percent of votes, political leaders still participate in elections to take advantage of the opportunity to present themselves and their parties in the media.

\textsuperscript{13} Wiatr, Narodziny i przemiany, 181 – 182.
\textsuperscript{14} Dziemidok, Partie polityczne, 9 – 43. Stępińska, Marketingowe strategie wyborcze, 93 – 101.
As a result, 26 of a total number of 52 candidates (50%) who ran for the Polish presidency from 1990 to 2005 were party leaders or party members, 23% were officially supported by political parties despite not being a party leader or even a member, and 13% might have been regarded as being politically independent, although two of them were indirectly and unofficially supported by some political organizations or groups\textsuperscript{15}.

In the 2005 parliamentary elections, 18 political parties and organizations registered their lists of candidates and at the beginning of the presidential race there were 16 candidates on the electoral list. Two candidates resigned a few weeks into their campaigns (Zbigniew Religa and Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz) and one candidate, Daniel Podrzycki, died in a car accident right before the presidential campaign in the media had started. One more candidate, Maciej Giertych, resigned during the final stage of the presidential campaign.

Table 1 traces the relations between political parties (column A) and presidential candidates (column B). It clearly shows that as many as 11 out of 16 (69%) registered presidential candidates had strong political party ties: 9 candidates were either current or former leaders of the political parties and one candidate was a party member.

Table 1. Relations between political parties and presidential candidates in 2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political party (A)</th>
<th>Presidential candidate (B)</th>
<th>Relations between (A) and (B)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (Law and Justice) – PiS</td>
<td>Lech Kaczyński</td>
<td>„Honorary Chairman”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Platforma Obywatelska (Civic Platform) - PO</td>
<td>Donald Tusk</td>
<td>Leader of the party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socjaldemokracja Polska (Social Democracy of</td>
<td>Marek Borowski</td>
<td>Leader of the party</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{15} Stępińska, Wizerunek, program, czy partia?, 185.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party Name</th>
<th>Leader/Member</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Poland) – SdPL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samoobrona (Self-Defence)</td>
<td>Andrzei Lepper Leader of the party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe (Polish People’s Party) – PSL</td>
<td>Jaroslaw Kalinowski Former leader of the party, party member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Konfederacja Polski Niepodlegléj (Confederation of Independent Poland) – KPN</td>
<td>Adam Słomka Leader of the party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polska Partia Narodowa (Polish National Party) – PPN</td>
<td>Leszek Bubel Leader of the party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liga Polskich Rodzin (League of Polish Families) - LPR</td>
<td>Maciej Giertych Member of the party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>Stanislaw Tymiński Candidate supported by Ogólnopolska Koalicja Obywatelska (Polish Civic Coalition)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>Henryka Bochniarz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>Liwiusz Ilasz -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>Jan Pyszko A chairman of Polsko – Polonijna Organizacja Narodu Polskiego – Liga Polska (Polish Emigrants’ Organization of Polish Nation – Polish League)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Platforma Janusza Korwin – Mikke (Janusz Korwin – Mikke’s Platform)</td>
<td>Janusz Korwin – Mikke Leader of the party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Polska Partia Pracy (Polish Labor Party) – PPP</td>
<td>Daniel Podrzycki Leader of the party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej (Democratic Left Alliance) – SLD</td>
<td>Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz Supported by the party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>Zbigniew Religa -</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Stepinska, Wizerunek, program, czy partia?, 185.*
Besides political parties mentioned in the first column (A) of Table 1, there were several other parties participating in the parliamentary elections in 2005, namely: Partia Demokratyczna – demokraci.pl (Democratic Party – democrats.pl), Ruch Patriotyczny (Patriotic Movement), Ogólnopolska Koalicja Obywatelska (Polish Civic Coalition), Dom Ojczysty (Motherland’s House), Polska Konfederacja “Godność i Praca” (Polish Confederation “Dignity and Labor”), Centrum (Center), Inicjatywa RP (RP Initiative), Narodowe Odrodzenie Polski (National Revival of Poland). The opinion poll results showed that each of them might achieve less than 3 percent of votes in the elections.16 As early as 2004 the competition between two right-wing political parties, Platforma Obywatelska (PO) and Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (PiS), became the pivot of the forthcoming campaign. Both of them were targeting similar groups of voters and their potential presidential candidates: Donald Tusk (a leader of PO) and Lech Kaczyński (a 'Honorary Chairman' of PiS) seemed to be the obvious main rivals. Once they officially decided to run for presidency, it became clear that the intensity of competition between the parties would double in the presidential race.

On the left, there were two major competing parties: Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej (SLD) – a party launched by the former communist politicians soon after the communist party was dissolved, and Socjaldemokracja Polska (SdPL), launched in 2004, after a split off from the SLD. Another significant participant of the 2005 elections was Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe (PSL), traditionally and currently representing mostly farmers. Two more parties that entered parliament were the conservative right-wing Liga Polskich Rodzin (LPR) and the populist Samoobrona.

2.1 The legal framework of political advertising in Poland

It is worth mentioning that in Poland two types of broadcast advertising are distinguished: unpaid programs and paid spots. Political actors are allowed to purchase airtime in both
commercial and public electronic media to broadcast their spots up to 15 days prior to the final 24 hours before election day. The programs, on the contrary, are broadcast exclusively on public radio and TV stations (again, 15 days prior to the 24 hours before election day).

Interestingly, originally the election regulations did not mention commercial political advertisement at all. Although political ads have been broadcast since the mid-1990s in Poland, it was not until the parliamentary election of 2001 when paid and unpaid political advertisements were clearly defined in the Polish election law\(^\text{17}\). Today, the election law regulates most of the aspects, including a period of broadcast, allocation of free broadcast time on public television and radio stations and the rules of purchasing advertising time in both types of media.

As far as programs are concerned, regulations of the allocation of broadcast give an equal amount of time to all political parties and presidential candidates that have successfully gone through a process of registration. In the parliamentary elections to the Sejm, according to the election law, all registered election committees share a total number of 15 hours of free airtime on the national public TV stations and 30 hours on the national public radio plus 10 hours of free airtime on the regional public TV stations and 15 hours on the regional radio. Candidates to the Senat (the upper chamber) share 5 hours on the national TV stations and 10 hours on the radio stations plus 3 hours on the regional TV stations and 6 hours on the regional radio\(^\text{18}\).

In presidential elections the general rules are the same (period, equal access and airtime allocation), but the number of hours are different. Namely, before the first turn of voting, presidential candidates share 25 hours of free airtime on the public TV stations and 35 hours on the radio stations, while before the second turn of voting the numbers are as following: 6 hours on

\(^{17}\) Stępińska, Marketingowe strategie wyborcze, 115 - 116.

TV, 8 hours on the radio stations. As a result, an actual amount of time given to political parties or presidential candidates varies every time, depending upon the number of political actors in the race.

Furthermore, unpaid political advertisements are broadcast in blocks of programs without any break and a sequence of the ads’ presentation is fixed by drawing lots. The content of an ad may not be questioned or changed without a court’s permission. Consequently, political parties and presidential candidates may prepare their campaign messages freely in order to meet their objectives by using a variety of techniques. What is required by the election law is a sponsor identification note in every advertising.

Since the campaign programs are broadcast as sets of messages at a particular period of the airtime (usually twice a day) on the public electronic media, only those who are indeed interested in this type of campaign message watch them and the average audience rate is about 2 to 5 percent. On the other hand, these are much longer than paid spots. For example, in the 2005 parliamentary election campaign, every program took about 4 minutes.

The paid spots, on the contrary, are broadcast among commercial advertisements during selected periods, including the 'prime time' before or after popular newscasts or movies. Therefore, a potential and actual audience rate is much higher than that of programs. However, since the airtime must be purchased, the mean duration of one message is 20 to 30 seconds.

Paid campaign spots may be used in any kind of campaigns. However, there are still some regulations that limit not only the period of broadcasting paid ads, but also the amount of money

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20 Stępińska, Marketingowe strategie wyborcze, 113.
21 Ibid., 220.
22 Ibid.
that may be spent on a campaign (including advertising) and even prices (they must not be higher than 50 percent of the regular price of commercials). The aim of these regulations is not to give the bigger, richer and already established parties an advantage over smaller competitors and newcomers\textsuperscript{23}.

The election law prohibits candidates from making false or deceptive claims. While it may be difficult to distinguish truth from falsity, courts are expected to make every effort to determine whether a statement was false or misleading should a candidate or party feel offended or accused. In such a case, the legal procedure implemented by the court is shorter than a regular one in order to stop illegal activity as soon as possible\textsuperscript{24}.

Additionally, during the last twenty-four hours prior to elections, any campaigning and canvassing in favor of a presidential candidate or political party is prohibited. Results of election polls are not be published at that time as well\textsuperscript{25}. It is worth mentioning that the scheduling of the 2005 elections put this particular regulation in jeopardy. Since the last 24 hours of the parliamentary campaign were actually the first 24 hours of the presidential campaign, candidates running for presidency (especially those with party ties) faced a difficult situation. Eventually, all of them decided to postpone their campaign until the Monday after the parliamentary elections.

3. Theoretical framework

Because of the long tradition and pervasiveness of political advertising in American campaigns, there has been much research on political campaign messages in the United States. The results of that research, followed by the conclusions from the studies conducted in the Western European countries, led to some conceptions of modern political communication. In particular, there are several key concerns that have dominated studies of

\textsuperscript{23} \citet{stepinska:2014a}, Marketingowe strategie wyborcze, 114.
\textsuperscript{24} \citet{sobczak:2014a}, Wolność słowa w kampaniach wyborczych [Freedom of expression in election campaigns] In Marketing polityczny. Szansa czy zagrożenie, 53 – 70.
\textsuperscript{25} \citet{ustawa:2014a}, Ustawa o wyborze Prezydenta RP.
the content of political advertising, namely issue versus image content and negative versus positive content.

3.1 Issues versus Images

No topic has been more dominant over five decades of research on political advertising than the discussion of whether or not campaign spots are dominated by issues information or image information. One of the perennial criticisms of television advertising in politics is that it trivializes political discourse by concentrating on candidates’ personalities and images rather than on issues. Interestingly enough, it seems to be an unfounded concern since research has shown that most ads, usually between 60% to 80%, concentrate more often on the issues than on candidates' images26.

Nevertheless, it is important to note that concentration on the issues does not always mean that candidates are providing substantial arguments or explaining complex policy issues. Actually, as Joslyn’s research has indicated, the percentage of spots with specific policy information is much lower than the overall number of issue spots. Issue-oriented ads contain vague policy preferences, and spots are replete with emotional and cultural symbols and images, as well as value concerns27.

Researchers also have noted an increasing difficulty in distinguishing between issues and images in campaign messages. Traditionally, issues have been viewed as statements of a candidate’s position on policy issues or preferences on issues of public concern, whereas image has been viewed as a concentration on the candidate's qualities or characteristics28. However, many researchers have acknowledged that this

27 Joslyn, Mass media and elections.
28 Kaid and Johnston, Videostyle in presidential campaigns.
dichotomy is a false one, since issues not only can be, but actually are, consistently used to create a candidate’s image.  

3.2 Negative versus Positive

Although it may seem that the controversy over negative and positive spots has arisen only recently, analyses of spots over time indicate that negative spots have been, in fact, a factor in all American presidential campaigns. However, it is true that there has been a real increase in the number of negative spots in American presidential campaigns since the 1980s. Interestingly, negative ads tend to be more issue oriented than positive ads.

3.3 Other Content Considerations

A considerable amount of work has also been done on a concept of “video style”. The concept, first laid out by Kaid and Davidson, suggests that it is possible to understand a candidate’s mode of self–presentation in the campaign messages by analyzing the verbal, nonverbal and production characteristics of the messages. Video style has been used mostly to describe

characteristics of the presidential spots\textsuperscript{34}, and to analyze spot styles of incumbents and challengers\textsuperscript{35}.

While collecting the results of a number of previously conducted studies in the U.S. and Western European systems, Kaid and Holtz–Bacha showed that one might find common elements of in political ads across countries. In particular, a majority of ads concentrate on issues, rather than images of the candidates or political parties; most ads are positive; and a declining emphasis on parties, resulting in more personalized campaigns. On the other hand, some differences might be noticed in such areas as: a setting of the spot, a narrator, and the production techniques\textsuperscript{36}.

\textit{Image of a candidate}

As far as the components of ads are concerned, framing theory may be used to understand how the message packages political actors (candidates, parties). Framing theory holds that humans create story lines to organize a large amount of information into an efficient package for audiences to interpret. Seen from this perspective, framing allows political advertisers to organize large amounts of biographical and issue–oriented information about an actor into an efficient package for the audience to interpret, e.g. the construction of an image of the candidate by using biographical information and psychological features of the candidate's characteristics. Its is worth mentioning that not only verbal components of the ads, but also nonverbal ones, may be used to create story lines, e.g. by using visual techniques to show a candidate in a particular way.

Parmelee distinguished the following frames (images) and their components: \textit{a Political Leader} (politician, party leader, activity, experience, political agenda, objectives to be achieved), \textit{a Statesman} (dignity, authority, knowledge, experience), \textit{a Moral

\textsuperscript{34} Kaid and Johnston, Negative versus positive; Kaid and Johnston, Videostyle in presidential campaigns.
\textsuperscript{35} Kaid and Davidson, Elements of videostyle.
Authority (values, moral qualities, responsibility), a Chief Visionary (long-term vision, moral qualities, security), a Negotiator (dialog, communication skills, good relations with people, compromise, hope and optimism), a Friend (good relations with people, communication skills, social engagement, honest, trustworthy), an Independent Candidate (no party ties, financial independence; self-made), a Hero (sacrifice, fight for freedom, dedication to the country), an Expert (knowledge on political, legal and economic issues, experience), and a Father Figure (family values)\textsuperscript{37}.

Since Polish political advertising is strongly influenced by the concepts and techniques developed in the U.S., it is reasonable to use that theoretical framework to analyze some particular campaign strategies. At the same time, the format and content of political communication are culturally and politically determined. Thus, while formulating research questions and hypotheses I used as background not only general conclusions from foreign studies, but also the results of the Polish ones I present in the next section.

4. Previous studies

In Poland, since the 1990s a considerable amount of research has focused on campaigns. It is worth mentioning, however, that most scholars examined the political background of campaigns, including the relations between political actors, the mechanisms and procedures, and the decision-making processes\textsuperscript{38}. All of them clearly showed a predominant role of political parties and their leaders in every type of elections.

\textsuperscript{37} John H. Parmelee, Meet the candidate videos (Westport, CT : Praeger, 2003).
\textsuperscript{38} See: Bitwa o Belweder [Battle over Belveder] edited by Mirosława Grabowska and Ireneusz Krzemiński (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Literackie, 1991); Dziemidok, Partie polityczne; Mazur, Marketing polityczny; Robert Wisniowski, Marketing wyborczy. Studium kampanii wyborczych w systemach prezydenckich i semiprezydenckich (Finlandia, Francja, Polska, Stany Zjednoczone) [Election marketing. A study on the election campaigns in presidential and semi-presidential systems (Finland, France, Poland, and the U.S.)] (Warszawa – Wrocław: Powszechne Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 2000).
Other scholars analyzed political discourse through qualitative methods and offered comprehensive descriptions of the political messages broadcast during the parliamentary\textsuperscript{39}, presidential\textsuperscript{40}, and European Parliament elections.\textsuperscript{41}

In 2001, Pietrzyk–Zieniewicz distinguished several frames most frequently used by Polish presidential candidates. She noticed the style of self-presentation closely related to the main values of the political party the candidate represented. Namely, those who represented social democratic or liberal parties created the image of a \textit{Negotiator} most frequently, while those with political ties to right-wing parties introduced themselves usually as \textit{Moral Authorities}, \textit{Strong Leaders}, or \textit{Father Figures}\textsuperscript{42}. Since most candidates were also political leaders, this component of their image was strongly emphasized. On the contrary, all candidates having no political support presented that fact as an advantage (an \textit{Independent Candidate}), and introduced themselves as \textit{Self–Made Persons} or \textit{Experts}.

Based on that concept, Stępińska and Cichosz by their qualitative content analyses showed that, indeed, a candidates' images was determined not only by their personal characteristics, but also by their party ties. Stępińska completed previous observations with her findings on the types of images shared by representatives of more than one political orientation. She found that presidential

\textsuperscript{39} Ewa Pietrzyk-Zieniewicz, Kreacja wizerunku przywódcy politycznego (style argumentacji) [Political leader’s image creation (styles of persuasion)], Studia Politologiczne, vol. 5 (2001), 288 – 305.
\textsuperscript{40} See: Cichosz, (Auto) kreacja wizerunku; Stępińska, Marketingowe strategie wyborcze; Stępińska, Wizerunek, program czy partia?
\textsuperscript{42} Pietrzyk – Zieniewicz, Kreacja wizerunku, 295 – 296.
candidates having political ties with social-democratic and liberal parties preferred to introduce themselves as *Friends* and *Negotiators*, while those representing Christian–democratic, national far right-wing, or center right–wing parties most frequently created images of *Statesmen* or *Moral Authorities*. Interestingly, all candidates representing Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe (PSL) in the period of 1990–2000 created consistent complex images of *Family Men and Statesmen* together.

In her study on subsequent presidential campaigns, Cichosz (2005: 244) also showed that candidates representing left-wing political parties in Poland usually introduced themselves as *Attractive Personalities, Friends, or Political Leaders*, while those representing right–wing parties as *Father Figures* and *Moral Authorities*. Independent candidates most frequently introduced themselves as *Attractive Personalities, or Fighters* (intransigent challengers).

While Cichosz noticed a tendency to formulate more and more negative messages during presidential campaigns in Poland, Stępińska showed that this strategy might be less effective than one would assume. In 1995 and 2000, despite the aggressive attacks against him, Aleksander Kwaśniewski won the election, while the sponsor of negative political advertising did not benefit from that strategy. Although Kwaśniewski lost some of his potential voters, they decided to support another candidate, not the one who revealed negative information about Kwaśniewski.

Desperak, Stępińska, and Cichosz also noticed that most of the presidential candidates in their campaign messages actually represented the values, symbols and political agendas of their parties. As a result, messages spread during presidential campaigns...
campaigns are remarkably similar to those broadcast in parliamentary campaigns\textsuperscript{46}.

Therefore, based on the theoretical background and the results of the previous Polish studies, the current study proposes the following Hypothesis 1:

H1: Political parties promote their presidential candidates during the parliamentary campaign (in their programs and spots) to support their own position in parliamentary elections.

Although one may observe a trend of personalization in political advertising messages in the U.S. or Western European countries, in Poland a political party still determines the content and format of political communication during campaigns. By ‘personalization’ I only mean that a lot of attention is paid to the party leader, who, as I already shown, is quite frequently also a presidential candidate. Thus, in fact, all elections are perceived as a considerable opportunity to promote political parties.

Hence, I propose a second hypothesis, namely:

H2: Despite the fact that parliamentary elections would be over at that time, presidential candidates having strong party ties will be presented predominantly as political leaders in their election campaign messages.

It is worth emphasizing that much of the studies mentioned above were qualitative ones. Actual quantitative studies through codebooks have been rather rare in Poland. Therefore, this study provides an original contribution to political communication research both by analyzing the content of Polish political advertising through both quantitative and qualitative methods, and looking at the influence of 'double elections' on the messages broadcast during the campaigns.

5. The research design

To answer these research questions and verify the hypotheses I used content analysis through quantitative and qualitative methods. Two separate coding schemes were applied to the programs and spots of political parties and presidential candidates. The general rule of creating both code sheets was to make them adequate to the type of election and, at the same time, as complementary to each other as possible.

Thus, in addition to simple categories like candidate's or political party's name and length of ads, the code sheets included verbal content categories that determined the nature of the message (positive or negative) and an issue or image focus of the ads. Ads were categorized also according to the presence or absence of partisan appeals, personal qualities of the candidates, and a type of issue content. Furthermore, a set of categories was developed to measure the strategies used by political parties and presidential candidates to take advantage of the ‘double elections’ situation.

Among nonverbal content categories, those measuring presence or absence of political parties’ symbols (name, logo, faces of the leaders or members) in presidential ads were of significant importance. On the other hand, all ads were coded for a dominant speaker in the ad, indicating whether a presidential candidate appeared in the party's ads and/or if political party leaders (or members) were those who delivered the message about a presidential candidate.

Furthermore, the 'presidential' code sheet included categories indicating the archetypal images and presidential symbolic roles. This part of the codebook was based on Parmeelee's\(^{47}\) and Pietrzyk–Zieniewicz's\(^{48}\) conclusions of their studies on the most frequently used images, described in the section on theoretical framework above.

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\(^{47}\) Parmeelee, 2003.

The unit of the analysis was individual political advertisements, including unpaid programs broadcast on the Polish public TV stations (TVP1 and TVP2), and paid spots broadcast on one of the private TV stations (TVN) and two public ones. A total number of 181 ads were coded, including 47 paid spots and 77 unpaid programs broadcast during Polish parliamentary campaign in 2005, as well as 56 programs broadcast during campaign before presidential elections in 2005.

The general rule was to analyze an equal number of programs for each political party and presidential candidate and a number of paid campaign spots selected proportionally to a general number of this type of the messages broadcast during the campaign. Specifically, 6 different parliamentary programs per political party were coded (except in the case of the PPN, where I coded 5 programs), and 4 programs per presidential candidate before the first ballot, and 2 more programs per presidential candidate before the second ballot. The exact number of parliamentary spots under the study was as following: SLD 4; PO 6; PiS 14; PSL 6; Samoobrona 1; LPR 10; and SdPL, 6.

Some of the political parties, however, were not allowed to broadcast their campaign unpaid programs on the national public media. Since they registered their electoral lists in too few districts, they could present their programs only on regional public TV and radio stations, or purchase advertising time. It should be mentioned that those “regional spots” were not taken into account in this study for three reasons. First, in many cases the regional spots of leading parties just repeated the content of national ones. Only a minority differed significantly from national spots, focusing on presenting a number of candidates representing a particular political party. Second, those parties that broadcast only regional spots were actually actors of lesser significance on the political market. The opinion poll results showed that they might get less than 3 percent of votes49. Finally, none of them supported any presidential candidate.

49 Preferencje partyjne, 2005.
All ads were recorded and transcribed. Then, ads were coded by a researcher. As a check against the risk of subjective findings, the researcher repeated the coding process. The coder reliability, which was tested using Holsti’s formula50, was 83 percent (format of the ad) and 87 percent (negative/positive character of the ad). It is worth mentioning that election campaign programs, due to the complex character of their content, were the most difficult to code.

6. Findings

Hypothesis 1 theorized that political parties would promote their presidential candidates during the parliamentary campaign in their programs and spots in order to support their own positions in the parliamentary elections. This hypothesis was tested for those parties that officially supported a presidential candidate and for those presidential candidates who were leaders or members of political parties. According to the data analysis, all political parties with leaders running for presidency made sure to promote their images in the parliamentary election spots and programs.

The Table 2. shows that presidential candidates who were party leaders or members were present in most of the campaign spots of political parties. In some cases (as Samoobrona or SdPL), the presidential candidates were present in all of the parliamentary spots and programs.

The hypothesis was confirmed even for SLD and a presidential candidate officially supported by this party, W. Cimoszewicz. Although W. Cimoszewicz resigned a few weeks into the presidential campaign, he was still present in the parliamentary programs of SLD and the reasons for his resignation (the attacks against his family) were actually used as arguments against the political opponents of SLD.

The only exception here was the campaign of LPR – in this case the presidential candidate was not a party leader himself (Roman

50 Ole R. Holsti, Content analysis for the social science and humanities (Reading, MA: Addison Wesley, 1969).
Giertych), but his father (Maciej Giertych). While the symbols of the party were present in all his programs, he was not even once mentioned in the programs and spots of the party.

The Table 2. also shows that presidential candidates were more often promoted in the programs than spots (74% to 66% overall), which may be explained by a difference in duration of both forms of advertising. Since programs are longer, the content is usually much more complex, covering several issues and presenting party leaders and members.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of the political party</th>
<th>Presence of a presidential candidate</th>
<th>Formats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Programs</td>
<td>Spots</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PiS</td>
<td>Yes (100%)</td>
<td>Yes (71%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PO</td>
<td>Yes (83%)</td>
<td>Yes (83%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSL</td>
<td>Yes (75%)</td>
<td>Yes (67%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samoobrona</td>
<td>Yes (100%)</td>
<td>Yes (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LPR</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDPL</td>
<td>Yes (100%)</td>
<td>Yes (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLD</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Furthermore, Table 2. shows that the presence of a presidential candidate in the parliamentary campaign spots and programs affected both the format and content of ads. First of all, political parties supporting presidential candidates produced more spots and programs of a biography and a party leader statement format, than those parties without their own presidential candidates. The latter actually produced more "man-in-the-street", documentary, and talking-head types of campaign messages.

Moreover, once the presidential candidates were presented in parliamentary election spots and programs, they were crucial speakers providing their party's message and agendas and creating their positive image. Furthermore, in all cases they were introduced as political leaders and current or former party leaders.

Moreover, as Table 3 shows, most of the parties supporting presidential candidates produced more messages focused on image than political actors without presidential candidates. At the same time, political leaders of small, not well-recognized parties with election rates lower than 3 percent, who decided to run for
presidency, used the parliamentary election messages to present their party's agenda rather than their own. This strategy was used mostly by the leaders of the PPP, PPN, Platforma J. Korwin–Mikkego, and OKO.

Table 3. Parliamentary election advertising: image versus issue

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Image oriented programs</th>
<th>Image oriented spots</th>
<th>Issue oriented programs</th>
<th>Issue oriented spots</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PiS</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PO</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSL</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samoobrona</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LPR</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDPL</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLD</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PD</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPN</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Platforma J. Korwin – Mikkego</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OKO</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ruch Patriotyczny</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The data presented in Table 4. reveals that strong, well-established parties with financial support (PO, PiS, PSL, SLD, or SDPL) could divide their messages between two different types of political advertising according to their objectives. At the same time, since most of the challengers (PPP, PPN, Ruch Patriotyczny, Komitet Janusza Korwin – Mikkego, and OKO) usually define themselves in opposition to “first rank” political actors, their campaign messages may be predominantly negative. Furthermore, the newcomers or challengers usually lacked the funds for the campaign. Therefore, not surprisingly, they tried to take advantage of free airtime to present their political offer and attack rivals.
Interestingly enough, while some presidential candidates seemed to be 'put in charge' of creating a positive image of their parties (PO - D. Tusk, PSL - J. Kalinowski, PiS - L. Kaczyński), others emphasized their role of "fighters" by attacking political opponents (Samoobrona - A. Lepper, J. Korwin – Mikke, PPP - D. Podrzycki, PPN - L. Bubel). Also, most presidential candidates making attacks in the parliamentary ads, perceived political parties rather than presidential candidates as their main opponents.

Furthermore, both presidential candidates and political party leaders most frequently criticized their political opponents for their past performance (PO, PSL, PPP), and used general labels rather than names to point out main rivals. For example, A. Lepper, being a party leader and a presidential candidate of 'Samoobrona' labeled his opponents as 'communists' and 'liberals', while the leader of SLD (but not a presidential candidate) and M. Borowski, a party leader and presidential candidate of SdPL, placed right–wing political parties as the objects of his negative campaign, while not attacking directly any presidential candidate.

On the other hand, taking into consideration the fact that most party leaders were actual presidential candidates, we may regard the strategy described above as an element of the indirect double negative campaign (against political parties and presidential candidates).

Hypothesis 2 theorized that presidential candidates having strong party ties would be introduced mostly as political leaders representing the political parties. This hypothesis was also confirmed by the results of the study. First of all, symbols of the party (name and logo) were present in all campaign programs of candidates with party support.

Secondly, some of the presidential candidates invited party members to be speakers in their ads (M. Borowski, J. Kalinowski, J. Korwin–Mikke, L. Bubel), while others decided to invite moral authorities and celebrities to play that role, but introduced other party members in the video materials (D. Tusk, M. Giertych, A.)
**Table 4. Parliamentary election spots and programs: positive versus negative**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Positive ads</th>
<th>Negative ads</th>
<th>Who attacks? Programs</th>
<th>Who is attacked?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Programs</td>
<td>Spots</td>
<td>Programs</td>
<td>Spots</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PiS</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Main political rival: PO and its political agenda.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PO</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Political opponents for their past performance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSL</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Political opponents for their past performance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samoobrona</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Political opponents labeled as 'communists' and 'liberals'</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LPR</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Political opponents labeled as 'communists' and 'liberals'</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDPL</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Political opponents from the right side of a political scene</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLD</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Political opponents: PO and PiS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PD</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Political opponents for their past performance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>All political opponents</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPN</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>All political opponents</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Platforma J. Korwina – Mikke</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OKO</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>All political opponents</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Słomka). In a few cases presidential candidates were introduced as significant members (“faces”) of the party (L. Kaczyński as “An Honorary Chairman of “Prawo i Sprawiedliwość”; A. Lepper, D. Tusk, M. Borowski as the leaders of their parties).

Table 5 shows of the study's qualitative findings. The results of the analysis show that although presidential campaign ads were focused mostly on personal characteristics of the candidates, those with strong party ties were framed as political leaders by emphasizing their political experience and achievements.

Both verbal and nonverbal components of the presidential campaign messages were used to create the images of a few different types of political leaders, namely, a leader and a statesman (M. Giertych; L. Kaczyński); a leader and a friend (D. Tusk); a leader and a moral authority (M. Borowski); a leader and a hero (A. Słomka); a leader and a negotiator: J. Kalinowski. Additionally, some elements of the other symbolic roles were combined with previously mentioned images. One of the most popular was also a Father Figure (L. Kaczyński, D. Tusk, J. Kalinowski).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Symbolic role(s)</th>
<th>Archetype(s)</th>
<th>Verbal components</th>
<th>Nonverbal components</th>
<th>Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political leader</td>
<td>Candidates are associated with political party heroes of the past.</td>
<td>Political leadership; experience; political agenda; previous positions and functions.</td>
<td>Party members; logo; name of the party; political party's magazine', pictures of political party meetings, formal outdoor, formal clothes.</td>
<td>Borowski, Bubel, Kaczyński, KalinowskiKorwin – Mikke, Lepper, Słomka, Tusk.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Statesman and Father Figure</td>
<td>Candidates learn responsibilities, love of country and other core moral values from their parents (grandparents).</td>
<td>Dignity; nation; Motherland; duties and responsibilities.</td>
<td>Formal clothes, armchair, desk, eyeglasses, piano; moderate body movement; formal indoor setting; flag.</td>
<td>Giertych, Kaczyński, Korwin – Mikke, Tymiński</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moral Authority And Hero</td>
<td>Candidates display heroism (wartime or resistance to the pressure of the communist)</td>
<td>War heroism; fight for freedom; values' suffering for the country; sacrifice; resistance to corruption; honesty.</td>
<td>Formal clothes, armchair, desk, books, eye-glasses, piano; moderate body movement; formal indoor setting; flag, pictures and documents illustrating the heroic past performance.</td>
<td>Borowski, Giertych</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Personality</td>
<td>Appearance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent Candidate</td>
<td>Candidates have a great career outside the politics.</td>
<td>Outside political scene; self-made man; success.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family Person and Friend</td>
<td>Candidates are good with their children and/or grandchildren.</td>
<td>Happy husband (wife, mother, father); taking care of family; support for young people; tradition; future.</td>
<td>Smile; presence of family members, family pictures, casual dress, informal outdoor setting.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negotiator</td>
<td>Candidates had a hardscrabble beginning in life, but succeed through hard work.</td>
<td>Skills, communication; dialog; contact with society; effectiveness; competence; solving problems.</td>
<td>Eye contact; shaking hands with people; talking and listening to people; semi-casual dress, both formal and informal outdoors settings.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expert</td>
<td>Candidates have a great career outside the politics.</td>
<td>Knowledge, analysis; diagnosis; skills.</td>
<td>Formal dress, formal indoor setting; desk, copies of documents; books; moderate body movement.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
7. Conclusions

This paper agrees with scholars who have argued that political parties play a predominant role in the Polish public sphere. The previous studies on both parliamentary and presidential campaigns revealed that political parties might influence not only the process of candidates’ nominations, but also the way candidates are presented in campaign messages. The current study showed that once these two types of the elections are set within a frame of a few weeks, the parliamentary elections seem to be of higher significance for political actors, while the presidential ones are perceived mostly as an additional scene for political competition of party leaders.

While most of the previous Polish studies were focused on an analysis of some particular events, decisions or strategies, this study provides empirical evidence for the phenomena previously only described in the literature. Through quantitative and qualitative methods, the present study demonstrated that Polish political advertising is still predominantly positive rather than negative, while the focus of the messages (image versus issues) depends heavily on the position of the political party and on the presence (or not) of a presidential candidate supported by the party.

Extending prior research, my study also found that in the case of 'double elections' party ties determined the frame used by presidential candidates. Since most party leaders were playing two roles at the same time, they had to decide which frame was the most important to them. The results showed that the primary frame was a Party Leader, followed by some other dimensions of an image.

The study has a few shortcomings. First of all, being focused on one specific case, I was not able to provide full data required for a comprehensive comparison to previous studies. Further studies should collect the detailed results from main studies or be designed to cover a few election campaigns in order to recognize the major differences and similarities.
Secondly, not all political parties participating in the parliamentary elections were taken into consideration in this study. Due to the research design, I decided to limit the number of political parties under the study and not code the content of regional spots and programs. Further studies might include all political actors and their messages to see whether there is any difference between political communication of the well-established parties and newcomers. Finally, not all the features of campaign messages have been studied here. Further analyses might be focused more on the format of the ads.

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THE ENCOUNTER OF POLITICAL MARKETING WITH DIFFERENT VERSIONS OF DEMOCRACY

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Abstract

Political marketing’s evolution owes much to the contributions of Anglo-American scholars from the discipline of marketing. These contributions have been based on liberal understandings of democracy and have adopted a positivist epistemology. Notwithstanding the progress achieved thus far, the evolution has been one-sided, drawing mainly from the marketing literature without keeping up to date with literature in political science on democratic theory. The article urges scholars to seriously engage with the texts of political theory scholars on democracy. It argues that political marketing stands to benefit from identifying the major shortcomings of both the liberal interest group and the deliberative models of democracy. This article proposes that I.M. Young’s version of communicative democracy warrants serious attention by political marketing scholars both for the theoretical insights it offers and for opening new paths for research.

Keywords: Political Marketing, Liberal Models of Democracy, Communicative Democracy

Developments in the field of political marketing have thus far been shaped mainly by the contributions of Anglo-American scholars who have been trained in the field of marketing and have taken up the task of transposing, adjusting and applying marketing ideas, concepts and methods to the political arena. Research area has been mainly focused on elections, directing attention to the needs of the customer (citizen-voter) and demonstrating the relevance of market research (surveys, focus groups, interviews, content analysis) in campaign strategy, message development, political advertising, etc. Besides electoral contests where emphasis is placed on campaigns of
candidates and political parties, other research foci include the development and implementation of campaigns by governments, lobbyists, interest groups, non-governmental organizations and civil society groups and movements.

The literature of political marketing is heavily skewed towards elaboration of marketing concepts and methods. This is understandable given that most of the contributions in this nascent field come from scholars trained in marketing. However, the advancement of the field depends on bridging the disciplinary divide among scholars working in the mother disciplines of marketing and political science. From a political science perspective, this call is both welcomed and long overdue, as the literature of political marketing has not kept pace with theoretical formulations and debates on democracy prevalent among political theorists.

This paper attempts to bridge this lacuna by engaging in a kaleidoscopic and selective reading of formulations in political theory with an eye of identifying foci and concepts that may enrich political marketing’s understanding of democracy. Some may find this exercise futile and pointless either because they find political marketing’s instrumental operation incompatible with attempts at deepening democracy or because they see no problem whatsoever with the liberal version of democracy that political marketing embraces. I find both views quite problematic. The first view is advocated among politicians and scholars of center-left persuasion who view political marketing with suspicion if not outright hostility. Against the incompatibility thesis I would simply state that political life in contemporary societies is mediated by symbols such as media frames, rhetorical tropes and devices and the tools of the trade of political marketing (political images, political advertising, public opinion polls). Style is as

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important as form in the conduct of today’s politics and what you say in politics will not go very far unless you know how to say it to a media-saturated polity. The inroads marketing concepts have made in politics are irreversible and political actors can ignore them only at their own peril. If political marketing partakes in the manipulation of images, the engineering of consent and the depoliticization of issues, then political participation is weakened and democracy suffers. Alternatively, if political marketing highlights previously unexplored images and issues mostly of oppositional groups then political participation is broadened and democracy is deepened. The jury is still out on whether political marketing impoverishes democracy and further empirical research is needed to shed light on it.

The second view finds resonance among political marketing practitioners and scholars who reason that the dissolution of communism and the subsequent triumph of neo-liberalism offered fertile ground for the cultivation and ascendancy of market-driven approaches to politics including political marketing. Although few will quarrel with this assertion, political marketing scholars need not be complacent about the triumph of neo-liberalism and the new wave of spreading the U.S. version of democracy globally. Against the complacency thesis, one can easily point to discrepancies in the workings of liberal democracies reaching sometimes crisis proportions as reflected in the overwhelming power of special interests, the disrepute of political parties, the low public regard and approval ratings for politicians, the media driven sensationalist coverage of political issues and the increasing rate with which political scandals and charges of corruption have come to light. Between the Scylla of expressing an outright negative view of political marketing and the Charybdis of being complacent about the workings of liberal democracy and the contribution of political marketing to its functioning, I would like to propose a serious engagement with political theory texts on democracy in an attempt to move beyond the dominant interest-based liberal and procedural understanding of democracy. My proposal consists of three interrelated moves that political marketing scholars need to undertake: a) an engagement with deliberative and, in particular, communicative versions of democracy; b) a de-centring of the focus on the acts of voting
and campaigning in order to allow for the scrutiny of other political acts like demonstrations; and c) a substitution of a social constructivist understanding of the notion of “public” for the now prevalent conception of aggregating individual opinions. These suggestions and reformulations would, in my view, anchor political marketing to a more inclusive and I dare say more substantive conception of democracy as well as introducing a bottom-up approach to agency as a supplement and a corrective to the top-down approach prevalent in political marketing studies.

Margaret Scammell is one of the few political marketing scholars to ponder the relationship of political marketing to democracy. She has suggested that the marketing concept goes hand in hand with the “plebiscitary model of democracy.” This is a populist conception whereby public interest is defined as the sum of individual interests and citizens are asked on regular intervals to express their preferences in plebiscites and referenda. Marketing scholars may rejoice at the advantage of establishing procedures that oblige politicians to take seriously the views of the electorate, but this form of democracy is not without its limitations. Without going into much detail, the plebiscitary model a) makes unrealistic assumptions about a well-informed citizenry, b) subjects all decisions to the tyranny of the majority without concern for minority viewpoints, c) overlooks bureaucratic difficulties and time constraints in holding referenda on a nationwide scale, and d) sidesteps the role that strong intermediary associations of civil society, like parties, voluntary groups, and non-governmental organizations can play in fostering public discourse. In my view, most political marketing accounts bracket the concept of democracy.

Reflecting upon the relationship of political marketing to democracy, most political marketing accounts either do not make explicit and/or do not engage in serious theoretical discussion regarding the type or form of democracy they are talking about.


One cannot help but notice a close affinity between marketing and liberal conceptions of politics reflecting the equivalence of capitalism in the economic sphere with liberalism in the political sphere. Most political marketing scholars subscribe to the representative model of democracy and analyze its workings through the theoretical lenses of Joseph Schumpeter’s elitist theory of democracy and Anthony Downs’ economic theory of democracy. Such conceptions, though, promote a certain view of politics. Both assume that individual interests are pre-given; conceive of politics as a power game among competing interests and voter preferences as predetermined and invariant; view citizens as passive consumers who secretively express their political preference through the periodic act of voting, and make the pursuit of vote maximization and capturing the reins of power the end goals of political activity undertaken by political parties and politicians.

Schematically speaking and in conformity with these assumptions, political marketing conceives of the political arena as an electorate market where political parties, analogous to firms, compete with political programmes, the equivalent of products in the market place, to get the votes of the electorate. Political marketing is a strategy or an orientation that parties and politicians adopt to attain their end goal: capturing the state through vote maximization. To pursue this goal, parties and politicians aggregate, with the aid of public opinion polls, policy preferences, adjust policy positions towards the center of the political spectrum to capture the majority of shifting or undecided voters and encourage voter participation through such activities as fund-raising, attending rallies, participating as delegates in conventions and voting the day of elections. This depiction of political marketing falls within the core of liberalism in politics. In the words of an astute observer: “the electoral market works to support liberal democracy by disciplining the leaders and the electorate and by buttressing liberal democracy’s three main

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In discussing the model of liberal democracy that subsumes political marketing within its wings, I would like to single out for comment two features of the model that have far reaching implications for future political marketing research. The first is the goal of vote maximization and the second concerns the notion of the “public” as aggregating opinions and preferences of individuals. Political marketing’s espousal of these aspects of liberal politics has important implications for the conduct of democratic politics. Political marketing activity centers on vote maximization. Political marketing as a strategy to aid parties and politicians in maximizing their vote is a rational activity that cannot escape the unintended irrational consequences of the market-led liberal version of democracy. The first irrational consequence is that vote maximization pushes parties and politicians to move to the center in search of votes, blurs political distinctions and, in the process, allows appeals to passion to reign over appeals to reason and self-interest. The second irrational consequence is that, with the help of political marketers, only a small fraction of political issues are exposed in campaigns; instead, emphasis is placed on image. The practices of segmentation and targeting, so popular among political marketers, are exclusionary in the sense that they address narrow segments of the public. As a result, voters may turn their back on electoral politics sensing that neither their narrow interests nor their more general interest in the common good are served from their participation in politics. Two issues of particular relevance to political marketing that emerge from the discussion on vote maximization are the effects of political marketing on political participation and the centrality of images and, more generally, of symbols in politics. Although I have alluded to these

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issues before, I will urge political marketing scholars to pay more attention to Iris Young’s communicative democracy model precisely because it integrates the symbolic and rhetorical dimensions in the conduct of democratic politics.\textsuperscript{10}  
The emphasis on vote maximization absorbs most of the labours of political marketing practitioners and scholars. The campaign period is for practitioners the stuff of politics and for scholars the field that generates theoretical and empirical studies. However, this sole preoccupation with the process leading to the act of voting produces political marketing’s voting bias and eschews consideration of other political democratic activities. Aside from campaigning and voting, other activities take place in democracies like deliberation (arguing, debating, bargaining), lobbying, mobilization, organization and political protests and demonstrations.  

To limit political activity to campaigning and voting amounts to foreclosing the possibility that the people, where sovereignty resides, will have a say in the shaping of policy options and government decisions. In liberal democracies, the citizen remains passive and all political activities revolve around the initiatives that political elites take in institutional settings. The key question is whether political marketing can be compatible with active forms of citizenship and give voice to the activities of social movements that either aim to change the distributional outcomes of political institutions or seek to challenge the constitutive rules that define some acts as political while confining others in the private sphere.\textsuperscript{11}  
The activities can range from bargaining and deliberating within the confines of institutionalized politics to political protests and demonstrations that aim to transform the rules and principles governing what is termed “political” and make the public sphere all encompassing.

Public opinion is a concept that carries considerable resonance in the formulations of political scientists and specialists in political marketing. Democracy is a system of governance by and for the people. Liberal electoral politics is inconceivable without public opinion polls and a political marketing strategy cannot be developed without the input of political market research in uncovering the preferences of the electorate. In addition, the political marketing approach to politics derives its legitimacy from its stress on devising campaign strategy and public policies based on what the public deems important. Public opinion is the focal point where political marketing meets theorizing about democracy. For this reason, I have singled out for comment the notion of the public. In most public opinion studies, the public is composed of the aggregative opinions of a sample of individuals. Political analysts and pollsters break down the public into various categorization schemes (i.e., supporters of party A/supporters of party B/undecided; loyalists/radicals/activists/undecided/uninterested/disaffected; etc.) These categorizations of pollsters flow from a top-down process that serves the strategic interests of parties and politicians. No matter how natural these categories appear to politicians and the electorate, they are constructions of political marketing discourse. This alternative conceptualisation of “the public” acknowledges that the “public” is a social construction constituted in discourse.12

It follows, therefore, that different versions of democracy construct “the public” differently. In the constructions of political marketing experts, voters are conceived in the passive role of consumers than the more engaging role of citizens. Another familiar construction in political marketing circles is the construction of a “representative public” based upon the statistical notion of representativeness.13 The concept of representation, being primarily political, is flexible and can be

broadened to include views of disadvantaged groups that do not participate in formal politics. In Nancy Fraser’s terminology these groups form the “subaltern counter-publics.”

Currently, there are more theoretical offerings on democracy on the table for scholars in the field than the representative or interest group model of democracy. I will comment on two versions of democracy: deliberative and communicative democracy.

In a seminal work Jon Elster has suggested that politics resembles both a market and a forum. Overemphasis on the play of pre-given interests in a political market excludes from consideration a vital aspect of democratic politics: invoking reasons for defending interests and advancing arguments in an attempt to persuade others to one’s point of view. The emphasis on deliberation among citizens for reaching the best rational decision for all concerned has given rise to deliberative democracy. This form of democracy is associated with the work of Jurgen Habermas and his followers. One of them, James Fiskin has conducted deliberative polls, requiring respondents to first question political candidates on a number of issues and, following conversation, to form their opinions and list their preferences. Deliberation in modern societies takes place in various institutional settings like parliaments, courts, and government bureaucracies. For deliberation to occur, a network of messages must be circulated in society, raising issues, offering

14 Nancy Fraser, “Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy,” in Habermas and the Public Sphere, ed. Craig Calhoun (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press 1999). 123.
information, listing opinions and giving interpretations. The public sphere is the space where active citizens and civil society actors express their views, discuss issues of general concern and form what constitutes public opinion.

The overemphasis that the deliberative democracy model places on reasoned debate and universal principles of rationality that transcend particularistic interests may safeguard objectivity, but it is a cause of concern to critics of the model and political marketers alike. Critics contend that the model is oblivious to the cultural differences among debate participants as well as to their different styles of speech. The fact, for instance, that deliberation is conducted in formal institutions raises the issue of exclusion, as members of some groups (small parties, minorities, social movements, single-issue NGOs) do not participate in this process. Even if these groups were to be included in the deliberations, exclusion would take the form of not being competent enough and adept to conform to the norms of the deliberation (emphasis attached to winning the argument, assertiveness, deductive reasoning, absence of emotional expressions, etc). Cultural theorists and political marketing specialists may also object to the deliberative model’s insensitivity to symbolic references and to the use of figurative language.

A model of democracy that I find more congenial to the interests of political marketing scholars is Iris Young’s of communicative democracy. The model is made up of four elements that broaden public participation and account for preserving the plurality of diverse cultural and social perspectives. These elements or communication modes are a) critical argument, b) greeting which includes preliminaries to discussion and non-linguistic gestures, c) rhetoric that entails using figures of speech to attract and maintain the audience’s attention, and d) storytelling in the form of narratives that make people understand

19 Young, “Communication and the Other,” 122-125.
20 Young, “Communication and the Other,”; Young, Inclusion and Democracy.
the experiences and situation of others different from them. Aside from critical argument, the element that is shared by both deliberative and communicative versions of democracy, the remaining three elements stress the point that human beings are constituted of rational and emotional selves. Symbols, non-discursive facets of communication and passions are equally important as appeals to reasoned arguments in political discourse and mobilizing people to action. To engage in political acts, people must be capable of both reasoning and feeling for matters they experience as a collective and for which they seek to arrive at binding decisions.

Young’s model of communicative democracy has the dual advantage of paying tribute to a variety of forms of communication and enlarging participation in a reconfigured public sphere. The model of communicative democracy has considerable implications for work in the field of political marketing. Besides resembling a market and a forum, politics becomes also an arena of staged publicity and exposure to contested meanings. In the public sphere of advanced liberal societies, definitions of what constitutes “the political” are shaped by the discursive and non-discursive strategies and tactics of political agents and social groups. To diffuse their message(s) throughout society, political agents and groups lean on the shoulders of political communication professionals and publicists. Political marketing experts frame and/or give a particular spin to an issue before it enters into the transmission belt of mass media outlets.

Additionally, communicative democracy and political marketing take seriously issues of symbolism and style in politics. Let us briefly consider what importance Young’s three elements of communication can have on political marketing. Greeting can take place inside as well as outside the boundary condition of the deliberative system. Inside the system, exchanges are characterized by civility, rules of etiquette and orderly procedures. Before the initiation of a dialogue, interlocutors engage in gestures of politeness and flattery, become familiar with one another and their surroundings and convey messages through non-linguistic gestures (hugs, smiles, etc.)
All activities that prefigure the actual deliberation, from body language of political actors to opening remarks that profile the political background and experiences of the participants, can find their ways in video clips and political advertisements at the hands of political marketing experts. Young mostly treats greeting as a pre-deliberation activity that is met with acclamation in political gatherings. Stretching Young’s formulation a bit further, we may substitute reception for greeting in order to encompass both the positive and the negative aspects of the encounter. This reformulation allows us to account for activities that are addressed to a deliberative system, yet fall outside its boundaries as the many encounters of activists with officials of international institutions (i.e., WTO, IMF, G-8 meetings, etc.) amply testify. Outside the walls of deliberation, exchanges can become rowdy, disorderly and even erupt into violence. Activists eschew deliberation believing that political and economic inequalities favour elite groups and their own viewpoints are not accorded a fair hearing. Activists, as the name signifies, engage in direct public actions that garner the attention of the media and generate considerable media exposure. Actions that activists find congenial to their cause include blocking entrances to meeting places, disrupting the course of deliberations, participating in demonstrations and sit-ins, etc.\textsuperscript{21} Political marketing experts and commentators can seize upon this event-generated publicity to reframe issues, challenge dominant perspectives and bolster support for the viewpoints of oppositional and marginalized groups. Communicative democracy could expand the scope of political marketing by making social movements and oppositional groups subjects of study.

Rhetoric, the second element in Young’s formulation, shares a couple of important traits with political marketing. Both disciplines are oriented towards appealing to and meeting the needs and desires of audiences, the listening public in the case of rhetoric and the voter-consumer in the case of political marketing. Rhetoricians and political marketing experts alike

\textsuperscript{21} Iris Marion Young, “Activist Challenges to Deliberative Democracy,” Political Theory 29:5 (October 2001), 673.
address specific political matters that call for concrete solutions and couch their messages in such a manner as to attract and maintain the interest of their target audiences. The second trait that unites both disciplines is the emphasis they place on winning. Both conceive of politics as an agonistic arena where reasons and passions are purposefully mobilized to induce citizens to action and win electoral contests. Rhetoric scholars and political theorists sympathetic to rhetoric have offered a number of insights that can be of interest to political marketing scholars and professionals.22 Take for instance the segmentation scheme proposed by rhetoricians for a political debate audience. In place of a scheme that divides voters into supporters, opponents and undecided, political marketing experts can draw upon work in debate rhetoric that breaks down an audience into partisans, abstainers, spectators and deliberating citizens depending on the degree of cognitive involvement and emotional assurance a voter experiences on an issue.

To get voters on their side, politicians in political debates either adopt a vote-gathering strategy based on emotional arousal or a vote-shifting strategy that relies on reason to prove the worth of one’s arguments. Vote-gathering resonates with spectators while vote-shifting with deliberating citizens.23 Thinking along similar lines, political marketers may utilize John Dryzek’s proposal of classifying rhetoric into two types: bonding and bridging rhetoric. Bonding rhetoric, addressing people that share similar outlooks, accentuates feelings of belonging in the inner group and drives a wedge between “us” and “them.” In bridging rhetoric, on the other hand, the speaker intends to reach and influence an audience different than his/her own. Political marketing experts may find Dryzek’s examples of how political leaders like Martin Luther King, Jr and Nelson Mandela employed bridging rhetoric to marginalize extreme positions very illuminating. Equally

significant is Dryzek’s conclusion that bridging rhetoric is “more clearly defensible when it comes from those representing an historically subordinate position or an equal partner rather than an historically dominant position.”

Storytelling or narrative is the third element in Young’s formulation. A narrative conveys particular experiences from a certain perspective. It weaves together in a story a series of events, highlighting some while obscuring others. Although narrative analysis has been extensively used in the humanities, it has recently made inroads in the study of politics and in business studies.

Communicative democracy’s use of narrative can create an appreciation of methodological pluralism among political marketing scholars, urging them to experiment with qualitative approaches to marketing. The artful use of narrative has been appreciated by political consultants for some time. According to James Carville and Stanley Greenberg, two renowned political strategists, the lack of a compelling narrative on the part of the Democrats was largely to blame for the loss of Democratic candidate John Kerry to Republican candidate George W. Bush in the 2004 U.S. elections. For these reasons, it is worth considering in more depth the insights of communicative democracy. Political marketing stands to benefit from engaging with the texts of political theory on the topic of democratic politics. It is hoped that such an engagement will sharpen critical reflection among political marketing scholars and aid their quest for more elaborate and context-specific theoretical formulations.

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THE ROLE OF AL-JAZEERA IN EMPOWERING ARAB CIVIL SOCIETY

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Abstract

The relationship between civil society and satellite broadcastings in the Arab World is increasingly developing. In fact, Arabs are becoming more conscious of civil society issues thanks to the emergence and growth of many innovative Arab satellite networks such as Al-Jazeera. Al-Jazeera continues to command the largest share of the Arabic news market, allowing the network to be a powerful communication tool that eases the challenges encountering Arab civil society. These challenges stand as stumbling blocks in the Arab civil society’s way of contributing to the democratic transition of many counties in the region. Using a content analysis of Al-Jazeera’s website and randomly selected broadcasts, this paper shows Al-Jazeera’s important role in helping Arab civil society to overcome its challenges and empower its organizations through extensively covering their activities and frequently hosting their representatives. The paper further argues that empowering Arab civil society makes Al-Jazeera an important potential player in the Arab democratization taking into consideration the significant role that civil society organizations play in a democratic transition.

Keywords: Al-Jazeera, civil society, the Arab World.

1. Introduction

The Arab world is undergoing an accelerating development in the political, social, economic and technological makeup of many countries that comprise it. These developmental changes are having extensive effects on Arab people and Arab regimes; in fact, some of these regimes have recently attempted to engage in a process of modernizing, liberalizing and democratizing many sectors of public life including the media. The emergence and
growth of many Arab transnational satellite TV networks, such as Al-Jazeera, is one of the manifestations of this development. Some of these networks have made tremendous inroads in the Western dominated flow of news, allowing Arabs to maintain an effective globalization tool through which they can inform the world about their pressing issues and emerging problems. Al-Hail argues that ‘the relationship between civil society and satellite broadcasting in the Arab world is becoming clearer and more significant owing to two simultaneous and related developments.’

First, he emphasizes the growing importance of satellite broadcasting in the region; second, he highlights the fact that Arabs are becoming more aware of civil society issues owing to the growth of Arab satellite broadcasting.

Although Arab civil society organizations are increasingly growing, they still encounter many challenges; the most important of which is holding a communication tool through which they can channel their messages and promote their democratic agenda. Using a content analysis of Al-Jazeera’s website and randomly selected broadcasts, this paper shows Al-Jazeera’s important role in helping Arab civil society to overcome this main challenge and empower its organizations through extensively covering their activities and frequently hosting their representatives. The paper further argues that empowering Arab civil society makes Al-Jazeera an important potential player in the ongoing democratization throughout many Arab countries. To put it differently, the democratic transition theory considers civil society an important player in a democratic transition; so empowering its entities makes Al-Jazeera a significant contributor in the democratic transition throughout the region.

The first part of this paper commences with providing a brief overview of the mainstream TV channels in the Arab world followed by a short discussion on the rise of Arab satellite channels and concludes with a discussion of the growth of civil society.

society in the Arab world and the main challenge that encounters its development. The second part empirically examines the role of Al-Jazeera in lessening this challenge and empowering Arab civil society. The paper concludes with discussing the potential contribution of Al-Jazeera in the ongoing democratic transition throughout the Arab world.

2. The Mainstream Arab TV Channels

The role of Arab media in general and Arab TV channels in particular has always been influenced by Arab governments which tend to consider a TV station as a symbol of national status rather than a communication tool that can be used to address citizens in an objective and impartial manner as well as a platform where issues of democracy and political reform can be freely and openly discussed. In fact, although few Arab regimes have liberalized parts of their media systems such as the internet and the press in Morocco, Jordan and Egypt, none of them attempted to open up the TV sector, except for few Gulf countries such as Qatar and UAE.28 Some scholars (e.g. Price and Amin) argue that the advancement of information technology and the exponential increase of transnational satellite channels have made Arab national borders more amenable to other transnational channels.29 However, I (along with Selber & Ghanem) think that Arab governments can still dominate and shape the structure and behavior of Arab media in general and transnational satellite broadcasting in particular; the recently signed Arab satellite broadcasting charter is a clear example of this dominance.30

The Arab League summits have mostly been opportunities that illustrate and enhance the widespread cliché ‘Arabs agree to

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disagree’. However, it seems that this cliché fades away when Arab regimes aberrantly and unanimously agree on manipulating laws to ensure maintaining a strong grip on media in general and satellite broadcasting in particular. The Arab League adopted a non-binding document on February 13, 2008 in Cairo entitled "Principles for Organizing Satellite Radio and TV Broadcasting in the Arab Region"; a long title for a relatively short charter which was the brainchild of Egypt and Saudi Arabia. It was signed by twenty Arab countries and only Lebanon and Qatar refuted to sign it. Abu-Fadil stated that this document ‘eerily parallels the existing legislation in a number of Arab countries whose fledgeling private broadcasters had hoped to establish a foothold in an otherwise state-controlled media landscape.’ 31 Qatar’s refusal to sign the charter implies that Al-Jazeera was targeted as it is mainly funded by Qatar’s royal family and enjoys a larger margin of freedom in comparison to most mainstream Arab TV channels. Unlike most Arab national channels, the newly emerging Arab satellite broadcasters, especially Al-Jazeera, provide a space for political parties, social movements, and civil society institutions to engage in an open and free debate, criticize Arab regimes and uncover their corrupt policies. Clearly, Arab regimes do not only control their national TV channels but they also attempt to do so with the Arab transnational satellite broadcasters which seem to epitomize a better alternative to the state-dominated networks.

3. The Rise and Growth of Arab Satellite Broadcasting

While it is difficult to comprehensively encompass all the factors that have contributed into the emergence of Arab satellite channels, I briefly highlight some of the important ones. Rinnawi attributes the birth of Arab Satellite Broadcasting to a combination of Arab domestic politics and the advancement of technology. 32 The first factor was the Lebanese domestic politics which is characterized by the presence of three major sectarian

groups each of which is epitomized by a charismatic leader or a strong party. The articulation of each group’s interests necessitated the formation of different media outlets. These are Al-Hariri’s *Al-Mustaqbal* for Sunni Muslims, Hezbollah’s *Al-Manar* for Shiites, and Pierre Daher’s LBC for Maronites. Nowadays, these channels are major players in the landscape of Arab satellite broadcasting as their target audience goes beyond the Lebanese to reach a wide range of pan-Arab audience. The second major aspect of Arab politics refers to those tiny and wealthy Gulf regimes which have aimed at putting themselves on the regional political map through establishing critical news networks such as Qatar’s Al-Jazeera. These two factors were enhanced by the advancement of technology which makes broadcasting transcend local borders and reach most of Arab households throughout the region.

In addition to Rinnawi’s birth factors, I identify two main ones which contributed into the growth of these innovative outlets. First, the costs of satellite dishes are increasingly decreasing allowing most Arabs to have access to these channels. These dishes mushroom even in such places as Alger’s *Kasbahs*, Cairo’s slums, the suburbs of Damascus, and the desert’s tents of Arab Bedouins. Second, the poor performance of the state-owned media, which tend to present one-sided stories, result in excluding a wide variety of views that represent different civil society institutions. In so saying, the emerging Arab satellite broadcasting can play an important role in empowering Arab civil society through allowing various voices to be voiced out. Before examining the empirical validity of this assumption, I briefly discuss the status of Arab civil society organizations and the challenges they encounter.

4. Civil Society in the Arab World: Definition, Development and Challenges

Although there is no consensus among contemporary scholars on what constitutes civil society, most of them (Kaldor and Dahlgren) agree that civil society includes a wide range of formal and informal groups such as associations, syndicates, federations, clubs, unions, guilds, and social movements that are autonomous
from the state and bound by legal order or a set of shared rules.\textsuperscript{33} Diamond states that these groups usually include citizens acting collectively in a public sphere to express their interests, exchange information, make demands on the state and hold state officials accountable.\textsuperscript{34} The question is to what extent the above characteristics of civil society, which are mainly Western-oriented, comply with the Arab context.

The concept of “civil society” in the Arab world seems to suggest a different notion from the one conventionally used in the West.\textsuperscript{35} First, while the chief building blocks of the modern Western society lie in encouraging individuals’ initiatives and their effective roles as citizens, the contemporary history of the Arab world reveals a focus on leaders and states where enhancing the status of the regime is favored over encouraging individual initiatives and contributions in the political life. This explains the fact that most Arab civil society groups are charitable organizations whose main aim is to provide material help to the less privileged among the Arab populace. Additionally, many of these civil society organizations are related to the state and they might even be considered “semi-governmental” institutions as Al-Halfi pointed out.\textsuperscript{36} Generally, the concept of civil society in the Arab world entails different definition from the one that exists in the West; this is due to the environment where it operates which is characterized by low rate of volunteerism as well as the lack of autonomy which is a product of the state dominance. In any rate, this overview cannot be generalized to include all Arab states as there is a considerable variance among them in terms of the extent to which civil society institutions have evolved.


Al-Sayyid categorizes Arab states into three groups based on the degree of respect to freedom of associations. The first group includes countries that allow a reasonable margin of freedom of association in which political parties are authorized and the establishment of professional associations is permitted such as Mauritania, Tunisia, Morocco, Jordan, Algeria between 1988 and 1991, Yemen, and Kuwait. The second group includes countries where various civil society associations exist but they are heavily controlled by the presence of a dominant or single party. This group includes Arab countries that used to be- or still- deemed radical such as Libya, Syria, Iraq and Sudan. The third group comprises countries where freedom of association is not witnessed either for political parties, professional associations, or trade unions. This group includes most Gulf countries, except a few such as Qatar, Kuwait and UAE.

Based on Al-Sayyid’s typology, I identify three types of relationships between Arab civil society and Arab political systems. The first type reveals an embryonic civil society with a relatively friendly relationship with the political systems within which they operate. The second type discloses a relationship of suppression from the part of political regimes; the third type divulges a non-existence of any relationship owing to the non-presence of civil society institutions. The type of relationship between civil society and political systems does also suggest that there is a connection between political liberalization and the emergence and growth of civil society. In other words, there is a mutual enhancement between the process of democratization and the development of a strong civil society in which each one contribute into stimulating and developing the other.

Despite the disparity between Arab states in the development of an active civil society, Ibrahim has generally considered this development a promising one and identifies many factors that

have contributed, and will contribute, into the growth of Arab civil society. I categorized these factors into internal and regional. The internal factors include the growing number of new socio-economic entities such as trade unions, professional associations and social movements. In so saying, most Arab governments find controlling these steadily growing organizations a difficult task. The regional factors refer to the prolonged regional armed conflicts which have drained states’ resources and weakened their power. These factors have pushed the agenda of civil society forward in many countries, but the progress remains sluggish taking into consideration that the Arab experience of civil society is relatively new and it goes without saying that new experiences often encounter numerous challenges.

The first and foremost challenge which encounters civil society in the Arab world is the inability of its components to communicate their ideas and put their messages across. This is mainly owing to the state’s control of the media which goes beyond the national level to include collective measures to control the transnational broadcasting. Lacking a communication platform through which civil society can address Arab constituencies remains the key challenge that hinder the development of the sector. Without such a communication tool, civil society can not uncover the oppressive practices of Arab regimes against human rights organizations; additionally, they cannot effectively raise peoples’ awareness on certain pressing issues of direct concern to Arabs. In short, without a powerful communication tool, civil society in the Arab world can hardly fulfil the aforementioned functions and, therefore, it is difficult to talk about empowering civil society in the Arab world and its potential contribution in the democratic transtion throughout the region.

5. The Role of Al-Jazeera in Empowering Civil Society in the Arab world

Before venturing into investigating how does Al-Jazeera empower civil society in the Arab world, it is important to justify its choice from a wide range of other Arab transnational broadcasters. First, Al-Jazeera continues to command the largest share of Arab news market. 53% of Arabs identified Al-Jazeera as their first choice for news. Second, Al-Jazeera maintains a relatively large margin of freedom in comparison with its counterparts in the region. This allows the channel to encompass various views on different issues. Third. Al-Jazeera is also the most controversial among the newly emerging Arab satellite broadcasters not only in the Arab world, but also in the West; this was translated into banning and boycotting the channel’s broadcasting in many Arab countries the last of which was Morocco after the 2007 Moroccan parliamentary elections. All these reasons make Al-Jazeera a unique case for examining the role of Arab satellite broadcasting in empowering civil society in the Arab world.

Al-Jazeera plays an important role in empowering civil society organizations, especially those working on issues of freedoms, human rights and political reform. The empowerment is reflected in the considerable attention Al-Jazeera gives to such organizations both in its website and broadcastings in an attempt to make their voice heard and help them to voice out their concerns. In order to test the accuracy of such a hypothesis, I did a content analysis of www.aljazeera.net and three randomly selected broadcasts.

2008 Media Viewership
Aggregate
When you watch international news, which of the following network's news broadcasts do you watch most often?

- Al Jazeera, 53%
- Al Arabiya, 9%
- An Egyptian Network, 17%
- MBC, 7%
- LBC, 3%
- Al Manar, 2%
- Morocco TV, 2%
- Al Hurra, 2%
- Other, 2%

Al-Jazeera’s Website
Fig 3. aljazeera.net home page
I conducted a content analysis of Al-Jazeera’s website (www.aljazeera.net) in Arabic on April 10, 2009. It is important to point out that the date was randomly selected as it coincided with writing this paper. The purpose of the content analysis was to find out how much attention does Al-Jazeera give to issues pertaining to civil society organizations in the Arab world. The website’s menu contains four main sections; namely, *akhbar* (news), *almaarifa* (knowledge), *iktsad and aamal* (business and economics), and *huriyat and hukuk* (rights and freedoms). I found around 56 entries/articles in the four sections which cover a wide variety of issues ranging from politics, economics, natural disasters, human rights violations, to name a few. Some of these articles were published on April 10, 2009 and others dated back to a couple of days before. I skimmed over the titles in an attempt to decrease the number of articles and rule out the irrelevant ones based on two main criteria. First, the article should be related to the Arab world in general or to a particular Arab country. Therefore, the articles that are related to other countries were ruled out. Second, the article should deal with issues related to the activities of Arab civil society organizations.

The above sifting left the analysis with 19 articles; that is, one third of the total articles found most of which are related to rights and freedoms. Geographically speaking, these 19 articles cover many countries including Morocco (1), Egypt (2), Yemen (1), Libya (1), Sudan (1), Tunisia (1), Qatar (1), Palestine (3), Mauritania (1), UAE (1) in addition to six articles about the Arab world in general. As far as the subject matter is concerned, the articles mainly covered the activities of the organizations that deal with rights and freedoms. Understanding that analyzing the content of these articles remains beyond the scope of this paper, I briefly summarize the issues covered. The most salient issue was freedom of speech and the everlasting battle between Arab governments and journalists’ associations in an attempt to gain more freedom and less governments’ censorship. Second, there was the issue of human rights and the tireless struggle of Arab human rights associations to denounce human trafficking in Gulf countries, which remain a common destination for South and Southeast Asians. They serve as domestic workers and unskilled laborers and often fall victims to involuntary servitude, excessive
working hours and nonpayment of salaries as well as sexual and physical abuse. Furthermore, there was a reference to the Arab human rights associations’ advocacy for improving the situation of detainees in Arab prisons and guaranteeing fair and transparent trials for political prisoners. Another salient issue was the active Arab businesswomen association which had met in Oman and came up with a set of recommendations for the G-20 summit that took place in London April 2, 2009. This is in addition to other miscellaneous issues such as children’s rights and the untiring efforts of Arab organizations to limit child’s labor and promote girls’ education. Table 1 below summarizes the titles of these articles.

Table 1. Al-Jazeera’s Website: A Content Analysis of Al-Jazeera’s Coverage of the activities of Arab Civil Society Organizations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country/Region</th>
<th>Title of the Articles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| General to the Arab World | • Who can realize the motto “Children First”  
  • Arab human rights organizations reject deporting 1200 Tunisians from Italy.  
  • The family of a Yemeni prisoner in Afghanistan asks Obama to release him.  
  • Prisons in the Arab World.  
  • The stumbling blocks for establishing freedoms in the Arab region.  
  • Arab Businesswomen Association’s recommendations to the G-20 in London.  
  • The Palestinian Center for Human Rights condemns the Israeli arrests in the West Bank.  
  • The situation of human rights in the occupied territories is worsening.  
  • Palestinian journalists protest against censorship.  
  • Egyptian human rights activists and journalists ask Mubarak to stop arresting bloggers.  
  • An urgent plea from Arab human rights associations to Cairo to respect its promises for freedom of press.  
  • A Qatari institution launched a |
| Palestine | |
| Egypt | |

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Qatar | campaign for human dignity against human trafficking.
---|---
Sudan | The battle between Sudan and Arab human rights organizations.  
       | The Tunisian opposition accuses the government of marginalizing it after banning its newspaper. 
Tunisia | A Yemeni human rights organization accuses the Yemeni government for torturing female detainees and sell their children. 
Yemen | Nouakchott releases a journalist and dis-bans an electronic newspaper. 
Morocco | Human rights movement in Morocco between promises and consensus. 
Libya | The compensation verdicts revealed issues of torture in Libya. 
UAE | Human rights activists criticize the new communication law in UAE.

The fact that there is a significant attention from the part of Al-Jazeera to covering various activities of Arab civil society organizations would play an important role in empowering them due to the wide reach of Al-Jazeera’s website which is the most visited website in the Arab world (approximately 2 million page views a day) and one of the top 200 most visited websites in the world according to Alexa.com.41 This would ease the main challenge that encounter these organizations; that is, the lack of a communication tool whereby they can voice out their concerns and put across their messages. However, one might argue that despite the wide reach of Al-Jazeera’s website, this latter can only be used by the elite or, more correctly, the computer literate, which represent a small part of the Arab populace. For this reason, a more encompassing analysis of Al-Jazeera’s broadcasts is needed owing to their broader reach.

6. Al-Jazeera’s Broadcasts

A similar analysis of three live programs was conducted during the first and second week of April, 2009 (April 1-12). It is also important to emphasize that this timeframe was randomly selected as it just coincided with writing this paper. These programs are *Lil-Nissa’ Faqat*, *Al-Ittijah al-Muakiss* and *Hiwar Maftouh*. Since the main purpose of this paper is to find out how does Al-Jazeera activate and empower Arab civil society organizations, I was mainly interested in the topic, guests, and the issues being discussed in each program rather than engaging in a discourse analysis to examine how the issues were framed. Before summing up the findings, I shall briefly introduce the randomly chosen programs.

For the fifth year in a row, *Al-Ittijah al-Muakiss* (the opposite direction) continues its tireless pursuit of daring controversial topics, and remains one of the most popular talk shows and most interactive programs amongst the Arabic-language Satellite Channels. Every Week, Dr. Faisal Al Qassem, a former BBC journalist, moderates a debate between two personalities with opposing views on a particular issue. Second, there is *Lil-Nissa’ Faqat* (for women only) which is usually presented by Montaha Al-Ramahi and geared particularly towards women. Women from all over the world, especially Arab women are invited to express their points of view about critical social, political, scientific and environmental issues. As it is the case with most of Al-Jazeera’s programs, audience input is vital to the show where Arabs, especially women participate directly to the program through phone calls. Third, there is *Hiwar Maftouh* (open dialogue) where Arab decision makers and intellectuals answer questions live from the audience on topics of Arab interests. A summary of findings is included in tables 2, 3, and 4 below.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Host</th>
<th>Topic of Discussion</th>
<th>Guests</th>
<th>Point of Discussion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Apr 3, 09</td>
<td>Fairuz Zayani</td>
<td>Sexual exploitation of Children,</td>
<td>Sarour Qarwany: consultant for a humanitarian development possibilities</td>
<td>- Examples of children’s sexual exploitation in Morocco.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Maha al-Hamsssa: is a manager of the program for children’s protection in the Jordan office of UNICEF.</td>
<td>- Sexual exploitation of children and the lack of statistics.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Iza Karim: professor of education in the national center for social and criminal research</td>
<td>- Psychological effects of sexual attacks on children.</td>
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<td>- Social effects of children’s sexual exploitation.</td>
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<td>- Ways to identify molested children.</td>
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<td>- Protected methods against sexual harassment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr 7, 09</td>
<td>Louna ash-Shebl</td>
<td>The New York Conference and Women’s rights</td>
<td>Azat al-Hur Marwa: general coordinator for the Lebanese national project to eliminate discrimination against women</td>
<td>- Arab civil society organization and the external agendas.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Ignoring cultural differences in Beijing’s agreement on women’s rights.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr10</td>
<td>Louna ash-Shebl</td>
<td>the culture of voluntary work in the Arab women's charitable organizations</td>
<td>Amany Qandyl</td>
<td>executive director of the Arab Network for Arab national organizations. the former president of the Lebanese Women’s Council</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Iqabal Doghan</td>
<td>- the role of the Arab women in less privileged areas. - evaluation of the performance of Arab charitable organizations. - women’s role in the work of charitable organizations. - traditions and customs that hinds women’s work as volunteers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mana Shishtar</td>
<td>- true sexual freedom and women’s enablement.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Moha Aby Diya Shimass - head of the woman’s center for the direction of constitution in Cairo
Aliya al-Karady - Iraqi researcher for gender and women’s affairs
Amany Qandyl - executive director of the Arab Network for Arab national organizations. the former president of the Lebanese Women’s Council
Iqabal Doghan - the former president of the Lebanese Women’s Council
Mana Shishtar - activist the domain of voluntary work
## Table 3. Al-Ittijah al-Muakiss: A Content Analysis of the Program’s Discussed topics and Received Guests

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Host</th>
<th>Topic of Discussion</th>
<th>Guests</th>
<th>Point of Discussion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Apr 1, 09| Faical Al-Kassim| the [Nairobi] peace accord in Sudan                                                   | Ghazy Suleiman chairman of the National Coalition to restore Democracy in Sudan | - Religious, cultural, and political pluralism and the danger of dividing Sudan.  
- Dividing the wealth between the North and the South and its problems.  
- The foreign role behind the peace accord and its implications.  
- The situation of Sudan during the transitional period.                      |
|          |                 |                                                                                        | Hassan Saty A Sudanese journalist and writer                           |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |
| Apr 7, 09| Faical Al-Kassim| of police states and the political friction in Lebanon and Syria                      | Abd al-Razaq Eid founding member of the committee for reviving civil society in Syria | - The Syrian internal movement Vs the security core.  
- the discourse of the opposition against Syria.  
- the reasons behind the Syrian political rigidity.                                                                 |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |
<p>|          |                 |                                                                                        | Karim al-Shybany head of the Syrian National Democratic Party          |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Host</th>
<th>Topic of Discussion</th>
<th>Guests</th>
<th>Point of Discussion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Apr 2, 09</td>
<td>Ghassan Bin Jeddou</td>
<td>The Arab future and the issue of freeform</td>
<td>Burhan Ghalioun professor of sociology at the university of Paris and director of the Center for Contemporary Oriental Studies</td>
<td>- The secret behind the silence of the Arab population.</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Moustafa Al-Faqi the head of the Egyptian National Assembly’s Foreign Affairs Committee</td>
<td>- Arabs between reform and change.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Reform between civil society and authority.</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- the internal dispute about openness and external intervention.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apr 9, 09</td>
<td>Ghassan Bin Jeddou</td>
<td>The Arab popular movement</td>
<td>Issam Khalifa a professor of history in the Lebanese University</td>
<td>- Popular pressure and the opportunities for change.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Assa’ad Abu-Khalil Professor of political science in the University of California</td>
<td>- Popular pressure and the external intervention.</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ala Maddy foundation of the middle party and the Kiffayah movement in Egypt</td>
<td>- Democracy between national and foreign agenda.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Arab popular movements in the context of global movements.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
7. Al-Jazeera and Democratic Transition in the Arab World: Discussion and Conclusion

Taking into consideration the randomly selected timeframe for analyzing the content of the website and the three broadcasts, the above content analysis reveals a strong attention from the part of Al-Jazeera to civil society organizations in the Arab world. This attention can be effortlessly inferred from the topics chosen by the hosts and the guests who mostly represent civil society organizations. The appearance of such national organizations on Al-Jazeera shall doubtlessly empower them, especially if we know that 70% of Arabs who own satellite dishes tune in to Al-Jazeera for news and political information, which also include Arab communities in the US and Europe.  

This is in addition to Al-Jazeera’s command on the largest share of Arab news market as, approximately, 60% of Arabs mentioned Al-Jazeera as their first choice for news. In so saying, Al-Jazeera plays an important role in removing the major stumbling block that hinders the development of Arab civil society organizations; that is, a popular communication platform whereby they can present themselves to the Arab populace, channel their mission, and put their messages across. Furthermore, the topics discussed and the guests received in these programs reveal a clear focus on issues of political reform and freedoms in the Arab world which indicates the role of such a media outlet in creating a free and open space where issues of democracy can be debated freely and openly.

Free and open debate on issues of democracy and political reform remains important for a smooth democratic transition as it is difficult for citizens to effectively participate, organize, and freely choose among political alternatives without a context of political freedom. The processes of democratic transition have often been a point of academic interests since the early 1980s, especially for political scientists. This academic surge started with


examining the democratization of the remaining authoritarian regimes in Southern Europe in addition to the continuing processes in Latin America. This was followed by a relatively similar process in East and Southeast Asia, Africa- to a lesser extent- as well as the most dramatic transformation of former communist regimes in Eastern and Central Europe. This marked the beginning of a new era of scholarship which is often referred to as the third wave of global democratization. Surprisingly enough, the process of democratization in the Arab world was given a little or no attention by scholars of comparative politics. To illustrate, O’Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead’s groundbreaking comparative study of transitions from authoritarian rule do not refer to any Arab country in their volume. Similarly, Dimaond, Linz, and Lipset’s four-volume study of democratic politics in the developing world excluded most of the Arab world claiming that ‘the Islamic countries of the Middle East and North Africa generally lack much previous democratic experience, and most appear to have little prospect of transition to even semi-democracy.’ The interests started to emerge in the mid 1990s, especially from social scientists who focus on the Middle East. However, most of these contributions (e.g. Yom, S.L. 2005; Plattner, M.F. & Diamond, L. 2002; Handelman, H. Tessler, M.A., & Kellogg, H. 2000; Pratt, N.C. 2007; Ottaway, M. & Choucair-Vizoso, J. 2008) remain ad hoc in the sense that they were not able to identify the theoretical issues to studying the specificities of political change in the Arab world such as the important players which usually take part in the democratic transition and lead the process of enhancing democratization. In other words, they mostly examine Arab democratization process in the light of previous transitional democratic experiences, especially in Southern, Eastern and Central Europe. In so saying, I was

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interested in the available literature on the vital actors which escort and lead the transition process.

The mainstream transition theory emphasizes the role of political elites and civil society in carrying out the political reform and leading the democratization process. Similarly, Stepan and Linz argue that the role of political elites, especially at important moments and crises, is decisive in the democratic transition of a particular society. On the other hand, Baker relates civil society associations and movements to the role of the elites and argues that these organizations provide the conditions for the elites to negotiate democratic transitions. In brief, the democratic transition theory considers political reform and democratization a function of political elites and civil society organizations, but not of the media.

Clearly, mainstream democratic transition theorists have rarely considered media, especially TV, to be a catalyst for democratic change. McConnell & Becker attribute this assumption to two major factors. First, they argue that politics or market forces seem to dominate the media which can either be subject to industrial forces or be controlled by the state. Second, media content is mostly influenced by actors such as governments, lobbies and political parties. This makes the media a reactor rather than a pro-actor in the democratic transition as it cannot be a driving force in this process because it is a vulnerable player

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which is usually forced to follow the flow. An attempt to read the transition theory in the light of Al-Jazeera’s case reveals two main limitations for this theory. First, the theory was mainly concerned with the state-based media but not for the transnational satellite channels that transcend countries’ national borders in an attempt to establish a new public space where issues of democracy and political reform can be debated. Second, the case of Al-Jazeera ridicules the second factor because although it is funded by Qatar’s royal family, it enjoys an unparalleled margin of freedom in the Arab World which was a source of a lot of diplomatic tension between the Qatari government and the Arab as well as Western governments; the Qatari government keeps turning down the complaints about Al-Jazeera’s coverage of certain issues and emphasizing the editorial independence of Al-Jazeera. All in all, the fact that Al-Jazeera plays an important role in empowering Arab civil society shall make the network a potentially significant contributor in the democratic transition of the Arab region. Therefore, it is crucial to reconsider the role of media in democratic transitions, especially with the emergence of such satellite networks.

Bibliography


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BOOK REVIEWS


Author: Kira D. Baiasu
The American University in Cairo

Democratization in the Middle East has preoccupied scholars for decades, but the 2002 U.S. invasion of Iraq and President George W. Bush’s subsequent announcement of an initiative to spread democracy in the region brought the issue to the forefront of public debate. *Egypt after Mubarak* explores the ideological platforms of political reform deriving from Egypt’s major oppositional forces, primarily the judiciary, the Muslim Brotherhood, and the business sector. Bruce Rutherford assays the prospects of this liberal agenda leading to democracy. The wealth of information presented and insightful analysis makes this book an essential read for anyone interested in Egyptian politics or democratization in the Middle East.

Tackling the question of Egypt’s future post-Mubarak, the book aims to conjecture on the political prospects of the country through a study of secular and Islamist opposition groups whose reform agendas converge around diverse manifestations of liberalism. In addition, Rutherford seeks to decipher the differences between Egyptian forms of liberalism and classical liberalism as well as demonstrate that liberalism and democracy are two autonomous concepts. Citing scholars such as Peter Hall and Theda Skocpol, Rutherford takes a historical institutionalist approach to understanding the hybrid nature of the Egyptian regime and the political change that “occurs as a result of critical junctures that weaken old institutions and strengthen others” (p.25).

Relying on an array of solid sources in both English and Arabic, the book effectively outlines the evolution of liberal constitutionalism within the judiciary in chapter two and the
emergence of Islamic constitutionalism within the Muslim Brotherhood’s doctrine in chapter three. Utilizing court rulings, legal journals, political documents, and interviews with key players, the book determines that both the Muslim Brotherhood and the Egyptian judiciary hold a view of politics and law that is liberal. However, the judges are more comfortable with a powerful and invasive state than the classically liberal ideal, believing the role of the state is to defend the public interest through fostering economic growth, maintaining order, and protecting citizens’ rights. Islamic constitutionalists also diverge from the classically liberal model, regarding the state’s purpose as enforcer of Islamic law. The Muslim Brotherhood pictures a more intrusive state to ensure the construction of a pious community.

The book demonstrates that while liberal constitutionalism is grounded in secularism and Islamic constitutionalism is based on divine revelation, their differences in practice are not so great. Both believe in constraints on the state, strengthening the rule of law, and protecting some civil and political rights, while emphasizing the interest of the community over the individual. Rutherford’s strength lies in his ability to not only uncover the features that distinguish one form of liberalism from another but also to identify the ways in which their similarities coalesce to contribute to the greater movement toward political liberalism.

Continuing its examination of the principal forces advocating for liberal reform, the book canvasses the causal effects of Mubarak’s privatization program, in response to pressures from the World Trade Organization and International Monetary Fund. The program led the business sector and the Egyptian Center for Economic Studies (ECES) to champion political reform in the area of laws and procedures pertaining to the economy and the functioning of businesses, calling for trade liberalization, the rule of law, and a dispersal of power amongst the three branches of government. Rutherford astutely ascertains that while the government may not be moving toward democratization, it does recognize the benefits of liberalization, particularly in the economic sphere. The National Democratic Party, the governing political party, has assumed many aspects of the ECES’ policy
agenda appointing Gamal Mubarak, the president’s son, to the Guidance Committee of the General Secretariat, which has worked to decrease the role of the state in the economy and expand the private sector.

One of Rutherford’s shortcomings is his failure to clearly apply theory to his analysis. The book places economic transformation within a historical context discussing how Nasser’s state control over the public sector, subsidy system, and bureaucracy permitted the autocracy to persist. Eventually, this system that left little money for economic development was impossible to uphold and Sadat’s *infitah* policies, which were advanced by Mubarak, turned away from statism and toward privatization and free trade. According to Rutherford, “By abandoning any pretense of upholding the basic premises of statism, the regime created an opportunity for alternative conceptions of the polity to develop and gain broader support” (p.140), which gave rise to liberal constitutionalism and Islamic constitutionalism. At this crux in the discussion it would have been helpful for the author to identify the connection between the fall of the Egyptian statist system and the historical institutionalist concept, articulated in the introduction, that opportunities for political change rise out of critical junctures, such as economic decline, that weaken old institutions. Unfortunately, Rutherford forgoes the chance to place the economic transformation within his stated analytical framework.

The ingenuity of Rutherford’s assessment lies in his distinction between liberalism and democracy. Western nations are most familiar with the concept of liberal democracy, yet the book illustrates that liberalism and democracy are separate concepts deriving from separate processes. While liberalism is a set of institutions and relationships between institutions that protect citizens’ basic rights and constrain state power, democracy denotes decision makers being selected through fair and honest elections. Aversion to advocating for democratic reform and broad public participation in politics is reflected in the stance of the Muslim Brotherhood, the business sector, the NDP, and the Judges’ Club. Judges support limiting state power and holding the
state accountable to the rule of law, but they distrust mass public participation in politics believing it may lead to disorder.

While Egyptian liberalism is progressing, Rutherford argues that prospects for Egyptian democratization are poor, particularly after amendments to the constitution adopted in 2007 that show signs of deepening authoritarianism. However, Rutherford remains optimistic, outlining the ways that liberalism may facilitate the development of an autonomous private sector, thus, aiding in the democratization process. Egypt will most probably remain a hybrid state, but the separation of liberalism and democracy may provide an alternative path for the country.

Again overlooking the occasion to place ideas within the theoretical framework constructed in the introduction, the author is unsuccessful in applying the hybrid regime concept to his findings. It appears that his intention was to adduce the development of liberalism separate from democracy as an indication that Egypt is a hybrid regime not necessarily transitioning toward democratization. While the introduction delineates the features of hybrid regimes at length, the writing does not make mention of hybrid states again until the conclusion, and even then the author desists from connecting the concept to his analysis of the emergence of a liberal reform agenda that shies away from promoting mass participation in the political process.

Overall, *Egypt after Mubarak* is a perceptive and informative achievement. Rutherford should be lauded for his progressive approach to political science. Rather than being constrained by a particular methodology, he skillfully uses history as an analytical tool to deduce the manner in which institutions shape political outcomes. Through an investigation that incorporates the multifarious, interdependent elements that affect institutions and political decision making, the author successfully identifies the factors that may lead to political change in Egypt.

Author: Martino Bianchi

The Maastricht Treaty as a milestone in European integration is a topic that after almost 20 years is still important to understand the nature of EU. As the main literature about Maastricht point out, it has not only hugely reformed the institutional framework and the competences of EU, but it has also set a benchmark, if not the boundaries, for the following reforms: the European Monetary Union, the subsidiary principle, an expanded role for the European Parliament, and the “pillar structure” are just the most discussed ones. For these reasons scholars that try to analyse recent evolution of EU with a path-dependent and diachronic point of view are able to give important insights, avoiding rough simplifications of such a complex topic.

The new volume “Back to Maastricht: Obstacles to Constitutional Reform within the EU Treaty (1991-2007)” is clearly oriented toward this kind of analysis: it is a collective contribution, edited by Stefania Baroncelli, Carlo Spagnolo and Leila Simona Talani and published by Cambridge Scholars Publishing, whose aim is to give a crosscut on various issues of European integration. The focus is not set on a single topic, but it’s set on a broad bunch of themes related to Maastricht Treaty. Indeed, the analysis goes far beyond the intended timeline (1991-2007) and, obviously, beyond a simple analysis of the treaty itself. Hence, the contributions cover many crucial areas of European integration: from the institutional framework of the new European polity, to the critical issue of European citizenship, but the wider part of the book covers the historical roots of the monetary union and its development, as well as on the interactions between the monetary union and the main economical policies enforced by the EU and by the member states.

In this respect, the book is an outstanding contribution for all scholars broadly interested in European politics and policies, but it
lacks a precise focus. The eclectic range of topic addressed in the book is mirrored in the number and expertise of the authors. In fact, the book is a collection of eighteen articles, written scholars with different academic background: law, history, economics, political sciences and sociology.

While the topics addressed and the methodologies employed are hugely diverse, the common link between all articles is given by the underling approach used in describing the recent developments of EU: what all the authors do is to produce a dynamic explanation of EU integration, rather than a static description. As a consequence, each article tend to look at the consequential changes occurred in EU polity and its policies, to find the roots of any major change in the previous situation and to disclose the political or scientific dialectic that led the evolution. Generally they try to show how the actual reforms enforced in the past were the result of a mediation between different standing points in a changing environment, rather than a conflict in a static structure of power. It’s important to note that this approach overcome the traditional division between intergovernmentalist and federalist approaches, in order to give wider and more comprehensive assessments of the “state of art” in European integration. There is a systematic attempt to break the classic divisions in the scientific literature and to produce an innovative theoretical framework.

Particularly significant, in this respect, is Serena Giusti’s article “What have the implications of Maastricht criteria in the 2004 Enlargement been? The point of view of Central European Countries”. This contribution gives an overview of the interactions between EU and new member states in each stage of the accession process (pre-accession, accession, post-accession) and, at the same time, describes the internal dynamics of new members’ politics. The result highlights the huge merits of the dynamic approach adopted in this book: moving from a single issue (i.e. 2004 enlargement) it manage to produce an in depth analysis of the variable interactions between different actors in a long period and to link this changing environment to the changes occurred in power-relations and in the legal framework. Despite the length, this contribution is one of the most interesting
analysis of EU 2004 enlargement that can be found in the literature, and, in our opinion, this is specifically due to the theoretical approach chosen.

Similarly, Francisco Torres’ “The Long Road to EMU: The Economic and Political Reasoning behind Maastricht”, gives an outstanding insight in the long process that links the decline of Bretton Woods system to the introduction of the European Monetary System and the European Monetary Union. The analysis carried out by the author connects the slow convergence that occurred between policy preferences of the member states and the political bargaining that took place between them to overcome the differences and to reach a compromise that could absorb both the monetarist’s standing-point and the economist’s one: “rather than distinguishing between the EMS and EMU in terms of their Keynesian or monetarist [...] theoretical foundations, the different [...] successful political compromises [...] can be explained in terms of convergence of preferences over time, tempered of course by [...] the corresponding bargaining power of each camp” (p. 204). Interestingly, the editors of the book present also a paper that directly opposes to this claim, thus giving to the reader a good overview of different theories: “The long road to EMU: Determinants and Theoretical Foundations of the EMS and EMU”, written by Pompeo Della Posta.

As we have seen, the main criticism that can be raised to this contribution is the lack of a precise focus: in fact, this is neither a systematic study of Maastricht treaty, neither an in depth analysis of a specific area of EU intervention. On the contrary, it’s a collection of interesting papers on various themes loosely connected with Maastricht Treaty: as a consequence, it’s not really clear which is the aim of this book, and probably it was more appropriate to publish each paper in a specific academic journal, in order to improve the visibility of each single contributions. This impression is strengthened observing that some of the most interesting papers are those covering not big issues of EU integration, on which a vast literature is already available, but some more recent development (and hence less closely related to Maastricht Treaty), and topics generally not central in the literature. In this respect, the title of the book is
slightly misleading because explicitly covers just one of the topic of the book and, hence, the book seems to give an insight only in political issues related to EU institutions.

Moreover, the academic disciplines related to the inquiry of the different topics covered by the book are diverse and there is no clear methodological approach. Each author chooses its own methodology: we move from the historical constructivist of Carlo Spagnolo’s introduction, to the refined legal analysis of Julio Baquero Cruz and Bruno de Witte, from the analysis strictly rooted in political science’s methodology of Philippe Schmitter, to the macroeconomical and financial analysis of Paul De Grauwe. Hence, the final result is jeopardized by this lack of coherence: the book doesn’t flows consequentially from a topic to another, but it’s more a collection of pictures, whose intrinsic value is, indeed, particularly high.


Author: Monika Dąbrowska
University of St Andrews

In spite of the changed zeitgeist of European international relations in the 21st century the lingering perception of existential uncertainty remains topical and one can safely assume that more than twenty years of peaceful coexistence is needed to eradicate it totally. Thus, even though the scope of security studies had changed, and the deepened and broadened agenda acquired a new and complex significance, the role of power, the nature of security relations and the conceptions of identity still constitute the fulcrum for researchers wishing to advance our understanding of the dilemmas of regional security studies. Exploring whether the power differentials are of little importance or are they still politically significant, Security Strategies, Power disparity, and Identity: The Baltic Sea Region invites the reader to an insightful journey to learn more about unequal power relations between the countries of the Baltic Sea region.
Security, power, and identity, the three intrinsically interwoven phenomena, stand at the focal point in this insightful analysis of security relations in the Baltic Sea region. Acknowledging that power influences both the security choice and the identity choice, the authors set an ambitious task of researching under what conditions unequal power may prevent or encumber the emergence of cooperative security understood not as the lateral relations between respective countries of the region, but rather as the actions undertaken by group of states with various power, security needs and conceptions of identity. Wishing to explore the possible effects of power disparity on cooperative security and integration, the authors tackle the issues of progress towards cooperative security versus the threat perceptions often enhanced by power disparity; the influence of strong group identities, and the role of concrete conflicts and specific interests in security context.

This volume edited by Olav F. Knudsen constitutes a collection of papers by distinguish scholars: fine examples of considered thought, careful yet innovative theoretical approaches, meticulous empirical analyses, and sound knowledge of the field. Chapter 3 traces the development of events and ideas relating to security in the Baltic Sea region and although it says little of the origins or possible reasons for its specificity and is, at best, succinct on Russia’s role, it provides the reader with much needed factual overview. Chapter 4 offers a brilliant account of “an identity dimension to security choice and a security dimension to identity choice” (p. 51). The author explains the politic of ‘having a cookie and eating it too’ and explores the strategy of balancing between remaining Finnish and Swedish and institutionalizing national security. The emphasis on identity aspect might not be satisfying for everyone however for the question why these two strategies differ from the policies of the other states in the region does not appear; especially lacking is the comparison with Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, so different in their security approach. Another focal point of analyses presented in the book is the possible change of state structures relative to integration processes and other transnational phenomena, like international cooperation of expert groups: Chapter 5 focuses on the role and impact of epistemic
communities, while Chapter 6 brings into a view the societal factor and via discourse analysis examines how and to what extent identities mediate power disparity. These findings are particularly interesting when one compares them with Chapter 3 propositions. Finally, Chapter 7 broadens the security context of the volume by approaching the debate from the perspective of information technologies as an additional power resource through the case studies and Chapter 8 surveys the Baltic Sea region security landscape using the game theory as an analytical tool. The abundance of games makes this somewhat pick-and-choose chapter slightly overwhelming, especially for those not too well familiarized with the game theory, particularly if they read the chapter first and the appendix explaining the arcana of the applied methodology second. The concluding chapter revisits the working hypothesis and earlier theoretical assumptions and scrutinizes them in the view of empirical findings from the volume.

Just mere description of what the book offers highlights its greatest strength and simultaneously it greatest weakness. Since it is a collection of essays, on the one hand it offers extremely broad perspective when it comes to topics and methodology, yet at the same time, the reader might be under impression that the authors of respective chapters talk together but too rarely to each other. The book endeavours to be a comparative study, however it needs to be emphasized that the study cases are not evenly distributed. Although the regional breadth is impressive, some areas are not covered. While a reader will find a lot of information about Finland or Sweden (also Estonia has its fair share), those wishing to know more about Latvia or Lithuania will be left wanting. Similarly, it would have been useful to have concluded some other aspects of security, for instance its economic or environmental dimensions. Also, some political scientists will be perhaps irritated because mainly statist approach prevails in the volume. However, on the other hand, this contributes to methodological integrity and keeps the level of analysis stable. It needs to be underlined that the book is directed to a more mature reader – it assumes certain level of knowledge not only in political science (for instance the table of abbreviations is nowhere to be found: too bad if the reader does not remember what the PfP
stands for!) but also when it comes to the general knowledge about the region in question. The history is covered in Chapter 3, however, it is understandably a constrained and simplified version, and therefore there are cases of historical facts not accounted for in the short overview (because they are either too detailed or too old). Besides the conscientious considerations of various theoretical approaches, one of the unequivocal strengths of the volume is its interconnectedness: It goes beyond the sheer assortment of articles that happen to have similar topics or share the area of interests. This trait is especially visible in Chapter 8 where the theoretical propositions are tested against the empirical findings from other chapters.

With the demise of the Soviet Union and the majority of the countries in the region firmly socialized within the Western structures, be the European Union or NATO, is power as a threat concept the ghost of the past? By bringing forth many issues of an utmost importance for security studies on both regional and European levels, the book successfully examines these issues as they pertain to the countries in this geographical location. This brilliant composition of essays covers a wide variety of important topics. As an imaginative inquiry, clearly written and soundly organised, the book is a valuable contribution to our understanding of a security issues, identity transformations and a power play in the region. Overall, this well written and highly readable book is a perfect proposition for all students of security studies as well as for those interested in the recent developments in the Baltic Sea region.


Author: Konstantin Kilibarda
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Ananda Das Gupta’s *Corporate Citizenship: Perspectives in the New Century* is best classified as a general survey of corporate social responsibility’s (CSR) increasing relevance in an era of
globalization. Along these lines, Das Gupta offers readers a general introduction to CSR, including basic definitions of key terms and a general overview of its conceptual precepts. The book is therefore useful for those seeking a very quick introduction into themes broached by CSR-practice and particularly for those interested in the specific impediments to implementing CSR policies in developing countries (in general) and in India (in particular).

As the succinct introduction by Prof. David Crowther (editor of the *Social Responsibility Journal*) underlines, CSR can be traced to social contract theorists like Jean Jacques Rousseau and the related rights and responsibilities that individuals have with respect to the social whole. In a suggestive passage that resonates in the current context of a worldwide economic downturn, Crowther argues that at its best CSR can provide: “a way forward which negates the negative effects of an unregulated free global market” (Das Gupta 2008: x).

Although Das Gupta traces the origins of CSR practice to David Owen’s model communities established at New Lanark (Scotland) and the Quaker owned businesses of the 19th century, he argues that recent attention to CSR by larger corporate players is symptomatic of a growing shift in values among top executives and managers since the 1960s and 1970s. As a result, Das Gupta notes that corporations are increasingly less interested in ‘maximizing’ their profits as they are in ‘optimizing’ them, which is reflected by the shift away from a more narrow focus on ‘shareholder’ to a broader emphasis on ‘stakeholder’ interests.

CSR is thus marked by a relational and interactive approach to stakeholder interests that sets it apart from the unidirectional and non-participatory ‘charity’ of earlier philanthropic endeavors, according to Das Gupta. He highlights three distinct approaches to CSR that have emerged in recent years and that have influenced its popularity, including: (1) the advertising, or public relations approach, that sees CSR as fundamental to a firms ‘branding’ practice; (2) the socio-economic approach, which he attributes to ‘new economy’ entrepreneurs and their sensitivity to and understanding of the market’s limits if capitalism is to survive
in the longer term; and (3) the rights based approach positing that key stakeholders have “a right to know about corporations and their business” (Ibid: 139-140).

In the Indian context, Das Gupta traces CSR’s antecedents to the late-19th century philanthropic initiatives of the great Indian industrial houses tied to the Tata, Birla and Shriram families. For Das Gupta, CSR in the Indian context didn’t really come into its own until the 1990s – though earlier initiatives by J.R.D. Tata in the 1960s are noted - and is still often conflated with simply following government regulations. It’s translation into a more universal business practice on the sub-continent, argues Das Gupta, is impeded by the widespread corruption that exists as a result of a still expansive Indian bureaucracy (despite increasing liberalization), the instability created by ‘swadeshi fervor’ common during electoral cycles and a tendency to avoid initiatives unless the threat of strict penalties or sanctions is imminent.

The main impediment that confronts readers wishing to learn about CSR, however, is the poorly edited quality of Corporate Citizenship. Many sentences and paragraphs are repeated, transitions are sometimes far from smooth, headings don’t always correspond with the contents that follow, and formatting errors abound. The book consistently shifts from overly general overviews of broader social problems in a globalizing world (including discussions of ecological, socio-economic and spiritual issues) – not that these aren’t relevant to the complex environments in which enterprises increasingly operate in – to highly technical and extensive discussions of the recommendations, for example, of the 1999 Kumar Mangalam Committee Report on Corporate Governance prepared for the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI).

Furthermore, bloc quotations from corporate websites and blogs without much commentary and analysis, not to mention the scant index and literature review, do little to help the overall flow of the author’s arguments or enhance the texts usefulness to researchers. This is not to say that the book has no strong points. In particular Das Gupta’s contention that modern accounting
methods need to be seriously revised is interesting. Taking his queue from the scandals at Arthur Andersen and other high-profile accounting firms, Das Gupta argues that business practice needs to become more accountable, transparent and democratic in the face of increasingly knowledgeable and demanding publics and consumers.

The normative dimensions of CSR, at their best, should be embedded all along the supply chain, from initial supply of goods to the ultimate end users according to Das Gupta. The overly narrow focus on the black and red ink of financial accounting models tends to obscure both the costs and benefits of corporate activity on social, environmental, human and political processes. It is along these lines that Das Gupta argues that Indian business can gain from a greater integration of CSR values into its practices, making it both more competitive within India and globally (he cites the proactive changes made in the Indian carpet industry with respect to the use of child labour and toxic dyes to meet global consumer demand as an example).

Where Das Gupta falters, besides the aforementioned shortcomings of the book, is in the overly utopian and at times contradictory prescriptions he suggests. While on the one hand, he offers a number of practical considerations for business, the text is too burdened by a repetitive and disjointed narrative to allow for such insights to be quickly internalized by the reader. The foray into visionary arguments for a global ‘civilization’ mediated by scientific ‘truth’ and spiritual values has a tinge of science fiction to it, while the nods to the market and then subsequent resort to a sudden quotation from a ‘Youth for Social Action’ geocities website which claims that: “Capitalism isn’t the best we’ve got. A system that gears to meet the needs of the people – a socialist system – is the much decent [sic] and viable alternative” (Ibid: 79) is a bit too eclectic of a sampling of perspectives to provide a coherent narrative for some of the important issues Das Gupta raises.

In short, Corporate Citizenship is best read as an introductory text for those interested in new perspectives on Indian business and its approaches to CSR (a discussion mainly to be found in
Chapter Three), while it fails as a coherent general introduction to CSR. Nonetheless, for scholars working on Central and Eastern European politics, the book does offer some interesting discussions – from a comparative angle – of the political economy of corruption, foreign aid, and the transmission of global corporate values to new contexts that might be interesting to think about in more detail. Das Gupta should be commended for broaching some important themes worth thinking about, though readers should beware of the books somewhat halting readability and disjointed flow.


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The fall of communism increased the interest of the political scientists in the formation and functioning of totalitarian regimes. But, despite an impressive number of books, studies, direct interviews with main political actors, they are still many gaps regarding the level of transformation of those systems and the old patterns of behaviour resumed in the nascent democracies. Through a series of studies outlining the theoretical framework as well as the specific cases of Hungary, Poland, Russia and Ukraine, Gerd Meyer is making in elucidating the relation between formal institutions and informal politics in Central and Eastern Europe between 1989 and 2005.

The four countries took aftermath different democratic paths and the degree of communist heritage differs significantly. But, for the political science by the exploratory and pioneering character of the analysis, the diversity of the cases is contributing in a significant way to clarifying the concepts as well as the practical implications as a step forward in understanding the current situation. Meyer delineates the concepts and their contextual translations, while the other authors are centred on the relation
between formal institutions and informal politics in Hungary (Andras Bozoki and Eszter Simon), Poland (Aleksandra Wyromzumska and Gerd Meyer), Russia (Aitalina Azarova, case-study with information at the level of 2005, before the Putin’s new political position) and Ukraine (Kerstin Zimmer, until 2004/2005, mostly focused on the situation during Kuchma’s term in office).

Starting from the character and main mechanisms of informal politics as enacted by power elites, the authors are evaluating the degree of personalization in the daily politics, for documenting the ways in which national political cultures succeeded – or not – in establishing the minimum degree of legitimacy, required in democracies.

One important asset of the book relies in the use of the extensive qualitative researches. The opinion polls and the extended country-wide studies are not only a rich basis for designing future evolutions, but are also extremely resourceful in providing suggestions concerning the past behaviours. The data offered in the communist times were at least defective in offering accurate answers and evaluations.

Meyer is cautioning from the very beginning (p.15) the study exclusive focus on the political elite level, less attention being paid to actors as civil society or NGO and other interest groups. But civil society, in its various local translations, played an important role in the new political representations of the post-communist societies. Even if its voice is not always took into full consideration or, as in the Russian case, doing it could involve various – informal and formal - political retaliations, the networks of trust designed by the civil society as the role of reservoir for political leadership in many post-communist regimes, are of great importance. For the accuracy of the whole evaluation, not addressing this aspect could be the missing link.

The analysis is following four main hypotheses (pp.16-17): First, the political process follows both formal and informal patterns. Second, the state institution and formal rules are “moulded” or even “privatized” by leaders and elites groups. Third, old and new
patterns persists and are to be found in the constitutional building, institutions and ways in which the political actors are using the resources and opportunities. Last, it is a big difference between the popular support for “democracy” claimed by the leaders and the use and composition of democratic institutions and the current practices.

If the formal dimension of the political processes are mostly easy to define, analyse and with measurable effects – rules and stables norms (mostly written as laws, constitutional provisions etc.), officially defined and publicly declared as basic values (p.18), the informal dimension (pp.18-19) is dealing with patterns of interest formation and degree of influencing political decisions, being more fluid and not easy to catch in a universal formula. In this respect, the quantitative evaluation is the most useful tool in order to have a clear picture of the functioning of the informal networks in a given society. The informal level of politics is having a pendant in the process of personalization of politics, a phenomenon very much visible in the first post-communist decade and still present in the non-EU and NATO countries analyzed in the book – Russia and Ukraine. According to Meyer (pp.42-43) the specific conditions encouraging the personalization are: presidential systems or with a strong prime-minister, few restrictions for party financing; replacement of the top layer of nomenklatura with new individuals; new, but at least in the beginning, weak institutions; authoritarian and paternalist traditions of strong leadership; slow development of strong and stable political parties, unclear, weak or absent regulations for political parties. In addition, the Western import of political marketing and American style-television focused politics weakened considerably the substance of the already weak political systems from the post-communist countries.

Each of the case-studies is offering interesting food for thought. The analyses are far of being complete, but the opportunities for ulterior researches are impressive. In all the cases, the politics should be identified with a name: Putin, or the “Man is the program” in Russia (p.84); Orban Viktor, the former Hungarian charismatic prime-minister fuelling the nations’ dreams with “a vision of the future instead of entirely looking backward” (even, in
fact, most part of his visions were based on millenary historical and religious myths) (pp.170-1); the Polish president, as the individual currently in office, enjoyed always much higher popular than the legislative branches (p.196); or the Ukrainian system where the directions of change are given by the “constellation of actors at the time of independence”, with a high profile and a well managed structure of influence and support (p.269). Probably, the Polish case would need a broader evaluation, mostly in relation with the influence of non-political actors, as the Catholic Church, as informal and pressure group. As for Ukraine, a study regarding the current unfinished battle – in fact a never ending cycle of steps forward and backward, almost impossible to be predicted rationally – between various political groups and their ideological and geopolitical affiliations, will need a more in-depth and multi-level evaluation.

In various degrees, all over the world, the presence of the informal level of politics is a constant in all the political systems and institutions – as the EU and UN. The analysis of the Central and Eastern European systems is offering new elements of knowledge regarding the remaking of the political and institutional puzzle in post-communist, transition systems. They are enormous choices, based on the structures of the political elites and the historical and cultural profiles of the political systems and of the main actors.

The book is among first complete guides of the relation between informal and formal politics in this region and represents a valuable source of information and reference for all those interested in this area of study – from political scientists, economists, sociologists and journalists. The scholars in the area of post-communist studies are offered not only a new challenging theoretical background, but also an impressive amount of data and biographical references, opening an impressive number of ways of any further researches.

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Michael Mezey’s book is a tripartite look at the American Congress, Representation Theory and Comparative Legislative Studies. Indeed these three factors constitute a broad scope of political discourse, though the book does lend primary focus to the model of the US Congress and thus speaks directly of the normative variables of representation found in a modern democracy. Mezey’s work is both representative and a good propaganda for the half-a-century-old subfield of congressional studies, which had first flourished after the Second World War, inspired by the behavioral movement in political science.

The author indicates in the preface that the goal of ‘Representative Democracy’ is to make such an important subject accessible to college level students. It has the feel of a textbook, with an appendix that includes a list of 30 questions to be debated in class. But going beyond the two elements, Mezey’s synthesis is highly valuable for legislative scholars, for those who want to understand US politics and nonetheless for the actors themselves. The book deals comprehensively with the real and perceived shortages of the American representation system and as such is a valuable resource for politicians and constituents.

The first three chapters are mainly theoretical, discussing concepts like ‘anticipatory’ and ‘surrogate representation’, ‘expressive voting’ or ‘descriptive representation’. The advantages and disadvantages that come along with understanding the representation relationship in the light of principal-agent theory or of Hanna Pitkin’s theory of ‘responsiveness’ are also weighed and compared. The last chapter closes by presenting criticisms brought against representative institutions from both left and right oriented scholars. In doing so, Mezey analyzes potential solutions to a global trend of decreasing trust in legislatures - ‘more direct democracy’ measures, strengthening the executive,
term limits, ‘deliberative polling’ or ‘campaign spending caps’.

The three remaining chapters are more empirical in their approach. They document the link between constituents’ opinion and Congressional voting behavior, the values and perverted effects associated with constituency service and finally, the influence of moneyed interests on Members of Parliament (MPs, henceforth) and the reality, or impression of corruption that it conveys. Each of these chapters has a comparative section looking at the same phenomena in other political and geographical contexts; focusing on Europe and Latin America mainly, but references are also made to Australian and African legislatures.

What is most interesting in Mezey’s deconstruction of the American representation mechanisms is his sharp manner of judging their equity and fairness against the ‘national interest’ and minority concerns. Thus, the author illustrates with numerous telling cases, the way in which MPs’ individual responsiveness to constituency interests can and does often lead to collective irresponsibility (p. 194). This is a particularly strong argument because of the outburst of earmarks or allocational responsiveness, which induced negative effects on budget deficits and diverted money from the projects where they were needed.

The chapters on public policy and interest groups add to the image of systemic flaws of the US model of representation. Not surprisingly, the core defect in Mezey’s eyes is the ‘permanent campaign atmosphere within which the Congress operates’ (196). He is convincing in portraying the fund-raising pressure for MPs, which amounts to $30,000 a week for an average Senator. This framework explains their appetite for more and more campaign contributions coming from interest groups and lobbyists. In effect, this produces a dramatic loss in institutional credibility due to several corruption scandals and also frustrates the interests that do not dispose of large amounts of resources. Moreover, reelection concerns makes Congressmen risk averse since almost every vote is cast fearing the challenger’s 30 second negative commercial in the next election (p. 133). Of course, this aversion becomes easily damaging when unpopular policies are needed but
the MPs prefer not to act.

Despite the author’s vivid descriptions it may be difficult for a European legislative scholar to grasp such reelection fears while keeping in mind that the turnover rate is constantly around 5% for the House and less than 20% for the Senate. Mezey points out that, in the absence of any realistic possibility of limiting the influence of moneyed interests on MPs, the alternative solution would be to ‘broaden the spectrum of interest groups that have financial resources, so that politicians will not be beholden to only one side of a policy issue’ (p. 191). The author’s hopes in this perspective are related, idealistically or not, to a proliferation of mass membership organizations that will use their members’ fees to counterbalance the lobby made by the small but wealthy groups. Nevertheless, this seems quite an unrealistic and feeble expectation in an era of increasing citizen alienation.

On the other hand, Mezey proposes compelling answers to the question of how to reduce the pressure of campaign funding and the subsequent scandals associated with it. The first would be the excessively disliked policy of public funding for congressional campaigns, while the second would imply the creation of a congressional independent office that would ‘monitor the behavior of its members and deal with ethical issues’ (p.197).

Mezey’s book is important also because it acknowledges one of the most significant crisis symptoms of modern representative democracies, i.e. more and more citizens reject the very essence of what the legislative branch is supposed to do – deliberate and argue between alternatives, make compromises and even keep the status quo if no solution is reasonable (p.181 and p.193). Although Mezey does not mention it, this is even more a case in those political systems, often found in Latin America and Eastern Europe, where the above mentioned collective mood is incited by populist presidents having an anti-institutional stance, which demonizes first and foremost the legislative and its members. Under these conditions, should the whole representation scheme be rethought? Probably here the author takes the most radical posture of the entire book, since he seems ready to accept an almost complete change in the Congress’ role, meaning giving up to the executive some of the public policy competencies while
strengthening its oversight role (p. 196).

‘Representative Democracy’ can be read as the synthesis of more than fifty years of research on the American Congress and of the major findings coming from the comparative literature. One can not overlook the immense amount of work implied in reviewing the Congressional Record or the Congressional Quarterly, which allows Mezey to bring telling examples in support of his arguments and, more important, allows him to present the most up-to-date/complete ‘state of the art’ in legislative scholarship. This does not make the book a dry or overloaded piece, as the writing style is very reader-friendly. The author quotes, when discussing the impression of corruption brought by various earmarks or by some campaign donations made by lobby firms, the Democrat Congresswoman, Nancy Boyda, who said ‘Democracy is a contact sport’ (p. 119). With scholarly work like that of Professor Michael Mezey one can have the refreshing feeling that the honest, attentive referees have not completely disappeared from the game.


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The configuration of identity resides in a complex linkage of socio-political mechanisms and processes, as well as historical contingencies. The analyses encompassed in the volume under review address the origins, dynamics, role and function of various levels of identity: individual, ethnic, national, and supranational. Underlying in most of the approaches is the investigation of a distinct dimension of identity: the political one. The manifestations of cultural identities on the political arena are essential to the study of power relations configuration, especially in ethnically mixed states or in the relationship between state and supra-state structures. In this line of logic, the importance of
political elites in enhancing or reducing intergroup boundaries deserves scholarly investigation. By marking out belonging and identity, identity discourse contributes significantly to the positioning of social performers (individual and/or collective) that it describes antagonistically. It consequently shapes social and political relations, and has the capacity to influence the structure of the society itself. It provides a significant aid in endorsing social distance, but it can also prove a most powerful means to engender the cooperation of two or more groups in a society. Elites construct the political identity of those they represent by using this power tool. Identity becomes a political issue, and is no longer simply a cultural, private one. It becomes the mover of claims to political power.

Weighting Differences generously covers the political undertones of identity through a series of articles that symmetrically address multi-level and national identities, as well as provide an in depth analysis of the Romanian case. Apart from the political dimensions, the volume also ably explores economic, sociological and historical factors that describe the dynamics of identity. By narrowing down the range of analysis from the transnational (Daniel Dăianu, Vasile Boari, Mihai Spariosu, and Andrei Marga) to the national level (Adrian-Paul Iliescu, Aziliz Gouez, Toader and Simona Nicoară, Virgil Ciomoş, Sergiu Băltătescu), and to the dilemmas of identity as part of the migration phenomenon (Andrada Costoiu, Ioan-Aurel Pop), the volume in fact pertinently illustrates the sheer complexity of the topic it addresses. More empirical than theoretical, the volume hints in fact at the scarcity of theoretical approaches to identity formation (Gabriel Andreescu’s article investigates this issue at length).

In what concerns Romania, as is swiftly highlighted in the volume, the emphasis unavoidably falls on minority-majority relations when it comes to identity issues, the epitome being Romanian-Hungarian relations. It is already a truism to state that during the past twenty years (1990-2009), there has been a remarkable progress in Romanian-Hungarian relations, especially when looked at from the viewpoint of the extension of the minorities’ rights framework. The deadlock can be succinctly portrayed as the unitary state vision versus the cultural and
territorial *autonomy seeking vision* of Romanian-Hungarian relations. In the former vision, Romanians view Hungarians as challenging the authority of the state whose citizens they are, while in the latter, the Hungarians express (a more or less symbolic solution to) their malaise concerning their perceived inferior status. Framed as either anti-Romanian or anti-Hungarian attitudes, these arguments can only strengthen the existing inter-community separating lines. This logic of conflict has been pursued by both parties almost unrelentingly since 1918. It’s needless to say that neither party’s interests are genuinely served. In this respect, Adrian-Paul Iliescu’s article is relevant since it tackles the components of the Romanian historical “identitary obsession”. Although there is no article that analyzes the same issue from the Hungarian perspective, one may still reasonably argue that similar errors exist and persist.

The question that deserves analysis considering the present situation is “What happens after recognition\(^1\) has occurred?”. Since identity politics is a dynamic phenomenon that thrives on a constant presence in the public life, political parties or movements that make use of it cannot abandon its claims without risking of losing a significant part of their public support. As follows, contending debates rather than compromisig dialogues are more appealing and mobilizing. The Romanian political identity has been fixed through political and cultural elite discourse starting with the beginning of the twentieth century in a pattern of control or supremacy. Continued even after 1989, this model of domination is also obvious as an underlying theme of the attitude towards Hungarian claims for the institutionalization of their political identity. Rejecting any demands that challenge the political-institutional control of the majority, the discourse of the minority containing outcomes perceived as potentially threatening has been constantly invalidated as being hostile to state integrity and social cohesion.

Neither the Romanian, nor the Hungarian project, however, displays the elements of congruence needed to sustain an

\(^1\) I use the concept in the meaning ascribed to it by Charles TAYLOR et al., in Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition, Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ, 1994.
emerging political community\(^2\) in a more encompassing meaning: one that recognizes the ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious differences between the ethnic majority and national minorities, and also provides the elements that cultivate common objectives and actions. This issue is profoundly linked with the emergence of the conditions that favor the consolidation of democracy, a genuine integration in the European Union and the construction of a European identity.

Preserving past-oriented visions of legitimacy, both Romanian and Hungarian elites have overemphasized symbolic elements and cast off the need to redefine their relations for the benefit of the communities themselves. The stake of a mutual commitment to pursue these objectives (and others) of identity redefinition is the creation of a genuine dialogue, one that goes beyond vested political interests and permeates the social interaction level. It is also critical that debates on the academic level between Romanian and Hungarians intellectuals be part of this identity-restructuring attempt. Presently, they are almost extinct. Their task is to nurture the departure from historicism and ethnocentricty to a constructive dialogue that would propose the guiding principles of this long-duration process. Although references to the past which are self-critical and raise awareness concerning one’s own errors and mystifications could be beneficial for a readjusting of identity, the preservation of stances which cast guilt on the “others” can only be self-defeating in the long term.

To conclude, once constructed, identity can also be deconstructed and also be given new directions. In its collective, public dimensions – those particularly explored by the volume under review – identity is inevitably interlinked with politics and

\(^2\) Elizabeth Frazer, The Problems of Communitarian Politics: Unity and Conflict (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 220. Frazer defines a political community as representing "[...] a political settlement [that] is forged—by violent conquest, by the gradual centralization of power and the accrual of legitimacy, by the dispossession of kings in favour of the commons—a political community, in the present sense, might be said to be the upshot at the point when individuals share allegiance to a particular set of institutions and procedures".
therefore vulnerable to its influence. However, the multitude of affiliations that can be pursued (local, regional, national, transnational) acts as a catalyst against the monopoly that has long been detained by ethnicity. The significance of *Weighting Differences* therefore lies in the competent illustration of broad areas of research in identity-related fields, its multifaceted perspective being of considerable help to both students and scholars interested in this particular field.


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This book deals with the problem of the perception of the West by Asians, mostly Turks and Japanese, and purports to explain the reason why anti-Westernism had spread among Asians from approximately the middle of the nineteenth century to the middle of the twentieth century. The problem of the perception of one country/culture by another is one of the most popular subjects in modern historiography and is related to the popularity of postmodernism in Western thought, at least in the American variation of it, for the last several decades. In the context of postmodernist paradigms—mostly existing in its leftist version—it is assumed that the construction of identities, the prevailing ideological trends, what is usually called “discourse,” by Michel Foucault (one of the most influential leftist philosophers from this school), is not an abstraction. It is intimately related with political reality; and those who control “discourse” control reality. As a matter of fact, quite a few postmodernists, with their postmodernist playfulness, often imply that reality does not exist as an objective fixed entity but that it is changing “discourse” that is the reality.

The importance of this general framework in present-day historiography/social thought explains why the image of others has become such a popular subject and is usually connected with
the prevailing political mood. The increasing conflicts in the Middle East, mostly the Arab–Israeli conflict, is the backdrop of Edward Saide’s seminal work, Orientalism, which holds that the “discourse”/image of the Orient constructed by Europeans was a way through which they could control and actually conquer the Orient.

After September 11, there was a certain counterattack against the image of the West as being responsible for all the problems of the East. It was also implied that the Orient could have a negative and wrong image of the West, which it might employ to justify terrorism against the West. Finally, for some researchers, the image of foreign countries or civilizations is indeed related with real-life experience, which could also lead to serious frustrations and even hostilities. This was the point of departure of Aydin, who focused on the image of the West by the Japanese and by the Ottoman Turks from approximately the late nineteenth century to approximately the middle of the twentieth century.

According to the author, the Asian elite had become increasingly fascinated with the West by the beginning/middle of the twentieth century. It was the humanistic and, in a way, democratic traditions of the West that excited them the most. Contact with the West had encouraged them to re-evaluate their native cultures, and they found that Western and Eastern values were not as opposed to each other as one would assume. Turkish intellectuals, for example, found that Islam is not actually contradictory to the basic premises of Western liberalism. Consequently, they were eager to promote liberal/humanitarian Western ideas in the Ottoman Empire and emphasized the necessity of rapprochement between West and East on the grounds of common shared values.

The Japanese elite also shared the same ideals and were anxious both to develop liberal principles in Japan and to push Japan closer to the West in order to build a commonwealth of humanity. Still, both the Ottoman/Turkish and Japanese intellectual/elite became pretty much disappointed by the end of the nineteenth century.
To start with, the West had no desire to reciprocate and to accept Asians as equals. They emphasized that their ideological framework, e.g., Islam, not only was incompatible with Western values but actually treated those who professed the Asian creeds inferior to the people of the West. Not only did Asians’ philosophical/religious doctrines make them inferior to the West, but Western ideologists also started to emphasize racial/biological differences. In the context of the social-Darwinism framework, so popular in the West by the end of the nineteenth century,

Europeans were incompatible with and superior to Asians not just because of their culture but also because of their biological attributes. These new ideological changes went along with the increasing popularity of the war and militarism in Western ideology and practice. This created additional problems. Indeed, the Asian intellectuals/elite, as the author suggests, were taken aback by such a betrayal by the West of their own principles and, in a way, decided to teach the West a lesson. The Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905) was such a lesson. Russia’s stunning defeat was hailed not just in Japan but all over the Asian world. It indicated, as the author emphasized, to Asian nations that arrogant European imperialists could be defeated and the road to a free and democratic Asia be opened.

Here, as the author implies, it is Asia that became the flag bearer of the democratic values abandoned by the West. While the Russo-Japanese War should have been a lesson for European imperialists, it was not. And this exacerbated tensions, leading to WWI and, finally, to WWII. Yet, even during these events, Asians, such as the Turks and the Japanese, at least some of the visible members of their elite, had humanitarian and universalistic views and, from this perspective, were better, as the author of the book implies, than quite a few Europeans. After WWII, these benign traditions continued to be carried on by Asian intellectuals who patiently waited, wondering when the West would understand that Western and Asian values are pretty much compatible and both the West and East could pursue the establishment of human rights together.
One could raise the question as to what degree this relationship between the East and West was related to the facts. Of course, no one should challenge the author’s basic data. Indeed, there were liberal Asian intellectuals who really believed in the universality of Western human rights and who believed that both West and East should follow their dictums. There is no doubt that they were appalled by the facts of Western imperialism and disregarded those very principles that Western politicians had preached publicly. Still, the problem was the degree of influence of these people in the actual shaping of Asian countries’ policies. And it is clear that these people, or at least, liberal views, were marginal and that it was quite different principles that shaped the policies of those Asian countries.

Japan could be a good example. The Meiji Restoration was motivated not by the desire to be democratic and humane but by the desire to be a good match to European powers and to acquire an empire of their own. Consequently, the major result of the Meiji Restoration—inspired by the West—was not a Western-type parliament but by the Japanese conquest of Korea and war with China, where the populace was treated savagely, not much differently from the way the Europeans treated their conquered people.

While the author’s vision of the past could well be questioned, the book could be interesting from another perspective. It could inform readers about the views of the visible segment of the elite in some non-Western countries, such as the Turks, for example, who insist that their culture and cultural traditions are quite compatible with those of the West and who wonder why, despite all their efforts, they are not accepted fully in the concert of Western powers. Turkey, for example, has knocked on the door of the European Union for quite a long time.
Interdisciplinary influences on history, especially those coming from anthropology, paved the way for the emergence of a recent interest and emphasis on the role of agency. Accordingly, a new understanding that perceives history not only as a series of chronological events but also a collection of personal accounts, understandings and observations came to light. With the increase in the number of studies based on oral history, memories of ordinary people came to be a generous source for historians. Although this relatively new aspect of historiography did not escape the attention of Turkish scholars, it is safe to argue that conducting studies based on oral history is a recent trend. In this sense, *The Role of Memory in Historiography of Hatay: Strategies of Identity Formation through Memory and History* is a significant attempt aiming to produce knowledge by resorting to oral history in Turkey.

The major question that the study puts through is the ways in which the annexation of Hatay to Turkey in 1939, which took place sixteen years after the establishment of the Republic, is remembered and transmitted to next generations by the residents of the region coming from different ethnic, religious and socio-economic backgrounds. One of the objectives of the study, as Esra Demirci Akyol indicates, is to “show that it is not possible to talk about a single history” as the official history suggests (5). Rather than one, stagnant explanation, past events may have multiple accounts based on who is remembering that particular event. Group membership is a significant determinant of identity which influences the way people remember certain incidents. Therefore, people from different ethnic, religious, socio-economic groups may have a tendency to remember historical events differently.
The book is organized in five chapters. The first chapter provides the reader with a comprehensive review of the existing theories and approaches regarding memory and oral history. An overview of theories and a discussion over how memory came to be an important source in contemporary historiography is followed by a small section on how different oral history is from other approaches. According to the author, oral history captures meanings attached to a particular historical event which is not possible to understand by studying written documents only. Next chapter explores the methodology of the study. The study is mainly based on in-depth interviews with nine residents of Hatay coming from different parts of it. The interviewees also diverge in terms of their ethnic and religious identities as well as their socio-economic statuses and education levels. The third chapter provides the reader with a chronological order of events in Hatay and Antioch region that spans a period from Roman Empire to the annexation process.

The analysis of the interviews starts to unfold in the fourth chapter. The author groups the issues discussed during the interviews under five common themes: notables and local elites; land ownership; memories of the local heroes; taking sides in the voting process and migration. All these themes present the fact that national history only tells one aspect of a particular historical event where the situation is much more complicated. Moreover, individuals’ multiple identities interfere when they remember a particular event in the past. The author does an excellent job in describing and uncovering the ways in which people’s religious and ethnic identities as well as their socio-economic status affect the way they remember historical events. However, an important issue that is underlined throughout the interviews escapes from her attention: the issue of citizenship.

Citizenship is a recurring theme that reveals itself in various cases throughout the interviews. Almost all of the non-Sunni Turk interviewees feel the need to underline their Turkish citizenship either referring to their current attachments or their ancestors’ royalty to Turkey in the past. The major reason for this preponderant need is that “Turkishness,” although defined by citizenship and claimed to embrace people from all ethnic and
religious groups who happen to be tied to Turkey as citizens, is only reserved for Sunni Turks in practice. Therefore, Sunni and Alawite Arab interviewees keep mentioning their Turkish citizenship in a way to tell the author and hence the reader that they are not traitors, or in other words, they are not the “other”. They stress their attachment to Turkey as citizens in order to claim equal treatment with the rest of the population, especially with those who are Sunni Turk. As a result, they mention how their ancestors’ fought against the enemy during the World War I or claim that Arabs in Hatay would ally with Turkey if any dispute with Syria emerges. Although citizenship is a recurrent and central issue that comes up frequently during the interviews, the author does not explicitly address the link between “citizenship claims” and the feeling of “otherness” and the way past events are remembered.

While it is a well researched study, providing a comprehensive historical account of Hatay, the book fails to address a noteworthy issue; the current political and social structure in the city and region. This is important especially because the author, throughout the analysis section, claims that present political and social context of Hatay influence interviewees’ memory considerably. However, she does not indicate the current structure, i.e. power politics, groups involved in power struggle and also does not elucidate the ways in which they affect the way people remember past events.

The book has a strong and well designed methodology, explaining each and every step of the research. However, there is a minor weakness regarding sampling. Although the author indicates that her “motivation was not to represent what each ethnic and religious group tell about history of Hatay (25-26)” it would make the analyses richer if Armenians whose presence, both during the World War I and the annexation process, influenced other groups’ remembrance of past were included in the study. Although the author mentions that she has conducted an informal interview with the daughter of a converted Armenian living in Izmir, there is no single reference to her throughout the book.
On the whole, *The Role of Memory in the Historiography of Hatay: Strategies of Identity Formation through Memory and History* is a well designed and researched study. It focuses on a significant aspect of historiography; oral history, which is a relatively new methodology used in historical research in Turkey. The author successfully defends the argument that explaining historical events is not an easy task because there is no single history but multiple historical accounts that may overlap and also contradict each other. She also clearly displays, with in-depth interviews, the ways in which memory is influenced by identities a person harbors. The author convinces the reader about the necessity of complementing historical research based on written documents with oral history studies. This is a rich, well researched and insightful book making a significant contribution to oral history literature in general, and to the one in Turkey, in particular.
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