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THEY WILL SAVE US, OR SHOULDN’T THEY? 
AN ANALYSIS OF THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY IN THE ALBANIAN PRINT MEDIA AFTER THE JANUARY 21ST 2011 DEMONSTRATIONS

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Abstract

This article investigates the political controversies related to the role the international community plays and should play in contemporary Albanian politics through an analysis of the media accounts of the January 21, 2011 demonstration. We analyse opinion articles in the mainstream media and find that there are two representations of the political reality that compete for legitimacy: one in favour of the government and the other against it. The picture that emerges from the media accounts is that events, political action and political personalities are subject to the perceived judgement of external actors, whose confirmation or support is taken as the legitimizing factor. Thus, the accepted patterns of power put the international community at the top, from where they control, monitor, confirm or refute political elites. The alternative representation criticizes international intervention as a deterrent to the democratization processes in Albania.

Keywords: media, external actors, politics, control, Albania.

1. Introduction

Since the fall of communism Albania has been undergoing the process of political democratisation. Authors like Bideleux and Jeffries called the type of regime that has been developing and its practices in the country “a rude yet very vigorous democracy of sorts”, in which, despite rough party politics and frequent allegations of electoral malpractice, since 1999 Albanian politicians and voters have not resorted to violence to achieve
political success.\textsuperscript{1} Furthermore, the country has been accepted into NATO in 2009, signed the Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the EU in 2007 and the Visa Liberalisation Agreement with the Schengen counties in December 2010, all of which have been considered positive signs of the democratic consolidation process in the country.

Yet, on the 21\textsuperscript{st} January 2011, according to official reports, twenty thousand people in Tirana demonstrated against the current government denouncing it for electoral fraud and corruption. As a result of confrontation with security forces, three demonstrators were killed, tens of demonstrators and police officers were injured and a fourth person died later of injuries sustained in the confrontation\textsuperscript{2}. The event gave rise to an outstanding media debate which was focused on the broader effect of the “incident”, and the initial purpose of the demonstration was connected with a myriad of themes such as political violence, the state of democracy in the country and its institutions; all of these were further influenced by the perception of the international community’s role in domestic politics.

Commentators were skewed towards two main positions, although at various degrees, the first one being in support of the government and the second against it, which was reflected in two conflicting interpretations and representations of the political reality in Albania. The first one is that of a primitive and violent country and people unable to build a sustainable democratic regime and therefore in need of external international intervention to guarantee the continuity of democracy and prevent any slip back to authoritarianism. The second representation is an understanding of the political situation and political behaviour as proceeding in the context of politics as normal, as long as actors involved have interests and objectives, whereas international intervention is considered as a violation of

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\textsuperscript{2} \textit{Shqip} 26.01.2011
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the country’s sovereignty and consequently a negative influence for the democratisation process in Albania.

As a result, certain questions emerge: how are these political controversies created? How are media accounts constructed in order to create assumptions and beliefs about specific events, courses of action or political actors? What do they tell us about patterns of power and the attitudes towards these patterns? I argue that through mainstream media discourses such as opinion articles we can identify accepted patterns of power in which the international community is the authority legitimizing or judging as illegitimate the actions of the political elite. The alternative discourse, which is underrepresented in opinion articles in the mainstream media, tries to demarcate Albanians against such influences by supporting the claim that international intervention is influencing negatively in the process of democratisation of Albania.

The study of media discourses is relevant in this context because it might help us understand the formation of public opinion on a particular issue or event. Discourse is, as Fairclough tells us, a mode of action and representation and analyzing it helps political scientists understand positions and attitudes of those that have constructed such discourse. Furthermore, through their language we can construct a picture of the influences that Albanian public opinion is exposed to, and which they employ in order to give meaning to and construct the world around them. In other words, this article will use media as a window on the power patterns in Albania.

Methodologically I focus on the political discourses through which the “essence” of the Albanian society has been constructed. The perspective I have chosen is that of analyzing dominant

discourses present in the mainstream printed dailies with the highest circulation, focusing on the particular case of opinion articles. Analyzing media discourses allows us to understand how language is used to create meaning and represent reality. As we identify patterns of language, we can “show how these constitute aspects of society and the people within it” under the basic assumption that “the language available to people enables and constrains not only their expression of certain ideas but also what they do.” In the specific case of opinion articles, by looking at discourse we see how commentators (and possibly their publishers) see the process of democratisation in Albania and how they want their readers to see it. Although what we see is subject to interpretation, and in an analysis we might be including certain aspects while intentionally excluding some others.

The article is structured in five parts. After the introduction there is an overview of the theoretical debates on discourse and politics, followed by the methodology used to conduct the analysis on the role of the international community, which is the fourth part of the paper. I conclude with a summary of the main findings, explain some of its limits and provide a few suggestions for further research.

2. Discourse and Politics

Politicians now operate within three parallel political environments, each with its own practices and discourses, namely: substantive policy making, also known as elite politics; the hype, in which imagery and mythology are manufactured, also known as mass politics; and the meta-level, in which the political game is planned and managed. In order to understand media discourses and present a plausible interpretation of the underlying power patterns observable within them, we need to see how these three environments interconnect and interact.

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Elite politics is conducted by the so-called insiders and semi-insiders. Insiders take the decisions, thus shaping political reality, whereas semi-insiders are their collaborators and act as intermediary between the political elites and the masses. The relationship of the masses with the political elites is complicated, especially so because the elites are usually part of the state, which is a provider of benefits but which can also posit threats to its own citizens. In a democratic environment the state is considered an instrument that works for the people. Nevertheless, it is directed and operates by and through elites who are, in many cases, perceived as if they use the power conferred to them by the masses for their own purposes. This perception is reinforced when the state is seen as working against or neglecting the majority of its own citizens. In the first scenario the citizens recognise the state as legitimate and identify with its structures, whereas in the second the citizens antagonise with the elites that control the state, which means that the relationship between state and citizens resembles the patterns Edelman defined as “Now it is ‘us’ and often it is ‘them’.”

The tension between elite politics and mass politics is facilitated by semi-insiders who are usually well-educated individuals from the middle-class who do not hold any decision-making positions in the state structures but work for the insiders in creating the hype with which the outsiders are presented and expected to be subject to. They work within the media as commentators who serve as interpreters for or persuasive intermediaries between the elites and the masses. Their power exists in the selection and shaping of the themes to be found in political discourse, in an attempt to influence public opinion.

Because of the ubiquity of media in today’s political communication its role is inescapably ambivalent in forming public opinion. The whole political spectacle is constituted by a media continuously constructing and reconstructing issues of public concern, such as social problems, crises, enemies, and

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leaders, thus creating a series of threats and reassurances for the publics concerned with them. Political controversy revolves around and feeds on conflicting interpretations of current political actions and developments. Consequently, media accounts become devices for creating contrasting assumptions and beliefs about the world rather than stating facts. These representations of political reality are used as instruments for winning support and opposition for specific courses of action and for particular ideologies and to stimulate and/or discourage existing frames, which makes them competing representations.

Fairclough recommends that when analyzing language as discourse the scholar has to take into consideration several dimensions: discourse as text, as discursive practice and as social practice. For the purposes of this study, however, the most relevant aspects in analyzing political discourse is to see language from the perspective of a discursive and social practice, that is, as a mode of action and of representation and at the same time shaped and constrained by social structure. Discourse is constitutive in several aspects such as social identities, social relationships and systems of knowledge and belief. Through discourse we can read into and understand how people perceive and describe their own identity, how they understand and construct their relationships towards others, things or institutions, and how they construct their systems of knowledge or belief. As a result of identity, relational and ideational functions, discursive practice contributes to both the reproduction and the transformation of a particular society.

As a social practice discourse has interwoven economic, cultural, political or ideological orientations, without any of them being reducible to discourse. As a political practice, discourse

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12 Ibid, 63.
13 Ibid, 65.
“establishes, sustains and changes power relations and the collective entities between which power relations obtain.”\textsuperscript{14} As an ideological practice, it “constitutes, sustains and changes significations of the world from diverse positions in power relations.”\textsuperscript{15} These practices are not independent “for ideology is significations generated within power relations as a dimension of the exercise of power and struggle over power.”\textsuperscript{16} In other words, language is not a neutral means of reflecting and describing the world,\textsuperscript{17} but a struggle for hegemony, in terms of producing, distributing and consuming texts, a struggle that contributes to the reproduction or transformation of the order of discourse.\textsuperscript{18}

Competing discursive representations try to establish one version of the world in the face of other competing versions, what Fairclough calls establishing or confirming one’s hegemony.\textsuperscript{19} The latter is constructed through the ideology of the power holders and is produced to legitimize their position and claims. Furthermore, “the logic of hegemony presupposes the existence of a social field criss-crossed by social antagonisms and the availability of contingent ideological elements.”\textsuperscript{20} Opinion formation is done through the employment of these ideological elements which operate through the mobilisation of discourse. In this way, by mobilizing meaning the processes of ideology serve also as means of mobilizing consciousness.\textsuperscript{21}

Gamson proposes the combination of competing frames and media practices in forwarding and transforming these “original inputs” with the cultural tools through which people respond and

\textsuperscript{14} Ibid, 67.  
\textsuperscript{15} Ibid, 67.  
\textsuperscript{16} Ibid, 67.  
\textsuperscript{18} Fairclough, \textit{Analyzing}, 86-93.  
\textsuperscript{19} Ibid  
assimilate them.\textsuperscript{22} The cultural mechanisms employed in order for the persuasive rhetoric to be more successful are themes of common sense of cultural and historical grounds, which means that in contemporary discourses one often finds the use of past events or stories to describe current ones via the use of parallels of positive or negative similarities and analogies.\textsuperscript{23} These cultural resonances are an expression of the dependence on the past experience in a particular society, the evocation of which provides the resemblance necessary to make the new content easy to capture.\textsuperscript{24} In that cultural past lie some basic determinants of the collective behaviour and hence of public opinion.

However, evoking the past is not enough to gain legitimacy and support because, despite intentionality, the results are dependent on more than one piece of discourse. Thus, public opinion can be explained by culture, but more completely so, if we look at the process of socialisation, the political actors and the specific events.\textsuperscript{25} Post-communist transition, for example, was characterised by exposure to Western perceptions and influences and EU or NATO conditionality, both of which have created new power patterns and hierarchies within societies. The exposure to a post-communist and global world of ‘ethnoscapes’, ‘mediascapes’, ‘financescapes’ and ‘ideoscapes’ flows\textsuperscript{26} has affected Albanian political, economic and social development even more because of “the contradictory outside influences in the 1990s, as many times in her history before.”\textsuperscript{27} Albania’s modern state history presents several instances of struggle against foreign imposition or influence. Such tensions have resurfaced in

\textsuperscript{23} Billig, \textit{Ideology}.
the latest period of transition to a democratic regime, which has also been characterised by ongoing re-definition of the political reality.

Furthermore, the initial foreign and humanitarian aid interventions of the 1990s were soon replaced by the new impersonal and depoliticised rhetoric of institutionalism, empowerment and state capacity building. According to this type of discourse, intervention is no longer seen as violating state sovereignty but as a necessity to prevent fragile transitional states from failing in their attempt to democratise and develop economically. David Chandler argues that the basic assumption here is that certain states are limited in their capacity to autonomously democratise. These discourses of international state-building are ideological and serve the purpose of hiding interests of power. In a post-Cold War era, the threats to the Western way of life are no longer articulated as ideological or political but instead as economic and institutional. In this discursive frame the understanding of different capacities serves as apologia for the status quo of international intervention, according to which it becomes paramount to assist weak or transitional states to build the institutional capacities necessary to eliminate threats to democracy.28 The impact of such practices is already visible: sovereignty, for example, no longer demarcates the dividing line between what or who is inside and who is outside a particular political community. Poor countries worldwide as well as eastern European countries, such as Albania, aspiring to join the EU - all easily located in the category of non-Western states - nowadays “lack even the formal capacity to formulate public policy independently of the requirements of international institutions”, having thus been reduced to bodies that respond to external international powers.29

3. Methodology

In this study, I analyzed a selection of opinion articles published in the Albanian daily mainstream newspapers Shekulli, Gazeta Shqiptare, Panorama, Shqip and Mapo between January 21 and 31, 2011. These papers are the widest read in Albania, according to regular surveys conducted by the independent Research Centre Monitor.30 The selected dailies are considered “independent”, although you can trace some political inclination towards the left (Shekulli, Gazeta Shqiptare and Shqip) and right (Panorama and Mapo), which means that the former three would currently be positioned as oppositional to the government, while the latter two as pro-government. Lani and Çupi tell us that free press in Albania emerged as party press, so despite attempts to become independent, “the threads that link the journals with the headquarters of the political parties generally still exist”31.

All selected newspapers reserve one or two pages for editorials, opinions and commentaries, ranging from one to four articles per issue, in which individuals with a public profile comment on the latest issues of concern in the public debate, usually something of a political nature. Although they do not all necessarily embrace the newspaper’s editorial line, articles tend to reflect it extensively. A plausible explanation for the exceptions to the editorial lines might be personal connections or an author’s high public profile which allow certain people to make their opinions more visible in public. The writers range from professional journalists, prominent well-known journalists (or so-called opinionists) to lecturers at the university, professionals and representatives of the civil society and other prominent figures such as writers or artists, who most of the time have some sort of international training or experience. They become important

influential political actors, especially when they publish under the umbrella of “independent media”.  

Newspaper articles were chosen not only because of the practical ease of collecting the data but also because of “their very ubiquity, coupled with intensity of usage, public attention and political influence.” As a political scientist, the interest in newspaper articles is mainly in their being part of the political communication channels. Furthermore, the section on opinions or commentaries, although presenting individual opinions, are rich in terms of content and allow for a more in-depth analysis and interpretation of the political discourse. Despite their individual character, they do serve as social representations of themes competing for a legitimised position in the Albanian public discourse. They are written by semi-insiders and published in the mainstream media which means that they represent an account of the ruling rhetoric, considering that the ownership of the means of production is the ownership of the means of persuasive rhetoric. They also reflect the constitutive context in which and about which they are articulated. As Mautner puts it, “if you are interested in dominant discourses, rather than dissident or idiosyncratic voices, the major dailies and weeklies are obvious sources to turn to.” Furthermore, categorised as opinions they give us the opportunity to understand the main representations of Albanian politics, and give us a hint of the main discussions in the public opinion, especially considering that they try both to reflect and shape such opinion. In other words,

34 Gill, Discourse, 276.
35 Billig, Ideology, 4.
37 Mautner, Analysing, 32.
38 Fairclough, Analysing, 55.
by analyzing these types of articles we can detect the perceived patterns of power in the country.

As a result of the sample size and the qualitative method of analysis, we cannot know how representative the ideas presented in commentaries are of the general Albanian public opinion. We do, nevertheless, know that “dissemination to large audiences enhances the constitutive effect of discourse – its power that is, to shape widely shared constructions of reality.” Consequently, by analysing the opinion articles in mainstream daily newspapers we will be able to cast light on these discourses, i.e. have a view of the current political discourse in a post-communist country still undergoing the democratisation process such as Albania.

3.1 Data body

The preliminary data collection was conducted on nine papers, covered a period of six weeks and resulted in a data body of 700 articles, which I narrowed down through a cyclical process. The selection was based on three criteria: time period, sale rates, and variety of authors writing in the commentary/opinion section.

After the preliminary analysis, I decided to select 50 articles (10 for each newspaper), which range from approximately 500-2000 words published during the first ten days including January 21. The selection was content-based and format based. I removed from my set most of the shorter articles as well as those without authorship (which were published under the Editorial column). I also chose one or at a maximum two articles from the same author, in the cases when they had published several times during that ten-day period. Finally the relevance of the content of the articles was taken into consideration. For example, Artur Zheji had published three articles in Mapo: “The day after”, “Help us Arvizu!” and “The Honour of the Guard and the Honour of the Soldier.” I kept the first two articles because they give a more comprehensive view of the understanding of the event and what

39 Mautner, Analysing, 32.
40 Ibid, 35.
followed ("The day after"), and of the relationship between Albanians and the international community, through the particular example of the American Ambassador ("Help us Arvizu!"). The selected articles are focused on themes such as the interpretation of the demonstration, causes, effects and responsibilities, predictions and recommendations for the future and interpretations of the follow-up behaviour of the various domestic and international agents.

3.2 Sensitizing concepts and main themes

Following Fairclough’s framework, when analyzing the newspaper articles immediately after the event of January 21 I tried to detect the societal and cultural constraints that shape Albanian discourses and identify how discourse constitutes social identities, relationships and the systems of knowledge and belief in the contemporary Albanian context. I worked with sensitizing concepts, which are fluid concepts, ideas, notions or questions that served as a starting point, which directed my attention with regards to where to look and what to look for. 41 As the literature suggests, sensitizing concepts are easier to refine with the new attributes or even replace completely with new appropriate context-specific ones, thus enabling the researcher to identify the particularities of the context.42 After the pre-analysis I realised that, apart from the category, the attributes associated with these concepts were important in two ways: first, because as partial propositions they help us construct a more detailed comprehensive concept; and second, because the construction of

41 Herbert Blumer, "What is Wrong with Social Theory?" American Sociological Review. 19: 1. (1954), 3-10.
these concepts is done in two competing frames of representation, which if ignored would confuse our results.43

The sensitizing concepts used for the analysis were violence, legitimacy, reputation, reconciliation, democracy, institutions, the people, elites/leaders within a frame of competing representations for the event in question. During the pre-analysis, I assessed the articles and identified the sentences in which authors mentioned or spoke of the above, while realizing that there were more important concepts dealt with that I had initially incorporated. While all themes are inter-related, the ones relevant for the current paper are the following:

Reputation was discussed within a major theme, such as that of identity, in which Albanian state-formation history and the recent past were reflected as indicators of current behaviour in the frame of historical determinism and fatalism.

Reconciliation and reputation were found to be directly linked with the concept of international community. The understanding of the media commentators was that their agency was decisive in the Albanian democratisation. The dynamics of power in the country cannot be clearly understood if we do not include the international community into the agents involved in the context.

There is obviously more to these opinion articles than the selected themes but while this article does not pretend to be a complete expose of the contemporary political discourses in Albania, it does aim to understand them by opening a window through media into such discourses. Finally, it is worth mentioning that the accounts presented in the analysis below are inescapably an inference and a construct of the author of this article.

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43 Gill, Analysing, 179-181.
4. Analysis

The main claim of this article is that the perception of the outside world is central to the way political reality is constituted in Albania. Therefore, media accounts attribute an extended power of leverage in the way domestic politics are conducted towards the international community. There is a relatively clear pattern of pro- versus anti-government discourses, generally along the lines of pro- versus anti-government media. While pro-government discussions are compliant with international authority, there are two distinguishable patterns in the anti-governmental articles: that of compliance, but which produces an alternative representation of the Albanian reality in order to gain support for their party; and that of critique, which demands that the international community not violate the democratic rules of the game, including those related to state sovereignty.

The construction of the competing representations in the Albanian media is based on the perception of the role the international community plays in domestic politics. Therefore, it is important to investigate what the international community means for the media commentators and how they are situated in the accounts about political reality. Knowing how the media sees and interprets the position of the international community will help us understand their accounts of Albanian politics.

The international community is referred to in Albanian dailies variously as the internationals, the international factor, international community, the diplomats, the West, Westerners, EU and the US, Europe and America, our partners and international allies. In the first days after the January 21 demonstrations the international community is briefly mentioned either as an entity or body to which Albanians have to report to because of their international engagements, such as membership of NATO or the aspired membership of the EU. Both pro- and anti-government media express their concerns on how the demonstration will affect Albania’s reputation in terms of EU conditionality. In one anti-government account, the author arguing against violence states that “we are not pretending to
enter Africa, but Europe and as Europeans.”\textsuperscript{44} Another argues that political murders are unacceptable for a NATO member and an aspiring EU candidate: “but murdering someone in the middle of Europe, just because they expressed their anger in a demonstration, for a NATO country that aspires to be accepted in the EU, this is unacceptable.”\textsuperscript{45} Likewise, EU membership is considered to be threatened by the demonstrations of January 21, even for a pro-government author, who, referring to children in Albania, wrote that “last Friday their European future was once again threatened.”\textsuperscript{46}

The declarations of the international representatives who condemned the violence and who appealed for consensus and a return to the institutions received a lot of media attention and commentary. One of the most commented declarations was that of the American ambassador, who called Prime Minister Berisha “a real statesman” because he accepted to withdraw his intention for a counter-demonstration one week after January 21.

Pro-government media interpreted the first international declarations against violence as a sign that the international community does not consider the accusations of the opposition as founded; on the contrary, they ignore them. As one author put it, “It seems like the attempt to divide the West in its position will not be successful. It seems like the internationals do not consider the socialist leadership as an actor anymore.”\textsuperscript{47} To strengthen their account of the international support for the last election results, pro-government authors underline the fact that they were confirmed by the international community and their bodies, such as ODHIR, one writing that “the last elections have been certified by ODHIR’s internationals.”\textsuperscript{48} In one article the author extends the international support to the overall performance of the government:

\textsuperscript{44} Delia, Shqip 23.01.2011.
\textsuperscript{45} Gumeni, Shqip 27.01.2011.
\textsuperscript{46} Ylli, Panorama 23.01.2011.
\textsuperscript{47} Cako, Panorama 27.01.2011.
\textsuperscript{48} Ibid; but also in Marku, Mapo 24.01.2011.
All of us are witness to the fact that Albania under the rule of Prime Minister Sali Berisha, during the last five years has scored a large economic development, hiring thousands of people, building roads, even in those areas where before it was impossible to go even on foot, building hundreds of new schools and developing a democracy that has been supported by the international community, in particular the European Union.49

The subsequent declaration of the American ambassador was also cheered on by the pro-government writers. In one article the author analyses the declaration of the diplomat and praises it as “awesome, extra (super) exact, extra benevolent, extra professional.”50 The same author in a different article interprets the diplomatic declarations as a sign that the international community does not approve of a change in government. According to him the declaration of the American ambassador clarified some misunderstandings and speculations on the attitude of the international community towards the government. The author argues that despite the Socialist Party’s attempts, the international community does not support the removal of Berisha from power: “it was articulated more clearly than ever internationally that the violent political move of the SP to provoke the fall of the Government and Berisha’s ‘resignation’, does not have any international support.”51

In the anti-government media, we find more criticism about the international community and the relationship local politicians have with them. In an article titled “We upset Olympus”, the author compares the relationship between Albanian politicians and the international community with that of mythological Greek gods with mortals:

We have established weird relations with them, like that of a child with a parent, a pupil with the teacher, sometimes of a servant with a master. We call them to save us, to legitimise

49 Bajraktari, Panorama 23.01.2011.
50 Zheji, Mapo 25.01.2011.
51 Ibid
our word and actions, to support our authority. Any time our political communication freezes in the momentous gridlock, we ask them to play the referee, so that we can continue with the next similar conflict.52

Similarly, in an article titled “The hasty declaration of a higher diplomat” the author claims that there is no opposition to the international community, in particular from the politicians, who are continually trying to interpret the ambiguous international rhetoric so that they can adjust their behaviour accordingly:

Here in our country it has been years since nobody wants to go against the internationals, even less so against the Americans. In particular the politicians who do not want to stain their biography because they ‘endanger’ their career from the ‘American wrath’...They are conforming to the international will, trying to guess what that will is by subduing to the strong ones in global politics. The whole 20 years Albanian politicians have been stretching to read properly the messages from abroad, although they have often been ambiguous criticizing and giving the right to both parties, thus allowing both parties to cite and use those parts that were convenient in their internal war for power.53

The same author argues that the American ambassador, who had just arrived in the country, was not well-informed about domestic politics: “Mr. Arvizu has just arrived in Tirana, so obviously he has not had time to learn the history of this country, and he has not had time to learn the political history of the last twenty years”.54 The Ambassador’s appraisal of the prime minister in a press release is considered by that author as a negative influence in the political developments of the country: “Such a declaration in an aggravated time and situation like this, instead of calming will enrage more those who have chosen the path of protest to express their position against the current governance...”55

52 Vehbiu, Mapo 31.01.2011. We can consider Vehbiu’s article published at Mapo an “outlier”. His articles are usually published in the anti-government media, in particular Shekulli.
53 Toçi, Shekulli 31.01.2011.
54 Ibid
55 Ibid
In another article, the author accuses the international community of maintaining an ‘impartial’ position, which for him means that they are not intervening to stop Berisha, because they have an interest in preserving stability in the country. However, he argues, the crisis is so deep that “[i]t is not the time for western institutions to have ‘impartial’ positions. This time the west has to be on the side of justice and truth not stability.”\textsuperscript{56} Justice in this context means that they would openly take a position against Berisha’s autocratic rule.

Similarly, another author accuses the international community of distorting politics in Albania in such a way that they, as internationals, actually contribute to the crisis, writing “[i]f the Albanian people today are at a crossroad, the International Community has part of the fault.”\textsuperscript{57} Their behaviour is explained by the author as the result of various international actors’ economic interests which encourage them to maintain the established equilibria of influence in the country:

the Americans, Italians or the French are holding on to a regime that has thrown them a ‘bone’, for their businesses or their waste, so they, blinded by the economic concessions that Sali Berisha is making with the money and the lives of Albanians, are not being able to see Albania’s current reality: that it is deep in tyranny.\textsuperscript{58}

Another reason introduced for the alleged biased attitude of the West is that of a trade-off for keeping Albania “stable” in a world where multiple conflicts are underway. In the context of the uprisings of January 2011 in Tunisia, an author draws a comparison between the attitude of the International Community there and in Albania shortly before:

While supporting the events in Tunisia, so that democracy can triumph, in the case of Albania, they [the international community] are using a different standard, against the will

\textsuperscript{56} Stefani, Shqip 31.01.2011.
\textsuperscript{57} Rrozhani, Shekulli 28.01.2011.
\textsuperscript{58} Ibid
of the people, although the instigator of the crisis is the same person that was thrown away from power and put at the periphery of politics for several years.\textsuperscript{59}

Among the anti-government press, we also find authors arguing that the international community has kept its distance from Albanian politics, a position which has had negative influences in politics. One author states that

For some time now they [international community] are refraining from having an active role in the dialogue, but encourage and support it... What the internationals know, but do not accept yet, is that in Albania this option is ineffective and non-real.\textsuperscript{60}

Therefore he argues that there is a need for more intervention in order for the political impasse to be overcome. His claim is that unless the international community chooses not to intervene and unless local actors do not follow international guidelines, the crisis cannot be resolved. As a result of Albanian inefficiency, the only optimal long-term solution the author can propose is that it is given by the internationals and simply applied by the local actors:

the international (EU) negotiator should provide an extra solution... EU and USA rightfully think that a NATO member and a candidate country to the EU should not expect external solutions, but in the current conditions in which the country has become pawn of a politics that is extreme, exclusive and without solutions, it is responsibility of Brussels to behave outside the diplomatic practices. If Brussels does not do this today, tomorrow it is not excluded that it will be obliged to bring once again diplomatic peace missions and why not, even military ones for the protection of tranquillity and normality in Albania.\textsuperscript{61}

\textsuperscript{59} Rrozhani Shekulli 28.01.2011. The author is referring to the fact that Berisha was president in 1997, when the country went through the civil unrest after the pyramidal schemes collapsed. After that he remained in opposition for eight years.

\textsuperscript{60} Krasniqi, Gazeta Shqiptare 29.01.2011.

\textsuperscript{61} Ibid
This author considers the crisis so deep that it might escalate to an open fire conflict that will need international humanitarian intervention. In this quote there is a cultural resonance with what happened in Albania during the civil unrest of 1997.

Very few anti-government newspaper articles address the issue of sovereignty. In one such article, though, the author comments on the behaviour of the internationals by questioning its consequences:

The ball is in the field of the internationals, who, after having violently robbed Albania’s sovereignty during the last week, in the coming week will have to prove that they did so to remove from this sovereignty only the excessive amount of poison and insanity, and return it clear from poisons, but still not castrated from our necessary critical instinct.62

In another anti-government media article, though, the author argues that in a state of crisis sovereignty becomes a secondary issue compared to the urgent need for establishing order:

The sooner this [internationally mediated negotiation between parties] will happen, the sooner the crisis will be overcome and the country will go back to normality. Any alibis against this, such as the rhetoric on sovereignty or foreign non-intervention, are minor issues in comparison with the urgent needs of Albania for a functional democracy and democratic stability.63

This interpretation of the relatively minor importance of sovereignty in comparison to order is present even in the pro-government media. One author, for example, admits that the violation of sovereignty is not good, but for him the crisis is irresolvable by itself:

The internationals have strongly returned in the Albanian political gridlock, which with the events of January 21 turned

62 Shameti, Shqip 29.01.2011.
63 Krasniqi, Gazeta Shqiptare 29.01.2011.
into a political crisis. While it is clear that this is a regress for the Albanian life and society, it is not time to weep over this. It is time, more than ever, to strongly support and trust our international friends and allies, at their competence and impartiality, in order to overcome this crisis.64

In another article, we see the author articulating international intervention as a necessity that derives not only from the current crisis, but also because he sees Albania falling into the same patterns of civil unrest regularly:

Help us Arvizu! And deeply ashamed of myself and what I represent, I ask you, Mr. Ambassador: ‘Take into your hands the ‘democratic whip’ of the State Department authority, and remove them from this spiral, and then forgive them because they know but they also don’t know what they are doing!’ So, help us Mr. Arvizu, this old country, apparently goes crazy every 15 years.65

Thus, international intervention is interpreted in two main ways. In the pro-government press the international community is the saviour of the day in a political context where the domestic political actors are incapable of compromise and consensus, but most importantly of democratic practices. They use the rhetoric of the international community to legitimise their interpretations on current events. At the same time, the anti-government press questions their role not only for their perceived partiality but also as violators of the country’s sovereignty. While for some commentators this is unacceptable, for others such external intervention is acceptable under the current impossible conditions in which the need for stability and democratisation is more important than national sovereignty. They criticise the attitude of the international community by underlining their ambiguous diplomatic statements and their unjustifiable intervention in local affairs through political and diplomatic pressure.

64 Çili, Mapo 26.01.2011. The title of the article is also telling “The obligatory return at the internationals.”
65 Zheji Mapo, 25.01.2011.
5. Conclusion

In this article we opened a window via the print media into contemporary political discourses in Albania. An analysis of the theme of the international community’s role in domestic politics articulated in opinion articles published in five daily newspapers and discussing the demonstrations of January 21, 2001 shows that there is political polarisation reflected, even in supposedly independent media accounts. There is a pro-government and an anti-government rhetoric, which present opposing accounts and interpretation of the role the international community has played, and should have or should play in the country. These competing representations are used by the pro- and anti-government media as devices for creating conflicting assumptions and beliefs in an attempt to gain public support. There is an overall perception that the role of the international community is constitutive in constructing and validating political action in the country. However, accounts differ in their interpretation of what the international community is saying and what they expect the local elites to do.

The picture we gather from the media accounts is that events, political action and political personalities are subject to the perceived judgement of external actors, whose confirmation or support is taken as the legitimizing factor. Thus, the accepted patterns of power put the international community at the top of a hierarchy from where they control, monitor and confirm (or not) the positions of political elites. The semi-insiders operating as media commentators are subject to the influences of both the discourse of the international community and that of the local elites, so they reproduce or transform the existing patterns of behaviour.

The pro-government press claims that the government has the support of the international community. They reproduce the international discourse on the fragile but nevertheless functional democracy in Albania and interpret opposition demonstrations as an attempt to overthrow the fragile balance of the society. They appeal for compromise and consensus as a way to preserve
stability and continuity. The anti-government press’ interpretation is that international intervention is forcing stability in a context where political controversy has led to a political gridlock that cannot be resolved, unless the rules of the political game are not changed. The removal of the international community from the position of authority would finally allow for correction of current anomalies and the development of a legitimate and democratic politics, and consequently the establishment of a legitimate political system.

Media discourses cast a light on some of the themes that constitute the continual political uncertainty in Albania. They provide an interpretation of the political reality from the perspective of semi-insiders who, because of their connections to the political elites and their international training, nonetheless become their spokespeople. Consequently, although they might reflect it somehow, there is no way we can know how constitutive they are of the broader society’s perception of the political reality in the country. The persuasive rhetoric underlying the opinion articles tell us that these representations are competing for legitimacy; however, we do not know how successful they are in the sense of whether one of them dominates in the public opinion. We can guess that there might be as much controversy among the population as there is in the media accounts, an assumption we can also make based on the fact that in the last elections both parties received approximately half of the vote.

This article does not pretend to be exhaustive, because due to availability of time and space, I have done discourse analysis on a selection of 50 opinion articles published after the event in five mainstream daily newspapers and covering a time period of ten days. However, this exercise is important for paving the path for a more in-depth comprehensive and comparative study of Albanian media discourses and their role in public opinion formation. Nevertheless, considering that it was a saturated sample which was narrowed from a larger one, we can assume that it is quite representative of the mainstream media discourses in Albania. Furthermore, through discourse analysis we were able to look at the political media discourses and understand how
political controversy is articulated and how competing representations are constructed in order to gain the support of the wider public opinion.

However, the findings of this study refer only to the media accounts on the event, the role of various actors and the political process as a whole. They encourage us to think of the accounts of the other three entities with which these media representations are interconnected. Future research could focus on the analysis of the discourses of political actors themselves, such as political leaders, and an in-depth analysis of the international community reporting on Albania in order to understand their perspective on Albanian politics. Although methodologically more challenging, an attempt to analyze popular perceptions of the international community would contribute extensively to our understanding of political processes in particular contexts.

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INTERNET FORUMS IN LITHUANIA: A NEW STIMULUS FOR SOCIAL CAPITAL?

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Abstract

This article analyzes the process of social capital formation in internet forums. It investigates whether this social phenomenon can originate in online environments and to uncover the steps of its development. Three Lithuanian internet forums are chosen for the analysis according to their discussion topics: professional, family and leisure. The methodology used is participant observation, surveys, and interviews with members of these message boards. Data analysis indicates that interactions in internet forums can contribute to formation of social capital and bridging social capital is the predominant type among Lithuanian message boards. Moreover, there exists a “middle ground” of interaction between online and offline environments and leisure forums contribute to the formation of social capital less than other discussion groups.

Keywords: internet forums; bridging, bonding, and linking social capital; online and offline interactions; cooperation; Lithuania.

1. Introduction

Over the last 40 years civic engagement (voter turnout, political knowledge, political trust and grassroots political activism) has declined in the United States, Japan and Latin America.¹ Similar trends have been noticed in the post-communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). For example, as Mikolaj Czesnik writes, not only is voter turnout in CEE countries

relatively low, it has been steadily decreasing from the very beginning of the democratic transition.\textsuperscript{2} Voting and other types of political participation are essential for the good quality of democracy as, in this way, citizens express their will and exercise control over the matters which affect their interests. Consequently, declines in these trends have raised concerns for many political scientists.

What is to blame for such declines? Robert Putnam claims that the introduction of television contributed to the collapse of civic engagement.\textsuperscript{3} According to him, this new medium provided opportunities for individual entertainment; as a consequence, people withdrew from social gatherings, social participation declined and so did voting.\textsuperscript{4} Putnam builds his case on the concept of social capital which is, in his view, an essential component for the successful functioning of democracy.\textsuperscript{5} He defines this phenomenon as “connections among individuals – societal networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them” and facilitate coordinated actions among individuals.\textsuperscript{6} The concept of social capital was created to analyze connections among individuals in the offline environment, but now, as new communication technologies emerge, it can possibly originate in online environments as well.

Thanks to new technologies and media (e.g. the internet, mobile phones) different forms of communication have become available which we could expect to contribute to new forms of civic activity and political engagement. However, not all of the new

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{6} Putnam, \textit{Bowling Alone}, 19.
\end{itemize}
communication habits could be considered as equally contributing to the formation of social capital. For example, the internet reduces costs for communication so much that people can easily “participate” and “support certain initiatives” such as clicking “Like” on Facebook, which does not necessarily transform into active political participation. On the other hand, communication practices are different on internet forums. As defined by Wasko and Faraj, an internet forum is “a self-organizing, open activity system focused on a shared practice that exists primarily through computer-mediated communication”.

Message boards unite people around a specific topic or issue for discussion; moreover, interaction on the online sphere often transforms offline communication. For example, people start to organize offline meetings, share common concerns in the real world or come up with initiatives to collectively protect their interests. These findings suggest that initiatives which originate in internet forums might be considered as a manifestation of social capital deriving out of online interactions.

Internet communication and its influence on the formation of social capital is a relatively new and understudied field in social science. Wellman et al emphasize that internet analysis requires a redefinition of the understanding of social capital and an introduction of new ways of measuring it. An analysis of virtual communication can help to reveal its possible influence on civil activity and unfold the process of social capital formation.

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7 I use the terms internet forum and message board interchangeably.
In this article I distinguish between three types of message boards: professional forums, members of which share their knowledge on financial, political or legal matters; family forums, which concentrate on household issues; and leisure forums, which include discussions about music, videos or games. Robert Putnam claims that leisure groups contribute to formation of social capital as much as political groups because they help to establish trust among individuals and develop self-discipline that facilitates easy cooperation for common objectives.\(^{11}\)

Regarding Putnam’s arguments, this article will verify whether leisure forums foster social capital as much as professional and family message boards. Other important questions that I will answer are: can we speak of online social capital? If we can speak of such a thing, what is the influence of internet forums on the formation of social capital in online and offline environments? Can social capital originate from online interactions? Which type of social capital – bonding, bridging or linking forms in the internet forums? Is there a “middle ground” (email, Facebook, mobile phones) between online and offline communication?

The specific focus of this research is the communication among participants of Lithuanian internet forums. Lithuania is a very interesting case to study because, firstly, it is part of the post-communist sphere and suffers from extremely low voter turnout and minimal trust in public institutions.\(^{12}\) Thus, formation and manifestation of social capital is highly important for the emergence and maintenance of a healthy democracy in this country. In addition to this, Lithuanian internet forums still have not been analyzed from this perspective.


2. Social Capital

It is intuitively clear what social scientists mean when they refer to social capital; however, this concept has countless definitions. In order to describe the concept as precisely as possible, it is important to examine the definitions provided by the most prominent social scientists. Pierre Bourdieu describes social capital as “the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition”. James Coleman, on the other hand, emphasizes the functional side of this phenomenon. According to him, social capital refers to people’s ability to work together in groups. Two characteristics are very important, then: the existence of social structure and facilitations of individual actions within the structure. Fukuyama broadens this description by including any instance in which people cooperate to common ends on the basis of shared informal norms and values. Definitions, provided above, suggest several indicators of social capital including mutual recognition and understanding among individuals, shared norms and values and successful cooperation to achieve common goals.

One of the best known theorists in the social capital paradigm is Robert Putnam. This scholar stands out from the other authors because he considers social capital as the attribute of communities and not individuals. He claims that this concept refers to “connections among individuals – societal networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from

them”. Putnam also emphasizes that these features facilitate coordinated actions, thus members of society cooperate much easier. He identifies the difference between individual and collective aspects of social capital: individuals initially form connections to benefit their needs, but these reciprocal relationships have a spillover effect that eventually serves the whole community.

When the influence of social capital on democracy is discussed, dense networks of civic associations are mentioned as a significant ground for success. Putnam emphasizes that associations do not need to be political: membership in leisure groups like a choir or a bird-watching club also motivates people to do something together with others and thus helps to develop cooperation skills, self-discipline, as well as a sense of responsibility for collective endeavors. As a consequence, these networks stimulate the active participation of their members in public affairs and thus contribute to citizenship in a full sense (not only formal obligations, but initiatives of self-government and involvement in the state’s affairs).

Putnam expresses concern about a long-term decline of all forms of social capital in the U.S. since the 1960s. According to the author, these trends are highly influenced by new technologies and the mass media, which have become increasingly individualized (for example, they enable people to consume entertainment individually). He assigns this same role to the internet as another individualizing medium, which draws people away from their social environments, potentially alienating them from social interactions and civic engagement. However, a number of authors have criticized Putnam’s argument (see, for

17 Putnam, Bowling Alone, 229.
20 Putnam, Making Democracy Work, 90.
21 Putnam, Bowling Alone, 229.
example, Fischer\textsuperscript{22}) saying that American civic life has been changing but not declining.

Ladd uses the term “churn” to illustrate the process when some organizations decrease in membership while others attract more members.\textsuperscript{23} Fischer adds to this critique by saying that instead of participating in usual, institutionalized ways, people get involved in \textit{ad hoc} campaigns.\textsuperscript{24} In addition, the author thinks that due to the shift of the nature of civic participation, it has become more diffuse and much more difficult to measure and evaluate. Finally, Fischer provides additional data that contradicts Putnam’s claims; for example, in the U.S. trust in government has been rebounding since the 1990s, the crime rate has been decreasing, and new forms of social connection have appeared.\textsuperscript{25} This evidence suggests that social capital could be transforming rather than decreasing in modern societies.

Quan-Haase and Wellman claim that there might be different ways in which effects of the internet on social capital can be conceptualized.\textsuperscript{26} Putnam’s interpretation – diminishing social capital – is one of those possible outcomes. The authors add that the internet can also transform social capital (creating spatially-dispersed and sparsely-knit interest-based social networks) or supplement it (by facilitating existing social relationships). During their research the authors find empirical evidence for all of these possibilities.\textsuperscript{27} The collected data shows that online participation may intensify reciprocity and trust and further support local

\textsuperscript{24} Fischer, \textit{Bowling Alone}, 5.
\textsuperscript{25} Ibid, 11.
\textsuperscript{27} Ibid.
community interests. On the other hand, it may also decrease offline social contact and increase loneliness.

These contrasting results suggest that new variables should be introduced in order to evaluate the influence of the internet on social capital. As these authors put it, the internet leads to new forms of social capital that cannot be easily captured with existing forms of measurement. Thus, researchers need to develop new forms of measurement to complement the existing ones.

Putnam identifies two types of social capital: bridging and bonding. The former refers to loose networks between individuals who might help each other with certain information, but without emotional support. Putnam suggests that this type is more outward-looking and encompasses people across different social divides. By contrast, the latter indicates tightly-knit, emotionally strong relationships. The sociologist claims that it may reinforce exclusive identities and homogeneous groups. These descriptions suggest that bridging social capital could be more beneficial for democracy because it enhances diversity and connects people from different social groups, bringing the public sphere closer to the Habermasian ideal. In addition, Michael Woolcock argues that Putnam overlooks the third type of social capital, namely linking social capital. This type of social capital helps reaching people in politically or financially influential positions. It also establishes vertical connections with formal institutions. As the UK National Statistics Office describes it, linking social capital is concerned with relations between people

28 Ibid, 9.
29 Putnam, Bowling Alone, 23.
30 Ibid.
who are not on an equal footing as they who differ in power, social status or wealth.  

Following this literature review, I arrived at my own definition of social capital which has been used for the data collection portion of this research. Firstly, following the classical authors who wrote about social capital, in this article social capital represents social networks and connections among individuals, who share the same norms and values. Trust, mutual support, reciprocity, respect and helpfulness are noticed in interactions among members of these social networks. Moreover, all of these features foster cooperation and coordinated actions among individuals. Hence, the functional element of social capital is also very important as it can voluntarily produce social resources or accomplish common goals. There are a number of activities that can indicate cooperation for certain purposes including acts such as petition signing, official letter writing and picketing. For example, if people in a social network decide to establish a club or association that definitely indicates the existence of social capital. Robert Putnam often mentions these entities as indicators of the analyzed phenomenon, probably because they show that group members can cooperate effectively enough to establish a body to protect and further their interests.

2. Analysis

2.1 Methodology

In this research I use quantitative online surveys as well as qualitative methods including participant observation and online interviews. Participant observation aims at collecting primary information about internet forums and observing interactions among their members; surveys are meant to identify the general trends of communication and compare forums with each other while interviews with members of message boards help to get deeper insights and explain tendencies, observed during the

34 Putnam, Making Democracy Work, 167.
survey data analysis. All of these methods have been developed to study an offline world; thus they need to be adjusted for an online environment. What is the best way to study the cyber-realm? Is the virtual communication so specific that new methods should be developed for its analysis? Should the internet be studied separately from the real world? According to Richard Rogers, the internet can and should be studied separately from the offline environment because it is “a research site where one can ground findings about reality”. 35 He provides an example of study about the right-wing culture in the Netherlands. Content analysis of extremist websites demonstrated that right-wing culture has been hardening in the country. This is an illustration of how the internet is used both as object and source of study to ground claims about society.

As a result, Rogers claims that it is not necessary to go offline to study online communication because the internet offers particular research possibilities, which are sufficient for virtual realm studies. Moreover, social actors, whose activism originates online, usually feel much more comfortable communicating with a researcher in a virtual environment. For example, as Christine Hine writes, “I needed to adjust my way of relating to respondents according to the ways in which social practices are defined and experienced”. 36 Referring to these arguments, I assume that online research is adequate to study the formation of social capital in the internet forums and its manifestation offline. Hence, both quantitative and qualitative methods of this research are carried out completely in an online and virtual space.

To formulate questions for the quantitative survey, I used the study of Ellison et al as an example because these authors analyzed three types of social capital in the online social network.

Facebook\textsuperscript{37} (the questionnaire used for this research can be found in Appendix 1). The questions target all three types of social capital and aim to evaluate what happens between online and offline interactions (what I call “the middle ground”). The questionnaire is also designed to measure offline communication, assess the existence of common values among forum members, and evaluate the capability of individuals to cooperate for common goals. Following the quantitative survey, I organized individual online interviews with members of internet forums. The interview questionnaire is presented in Appendix 2.

\subsection*{2.2 Case selection}

Lithuania, as a post-communist country which suffers from an extremely low rate of voter turnout and trust in public institutions, is a very interesting case to study. In 2010, 55 percent of households could use the Internet at home.\textsuperscript{38} In urban areas, 62 percent of households had Internet access at home, whereas in the rural areas only 41 percent enjoyed the same access. Internet usage has been steadily increasing in the country: people get involved in more varied activities in the virtual space and the time spent online is rising.\textsuperscript{39} Therefore, I assume, the internet might increase people’s communication accordingly. Hence, I chose three big Lithuanian internet forums to analyze their role in the formation of social capital in online and offline environments.


From a list of 69 of the most popular internet forums in Lithuania⁴⁰ I identified three predominant discussion topics. Firstly, there are professional forums, members of which share their knowledge on financial, political or legal matters, rather than personal issues. Secondly, family matters are also a very popular topic to discuss online. Indeed, two out of the ten largest Lithuanian message boards concentrate on household issues. Finally, the third most widespread type of internet forums includes discussions on various leisure topics, usually sharing opinions about music, videos or games. My previous research in the field indicated that the size of internet forums has no influence on interaction among their members; however, I found that people participate in internet forums for different reasons depending on their topic.⁴¹ Thus, for this article I chose large message boards in order to increase response rate; one representative of every forum type – professional (Tax.lt), family (Supermama.lt) and leisure (Linksmas.net). Participant observation was my first step of data collection, which allowed me to study members of these forums and their communication habits.

The second step of my research was qualitative surveys. I created a separate survey for every internet forum and sent letters to random members of every message board asking them to answer my questions. Initially around 300 letters were sent, but in a few days I distributed an additional 100 requests. The response rate was fairly high; hence in a week I had 80 responses from Tax.lt, 87 and 86 replies from the other two forums. Result analysis can be found in the Table 1. This table checks whether there is a statistically significant difference between answers of different forum members. For this purpose I ran a T-test for two independent samples, which uses data from two separate samples to draw inferences about the mean


⁴¹ Trinkūnaitė, Collective Action on the Internet, 52.
difference between populations. The table presents three figures for every question in each forum: “Difference” (response mean difference), “T-test score” and “Probability”, which indicates how significant the difference is.

The third step of my research was interviewing members of the studied message boards. I sent 20 to 30 letters asking if users of internet forums would agree to answer my questions in written form via a Skype-enabled chat or another form of instant messe communication. Five members of Supermama.lt forum and four members from the other message boards responded to my enquiry. I was satisfied with the quality of all of the interviews because respondents provided in-depth answers to my questions. In order to ensure anonymity of respondents, I coded their names. For example, T.Resp1, where the letter T indicates Tax.lt forum (S – Supermama.lt and L – Linksmas.net message boards, accordingly) and Resp1 specifies the number of the interview subject. In describing the collected data I refer to my respondents using these codes.

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42 The independent two-sample t-test is used to test whether population means are significantly different from each other.
Table 1. Survey Results. T Test for Two Independent Samples

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Forums and number of responses</th>
<th>Linksmas and supermama</th>
<th>Linksmas and Tax</th>
<th>Supermama and Tax</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Difference T-test score Probability</td>
<td>Difference T-test score Probability</td>
<td>Difference T-test score Probability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Question 1</td>
<td>-0.040 -0.526 0.600</td>
<td>0.349 5.113 0.000***</td>
<td>0.389 5.740 0.000***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Question 2</td>
<td>0.470 7.785 0.000***</td>
<td>0.168 3.034 0.003***</td>
<td>-0.303 -4.206 0.000***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Question 3</td>
<td>0.085 1.155 0.250</td>
<td>0.319 5.036 0.000***</td>
<td>0.233 3.826 0.000***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Question 4</td>
<td>0.153 2.247 0.026*</td>
<td>0.139 1.966 0.051</td>
<td>-0.014 -0.208 0.835</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Question 5</td>
<td>0.115 2.823 0.006***</td>
<td>0.264 4.114 0.000***</td>
<td>0.150 2.066 0.041*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Question 6</td>
<td>0.207 4.232 0.000***</td>
<td>0.263 5.108 0.000***</td>
<td>0.057 0.819 0.414</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Question 7</td>
<td>0.304 4.774 0.000***</td>
<td>-0.081 -0.997 0.320</td>
<td>-0.385 -5.456 0.000***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Question 9</td>
<td>0.559 9.692 0.000***</td>
<td>0.080 1.031 0.304</td>
<td>-0.479 -7.911 0.000***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Question 11</td>
<td>0.060 0.896 0.372</td>
<td>0.074 1.065 0.289</td>
<td>0.014 0.0237 -0.813</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Question 12</td>
<td>0.061 0.920 0.359</td>
<td>0.117 1.696 0.092*</td>
<td>0.056 0.397 0.397</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Question 13</td>
<td>0.362 5.200 0.000***</td>
<td>0.435 5.651 0.000***</td>
<td>0.072 1.094 0.276</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For the list of questions, see Appendix 1 at the end of the article.
* Significant at the 0.10 level, 2-tailed test
** Significant at the 0.05 level, 2-tailed test
*** Significant at the 0.01 level, 2-tailed test
3. Results

3.1 Interactions among Members of Internet Forums: The First Impressions

The forum tax.lt was started in 2002 and currently has around 45,300 registered users. Most of its members work as accountants and join this message board in order to discuss their professional matters including new laws and the administration of official documents. Interviewed members of tax.lt emphasize that discussions in this forum spin around a narrow spectrum of topics and are very professional. For example, T.Resp4 says:

> [t]his website is distinguished from the others because its members are people of one specialization.

Despite the fact that the emphasis is on professional topics in the forum, the “Blather” topic is quite developed as well: users tell funny stories and jokes, and share interesting links with each other. It seems that although this leisure topic is relatively less developed than professional discussions, it helps to maintain a friendly atmosphere on the message board and create stronger ties among its members.

From discussions in the tax.lt forum, it can be observed that its members willingly support each other. For example, one user posted a message that some officers from the Tax Inspectors office came to check documents of the firm she worked in. She complained that these officers were disrespectful and she was not sure whether all the documents had been prepared correctly. This post soon received many replies of other tax.lt members which advised her how to talk with the officers, which documents to prepare and which laws to quote. This illustration suggests that in forum tax.lt mutual support and reciprocity exist among individuals. Moreover, an interesting fact is that at least some users consider themselves as members of a closed community,

where status and reputation are extremely important. For example, T.Resp4 writes:

[t]alking in youth jargon, OLD (the most experienced – author’s note) people lead in this forum. Inexperienced (and overconfident – author’s note) youth is turned away. They have to calm down, come back to their studies and work.

However, the most impressive example of cooperation in this forum was the establishment of a National Accountant Association, a body, which was created to protect their professional interests as accountants.

Another analysed forum is Supermama.lt, which was established in 2002 and at the moment has more than 168,000 registered users. Most of the discussions on this message board focus on child nurturing and family issues. One sub-topic, which is a very interesting example of communication, is used for discussions about infertility. Discussions that are found in this sub-topic are very personal and intimate. As S.Resp4 says,

[i]nfertility has always been considered in Lithuania as a sign of immoral life; thus many members of the forum are afraid to be identified.

This comment suggests that many users of the message board would probably be ashamed to talk about their problem in the physical space. However, the forum enables its members to transfer very personal issues into a public sphere and still retain anonymity. Another important observation about this forum is the existence of a collective identity among its members. S.Resp4 mentions that other users of the message board are the only people, who can understand and support her after many unsuccessful medical procedures.

Moreover, it should be mentioned that users of supermama.lt forum often consider themselves as members of a close community, where reputation and status are very important. For example, as S.Resp3 explains, over the years “old” members
have formed a tight circle and novices are met with a dose of distrust and suspicion. Thus, new forum members have to be “examined” before being accepted by the group. As S.Resp3 describes it,

[i]n the beginning they have to introduce themselves. Later on we are looking for discrepancies in their comments and trying to find out their attitudes. In a few words, we have our own circle, which is not easy to access – you have to win our friendship.

However, whenever people gain the trust of other members, they receive all the support and benefits of the group. An interesting fact is that the largest support exists in groups, where members established institutionalized clubs or associations.

Following these illustrations, relevant questions arise: how can members of such a large internet forum develop such strong collective identities? Is it possible to do so in a message board which has above 150.000 registered users and more than 14 large topics for discussion? The answers to these questions lie in the comment of S.Resp2, which I received as a private message in the forum:

[s]upermama.lt contains a large number of smaller message boards that are divided by member interests. For example, I actively participate in certain topics, but there are groups where I would not know what to say.

This explains how members of Supermama.lt manage to develop so strong relationships with each other, provide mutual support and successfully cooperate for common goals.

Linksmas.net started in 2005 and has now almost 40.000 registered users. This forum does not have one particular subject for discussions – its members chat about random leisure topics like music, videos, and computer games. As compared to the previously described message boards, replies to each other’s questions in this forum are usually shorter and less informative; its members have not established any club or association outside
of the message board yet. There might be several reasons for this reality: firstly, members of Linksmas.net forum are much younger than participants of the other two message boards: 89% of survey respondents were twenty years old or younger. It might be the case that young people still have not developed cooperation skills and that they lack experience and knowledge on how to establish official entities. Secondly, the reason could be determined by the fact that members of this forum have no common topic to discuss; hence, they have no common problems to share or need to come together and change a particular situation. It might also be the case that in leisure forums people mostly come to relax and chit-chat; thus reciprocity and mutual support is less important than in other types of message boards.

3.2 Social Capital in Internet Forums. Bonding, Bridging or Linking?

The first two questions of the survey (Appendix 1) were aimed at finding out whether bonding social capital exists among members of the internet forums. Answers to the first question have shown that tax.lt members are much more willing to turn to someone in the forum for advice about making important decisions than the members of other two message boards. This trend might be explained by the fact that users of tax.lt forum trust each other concerning professional issues; this is observed in both forum discussions as well as during the interviews. On the other hand, answers to the second question show that the forum Supermama.lt leads in the amount of users who know someone who would lend them 100 Lt (29 €) in case of an emergency. Moreover, some respondents from the Supermama.lt forum claim to have strong emotional relationships with other members of the message board. However, in statistically significant terms, results for these two questions are too weak to generalize whether bonding social capital exists in one or several of the analyzed forums.

By contrast, results from the questions, aimed at measuring the existence of bridging social capital provide more certain answers. For example, 90% of the tax.lt forum respondents claim that
interacting with people from this message board makes them feel part of a larger community. This figure differs significantly from the other two forums. However, a large percentage of the other two forum members also gave a positive answer to this question. Similar trends can be observed in replies to the fourth question: a large proportion of all forum respondents claimed that online they make connections with people who they would not normally meet in real life (in a work place, at school or in a neighborhood). Only members of the Linksmas.net forum seem to make fewer connections with distinct groups. This tendency could be explained by the fact that tax.lt and supermama.lt forums gather members from more distinct geographical regions of Lithuania. For example, T.Resp4 notes that the forum is quite diversified in social dimensions:

\[\text{notably delicate issues arise from different attitudes, places of residence, education levels and nationalities.}\]

By contrast, L.Resp2 mentions that most of the Linksmas.net members come from two Lithuanian cities, Šiauliai or Kaunas and that he sometimes meets other members in the street or at college. However, although members of the message board Linksmas.net are less likely to meet people from other geographical or social dimensions than users of tax.lt or then Supremama.lt forums, positive answers from all three message boards are large enough to claim that this characteristic is relevant to all of them. In short, the collected data suggests that bridging social capital exists in all three message boards, but especially in the tax.lt forum.

Finally, questions five and six are meant to test for the existence of linking social capital. The number of respondents who confirmed that being a member of those forums helped them connect with people in power positions or facilitated access to public institutions is too small to claim that this type of social capital exists in any of the message boards. However, Linksmas.net members responded especially negatively to these questions. This trend could be explained by the fact that members of both tax.lt and supermama.lt forums have...
established associations to protect their interests and they recognize that these entities enable them to reach formal institutions or people in power positions to some extent. For example, T.Resp4 says:

[w]e needed consultations of influential officers, but they do not help every single citizen. However, this association (National Accountant Association – author’s note) is a serious body; thus they perceive us more seriously.

In general, although it cannot be claimed that linking social capital exists in the message boards, premises for its formation can be found in forums tax.lt and Supermama.lt.

3.3 Middle Ground between the Online and Offline Environments

In order to find out whether a middle ground of communication exists between the online and offline environments questions seven and eight were added to the survey. Data indicate that approximately half of the members of forums tax.lt and Linksmas.net use alternative means to interact. Furthermore, a significantly larger part of Supermama.lt users replied positively to these questions. Respondents from these message boards indicated that they mainly use Skype, Facebook, write e-mails or call each other on the phone. Since the data shows that a middle ground of communication exists, several relevant questions arise: firstly, why do members of message boards decide to embrace alternative means of interaction, and secondly, how does this process evolve?

Answers to these questions can be found in the interview material. For example, L.Resp2 says that although he could discuss any issue in the forum, at some point he wants more privacy. This comment suggests that when the relationship among forum members becomes stronger, they start to look for alternative and more private ways of interaction. T.Resp2 describes how this process evolves:
The original need for these interactions was to solve professional problems. But professional communication gradually transforms into personal relationships.

These comments disclose the dynamics of online interactions. However, out of this material additional important questions emerge: which way of communicating is more widespread? Do people first start to use alternative means of interaction, and later meet in offline space, or vice versa? Do people communicate in internet forums and in “middle ground” but never meet in real life?

Data collected via interviews offers support for both hypotheses. For example, L.Resp4 says that she has added many members of Linksmas.net forum to her friend list on Facebook, though she has not seen most of them in the real world. On the other hand, a respondent notes that after participating in a forum meeting, she started to connect to these people in her online social network. This comment suggests that although face to face communication is not necessary for members of internet forums to start using alternative ways of interaction, meetings in the real world enhance this process. Offline meetings were mentioned as a starting point for more diversified communication by most of the interview respondents. These illustrations suggest that middle ground of communication exists between online and offline communication; but in the majority of cases people tend to meet in the real world before interacting via Facebook, Skype or phone.

3.4 Meetings in the Real World – How and Why?

As compared to the data described in the previous subchapter, it turns out that forum users are not only using alternative ways of communication, but also meeting each other offline. Approximately half of the members of the tax.lt and Linksmas.net forums interact face to face; in the case of the Supermama.lt board, however, this figure is significantly larger. Users of this family forum usually meet to drink coffee or beer, participate in organized member meetings, spend free time together, and, interestingly, their families communicate also with each other.
Interviewees explain how they decided to meet other members of internet forums in the real world. For example, T.Resp2 recalls that users of tax.lt forum firstly developed friendly relationships with each other online; hence later on it naturally outgrew to regular meetings. Additionally, most of respondents claim that after the first meeting they regularly see each other offline. As T.Resp2 says,

> [e]very year we meet 2 to 4 times. We are very attached to each other and we miss each other, because we live in different places of Lithuania – from Vilnius to Palanga.

It seems that meetings in the real world are very pleasant for most of the members. For instance, T.Resp4 says that each of tax.lt forum meetings has a different topic (one 2011 meeting is billed as “Back to the Childhood”). People usually organize quizzes, dances and food cooking fests. Moreover, T.Resp3 recalls that once she travelled across the country in order to meet one person she really liked from the forum.

S.Resp2 of message board Supermama.lt describes the process of planning a meeting:

> [w]e firstly agree what time is the most comfortable for us and we make a list of participants. Then, we usually go to a cafeteria and spend an evening chit-chatting. Sometimes we come up with a cultural program – we go to the cinema or the theater together. Our group was formed according to the baby delivery date, thus we meet to celebrate birthdays of our children.

All of these examples demonstrate similarities to the experience of users of the tax.lt forum and the members of message board Supermama.lt regularly meet each other offline and thus develop strong mutual relationships. However, interviews with members of the Linksmas.net message board disclosed a slightly different face to face communication pattern. It turned out that meetings are organized spontaneously and irregularly, and there is less organizational work done in advance. For example, L.Resp4 describes one of the forum members meeting:
[w]e went to the shop and later - to the little park nearby. We played cards and talked.

Another relevant question in this chapter is how meetings in the real world change communication among the forum members. Interview data shows that when people get to know each other offline their interactions online become closer as well. T.Resp4 says:

[w]hen you get to know someone personally, it is also much easier to communicate with him/her on the message board. You already know what these people do in life, what they think, which specific knowledge they have.

Therefore, it seems that not only the online environment enhances offline communication, but the latter one also strengthens interactions in a virtual space. Examples analyzed here show that there exists both offline communication of message boards’ members and an intermediary ground between online and offline spaces.

3.5 Goal Achievement. Can Members of Internet Forums Cooperate?

One social capital indicator is the existence of common goals and values among the group members. Survey question eleven was designed to examine this indicator. Results showed that respondents from all three message boards consider themselves to share similar goals and values with other members of their forum (note, though, that statistically significant differences do not exist). However, this indicator cannot be automatically perceived as evidence of the existence of social capital. The more important issue here is how successfully members of these forums could cooperate in order to achieve the goals they share. The twelfth and thirteenth questions of the survey are meant to speak to this issue. Respondents were first asked if they feel it would be easy to cooperate with other people to achieve common goals and secondly if members of the message board have already cooperated to achieve anything.
Results to these questions revealed an interesting trend. Firstly, users of all three message boards admitted that it would not be complicated to work with other members of forums they belong to. However, it turned out that people actually cooperate in two out of three message boards (tax.lt and Supermama.lt). How can this finding be explained? It seems that either members of the leisure forum are very optimistic about possible cooperation, but it does not work in real life, or there exists a potential for common work, but there still has not been any stimulus to trigger this potential.

With regards to tax.lt, T.Resp3 recalls that when a forum member’s child participated in the photography contest, other users voted for him on the contest website to help him win. In addition to this, T.Resp4 mentions the organization of charity and money collection for an ill girl. But the most impressive example of cooperation is the establishment of the National Accountant Association which aims to protect professional interests of accountants. Survey respondents indicated the establishment of this entity as the most prominent example of their common work, alongside letters to officials and petition signing.

Members of Supermama.lt indicated petition signing and participation in public events, pickets and flashmobs as the main types of common work in their survey responses. Interviews revealed other existing initiatives of forum members, mainly donations for sick and poor people. The message board also has a separate topic called ‘Support the Children!’ This topic is meant to organize visits to orphanages and visits to greet children on their birthdays. Forum members split up the tasks: to buy the present, a cake, candies and beverages, and going to visit the children. In general it looks like members of the forum Supermama.lt are very empathetic for disadvantaged and sick people and thus work together to assist them. Finally, there are several impressive examples of successful initiatives in the Supermama.lt forum. S Resp3 mentioned the Horse lover club, and S Resp4 elaborated on the Fertility Association, both established by the members of message board Supermama.lt.
It is also interesting to observe what kind of cooperation exists among members of the leisure forum Linksmas.net. Survey data suggests that, similarly to Supermama.lt users, Linksmas.net members often sign petitions and participate in public events, pickets and flashmobs. L.Resp4 also mentions that message board members help each other do homework assignments or share music and movies online. These activities can be considered as mutual support and helpfulness, but they do not really fit under the notion of cooperation to achieve a common goal. Moreover, L.Resp2 explains that members of this internet forum are willing to help others only if that does not require too much time and effort:

\[
\text{[i]f there is some contest and we just need to press a few buttons... if it is not too complicated, then we definitely support each other.}
\]

It is difficult to classify this type of behavior as exactly “helpfulness” or “cooperation”. It looks that this is the case where the internet reduces costs of communication so much that people can “support” certain initiatives without spending much time on them. Thus, they do not develop cooperation skills, self-discipline or responsibility for collective endeavors which are necessary for successful collective actions.

### 3.6 Social Capital Originating Online: Three Examples

The National Accountant Association was established in March 25, 2009. During the first year of its existence it attracted more than 130 new members, most of whom are members of the tax.lt forum.\(^{44}\) Discussions on the message board show that the idea to create this body was discussed as early as 2004 but it took another five years for the project to be realized. Why did it take so long? As reported in the article about the National Accountant Association, there are several professional organizations in the

\(^{44}\) Romas Dikčius, “Narystė už 100 litų?” ("Membership for 100 litas?")", weekly newspaper "Apskaitos, audito ir mokesčių aktualijos", 2010 02 01, Nr. 5 (581).
country which aim to protect the interests of accountants. However, all of them are quite ineffective and this problem became particularly obvious when the global financial crisis began in 2008. The Lithuanian Parliament passed many new laws in an extremely short period of time and a number of taxes were unexpectedly increased. As T.Resp4 recalls, members of forum tax.lt were furious because of this rush and the fact that no one consulted their opinion on these matters. Therefore, the initiative group quickly formed in the message board and the Association was established soon thereafter. Depending on their qualifications, forum members offered themselves as volunteers for different positions in the Association. All of these people work without any payment for their efforts. In addition, other tax.lt members express great willingness to contribute to the association’s work, for example, by transferring to its budget 2 percent of the Income Tax they pay.

What are the main activities of the National Accountant Association? Firstly, it organizes seminars to raise the level of qualifications of its members. Secondly, it communicates with public institutions and expresses a group position on behalf of accountants towards the newly accepted laws. Thirdly, this body seeks to raise the prestige of the accountant profession. The following aims are indicated in the statute of National Accountant Association: “to represent and defend the interests of Association members, to foster their civic engagement, to provide its members with versatile information and assistance”. There are several examples which indicate the successful functioning of the Association: it organizes practical seminars for its members, provides professional consultations, distributes summaries of the

45  Ibid.
newly accepted laws, and organizes internal events. Moreover, it has sent several letters to public officials and institutions including Vytautas Landsbergis, a Lithuanian Member of the European Parliament, the Lithuanian Parliament itself and the Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Lithuania. These letters were meant to present the Association’s position on different issues and they were published by the national media.

The National Accountant Association is an extraordinary entity because it originated on the internet forum tax.lt. During discussions online members of this message board came up with an idea to establish this body and successfully cooperated to bring the idea into practice. None of the forum members knew each other before joining this virtual space. The director of the entity Artūras Tankevičius says that this body is not a classic association or community. It is rather a club of friends and like-minded persons. Thus, the National Accountant Association is a noteworthy example of an entity which originated from forum members’ online interactions.

I got to know about two other initiatives which stemmed from the forum Supermama.lt only during the interviews; hence I have less information about these entities. However, they are also very interesting examples of cooperation among members of the message board. For example, the online horse lover group established their club in 2007. This community unites people who spend their free time with horses, but are not professional athletes. S.Resp3 says that the club members help each other; for example, they offered money for one of the members whose animal needed surgery. Another entity which was started by Supermama.lt users is the Fertility Association. S.Resp4 says that most of its members joined the forum looking for useful information but soon became good friends and companions. The idea to establish the Association originated six years ago because

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49 Dikčius, “Membership for 100 litas?”. 
the message board’s members felt that they needed to protect their interests. According to S.Resp4 there are around 50-60,000 infertile couples in Lithuania; however, the country still does not have any assisted reproduction law. As a consequence, infertility is not officially recognized as an illness so the state does not compensate expensive medical procedures and most of the infertile families struggle to receive any treatment. The main activity of the Association is to campaign for the adoption of the fertility law. The association assists its members in various ways including by providing discounts for medical procedures or paying the entirety for some of them from its budget. According to S.Resp4, the entity now has more than 300 members but its idea and structure was formed completely on the message board. This fact makes the reach of these activities really impressive.

All three entities, described above, help to answer the question as to whether social capital emerges from online interactions. As mentioned before, Robert Putnam considers clubs and associations as indicators of social capital because they show that group members can successfully cooperate and create separate bodies to protect their interests. In this way they formulate their positions and communicate them for the government. This bottom-up process is beneficial for democracy, because citizens get involved into the law making process in different ways, not only by a formal voting process.

The examples presented above show that online discussions often stimulate people to take new initiatives and establish entities to further their needs. But what of the message board Linksmas.net? Its members displayed less mutual support, reciprocity, helpfulness and cooperation, which are indicators of social capital. Moreover, this is the only internet forum where no club or association was created out of the forum members’ interactions. On one hand, this trend might be explained by the young age of Linksmas.net participants: they probably lack experience and cooperation skills. On the other hand, young people often come up with very creative initiatives if they have a fairly relevant topic which stimulates them. Therefore, this article assumes that the topic of this internet forum determines the
passivity level of its members. Most of them join the message board for daily chit-chatting; thus, they do not have any stimulus to develop their cooperation or extend it behind the boundaries of the forum. These observations suggest that Robert Putnam might have been wrong when he claimed that leisure groups equally contribute to the formation of social capital, at least as far as online interactions go.

4. Conclusions

The aim of this study was to check whether social capital can originate in online environments and to uncover the steps of this process. Data analysis showed that out of three message boards, two forums fostered social capital considerably more than the third one. The collected data also indicated that interactions on internet forums can contribute to the formation of social capital in both online and offline environments. These findings bring us back to Robert Putnam who is quite skeptical about the influence of new information technologies on social capital. However, the findings of this research show that Quan-Haase and Wellman are correct when they claim that Putnam’s interpretation – diminishing social capital – is just one of the possible outcomes.\(^\text{50}\) It turned out that social capital can be not only observed in forum members’ online interactions, but they also transform into offline initiatives like the establishment of clubs or associations which are certainly manifestations of social capital.

In addition to this, the collected data indicates that the bridging type of social capital is predominant in internet forums. What does it mean? If we follow the arguments of Robert Putnam, bridging social capital is most beneficial to democracy because it connects people from different social groups, enhances diversity and creates broader identities.\(^\text{51}\) To my mind, these characteristics bring the public sphere closer to the Habermasian ideal which can be interpreted as "a theater in modern societies

\(^{50}\) Anabel Quan-Hasse and Barry Wellman, *How does the Internet Affect Social Capital*, 3.

in which political participation is enacted through the medium of talk". If this assumption is correct and social capital not only originates from online environments but also enhances discussions among diverse segments of society, these trends let us hope for positive changes towards a healthier democracy not only in Lithuania, but also in other post-communist countries, which suffer from low civic participation but where internet connectivity is high.

The analysis also indicated that the process of social capital transfer from online to offline environment can be deconstructed into smaller steps and a “middle ground” of communication can be observed. Furthermore, research showed that members of the leisure forum Linksmas.net are noticeably less cooperative and demonstrate a lower collective identity than message boards’ tax.lt and Supermama.lt participants. These findings indicate that Robert Putnam is not correct when he claims that leisure groups are equally important for the formation of social capital. However, it is also possible that there are factors which remained unobserved in this research that determine the passivity of Linksmas.net members. To answer this question, it would be relevant to further analyze other online leisure communities such as fan groups.

52 Nancy Fraser, Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy, (Social Text, No. 25/26, Duke University Press, 1990), [JSTOR database], 57.
53 Putnam, Making Democracy Work, 90.
Appendixes

Appendix No. 1. Survey Questionnaire

Q1. There is someone in the forum I can turn to for advice about making very important decisions.
   - Yes
   - No

Q2. If I needed an emergency loan of 100 Lt, I know someone in the forum I can turn to.
   - Yes
   - No

Q3. Interacting with people in the forum makes me feel like a part of a larger community.
   - Yes
   - No

Q4. In this forum I make connections with people who I would not normally meet in the real life (in my work place, school or neighborhood).
   - Yes
   - No

Q5. Being a member of this internet forum helps me connect with people in power positions.
   - Yes
   - No

Q6. Being a member of this internet forum facilitates my access to public institutions (tax inspection, local municipality, etc.)
   - Yes
   - No

Q7. Do you communicate with other members of the message board in other ways than in the forum?
   - Yes
Q8. If yes, how?
- Email
- Skype or other type of instant messaging (MSN, ICQ, etc.)
- Via mobile phones (sms, phone calls, etc.)
- In other internet forums
- Facebook or other online social networks (banga.lt, one.lt, frype.lt, etc.)
- Other.

Q9. Do you meet with other forum members in the off-line environment?
- Yes
- No

Q10. If yes, how?
- I meet with one or two forum members for a coffee, tea or beer
- I participate in organized meetings of forum members
- We spend your free time together.
- After joining this forum, our families started to communicate.
- We meet to talk about the topics that we discuss in the forum.
- We take certain initiatives together (organize pickets, write letters to officials, etc.)
- Other way.

Q11. Do you feel that you share similar goals and values with other members of the internet forum?
- Yes
- No

Q12. Do you feel it would be easy to cooperate with these people in order to achieve common goals?
- Yes
- No
Q13. Have the forum members already cooperated to achieve anything?
   - Yes
   - No

Q14. If yes, in what ways?
   - Sign a petition
   - Send letters for officials
   - Establish an association
   - Participate in a public events, pickets, flashmobs, etc.
   - We have our publications.
   - Other.

Q15. Your education:
   - Primary education
   - Secondary education
   - Professional degree
   - Higher education

Q16. Your age
   - 20 or less
   - 21-25
   - 26-35
   - 36-45
   - 46-60
   - 61-74
   - 75 or more

Q17. Your gender
   - Female
   - Male

Appendix No.2. Questions For Interviews

Do you maintain contacts with other members of the message board in other ways than forum? (Email Skype, Facebook, phone)
   - when did you start to communicate? why that happened and how?
- why do you communicate?

Do you meet other forum members in the real world? (to have coffee or beer, participate in organized meetings, take common initiatives, etc)
- how did it happen and why?
- how often do you meet? have you become closer with these people over time?
- do you meet with one or two members of the forum or a group of them? how often and why?
- can you give me any examples? where do you go, what do you do? do you remember anything fun nor interesting that happened when you met them?

Can you say that during on-line discussions people come up with new ideas and initiatives?
- Do you remember any examples?
- Why forum members came up with these initiatives and were they supported by other members?
- have you come up with any initiatives yourself? have you supported any? why?
- can you say that forum members support each other? why?

Additional questions about clubs or associations.
- when and how did the idea to establish this association emerge?
- who were the members of the founding group? did they know each other beforehand or met in the forum?
- when and how did you learn about the association/ club?
- what would you name as the main aim and activity of the association/ club?
- do you feel that the association/ club enables you and other forum members to contact people in power positions? how?
- do you have additional events to meet and spend time together?
- can you say that since you joined the association you got closer to its members or it is more an official organisation?
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RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN HISTORY AND A SENSE OF BELONGING – RUSSIAN SPEAKING MINORITY INTEGRATION IN LATVIA

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Abstract

This article will analyze the role of history and sense of belonging development for integration and naturalization efforts in Latvia. In establishing the significance of history in national identity formation, theoretical literature analysis will explain why belonging is a fundamental need and how history and historic celebrations become tools in the process. Data from 1998-2008 will be used to illustrate the theoretical analysis and explain the dramatic drop in belonging amongst Russian speaking non-citizens. The article will argue that nation building in Latvia is based on ethnicity and culture, emphasizing collective memory and interpretation of history, as the basis of national identity. For non-members of the ethnic titular, belonging has depended on assimilation into the predefined ethnic and cultural community. The demands have alienated a significant portion of the population and opened doors for identification with Russia as the external homeland, encouraging a Diaspora identity and complicating further integration efforts.

Keywords: Latvia, history, national identity, sense of belonging, integration, external homeland

1. Introduction

Latvia has a well-documented struggle with the naturalization and integration of the historic legacy immigrants left within its
boarders after ethno-nationalism helped bring about the collapse of the Soviet Union\(^2\). Twenty years later, numerous governments, policies, pressure from international organizations and outside influences have failed to bring about a solution to the sizable non-citizens, or residents lacking citizenship of any state, population within Latvia. The Office of Citizenship and Migration Affairs documents these figures currently to stand at 14.61 per cent (326,735) of the total population\(^3\). Of the non-citizens population; 66 per cent are Russian, 14 per cent are Belarusian, and 10 percent are Ukrainian\(^4\) and comprise what David Laitin has termed the "Russian-speaking population"\(^5\).

The idea that integration should be based on fostering a sense of belonging is a topic commonly hinted at by Latvian politicians and academics\(^6\). Survey data also supports the presumption that a sense of belonging can play a vital role in the naturalization

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4  Calculation based on above Office of Citizenship and Migration Affairs document.
process. The survey *On the Road to Civic Society* from 1998, ascertained that 23 per cent of the non-citizens eligible for citizenship did not plan to apply because they did not feel a sense of belonging to Latvia. Additionally, the *New Citizens Survey* established that 90 per cent of the new-citizens stated that a sense of belonging to Latvia was a “very important” or “important” factor in their application for citizenship. A sense of belonging can, therefore, be both the main motivational aspect for acquiring citizenship, and the lack thereof can serve as the main hindrance to non-citizens completing the naturalization process.

The idea for this article stems from comparing survey data on the sense of belonging, and historical event interpretation and celebrations, from 1998 and 2008 amongst the Russian speaking non-citizens of Latvia. Both surveys were commissioned by Latvian government bodies in an effort to monitor the integration efforts of Russian speakers in Latvia. In the survey *On the Road to Civic Society*, concluded in 1998, 81 per cent of citizens claimed a sense of belonging to Latvia, as did an overwhelming 80 per cent of non-citizens. In 2008, the same 81 per cent of citizens claimed belonging to Latvia; however, only 51 per cent of the non-citizens felt the same. Within this article the survey data on the sense of belonging to Latvia of the non-citizens is compared to survey data on their expressed sense of attachment to Russia, as well as their stated support for the celebration of the historically sensitive Soviet Victory Day on May 9th. Comparison shows that as the sense of belonging to Latvia dramatically

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9 Baltic Data House, *Cela uz Pilsonisku Sabiedribu*, 61
10 Secretariat of the Minister of Population Integration of Latvia, *Kvantitativs un Kvalitativs Petijums par Sabiedribas Integracijas un Pilsonibas Aktualiem Aspektiem* (Qualitative and Quantitative Survey on Society Integration and Citizenship Aspects) (Riga: Secretariat of the Minister of Population Integration of Latvia, 2008), 20
decreases, support for May 9th celebrations drastically increases, as does expressed attachment to Russia. The article presents the data side by side in order to show how celebrations and rituals steeped in collective memory impact identity formation and group belonging.

The ten year time period is chosen for this study because of European Union conditionality, which linked EU membership for Latvia with a widening of the conception of state. In 1998, the European Union linked admittance to the EU with decreasing the number of non-citizens in Latvia, encouraging Latvia to move away from the ethnic conception of nation and foster the inclusion of the legacy Russian speaking non-citizens. The year 2008 is significant because it allows to make judgments on the relative success or failure of EU conditionality on naturalization efforts, and to monitor the continued motivation, four years after the joining of the EU, of Latvia to continue integration efforts. The time frame is also interesting from the perspective of kin-state, or external homeland, influence. The time period begins with weakened Russia in 1998, after the Russian financial crisis, and monitors the ten years of Russian consolidation of power and increased influence on neighboring states.

The article will combine existing academic perspectives on the sense of belonging and historic interpretation with concrete data on national identity manifestation through collective memory and significant historic event commemoration in Latvia. The article is structured as follows; first, it will analyze theoretical literature in order to examine the role of a sense of belonging in group cohesion and integration, and the role of history and historic celebrations in group identification. By taking the theoretical analysis into account, the article will then review the role of history in Latvian national identity construction and the consequent problems posed by historic interpretation for integration. Next, the article will show how the recent drop in the sense of belonging amongst the Russian speaking non-citizens in Latvia can be attributed to Russia’s heightened interest and support for its Diaspora abroad and the recent attempts by Russia to reinvent and glorify its Soviet past. In illustrating how the
consolidation of the Latvian national identity has been based on the idea of ethnic and cultural membership, with heavy emphasis placed on history and collective memory for belonging, the article will demonstrate how the Russian Federation has been able to exploit the resulting lack of an accessible Latvian national identity for the Russian speaking non-citizens. Thus, the article hopes to contribute a fresh perspective on the role of historic interpretation in national identity formation, and on the importance of a sense of belonging to group and territory, within the integration context in Latvia.

2. An Overall Look at the Sense of Belonging

The phenomenon of attachment, or sense of belonging, in academic literature generally highlights the group and territorial dimension. Belonging satisfies a human need, as emphasized by John Breuilly in *Nationalism and the State*, “People do yearn for communal membership, do have a strong sense of us and them, of territories as homelands, of belonging to culturally defined and bounded worlds which give their lives meaning”11.

In social psychology theory, two factors are held to be instrumental in the development of a sense of community – the territorial and relational dimensions. The territorial dimension, or the physical rootedness, refers to the actual territory inhabited. The relational dimension, or the social bonding aspect, refers to the quality and nature of the relationship between the inhabitants within the territory12. The concrete territory by itself can not constitute a sense of community, and is interdependent with the relational aspect13. In measuring the combined attachment to the

group and territory, this article will use the concept of patriotism as defined by Daniel Bar-Tal. The core concept of patriotism, according to Bar-Tal, encompasses both the attachment of group members to their group and to the territory, or land, they inhabit\(^\text{14}\). Patriotism is, therefore, an effective measure of both physical rootedness and social bonding of individuals.

The sense of community theory, as developed by McMillan and Chavis, stresses the importance of the shared emotional connection in the development of a sense of belonging as the definitive element of a true community\(^\text{15}\). This is further substantiated by the hierarchy of human needs identified by Abraham Maslow in *A Theory of Human Motivation*, in which he refers to the emotional and relational aspect of belonging to a group as a fundamental human need, placing it behind only physiological and safety needs\(^\text{16}\). In group belonging two factors are instrumental. First, the individual has to identify with the community and the distinctive markers that connect the individuals of that community. Secondly, the community has to recognize the individual as belonging.

At the nation-state level, the distinctive markers that connect an individual to a community, signal his or her membership, and serve to solidify the emotional connection amongst the population are discussed by Ulf Hedetoft in *The Politics of Multiple Belonging*. The process of ascription or construction of belonging politicizes belonging within the nation-state context and belonging becomes tied to a specific nation and institutionalized in the form of a passport and citizenship, with the boundaries between “us” and


“them” drawn\textsuperscript{17}. Bar-Tal agrees that for a group to feel patriotic, attached to other members of the group and to the territory inhabited, no particular societal-political system is required. However, “What is necessary is to experience a ‘we-ness’ as a group, to feel a sense of belonging to it. The task of constructing a sense of belonging is therefore a major objective for leaders of any societal-political unit.”\textsuperscript{18}

The nation-state government plays an important role in choosing what factors to build the “we-ness”, or the national identity, of the group upon, and ultimately set the criteria through which membership is signaled. Within the ethnic and cultural discourse of national identity and belonging, the importance is placed on the relational and narrative aspects of identity, of which memory and history are essential ingredients.\textsuperscript{19} The “national space” and “territoriality” are constructed to rest on what Czaplicka and Ruble call the “archaeology of the local”, focusing on a sense of common history, common topographies, and common genealogy\textsuperscript{20}. The shared past, experiences, customs and culture stemming from history serve as strong building blocks for a sense of belonging to the group. What is important at this level of belonging is inter-group interaction and the demonstration of adherence to group norms accepted by others.

As Fredrick Barth writes in \textit{Ethnic Groups and Boundaries} “the cultural features of greatest import are boundary-connected: the diacritica by which membership is signaled and the cultural standards that actors themselves use to evaluate and judge the actions of ethnic co-members.”\textsuperscript{21} Socially relevant factors alone


\textsuperscript{20} Hedetoft, ”Discourses and Images of Belonging,” 29.

become diagnostic for membership. The “us” vs. “them” categorization becomes dependent on the individual himself and if he identifies and chooses to be evaluated by the criteria of the group, and if that group accepts him as belonging. In the Latvian case, history is one of the defining criteria held to be instrumental for group belonging, willingness to accept and adhere to the specific interpretation of history has served to distinguish the “us” from “them”.

2.1. The Historical Elements Emphasized for Belonging

As Stuart Hall writes, in Andreas Huyssen’s book *Twilight Memories: Making Time in a Culture of Amnesia*, “Identities are the names we give to the different ways we are positioned by, and position ourselves in, the narratives of the past.” The national grand narrative, or the national master narrative, is a historical representation that accompanies the formation of a nation-state and defines group relations with others in the past, while also defining behavior in the present and in the future. The goal of a national narrative is to encourage in the group members a sense of belonging, identification and pride. The history model propagated within the nation-state will record traumas of past generations and emphasize elements of history that are considered to be definitive for the group identity. The groups’ adherence to the “official” version of history, and the socialization of the next generation within this group history, gives members the feeling that they are playing a definitive part in the reproduction and sustenance of a “living” tradition.

Rituals and celebrations of the group further sustain the emotional attachment of members to each other and serve as reminders of key events in the formation of the group. Emile Durkheim is credited with explaining the fundamental way rituals and celebrations serve to solidify the attachment of individuals to the group and to each other, providing them with a common identity and “shared common origins.” Collective emotions evoked in rituals reinforce enduring feelings of group belonging and symbols “serve to provide the group with self-awareness, they act as border guards distinguishing ‘us’ from ‘them’.”

In explaining the importance of holidays or celebrations, Amitai Etzioni makes an important point in that holidays “reaffirm communal bonds (although they may reaffirm some bonds at the same time that they undermine others)...” In other words, taking part in certain rituals or holidays can solidify the community bond within a particular group; however, certain rituals or holidays can also serve to alienate an individual or a group of individuals from the group. In making the choice about celebrations and rituals held to be instrumental to the foundation of the group, an individual reaffirms or disengages from group norms and the living tradition. Hence, also making a decision about group belonging. As Eric Hobsbawm writes, “To be a member of any human community is to situate oneself with regard to one’s (its) past, if only by rejecting it.”

Belonging, as discussed above, satisfies a basic emotional human need of generating a positive self-evaluation. As effective as groups are at maintaining their boundaries and reinforcing ingroup identification, the individual self is reflexive and influenced

by the environment and the other groups around them, and is constantly driven by the need to maintain positive self-evaluation. Anthony Giddens, in *Modernity and Self-Identity*, writes that “the self” is ever-changing in relation to the lived experiences and changes in the surrounding environment. The account of “who we are” will continuously react to the evolving circumstances and how we align ourselves in relation to them. This becomes especially important in instances where the individual feels unable or unwilling to comply with “in-group” norms, feels unwelcome, or is unable to maintain a positive self-evaluation within the provided framework. At this point alternative sources of belonging, such as an external homeland, can begin to influence group identity.

### 2.2. History, Sense of Belonging and an External Homeland

In instances where history has been interpreted by the core group, while excluding those residents who are unable or unwilling to comply with the “in-group” interpretation, Diaspora group identification can offer an alternative group belonging model. Walker Connor defines a Diaspora as a “segment of people living outside the homeland.” Therefore, the Diaspora has to recognize another nation-state as their rightful homeland, and has to be encouraged by the external homeland to define themselves as rightful group co-members through ethno-cultural affinity. Roger Brubaker explains that:

> A state becomes an external national “homeland” when cultural or political elites construe certain residents and citizens of other states as co-nationals, as fellow members of a single transborder nation and when they assert that this shared nationhood makes the state responsible, in some

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sense, not only for its own citizens but also for ethnic co-
nationals who live in other states\textsuperscript{31}.

If Diaspora identity is able to provide the group members who
feel excluded from the national identity of their country of
residence with a positive self-evaluation, then the Diaspora group
will begin to identify with the criteria emphasized for group
belonging by their external homeland. In case history and its
interpretation is, once again, emphasized for group belonging
within the Diaspora identity, the excluded members from the
national identity of their country of residence will disengage from,
or will continue opposing, the living tradition and the national
master narrative offered by the core group, if it contradicts the
external homeland’s interpretation. The Diaspora is likely to
participate, or support participation, in alternate rituals and
celebrations that reaffirm their connection within their group,
even at the cost of further distancing themselves from the
national identity of their country of residence. Further, once this
alternative identity has taken hold the group distancing is likely to
continue through the socialization process in the family.
Integration, in cases where the minority group begins to lose a
sense of belonging to the state of their residence, becomes
extremely difficult.

3. Application to the Latvian Case

Researchers have focused on the predicament of the Russian
speakers in Latvia ever since the collapse of the Soviet Union.
The problem has been approached from many different
perspectives. The role of history in identity construction in Latvia
has been discussed by Ehin and Berg\textsuperscript{32} who have emphasized the
incompatibility of the Baltic and Russian national identities, by
Vieda Skultans\textsuperscript{33} and Vita Zelce\textsuperscript{34} who have written about national

\textsuperscript{31}  Roger Brubaker, \textit{Nationalism Reframed} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996),

\textsuperscript{32}  Ehin and Berg, “Incompatible Identities?,” 9.

\textsuperscript{33}  Vieda Skultans, “Theorizing Latvian Lives,” \textit{Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute} 3
identity in Latvia constructed upon collective memory of Soviet trauma. Russian history, specifically Russian interpretation of history, as the basis of Russian speaker identity has been noted by Amir Weiner\textsuperscript{35}, David Laitin\textsuperscript{36}, and Latvian academics Leo Dribins\textsuperscript{37}, Ilga Apine and Vladislavs Volkovs\textsuperscript{38}. Aivars Tabuns\textsuperscript{39}, Rasma Karklins\textsuperscript{40}, and Brigita Zepa\textsuperscript{41} have written about the various aspects of integration that have come into conflict with historical interpretation. Nils Muiznieks has made significant contributions to the academic field by exploring the “geopolitics of history” in Russian and Latvian relations\textsuperscript{42}. Specific attention has been paid to the May 9\textsuperscript{th} Victory Day celebrations, within the

\begin{itemize}
  \item Ilga Apine and Vladislavs Volkovs, \textit{Latvijas Krievu Identitate: Vesturisks un Socilogisks Apcerejums} (Riga: LU FSI, 2007).
  \item Brigita Zepa, \textit{Integracias Prakses un Perspektivas} (Riga: Baltic Institute of Social Sciences, 2006); Brigita Zepa, \textit{Etniska Tolerance un Latvijas Sabiedribas Integracija} (Riga: Baltic Institute of Social Sciences, 2004).
\end{itemize}
context of Russian-Latvian relations, by Kinta Locmele et al. and Eva-Clarita Onken.43

The diverging versions of history have been established, and the lack of a sense of belonging amongst the Russian speaking non-citizens has also been noted, however, there has been no direct link made between the two, while factoring in the influence of the external homeland. The two studies that have come closest to addressing the topic are articles by Kjetil Duvold44 and Brigita Zepa45. Duvold in his article focuses on the issue of loyalty amongst the Russian speakers in the Baltic States to their respective countries of residence. His specific analysis of a sense of belonging of Russian speakers in Latvia is geared toward their belonging to the political community. Brigita Zepa in her article focuses on the identity changes taking place amongst the Russian speakers in Latvia in the years since the collapse of the USSR. She also notes the close link felt by Russian speakers to Russia and the influence of diverging version of history on integration efforts. Both surveys use data on territorial identification of Russian speakers with Latvia and Russia from 2004. Zepa’s survey data notes that in 2004, 74 per cent of Russians and other minority representatives in Latvia expressed a sense of belonging to Latvia.46 Therefore, in 2004 already a mild drop in overall sense of belonging to Latvia, as compared to 1998, can be noted.

46 Zepa, The Changing Discourse of Minority Identities, 8.
This article proposes to continue and contribute to the above mentioned 2004 research on the sense of belonging of Russian speakers to Latvia, and to the multi-dimensional research of colleagues noted above, in an effort to explore the relationship between sense of belonging, national identity redefinition, and the influence of the external homeland in Latvia up to the year 2008.

3.1. Background

The former Soviet regime is responsible for the embedded expectations of belonging Latvia chose to work with after the collapse. As Roger Brubaker in *Nationalism Reframed* explains, the Soviet regime institutionalized nationality by assigning legitimate ownership of states to the titular population, and these states were conceived of and for the titular group\(^{47}\). Alternatively, the Russians in the USSR were encouraged to hold more cosmopolitan views and were not tied to a specific territory; rather they were encouraged to view the whole of the Soviet Union as their homeland, and as such did not feel a need to integrate, or develop a bond, with the titular groups\(^{48}\). In Latvia, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the end result of these two conflicting policies were that the ethnic Latvians, or the titular population, felt strongly connected to their land and each other, and the primordial model was easily invoked in the transition process. The Russians, on the other hand, faced a dramatic loss of status and identity, in what David Laitin has called "the double cataclysm"\(^{49}\), and were left with an unstable model of self-identification.

Some of the Russian speakers had begun to identify with the territory of Latvia and tied their future socio-economic well-being with Latvian independence. They sided with the titular population in the transition struggle against the USSR, as demonstrated by

\(^{47}\) Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed*, 54.
\(^{49}\) Ibid, 87.
the large percentage of minorities who voted for Latvian independence on March 3, 1991. However, the Russian speakers who voted for Latvian independence had the expectation that socio-economic well-being would override the importance of ethnic origin. This belief was rooted in the program advocated by the Popular Front of Latvia (PFL) that “promotes and consolidates the efforts of all of Latvia’s inhabitants, regardless of their social status, language, party, religious or national affiliation, to democratize society and further its moral renewal.” According to the PFL, citizenship was to be granted to all permanent residents of Latvia who had lived in Latvia for the last ten years.

Coinciding with Ulf Hedetoft’s ascription/construction phase of belonging, the boundaries between “us” and “them” in the citizenship context were drawn shortly after the independence vote, and further complicated the identity of Russian speakers in Latvia. In the autumn of 1991, in contradiction to the earlier PFL program, the Parliament decided to restore citizenship to inhabitants of Latvia who had resided in Latvia prior to June 17, 1940 and their descendants. Hence, declaring the historic significance of 1940 in the future construction of the Latvian master narrative, and excluding the Russian language speakers who had migrated to Latvia during the Soviet period from the civic Latvian identity and belonging associated with citizenship. This left many of the non-Latvians who had supported Latvian independence feeling as if they had been deceived.

52 Latvijas Tautas Fronte, Gads Pirmais (Riga: LTF, 1989), 208.
On the other hand, there was also a significant proportion of Russian speakers in Latvia who were supportive of the conservative forces attempts to renew the Soviet era status quo. Their identity and sense of belonging was still very much tied to the now collapsed system. Their beliefs and nostalgia propagated their alienation from the Latvian titular group, and for the titular group the power theory of inter-group relations reinforced stronger in-group identification from the suspected threat to power. The in-group bias assumptions that all out-group members were similar to each other and had sinister intentions spawned the fear of Russian speakers as the fifth column of Russia and perpetuated a sense of distrust.

As a result of the above mentioned, and the ease of invoking a past which resonates with the co-nationals, the Latvian national identity that emerged during the transition period was one heavily based on ethnic nationalism and a collective recollection of the traumatic Soviet experience. As noted by Vieda Skultans “The Holocaust has become central to Jewish identity, so deportation has come to constitute a certain feature of Latvian identity.” The data from the 1994 Baltic Barometer gives solid bases to the Latvian claim of a national master narrative based on persevering through suffering. Of the surveyed ethnic Latvians, 32 per cent claimed to have someone in the family who was deported, executed or shot by the Soviet regime. Therefore, what has to be kept in mind, as Will Kymlicka notes in Can Liberal Pluralism be Exported?, is that “The Russians in Estonia and Latvia are not seen as weak and disenfranchised minority groups, but as a reminder and manifestation of former Soviet oppression.” This unique case, distinctive to Eastern

54  Dreifelds, Latvia in Transition, 69.
56  Richard Rose, Nationalities in the Baltic States (Glasgow: Centre for the Study of Public Policy, University of Strathclyde, 1994), 59.
Europe, creates the situation where the minority has a kin-state that is seen as the nemesis of the titular group, and the assumption “that the minority collaborated with this kin-state in oppressing the majority group.” The emphasis on historic suffering became a key hurdle for outsider identification with the in-group, especially for Russian non-citizens.

The traumatic period of Soviet history became the bedrock of the Latvian master narrative. The collective memory of the past trauma was emphasized for group identification and the remembering of the past became vital for setting the course for the future. As noted by Cecile Laborde:

No public sphere of existing liberal democratic states can be culturally neutral. It inevitably expresses a particularistic heritage made up of complex ideological traditions, established languages, national symbols, frequent references to a shared – if often mythical – history, particular ways to structure time and space, accepted styles of argument and rhetorical devices, and so forth.

Latvia is no exception, the key document which serves as the legal basis for state integration efforts, the National Program on the Integration of Society in Latvia, reflected this. According to the Program, an integral step in the integration process is a unified interpretation of history:

It is important to establish an objective understanding of the past in order to reach agreement about Latvia’s future. Of particular importance is the history of Latvia’s period of independence, along with the causes which led the independent republic to be occupied and violently incorporated into the USSR in 1940. The people of Latvia did not voluntarily choose the Soviet system or to live in a totalitarian system. Of fundamental importance is a unified position vis-à-vis the unlawfulness of the Soviet regime –

58 Kymlicka, "Western Political Theory and Ethnic Relations in Eastern Europe,",66.
deportations and all manner of other repressions against the Latvian people, nationalization of private property, forced collectivization and industrialization, and demographic policies. Denunciation of this must be based on an in-depth and objective understanding of historical events if different ethnic communities – and younger generations in particular – are not to find that historical understandings are an obstacle against integration processes.60

Documents such as this demonstrate that in the process of politics of belonging Latvia has chosen to adopt the Western model of national identity, requiring members to be united through culture, common historical memories, myths, symbols and traditions61. As such, sense of belonging continues to be based on ethnic and cultural membership, emphasizing collective memory and an exclusive interpretation of history as the basis of national identity and group belonging

3.2. Manifestation in Survey Data

This article will use secondary analysis of three surveys conducted in Latvia to illustrate the impact of historic legacies on a sense of belonging and national identity within the 1998-2008 time frame. The two main surveys that will be used for the measure of a sense of belonging from 1998 and 2008 were both commissioned by the Latvian government bodies in an effort to monitor the integration efforts of Russian speakers in Latvia. The first survey was carried out by Baltic Data House in 1998, with working group participation from all the relevant government institutions involved in integration efforts and OSCE Latvian mission representatives. Through random selection a total of 3044 individuals, proportionally representing citizens, non-citizens, and Russian citizens living in Latvia, were surveyed62. The second survey, conducted in 2008 and carried out by AC

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60 Ministry of Justice, National Program on the Integration of Society in Latvia (Riga: Ministry of Justice, 2001), 9.
62 Baltic Data House, Cela uz Pilsonisku Sabiedribu, 15.
Konsultacijas upon the request of the Secretariat of the Minister of Population Integration of Latvia, was specifically constructed in a way to allow for data compatibility and comparison with the 1998 above mentioned survey as a follow-up measure. Through random selection a total of 1200 respondents were surveyed, proportionally representing citizens and non-citizens of Latvia. In addition, the article will use data from the 2008 survey/research project *The Presentation of 20th Century’s Difficult Questions in Latvian Schools and Museums* carried out by Viktors Makarovs through the support and financing from the Soros Foundation Latvia. The project surveyed 400 12th grade students in Latvian and Russian schools in Latvia. A little more than half the respondents surveyed were students at the Latvian school, the other half were from the Russian schools. The project data shows that the division based on language of instruction also nearly perfectly corresponded to the language spoken at home.

In the 1998 and 2008 surveys, when looking at the responses to the question of “How strong is your bond with Latvia?” to measure the sense of belonging of citizens and non-citizens a dramatic drop can be noted. In 1998, 80 per cent of non-citizens reported that they felt a “very strong” or “strong” bond, and hence a sense of belonging to Latvia. However in 2008, in response to the same question only 51 per cent of the non-citizens felt a “very strong” or “strong” bond with Latvia. The drop in sense of belonging is further correlated with a drop in patriotism, which, if understood in line with Bar-Tal’s definition, measures the attachment of group members to their group and to

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66 Secretariat of the Minister of Population Integration of Latvia, *Kvantitātīvs un Kvalitatīvšs Petijums par Sabiedrības Integrācijas un Pilsonības Aktuāliem Aspektiem*, 37.
the territory they inhabit\textsuperscript{67}, or the physical rootedness and social bonding aspects of community. If in 1998, 37 per cent of the non-citizens had a positive response to the statement “I consider myself to be a Latvian patriot”\textsuperscript{68}, then in 2008 the figure was even smaller, accounting for only 20 per cent of non-citizens\textsuperscript{69}. Because sense of belonging can serve as the motivational force in the naturalization process, the drop in the sense of belonging is problematic for further naturalization efforts in Latvia.

History interpretation, and specifically historical event celebrations, in the Latvian case prove to be divisive and hinder identification with the Latvian national identity. The survey/research project on historical interpretation and representation from 2008, brought to light the significant impact history and its interpretation has on group relations. In the survey, Latvian and Russian speaking students were asked to answer questions gauging their interpretation of historical events. The Russian speaking students were either non-citizens themselves, or the majority had at least one parent in the family who was a non-citizen\textsuperscript{70}.

The results were startling in revealing how disruptive historic interpretation is for group identification and relationships, and especially how decisive it is for the Latvian speaker attitudes. When presented with the statement, “The opinion exists that 20\textsuperscript{th} century history impacts Latvian and Russian speaking resident relations” and asked “If you are Latvian, to what extent does your knowledge and opinion of 20\textsuperscript{th} century history in Latvia specifically affects your attitude toward and relationship with Russian speaking Latvian residents?” over half of the Latvian

\begin{footnotes}
\item[69] Secretariat of the Minister of Population Integration of Latvia, Kvantitātīvs un Kvalitatīvs Petījums par Sabiedrības Integracijas un Pilsonības Aktuāliem Aspektiem, 39.
\item[70] Soros Foundation Latvia, 20.gadsimta Vestures Pretrunigo Jautājumu Pasniegsana Latvijas Skolas un Muzejos, 22.
\end{footnotes}
respondents, or 61 per cent, said that it “significantly affected” or “affected” their relationships and opinions. Only 15.5 per cent of the Latvians said that history has “no effect whatsoever” on their relationships with and opinion of Russian speakers. The same statement and question, “If you are a Russian speaking resident of Latvia, to what extent does your knowledge and opinion of 20th century history in Latvia affects your attitude toward Latvians?” was asked of the Russian speaking students. A little less than half of the Russian language speakers, or 46 per cent agreed that history “significantly affected” or “affected” their relationships and opinions of Latvians. However, 23.3 per cent believed that history has “no effect whatsoever” on their relationship with and opinion of Latvians. These findings confirm that history and its interpretation has a very real presence in day to day group relations, and heavily influences the integration process.

The interpretation of the Soviet period has always been a divisive issue within the Latvian context. The results of the 1998 survey show that citizens and non-citizens of Latvia disagree on the overall regard for the Soviet period. In showing their support or opposition to the statement, “Thanks to the helpfulness of the USSR population, Latvia was able to achieve high economic and cultural development in the Soviet Union”, only 26 per cent of citizens supported the statement, and 64 per cent objected. The majority, or 58 per cent of non-citizens supported the statement, and only 27 per cent objected. To the statement, “The international Soviet policy promoted the development of nations and national friendship”, 60 per cent of non-citizens agree, and only 26 per cent disagree, and 29 per cent of citizens agree, and 58 per cent disagree.

However, when asked about specific historic dates and celebrations in 1998, the survey answers were not yet as problematic for group belonging and identification. May 9th, or the

71 Ibid,18.
72 Ibid,18.
73 Baltic Data House, Cela uz Pilsonisku Sabiedribu, 65.
Soviet Victory Day over Nazi Germany in the Great Patriotic War, is the day the Latvian history considers at the official enforcement of occupation according to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. The day is seen as the traumatic beginning of the Latvian national master narrative of suffering. In the 1998 survey, only 3 per cent of non-citizens, and 0 per cent of citizens claimed to celebrate or support the celebration of May 9th.\textsuperscript{74}

Although the interpretation of the Soviet period has always been problematic, the 1998 survey data shows that the celebration of Soviet Victory Day was not a definitive element of the Russian non-citizens identity, and as such the Russian non-citizens were not supporting an event that would indubitably alienate them from the majority group, as discussed by Amitai Etzioni and Eric Hobsbawm. In other words, the historic interpretation of what had happened differed, but there was no definitive drive to reaffirm this differentiation. However, over the course of the decade there has been an overall transformation of the interpretation and celebration of these events, and their overall significance to the non-citizens’ identity.

In the 2008 student survey, the Russian and Latvian speaking students were asked about specific periods of history and asked to evaluate the Soviet period in the following question, “In your opinion, how would you evaluate the period of Latvian history from 1944-1990?” The possible answers provided were “positive”, “mostly positive”, “positive and negative aspects”, “mostly negative”, “negative”, or “hard to say”. Of the Russian speaking students, 63 per cent evaluated the period as “positive” or “mostly positive”, where only 9 per cent of the Latvian speakers echoed the same sentiment, and 62 per cent rated the period of history as “mostly negative” or “negative”.\textsuperscript{75} The survey also asked the following question, “What did the Soviet army in 1944/45 do to Latvia”. Again, the answers were polar opposites.

\textsuperscript{74} Ibid, 68.

\textsuperscript{75} Soros Foundation Latvia, 20.gadsimta Vestures Pretrunigo Jautajumu Pasniegsana Latvijas Skolas un Muzejos, 13.
The majority, or 62 per cent, of the Latvian speakers responded that the Soviet army occupied Latvia. At the Russian language schools only 5 per cent of the respondents agreed that the Soviet army occupied Latvia, and 65 per cent believed the Soviet army liberated Latvia.76

The students were also asked how they viewed the Soviet Victory Day celebrations on May 9th in the following question, “What is your opinion of the May 9th celebrations at the monument of Victory?” The possible answers provided were, once again, “positive”, “mostly positive”, “positive and negative aspects”, “mostly negative”, “negative”, or “hard to say”. Only 12 per cent of Latvian language students regarded the May 9th celebration as “positive”, where 82 per cent of the Russian speakers consider this a “positive” event.77 The survey definitively shows that by 2008 not just the overall impression of the Soviet period differs among the Russian and the Latvian speaking populations as it had before, but how in the ten year time frame the interpretation of specific, historically sensitive, events and support for their celebration has transformed.

The interpretation of history has served as a definitive marker to identify the “in-group” and “out-group” members in Latvia, and has hindered the receptiveness of the titular population to the Russian speakers and the ability of the Russian language speakers to identify with a common master narrative and a national identity. This is problematic, as the key to developing a sense of belonging is contingent upon one’s ability to self-identify as a part of the “in-group” and having others perceive you as such. As evident in the survey data above, history impacts the relationships of the Russian and Latvian speakers and affects their opinion of each other. However, if the Soviet period has always been interpreted differently by Latvians and Russian speakers and this interpretation has guided in-group norms and

76 Ibid, 10.
77 Ibid, 11.
identification, why has the sense of belonging to Latvia reduced so dramatically in non-citizens from 1998 to 2008?

The drop in a sense of belonging results from the unresolved exclusion of Russian speakers from the Latvian national identity, because of the continued emphasis placed on the Latvian version of history and collective memory for group belonging and integration. This is evident from the 2001 *National Program on the Integration of Society in Latvia*, drafted to outline the integration policy of the Latvian government. The additional element, which has triggered the drop in sense of belonging amongst the non-citizens in Latvia, is the role Russia, or the external homeland of these Russian speaking non-citizens, has begun to play in their group identification. As the theoretical discussion showed, one of the key components of group identification is the sentimental factor provided by the ability to define with a cause and a collective, and to generate a positive self-evaluation within the national master narrative. The 2008 survey focus-group discussions reaffirmed that both citizens and non-citizens associate Latvia with the Latvian nation and the Latvian version of history, leaving little room for alternative version of history or means of identification. As discussed by Anthony Giddens, the individual self is reflexive and responds to the surrounding environment and lived experiences in a constant drive to maintain positive self-evaluation. In the evolving circumstances and continued lack of acceptance by the “in-group”, the un-reflected sense of belonging to Latvia has become disengaged, as alternative sources of belonging have proven themselves to be a viable option for the Russian speaking non-citizens.

### 3.3 Russia as External Homeland

Understandably, due to the Soviet Union’s policies of population transfer from Russia to the Soviet satellite states, the

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78 Secretariat of the Minister of Population Integration of Latvia, *Kvantitativs un Kvalitativs Petijums par Sabiedribas Integracijas un Pilsonibas Aktualiem Aspektiem*, 46.
identification of Russian speaking non-citizens with Russia, as their original homeland, has always been high. However, as survey data shows, over the ten year period analyzed the attachment and sense of belonging to Russia has more than doubled. In 1998 survey, when Russian speaking non-citizens were asked to gauge their attachment to Russia and asked the question, “How strong is your bond with Russia?” only 20 per cent of non-citizens responded that their felt bond is “strong” or “very strong”79. However, by 2008 in response to the same question already 49 per cent of non-citizens rated their bond with Russia as either “strong” or “very strong”80. This demonstrates that in the ten year time period in question, as the sense of belonging to Latvia has decreased amongst the non-citizens, their attachment to Russia has increased. Further, as illustrated by the survey analysis of historic event interpretation above, as attachment to Russia has increased also the adherence to the Russian version of history has gained support amongst the Russian speaking non-citizens of Latvia as a means of self-identification and belonging.

In the past decade, Russia has reestablished its role in the world and has branded itself as the rightful heir of Soviet achievements. Russian history, and the Soviet period, has been reinterpreted as something for Russians to be proud of. Vladimir Putin has bluntly stated that the collapse of the Soviet Union was the greatest geopolitical tragedy of the 20th century. During the Putin regime, the ideology, which sought to promote the governing regime, turned to history, encouraged the celebration of Russia’s greatness in the Great Patriotic War, and made national holidays and commemorations, such as May 9th, a source for national self-esteem81. As Hobsbawm has noted, holidays are “invented” in order to create social cohesion, to establish and legitimize institutions of power and authorities, and to ensure value systems

79 Baltic Data House, Cela uz Pilsonisku Sabiedribu, 55.
80 Secretariat of the Minister of Population Integration of Latvia, Kvantitatīvs un Kvalitatīvs Petījums par Sabiedrības Integrācijas un Pilsonības Aktualiem Aspektiem, 37.
and self-worth\textsuperscript{82}. Russia’s re-invention of its own historic past and glorification of such achievements during the Soviet period as the victory in the Great Patriotic War, has led to a steady increase in Russian popular pride\textsuperscript{83}.

Support for the May 9\textsuperscript{th} celebrations in Russia, since Putins’ rise to power, has grown significantly. Data cited in Locmele’s article on Victory Day celebrations states that in 2004, 72 per cent of Russians declared Victory Day to be an important holiday for them and in 2005, 71 per cent claimed to celebrate the holiday themselves\textsuperscript{84}. The 2005 celebrations of the 60\textsuperscript{th} anniversary of Victory Day in Russia were a global event, with leaders from all over the world invited to the festivities in Moscow. The event for Russia was the largest national and popular holiday since the collapse of the Soviet Union\textsuperscript{85}. Victory Day celebrations have now become, in the words of Locmele, “the main ritual in Russia which is supposed to ensure the unity of the state and the people, as well as the solidarity and identity of Russians who live in Russia and elsewhere.”\textsuperscript{86}

As Russian pride and positive self-identification, stemming from the re-interpretation of Soviet history, has increased, the influence has also been felt in Latvia. Leo Dribins has remarked that the rebirth of Russian nationalism and the concept of Russian history centered on pride and achievements in the Great Fatherland War has undoubtedly influenced the self-identification of Russian-speakers in Latvia\textsuperscript{87}. Academics such as Nils Muzinieks claim that this has been a deliberate effort by Russia to reach the

\textsuperscript{83} Levada Analytical Center, Russian Public Opinion 2008 (Moscow: Levada, 2009), 9.
\textsuperscript{84} Locmele et al., “Commemorative Dates and Related Rituals,” 122.
\textsuperscript{85} Ibid, 122.
\textsuperscript{86} Ibid, 123.
\textsuperscript{87} Dribins, "Latvijas Vestures Faktors Sabiedribas Integracijas Procesa," 45.
hearts and minds of Russian-speakers abroad88. History, memory, and the invocation of a glorious past has been a means for Russia to harness “soft power” in geopolitics to use in future negotiations89.

An especially effective tool in the Russian efforts to communicate their own version of the grand narrative, or the national master narrative, and to downplay the Latvian version of history, has been the Russian language media. Not only has the Russian media been successful in constructing an enemy image of Latvia within Russia, as demonstrated by the joint academic volume *Manufacturing Enemy Images? Russian Media Portrayal of Latvia*90, but the peculiarity of the media market in Latvia is such that most Russian speakers in Latvia watch and listen to mass media reports from Russia. As a result, a 2005 report titled *Ethnopolitical Tension in Latvia: In search of a Conflict Solutions* showed that the ‘attitudes of many Russian speakers in Latvia are closer to the attitudes that are expressed in the Russian media, as opposed to the official views of the country in which these people live’91.

The impact of the Russian influence on Russian speaker identity in Latvia has been noted by academics such as Aivars Tabuns. In comparing data from various surveys within the time frame of 1995-2003, Tabuns notes the pronounced decrease in sense of belonging expressed by Russian speakers and correlates the lack of sense of belonging to Latvia with an increase in the gap between Latvian and Russian attitudes toward national pride in regards to Latvian history92. It becomes clear that the persistent

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89 Nils Muiznieks, “History, Memory and Latvian Foreign Policy,” 7-19.
91 Baltic Institute of Social Sciences, *Ethnopolitical Tensions in Latvia: Looking for the Conflict Solution* (Riga: Baltic Institute of Social Sciences, 2005), 34.
complications of historic interpretation amongst the Latvian and Russian speakers, and Russia’s intensified influence on Russian speaker identity, have increased Russian speaking non-citizens sense of belonging and identification with the history model propagated by the Russian Federation. As such, Russian speakers have also become supportive of collective acts of remembrance, such as Victory Day celebrations, that further erode their emotional attachment to Latvia.

In the politics of belonging, Russia as the external homeland has taken on a certain responsibility for its construed ethnic co-nationals, and reaffirmed their belonging to the renewed Russian identity. In coping with “the double cataclysm” of identity loss, at least a part of the Russian speaking non-citizens in Latvia, have started identifying with the Russian culture, and consequently also the Russian version of history, as a source of pride. Their insistence on reaffirming this bond through celebrations and rituals, such as Victory Day celebrations, ultimately severs their sense of belonging to the collective Latvian national identity.

4. Conclusion

In looking at the dramatic drop in the sense of belonging amongst the non-citizens of Latvia from 1998-2008, this article has attempted to expand upon the work of colleagues, by specifically concentrating on the sense of belonging within the national identity framework and the influence of the external homeland on Diaspora identity and its manifestation. The article has reviewed the applicable theoretical literature on the sense of belonging and social identity theory and has shown the importance of group belonging to individual identity and to the integration process. Within the wider context of nation-state belonging and national identity formation, the emphasis placed on history, national grand narratives, and rituals and celebrations has been discussed. The theoretical framework has then been applied to the particular case of Latvia, in order to explain the role of collective memory and trauma in national identity redefinition after the collapse of the Soviet Union.
In the politics of belonging, the Latvian state has attempted to create the “we-ness” of the group upon Western model of national identity, requiring members to be united, if not by primordial links, then through membership in a cultural community, emphasizing common historical memories, myths, symbols and traditions. In looking at official government policy and documents detailing the scope of integration in Latvia, the article has shown that nation building in Latvia has focused on the narrow understanding of belonging based on ethnic and cultural membership, emphasizing collective memory and an exclusive interpretation of history, as the basis of national identity and group belonging. Further, the article demonstrates the divisive power of history in Latvia amongst the “in-group” and “out-group” members through survey data. By reviewing the historically sensitive years, events, and their interpretation in data, the article confirms that historic event interpretation has a very real presence in day to day group relations, and heavily influences the integration process.

The ease of invoking a past that resonates with other co-nationals in a time of transition, and the definitive part in the construction of the “Other” played by collective memory and history, has placed the responsibility of change on certain groups in society. Belonging, for those not considered a part of the ethnic titular population, has largely depended on their ability to accept and assimilate into the predefined ethnic and cultural community. Those who could not meet the expectations of assimilation, integration and adaption to the national identity were left with limited means for positive self-identification. This has led to the alienation of a significant portion of the population and has opened doors to Russian speaker identification with an alternative history model propagated by the external homeland.

With the reestablishment of Russia as heir to Soviet greatness, the growth of Russian pride in Russia, through the various soft power networks these changes have also affected the Russian speaking non-citizens in Latvia. The article discusses how Russia has deliberately, through the particularities of the Latvian media space which is linguistically segregated, been able to influence
the identity of the Russian speaking non-citizens in Latvia precisely because the Russian speaking non-citizens have been excluded from the national identity model and mislead in the transition years. Russia’s willingness to include these co-nationals in the transborder nation, and serve as their external homeland, has provided a much needed alternative identity and a means to a positive self-evaluation.

The article demonstrates how the significant drop in the sense of belonging felt toward Latvia amongst the Russian speaking non-citizens, directly correlates with an increase in felt affinity toward Russia. The article uses survey data to show how bonds, or attachment, felt toward Russia have significantly increased within the 1998 to 2008 time frame, as has support for means of reaffirming the emotional attachment to members of their own group through rituals and celebrations; such as the Soviet Victory Day.

As pointed out by Ilga Apine, Russian history propaganda does impact the integration process in Latvia. However, she also notes that May 9th is a vital part of the Russian identity and positive self-evaluation. This is not something that Latvia should try to eradicate; rather this discrepancy in historic interpretation is something Latvia should learn to live with93. It is time for Latvia to question the role history has played in the construction of national identity and the implications of this for membership and belonging in a contemporary society. As Bhikhu Parekh has stated – if identities are the products of history, they can also be remade by history94. Alternatively, integration and naturalization efforts are likely to prove increasingly difficult.

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DEMOCRACY, PLURALISM AND THE IDEA OF PUBLIC REASON: RAWLS AND HABERMAS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

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Abstract

The notion of public reason, developed by two of the most influential contemporary political thinkers - Jürgen Habermas and John Rawls - as well as the contemporary discussions on the concepts of citizenship, civil society and the public sphere, among others, are all manifestations of the attempt to handle the thorny issue of the relationship between difference and equality. This article analyzes these two conceptualizations of public reason in a comparative perspective and its main contention is that the point where they depart each other is too important to be neglected. Although Habermas himself described his criticism of Rawls as a “familial dispute” and stated that he is engaged in a “friendly and provocative” critique in such a way that Rawls’s theory can reveal its strengths, this article insists that the use of public reason is conceptualized radically differently by Rawls and Habermas.

Keywords: Public reason, democracy, pluralism, Rawls, Habermas.

1. Introduction

In a country like Turkey, it is a routine to hear people talking about “co-existence of differences”, “a mosaic of cultures” or “differences as richness”. As elsewhere in the world, the notion of pluralism is often at the center of the current political debates about democracy. This is mostly related with the rising tides of the Kurdish issue and headscarves affair. Especially nowadays such discussions are once again at the center of the political agenda due to the hot debates over the need for a new a constitution. However, in order to be able to provide an opening
in the real sense of the term, the relationship between democracy and pluralism needs to be considered within the framework of the “problems that are associated with equality in the context of difference.”1 Turkey and many other countries have struggled and, continue to struggle with questions of this kind. Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, France, Britain and many others have been trying to handle the tension between difference and equality that has been manifesting itself in different ways. Concomitantly, over the last few decades these problems have had a central place in contemporary political thought.

Contemporary discussions on the concepts of citizenship, civil society, public sphere and participatory democracy among others are all related with this query. A particular line of thinking in modern political thought, namely the post-Marxist tradition, has insisted that the relationship between pluralism and democracy should be viewed in terms of antagonism and hegemony.2 The notion of public reason, developed by two of the most influential contemporary political thinkers, Jürgen Habermas and John Rawls, could be considered as another attempt at handling this complex issue. Both thinkers follow the same line of thinking in that they refer to the idea of consent as an important concept in political theory as opposed to the above-mentioned post-Marxist strain of thought that focuses on the idea of conflict. Rawls and Habermas call for public use of reason in finding a common ground, which, according to them, is the prerequisite of living together. This article analyzes these two conceptualizations of public reason in a comparative perspective and its main contention is that the point where they depart each other is too important to be neglected. This claim may seem ironic considering the fact that Habermas himself described his criticism of Rawls as a “familial dispute” and stated that he is engaged in a

“friendly and provocative” critique in such a way that Rawls’s theory can reveal its strengths:

Because I admire this project, share its intentions, and regard its essential results as correct, the dissent I express here will remain within the boundaries of a familial dispute…I shall raise objections directed not so much against the project as such but against certain aspects of its execution…My critique is a constructive and immanent one.³

Habermas explained in an interview that his discourse ethics approach “is an attempt to reconstruct Kantian ethics with the help of the theory of communication” and that his suggestions “derive above all from Rawls and Kohlberg.”⁴ Similarly, McCarthy observes that these two theorists have traveled different paths from their common starting point in Kant’s philosophy and yet despite the differences they have remained close enough to make their disagreements instructive.⁵ Notwithstanding these arguments, this article insists that the use of public reason is conceptualized radically differently by Rawls and Habermas. Rawls uses the concept of “public reason as a form of ex ante limitation of reasons which can be offered in the public space in order to justify coercive action by the state” whereas “Habermas understands public reason as an ex post concept”. Rawls argues that when we are debating on politics we should not take our comprehensive doctrines as a reference point; our justification should be based upon reasons that can be generalizable to the doctrines present in a certain society. For Habermas, on the other hand, the public space should be open to any reason arguing from any comprehensive doctrine. The acceptability of this

reason, whether it is public and whether it is generalizable, is to be decided through public deliberation.

This study departs from the contention that this difference is worth thinking about since the two thinkers are suggesting two different ways of dealing with pluralism pervasive in modern society. There would be at least two consequences, one theoretical and one socio-political, of a decision to choose one framework or another. First, it would influence the way we understand justice theoretically: is justice ‘comprehensive’ or merely ‘political’? Second, it would influence the way one answers the question: should the liberal state take binding decisions based on arguments from such issues as religion and metaphysical beliefs or should it attempt strict neutrality between these? Before going into the details of this comparison, however, there is need for an understanding of the three major (and closely related) questions these two theoreticians have reflected upon: the question of the thorny relationship between difference and equality, the question of the relationship between pluralism and democracy, and the question of the relationship between the individual and the community.

2. The Liberal Idea of Pluralism

Contemporary democracies face important questions of justice, equality and freedom due to different ethnic affiliations, religious beliefs, views of morality, ethico-political principles, and ideals of the citizens of the nation-states. What complicates the matters is that in all these areas there is little possibility of convergence while at the same time the individuals and groups having those particularities need to live together politically. This in turn means that there should be some common ground or a reference point from which their political claims can be judged. Consequently, it becomes inevitable to ask what the 18th century liberalist motto of “Liberté, Égalité, Fraternité” means in today’s societies. Anne Phillips asks a number of important questions in this respect:

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6 I am grateful for these suggestions to one of the anonymous reviewers of CEU PSJ.
How are democracies to deal with divisions by gender or ethnicity or religion or race, and the way these impinge on political equality? What meaning can we give to the political community when so many groups feel themselves outside it? How can democracies deliver on equality while accommodating and indeed welcoming difference?

Although until recently the liberal democratic conception of citizenship remained as the most widely accepted answer to such questionings about equality, difference and democracy, lately it has become the focus of criticism on the grounds that it has serious shortcomings to handle this tension. As is well known, liberal democratic notion of citizenship are grounded on the premise of universality which implies that all individuals are given the same formal/legal rights regardless of gender, race, ethnicity, religion or class which results in an abstract notion of citizen-individual. The rationale behind this formula is that these latter categories are conceptualized and formulated as private matters while the realm of politics, as well as citizenship, is defined in the public sphere. The notion of citizenship in its liberal democratic formulation has tried to solve the problem by creating a homogenous public by relegating all particularity and difference to the private. Liberal democracy has presumed that we can abstract some essential human sameness in people and tried to structure the political public realm on this principle of universality. Consequently, liberal democratic citizenship has

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7 Phillips, Democracy and Difference, 2.
9 The goal of the universality principle is to free people from their differences and to equalize all members in their political rights, independently from the particular human beings they are. It would be unfair to view this goal as narrow-mindedness. It has been fundamentally important in modern history, supporting the emancipation process from the hierarchical societies of the ancient regime. The principle of equality before the law came with the notion of popular sovereignty during the French Revolution. The main target was social hierarchies which used to be the basis of honor in the ancient regime sense in which it was intrinsically linked to inequalities. As against this notion of honor, we have the modern notion of dignity in the French Revolutionary ideas, now used in a
taken the form of a legal status where everybody is equal and are possessed of the same political rights. However, both the intensity of the ongoing intellectual debates and problems at the practical level show that this distinction has not been so successful in dealing with particularities.

As Hall and Held point out, “from the ancient world to the present day, citizenship has entailed a discussion of, and a struggle over, the meaning and scope of membership of the community in which one lives. Who belongs and what does belonging mean in practice?”10 In the liberal democratic framework, then, being a member of a political community has come to stand for being the bearers of the same legal rights. In today's conditions, however, it has become increasingly difficult to answer this question largely due to the process that we call globalization. The latter has been going hand in hand with the tension between cultural homogenization and cultural heterogenization which is also known as the tension between universalism and particularism.11 This tension corresponds to a debate revolving around such questions as:

Can citizens with diverse identities be represented as equals if public institutions do not recognize our particular identities but only our more universally shared interests? Apart from ceding each of us the same rights as all other citizens, what does respecting people as equals entail? In what sense

universalist and egalitarian sense, where we talk of the inherent dignity of human beings, or of citizen dignity. So, in this sense this universality principle and the public/private distinction has been an achievement, a contribution to political equality. In time, however, it has led to severe criticisms. For this discussion see Charles Taylor, Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 27.


should our identities as men or women... Christian, Jews or Muslims... publicly matter?\textsuperscript{12}

In a similar manner, Mouffe asks a crucial question:

How can the maximum of pluralism can be defended – in order to respect the rights of the widest possible groups without destroying the very framework of the political community as constituted by the institutions and practices that constitute modern democracy and define our identity as citizens?\textsuperscript{13}

These are complex questions: if the deeply different perspectives on critical subjects are allowed to dominate political life the result may be disunity; on the other hand, if citizens are told that in politics they should not use their most fundamental beliefs about what is true, that may seem both unreasonable and a serious infringement of full liberty.\textsuperscript{14} So, "this conflict is the dilemma and it is a genuine one."\textsuperscript{15}

There have been a variety of responses to this dilemma as well as to the above-mentioned questions. This study will consider these questions and will show the way two prominent figures of political theory, Rawls and Habermas, have been trying to answer them. Phillips argues that positions on democracy have fallen broadly into two schools of thought: there have been those who supported liberal democracy and those who regarded it as an impoverished and inadequate form; so that the strengths and the weaknesses of liberal democracy have provided the central axis of the debate.\textsuperscript{16} Rawls and Habermas fall into the former category

\textsuperscript{15} Greenawalt, "On Public Reason", 670
being concerned mainly with the democratization of liberal democracy. In that respect, the key to their solutions is the notion of public reason. However, as will be shown below, they follow different paths.

3. Rawls and ‘Reasonable Pluralism’

The starting point of Rawls’s theory of reasonable pluralism and his thesis on the public use of reason is the presumption that moral and religious accounts of human nature, which he calls comprehensive doctrine, cannot constitute the basis for the public culture of a democratic society. The reason for this is that “long-run outcome of the work of human reason under enduring free institutions” is always disagreement over comprehensive doctrines.\(^{17}\) Since individuals and groups in a free society will hold different and incompatible philosophical, moral and religious views, there will be no comprehensive view accepted by everyone within a society. This, according to Rawls, is a normal condition of the public culture of democracy:

A basic feature of democracy is the fact of reasonable pluralism – the fact that a plurality of conflicting reasonable comprehensive doctrines, religious, philosophical and moral is the normal result of its culture and free institutions... As long as we live in a free society we should expect the diversity of conflicting and irreconcilable ... comprehensive doctrines.\(^{18}\)

Nevertheless, he still believes that there can be some common ground between those different comprehensive doctrines that he calls as an “overlapping consensus” a notion closely related to his

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18 As can be seen from this paragraph, for Rawls, the fact of reasonable pluralism is to be distinguished from the fact of pluralism as such: unreasonable, irrational, aggressive doctrines cannot be accepted. A comprehensive doctrine is reasonable if it is compatible with the essentials of a democratic regime i.e. if it acknowledges the freedom and equality of citizens on which political liberalism rests. See Robert B. Talisse, *On Rawls*, (Belmont: Wadsworth Thomson Learning, 2001), 62.
theory of public reason. What unites people in this sense is their sensitivity about political justice. "Since people with different comprehensive views might share similar ideas about political justice, a consensus on the basic political structure of society remains a possibility. It is this possibility that Rawls's theory exemplifies".\textsuperscript{19} The term 'political justice' has important implications for our purposes here: according to Rawls, a conception of justice must be political and not metaphysical in order for that conception to be as acceptable as possible. It should not be grounded upon a comprehensive doctrine, instead, such a conception must allow for a diversity of doctrines and the plurality of conflicting, and indeed incommensurable, conceptions of the good affirmed by the members of existing democratic societies... we hope that this political conception of justice may at least be supported by what we may call an 'overlapping consensus', \textit{that is by a consensus that includes all the opposing philosophical and religious doctrines likely to persist and to gain adherents in a more or less just constitutional democratic society}.\textsuperscript{20}

He explains this consensus through an example:

For example, when it is said that citizens are regarded as free and equal persons, their freedom and equality are to be understood in ways congenial to the public political culture and explicable in terms of the design and requirements of its basic institutions. The conception of citizens as free and equal is, therefore, a political conception... \textsuperscript{21}

So, an argument should be made in a way that "will be acceptable to a wide range of comprehensive doctrines and hence supported by an overlapping consensus."\textsuperscript{22} This in turn requires "skepticism or indifference to religious, philosophical, or moral

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{19} Greenawalt, "On Public Reason," 671.
\item \textsuperscript{22} Ibid., 429
\end{itemize}
truth" and starting "explicitly from fundamental intuitive ideas regarded as latent in the public political culture." Rawls is aware of the fact that it is not possible to avoid comprehensive doctrines entirely but he insists that "we do what we can to reduce relying on their more specific details, or their more disputed features." Consequently, he puts forward the question: "The question is: what is the least that must be asserted; and if it must be asserted, what is its least controversial form?" In order to answer this question by delineating the requirements of an overlapping consensus, Rawls develops the idea of "original position". In his own words,

this idea is introduced in order to work out which traditional conception of justice ...specifies the most appropriate principles for realizing liberty and equality once society is viewed as a system of cooperation between free and equal persons."

In A Theory of Justice Rawls defines the original position as "a purely hypothetical situation" but adds that "we can simulate the reflections of the parties by following the constraints it expresses." In this hypothetical situation, individuals have to choose the principles of justice which are to govern their society, but they are to do this behind "a veil of ignorance" so that no one knows anything about his or her personal identity:

No one knows his place in society, his class position, or social status; nor does he know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence and strength and the like. Nor, again, does anyone know his conception of the good, the particulars of his rational plan of

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23 Ibid., 429
24 Ibid., 429
25 Ibid., 429
life... more than this I assume that the parties do not know the particular circumstances of their own society.28

It is assumed, however, that everybody knows the general facts about human society and that they understand political affairs and the principles of economic theory, basis of social organization, and laws of human psychology.29 The parties in the original position are "not bound by moral ties to each other".30 One important consequence of this veil of ignorance is that "the parties have no basis for bargaining in the usual sense. No one knows his situation in society or his natural assets, and therefore no one is in a position to tailor principles to his advantage."31 As a result, the emerging moral principles to govern their society acquire a public character or they become generalizable.

Rawls accepts that this notion of veil of ignorance raises several difficulties. In order to deal with these difficulties, he recommends that the original position should not be thought of as a gathering of all actual or possible persons, but it "must be interpreted so that one can at any time adopt its perspective."32 What Rawls tries to develop is a tool that everyone can use in various conflicting situations in order to assert the views that are capable of gaining the acceptance of all members of the society.33 The important thing that needs to be underlined here is that Rawls does not believe in any possibility of reaching a consensus when at stake is the deeply different moral, philosophical and religious views. Therefore, the questions that could be brought to

28  Ibid., 118.
29  Ibid, 119.
31  Baynes, The Normative Grounds of Social Criticism, 121
33  It can easily be observed that this principle is quite similar to the 'categorical imperative' of Kantian ethics and Rawls does not deny this resemblance. However he argues that such previous theories, even contract theories, have passed over the problem of defining the knowledge of the parties and of characterizing the alternatives open to them. See A Theory of Justice, pp. 121-122.
the public political life should not be grounded upon these doctrines.

This point regarding the idea of avoidance from controversial claims takes us to the notion of public reason. Rawls argues that once citizens realize that they cannot reach agreement or even approach mutual understanding on the basis of their irreconcilable comprehensive doctrines, "they need to consider what kinds of reasons they may reasonably give one another when fundamental political questions are at stake." 34 Hence, "the idea of public reason specifies...the basic moral and political values that are to determine a constitutional democratic government’s relation to its citizens and their relation to one another. In short, it concerns how the political relation is to be understood." 35 The adjective public here specifies that "its subject is the public good concerning questions of fundamental political justice". 36 What follows from this definition is that “in public reason comprehensive doctrines of truth or right [should] be replaced by an idea of the politically reasonable addressed to citizens as citizens.” 37 Although Rawls argues that the idea of public reason “neither criticizes nor attacks any comprehensive doctrine, religious or nonreligious”, this situation requires that the doctrine in question is not incompatible with the essentials of public reason and democratic theory; the basic requirement is that a reasonable doctrine accepts a constitutional democratic regime and its companion idea of legitimate law.” 38 As can easily be seen, for Rawls “the method of avoidance” should always be applied when certain argumentation or concern will be brought to “the public political forum.” 39 Nevertheless, this requirement still allows us to introduce our comprehensive doctrine to political discussion. However, this can only happen on the condition that

36 Ibid, 575.
37 Ibid, 575.
38 Ibid, 575.
39 Ibid, 575.
in due course we give properly public reasons to support the principles of and policies that our comprehensive doctrine supports. Rawls calls this requirement the proviso. 40 Through the use of the proviso,

...their opinion is no longer just that of one particular party but an opinion that all members of a society might reasonably agree to, not necessarily that they would agree to. What is important is that people give the kinds of reasons that can be understood and appraised apart from their particular comprehensive doctrines. So the idea of public reason is not about the right answers to all these questions, but about the kinds of reasons that they ought to be answered by. 41

Taken together with other key concepts in Rawls's theory - political justice, the original position, the veil of ignorance and the proviso - his approach to the idea of public reason reflects the way Rawls tries to solve the basic problems outlined at the beginning of this article. He endeavors to solve the dilemma by developing a strategy of self-restraint or a method of avoidance in the sense of insisting that "the public political forum" has to be freed from deeply controversial doctrines.

There are three important points that could be raised regarding these strategies. First, Rawls makes a distinction between two categories: the category of the political on the one hand and the category of the moral, metaphysical and philosophical on the other. He tries to separate them from each other. This distinction is a very controversial topic open to be questioned from different angles. It suffices here to mention the basic question: is it really possible to draw the line separating public reasons and the reasons deriving from comprehensive doctrines? Rawls himself is aware of this problem and attempts to handle it by saying that there may be times that we do not need to separate them,

40 Ibid, 584. Emphasis in original.
because, there may be points of convergence between the two. In such cases, that is, when they are in accordance with the public reason, the people can use the reasons that their comprehensive doctrine supports. But it seems that the boundary problem still remains. What if a certain group of people insists on using their particular comprehensive doctrines by bringing them to the public political forum? This question takes us to the second important objection regarding Rawls's theory of reasonable pluralism. As one scholar points out, Rawls "tries to construct a theory which can be accepted by anyone who is prepared to take an impartial viewpoint." He assumes that individuals are capable of this self-restraint regarding the arguments that they can bring to public discussion. However, what if they are not prepared to act this way? The third important objection is that Rawls, regarding moral and philosophical viewpoints adapts a "strategy to discount the pluralism in advance, so to speak, by restricting public reason to the ambit of an overlapping consensus." Rawls believes there is no possibility of consensus and even a mutual understanding on such concerns so much so that it would not be unfair to say that he considers such discussions as waste of time. Habermas's critique of Rawls becomes important in its approach to those last points. As we will see below, he has a different standpoint in terms of his approach to the idea of consensus, and to the argumentation process regarding particular comprehensive doctrines.

4. Habermas's Critique of Rawls's Conception of Public Reason

Jürgen Habermas’s theory of communicative action presents an alternative to Rawls’s conception of the public use of reason. When we look at this “familial dispute”, we see that the differences between the two theses are quite important, even

crucial. In this part, we will try to highlight those points of divergence which are really worth thinking about. Habermas writes extensively on a variety of issues and concepts in political theory. This study will focus on one important part of his project which is the development of what he calls discourse ethics. In this project, Kant’s categorical imperative is reformulated in terms of a discursive procedure for moral argumentation.\footnote{Baynes, \textit{The Normative Grounds of Social Criticism}, 77.} The basic idea of discourse ethics is that “only those norms can claim to be valid that meet (or could meet) with the approval of all affected in their capacity as participants in a practical discourse.”\footnote{Habermas quoted in Baynes, \textit{The Normative Grounds of Social Criticism}, 77. Emphasis original.} At first sight this definition is quite similar to the basic argument of Rawls. What creates the difference is the italicized part of this sentence i.e. “as participants in a practical discourse” and hence we can take it as our starting point. “Anyone familiar with Habermas’s moral philosophy will be aware that he posits a distinction between moral theories of two fundamentally different kinds: monological and dialogical.”\footnote{Christopher McMahon, “Why There is No Issue Between Habermas and Rawls,” \textit{The Journal of Philosophy} 99 (March 2002): 112.} This distinction depends upon whether a theory affirms that the identification of the correct principles of morality is a project that must be carried out collectively (dialogically) or not (monologically).\footnote{McMahon, “Why There is No Issue Between Habermas and Rawls,” 112.} A dialogical theory affirms that the true principles of morality are essentially collective acts; they can be revealed only after a certain kind of interaction in which everyone participates.\footnote{Ibid, 112. In this article McMahon explains the differences between dialogical and monological theories of morality in detail, but at the end he comes to the conclusion that “the idea that there is an important distinction to be made between the moral theories of Rawls and Habermas –and more broadly between monological and dialogical moral theories- comes to naught.” (p.128) There are two reasons that he suggests to enhance his argument. First, for him, “in one sense, all theories that make a place for moral reasoning are dialogical” since “inquiry into what would truly be in everyone’s interests will normally take the form of a dialectical alternation between attempts to capture in general terms the essence of moral impartiality” (p.128-9). Second, he argues that}
great importance as Habermas constructs his critique of Rawls on this point.

In order to better understand this distinction and its significance we have to be familiar with another basic distinction that Habermas makes between "consent-oriented" (or communicative) and success-oriented (or purposive-rational actions).\(^{49}\) Communicative action "constitutes an independent and distinct type of social action", because "the goal or the 'telos' of communicative action is not ... to influence others, but ... to reach an agreement or mutual understanding."\(^{50}\) Baynes points out that "Habermas sometimes refers to communicative action as any social interaction in which the coordinating mechanism is action oriented to reaching understanding or agreement."\(^{51}\) These two concepts, dialogy and communicative action, are crucial for an understanding of the theory of discourse ethics and the concept of reason in Habermas’s theory in a comparative framework with that of Rawls.

It can be seen that Habermas places the most emphasis upon the social interaction among individuals and he uses a different framework from the original position of Rawls. Habermas does not find this approach appropriate and "he lifts Rawls's veil of ignorance and demands that we participate in a discourse where all are fully aware of the other’s perspectives and interpretations."\(^{52}\) In his own words, "as long as we apply this

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\(^{50}\) Ibid, 80.

\(^{51}\) Ibid, 80.

\(^{52}\) http://caae.phil.cmu.edu/Cavalier/Forum/meta/background/HaberIntro.html
more exacting test (categorical imperative) in a monological fashion, it still remains individually isolated perspectives from which each of us considers privately what all could will. This is inadequate."\(^5\) The reason why Habermas finds this approach inadequate is his emphasis on an interactive mode of reasoning:

The justification of norms and commands requires that a real discourse be carried out and thus cannot occur in a strictly monological form, i.e. in the form of a hypothetical process of argumentation occurring in the individual mind.\(^5\)

We should recall here that Rawls was asking individuals to use a method of avoidance and a strategy of self-restraint before deciding what concerns could be brought to the public discussion. According to him we can bring to public political forum only those concerns that we think will seem acceptable to the others. Habermas rejects this and argues instead that any question can be brought to public discussion and must be submitted to the views of others within an argumentative process. He insists that whether a concern is reasonable to all, or acceptable by everyone can only be decided as a result of (not prior to) an open discursive practice.

Habermas’s approach involves an appeal to individuals’ posterior, not their prior, grounds of acceptance... It is by reference to the ‘generalizable interests’ that emerge from the discursive criticism that particular normative principles are justified, not to the concrete motives that they bring into the argumentative discourse.\(^5\)

Discourse ethics is “a formalistic moral theory” in the sense of specifying “an argumentative procedure that any norm must

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Emphasis added.

53 Habermas, “Reconciliation Through the Public Use of Reason,” 117.


55 D’Agostino, Free Public Reason, 49.
satisfy if it is to be morally acceptable.”56 Habermas contrasts this theory with Rawls’s original position:

Rawls imposes a common perspective on the parties in the original position through informational constraints and thereby neutralizes the multiplicity of particular interpretative perspectives from the outset. Discourse ethics, by contrast, views the moral point of view as embodied in an intersubjective practice of argumentation which enjoins those involved to an idealizing enlargement of their interpretative perspectives.57

As Baynes states, Habermas puts forward three rules regarding the formal conditions necessary for reaching understanding or communicative agreement:

1. Every speaker with the competence to speak and act is allowed to take part in a discourse
2. a) Everyone is allowed to question any assertion whatever. b) Everyone is allowed to introduce any assertion whatever into the discourse. c) Everyone is allowed to express his attitudes, desires and needs.
3. No speaker may be prevented, by internal or external coercion, from exercising his rights as laid down in 1 and 2.58

It can be seen clearly, especially from rule 2, that in principle nothing (no interests, needs, desires, interpretations etc.) can be excluded from a public discussion at least from the outset, which is the case in Rawls’s original position and the veil of ignorance. The important thing here is that it is the process of argumentation will determine whether they are generalizable, whether they are relevant for the public or whether they are acceptable to everyone in the society. Their status must be submitted to the will and opinion formation process in which all take part actively.

57 Habermas, “Reconciliation through the Public Use of Reason”, 117.
In argumentation, proponents and opponents engage in a competition with arguments in order to convince one another, that is, in order to reach a consensus... In discourse what is called the force of the better argument is wholly unforced. Here convictions change internally via a process of rationally motivated attitude change.\textsuperscript{59}

As can be seen, this conception leaves the task of finding common ground to the participants themselves and the word ‘finding’ in this sentence can be changed to creating, expanding, contracting, shifting, challenging, and deconstructing common ground.\textsuperscript{60} It should be noted regarding Habermas’s argumentation process that “he envisages a process of collective reasoning rather than bargaining.”\textsuperscript{61} Reason, in turn, “is defined procedurally in terms of the structure of argumentation and process of communication” and the important thing becomes what interpretations, which views can withstand the challenge of opposition and the threat of defeat:

I have in mind the more open procedure of an argumentative practice that proceeds under the demanding presuppositions of “the public use of reason” and does not bracket the pluralism of convictions and worldviews from the outset.\textsuperscript{62}

Here again we see the importance that Habermas attributes to social action. In his words:

Creatures that are individuated only through socialization are vulnerable and morally in need of considerateness. Linguistically and behaviorally competent subjects are constituted as individuals by growing into an intersubjectively shared lifeworld, and the lifeworld of a language community is reproduced in turn through the

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{60} McCarthy, “Kantian Constructivism and Reconstructivism,” 61.
  \item \textsuperscript{61} McMahon, “Why There is No Issue Between Habermas and Rawls,” 118.
  \item \textsuperscript{62} Habermas, “Reconciliation through the Public Use of Reason,” 117.
\end{itemize}
communicative actions of its members. This explains why the identity of the individual and that of the collective are interdependent; they form and maintain themselves together.63

It is also argued that Habermas welcomes the situations of conflict.64 According to this interpretation, Habermas sees those situations as contributions to the integrative capacity of the identity: when a change in social environment creates a situation in which one’s own identity is no longer in equilibrium with that environment, self-identification stabilizes itself. Consequently, situations of conflict are not seen as a threat, but as a contribution in psychological terms. These examples clearly show the main point where Habermas’s discourse ethics diverges from Rawls’s thesis on the public use of reason. There are two important consequences of this participant-centered conception of public reason. One of them is the emphasis that Habermas places upon the formal rules regarding “the procedures of a discursive process of opinion and will formation in which the public use of reason is manifested” .65 Habermas prefers to develop a theory of public reason in “a strictly procedural manner” and criticizes Rawls for failing to do the same thing.66 Rather than dealing in a very detailed way with the use of public reason to determine what is relevant for public discussion (which is what Rawls does), his procedural and legal theory

... focuses exclusively on the procedural aspects of the public use of reason and derives the system of rights from the idea of its legal institutionalization. It can leave more questions open because it entrusts more to the process of rational opinion and will formation... It leaves substantial questions that must be answered here and now to the more or less enlightened engagement of participants...67

63  Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, 199.
65  Habermas, “Reconciliation through the Public Use of Reason,” 130.
67  Ibid, 131.
At some point, he takes the importance he attaches to procedure to its extreme by arguing that “the correctness of decisions depends solely on the fact that the procedure has actually been carried out.” 68 This in turn takes us to the importance that Habermas gives to legislation and its legitimacy. According to him, the legitimacy of legislation “is accounted for by a democratic procedure that secures the autonomy of citizens” and “citizens are politically autonomous only if they can view themselves jointly as authors of the laws to which they are subject as individual addressees.” 69 Moreover, “the democratic principle states that only those statutes may claim legitimacy that can meet with the assent of all citizens in a discursive process of legislation that in turn has been legally constituted.” 70 As McCarthy observes, in Habermas’s thinking “the constitution is viewed as a “project” that is always incomplete and subject to the ongoing exercise of political autonomy.” 71

A major concern of Habermasis is the participation of democratic citizens in the law making process and their role as ongoing constitution-makers. He argues that we should conceive “of the constitution as a project that makes a founding act into an ongoing process of constitution-making that continues across generations.” 72 Besides the importance Habermas gives to the procedure and hence to the process of legislation, the second important consequence of his formulation of public reason is the

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69 Habermas, ”Reconciliation Through the Public Use of Reason,” 130.
70 Habermas quoted in Lafont, “Procedural Justice?” 174. Lafont deals with the question of whether to meet the procedural conditions can guarantee the moral rightness of a norm. Her answer to that question is negative: “such a procedure cannot guarantee the moral rightness of a norm—nothing can. But it can entitle us to claim moral rightness for the norm, as long as no counterarguments appear (whether on the basis of new experiences, consequences, side-effects or learning process in general).”
71 Thomas McCharthy, “Kantian Constructivism and Reconstructivism”, 49.
questioning of the public/private distinction. Habermas criticizes Rawls for engaging with such a distinction by splitting “the moral person into the public identity of a citizen and the nonpublic identity of a private person shaped by her individual conception of the good.” Moreover, he thinks that

...such an a priori boundary between private and public autonomy not only contradicts the republican intuition that popular sovereignty and human rights are nourished by the same root. It also conflicts with historical experience, above all with the fact that the historically shifting boundary between the private and public spheres has always been problematic from a normative point of view...such differentiations must be subjected to the political will formation of the citizens... 

As can be seen, what underlies Habermas’s questioning of public/private distinction is his conceptualization of the development of the individual and collective identity as an interdependent process.

5. Concluding Remarks

For someone living in Turkey, a country with vital problems related with ethnic and religious identities, it is nearly equally inevitable for a man on the street and a political scientist to think about the meaning of democracy. The relation between liberty, equality and fraternity is getting more and more complex not only in Turkey but in many other parts of the world due largely to the pluralism (of ideologies, interests, identities, ethical principles) characterizing social and political realm. Some theorists have argued in favor of seeing this plurality of socio-political life in terms of antagonism and unequal power relations and focused on the concept of hegemony while some others have reflected on this matter with resort to the notion of consensus. Rawls and Habermas, representing the consensual point of view have

73 Habermas, “Reconciliation through the Public Use of Reason,” 129.
74 Ibid, 129.
directed attentions to the public use of reason. While their approaches at first sight may seem to follow the same line of thinking, this article has tried to show that the way Rawls and Habermas understand public reason is very different. A reflection on their theories as well as on the antagonistic point of view can function as analytical tools in our own effort to understand the world around us and can help us answering our own questions, which, in turn, is a project that is, necessarily, always incomplete.

Bibliography


DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE IN CRISIS

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Abstract

The paper tries to examine the effects of economic crisis on philosophical considerations of distributive justice. It tackles the problem of a radical increase in scarcity as a condition of justice. Instead of assuming a relatively fixed (“moderate”) level of scarcity as a background against which justice in distribution obtains, the paper examines what happens when this level risks falling below and how does that change our views of distributive justice. It takes upon the recent events in the United States to construe a specific philosophical model and ask how crisis distribution, where that favors wealthier actors, can be justified. By analyzing the crisis distribution principle, it ultimately aims to suggest that moderate scarcity should not be seen as a mere condition, but an important and vital object of justice. As such it falls within, not beyond legitimate obligations of democratic governance.

Keywords: distribution, circumstances of justice, crisis, natural rights.

1. Introduction

In A Theory of Justice, John Rawls identified two constitutive elements of conditions under which justice applies to people: objective and subjective. The objective ones pertain to the “moderate scarcity” of natural resources under which schemes of cooperation become necessary for a viable distribution. The subjective conditions relate to individual differences in conceptions of the good, interests and life-plans, which cause

1 I would like to thank Louis Enrique Camacho, Pavol Hardos, and two anonymous reviewers of the journal for their useful comments on earlier versions of the paper.
conflicts in the face of various distributive schemes of scarce resources. They exist “whenever persons put forward conflicting claims to the division of social advantages under conditions of moderate scarcity. Unless these circumstances existed there would be no occasion for the virtue of justice, just as in the absence of threats of injury to life and limb there would be no occasion for physical courage.”²

According to Rawls, moderate scarcity and conflict of individual interests are considered to be normal conditions of justice. They are at the same time necessary for justice to exist; otherwise there seems to be no need, and hence no obligation, to pursue justice. Were natural resources unlimited, each person would have had as much as she desires, and no distribution problems would arise. Similarly, were there no different individual interests, there would be no competition for limited resources.

In this article I focus on the objective circumstances of justice, for two reasons. First, in the context of distributive justice, the subjective principles seem parasitic upon the objective ones: if the scarcity does not exist, the conflict of interest is not sufficient to trigger considerations of justice. In situations of resource abundance all interests would be individually satisfied and no conflict would arise. However, the situation in which the conflict of interest does not exist and scarcity does is hardly even conceivable: when resources are scarce, the very fact of the biological existence of different individuals and their desire to live and survive can trigger conflicts and thus considerations of justice. Secondly, if understood in a dynamic rather than static fashion, the objective circumstances of justice raise interesting and important questions for a changing world. If scarcity is not fixed at a “moderate” level, but can deteriorate due to different reasons (rise of population, depletion of resources, economic crises), how does that reflect to distribution and the duties of justice?

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The latter question has been implicitly raised in the wake of the recent economic crisis, when acts by different governments to prevent a total economic crash spurred controversies and debates about the justifiability of crisis-induced distributions. This was especially the case with the US government bailout of big banks and corporations that was very often intuitively considered as unjust, given its distributive preference of those who are already well-off (“Wall Street”) against the majority of population and those worse-off (“Main Street”), as well as considerations that the bailout violated the principles of merit and responsibility, rewarding instead of punishing those who were deemed responsible for the crisis itself.

Though the US government bailout has many faces and deserves analysis from many different perspectives, I invoke it here as a rather simple case that helps us describe and examine two correlated philosophical questions: a) How does the increase in the scarcity of resources, triggered by sudden financial ruptures and an economic crisis influence considerations of distributive justice? b) What should be the distinct distributive role of government in conditions of resource crisis?

I try to tackle these questions in the following way. First, I outline some basic parameters of the discussion by simplifying the US bailout example into an ideal case. Second, I ask what different theoretical perspectives say about its justifiability and critically examine their different arguments. Finally, I offer my own interpretation on the case and conclude with a theoretical consideration about distributive justice in crisis and the role of democratic government in it, and argue for a dynamic understanding of scarcity as a condition of justice. Ultimately, I wish to argue that crises induce special considerations of distributive justice, under which objective circumstances are not only preconditions for justice to exist, but which are themselves essential objects of just concerns. By focusing on objective circumstances in considerations of distributive justice, the paper aims to counter assumptions about the merely background relevance of conditions of justice for considerations on different distributive schemes that seem prevalent in some of the recent
philosophical literature. It highlights the importance of bringing any discussion back to the fundamentals of the distributive problematic: resources and their changing nature.

2. The Crisis Distribution Principle

As outlined earlier, the case of the US government bailout as a response to the economic crisis will be treated superficially, as an exemplar of a more substantial principle and an ideal type that can link this discussion to real world problems. The argument will follow the basic relation of several structural elements in the ideal case, without any empirical considerations that might be suitable for analysis in analytic accounts. Following a narrow understanding of the bailout example, the structure of the case will consist of the following elements: the government with legitimate distributive authority, the resources as the object of distribution, and the corporations and citizens as both producers and receivers of the resources. By resources I mean natural and social valuables expressed in terms of public funds and substantial social services.3

Thus, the minimum of empirical information needed for the analysis of the US bailout as the ideal case rests on the following facts: after the collapse of the housing market, the US economy spiraled downwards, causing wide financial losses in both private and public sector, rise of unemployment and a recess in production. Fuelled by the fear of economic and social depression, the US government stepped in and saved a number of banks, insurance companies and corporations from collapse through a financial assistance program, drawn from public pool of resources. Assuming they are correct, the facts determine an

3 Here I rely on a semi-Dworkinian interpretation, by which I assume the "independent material resources" as the "metric" or "currency" of justice. Given the nature of the case, money here represents the embodiment of all material resources; its unmediated ‘translation’ into social services is implied. See Ronald Dworkin, ‘Equality of Resources’ in Sovereign Virtue (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), 80; also G. A. Cohen, ‘On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice’ in Ethics, No. 99 (1989), 906-944.
additional assumption from which the main normative principle is derived. This assumption implies that strategic public funds were used to salvage private corporations under the pretext of their essential value for the entire economic system. The assumption reveals a distinct normative principle, prescribing a particular pattern of distribution in the context of economic crisis. This pattern can be more succinctly expressed in terms of the following normative precept:

*The Crisis Distribution Principle (CDP):* In conditions of crisis, the distribution of resources should prioritize actors that are essential for the recovery of the economic system.

The principle operates under several additional assumptions. First, the particular pattern of crisis distribution is understood as a matter of an absolute necessity, the alternative to which is not less than an overall dissolution of the entire socio-economic system. Without some government redistributive action, the system would collapse. Second, the CDP disturbs the ‘normal’ distributive pattern, predominant in regular, non-crisis times. Whatever that pattern is, the CDP replaces it with new forms of distribution. In that sense, the CDP is a redistributive principle. Third, it assumes that there is a bundle of strategic public resources available for distribution when the crisis strikes. This may sound controversial, since the crisis itself implies a sudden and radical loss of the resources and their value, but does not necessarily need to be. Borrowing from the future by raising national indebtedness is a way of acquiring new resources for distribution without their actual physical creation. However, this does not make the issue a mere problem of justice between generations, because the distribution will significantly affect the current generation and reshuffle principles of justice applying to it, which makes it suitable for an intra-generational consideration of justice.4

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4 I subscribe here to a view similar to the one expressed by Joseph Mazor in ‘Liberal Justice, Future People and Natural Resource Conservation’ *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, Vol. 38, No. 4 (2010), 380-408. Mazor argued that the obligation to preserve natural resources for the future people is based on what the present people owe to each other. For the purposes of my argument, it
Fourth, it assumes that the actors that are essential for the recovery of the entire economic system are usually the richer parts of the population. The crisis distribution in case of the US bailout favored mainly big banks and corporate players who were well-off anyway. Given the nature of the capitalist economy, their position within the system is in direct relation to the system’s stability and viability. Fifth, the resources distributed to these actors could otherwise have been invested in various other social services, such as health or education. Since the crisis hit not only the financial players but also the society in general, many such services were cancelled or reduced, causing additional disadvantage of the poorer segments of population. This assumption makes the bailout case one that is a problem of distinct distributive justice rather than just a purely economic issue. Saving the plunging economy from the depression through public financial support of private corporations competes with investments into different social sectors and disturbs the balance established by the distributive patterns in normal times of “moderate scarcity”.

The CDP will be critically examined in the sections to follow. But, before that, it is important to emphasize that this paper is not inquiring into the causes of the financial crisis, nor aims at making any normative assumptions in this regard. Establishing the true causes of the economic crisis, upon which new assessments of the distributive schemes can be made is not a task of political philosophy and, accordingly, will not be pursued here. Instead, I will advance the following claim: whatever the causes of the economic crisis are, the same considerations of distributive justice obtain by the fact that the society in question, due to the emergence of the crisis, operates with a reduced amount of distributive resources and the necessity to stop further collapse. The CDP is in that sense *prima facie* ahistorical, insofar is sufficient to assume that various financial devices through which resources are ‘borrowed’ from the future generations through national debt do not dismiss considerations of justice based on the *intragenerational* rather than *intergenerational* distribution.
as it operates as an emergency distribution principle and doesn’t ask about the causes of the situation.

In devising the CDP, the priorities of economic stability seemed to have served as an immediate justification of the redistribution skewed in the interests of the big financial players, the well-off members of the society. Given the dependence of the US economy on the viability of the financial market, the prima facie priorities have dictated the CDP and perhaps determined its justifiability. Yet are these conditions sufficient to justify such a distribution? If not, what other considerations can render the US government bailout, as a form of crisis-induced distribution, just?

3. Utility, Equality or Priority? Justice and the Bailout

I choose to tackle the question from two different perspectives and three different approaches in order to examine what strands of contemporary philosophical literature could provide the background for answers. I then position these approaches and perspectives against an alternative explanation and examine the arguments for it. The perspectives are teleological and deontological, each focusing on a different set of assessment values. The teleological one focuses on the outcomes and judges the justifiability question against the final products of the distribution, disregarding the particular procedure that has been applied. On the other hand, the deontological is more concerned with the character and the effects of the procedure, regardless of the outcomes produced. The approaches I consider are utilitarian, egalitarian and prioritarian. They may offer different but sometimes overlapping answers to the distribution question, though cross-cuttingly relate to the two perspectives. In this section, I examine these approaches and assess justification they might offer. My aim is to show that a sufficient justification must go beyond these particular approaches and perspectives and anchor itself in a narrower and simpler fundamental principle. But, before I offer such a justification, I find appropriate to consider each of the approaches more closely and see what would be their responses to the question. Given the variety of ways to talk about the crisis distribution and the contemporary debates in
the mainstream media about the justifiability of government behavior in times of crisis, it is important to examine some of the arguments used and the principles that underlie them.

In short, all things considered, the utilitarian approach would justify the CDP, while the egalitarianism and the prioritarianism would not. Surprisingly, the otherwise competing and opposing approaches that are egalitarianism and prioritarianism share the response to the justifiability question of the CDP, though for different reasons.

3.1. Utility

The justification of the CDP under the utilitarian framework may follow the main argument of the overall indiscriminate benefit of the entire social and economic system. A subscriber to such a view would argue that the bailout distribution increased the aggregate likelihood for stabilization and economic recovery. It would not discriminate against different elements of the distributive scheme beyond the precepts of their economic functionality, nor seek relations of accountability as justification providing reasons. It would only care about the net benefit of the overall distribution and aim at the largest sum. It would be exclusively teleological since no procedural considerations would matter. The necessity to raise the net benefit of the outcomes, given its strategic relation to the stability of the system, overrides any concerns over procedural justice.

The logic behind the CDP itself seems to follow utilitarian norms and purely economic reasoning. The largest net benefits, not only in terms of stabilization of economic circumstances, but also in terms of securing future growth and development, could only be accomplished through assistance to those agents capable of generating new resources rather than to those not considered sufficiently productive. Therefore, in utilitarian understanding, the distribution in times of crisis needs to be based on prioritizing the most productive actors in society, because it is only through their assistance that the entire system can expect to recover from the economic downturn. The most productive actors in a capitalist
market-based society such as United States are usually those who are best-off anyway, including bankers, investors and corporate owners, so the crisis distribution is expected to keep the existing inequalities or even worsen them.

The utilitarian may, however, offer a more nuanced and gentle justification to the CDP that need not be based on brute notions of the greatest net benefit. He might say that the wellbeing of all members of the society, including those on the bottom of the social ladder, depends on the abilities of the best-off to (re)generate growth using funds distributed to them from the public resource pool. Echoing the arguments based on an ‘incentives for growth’ directed effort, this reasoning would assume that only when given special provisions, the most productive parts of the population will work harder and salvage everyone from economic disaster and even deeper inequalities. It could even extend the claim that the net benefit is to be aimed for because it is the only way to benefit the worst-off, which would otherwise fall into a more grave situation. However, as persuasively shown by G. A. Cohen, one cannot plausibly hold both that worst-off members of society deserve special concern and that the best-off need incentives to keep further inequalities at bay.

Furthermore, though it may resonate as reasonable given the way that a modern capitalist economy functions, the utilitarian approach to distribution in crisis is unsatisfactory because of its distinctively inegalitarian features. The utilitarian perspective looks at situations of crisis in purely functionalist terms, disregarding effects of public policies on different parts of the population and additionally, avoids raising questions of accountability and responsibility for the emergence of crisis so no policies for prevention of future collapses can be devised. It

6 Ibid.
seems to perceive the crisis as a matter of brute luck for which the entire society needs to bear the consequences. Thus, it fails to successfully respond to the entitlement objection, since the CDP does not ask whether the actors essential to the economic recovery are entitled to the resources they receive.⁷ Even if it asked, the most likely response from a utilitarian would be that they are not entitled, given the shared societal effort at their (re)creation and the fact that such distribution leaves the worst-off with insufficient resources for their wellbeing. Therefore, the utilitarian approach merely touches upon the surface of CDP justification and provides no substantial principle potent enough to ensure wider social and political legitimacy.

3.2. Equality

Another approach to justification of the CDP is the egalitarian. Unlike utilitarian, it would negatively respond to the question of justification and argue that such a principle is utterly unjust given the fact that it reproduces inequalities on both ends of the process. There are two different ways egalitarian objection to the CDP can be explicated. The first one is predominantly deontological and determines most of the egalitarian thrust in considerations of distribution in crisis, while the other one is teleological and pertains only to a minor consideration.

The deontological egalitarian would argue that the CDP is unjustified because it fails to treat all social actors suffering in the crisis equally. It would object to the preferential treatment of the most profitable actors on the basis of its inherent inequality and ask for additional justification, beyond mere principles of urgency and economic reasoning. This justification could be provided via reference to the assumption that, had the distribution not targeted the actors able to recover the entire economic system, the inequalities between the rich and the poor would even increase and lead to further deterioration of the living conditions for those who are now the least advantaged. However, the

deontological egalitarian would not be persuaded by such justification because the main concern would not be with counterfactual expectations in terms of outcomes, but with the procedural failure to justify the unequal treatment of different social actors. The fact that some actors are more essentially related to the stability of the economic system for them is an arbitrary fact that doesn’t by itself yield any distributive justification, but needs to be supplied with additional arguments.

On the other hand, the teleological egalitarian would aim for the equality of the outcome and object the CDP not only for failing to produce such an equal result but, more importantly, for reverse consequences of the distributive pattern it promotes. In this view, the ultimate aim of distributive justice is to produce equality of outcomes, whatever the currency of distribution is, \textit{a priori}, understood to be. In the case where distribution operates with resources, the aim is to equalize the resources across different social actors. The CDP, in teleological egalitarian view does the opposite: it distributes resources in a way that not only reproduces, but even deepens the existing inequalities between different actors.

Both egalitarian objections to the CDP would build on the assumption that the crisis has a differentiated effect on various social groups and any distribution that does not aim at redressing such an effect is inherently unjust. The deontological egalitarian would have a somewhat weaker objection since it would not aim at equalizing the outcomes after the distribution but only to prevent the unjustifiably differential treatment of presumably essential and non-essential (more and less productive) social actors in the distributive exercise solely on the basis of their different features in relation to the economic system. The teleological egalitarian would have a much stronger objection and would consider the CDP unjust in both procedural and substantial senses.

\[8\] Derek Parfit, \textquote{Equality or Priority} in Mathew Clayton and Andrew Williams (eds.) \textit{The Idea of Equality}, (New York: Palgrave, 2000), 84.
3.3. Priority

The strongest objection to the CDP would come from the approach associated with the prioritarian camp of political philosophy. The objection is based on an underlying normative validity of the “difference principle”, originally proposed by John Rawls and further developed by other political philosophers. The principle maintains that social inequalities are justified only if they advantage the worst-off parts of the population.

There can be two different versions of the priority principle applied in this case. The first one maintains that priority-based approach needs to exist because it will reduce or prevent deepening the existing social inequalities. This would be the teleological version of the priority view. The second one believes priority needs to obtain not because it will reduce inequalities, but because it is a self-standing normative value that needs no egalitarian justification.9 This would be the deontological version of this view.10 While both of these will strongly reject the *prima facie* justification of the CDP, only the second one will sustain its objections under the all-things-considered examination.

Namely, the teleological rendering of the priority approach objects to the CDP on the ground that it allows inequalities that do not benefit and even worsen the condition of the worst-off members of society.11 When the exigency of economic stability overrides the alternative social services extendible to the worst-off, the inequality of the distribution is unjustified because it deepens the existing social inequalities and does not benefit the worst-off. A response to such an objection could be that the inequality of distribution can still be justified because,

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9 Parfit, p. 103.
11 Strangely, the CDP itself sustains a certain prioritarian view that could be termed the “inverse difference principle” insofar as it favors the well-off, though not on the basis of their relative position on the socio-economic scale but on the basis of their essential importance for the stability and recovery of the overall economic system.
counterfactually, without such distributions which aim at the ultimate recovery of the economic system, the position of the worst-off would deteriorate even more, given the tendency of the crisis to devalue all social resources and affect absolute levels of welfare in society. Under such considerations, the difference principle would even command the CDP, since the position of the worst-off would ultimately depend on the possibility of the system recovering. Without the recovery of the economy, the relative inequalities would rise even more, since the worst-off do not possess enough absolute resources to cope with the increased scarcity induced by the crisis.

A far stronger, deontological version of prioritarianism would remain unconvinced by the counterclaims in favor of CDP because it would hold that no matter the counterfactuals, the CDP is unjust because it doesn’t assign more absolute value to the claims and positions of the worst-off members of society. In such a view, it is not the prospect of reducing inequality in the future that matters, but the fundamental prima facie value of benefiting the worst-off.

4. Natural Rights, Crisis and Distribution

However successful in justifying or objecting to the CDP, I suggest that none of these three approaches alone offers a fully satisfactory account. All seem to fail in the face of the character and profound social effects of the problem of crisis and the consequent increase of resource scarcity. Utilitarianism fails for it is unable to reckon with the responsibility issue and treats the problem in overly technical terms, being purely a matter of economic efficiency instead of social distribution. It seems fixated on the view that the distributive pattern of the crisis does not matter as long as the government response increases the net benefit, which sustains stability and enables future growth.

Under utilitarian justifications, no long-term solutions could be possible since failure to address the responsibility problem would impair reforms of the relations of production and seek only a temporal redress of the crisis critical effects. Also, utilitarians
could not propose development of a distributive pattern applicable in future crisis cases, since the justification it offers is very unlikely to generate long-term legitimacy given its essential ideological preference for the minority (well-off) position. Unlike utilitarian, the egalitarian justification could perhaps generate a wider legitimacy for their preferred distributive patterns, but the patterns themselves would not be suitable for a volatile economy and would threaten to disintegrate in the long run. Even if the deontological egalitarian objection to the CDP on the grounds of unequal treatment of individuals through distributive procedures could be acceptable and yield both legitimate and justified procedural proposals, the teleological emphasis on the equality of outcomes seems not only implausible but also problematic for the values of equal liberty and autonomy. The reasons for preferring equality in conditions of crisis that the teleological egalitarians put forward are unpersuasive given their conceptual dependence on the indiscriminate efforts to neutralize luck, both brute and optional. However, even if prima facie acceptable, the deontological egalitarianism would depend on the externally justified theory of political participation and could not operate as a self-standing principle.

The prioritarian approach to justification, in its teleological version, though strong in objecting to the CDP, dissolves when confronted with arguments based on the reinterpretation of utilitarianism to suit the least advantaged. Namely, the argument that the increase in the indiscriminate sum of resources benefits the worst-off by preventing the already increasing disadvantage caused by the crisis, disarms the teleological version of prioritarianism and brings it under the utilitarian umbrella. The deontological version, however resistant to similar rejoinders, still seems implausible given the short-term nature of the policy proposals it would suggest and their chronic instability in the face of a dynamic and changing world of capitalist economy.

12 On the problems of egalitarian efforts to neutralize luck, see Susan Hurley, ‘Why the Aim to Neutralize Luck Cannot Provide a Basis for Egalitarianism’ in *Justice, Luck and Knowledge*, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), 146-180.
Moreover, none of the approaches seem able to provide a plausible account that can persuasively respond to already notorious criticism that, faced with the increase of scarcity and the resulting legitimacy crisis, liberal democracy will turn into a form of paternalism, even authoritarianism.¹³ The criticism noted imply that an increase of scarcity tends to create greater inequalities, intensify conflict and promote more closed, centralized and authoritarian political institutions that come to operate without the popular consensus. Utilitarianism would not be able to answer such criticism on all three grounds, given its distinct inegalitarian thrust, as well as an uncritical willingness to surrender to state-centered decision making during crisis. Egalitarianism would account for the inequalities but would surrender to centralism even more than utilitarianism, given its emphasis (especially in teleological version) to produce equality of outcomes through institutional distribution. Similarly, priority approaches would fail to reckon with the overemphasized role of coercive distributions based on the patterned view of justice. The three approaches seem unable to offer a justification that could be based on a principled consensus and a policy derived from it.

However, the CDP can and needs to be justified, but the reasoning for such justification falls outside of the utilitarian, egalitarian and prioritarian perspectives. Alternatively, I suggest that the CDP can be considered just under the framework of natural rights and the liberal-democratic government’s duties to protect them. In cases of economic crisis that threatens to destabilize the entire economic system and disturb the fundamentals of the basic schemes of cooperation, the government has a natural duty to prevent such outcomes and preserve the basic socio-economic structure intact so that justice can exist.

I argue for this reasoning on the basis of two strands of philosophical tradition. The first one is direct and pertains to the protection of individual property. It relies on a Lockean understanding of natural and property rights and their relation to the civil government and its protective duty. Within this understanding, human natural rights assume the “state of perfect freedom to order their actions and dispose of their possessions and persons as they think fit” and the duty of the government, since men and women consented to its sovereignty over their individual selves, is to provide protection of these rights.\footnote{John Locke, \textit{Two Treatises on Government}, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), 101.}

The foundation of sovereignty, and thus the sovereign decision to redistribute resources in times of crisis rests on this assumption. In that context, the state is obliged to protect citizens’ property, including labor as the “foundation of property”\footnote{Ibid, 102.}, as well as prevent its arbitrary devaluation. Such behavior by the government is the precondition of people’s subjection to the sovereign rule, and thus its first duty in relation to individual property. The crisis threatens property by diminishing and destroying its value and the state has a natural duty to respond in a way that can prevent occurrence and development of crises. But, when crises occur due to uncontrollable facts, the state must act to stop it and revert its consequences. Government agency in times of crisis is thus inextricably linked to its sovereign rule and the individual consensual subjection to it.

In Locke’s words,

\begin{quote}
upon this ground a man’s having his stores filled in times of scarcity, having money in his pocket, being in a vessel at sea, being able to swim & c. may as well be the foundation of rule and dominion, as being possessor of all the land in the world: any of these being sufficient to enable me to save a man’s life, who would perish, if such assistance were denied him; and any thing, by his rule, that may be an
\end{quote}
occasion of working upon another’s necessity to save his life, or any thing dear to him, at the rate of his freedom, may be made a foundation of sovereignty, as well as property16.

Therefore, acceptance of this liberal reasoning needs to go beyond the ordinary justification of state sovereignty and extend to special duties of the government in times of crisis. When faced with a critical situation, the government has to protect individual natural rights to property using all available means even if it includes those falling outside usual policies. This comes with a proviso, as will be discussed below, but also is to be supplemented with another, broader liberal notion of the commonwealth.

This, second notion from the philosophical tradition is more indirect and deeper than the first and pertains to what can be termed the government duty to sustain necessary circumstances so justice can exist, rather than protect people’s property through direct actions. This one is related to the Hobbesian assumptions about the law of nature as “the fountain and the original of justice”17. In Hobbes’s understanding, justice can exist only when there is a covenant made, for

where no covenant hath preceded, there hath no right been transferred and every man has right to everything, and consequently no action can be unjust”. In other words, it is the covenant, the basic contract between members of society that makes acts of distribution just or unjust. Without it, social conditions plunge into the state of nature in which “every man has right to everything.

One can plausibly say that Rawls, when describing the objective and subjective conditions as circumstances of justice had a similar structure of basic relations in mind. Instead of Hobbesian “coercive power” as the umpire of distribution and guarantor of the covenant, in a Rawlsian contractarian framework “moderate

16 Ibid, 47.
17 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, (1651), 88.
scarcity” and the basic schemes of cooperation come in to play the basic role against which practices and considerations of justice are made. A “moderate” level of resource scarcity ensures that, conditioned by right social organization and the drive to cooperate, individuals will be able to produce, exchange and generate enough resources for a sustainable and peaceful life.

The basic scheme of cooperation, as the main precondition of justice, thus assumes that there must be no less than “moderate” scarcity, which conditions individuals to cooperation, mutual respect, and procedural equality as basic forms of social organization. Anything less than “moderate” threatens to dissolve the schemes of cooperation and cause individuals to refrain from obligations based on covenants and fight against all for bare survival. This not only leads to dissolution of societies and communities but also threatens the security of individuals, exposing them to uncontrolled violence and leaving them with no social protection of their property and life.

In this context, Rawls’ and Hobbes’ ideas come close to one another: there is a crucial condition that has to be sustained if justice is to exist. The contract between the subject and the sovereign for Hobbes can have a structural parallel in the moderate scarcity in Rawls. In the absence of either, basic schemes of social cooperation can dissolve and justice may be obsolete: radical scarcity equals a Hobbesian state of nature, where no justice is possible. So, just as it is important to sustain the contractual relation between the subject and the sovereign, it is equally important to sustain a relatively constant level of resource scarcity so basic schemes of social cooperation that enable establishment of justice remain possible. However, the solution to the contemporary economic crisis and the role of governments in it needs to be much more relaxed and liberal than envisaged by Hobbes. Consensual acceptance of citizens of an active role for the state in times of crisis is crucial for a liberal, yet strong and action-driven behavior of state institutions.

Therefore, given the possibility that an economic crisis, by increasing the level of scarcity from moderate to extreme,
endangers the basic cooperative scheme, there exists an obligation for democratic government to take care not only of different distributive schemes against given conditions of justice, but also of the conditions themselves, so schemes of justice in distribution can exist. This could be understood as a certain meta-obligation of the state to sustain the objective conditions of justice and prevent their dissolution so justice can exist in a concrete distributive form. In that sense, I would say the most appropriate justification of the CDP could come from the consideration that the state has an obligation to preserve the objective conditions of justice, so justice could obtain to protect the basic rights of individuals to their property and lives unrestrained by fluctuation in resource scarcity. The government is justified in prioritizing actors that are essential for the recovery of the economic system solely on the basis of this obligation and nothing else.

It is important, however, to note that this serves as a basic justificatory principle, upon which other considerations can be made. In my rendering, it comes with several conditions that broaden the scope of justification to include some of the alternative views discussed in earlier sections. The conditions can be outlined through what may be called a general legitimacy proviso: only if conditioned by considerations of responsibility, regulation and isolation, the justification based on Lockean natural rights and Hobbesian importance of commonwealth will be able to contribute to preservation of circumstances of justice and generate political legitimacy for the crisis distributive pattern. I briefly explain what I mean by this.

The legitimacy proviso, with a set of conditions, provides a positive ground for this otherwise negatively oriented justification that aims at securing wider social legitimacy. It means that, if aimed at protecting natural rights of individuals on the long run, a democratic government needs to adopt a set of positively oriented principles that provide long-term legitimacy for crisis-time distributions. Only if these principles are adopted, disturbing the regular pattern of distribution to preserve stability of the commonwealth can gain legitimacy and consensual support.
First, the justification need not be understood as temporally limited to the moment of the crisis, but stretches across time. In terms of past events, it commands examinations of responsibility and reassessments of relations of production insofar as they are related to issues of responsibility. This would imply that the natural rights justification directly provides an obligation to determine if there is any responsibility relationship between different actors, modes of production and the crisis. In terms of the future, it commands reciprocity-based redress of the crisis distribution. This would mean that, once the economy is stabilized, the actors that have received resources under the pretext of their essential importance for stabilization have an obligation to redress the inequality of crisis distribution through priority measures aimed at the least advantaged members of society who would, had the crisis not occurred, have received more resources in absolute terms, or alternatively, aimed at bringing the crisis-deepened inequalities at the pre-crisis levels. In that way, the responsibility condition of the natural rights justification would be broad enough to include both egalitarian and prioritarian approaches to distributive justice, and as such applicable in various local contexts with different notions of justice. The issue of responsibility would thus go both ways, looking backward as well as forward. An equal concern for natural rights of all members of society would oblige government to undertake measures that will prevent further dangers to the stability of the socio-economic system.

The reasoning behind this rests on both the Hobbesian and Lockean parts of the justification argument. In terms of responsibility, the government’s duty to look at the actors and structures responsible for the occurrence of the crisis springs from its underlying duty to prevent any further occurrence of similar crises and in such a way sustain the stability of the commonwealth. In terms of redress, if one understands the social provisions individuals are entitled to as a form of common property shared by groups of individuals on different social bases, then reductions or cancellations of such provisions can be understood as violation of rights to property and thus redressed.
once the crisis is tamed and conditions brought back to the normal (pre-crisis) level.

The second condition draws on the responsibility argument and the priorities of commonwealth stability. It assumes that unlike the pre-crisis period, private corporations receiving public money for the sake of the system’s survival need to become publicly accountable for their economic policies, since the crisis has made explicit that priorities of the commonwealth have priority over particular (corporate) actors. Crisis distribution would thus induce a process of broadening the relations of accountability on egalitarian bases: all receivers of public funds, including private corporate actors, have an equality-based requirement to be held accountable for the effects of their policies on the system as a whole.

Two things could be induced from such a condition: a broader scope of democratic participation, since the accountability of private economic actors who received public money would imply a civic overview of their practices and thus increase level of citizen participation in public policy scrutiny. Given the potential of private economic actors to influence and endanger individual property rights, such public oversight comes as an appropriate device for controlling forces capable of destabilization of basic schemes of social cooperation. But, more importantly, this condition also indicates a need for more, rather than less, political regulation of the economic sphere and its relation with the basic resource structure. It comes with an assumption that there are many potential violators of natural rights, and that the state, given the potential to control its institutions under democratic frameworks, is the least likely to commit such violations. Therefore, it is the most appropriate agent for controlling those actors that are potentially harmful and that seldom come under democratic scrutiny. The natural rights approach seems most capable for providing the basic arguments with which such policies could be advocated and put into practice.

The natural rights approach to the justification of the CDP is more successful than other particular accounts, discussed in the
previous section. There are several additional reasons this might be the case. First, the natural rights approach takes the problem of scarcity more seriously than other accounts. Although it may be based upon an ideal and value of natural rights, it is still firmly anchored in the contingency of the changing world and the dynamic nature of scarcity, being thus more responsive to the practical problems of distribution.

Second, it is at the same time narrower (being more precise) and wider in range, which makes it more acceptable to actors from different ideological positions along the liberal aisle. Arguably, subscribers of all three alternative approaches could endorse the value of basic natural rights and its overriding validity in face of different political dilemmas. Thirdly, it is not based on a particular distributive pattern, but allows for different distributive practices, which could satisfy a set of basic requirements. Finally, it is more flexible and open to a posteriori assessments of the resource production relations and the character of the economic system as a whole.

5. Conclusion: Justice and Dynamic Scarcity

In this article I examined the problem of scarcity as a condition of justice. Instead of assuming a relatively fixed (“moderate”) level of scarcity as a background against which justice in distribution obtains, I have tried to examine what happens when this level falls below or comes close to a collapse. In this concluding section, I wish to outline several structural remarks that can be derived from the previous discussion. The most important notion I wish to put forward is that moderate scarcity is not a mere condition, but an important and vital object of justice. As such it falls within, not beyond, legitimate obligations of democratic governance.

Under normal conditions of scarcity, which imply a limited yet relatively fixed amount of resources, the government devises a particular distributive scheme that reflects three structural facts: the amount of resources, relations of (resource) production and the dominant views of distributive justice. The legitimacy of the
governmental scheme of distributions depends on the stability of the relations between these elements. Once at least one of these elements experiences change, the entire scheme can undergo a transformation.

There are several reasons some of these elements may change. Resources can be based on exhaustible natural sources (such as oil or gas) and the cause for reconstruction of distributive schemes will spring from purely natural facts, once the natural resource pools are drained. Natural reasons do not exclusively derive from the exhaustion of natural resources but can also pertain to the rise of population and the unpredictable nature of the world economy, which by itself can cause limitations of the absolute level of resources distributed between individuals. Reasons can be social in character and pertain to changes in the relations of production, which can also initiate the need to rethink the existing distributive schemes. Finally, a conceptual change in views of distributive justice may also cause the change in dominant practices of distribution.

All three reasons may cause different types of social and economic crises. The latter one usually occurs during large social upheavals and revolutions, when entire societies undergo a fundamental transformation, changing patterns of distribution together with other forms of social organization. Its distinctive feature is the fact that the change in the distributive scheme follows a rationally devised and forward-looking plan, usually backed by the majority of population, if successful. The second reason is less a result of planned efforts but rather an unintended consequence of the rationally established relations of production. The first one, however, may not be based on any rational planning but instead occur as a natural fact, gradually or suddenly affecting the amount of resources and the scheme upon which their distribution is based.

All three reasons indicate the need to understand the moderate scarcity of resources as a dynamic phenomenon, influenced by a variety of both natural and social facts. Once scarcity as a circumstance of justice is understood in this way it is much easier
to understand the legitimacy crises that may accompany alterations in distributive schemes caused by changes in one of its constitutive elements. The nature of the change will, however, also indicate the character of the justifiability and legitimacy challenge to the distributive alteration. However, both in cases when the nature and causes of the change are known and attributable to human influence, as well as in those when they are not, a particular redistribution must take place to prevent the overall collapse of the system and the resulting deconstruction of the basic circumstances necessary for justice to obtain.

Different justifications to such distributions can be made. Some of them will support it while others will not. The prevailing approaches to justification of the crisis distribution, couched in terms of utilitarian, egalitarian and prioritarian arguments seem to depend on a fixed, rather than a dynamic view of the resource scarcity. The claims made on their behalf suggest that legitimacy to such justification could be obtained only if one agreed to deal with a stabile amount of distributive resources: in the face of radical resource instability, all three approaches collapse either because they are unable to generate long-term legitimacy for redistributive decisions (utilitarian) or because they are too implausible to stand as self-sufficient and independent justificatory frameworks (egalitarian and prioritarian). Unlike these, the natural rights approach, conditioned by specific legitimacy providers, will be broad enough to include the resource scarcity issue into the purview of its justification and treat it not only as a background circumstance, but an important object of the concerns of justice.

The natural rights justification of the CDP indicates the final answer to the questions posed at the beginning of this paper: because it is inherently dynamic, moderate scarcity cannot be a mere condition but also an object of justice. The change in the levels of scarcity, empirically confirmed by recent economic downturn, thus significantly affects our understandings of justice. It forces us to rethink justifications to different distributive schemes against a new reality. In such a reality a particular cooperative structure is no longer a given and fixated
circumstance but a dynamic object that needs to be accounted for. The role of democratic government in such contexts is not limited to the provision of distributive schemes against the given socio-economic circumstances but broadened to an active concern for sustaining the circumstances at the levels necessary for justice to exist.

If at particular points in time the levels of scarcity radically decrease the government is obliged to act in such a way that will stop the further deterioration of resources and bring them to a more acceptable level. When doing so, the government is justified in violating the principles of ‘normal’ (pre-crisis) distribution by relying on equal concern and protection of individuals’ natural rights. Only by responding to the changes in the dynamism of resource scarcity will a democratic government be able to generate legitimacy for its distributive schemes and ensure that, no matter what, the natural rights of individuals remain protected and isolated from the effects of the changing world as long as possible.

On a more empirical note, the case of the US government bailout must not be seen as an event specific to a single case, limited by the economic, cultural and political reality of the United States of America. The structure of the problem indicated by this example is of a much wider relevance and its importance for the world as a whole and will be more visible in times to come. Governments throughout the world will be increasingly challenged by future economic crises and fluctuations in the available resources, which will force them to rethink existing distributive strategies and come up with new answers and policy solutions for new social and economic problems caused by the crisis. The task of political philosophy is to think ahead of these developments and work out plausible and sustainable normative frameworks and suggestions.
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BOOK REVIEWS


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The Ku Klux Klan (KKK) often appears to the European reader as a spectacular source of racial violence. The Invisible Empire, the hooded people, and the fiery crosses seem just another eccentricity in the land of the mighty rule of law and civil rights. However, through a sharp analysis of the mobilization of the Klan as social movement, Rory McVeigh conveys a deeper insight into the roots of the KKK’s growth and decline. As a professor of Sociology at the University of Notre Dame, he has continuously delved into right-wing mobilization and the echoes of the Ku Klux Klan. His latest book provides an analysis on how social theories can explain this kind of mobilization and thus develop strategies for preventing the harm that right-wing extremism can cause to individuals and to the social fabric of the communities. Moreover, what makes this research more than an explanatory flashback is the existence of yet common situations such as vigilante groups patrolling the border between the United States and Mexico or neo-Nazis boldly marching through European cities.

The main focus of the book is on explaining right-wing mobilization from the viewpoint of a different theory, based on the supply/demand relation, so far most commonly applied in economics. McVeigh brings forward the *power devaluation theory* and examines it in comparison to other social theories such as the mass society theory, the collective behavior theory, the resource mobilization theory and the political opportunity theory. All of the above mentioned theories have only partially succeeded in accounting for how and why the mobilization of the members of the KKK occurred. Power devaluation (economic, political and status-based), generated by structural change, produces shifts in interpretive processes which, in turn, lead to activation of
organizational resources and exploitation of political opportunities (p.39). The model also includes feedback loops that represent movement mobilization as an ongoing process. The incentives for right-wing mobilization came, therefore, from economic, political and status-based power devaluation, from which the Klan drew benefit and articulated its members’ grievances by drawing on cultural identities rooted in race, nativity, and religion.

Drawing on sociological qualitative and quantitative analyses, on national and state-level statistics, on picture and document overview, the author deals with the redefinition of markets along cultural lines, the issues of public versus private schooling, the Prohibition, recruitment and activism.

The power devaluation model is detailed both according to a diachronic perspective covering the period from 1915 until 1928 and a synchronic approach on domains of the public life, such as the political power, the economic issues and the status-based privileges. McVeigh argues that political power devaluation results from an increase in the supply of and decrease in the demand for what is offered in the political exchange, while employment and wage are correlated to the proliferation of chain-stores, the ongoing industrialization (together with the increasing reliance on unskilled workers) and the immigration problem (the blacks from the South and the East European immigrants). The status-based privileges are related to the defense of the Prohibition and the advocacy for a better public educational system, which were the gateway towards maintaining or improving the social status.

As far as the arguments go, one can acknowledge the author’s point of view. Regarding the mobilization inputs, the motivations for joining the organization were far more complex than the status anxiety argument suggests. This is why the leaders of the Klan constructed call-action frames that resonated strongly with those who were experiencing power devaluation. The author’s theory can account for the causes of the movement’s rebirth and for their complex articulation, but it must pass the relay on to anthropology and social psychology when it comes to explaining the impact on the cultural interpretation framework. On a larger
scale, the power devaluation theory succeeds in explaining the Klan mobilization and its model is easily understandable and based on real historical input. However, the inside perspective is missing: the way in which the individual actually relates to the Klan is overlooked, in favor of an exterior panorama.

It seems therefore that this theory starts off well but at some point along the way it loses its force against the fluctuant and highly individual talents of the leaders of the moment. As McVeigh puts it, it is up to them to develop the ways in which the movement relates to the diverse grievances and responds to them. Considering the discrepancies and structural diversity of the 48 states to which it applies, the power devaluation theory can only provide a general framework and starting point. Economic and political power devaluation created incentives to join the movement, but they could not support the intrinsic motivation of the individual acts.

Nonetheless, what it can offer the readers is a different perspective on right-wing mobilization and a deeper case-study of the KKK in parallel with the fascist movements in Europe. Of the three stages of the Klan, the 1915-1928 period was contemporaneous with the rise of fascism, which their American homologues praised. While most of the totalitarian right-wing European movements have been secular or atheist, the American one was deeply intertwined with the Protestant creed and church. It is therefore interesting to compare it with, for example, the Romanian case of the Iron Guard, where religion (in this case, Orthodoxy) was a core component of the movement’s identity.

The quoted works, the vast literature on the subject and the extensive explanations depict a detailed picture of the Klan’s strategies for mobilization. The book covers a broad array of useful concepts, developing into a tool for research, as it gathers a great amount of information. This not just supports the main theory, but also helps to build “the big picture” of the United States at the beginning of the 20th century and before the Great Depression.
The book is aimed at a public that is familiar with specific terms and scientific knowledge but the style of the author facilitates the reading and thus it is at the reach of the average person interested in the Ku Klux Klan.

As the book is well documented, it manages to place its subject at the rightful place in the American society, laying a proper emphasis not only on the basic triggers of its existence, but also on the echoes and sequels it can provoke. Perhaps its greatest quality is, in this reviewer’s view, the prediction capacity of the proposed theory and thus its applicability in social sciences. We are witnessing events all around the world that raise awareness on the fact that inherent changes will lead to power devaluation which, at its turn, may have serious consequences that we should be well prepared against.


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More than six decades after the end of the Second World War it is hard to imagine the political, social, and human landscapes of Europe in the aftermath of hostilities. In reconstructing this recent past, we can rely on a large bibliography regarding the events from the Western part of the continent. But for what concerns the territory to the east of the Iron Curtain, the appropriate and single case-study documentation remains problematic and thus, topics such as the political, economic and social effects of the first year of the Cold War reconfigurations are still insufficiently explored. It is, for example, the everyday life of the displaced person or the consequences of displacement on the identity reconfiguration of ethnic minorities.

Warlands concerns the “profound political, social and economic upheavals in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, in the
immediate aftermath of the World War II” (p.1). After the choice for democratic institutions, made by most of these countries shortly after the end of the Cold War, some of the documents became available to researchers, but not all and not easily. Many were ideological interpretations of the past at stake which could be challenged by the direct access to such documents. Hence, the protection policies of some former communist states imposed restrictive legislation seriously limiting the access of researchers to source material. Such a situation seriously impeded academic freedom and, in many respects, the quality and quantity of the studies regarding the beginnings of the communist regimes. The explanation of this self-defensive attitude is that the critical analysis of the historical myths might jeopardize the basis of some current national representations.

Following WWII, large masses of people were on the move - refugees, survivors, orphans, deported and displaced persons - as a result of territorial changes. All studies included in this book are organised around the following themes: the exercise of power (including from the point of view of sharing and organising the knowledge), experiences of displacement, the transnational connections and memory and commemoration of displacement. The subjects are broad, but a detailed exploration of these themes is relatively limited by the specialized character of the articles included. Instead of exhaustively covering the topics addressed the studies offer various suggestions and possible lines of further development. This is both the strong point as well as the weak point of the book. By discussing very detailed topics, the specialized researcher might be provided with useful information and possible new perspectives. For those only interested in the issues regarding the first years of the Cold War, however, the volume is a collection of various pieces of a puzzle lacking the joints to fit them together.

The studies are structured around four main parts: Transit (national experiences and internal interventions in postwar displaced persons camps), Return (Soviet postwar resettlement practices and population management), Border Crossings(state practices of displacement and national reconstruction) and The
Politics of Memory (the long-term perspectives on displacement). The ways in which these topics are explained are unbalanced and do not cover extensively either the whole geographical territories of former communist Europe nor the problematic addressed. One of the most serious methodological problems is represented by the limits set by the informational resources: the information is too disparate and strictly limited to some very specialized cases without making obvious the broader picture. Without this panoramic view we are not able to make an evaluation of the period. The details could be misleading, creating an effect similar to visual illusion: a fragment is projected as the frame, obscuring the other unexplored aspects of the research.

Tomas Balkelis outlines the general context of these studies: “At the end of the Second World War refugees were everywhere: on the roads and streets, in cellars, bomb shelters, train stations and army barracks” (p. 25). The issue of the refugees provides the thread of the book. Their fate is followed during the various policies of pressures and propaganda they were exposed to (pp. 48-67) as well as their problematic social reinsertion (pp. 89-117, pp. 117-140).

Another category of refugees – the members of the Armenian and Estonian exile – are scrutinized following the relations with their homelands (pp. 231-255). This topic embodies huge research potential for the whole former communist area, particularly given the post-Cold War relations between different representatives of the countries at various levels of the exile and local communities. Another reality of the period was the problem of territorial changes, population displacement and transfers. The cases of Poland and Ukraine offer a deep understanding of the difficulties of the reconciliation and pacification process, as well as the problems faced by the ideas of regional cooperation (pp. 165-229).

The reader can follow directly the migration trajectories with the aid of maps of Central and Eastern Europe, the Western Republics of the USSR, Poland, Soviet Armenia and the Caucasus included at the beginning of the volume. Tables and Figures provide a very
small part of the data concerning the amplitude of the phenomenon analysed. The sources of the studies are as varying as the register of voices: direct testimonies of survivors, their published memoires or information included in documents in state archives. The theoretical and qualitative approaches are alternating with testimonies and, where possible, statistical information opening interest for further analysis and comparative studies as well as stressing the need for more openness of the files regarding this period.

What this collection of studies intends to bring as new for those interested in Central and Eastern Europe is not only a highlighting of a different repertoire of topics and geographical and temporal redefinitions, but also new approaches. These are based on historical delineations, geopolitical, economical or legal frameworks (p. 15). The literature in the area is burgeoning and dedicated studies have been published. But, what might be needed now is to trying and create, starting from a multiplicity of voices sharing their experiences, a comprehensive framework of another level of understanding the issue. Other possible areas recommended for supplementary attention are, according to Peter Gatrell and Nick Baron (p. 266), “how displaced persons were depicted in newsreel reports, feature films, literature and other media; how and in which genres migrants and exiles themselves articulated their own experiences in the years after the war”.

The book is a valuable resource for both communist, refugee and migration issues scholars and offers valuable suggestions for continuing the work of filling the knowledge gap still persisting in many areas regarding the beginning of post-war Europe.

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David Ekbladh’s first book, *The Great American Mission*, deals with the role of development policy in American foreign relations during the Cold War. More specifically, it discusses modernization as a developmental approach, tracing its rise and fall over a period of about forty years. In Ekbladh’s view, modernization theory fused political, ideological and strategic objectives at a time when the United States waged what was, in essence, a global struggle over ideas.

Yet ideas about modernization did not emerge as a consequence of the Cold War, Ekbladh argues. Rather they were an outgrowth of liberal ideas that germinated in the 1930s in response to the Great Depression and the rise of fascist and communist ideologies. The Depression brought state planning into fashion but the onset of ideologies that rivalled American liberalism saw that, in the United States, an approach to planning devoid of ideology was sought. This came to be called modernization. The approach was undergirded by a belief in technology, reflected a superiority of Western values and could trace its roots back to Reconstruction in the 1860s. In its early days, it was mostly pushed by Christian missionaries and non-governmental groups, one target being the turn-of-the-century Philippines.

Only after the Depression did modernization become embedded in official American government policy. It found concrete shape in the New Deal Programs, most conspicuously that of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA). In Ekbladh’s words, the TVA was “the grand synecdoche, standing for a wider liberal approach to economic and social development both domestically and internationally.” (p. 8) Indeed, it was “so influential globally that it would become nearly synonymous with liberal development
itself”. (p. 48) The book’s first three chapters are taken up with a
detailed discussion of how the TVA came to be the signature
project that provided a model for America’s subsequent
development policy. Further chapters then look in great detail at
how this philosophy came to be applied in North-East Asia (China,
and more extensively in South Korea) and then more widely in
Latin-America, Africa and Asia.

The last three chapters trace the demise of modernization,
arguing that the Vietnam debacle was principally to blame for its
fall. The chapter on the war itself focuses mainly on the effort to
create a “TVA on the Mekong River” in the 1960s. However, says
Ekbladh, it got nowhere since “the Tet Offensive in January 1968
smashed assumptions guiding development work.” (p. 217) What
is more, under pressure from both the left and the right, the
consensus around modernization at home also began to dissolve,
ushering in the arrival of dependency theory, environmental
concerns and approaches focusing on sustainability and targeting
poverty reduction. Only in the wake of the Iraq and Afghanistan
Wars did some of the discredited notions about modernization
begin to re-emerge, the author argues.

While not taking anything away from the book’s impressively
researched and documented argument, some criticisms can be
noted. One is that when probing the roots of modernization,
Ekbladh chooses, for unknown reasons, to skip over the
intellectual contributions of Talcott Parsons and A.F.K. Organski,
who furnished the notion with a full-fledged theoretical
framework. Another is that the overwhelming focus on
modernization leads to diminishing other approaches to
development. Ideas such as “trade not aid”, a focus on
investment, education or debt relief as ways to development get
only little discussion. The last chapter, which deals with “new
developments” in development policy from the Cold War to today,
discusses subsequent rival approaches in a mere seventeen
pages, meandering through sometimes tangential discussions on
Fukuyama’s End of History thesis (claiming that this entailed "a
modernization argument", p. 260), globalization and criticisms of
World Bank policies.

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In a way, this last chapter points to a somewhat more serious problem with the book, namely the interchangeable use of modernization and development. Ekbladh defends this choice by saying that in the post-WW II period, these were used as “nearly synonymous terms.” (p. 12). However, by not distinguishing between modernization -which could be conceived of as large-scale planning for the sake of development – and development in general, Ekbladh runs into some methodological and argumentative problems.

On the first point, the author's argument that Vietnam sounded the death knell for modernization would logically also imply that there also came an end to American development assistance. In this respect, Ekbladh's claim that “the concept of modernization fell out of fashion, because of its close associations with Cold War thinking, ethnocentrism and cultural imperialism” (p. 12) can certainly be defended. And of course, it is eminently plausible that in the wake of the Vietnam War, American development activities came to be viewed with much more suspicion, but this is not the same as suggesting that American development assistance as a whole came to a halt thereafter.

This critique would also lead to the need to revisit the contended causal link between Vietnam and the fall of modernization theory worldwide. Ekbladh's claim is that “[i]n the United States and internationally, the war in Vietnam helped undermine the broad consensus that had supported modernization since the 1940s.” (p. 224). However, this claim is not being backed up with analysis of development policies of countries other than the United States. Furthermore, most development economists would probably maintain that the demise of modernization had more to do with economic logic – that large-scale projects turned out to be ineffective in fostering long-term growth- and that the timing with the Vietnam War was therefore perhaps a coincidence.

Finally, the author sometimes seems to want to fit too much into his argumentative framework, whereby he comes to stretch his argument on various occasions. For example, he claims that
Defense Secretary Robert McNamara's inability to freely walk the campus of Columbia University during a visit in 1970 “provides insight into the connection between the war in Vietnam and shifts in thinking about development that came in the late 1960s and early 1970s.” (p. 226) Other examples appear in the final chapter, in which Ekbladh discusses the 2002 National Security Strategy, the Sachs-Easterly debate on development aid and Fukuyama's doubts about the neocon movement, all with relatively little relevance for his thesis, and all summarized rather than discussed on their merits. In the absence of a real conclusion, it leaves the reader somewhat dissatisfied, especially in light of the detailed and interesting discussions in the preceding chapters.

But while the book leaves something to be desired in terms of its argument, as a historical narrative it constitutes a very valuable and thorough contribution to understanding how modernization ideas furnished the foundations of American post-war development policy, whilst also supplying a series of interesting portraits of almost-forgotten figures who were intimately associated with this enterprise, such as David Lilienthal, Eugene Staley and Walt Rostow. As such, the book is a substantial contribution both to the literatures on the Cold War as well as the history of Western development policy, making it a worthwhile book for the specialist and the interested general reader alike.


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*Hobbes and the Law of Nature* constitutes the final monograph by the late historian Perez Zagorin, who was a specialist in the field of early modern European and English political thought. Zagorin died in April 2009 at the age of 88 and in this last work he presents his assessment of Thomas Hobbes as a political and
moral philosopher. Zagorin’s analysis is based on Hobbes’ three major political works - *The Elements of Law* (1640), *De cive* (1641), and *Leviathan* (1651) – which were written during the English Civil War that resulted in the temporary defeat of the British monarchy. As is explained in the preface, Zagorin’s twofold intention is to analyse Hobbes’ concept of natural law within its historical context, and to demonstrate his significance “as a humane moral philosopher and theorist of natural law”(p.x). For this purpose Zagorin repeatedly contradicts scholars who place a one-sided focus on the role of self-preservation, calculation, and unbridled absolutism, while instead he presents an image of ‘Hobbes the moral philosopher’.

In the first of four chapters Zagorin discusses Hobbes’ unique position within the tradition of natural law and natural right, which concepts compose “the twin foundation on which Hobbes built the entire structure of his moral and political theory’ (p.2). In comparing Hobbes’ view on natural law to the theories of his predecessors, Zagorin stresses Hobbes’ deviation from the age-old association between the natural and the good, and his refutation of a theistic foundation of natural law. On account of this innovative character, Zagorin considers Hobbes to have been little influenced by Grotius, in opposition to such theories as were voiced by R. Tuck and K. Haakonssen.

In chapter two Zagorin clarifies the relation between Hobbes’ moral natural law and his harsh opinion of man’s nature and condition in the pre-political state. According to Zagorin, “it would be wrong to suppose that the Hobbesian state of nature is completely lacking in moral principles”, since even in here “men can be cognisant of the law of nature and God” (p.41). After his illustration of the other-regarding dimension of Hobbesian natural law, Zagorin subsequently reverts to those aspects in which Hobbes deviated from tradition. Firstly, this concerns Hobbes’ affiliation between the desire for self-preservation and natural law; secondly, his legal positivism that only considers law as valid under the power of the sovereign; and thirdly, his conflation
between natural and civil law: “that contain each other and are of equal extent”.\(^1\) In regard to the second deviation Zagorin argues that it is because of Hobbes’ conversion of natural law into a set of moral (i.e. non-legal) principles, “that Hobbes could be at the same time both a legal positivist and part of the natural law tradition” (p.54).

In the third chapter Zagorin elaborates the argument that regardless of Hobbes’ fusion of natural and civil law – the laws of nature still function as an independent standard to which the Hobbesian sovereign is morally obliged (p. 54, 90). Zagorin commences the chapter with a discussion of certain controversially conceived aspects of the Hobbesian Commonwealth, such as the *de facto* relation between obligation and protection. Subsequently he proceeds to refute Q. Skinner’s view on Hobbesian liberty as constituting a reaction against the republican affirmation of rebellion (p.77). Alternatively, Zagorin locates a substantial amount of liberty for Hobbes’ subjects in the silence of civil law (i.e. negative liberty). Zagorin completes this moral picture of the Hobbesian Commonwealth with the claim that, besides, the sovereign holds genuine duties to these subjects, to which it is obliged by the law of nature and its inherent principle of equity (p.95).

In the last chapter Zagorin finalises his plea for the acknowledgement of genuine moral obligation in Hobbes. Notwithstanding Zagorin’s awareness of the importance of self-preservation in Hobbesian politics, he still maintains that “the laws of nature are not maxims of prudence but genuine moral principles that make people who live by them both just and good” (p.109). Zagorin attempts to clear Hobbes from the fallacy (that was initially conceived by Hume) of deducing values from facts, and the blame hereof is shuffled off on the ethical naturalism of Christian rationalists (p.115). In the final paragraph on ‘religion and toleration’ Zagorin concludes, that despite of the sovereign’s extensive power in religious affairs, even in this field Hobbes’

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\(^1\) *Leviathan*, 26.8.
opposition against persecution and tolerance towards diversity "reflect a broad strain of humanity and liberalism" (p.122).

In this book Zagorin, thus, presents a frankly moral picture of Hobbes as virtuous political thinker, secular natural law theorist, and forerunner of liberalism, in each of which respective claims he has been preceded by various other modern-day scholars. However, if Zagorin’s complete account is compared to the more common interpretations, it becomes immediately apparent that these attribute greater importance to the impact of self-interest, calculation, absolutism, and the lack of individual liberty. Besides, this standard interpretation is roughly identical to the assessment that Hobbes obtained from his own contemporaries, concerning whose criticisms Zagorin shows to be well-informed. In one of his final attempts to refute these 17th- and 18th-century critics, Zagorin attributes their persisting misconception of Hobbes to their ‘religious and political biases’ (p.100). A personal question that repeatedly occurred while reading the book is, whether an unbiased posthumous interpretation does not deserve a more considerate observation of an author’s contemporary reception, as it frequently appears that Zagorin’s conclusions are unevenly appealing to a present-day, secularist, and liberally oriented audience.

Despite of this question mark concerning Zagorin’s personal partialities in the construction of his case, on the positive side it should be mentioned that Zagorin applies a clear style of writing and structure, and additionally his arguments are rhetorically well-phrased. The outcome of Zagorin’s demanding attempt to depict Hobbes as a realistic but yet virtuous natural law theorist can, therefore, in part be validated as successful. Zagorin indeed finds adequate support in Hobbes’ writings for his demonstration of the other-regarding dimension of natural law, and for his description of the equitable office of the sovereign.2 Some of the broader claims that Zagorin derives from these depictions are, nevertheless, more difficult to account for. Throughout the work

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2 Cf. *Leviathan* Ch. 14, 15, 30.
Zagorin elaborately addresses Hobbes’ view on the relation between God, natural law, and civil law, but in the end it remains unclear how the legal positivism and secularism that Zagorin ascribes to Hobbes would allow the latter to consider natural law as an objective and morally obliging standard for the sovereign and its subjects.

Besides, it seems to me quite impossible to recognise genuine moral obligation in Hobbes on the basis of his concept of natural law, which (apart from its correlation with self-interest) is considered by Hobbes as inherently inconsistent with men’s liberty and natural right. In short, Zagorin’s book is a helpful introduction into the basics of Hobbesian politics, the prominent secondary debates, and the broader historical context of natural law theory, which will inspire many of its readers with a positive awareness of the potentially moral dimensions in Hobbes’ political writings.


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Most of the previous studies tend to understand the Internet-democracy relationship through theory, observation or prescription. Moving beyond those studies, Stephen Coleman and Jay G. Blumler’s book examines the relationship between the Internet and democratic citizenship from three of theoretical, empirical, and policy perspectives. In other words, the authors aim to explore how the contemporary notion of e-democracy could be theorised, investigated, and implemented. In order to explain e-democracy more clearly, Coleman and Blumler, in the first three chapters, discuss three major approaches that give

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3 Cf. Leviathan 14.3.
public communication; and direct democracy. Supported by empirical findings which demonstrate widespread public disengagement due to the lack of communicative connections of today’s liberal democracies, they argue that there is a requirement for “a more deliberative democracy” (p.38) which would be done by utilizing new media technologies to create a more effective and direct form of democratic interaction.

In the next two chapters, the authors apply this premise to the examination of case studies which consist of what they call “e-democracy from above” (i.e. the online parliamentary consultations of the U.K. Parliament and the community campaign creator of the Bristol City Council) and “e-democracy from below” (i.e. the BBC iCan e-democracy project, netmums.com, and the U.K.-based Stop the War Coalition online). Although these case studies indicate some limitations of e-democracy, particularly those regarding the low interactivity between policy makers and citizens, the authors still believe that the Internet possesses vulnerable potential to improve public communication which eventually enhances democracy. To realize the democratic potential of the Internet, Coleman and Blumler suggest not only initiating suitable policies and institutional support but also creating a civic commons in cyberspace.

With a renovated and interesting conceptualization of democratic citizenship and the potential of the internet, the authors succeed in their research goal. They note the ultimate goal of this book is to explain how the Internet can be utilized as an “institutional innovation” to “nurture critical citizenship and radical energy, while at the same time opening up representative governance to new respect for public discourse and deliberation” (p. 3). There are several key concepts the authors apply differently from previous studies that makes this book more theoretically useful than other books in the same field. Coleman and Blumler mention “critical citizenship and radical energy,” (p. 3) referring this phrase as the new expectations and meanings of citizenship in which the growing number of people who often expect to be heard and heeded on more occasions and matters than the ballot boxes of the Polling Day are being observed. When talking about
being citizens, they prefer using the term “democratic citizenship,” which they conceptualize as being citizens by “regarding themselves as a collectivity precedes any notion of a bounded political space to which they belong” (p. 6). In addition, democratic citizens, for Coleman and Blumler, are unlike the “state-centered citizens” whose their relationship to the state is already imagined and constituted. Rather, democratic citizens are those who enter to the political spaces toward autonomous civic practices.

However, instead of discussing this term by distinguishing it sharply to the state-centered approach, and therefore ignoring the role of political institutions, Coleman and Blumler argue that for people to engage closer to democracy, democratic institutions and processes must become sensitized to the ways in which citizens express their opinions, desires, and concerns. They ask for new spaces of political citizenship, spaces in which “civic energies” can consolidate comprehensively and productively, and suggest the Internet (or the cyberspace) as such politically vibrant spaces.

According to Coleman and Blumler, the Internet is not just a new technology but “an empty space or institutional void in which tensions between state-centric and democratic citizenship can be played out” (p.7). That is, on one hand, the Internet provides new digital and interactive channels for representatives and represented and governments and governed to communicate between each other. On the other hand, the Internet opens new spaces for citizens who have few other spaces available for them to tell their stories and express their fears and desires in constructive democratic ways. As a result, the Internet has a potential to improve public communications and enrich democracy. However, for Coleman and Blumler, such a potential could be realized only with suitable policies and institutional support.

The policy analysis chapter (chapter 6, Shaping E-Democracy) is another part that makes this book noteworthy and innovative. This chapter focuses on a pragmatic question, how should the
role of the Internet be conceived and enacted in contemporary democracy? The authors respond to this question by first employing the discursive construction of e-democracy approach to examine how the U.K. national government has attempted to shape a policy for e-democracy. They find five key principles the British government used in enacting e-democracy project: inclusion – a voice for all; openness – electronic provision of information; security and privacy – a safe place; responsiveness – listening and responding to people; and deliberation – making the most of people’s idea (p. 149). These principles have been applied to four main areas of policy: E-Voting; Local e-Participation; Government Dialogues; and Civic Initiatives (pp. 150-153). This review provides an adequate fundamental picture for the authors (and other scholars) to evaluate how e-democracy policy in the U.K. can stimulate democratic participation, and to what extent the key success of policy implementation could be.

However, when Coleman and Blumler deal with this evaluation, there are some weak points in their methodology. That is, instead of conducting a firsthand empirical analysis to support their arguments, the authors review participatory research, both those that measure individual-level determinants of whether people participate in politics and those that focus their analysis on participation in public policy-formation and decision making. Such a review may provide a clear theoretical idea for the implementation of e-democracy policy to be successful. As the authors suggest, creating “spaces” within which civic practices are placed, ordered and discovered is an important way in which policy can shape democratic citizenship (p. 162). Nevertheless, for the pragmatic question the authors raise in the early part of this chapter, a more systematic and empirical approach is required. In this sense, while knowing what should be done about e-democracy is good, understanding why that is a proper way is better.

The feasibility of the book’s recommendations is another weak point. It is true that today, the Internet is widespread, not limited to more advanced and industrialised countries but also the developing countries. Moreover, the Internet, as Coleman and
Blumler indicate, has a great potential in solving problems of contemporary democracy. Thus, the authors’ recommendation in establishing an independent government-funded agency along with creating civic commons is remarkable. However, this recommendation may be realized only for well-established democracies where the state and its political institutions are well-functioned and have capacities to deal with demands or problems raised by variety groups of people. In a society where democracy is new, a preparation stage for promoting an effective e-democracy such as by establishing political institutions that are properly designed, trustworthy, and efficacious as well as empowering pluralistic civil society would be required. Overloading active political participation to young democracies does not spontaneously bring advancement and consolidation to societies; indeed, it may even harm young democracies. Apart from these weaknesses, this well-written book is an important contribution to e-democracy, political communication, and policy literature.


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With a rate of about 1 percent incarceration per capita (i.e. the highest in the world) and damage from crime reaching 10 percent of GDP, the US allocates large budget resources to tackle this issue and faces serious deadlocks in the crime control domain. Starting from these facts, Mark Kleiman’s “*When Brute Force Fails*” raises awareness of the need to alleviate both the damages caused by crime and the burden that its control exercises on taxpayers. The analysis is based on the US experiences with crime and crime control, and that is neither a disadvantage, nor a weakness, but an almost exhaustive presentation of the evolution of crime rate, incarceration and public costs.
Kleiman organizes his paper in eleven chapters, firstly explaining why the present crime control strategy (building more prisons) became inefficient and demonstrating the need for rethinking it. He continues with presenting crime-swerving alternatives, here including probation and parole, or drug and gun control. The policy expert reserves one chapter for reviewing potential drawbacks in the implementation of the alternative strategies and the last one for revising every policy proposed, with supplementary details.

He promotes the idea that the “zero tolerance” credo is obsolete, instead introducing alternative measures whose efficiency is shown with rational arguments and concrete examples. The aftermath of the severe punishment policy does nothing but incapacitate the criminals. However, resources are scarce and crime continues to take place. Given that for offenders the impact of incarceration is not proportionate with the time in prison, Kleiman shows that swiftness and certainty of punishment successfully replace severity, especially in enforced conditions of probation and parole. Also, communicating the punishment to the potential recidivist offender proved to be an effective crime control strategy, as he can acknowledge the risks he is subjected to and can make an informed choice of whether or not to abide the law.

Such components contribute to cheaper security. Moreover, collaboration between institutions plays an essential role: as soon as education, public health and social care move beyond their initial objective and take measures to prevent crime, they could diminish crime rate. The education sector could contribute to curbing juvenile crime by changing schooling hours, as most offenses take place during afterschool hours while pupils are not under their parents’ surveillance; or introducing bullying prevention as a performance indicator for school management. Also, public health institutions should be concerned with raising awareness upon the dangers of becoming a member of a gang, using drugs or guns. Furthermore, drug law enforcement can influence the crime rate, both keeping potential offenders’ minds
lucid and reducing violence in the drug dealing process. A better gun control law should primarily focus on reducing access to firearms for gun-ineligible persons; moreover, accent should be put on curbing gun trafficking through intensive crime-gun tracing and enforcement against offenders. Environmental focus can contribute to crime control, in such respect, Kleiman is highlighting the influence lead exposure has on criminal behavior.

“When Brute Force Fails” is a combination of rational choice and empirical approaches, becoming an enjoyable reading and a sustainable public policy initiative for three interconnected reasons. First, Kleiman explains through rational choice calculations how a person chooses to abide by or break the law. One might object that people rarely use rationality when making choices. However, by simulating offenses and limited-resource actions similar to the crime control reality (in the chapter called “Tipping, Dynamic Concentration, and the Logic of Deterrence”), Kleiman pinpoints the essential details of the broader picture: high offense rates and scarce resources and the need for a mechanism to efficiently curb crime.

Every suggested policy is motivated both by explaining the status quo urging for it and the consequences upon the offenders and society. The book depicts low resource-consuming strategies that brought almost miraculous results, and these strategies could and should be extended at a wider, maybe national level. One successful example is the Hawaii’s Opportunity Probation with Enforcement (H.O.P.E.), which combined enforced conditions of probation, close monitoring and certain and swift punishment for noncompliant probationers. The program involved the corroborated work of probation officers, judges, prosecutors and lawyers, ending with an impressive curb in probationers’ drug use.

An eloquent chapter is “What Could Go Wrong?”, where Kleiman foresees potential hindrances and drawbacks of the policies he proceeds, like misapplications of dynamic concentration, if the problem is not the incapacity to punish, but crime detection, or differences of mission of institutions that should have concerted
work for crime control. He also highlights that some aspects of the policies should be subject to test and evaluation before they are implemented wider: presumably, the HOPE program will not work exactly with crack probationers in Washington just as it did in Hawaii. The book is aimed at sociologists, public policy scholars or crime control analysts, but also civic-active people who are interested in what should be done to ensure a safer environment.

One possible weakness of the book is that Kleiman fails to consider the position of victims. His arguments take into account both safety of tax payers and a better spending of their money. However, the emotional aspect is left uncovered. There are people willing to see their aggressors severely punished and this may be one reason why the US have a 15 percent lower crime rate than in 1974 and an incarceration rate four times as high. The book does not tackle the problem of extremely severe crimes, but, though they are not victims of grave crimes, burglary victims, for example, might not feel comfortable with the idea of their violators’ probation, no matter how attentively scrutinized they are during the program.

What makes the book worthy is the fact that Kleiman remains tenaciously realistic. The public policy expert is conscious that crime will not disappear. Therefore, he offers some examples of how consequences of drug dealing, for instance, can be diminished for those who are not involved. Moreover, he acknowledges the fact that some of his policy proposals might be flawed; but even if they did, the mere demarche of analyzing crime from many vantage points (the public costs for incarceration, the private costs of victims, the rational choice perspective of complying or offending the law) and suggesting instruments from different fields to counteract the issue remains innovative and worth considering it for further research.

It would be a pity if Kleiman’s remained just an impressive scholarly work. Everywhere resources are scarce and must be allocated efficiently to solve essential issues, like the safety of citizens. A primary responsibility of the state is to ensure the security of its citizen, and thus, crime control is a matter of both
legitimacy and proven efficiency of a state. It might take time to test, implement and evaluate the policy proposals and even more time to recognize the results across the US borders. Apart from time, implementing strategies that presume inter-institutional collaboration necessitate some financial cost. However, these can rather be seen as an investment, and in the long run, these financial costs will prove lower than continuing to build prisons. Better crime control reduces the financial and psychological damages produced by crime. The advantages of crime control policy target both public and private interests and cement the trust of citizens in their state.


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Stable Outside, Fragile Inside is one of the newest books in search of the distinctive development, erratic trends and widely perceived failure of Central Asian republics to make a successful transition to democracy after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The volume seeks to explain the region’s specific trajectory to independent statehood, focusing on processes of socialization with competing external norms, emanating not only the main protagonists of the Cold War, Russia and US, but also an increasingly influential EU, a myriad of international organizations and European countries, as well as regional powers such as Turkey, China, Iran, and Pakistan. At the same time, the book draws attention to the specific domestic context of awkward statehood of Central Asian polities – a set of authority structures and state society relations as well as unpredictable international behavior – which makes it difficult for the conventional frameworks to capture the current state of affairs. Opting for a flexible and comprehensive analysis of practices of statehood, the analysis claims to go beyond mainstream understanding of
compliance and delve into intricate processes of ‘localization’, which unfold at the intersection of local conditions and the larger world system (p.8).

The introductory chapter outlines the analytical approach of the book and clarifies the concepts used. The core of the volume is then divided in two parts. The first part reviews the main assumptions and the relevance of dominant analytical approaches used to understand post-soviet state making. The second part investigates the individual experiences of state making in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. The empirical analysis although varying in approach and methodology, is seemingly charted around a similar framework of localization. This combination of theoretical reflection and empirical research arguably distinguishes the book from most research, which claims to make an empirical contribution to the study of the region.

While the effort to engage with the model of localization while also reconsidering various approaches to transformation is commendable, the actual analysis is not always up to the objectives of the book to offer a much-needed theoretical reflection and elicit general patterns of state building. One of the main obstacles of the book to engage with theory in a meaningful way is the very fuzzy conceptualization of localization. The introductory chapter, which outlines the broader frame of analysis includes merely a short review on socialization and the more specific term of localization as domestication of international standards. The three page elaboration of the concepts is based on selective sources, which reflect neither a comprehensive understanding nor an adequate map of the broad literature on socialization.

The conceptualization overlooks most research on post-communist countries, which have become a rich laboratory for different schools of socialization research. More problematically, the book fails to operationalize the mechanisms through which localization might work. Although repeating that it subscribes to research, which seeks to uncover domestication of external
norms, the book has a void when it comes to specify the range of domestic factors or contexts which enable transmission of external norms. At times ‘local cultural values’ are posited as a crucial domestic factor that in the Central Asian context provides for indigenous structures of adaptation, namely the informal system, clan networking and structures of patronage (p. 21). Yet, the book insists that one “should desist the temptation to dismiss such networks as backward and counter productive to the logics of socialization” (p.22) leaving the reader wondering when and under what conditions these domestic values are supportive or counterproductive to emulation of external norms. Indeed, the unnecessary complicated language of the chapter does not help to elucidate what are the domestic conduits of socialization advocated here.

The book’s reflections on different approaches to statehood – although an appreciated effort to cross disciplinary boundaries – does not assist to clarify the lacunas of the theoretical framework. Instead, the parallel elaboration of various approaches leaves the reader with as many frames as questions. Moreover, not all the theoretical frames are evenly developed in terms of both the relevance of their assumptions and applicability in Central Asia. The well organized invocation of democratization literature offers sound explanations of region’s anomaly, arguing that it lacks most structural preconditions as well as the kind of agency apt to domestic change. The elaboration of the “clan perspective” extends the problematic role of historical factors by explaining the persistence of historically shaped clan formations as peoples’ strategies to engage with politics in everyday life. The next chapter elaborates on international political economy to explain states’ strategies of integrating in the global system. The last analytical chapter on post-colonialism outlines a new percourse into the study of Central Asia, but it is more of an apology for using related concepts rather than actually using it in the post-Soviet context. Indeed, more often than not the concepts and assumptions outlined by different approaches hardly speak to each other as well as to the main frame of localization, loosening the conceptual thread of the book and it usage as a frame for empirical analysis.
The empirical part, which draws on specific studies of statehood, is the most appealing section to the extent it brings rich insights into the intricate process of post-soviet state building while documenting and developing the common discrepancy between external norms and their localization in particular domestic environments. The case studies bring ample evidence that Central Asian polities are subject to alternative external norms and forms of intervention, which are not always beneficial to democratic state/building. In addition, the case studies bring similar evidence on some sort of selective flirtation with external norms, as relevant domestic actors pick and choose what is deemed beneficial for their short term political interests. The lack of social pressure and civil movements across the region has enabled strong presidents and political majorities of the day to use political clout at the benefit of their narrow own grouping rather than domestic progress at large.

The empirical analysis also discredits most countries’ search of ‘own models of democracy’ and rhetorical adoption to country specific conditions as an apology for different forms of authoritarianism. Altogether evidence from individual countries emphasizes the duality of political life, whereas informality is often more important that formality. Yet, the loose theoretical framework does not suffice to compare and streamline the individual processes, obstacles and recorded progress, thus reducing the possibility to generalize empirical findings from the region. The book offers limited prospects of generalizations also because different cases bring different and not easily comparable forms of evidence ranging from the most general systemic level of regime change to the meso level of institutional transformation and micro level of behavioral adaptation.

Overall, the book offers a summary of the “state of art” on Central Asian developments. Despite the lack of a common conceptual framework and the thin theoretical analysis, the empirical analysis offered in the book will be appealing to scholars working on political transformation in the region. It should be an informative complementary reader for the graduate level student,
but also policy makers interested in the anomalies of Central Asian post-communist statehood.


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*Global Electrification* pulls together a cohort of leading experts in the fields of industrial and financial history of power and light enterprises to offer a global history of electric utility companies since the early steps in the last quarter of the nineteenth century through the late twentieth century from the vantage point of international business history and transnational financial history. The authors do investigate the early beginnings and evolution of the electric utility industry in the background of both the rise to globalism of multinational corporations and the worldwide spread of international investments to crisscross private-sector activities and government-run initiatives, national and transnational concerns and capital flows. They adopt a two-fold research perspective: foreign portfolio investments and foreign direct investments are brought into focus alongside to pinpoint the changing balance between the level of internationalization and the degree of domestication – to borrow from the book’s vocabulary – featuring the history of the electricity industry since the early technological innovations (chapter 1), down into the recent attempts over the last twenty years to revive the role of multinational corporations after half a century trend toward either private-sector or state-owned national control (chapter 7).

According to the authors, this domestication pattern spanned since WWII through the 1970s recession years, following a crucial five-decade period when the light and power industry grew out of rising international flows in capital and industrial investments. The basic argument underlying this broad interpretation of the early decades is that the electric utility industry did require a high
level of capital intensive investments to turn the early technological discoveries into the electricity generating service sector. In part 1, after reviewing the early technical discoveries (pp. 6 ff.), Hausman, Hertner and Wilkins link this capital intensity driven internationalization to the birth and ascendancy of the modern city. They insist on the role of urbanization and modern system of communications in driving up consumers’ demand for electricity. Both foreign direct investments leading to the setting up of foreign owned enterprises, and the world wide diffusion of foreign portfolio investments carried out by financial intermediaries and private-sector multinationals, did support key capital-intensive investments, mostly, but far from only, in the West European industrializing countries. At the turn of the Twentieth century the British economy had already taken a lead in serving either as a creditor or as a direct investor in foreign countries, followed by the American, Swiss, Dutch and German multinationals. By 1914 the West European, Russian and Mexican electricity companies were extensively foreign owned or controlled (chapter 3).

During the 1920s, this internationalization pattern began to fall apart with significant advance of government-run activities in Russia, and the rising role of the Swiss and German holding companies. Notwithstanding this trend, through the 1929 crisis foreign direct investments and portfolio investments continued to play a role. Global electrification figures out the 1930s world economic crisis as the key watershed toward the following domestication pattern. Between 1929 and 1931 the European (Swiss and German) holding companies did much business out of the down fall of the American stock markets and purchased stocks and bonds on the cheap, whereas transatlantic German-American partnership were established. Shortly after 1931 a record-setting series of nationalizations and private sector acquisitions in the new authoritarian European regimes and through the Tennessee Valley Authority in the US (chapter 5) drove up this turn toward domestication. During WWII the war industry-related electricity requirements reinforced the 1930s’ new background of trade protectionism and autarchy, whereas
the post WWII era marked a step forward in this direction with scores of government-run initiatives (chapter 6).

Wilkins, Hausman and Hertner provide us with a comprehensive account of what they regard as the rise and fall of multinational corporations and international finance in the electric utility industry. Their argument is tidy and the reconstruction well-crafted in details, but far from being too much a technical one. Therefore, the book is worth reading both by specialists as a reference work for further research, and by a broader public with only basic knowledge of the electrical industry history.

In particular, some eye-opening issues raised are worth noting. The internationalization process of the early period are reconstructed with precision and recounts - through case studies such as the Mexican experience - how on the one side international financial and company ownerships merging across different countries, on the other the early efforts to bring this service industry under national control, strove hard to take the lead by the early twentieth century. Even more convincing are the paragraphs devoted to the turning point of the 1930s: the rise of totalitarian regimes swept away the early attempts to set up a continent wide electricity grid, but the degree of internationalization of multinational corporations operating on the European market was so far ahead by that time that the electricity companies could quit the European markets before any Third Reich takeover.

Besides, the following rise of national controls first in the US and later on all over Europe was the key to redress the balance between a steady rising electricity demand on consumer markets and a supply side restrained by the early 1930s’ economic downturn.

Though it is worthwhile, the book includes some missing elements and misleading interpretations due to the definition of utility company assumed. The authors maintain that a steady feature of this service sector be its need to raise money abroad to fund basic high added value investments, but that its involvement
in international trade was rather limited. When they state that during the full-blown period of internationalization to 1929 “only a handful of countries imported or exported more than a small fraction of the electricity produced”, whereas “capital flowed across borders a lot more freely than did electricity” (p. 30), they assume that this industry stretch from electrical generation to service distribution.

This prevents them from offering a balanced interpretation of both the WWII years and the post war decades. As other recent scholarly reconstructions stressed⁴, if we consider this service industry as a transformer of the energy of fuels into a flow of light and power, we find the post WWII era as the time period when its internationalization get momentum, with peaking import-export figures. This would help fill a misleading problem arising out of the post war domestication pattern, that to say why did the already globalised electricity sector withdrew from international business through decades featuring currency convertibility, multilateral trade agreements, rising transnational flows in capital goods and raw material. Similarly, the worldwide rise in national requirements for electricity during WWII was coupled with an unprecedented increase in primary energy imports to feed peaking industrial and service demand and consumption of electricity. This will also help figure out to what extent in the long run did foreign investments relate not only to internal capital investments but also to hard currency requirements to finance basic fuel imports essential to expand electricity production.

Authored by a pool of specialists in international business history, Global Electrification offers an original, quite comprehensive and readable account of the interweaving between the internationalization of finance and the struggle to keep the

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electricity sector under national control throughout a over a century long history. Notwithstanding some misleading interpretations it is worthwhile for readers and researchers with interests in either international economic history or the economic role of the nation state worldwide.

Vassilis Nitsiakos, On the Border. Transborder Mobility, Ethnic Groups and Boundaries along the Albanian-Greek Frontier (Berlin: Lit Verlag, 2010).

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Vassilis Nitsiakos’ book is part of the Balkan Border Crossings’ series, a larger research project concerning the evolution of the Greek and Albanian minorities after the fall of Communism in the 1990’s and this volume focuses more on the Albanians living next to the border with Greece.

On the Border is about the frontier populations sharing one common element: the border itself. The nature and character of the Albanian-Greek border is the topic of this book, with Nitsiakos focusing on the “secret” doors of the Albanian identities around that area. It is a travel diary, kept while visiting some border areas between Albania and Greece, a diary marvelously combining narratives of people, places and facts with a soft analysis of the sociological and anthropological issues that characterize the area.

What is Nitsiakos actually doing? He documents one-sided transborder migration from Albania to Greece in the light of the changes occurring after the brutal fall of Communism in Albania. His case studies are numerous, since every stop along the border holds a particular case and every town provides new data and issues to reveal and analyze. The reasons behind the choice of these cases are not explained – the author relies on the continuity argument, as the present book is part of a larger research in the area, and thus he uses his previous local
connections as case studies. There are few new case studies, and this is only by accident. For instance, the chapter about the wedding in Petran is a new case study – his local connection takes Nitsiakos to the wedding. Such unplanned events in the narrative are important in creating a certain flavor and make it more accurate.

The author operates with several key words: border, migration, transnational, transmigrant and internal migration. These concepts are scrutinized both from an academic perspective but also from a local perspective. Everything is filtered through the case of the border movements from Albania to Greece. There are three dimensions of the border: juridical, natural and socio-cultural. Each of the above concepts fits one of these dimensions, as Nitsiakos focuses especially on the concept and image of the border zone. The region is further framed in the larger historical and geographical context and towards the end of the analysis; Nitsiakos brings into discussion even the impact that globalization as a process has on the migration phenomenon. Migration is an issue inevitably connected with the realities of the nation state. However, Nitsiakos filters these concepts through the lenses of the globalized world, where the nation state relinquishes its dominant role and people are driven more and more towards new forms of collective and individual identification. In this regard, the construction of ethnic identity depends more on the awareness of difference induced by the border.

The purpose of the book is to investigate transborder mobility/migration in the case of Albania and Greece after the fall of communism, when the borderline between the two countries became a formality. There are no impediments in crossing it, and Albanians do it frequently, when they go to work in Greece and eventually settle there. The investigated boundary – the borderline has not only a geographical dimension but also a symbolic one. The fall of the material border in the 1990s led to the rise of a symbolic one. People are free to come and go, but it is the way they identify themselves in the course of this movement that is problematic. The cultural and spiritual dimensions are considerable landmarks in Nitsiakos’ analysis. When defining a
people it is highly important to see how he views himself and how the others regard it. For instance, Albanian immigrants call themselves Northern Epirotes when they are in Greece, hoping that the identification of the term with Greekness will facilitate their reception and improve their treatment in Greece.

Although the book could be considered a travel diary the target readers for Nitsiakos’ book are people with a solid background in the analysis of migration phenomena and anthropology. *On the Border* is structured in 16 chapters preceded by a Prologue and an Introduction. Each chapter has several sub-chapters, many of them with one-word titles referring either to places or people. Except for the Introduction and the Epilogue in which the theoretical aspects are presented and demonstrated, the chapters of the book rarely mention theories or concepts. These chapters are used as the playground to question and evaluate the concepts of border, migration, transnationalism etc. The author is constantly making references to specific concepts and even if the narration seems at times to be similar to a mere story of local customs it is in fact imbued with data and analysis ensues. Bearing in mind the fact that the book is part of a larger series, the target public should definitely be a specialized one: academics and trained personnel. A non-specialized reader would find it difficult to navigate through the sociological and anthropological concepts from the beginning of the book and to follow their implementation in the chapters.

Methodologically, the author uses the ethnographic narrative in order to deliver the intended message. The border line between Albania and Greece is the center stage actor of the book. The author uses lots of pictures to portray the local realities, making it look like an album. He should have also put along a map so that the reader could follow the itinerary accurately. The work is in fact a research diary with data collected in several years of traveling in the area. These data are intertwined with the personal analysis and questioning, which makes the effort a rather innovative and interesting one.

The main advantage of the book resides in the fact that it
contains a lot of useful information collected from primary sources. However, the raw collected data is constantly processed in order to be able to explain some of the concepts that Nitsiakos chose to analyze in this work. Another point in favor of the academic utility is that fact that every aspect is viewed critically, although Nitsiakos manifests personal attachment to the topic and the area of investigation due to the past research they share. However, all pieces of information are presented unembellished, allowing the reader to draw its own conclusions. This effort is also supported by the pictures attached, mostly black and white, depicting the cruel reality of the border area between the two countries. A main drawback of the book is the rather pedantic style of the Introduction and Epilogue, abounding with a specialized vocabulary, which would be inaccessible to most readers. What is more, Nitsiakos’ intention of rounding-up the book with the help of the technical Epilogue is not very satisfactory as the reader would have expected a more personal view on the topic, a more private conclusion, since throughout the book the author appears to be highly involved in the conducted research.

Taking everything into consideration, the book is well-written as it balances the theoretical aspects with lots of examples. The ideas are fluent and they derive naturally from the case studies. The choice of mixing the diary retrospective and the anthropological approach was an inspired one, as it helps conveying the aim and message of the book in a powerful and noteworthy manner.
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