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WOMEN IN BLACK: MOBILIZATION INTO ANTI-NATIONALIST, ANTI-MILITARIST, FEMINIST ACTIVISM IN SERBIA¹

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Abstract²

This article presents a study of mobilization into a specific type of political contention—anti-nationalist, anti-militarist, feminist activism in Serbia. It is based on qualitative data gathered from semi-structured interviews with individuals active in the anti-nationalist, anti-militarist, feminist organization Women in Black conducted in Serbia between April and May 2008. By analyzing the data gathered through the prism of social movement theory, the article identifies specific patterns of mobilization that are facilitated through various structures and mechanisms. These include the various functions of social networks, collective action frames, and collective identity and solidarity incentives—that guarantee sustained participation in Women in Black and the continued existence of anti-nationalist, anti-militarist, feminist political contention even in circumstances of strong social and political repression.

¹ An earlier version of this article was presented at the panel “Civil Society” at the 5th CEU Graduate Conference in Social Sciences at the Central European University in Budapest, Hungary in June 2009. I am grateful for the comments and criticisms of participants at this panel that have contributed to improving this article.

² I would never have been able to carry out this research project without the participation of all of the Women in Black activists I interviewed during my time in Serbia. Special thanks go to the following people: Stasa Zajovic, Lepa Mladjenovic, Nevzeta Josifovic, Zorica Trifunivoc, Nadja Duhacek, Boban Stojanovic, Jasmina Tesanovic, Katie Mahuron, Jelena Memet, Lina Vuskovic, Ana Imsirovic, Snezana Djordjevic, Marija Perkovic, Magda Anastasijevic, and Adam Puskar for their willingness, their hospitality, and for finding time in their busy schedules to participate in this project. I also thank my research supervisors at the Central European University (CEU), Francisca De Haan (CEU Department of Gender Studies) and Dan Rabinowitz (CEU Department of Sociology and Social Anthropology); my academic writing instructor, Thomas Rooney (CEU Center for Academic Writing); as well as Orli Fridman, Dragan Nikolic, Milica Jeremic, and Viktoriya Zhukova.
1. Introduction

This article presents an analysis of mobilization into the anti-nationalist, anti-militarist, feminist organization Women in Black. It is an organization, founded in Serbia in response to the wars that destroyed former Yugoslavia, that persists to this day and that has, since its inception, undergone much social and political repression. Women in Black’s activism represents a case of what Dough McAdam calls high-risk/cost activism. According to him, in the context of the study of social movements (SMs) and social movement organizations (SMOs), cost “refers to the expenditures of time, money, and energy that are required of a person engaged in any particular form of activism,” while risk “refers to the anticipated dangers—whether legal, social, physical, financial, and so forth—of engaging in a particular type of activity,” where “certain instances of activism are clearly more costly and/or risky than others.”3 Throughout the years, there have been instances of Women in Black activists being threatened, slurred, physically attacked, intimidated, unlawfully detained, tortured, and illegitimately criminalized.4 These social and state practices have had the aim of frightening and exhausting Women in Black activists and of promoting distrust and divisiveness among the members of the organization in order to inhibit the advancement of its mission.5 I thus locate this study within the framework of

5 Ibid. 51; WiB’s mission statement is the following: “We bring visibility to women’s nonviolent resistance to war, nationalism, sexism, militarism, all forms of ethnic homogenization, fundamentalism, xenophobia, homophobia, and all other forms of discrimination; we create space for women’s voices and actions against all forms of patriarchy, war and violence; we build networks of women’s solidarity on the global and regional
the study of contentious politics, defined by McAdam et al as “episodic, public, collective interaction among members of claims and their objects when (a) at least one government is a claimant, an object of claims, or a party to the claims and (b) the claims would, if realized, affect the interests of at least one of the claimants.” The research question that propelled this study was, considering the systematic social and political repression that *Women in Black* have endured ever since the start of their activities, how and why have activists become mobilized into this type of anti-nationalist, anti-militarist, feminist political contention?

In this article, I argue that mobilization into *Women in Black* takes place through specific structures (the “how”) and mechanisms (the “why”) of mobilization. When analyzing the data gathered for the purpose of this project through the lens of social movement theory, I share in the contention of McAdam and Tarrow that participation in activism—and in this type of anti-nationalist, anti-militarist, feminist high-risk/cost contention in particular—does not by any means occur in the context of disorder, social marginalization, and irrational outbursts of collective behavior but is instead facilitated first, by the various functions of social networks. These include the capacity of ties to the SMO to link potential participants to it and to thus structurally

6 Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly, *Dynamics of Contention* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 5.


facilitate recruitment, to underscore the connection between participating in the social movement and identities that potential recruits identify as central to their concepts of self, and to shape decisions through bonds of community, solidarity, and support. In addition to social networks, mobilization into this type of contention takes place through the organization’s construction of a specific collective action frame—that is not only anti-nationalist, antimilitarist, and feminist but that also provides a course of action that is set forward through emotions in the movement. And last but not least, mobilization into this type of contention takes place through the incentive that the collective identity of the organization offers for promoting and sustaining participation in this type of contention.

2. Relevance of the Study

Previous studies of Women in Black have included the qualitative sociological study of Women in Black in the context of the transnational women’s peace movement; the study of Women in Black and the work and politics of social memory; the relationship between Women in Black and the construction of responsible citizenship; the role of Women in Black in the process of redefining women’s political subjectivities in Serbia in the context of the disintegration of Yugoslavia and nation-state building; the anthropological study of the role of women during

10 Tarrow, Power in Movement, 106-122.
the Yugoslav wars of secession; and the study of women’s organized resistance to war and domestic violence during the collapse of Yugoslavia in Serbia. These previous studies provide biographical information on members of the organization, map how the organization emerged, and sketch motives for participation—as part of the background necessary to the development of the specific topics of inquiry they address. However, none of them focus exclusively on analyzing why and how people join Women in Black—namely the process of mobilization into this high risk/cost SMO. Considering that in the face of constant social and political repression ever since its inception, Women in Black has managed to maintain a cohesive organizational structure and has been characterized by the sustained participation of founding members, the recruitment of new members into it, and the expansion of the organization’s sphere of influence beyond Belgrade, an analysis of the structures and mechanisms that prompt mobilization into this type of political contention becomes ever more timely.

In what follows, I first provide a rationale for my research methodology and its application to this research project. I then situate Women in Black in the context of civil society as politics of resistance in Serbia during the 1990s, which is the locus in which the organization emerged. I also provide an account of the history of suppression of Women in Black that is strictly tied to the demands they have been making from the Serbian state ever since the inception of the organization. Subsequently, I analyze my empirical findings through the lens of social movement theory in order to shed light on how an organization that has undergone much social and political repression ever since its inception can not only survive but also flourish and expand its sphere of influence against all odds.

There is one important limitation to this study. I do not attempt to analyze here the impact of Women in Black in generating social and political changes in Serbia. Although relevant to assessing

how social movements matter in promoting social and political change, assessing the impact of this SMO on Serbian society does not constitute the primary research question addressed in this study, nor do the methods utilized for data collection—life-history semi-structured interviews—permit such an analysis. Instead, the focus here is on analyzing the conditions that have contributed to the emergence and sustained existence of Women in Black as an exemplary case of contentious mobilization. Also, it is worth mentioning that while examination of the roles played by Yugoslav successor states other than Serbia during the Yugoslav Wars of Secession from 199-1999 is obviously important, it goes beyond the scope of this article. Here, I refer exclusively to Serbia because it was the context in which Women in Black originated and the regime they were resisting.

3. Research Methodology

At the core of the research question for this study laid the question of motives in SMO research: motives for creating, for sustaining, and for joining a SMO such as Women in Black, whereas by paying attention to activists’ motives for creating, sustaining, and joining Women in Black the structures and mechanisms that prompted mobilization into this organization could be elucidated. Several researchers have emphasized the suitability of semi-structured interviews and life-history interviews in particular in the study of motives for participation in SMOs. Della Porta and Blee and Taylor emphasize the advantages that this research technique offers in finding out about motives for recruitment and participation, identity construction, personal and ideological identification with a SM or SMO, and the emotional dimension of recruitment and participation in a SMO.18 In this context, I deemed it appropriate to make use of semi-structured life-history interviews for the purpose of this research project.

Both Della Porta and Blee and Taylor underline the importance of choosing a purposive rather than random sample of interviewees based on their particular experiences in a SM or SMO. They argue that sampling should rely on the technique of snow-ball sampling and that it should follow first a principle of completeness—where the researcher chooses interviewees who know about the topic being investigated. Second, the researcher should keep adding interviews to the study until a “saturation of knowledge” occurs, that is, when “the interviews are garnering the same kind of narratives and interpretations.” They also argue that the sample should strive for similarity and dissimilarity, that is, “interviewees are chosen to see how the interpretations or accounts of similarly situated respondents compare, as well as to ascertain how those respondents with very different characteristics or in different circumstances differ.”

Following this research methodology, I conducted semi-structured life-history interviews in English and Spanish with different members of Women in Black. I selected my interviewees via snow-ball sampling and continued adding interviews to the sample until I considered that a saturation of the knowledge that the interviews were garnering had occurred. Following the principle of completeness, the sample included interviewees actively involved in the organization at the time of the interviews. Following the principle of similarity and dissimilarity, they included founding members and relatively recent members of the organization (i.e., members who had been involved with Women in Black for six months at the time of the interviews), members of different age groups, women as well as men. Eight of the interviewees accounted for participants in Women in Black in the very beginnings of its existence (the period comprising the start of the Yugoslav Wars of Secession and the fall of the Milosevic

19 Ibid. 68-193; Ibid. 92-117.
20 Ibid. 182.
22 Ibid. 100.
23 With the exception of two interviews, all of my interviews with Women in Black activists were conducted in English. One of the interviews was conducted with the help of a Serbian-English translator while another one was conducted in Spanish.
regime, 1991-2000) while seven accounted for later recruits (the post-Milosevic period).

I conducted the interviews with the help of an interview guide that included open-ended questions that allowed for flexibility to add more questions along the way when appropriate in order to delve deeply into the respondents’ subjective motives for participation in *Women in Black*. The interviews traced respondents’ trajectories as activists and as anti-nationalist, anti-militarist, feminist activists in particular. Questions inquired into how and when they became interested in socio-political activism, how and when they became interested in and involved with *Women in Black* in particular, how they feel about the socio-political repression that *Women in Black* have endured and whether this type of opposition to the organization has had an impact on their decisions to participate, as well as to the meaning of activism in their lives. I conducted a total of 15 interviews in Belgrade and Krusevac between April and May 2008. I gained initial access to *Women in Black* via e-mail correspondence with the organization prior to my arrival in Serbia and, most importantly, through personal contact with Zorica Trifunovic (a member of the organization I was acquainted with from a previous research project I had conducted in Serbia in 2006) and through Milica Jeremic (an acquaintance who had worked as a translator for a publication by *Women in Black* in the past).

4. Setting the Context: Civil Society as Politics of Resistance in Serbia during the 1990s and Three Phases of Repression

4.1 Civil Society as Politics of Resistance in Serbia during the 1990s

According to Einhorn and Sever, during communism in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), the notion of civil society went hand in hand with the notion of political dissidence as politics of resistance to the pervasiveness of an all-intrusive authoritarian state-apparatus. During state-socialism in CEE, political or civic initiatives that could pose themselves as alternatives and potentially challenging to the state were usually suppressed. In
this context, the citizen was defined in her right to work, to welfare, and housing at the expense of her right to political subjectivity and individual autonomy.\(^{24}\) At the same time, Watson argues that since during communism the realm of public politics was pervaded by the power of the communist state, civil society became private. Under state-socialism, all citizens were equally disempowered before the state as their rights to political citizenship were equally limited. All citizens were equally excluded from the polity.\(^{25}\)

Einhorn and Sever argue that in countries of CEE, such as Poland and Czechoslovakia, following the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the advent of multi-party elections, predominantly male intellectuals who had been part of the dissident movements of resistance against communism became part of the governing elites and the process of democratization and political pluralism was advanced as such.\(^{26}\) In Serbia, however, the passage from communism to post-communism did not involve a passage from state-socialism to democracy but rather the passage from state-socialism to state-nationalism.\(^{27}\) Although nominally post-1989 Serbia showed the apparent features of a liberal democratic regime (multi-party plurality), in actuality it remained a system of one-party, authoritarian rule.\(^{28}\)

Socialist Yugoslavia had been more open to the development of independent civic initiatives in comparison to the other socialist regimes in CEE and less prone to official censorship.\(^{29}\) However,

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\(^{26}\) Einhorn and Sever, “Gender and Civil Society in Central and Eastern Europe,” 163-190.


the political and institutional structure of socialist Yugoslavia was also a structure of authoritarian, one-party rule. According to Stojanovic, “during the 1970s and 1980s, with the exception of narrow liberal and civilly-oriented circles, resistance to the ruling regime had been largely based on national arguments and ideas about the conceived exploitation and engenderment of existing nations by the regime, but even more, and more importantly, by other Yugoslav peoples.” As a strategy for arising to power, Slobodan Milosevic from the League of Communists of Serbia (SKS) appropriated the rhetoric of nationalism and the alleged defense of Serbianism that had been the ideological basis of much of the Serbian opposition prior to 1987.

Following Milosevic’s rise to power in 1987, the institutional and political structures that had characterized the communist regime prior to 1987 were maintained. At the same time, the collusion of the ideological interests of much of the pre-1987 Serbian opposition with the newly emerged Serbian leadership devoid the opposition of its ideological bases. This political move enabled the regeneration and consolidation of the power of the SKS, named the Serbian Socialist Party (SPS) in the advent of multi-party elections, camouflaged in its alleged defense of the Serbian people and their right to live together in one state. The passage from communism to post-communism in Serbia should hence be understood as the passage from state-socialism to state-nationalism, where the institutional structures that formed the bases of the former communist regime remained almost untouched but where the ideology that the regime used to maintain its power was, on the outlook, fundamentally changed from socialism to nationalism.

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31 Ibid. 451.
32 Ibid. 449-478.
33 Ibid. 449-478.
Throughout the 1990s, the regime of Slobodan Milosevic managed to maintain a total monopoly of power. It systematically prevented the development of a normal parliamentary system by resisting all alternatives to its overbearing rule. The regime systematically depoliticized the population, manipulated election results, maintained control over the most important media sources, discredited political opponents and limited their public visibility, and co-opted part of the right-wing nationalist political opposition to its own cadre of allies. Most importantly, the regime played the main role in instigating the wars that destroyed Yugoslavia, where “the war constituted a vital part of the destruction of alternatives.” Not only did the wars signify an incredible humanitarian catastrophe but also provided the regime with “the ability to categorically disqualify political opponents as treasonous, unpatriotic, and fomenting division when unity is needed” and as “a pretext for severing communication between anti-war and anti-regime forces in different republics.”

In a context where the ethno-fascist nationalist state pervaded public politics, civil society in Serbia during the 1990s became private. Papic describes the socio-political context of Serbia during the 1990s as one of fundamental civic disempowerment and state/nationalist/patriarchal authoritarianism. “From the beginning Milosevic worked consistently to disempower all political institutions, and therefore all men except himself to preclude any possibility of competition between equals.” What Papic calls the structural emasculation of men’s power at the public level went hand in hand with what she calls the “retraditionalization, instrumentalization, and naturalization of

36 Ibid. 24.
37 Ibid. 24.
39 Ibid. 130.
women’s identities, social roles, and their symbolic representations.”

With the realm of formal politics and decision-making bodies completely monopolized by one party and one man, civil society in Serbia during the 1990s emerged as the locus of resistance to state-nationalist authoritarianism. Blagojevic characterizes the 1990s in Serbia as a “history of protests,” in which she highlights the role of the 1991/1992 and 1996/1997 students’ and citizens’ protests in the development of a culture of civil resistance and in furthering a democratic political culture. In addition to the protests, other initiatives provided also exemplary cases of resistance to the overbearing power of the Milosevic regime. These initiatives included pan-Yugoslav political movements that sought a peaceful settlement of disputes and a stabilization of the Yugoslav state, autonomous women’s organizations that worked toward refraining the curtailment of women’s rights and freedoms in the context of the rise of nationalism in Serbia, anti-war organizations such as Women in Black that worked toward the demilitarization of all aspects of life in Yugoslavia as well as on aiding deserters and conscientious objectors, organizations that promoted the development of civil society, and independent intellectual organizations. The development of civil society anti-nationalist and anti-war initiatives was an almost exclusively urban phenomenon and was frequently attacked and discredited by the regime since it posed an alternative to the politics of the nationalist state.

Within the context of the development of civil society anti-nationalist and anti-war initiatives, Women in Black initiated a specific feminist response to nationalism, militarism, and war. Women in Black have been an organization with a clear feminist

40 Ibid. 128.
43 Ibid. 479-508.
orientation since the start because the founders of Women in Black had long been involved with the feminist movement in Yugoslavia in a variety of different ways prior to the inception of Women Black as such. Founders of the organization had been involved in the production of feminist academic scholarship, in the organization of feminist conferences and groups, and in the foundation of women’s centers and the first SOS Hotline for women and children victims of domestic violence.44

Women in Black originated on October 9th, 1991, after the outbreak of war in Croatia, when a group of feminists from Belgrade held a vigil in front of the Student Cultural Center in Belgrade’s city center and peacefully protested against the war. They wore black as a sign of mourning for all the victims of the war, held signs, and had been inspired by a group of Israeli women who, in 1988, held weekly vigils to peacefully protest the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian Territories.45 The Women in Black were one of the first groups in Serbia to publicly protest the war in Croatia and to denounce the regime of Slobodan Milosevic for the atrocities it was committing. As other conflicts developed in the Balkan region, Women in Black continued protesting publicly against the wars on a strict regular basis.46 What started in 1991 as a group of ten women who were protesting against the wars that were destroying multi-cultural and multi-ethnic Yugoslavia has become one of the most important organizations in the international women’s peace movement, initiating the International Network of Women in Black and the Women’s Peace Network – Network of Women in Black Serbia.47

The founders of Women in Black first took part in the mainstream peace movement in Serbia, where they worked together with other pacifist women and men. The women who came to found Women in Black noticed that, within the peace movement, issues of gender were not being addressed in any way and that “the

44 Duhacek, “Gender Perspectives on Political Identities in Yugoslavia,” 113-126.
46 Cockburn, From Where We Stand, 79-105; Duhacek, “Gender Perspectives on Political Identities in Yugoslavia,” 113-126.
47 Ibid. 88.
The peace movement was...repeating certain patriarchal models, using patriarchal language and ignoring the inequalities between women and men."48 Thus they saw the need to organize pacifist resistance to war outside the realm of the mainstream peace movement and to form a “specifically feminist initiative against the terrifying upsurge of patriarchal militarism now dominating politics, pervading the media and swaggering the streets.”49

For Women in Black activists, the peace movement was to a certain extent replicating a patriarchal model because the work of women in peace groups was taken for granted and deemed invisible. The women who came to found Women in Black wanted their presence in the peace movement “to be VISIBLE, not to be seen as something natural, as part of our woman’s role,” they “wanted it to be clearly understood that what we were doing was our political choice.”50 In search for visibility and as a way to assert their political subjectivity, Women in Black took to the streets in the form of non-violent resistance. They held vigils on a regular basis during the war years and on especial dates once the war period was over.51 Today they are one of the most important projects in Serbia to confront Serbia’s criminal past. Paradoxically, because in this way they fight the general social tendency to forget about the past in order to move on, Women in Black have been accused by many in Serbia of disrupting the process of restoring normalcy and peace.52

Women in Black activists have asserted their political subjectivity not only by their public condemnation of the wars that destroyed Yugoslavia, but above all by taking responsibility for the wars that were committed in their name and by demanding accountability for the wars from the Serbian state. Since the inception of the organization, they have positioned themselves explicitly against

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48 Zajovic 1994 in Ibid. 84.
49 Ibid. 85.
50 Women in Black in Mladjenovic and Hughes, “Feminist Resistance to War and Violence in Serbia,” 262, capital letters in the original.
52 Ibid. 291-303.
the Serbian nation-state. They have rejected identification with the state because for them “identification with the states, with the male militaristic states means to assume the role of an accomplice in war and war propaganda.” Women in Black activists are “building a model of citizenship that is based on responsibility for the political unit they belong to.” Building this new model of citizenship based on responsibility has not, however, come without immense costs—and it is to an account of this phenomenon that I now turn.

4.2 Three Phases of Repression

According to Zajovic, the state and social repression that Women in Back have endured throughout the years are interwoven and can be divided into three distinct phases identified in chronological order: the period comprising the Yugoslav Wars of Secession and the fall of the Milosevic regime (1991-2000), the period between the fall of the Milosevic regime and the murder of democratically-elected prime minister Zoran Djindjic (2000-2003), and the period following Djindjic’s assassination and the election of nationalist leader Vojislav Kostunica as prime minister up to the present (2003-).

During the first period of repression the state promoted a denial of its belligerent reality by claiming that Serbia was not at war and consequently claimed an alleged lack of responsibility for the wars while blaming others—such as anti-war activists like the Women in Black. In this context of “state-organized crime and denial of criminal reality” between 1991 and 2000, Women in Black were in 1995 unlawfully banned to conduct humanitarian work in a refugee camp. From 1993 onwards, they also faced illegitimate legal proceedings against their public declarations following their street actions in several opportunities. In addition, throughout this first period, over twelve Women in Black activists

54 Zajovic in Ibid. 120.
57 Ibid. 49.
were subject to police interrogation “as a form of threatening, frightening, blackmail [sic], and breaking solidarity and group cohesion.”

Between 1992 and 2000, the regime purposefully frustrated meetings of the International Network of Women in Black through a variety of means as a way to sever Women in Black’s connections with international solidarity networks. In 1998 following the outbreak of violence in Kosovo, the government banned an anti-war rally organized by Women in Black and other anti-war groups. Women in Black and other peace groups condemned this government ban through a public statement, which was followed by the aggressive rhetoric of extreme-nationalist right-wing member of the Serbian parliament Vojislav Seselj, who labeled the Women in Black and other human rights organizations as “Serbia’s inner enemies” that should be caught.

Between June and September 2000, several Women in Black activists were subject to daily interrogations by the Serbian State Security (SSS), one of them was subject to illegitimate detention and torture from this same state entity, while two Women in Black activists were prosecuted through an arrest warrant. Also during this period, Women in Black were criminalized through financial control and the passport of one Women in Black activist, as well as some of the organization’s materials and documentation, were confiscated by the SSS. In addition, Women in Black activists were subject to apartment searches, secret monitoring of phone-calls, and installation of bugs in some of their apartments, while international Women in Black volunteers were expelled from Serbia. At the social level, during the 1991-2000 period, Women in Black were not only subject to physical and verbal attacks during their anti-war street actions but also socially stigmatized and criminalized.

During the period of the Djindjic government (2000-2003), Women in Black experienced a “disburdening of fear” and the promotion of their activities outside of Belgrade; at the same

58 Ibid. 50.
61 Ibid. 52.
time, the legal financial proceedings that had been initiated against them by the Milosevic regime were not dropped until February 2003. Despite the change in government, “the ouster of Milosevic in October 2000 did not bring an end to his legacy—a legacy entrenched in the institutions of the country and in the persons at the highest levels of those institutions.” Following the assassination of Djindjic and the rise to power of Vojislav Kostunica, Women in Black experienced a renewal in the repressive measures taken against them both at the social but most important, state, level.

As stated by Zajovic, “parallel to the rehabilitation of representatives of the previous (Milosevic’s) regime, methods from that period were rehabilitated as well.” Since 2003, Women in Black have been unjustifiably banned from conducting a variety of street actions on significant dates—including International Human Rights Day on December 10th 2004 and International Women’s Day on March 8th 2005. Also, they have been subject to state intimidation through visits of police officers to the main office of Women in Black and they have been accused of legal offenses. Most importantly, they have been unjustifiably subject to investigations on financial irregularities and have been accused of the crime of organization of women for prostitution. Consequently, they have undergone police interrogations and hearings in the Department of Organized Crime and Prostitution at the Ministry of Internal Affairs and at the Economic Crimes Department and they have also had unannounced visits from police officers to the main office of Women in Black in regards to this alleged offenses.

These incidents were particularly prominent between the months of April and October 2005. Apparently, they were part of a campaign of systematic harassment and intimidation conducted by state and non-state parties against human rights organizations.

62 Fridman, “Alternative Voices in Public Space,” 293.
in Serbia like *Women in Black* who were involved in a campaign called “Facing the Past.” This campaign commemorated the 10th anniversary of the genocide of 8000 Bosnian Muslim boys and men in the town of Srebrenica, Bosnia-Herzegovina in July 1995 at the end of the Bosnian war, and demanded for responsibility and accountability from the Serbian state for the wars and war crimes committed in the territory of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.65

At the social level, since 2003, *Women in Black* have been subject to media harassment and physical attacks and threats by non-state actors—including, but not limited to, individuals affiliated with extreme nationalist and clerical-fascist organizations including Obraz66 and the Fatherland Movement of Serbia.67 In 2004, *Women in Black* were attacked during a street action opposing the rise of violence in Kosovo and the attack of mosques and non-Serbs in Serbia and during the public commemoration of nine years since the genocide in Srebrenica. In 2005, *Women in Black* activists were attacked during a street action in Novi Sad that demanded that those prosecuted for war crimes be sent to the Hague tribunal, during a commemoration of 10 years since the genocide in Srebrenica, and during a public celebration of the International Day Against Fascism and Anti-Semitism on November 9th. They also received numerous threatening phone-calls in their office during the days prior to the 10th anniversary of the genocide in Srebrenica. In several occasions, the police blatantly condoned this violence by ignoring the charges that *Women in Black* pressed against the attackers.68

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66 Obraz means “honor” in Serbian.
In 2005, Amnesty International launched an international campaign requesting the Serbian state to increase the protection of human rights defenders in Serbia. This campaign resulted in an increase of police custody in all of the street actions organized by Women in Black. At the same time Women in Black “think that some forms of this protection led to an increased degree of ghettoization of Women in Black and separated us from public participation.”\(^{69}\) The international recognition of the problems faced by human rights defenders in Serbia like Women in Black did not by any means put an end to the social and state repression they have been subject to. In January 2007 two Women in Black activists were attacked by skinheads upon return from an election night party organized by a coalition of parties and associations of the opposition and Women in Black were unjustifiably banned from carrying out a peace march and performance in celebration of International Women’s Day on March 8th 2008.\(^{70}\) According to Zajovic, these events serve as evidence to show the continued and planned repression of the Serbian government over human rights defenders like Women in Black that aim to “discredit, frighten, and exhaust Women in Black” as well as to inhibit individuals to join the organization.\(^{71}\) More recently, on July 10th 2009 during a silent vigil in Belgrade’s Republic Square to commemorate 14 years since the genocide in Srebrenica, Women in Black activists were verbally attacked by a group of people belonging to clerical-fascist organizations who were holding a protest at the same time of the silent vigil. The police had to intervene in order to stop the clerical-fascist individuals from physically attacking the Women in Black activists. At the same time, the attackers were allowed by the

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\(^{70}\) Danas, “Hooligans Attack Women in Black Activists,” Danas, January 2007 [article on-line]; available at: www.zeneucrnom.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&lang=en&id=285, last accessed September 16, 2009; Women in Black, personal correspondence. The Belgrade police refused to grant Women in Black a permit to carry out a street performance and a peace march on March 8th on the alleged basis that the street performance and the march would constitute a threat to public safety and public property. Belgrade was the only capital city in Europe where street actions in commemoration of International Women’s Day 2008 were banned. Women in Black were finally granted permission and police protection to carry out the activities they had planned for International Women’s Day on March 16th 2008.

\(^{71}\) Zajovic, “Dis/continuity of Repression towards Women in Black,” 55.

Despite these social and state practices of intimidation, Women in Black continue to exist and to recruit new members into the organization. It is to a discussion of the structures and mechanisms that enable such sustained existence and the recruitment of new members into it that I now turn.

5. Analyzing the Findings: The Role of Social Networks, Collective Action Frames, and Collective Identity in Mobilization into Women in Black

5.1 Social Networks and their Relevance to Participation into Women in Black

According to McAdam, it is nowadays a well-known “fact” in the study of social movements that the structural proximity of social actors to a SMO would facilitate their involvement in it.\footnote{McAdam, “Beyond Structural Analysis,” 284-289.} Having a tie to somebody already involved in a SMO is crucial in determining actors’ decisions to participate. In this context, ideological identification with a social movement would not be enough of an incentive to take action; outsiders to a social movement organization may share in its grievances and mission but it is not until a structural opportunity through a tie—such as a friend, an acquaintance, or a family member—emerges that actors would actually consider the opportunity to join. Ties to a SMO act as mediators between the SMO and potential recruits. McAdam claims that this thesis has been proven through a wide variety of empirical examples in an array of different contexts.\footnote{Ibid. 283.} The data found through this study contributes to confirming this thesis.
A common pattern of mobilization among the activists interviewed for this study was their structural location in activist networks or having ties that linked them to such networks. The function that social networks play in structurally connecting people to join this SMO becomes clear from activists’ account of how they came to create Women in Black but even more so of how they came to join Women in Black after its foundation. The founders all knew each other, as they were linked structurally through specific networks prior to the inception of the organization: from joint activism in organizations such as the Center for Anti-War Action from the peace movement in Serbia, from joint work in the SOS Hotline for women and children victims of domestic violence, as well as through common ties of friendship. In the case of later recruits into the organization, friends, family members, acquaintances, and colleagues served as the nexuses for movement participation.

However, according to McAdam the structural ties that social networks provide do not suffice to account for participation. They give an account of the micro-mechanisms of participation but do not shed light on the actual meso-level processes that actually mobilize actors into action. The structural paradigm does not consider that social actors do not posses only ties that link them to social movements and that may motivate them to participate but also other non-activist ties that may discourage participation, as well as that people located near social movements do not decide to participate by “contagion” but are rendered with individual autonomy and agency to decide ultimately whether to join or not. In this context, the significance of the tie is crucial in motivating actors to participate, as “a viable model of individual action must take account of the fundamentally social/relational nature of human existence” and where “most individuals act routinely to safeguard and sustain the central sources of meaning and identity in their lives. As a practical matter, this means frequently prizing solidarity incentives over all others and, in particular, conforming to the behavioral dictates of

75 Ibid. 286.
those whose approval and sustenance are most central to our lives and salient identities.”

Prior ties to a SMO work as primary catalysts for movement participation when they “(a) reinforce the potential recruit’s strong identification with a particular identity and (b) help to establish a strong linkage between that identity and the movement in question.” Steps (a) and (b) are what McAdam qualifies as the “identity-movement linkage.” When the linkage is supported by those who are significant in a person’s life and the person in question encounters no opposition—or rather, more support than opposition from other significant others—activism becomes almost inevitable. The link between identity and movement becomes evident when examining the accounts of those who joined Women in Black from the very beginning. A common pattern in the accounts of those who joined the organization from the beginning is that they all had prior activist experiences of one form or another prior to joining the organization and that they identified strongly with the values of feminism and anti-militarism. In this context, activism, feminism, and anti-militarism stood as salient identities propelling decisions to participate, enhanced through common ties of trust and solidarity. No accounts of opposition to participate by people significant in activists’ life appear in any of their accounts. Instead, people insignificant in their personal lives presented the primary source of opposition, as explained in the previous section—the government and clerical-fascist groups. When full support comes from the inside of a movement, when a community of activists stands strong, the impact of repression from the outside is minimized and the chances of sustained participation increase.

According to McAdam, the process of 1) structural connection, 2) identity/movement linkage, and 3) the attempts of significant others to facilitate movement participation can occur

76 Ibid. 287.
77 Ibid. 287.
78 Ibid. 288.
79 Ibid. 288.
independently but they definitely guarantee activism when they take place together in the order outlined. The fact that these processes do in fact occur independently can be elucidated when considering the participation of later recruits into the organization, some of whom were linked not through strong ties such as friends or family members, but acquaintances and colleagues. In this context, the fundamental catalyst for decisions to participate in a movement is not primarily the influence of the tie but the collective action frame shaped by the organization, a discussion to which I now turn.

5.2 The Collective Action Frame of Women in Black

Framing, according to Tarrow “not only relates to the generalization of a grievance, but defines the ‘us’ and ‘them’ in a movement’s conflict structure.” Frames set limits to who can have access to the movement and who cannot by defining allies and opponents; they not only identify a grievance but historicize it by contextualizing it into specific social and political milieus that can—and, according to social movements, should—be subject to change through collective contentious action. “Inscribing grievances into overall frames that identify an injustice, attribute the responsibility for it to others, and propose solutions to it, is a central activity of social movements.” Frames not only specify ideological orientations but also set forth a modus operandi for movement action and are fueled and sustained by emotions and by the use of specific symbols that are “taken selectively by movement leaders from a cultural reservoir and combined with action-oriented beliefs in order to navigate strategically among a parallelogram of actors, ranging from states and social opponents to militants and target populations.” Frames and the ideological, emotional, and cultural baggage tied to them define socio-political

80 Ibid. 288.
81 Tarrow, Power in Movement, 21.
82 Ibid. 21-22.
83 Ibid. 111.
84 Ibid. 111-112.
85 Ibid. 111-112.
situations not as given, but as subject to change and mobilize people out of passivity into socio-political activism.86

In the case of Women in Black, the collective action frame defined since the inception of the organization by its founders has been substantiated by a specific ideological orientation—anti-militarism, anti-nationalism, and feminism. This ideological orientation defines war as inextricably linked to the joint work of militarism, nationalism, and patriarchy, and not as something inevitable that has always happened in human history, but as an injustice that should be fought against by concerned people and for which specific parties in society should be held accountable—in this context, the Serbian state. The ideology of Women in Black specifies allies—anti-militarists, feminists, and anti-nationalists—and opponents—war-mongers, sexists, and fascists. And underlying ideology, anger and indignation at the injustice of war and the feeling of solidarity with war victim survivors propel the collective frame into an action frame.

In addition to the role of social networks, the collective action frame described above served as a crucial mechanism to propel the activists interviewed to mobilization into Women in Black not only during the initial phases of its existence—the Milosevic period—but even more so during the post-Milosevic period. The activists interviewed who joined the organization way after its inception did stand structurally close to the organization, but in their cases it was not primarily the salience of the tie to the organization but the collective action frame defined by Women in Black that propelled their decisions to participate. As an activist put it in one of the interviews, “the reason I got involved with Women in Black is because it was the only thing that made any sense, it was the only place where somebody would sort of make a structured effort to explain how war is not inevitable, how it is something that we can and should avoid and stop and how it starts and what are the warning signs.” A collective action frame does not only provide a mechanism to promote movement participation, but also acts as a collective identity incentive to

86 Ibid. 111.
sustain movement participation. It is to a discussion of the role of collective identity as an incentive that I now turn.

5.3 Collective Identity as an Incentive for Sustained Participation into Women in Black

According to Friedman and McAdam, “the collective identity of a social movement organization (SMO) is a shorthand designation announcing a status—a set of attitudes, commitments, and rules of behavior—that those who assume the identity can be expected to subscribe to.”87 “It is also an individual announcement of affiliation, of connection with others. To partake of a collective identity is to reconstitute the individual self around a new and valued identity.”88 In this context, participation in Women in Black does not include only subscribing to a set of attitudes, commitments and rules of behavior, but also developing a sense of belonging to a particular group of people and acquiring a new definition of the self. In this context, collective identity acts as a powerful motivation for movement participation.89

Friedman and McAdam identify three stages in the life of social movements in which collective identity as an incentive plays a fundamental role.90 First, social movements emerge out of associations or groups that build upon pre-existing identities, which provides them with a framework to become established social movements organizations and develop. This can be seen very clearly in the case of Women in Black: they began their activism within the framework of the mainstream peace movement and were located primarily in the Center for Anti-War Action, from the basis of a clear anti-militarist and anti-nationalist identity that they co-joined with their feminist identity. They were first 10 women or so protesting and later they became a formal social movement organization (SMO). The passage from group to SMO constitutes the second stage in the life of a social movement. The third refers to the decline of the movement. In

87 Friedman and McAdam, “Collective Identity and Activism,” 157.
88 Ibid. 157.
89 Ibid. 162-166.
90 Ibid. 162-166.
the second stage, when a group becomes a SMO it will expand its reach from the original founders and will aim at recruiting new members into it. According to Friedman and McAdam, in this context, incentives for participation become fundamental. Friedman and McAdam point at the relevance of solidarity as an incentive in movement participation, which is linked to the collective identity by which a SMO comes to define itself—in the case of Women in Black, anti-nationalist, anti-militarist, and feminist. A specific collective identity such as this becomes a high incentive to participate when it becomes a resource in itself. At the same time that a SMO grants participants with the identity, it excludes non-participants from acquiring it and minimizes the chances of free-riding.91 Collective identity becomes an incentive to participate when it makes its collective action frame a resource the movement can make use of to propel participation, since “one of the most powerful motivators of individual action is the desire to confirm through behavior a cherished identity.”92

A common pattern found in all of the activists interviewed for this study was how participation in Women in Black confirmed the identity of anti-nationalist, anti-militarist, feminist activists through involvement in the organization. Participation in this kind of political contention was central to activists’ concept of self; it became a crucial part of who they defined themselves to be. In this context, refraining from engaging in this type of contention would signify a negation of the self as such—and the costs of non-participation would thus be much higher than the actual benefits of it. Solidarity, as mentioned earlier, goes hand in hand with collective identity and also acts as an incentive for movement participation. A common pattern found in all of the narratives of the activists interviewed for this study point at the sense of community found in Women in Black and at the framework of support, recognition, and belonging that participation in this type of contention provided. Their narratives pointed at the fundamentally life-affirming character of participation in this type of contention. Participation in Women in Black provided the interviewees a venue to transform feelings of

91 Ibid. 162-166.
92 Ibid. 169.
anger, indignation, and helplessness by rendering them with a sense of agency. It provided a venue for the activists interviewed to affirm their senses of self by enabling them to act according to their values; it was an identity that became strengthened by the bonds of community, solidarity, support, recognition, and belonging created in the process of participation.

6. Concluding Remarks

The main research question motivating the realization of this study referred as to how and why activists become mobilized into this type of anti-nationalist, anti-militarist, feminist political contention—considering that ever since the beginning of *Women in Black* they have undergone systematic social and political repression. If during the Milosevic regime it was dangerous to become mobilized into this type of contention, what were the structures and mechanisms that facilitated participation, despite the risks involved? For self-evident reasons, the period following the demise of the Milosevic regime is significantly different from it; however, *Women in Black* still undergo state and social repression. Then how and why do they become mobilized into the organization? When considering the patterns of mobilization into *Women in Black* identified in this study, the answer becomes multi-fold.

Activism in *Women in Black* does not emerge simply out of strong political and moral convictions and out of anger and indignation at the injustice of war. Beliefs and emotions, although an extremely important component to account for participation, are only one determinant to it. More specific, complex structures and mechanisms make activism happen. As identified in this study, these include the structural and what McAdam calls the identity/social movement linkage function of social networks as well as their capacity to determine decisions when ties to the movement underscore bonds of community, solidarity, and support. But social networks and their various functions are not enough to account for participation; as explained in this study, the development of a specific collective action frame that defines who the SMO is vis-à-vis other parties in the conflict structure in question, that underlines specific ideological orientations and a
course of action, and that is set in motion through the power of emotions is also an important factor determining participation. At the same time, as explained in this study, the collective action frame of the SMO has the capacity to act as a collective identity and solidarity incentive that promotes and sustains participation in this type of contention despite the risks involved.

As far as subsequent research on Women in Black goes, future studies should take notice of the fact that Women in Black is not only a single organization located in Serbia but a network of Women in Black organizations that are located in many distant parts of the world. In this context, a network analysis of the International Network of Women in Black could shed light to the mechanisms that have promoted the development of the network and that contribute to its continual spread throughout the world—in order to elucidate how SMOs limited to specific national contexts transcend the border of the nation-state and define their claims not only in local but also in global terms. In addition, a comparative study of the role of social networks, collective action frames, and solidarity and identity incentives in other organizations belonging to the International Network could shed light on the similarities and differences found in prompting mobilization into Women in Black organizations and underline how different structures and mechanisms facilitate the entry of new recruits depending on the socio-political contexts they find themselves in. It would be worth inquiring whether Women in Black organizations situated in contexts where they encounter no social or political opposition to their existence like they do in Serbia mobilize potential recruits similar to their counterparts in Serbia and whether that could substantiate empirically a comprehensive, holistic theory of activist mobilization.

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THE ROLE OF MEDIA IN EUROPEAN IDENTITY FORMATION: UNDERSTANDING THE COMPLEXITY OF TODAY’S EUROPEAN MEDIA LANDSCAPE

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Abstract

This analysis is undertaken in the context of enduring questions in possibility of common European identity. This debate has become urgent over the past decade or so. The question I would like to address here is what is the role of the media in European identity formation? The paper attempts to answer this question through secondary analysis of the data from different research. The challenge is to understand how identity formation takes place in today’s European media environment. But, an analytical conception of European identity should be understood as a process rather than a final categorization. Although media in Europe are essentially national, different studies prove that they cover European issues. The media have a key role in advancing our knowledge of Europe. For the formation of collective European identity, a strong European media landscape is a prerequisite.

1. Theoretical framework

The word ‘identity’ has a history. In the past, it was seen as something that was given to us. Nowadays, scholars suggest that we need to look particularly at identity formation. Modern interpretation of identity brings into question the traditional views about what really is identity formation. In this respect identity is a social construct which is formed along a continuum of “different degrees of choice and ascription”. ¹ Participation in identity formation has two contradictory principles. On the one hand, according to different theoretical domains which are proven by constructionists, identity is a discursive formation, and the

discourse is produced by those who have power. On the other hand, we have the freedom to choose the identity that corresponds to us. It is assumed that the importance of identity formation is associated with increasing unsecured and unstable, dynamic, 'flexible' or 'mobile' living conditions. According to Bauman, identity is “name given to escape for which the trace lies in the uncertainty.” Following from this, identity formation is constructed by means of some processes. Thus, the challenge is to understand how identity formation takes place in the contemporary world. In order to investigate the possibility of European collective identity, I will briefly characterize three aspects of the identity formation.

In the literature, it has often been observed these aspects of identity formation: personal (individual), collective and social. Human beings are the only ones that anguish over the question ‘who am I’. In this manner, we see that understanding personal identity formation means understanding personal traits (personal choices, behaviors) and environmental circumstances (socioeconomic status, geographical limitations, family dynamics) and their impact on the individual’s self-definition. Personal identity formations are the “meanings attributed to oneself by the actor; they are self-designations and self-attributions regarded as personally distinctive.” On the other hand, collective identity formation refers to a set of individuals’ sense of belonging to the collective. It is a cumulative product of individual’s consciousness that belongs to a particular social group and emotional value and significance that derives from that membership. Moreover, collective identity formation is the concept that through participating in social activities, individuals can gain a sense of belonging that transcends the individual. However, it is possible that belonging to a particular collective will be so strong that it will trump other aspects of the individual’s personal identity. It is also apparent that social identities “attributed or imputed to others in an attempt to situate them in social space. They are

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grounded typically in established social roles, such as teacher and mother”.4

The purpose of this article is to explore the question of European collective identity. Thus, it is first necessary to know how important the presence of “otherness” is to the formation of “we-ness”. According to Berger and Luckman, we really can not create the world without the existence of the other and without interaction with him.5 Other is an important element in the sustenance of collective identity. With regard to this concept, the definition of the other is the prerequisite for defining we-ness. “Collective identities can be defined as constituted by a shared and interactive sense of ‘we-ness’ (anchored in real or ‘imagined’ or ‘simulated’ attributes and experiences) associated with a collective agency. Collective identities are fluid and adaptive in order to achieve political recognition, legitimacy or other specific aims. In terms of content, collective identities can be constructed around specific traits which are seen to distinguish one group from another: language, ideology, class, ethnicity or religion.”6 It is usually envisaged that language and ethnicity are regarded to national identity formation.

In the literature dealing with identity formation, language is very often held to be one of the most important indicators of belonging to a nation. Nation state is characterized by having a common language through which people can communicate with each other. As a consequence of the historical development of nations, concepts about language are not free from ideological connotations. Ethnicity definition tends to be based on a combination of categories including race, skin color, religion and regional origins. But there is no consensus on what constitutes an ethnic group and thus ethnicity also is not free from ideological connotations. Membership of any ethnic group is subjective. However, it has been argued that the ethnic group is a “stage in the development of all nations.”7

Historically speaking, national identities in Europe are usually traced to the period in the late 18th and early 19th centuries when political actors created ‘imagined communities’ among people who do not know much of the national territory. But, the map of Europe has been redrawn numerous times since this period. In recent years, the proliferation of transnational agencies, new political organizations and media actors challenge the traditional model of nation state. Gellner once said that for a given nation to exist, it must be one in which its people “can speak and produce the same culture.”\textsuperscript{8} However, globalization has transformed the classical model of nation and culture. “National identities are, like everything historical, constructed and reconstructed.”\textsuperscript{9} So, in the era of supra-state organizations and multicultural societies, we arrive at the knowledge point which indicates that in fact our identities are transient, multiple and depend on the circumstances and the angle of view.

Starting with the last point, my presumption is that the European identity formation is possible. Moreover, I think of collective European identity in practical terms. What are the connections between mass media and European identity formation? Is it stronger Europe Americanization than Europe Europeanization? Why is the European public sphere so important? These are a few of the questions we will try to answer in this paper. Thus, I argue that we need to take a practical turn in our understanding of European identity formation.

\section*{2. The Possibility of Collective European Identity Formation}

European integration and European identity formation are fields of study that have attracted an increasing number of scholars over the last decades.\textsuperscript{10} The guiding questions for approaching this part of

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{10} In order to understand the concept of European identity formation I propose to read these books: Gerard Delanty, Inventing Europe: idea, identity, reality, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995). Jeffrey T. Checkel, Peter J. Katzenstein, European Identity, (Cambridge University Press, 2009).
\end{flushleft}
my paper are: How much of European identity formation is visible? Is there a confrontation between the European East and European West? It is difficult to answer these questions because we are witnessing a process that still takes place. I do not intend to offer conclusive answers to all of these questions. One thing is clear: identity formation is essentially very fluid. However, in seeking to answer these questions, there may be theoretical lessons to be learned from different research.

The idea of European identity formation is a complex one. As a result of this complexity we will try to point out a few problems. The first relates to the economic and political aspect of European integration which was much more forced for decades than cultural. It is crystal clear when we look at the beginning of formation of the European Union: European Coal and Steel Community was founded in 1951 and transformed into the European Economic Community and then into the European Community and in 1993 it became European Union. Nobody denies the importance of the free market and political participation which are crucial for the stability of European Union. However, it seems the cultural and media aspect are the most important for the formation of European identity.

The identity of Europe has been changing especially since the Second World War. The European Union now has 27 members. Reconfiguration of Europe can be immediately noticed in the former Yugoslavia which is now divided into three different zones, which obviously have different relations with the EU: Slovenia joined the EU, Croatia is considered to be a future member, while the rest of the former Yugoslavia (Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Macedonia) is still not included. "Freedom, which followed after the fall of Soviet domination in the countries of Soviet bloc since 1989 was for many of the east and south-east European countries, the first solid confirmation of their European identity after the Second World War. At the beginning of the 1990s, four specific cultural areas had already been identified in Europe: Central Europe, Baltic countries, South-East Europe and Eastern Europe. These areas the EU has offered different types of assistance for the purpose of their integration, that is. The EU has been effectively dealing in many ways with countries belonging to
the sub-regions. As a result, these areas have developed different rhythms and patterns of Europeanization". In most so-called new European democracies, the Europeanization process began to exercise influence on the rhetoric of cultural and media policy. This process is characterized by the requirements to establish the so-called “three pluralism”: plurality of ownership, market pluralism, and political pluralism. Accelerating the steps of European integration is the most important event in the history of Europe since the Second World War.

There is another problem. What is the best way to integrate so many different peoples, languages, religions, minorities and immigrants maintaining their separate identities yet at the same time building a new common identity? The task is not easy. “Euroskeptics are asking: Why is there no significant collective identity Europeans as Europeans...? Europe, even that narrow Western one, is not a communicative community, barely has a common memory, and only very limited shares same experiences”. But here we must ask whether the European identity is brand new or a new form of an old European identity which has been formed over the centuries. It seems that the second one is more correct, because regarding all of the differences, Europeans share a common culture. It is consisted of all traditions, of ancient Greece and Rome, through Humanism, the Renaissance, Reformation, Enlightenment, philosophy, art, and folklore of all nations up to the symbols of the European Union. However, many theorists rely on research of Eurobarometer 57.1 where it is clearly visible that is not a high percentage of those who feel as Europeans. Viewing one’s self purely as a European was an option selected by an average of

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12 Ibid.
only 4% of those polled. A much higher percentage identify more with their own nation. On the other hand, almost half of the respondents in Europe, 44%, admit not knowing any other language than their mother tongue.\(^{15}\)

Indicators are good, but one very important fact is forgotten viewed from the historical period of only six decades not much time has passed allowing for European integration. Why? If we focus only on changes in Central and Eastern Europe after the fall of the Berlin wall, we are clear how difficult it is to form a common identity from the patterns that used to be quite polarizing: West and East, capitalism and communism, democracy and one party system.

As a result of this complexity, it is usually envisaged that the Communist media regime in the Central and Eastern Europe was replaced by a market-led pluralistic media system after 1989. The post-Communist transformation involved fundamental changes in the media sectors in terms of production, organization, management, distribution and consumption. At this point we assume that establishing a new form of European identity is a difficult and slow process, especially given that Central and South Eastern European societies are not a “tabula rasa”.

Here it is important to note that institutional, cultural and economical domination of Western countries should not be allowed. If all have the same task in forming the common European identity, it must take care that all parts of Europe give their contribution. Central and Southeastern Europe from its cultural wealth can provide a lot to Western Europe. This is not to be forgotten. Also, the aspiration of Turkey to enter the EU must be taken into account because Europe goes beyond the symbolic geographical Europe which, for example, has already been confirmed many times in Eurovision, a large media event. For this reason, it is claimed that the new conception of European belonging is needed. It is a complex and long process that is implemented at the national, regional and local level. This leaves open the question of how to achieve a balance between

\(^{15}\) EB 243 (2006a), Special Eurobarometer 243, Europeans and their languages.
theoretical and practical definitions of EU politics. For example, when asked whether they are interested in European politics, 47% of the citizens of Europe responded positively. Also, it is not a small percentage who believes that things are moving in the right direction in the European Union (39%) \(^{16}\) Following from this, the developed literature on negative aspects of the EU lacks a firm evidentiary base for many core claims.

3. What is the Role of Media in European Identity Formation? Advantages and disadvantages

Because of all the above mentioned problems, it is of huge importance to determine what is the role, and how big is that role, of mass media in the formation of European identity. We live in an era of European integration where conditions change all the time. Europe today is increasingly driven by a combination of information and entertainment values. The media have the potential to exert enormous influence. In this light, Kellner defines several characteristics of the media culture. “Radio, television, film, and the other products of the culture industries provide the models of what it means to be male or female, successful or a failure, powerful or powerless. Media culture also provides the materials out of which many people construct their sense of class, of ethnicity and race, of nationality, of sexuality, of ‘us’ and ‘them’. Media culture provides the materials to create identities whereby individuals insert themselves into contemporary techno-capitalist societies.”\(^ {17}\)

The mass media penetration in the twentieth century encouraged scientific research in various fields and the researchers tried to answer whether the phenomenon of mass media changed the forms of knowledge, culture and social life. Mass media has been long thought to be an authentic transformer of reality (the concept of media objectivity) and from this authenticity, especially in television broadcasts, comes public confidence in media. However, the process of creating media images is very

\(^{16}\) EB 201, (2006), Special Eurobarometer, The future of Europe.
complex. It includes the organization, selection, emphasis, and exclusion of certain aspects of reality through defining, representing and using stereotypes, and is also under huge influence of economic, social and ideological factors.

Media imposed themselves as one of the key agents of almost all political or cultural changes. Media speak from the vicinity, leaving the impression that it was speaking to someone closely related, which leaves the impression of personal contact. The question of the media role in common European identity formation imposes itself as crucial for understanding the processes which describe identity formation. Already at the beginning of 19th century it had been shown that mass media were very powerful because they represented the new governments, authoritative decision makers, which pre-structured world events and formed the institutional image of reality.¹⁸ What can we learn?

Media offer many forms of identity. As one of the characteristics of European identity is that European identity keeps changing, the media have powerful arguments for this process. The media should actively promote the possibility of European identity formation. It is important to know that we use media representations of collective identity to create our sense of belonging. European identity formation is a project. Thus European media have to create a European identity by presenting to Europeans things they can identify with. “While trying to bridge gap between nations and Europe, and make her people become aware of their second identity, the media remain pluralism. This can be seen widely through broadcast media.”¹⁹

However, growing differentiation, segmentation and fragmentation of media audiences in the communication subcultures can be seen, as well as paying the ransom of mass

communication in the traditional sense of individual forms of communication. This results in a growing number of special interest groups in all types of media, as well as highly individual combinations of the use of media. Also, new media are no longer just an academic concept, they are not something which is discussed in theoretical debates. Media and audiences are becoming more fractured and dispersed with the arrival of new media. A study from Reuters Institute\(^{20}\) says that if this trend continues, we will no longer have news. It will happen because the money for advertising migrates toward new media.

These concepts indicate the next conclusion: there are many events and many aspects of a certain event, they all cannot be presented. Therefore, the media’s work is reflected in the fixation of meaning and definition of reality. That defining role of the media implies the ability to close ideological preferences selected in the meaning of the dominant discourse. Media defines the collective identity. If the media’s job is important in the formation of identity, we need particularly to look at the works and research in which are traces of contradictory views regarding the media coverage of European topics in the existence of the European public sphere. Scholars agree that the media are the central institution of the modern public sphere, but they do not agree on the issue of their role in the formation of European public sphere.

“Impossibility school”\(^{21}\) believes that there is no common European public sphere, because there is no common language, pan-European media and a common identity. Authors deny the existence of the European public sphere. It seems that the things here are put in the reverse direction. It would be logical to say that national and pan-European media should influence the formation of European identity, and not that the common public sphere does not exist because there is not that identity. Also, the


authors argue that the EU suffers from a “communication deficit”. According to Kurpas, Meyer and Gialoglou, the EU is still an “unknown entity for many journalists”. So, the role of media is crucial for the promotion of attitudes about the common European experience and the common European identity. William Gore, however, believes that there is no Europe as a media construct, because media audiences are interested only in what is happening in their country and that the issues of EU policy are completely ignored in the media space, and therefore there is no need for a supra-national body for self-monitoring as it would be, for example, the Pan-European Media Council.

On the other hand, the “realistic school” resents requirements that must exist in the media presentation of the European issue either on the national or European level. They agree that the real scenario of the European public sphere existence is linked, not for the supra-national common sphere, but for the Europeanization national sphere. Risse concludes that if media across national public spheres use the same media frames and formats when reporting on a specific European issue, this is a pointer of an actual common European public sphere. “As long as media report about the same issues at the same time, there is no need for pan-European media based on common language.” I am aware of the two stands and of their conclusions. In the next sections I will formulate an explanation.

Although media in Europe are essentially national, different studies prove that they cover European issues. The overview over self-references in European media from the 1950s to 2003

indicates that, for the first decades of its existence, Europe has played merely a marginal role in the landscape of self-references. The Maastricht Treaty marks a possibility for enabling a political union in Europe. The fruits of this process can be seen in 1999 and in 2003 (20.1 %).\textsuperscript{26} Hodess concludes during the comparison of the periods 1985 and 1990/1 that clearly more intensive EU reporting can be found during the later period.\textsuperscript{27} German media report a great deal on EU topics. Danish media also concern themselves quite frequently with EU topics.\textsuperscript{28} Mezek from survey in Sweden television (1999 and 2004) comes to this conclusion: “The new member-states were, around the EU expansion, presented more as ‘us’, as the shared fate was stressed, as well as stereotypes were rejected. What is more, ordinary people have been noticeably more present in the news reports more than before, which are important for bigger identification.”\textsuperscript{29} Also, Adriana Fagarasan has done research on European Public Sphere in BBC News and SVT Rapport during the 2004 European Parliament Elections debate and came to the next conclusions: the importance and weight given to the European elections is highly reflected in a technical aspect; both the British and the Swedish news programs devoted on average a fifth (\textapproximately 20min) of their emission time to election news in the two weeks leading up to the elections; the tone of the news connected to the European elections is generally neutral in both the television broadcasters.\textsuperscript{30}

\textsuperscript{26} David Trefas, National and European Identities in European media 1956 to 2003, Culture nationale et identité communautaire: un défi pour l’Union européenne, 11-13 décembre 2008.
\textsuperscript{27} Robin Hodess, News Coverage of European Politics: A Comparison of Change in Britain and Germany, in Europapolitische Grundverständnisse im Wandel: Analysen und Konsequenzen für die politischeBildung eds. Mathias Jopp, Andreas Maurer and Heinrich Schneider (Bonn: Europa-Union Verlag, 1998), 449-72.
In order to conclude what is the role of media in constructing European identity, we must also underline some negative aspects of European audiovisual concepts that should be reconceptualized. In Europe, the lack of high-quality programs is evident. Investigative journalism and a program for minorities are represented in a small extent on public and commercial channels. News often has tabloid character, especially in the commercial channels. As a result, viewers often fail to find the information they need for democratic decision making. The European Union has to establish an independent agency for monitoring media markets and media concentration on the EU and global level. Although in Europe there are nearly 6500 TV channels, 1809 regional and local channels, 269 entertainment channels, the report states that the television market in reality is very concentrated in terms of ownership structure and participation of the audiences. In most countries, several channels attracted the largest number of viewers. What defines media industry in Europe is consolidation. That process means that media industry in Europe is overpowered by the media conglomerate. Since 2003 there have been no changes between the first ten big ones, and it is a concern that the economical crises intensified the current processes and that it will be easier for the huge and powerful to survive than the small, local medias. Political pressure on regulatory bodies and public electronic media is widespread. Concentration of media ownership is very frequently seen as a problem of contemporary media.

The main goal of the project “Understanding the Logic of EU Reporting from Brussels” is to better understand how an EU news topic is selected. According to a report, over 70% of lobbyists in Brussels work for corporate interests, and just 20% represent non governmental organizations. On the other hand, according to the interviewed spokespersons in Brussels, “particularly those

31 The European Audiovisual Observatory, (2008), Broadcasting (Radio/TV).
with a journalistic background, many problems occur because journalists of small media outlets are underpaid and work in very harsh conditions; they are obliged to write stories before they really know the subject and they do not have time to carry out a deep and profound investigation. As a result, they are looking for stories that are easy to produce and easy to sell. This, again, adds to a communication deficit.”

Another major problem is the Americanization of European media. Commercialization, deregulation, convergence and concentration its final term finds in the so-called “Americanization” of mass media’s sphere. More specifically this means adopting the American model of organizing communication centers, production and programming patterns, as well as the American media products in a large part of the world, and even in Europe which was a bastion of mass communication in the public services. “Americanization is not only a huge presence of American media, but above all, understanding the role of media in society on the American way and acceptance of appropriate values postulated, thanks to which that the role is realizing. Many prominent European intellectuals publicly demand the European Union to protect the old continent from the Yankee Leviathan and American cultural imperialism, which Edgar Morin called “the new colonization”.

In the global market, film, television, music, publishing and advertising industries are dominated by American media oligopoly. “Media are America” argued Jeremy Tunstall. Since 1911 with the formation of the first film studio in Hollywood to the present day, American film production is the largest and most profitable on the world media market. Recent research shows that in the 21st century the leading position still belongs to Hollywood with an over 40% share in the global film production. The

36 The European Audiovisual Observatory, (2001), Film, Television, video, and new media in. Europe.
largest film productions in Europe are English, Spanish, French, German and Italian. However, their role is not large, because about 75% of films are imported from the USA to Europe. In the TV industry exists a similar situation. During the seventies USA exported two more hours of program than all other countries combined. “Narrative conventions, visual tropes and storylines found in Hollywood film and U.S. television have become the ‘norm’ for the European audience. These modes of representation have also had an impact on the ways in which most Europeans have learned how to “know” reality. This does not mean that Europeans have become completely and passively “Americanized”, but that a U.S.-based system of representation has informed their identities in meaningful ways.”

In sum, we assume that there are positive and negative aspects of media power. Thus, it is quite clear, a common European identity does not develop in some kind of a vacuum. The starting point for the concept of European identity needs to begin with the common transnational media systems and European public sphere. In other words, research needs to begin by media observing EU citizens, policy makers and interest groups. Mass media actors are able to cut across national boundaries. Because of Americanization, consolidation and commercialization, the EU needs to create a well organized pan-European media institution and self-regulatory bodies. A more realistic model of European identity formation would allow the EU to improve some parts of its transnational media strategies. That is why Europe needs a theoretical and practical redefinition of media practices.

4. Conclusion

The relationship between media and collective European identity in this paper has been examined in various contexts. We may safely conclude that the media are deeply linked to the formation

37 The European Audiovisual Observatory, (2003), Horizontal rating of audiovisual content in Europe: an alternative to multi-level classification?
of European identity. The media should provide information concerning all European countries and cultural exchange through films, programming and media events. In the same time, media should actively support a forum for discussion on European affairs. Since the authors agree that there is still more “communication deficit” in Europe, national and transnational media system must work harder on the presentation of the European issues because their role is the largest in the formation of European identity. Media are a pivot of democratic multicultural European society that will respect, protect, cherish and improve ethnic, national, cultural, religious and linguistic differences. If someone is a German, Italian or Romanian he is at the same time European. The foundation requires respect for diversity and it is contained in the modern understanding of identity that implies freedom as essential feature of identity. Everybody is free to feel as members of a certain nation, but at the same time they should feel like Europeans who are privileged at least because they participate in the construction of a unique historical project which is called the EU. This project is not similar to the United States or to traditional nation-state or supranational uninfected monolith community. It is a Europe composed of small Europes, enriched at the same time with the same similarities and differences, and that is what the media should represent. Europeanization of media space and a common identity is a process that lasts. But this does not mean that European identity does not exist. European identity just needs more care through media practices. Europe now has to consider how to form new models to advance pan-European media institutions.

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GENOCIDE OLYMPICS: THE CAMPAIGN TO PRESSURE CHINA OVER THE DARFUR CONFLICT

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Abstract

What is the impact of a domestic-based social movement’s efforts to promote international conflict resolution? To end the conflict in Darfur, the US-based Save Darfur Coalition (SDC) has pursued a strategy of international venue-shopping to seek additional sources of leverage on the government of Sudan. The SDC identified China as Sudan’s staunch ally in the international arena. During the period leading up to the Beijing Olympics in August 2008, the SDC and its member organizations explored traditional and innovative channels for pressuring the Chinese government. This article will examine the emergence of China as a target, the development of the China Campaign, and the impact on Chinese foreign policy. The reconstruction of the strategies of the SDC is based on a systematic content analysis of the web sites, organization archival material, and newspaper accounts of activities. The main data source consists of in-depth interviews conducted with SDC leadership, Darfuri activists, Congressional legislative aides, and officials from the Chinese Embassy and the Department of State.

1. Introduction

As the decades-long North-South conflict in Sudan was coming to a close in 2004, a United Nations Human Rights Coordinator for Sudan cautioned that a region called Darfur now posed “the
world’s greatest humanitarian crisis.” The government of Sudan was waging war against rebel groups in Darfur. That summer, a group of concerned organizations and individuals in the United States came together to form the Save Darfur Coalition (SDC) and advocate for conflict resolution. With unprecedented scope, the SDC embarked on a strategy of international venue-shopping, a process by which the Coalition sought additional targets beyond the US national arena in order to generate leverage over the government of Sudan. From 2004-2008, the SDC highlighted and targeted crucial linkages in the international arena while staying rooted domestically in the US. As an ally of the government of Sudan and the host of the Olympic Games in 2008, China was regarded as a vulnerable target.

During the Beijing Summer Olympics 2008, China welcomed over 200 countries for the quadrennial ritual of competition, fellowship, and sportsmanship. China’s hosting of the Olympics prompted aggressive media attention around its human rights policies. When actors such as the United States and the United Nations failed to compel the international community to respond to Darfur, advocates in the US began a unique campaign to target China focusing on the venue of the Olympic Games. This campaign included a lethal re-branding of the Beijing Games as the “Genocide Olympics.” Overall, the China Campaign created a public relations storm that threatened the positive image that China had wanted to project. China’s response to the campaign came in fits and starts as the country grappled with this unexpected torrent of negative attention connected to a foreign policy issue. This article lays out the narrative of the campaign against China launched by advocates on behalf of Darfur during the Beijing Olympics 2008.

The case of the SDC’s China Campaign offers a window into the expanding opportunities for non-state actors on the world stage and their potential for political impact. The use of an international venue-shopping strategy reflects the complexity of the global

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landscape and the growing capability for non-state actors to tap into additional channels of access to political bodies like states and international institutions. As a non-state actor, the SDC’s strategy shaped global politics by multiplying target venues in the international arena. Between 2007 and 2008, the SDC targeted China’s foreign policy and crafted a campaign that aimed to exploit the Olympic Games as a pressure lever. In this article, I argue that the SDC’s targeting of the Beijing Olympics followed what I call an international venue-shopping strategy and that, to pursue this strategy, the SDC made use of critical linkages in the geopolitical landscape. The reconstruction of the strategies of the SDC is based on a systematic content analysis of the web sites, organization archival material, and newspaper accounts of activities. The main data source consists of in-depth interviews conducted with SDC leadership, Darfuri activists, Congressional legislative aides, and officials from the Chinese Embassy and the Department of State. Some of the questions I consider include: How does the China Campaign reflect the movement’s international venue-shopping strategy? How did the SDC manipulate critical international linkages of the geopolitical landscape? Did the SDC influence China’s foreign policy towards Darfur?

In this article, I lay the foundation for the SDC’s advocacy’s international venue-shopping strategy and assess the impact of the China Campaign. First, to situate my topic in the larger theoretical context, I review the literature surrounding non-state actors, social movements, and transnational relations. In the second section, I appraise China’s foreign policy by reviewing its historical connections to Africa. Here, I detail the close relationship between the governments of China and Sudan. In the third section, I narrate the emergence of the US-based SDC’s efforts to target China. I map the main players and goals of the China Campaign leading up to the 2008 Olympic Games and the extent of official US support. Finally, I examine China’s interaction with the China Campaign and assess the SDC’s degree of influence using a typology of policy responsiveness.
2. Non-State Actors and Transnational Relations

2.1 Social Movements on the World Stage

Today’s world order includes numerous non-state actors interacting with states and international institutions. These non-state actors may include corporations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and social movements. The encounters and exchanges between non-state actors and states across borders come under the heading of transnational relations. In one subset of these interactions, social movements often seek to shape and influence state behavior around human rights norms and practices.

This article stands at the intersection of the study of social movements and transnational relations. Two contributions to the literature can be distinguished. First, by constructing a case study of an international campaign, I highlight the role of non-state actors such as social movements in an increasingly integrated world. Second, I attempt to analyze the impact of social movements on international actors by measuring the degree of influence on a country’s foreign policy. For both tasks, I shift methodological tools developed at the domestic level to analyze the activity of social movements at the international level. I marshal the data from this case study to argue that the Save Darfur Campaign made a considerable impact on China’s foreign policy towards Sudan.

Traditionally defined, a social movement is “a sustained, organized public effort making collective claims on target authorities.” Tackling the study of social movements beyond the state demands that we carefully distinguish among different

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levels of claim-making. A conventional framework dissects a movement campaign into at least three main parties: group of claimants, object/target of claims, and an audience/public. Then this campaign is placed on a level of orientation: local, regional, national, and international. Normally, these parties operate on similar levels of engagement, i.e. local claimants match with local objects, etc.

In the field of transnational relations, social movements wreak havoc on a customary level-of-analysis typology. No longer are national systems the primary targets of advocacy, nor are nationally based movements constrained to lobby their own governments. Throughout the twentieth century, social movements expanded the scope of their sites to incorporate targets outside the domestic arena such as foreign governments, regional and international organizations and multinational-corporations. These social movements pursue policy in international policy-making arenas, make claims in other countries, or sustain broad coalitions across regions.

The expanding space for transnational political action offers abundant ways for people across borders to influence decision-making within different venues. The strategy of international venue-shopping captures this process of multiplying sites for political advocacy. Previously, the term venue-shopping has been used to describe the political strategy of advocacy groups operating in the domestic arena. In this article, I shift levels to analyze social movement activity in the international arena.

2.2 Measuring the Impact of Social Movements

At both domestic and international levels, scholars have long sought to classify how social movements act as vehicles for political change. Understanding the outcomes of a social movement often involves determining success: whether the goal

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has been reached. From this point of view, it would seem that the SDC has failed to meet its goal of resolving the conflict in Darfur. As one journalist declared, “Save Darfur cannot claim the one success that really matters: stopping the killing.”\(^6\) But in measuring the Campaign’s impact, we need to look past this fact and focus on other consequences.

For many social movement scholars, the narrow focus on success or failure overlooks other important outcomes of political strategies like degree of influence. Even if the goal of a social movement might be a particular policy that is never enacted, we can still track the causal dynamics under-girding decision-making and untwine the relationship between the social movement and the political actor. As one way to understand the incremental outcomes of social movements, it is constructive to look at different moments in the decision-making process of the political actors. In their work on transnational advocacy networks, Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink identify broad stages where influence can be measured.\(^7\) But in their case studies of environmental and women’s rights movements, the networks advocated over periods of years and even decades at many different levels of politics including global policy arenas and international institutions.

In contrast, to assess the actions of a focused campaign unfolding over the course of one year against a single international target, an alternate measure is needed. Paul D. Schumaker gave the study of social movements a useful typology that focuses on policy responsiveness.\(^8\) For Schumaker, responsiveness is “the relationship between the manifest or explicitly articulated demands of a protest group and the corresponding actions of the political system which is the target.”\(^9\) To my knowledge, this

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\(^7\) Keck and Sikkink, 25.


\(^9\) Ibid 494.
typology is often cited in the social movement literature but its application is rare and restricted to cases of domestic social movements with domestic claims. The index has been cited at times to classify agenda-setting and responsiveness in policy-making issues as varied as abortion, agrarian reform, and anti-war protests. The advantage of this typology is that allows for comparison. The methodological challenge has been operationalizing the types of responsiveness; a nuanced case study can address this. Overall, the typology enables us to measure the impact of a social movement by tracking the degree of influence across various stages of an advocacy campaign. In this article, I employ a modified version of this typology that shifts the level of analysis from measuring influence on a domestic institution to an international actor.

3. China’s Foreign Policy

3.1 China’s Resource Diplomacy in Africa

China’s relationship to Sudan is the product of extensive engagement between China and Africa in recent decades. Centuries of Chinese history reveal a mixed foreign policy that vacillated from exploration to isolation to imperial campaigns. With its establishment as the People’s Republic of China in 1949, the country inaugurated a new chapter of relating to the world beyond its borders. In addition to seeking relationships to the global superpowers of the US and USSR, China closely identified itself as part of the developing world and cultivated extensive ties to Asia, Africa, and Latin America. China’s role as an

12 This included courting Arab governments as part of a pro-Arab policy. Mao Yufeng, “China’s Interests and Strategy in the Middle East and the Arab World,” in China and the Developing World: Beijing’s Strategy for
international leader was solidified during the 1954 Bandung Conference, which hosted delegates from 29 Asian and African countries and heralded an era of Asia-Africa solidarity that led to the “Non-Aligned Movement.” These efforts at multi-polarity cemented China’s ties with numerous countries in an otherwise bipolar era.

When China’s brutal clampdown of the 1989 Tiananmen Square demonstrations led to Western approbation, China reasserted its relationship to the Third World. The 1990s saw China opening its burgeoning economy to global flows of capital and investment. Following the path of economic growth laid by Deng Xiaoping a decade before, this “recommitment” to the Third World linked economic and foreign policy. In 2002, Beijing declared a “go out” strategy with the plan to invest heavily in the developing world. For China needed ample natural resources to fuel its rapidly expanding economy, especially in the area of energy. China follows a unique approach by seeking to be in command of oil at its source in order to guarantee a steady flow of supply and shield oil from fluctuating market prices. To detach itself from reliance on Middle Eastern oil suppliers, China has made a concerted effort to control African oil sources. Since 2004, China has become the second largest importer of African oil, after the United States. This monopoly is the outcome of a decades-long

16 While China may be a gigantic country, its holdings of known oil reserves are miniscule; the country's percentage of the world supply stands at a mere 1.3%. BP Company, BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2008 (London: BP Company, 2008), 6.
cultivation in certain Africa states involving diplomatic and economic links, a combination that has been dubbed “resource diplomacy.”¹⁹

In the post-Cold War era, Africa held little strategic interest for the US. China began to capitalize on neglected pariah regimes, where the absence of Western political and economic ties left a field with little competition. Since the 1990s, China has maintained extensive ties to African countries as part of far-reaching foreign policy agenda that centers on “soft power.”²⁰ This “soft power” influence is not focused on extending military might; rather, this influence includes resources like foreign direct investment (FDI),²¹ trade and development aid.²² China also offers its African partners a variety of initiatives and exchanges in the medical, agricultural, and technological sectors. The relationship was further cemented through the creation of the China-Africa Cooperation Forum in 2000.²³ Early in 2006, China consolidated its objectives in a white paper “China’s Africa Policy” that outlined an era of further cooperation.²⁴

²⁰ According to Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “Soft power is the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments.” Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “Soft Power and American Foreign Policy,” Political Science Quarterly 119 (2, Summer 2004): 256.
²² In the area of trade, China has an increasing surplus though trade is focused on five commodities: oil, iron ore, cotton, diamonds, and wood.
²³ Extensive investments in infrastructural projects to build capitalism in Africa have also generated massive amounts of goodwill. China also spurs economic development through grants, debt relief and low-cost loans. Without the onerous demands of World Bank and IMF aid programs, China offers attractive terms for trade and investment, a winning combination for developing countries in Africa. Joshua Eisenman, “China’s Post-Cold War Strategy in Africa: Examining Beijing’s Methods and Objectives,” 46.
²⁴ Meeting every three years at the ministerial level, the China-Africa Cooperation Forum has unified and amplified the political voice of China and its African partners.
²⁵ In particular, China will pursue exchanges with countries in Africa “on the basis of the principles of independence, equality, mutual respect and non-interference in each other’s internal affairs. The purpose of such exchanges is to increase understanding and friendship and seek trust and cooperation.” Ministry of
Critically, China’s relationship to Africa follows the central tenets of Chinese foreign policy, which include respect for sovereignty and non-interference. One observer described this as a variation of the golden rule, “China considers other countries meddling in its affairs unacceptable, and it’s assumed its friends feel the same way.”26 Diplomatically, it is the African nations who have supported China at international bodies like the United Nations.27 In return, China refrains from criticism of its African allies; as one observer noted: “Nor will China be leading any campaign to encourage democratization in Africa.”28 Thus, African nations and China represent a mutual effort for buttressing censure in both regional and international arenas.

3.2 China in Sudan

China’s position as Sudan’s staunch ally in the international community followed its pattern of diplomatic engagement with its African partners. China’s relationship with Sudan began in 1959 but was slow to develop as pro-Soviet elements in Sudanese political spheres caused difficulties when China and the USSR were in conflict. When the Sudanese government sought to crush the Sudanese Communist party following a failed coup attempt in 1971, China stepped in to provide military supplies and training. Since that intervention, China has remained a key source of arms for Sudanese political leaders.

Though oil was discovered in Sudan in the 1950s, early production efforts by American and European based major companies in the 1970s failed to get traction. When Southern

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27 Among its African partners, China has garnered allies for its campaign to isolate Taiwan as part of its "one-China principle."
Sudanese forces attacked production facilities in 1984, Western oil companies left Sudan. A decade later, Sudan’s entanglements with Osama bin Laden and terrorist networks led to sanctions from the United States and other members of the international community. The US still considers Sudan a “rogue state” due to its support of international terrorism. These sanctions prevented Sudan from exporting oil and buying weapons from participating countries, a group which did not include China.

In the absence of major competition, Sudan’s oil finds caught the eye of the Chinese government since the oil had a low sulfur content that was desirable for China’s refineries. By 1997, the state-owned China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) had grabbed the lion’s share of Sudan’s nascent oil industry as China swept into the country bringing massive amounts of capital. CNPC met the demands of Khartoum’s evaluations of potential companies and outmaneuvered the other bidders by throwing in the offer to build an oil refinery. When Sudan formed a consortium known as the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company (GNPOC) to develop its oil sector, China took a 40% share. With the influx of FDI, Sudan built a 930-mile pipeline from the oil fields to Port Sudan that began transport in 1999.

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29 By the early 1990s, oil companies from Western countries had exited Sudan en masse due to shareholder pressure and international sanctions over Sudan’s human rights record and support for terrorism.
30 In 1993, the Clinton Administration placed Sudan on the list of state sponsors of terrorism on the basis of evidence of international terrorist activity and imposed sanctions on the country in November 1997. In 1996, the United Nations Security Council passed two resolutions passed in 1996 condemning Sudan’s activities as a “threat to international peace and security” and called upon states to honor sanctions against the country.
34 The state-owned company Petronas of Malaysia purchased a 30% stake.
35 Meanwhile, the growing partnership between China and Sudan did not go unnoticed in Washington, DC and advocacy circles. In 1999, when China National Petroleum Company (CNPC) attempted to access US capital markets by going public on the New York Stock Exchange, the effort was rebuffed by criticism of CNPC’s operations in Sudan.
At the time, CNPC’s investment in the oil sector in Sudan was China’s grandest international oil project. Today, China’s consumes two thirds of Sudan’s oil exports.

China’s domination of Sudan’s oil sector provided entrée into a closer relationship with Khartoum. As the largest provider of foreign investment, China has poured over $15 billion into the country since 1996 for the construction of roads, bridges, and utility stations. In 2003, China sent around half a million dollars in FDI; in 2006, this amount was nearly 500 million. Between the years 2003-2006, China was the country’s primary supplier of weaponry delivering $55 million worth of small arms amounting to 90% of Sudan’s small arms since 2004. The scope of China’s engagement in Sudan encompasses many sectors and areas of development.

3.3 China in the Post-Cold War Era

In the recent past, China’s foreign policy has become difficult to characterize. In its external relations, China needed to overcome enormous misperceptions. At the end of the Cold War, China launched a new era of engagement with the world order under the leadership of Presidents Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao. Rather than employing the use of military force to address territorial disputes, the post-Cold War era has seen China deftly utilizing diplomatic channels. China purports to rise as a global superpower through economic and political means.

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Yet, internationally, there was growing concern over China’s close ties to pariah and rogue states as part of its resource diplomacy, relationships with “no strings attached.”\textsuperscript{40} China’s business ties undermined international sanctions that aimed to punish dictators. Washington, in particular, urged China to be a responsible stakeholder in the cooperative formulation of policies towards states that support international terrorism. While enduring much criticism for its foreign policy, there are signs that Beijing tempered its support of rogue states. Indeed, China has demonstrated its intention to be a conscientious member of the international community. Since the 1990s, China has begun to pursue a foreign policy that is “more proactive and flexible.”\textsuperscript{41} This includes efforts at multilateralism, the use of “soft power”, and participation in international bodies. At the international level, China supported United Nations peacekeeping efforts by contributing 5,872 personnel to 15 UN peacekeeping missions, the majority being African missions. From membership in only one international governmental organization (IGO) between 1949 and 1971, China now participates in over 50 IGOs. This increased involvement signals that China was falling in line with other members of the international community “on a number of international normative questions.”\textsuperscript{42}

No one doubts that China’s strategic interests, both economic and political, are at stake. As a country that has moved from Communist rule to state-led capitalism in three short decades, China’s definition of itself is evolving rapidly. Many have noticed a reorientation of China’s global outlook within traditional international relations frameworks. In its aggressive pursuit of strategic partnerships and focus on resource diplomacy, China demonstrates a realist stance. Yet, with efforts at multilateralism

\textsuperscript{40} Chinese leadership professed support for Iran, North Korea, and Sudan among other unpopular countries and was the largest trading partner of each of these countries and the second largest to Burma and Zimbabwe. See Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt, “China’s New Dictatorship Diplomacy,” Foreign Affairs 87 (1, Jan/Feb 2008): 38-56.


\textsuperscript{42} Cited in Pan, “China’s Changing Image of and Engagement in World Order.”
and confidence building, China exhibits liberal objectives to be a responsible superpower. Overall, China’s national interests are considered to be a “work in progress.”

China long sought to host the Olympics as a way to present itself positively to the world. The government’s first bid for the 2000 Olympic Games was unsuccessful and may have reflected discomfort with China in the wake of the 1989 Tiananmen Square violence. When the International Olympic Committee announced its decision to award the 2008 Olympic Games to Beijing, Wang Wei, the senior Beijing Olympic official, asserted, “Winning the host rights means winning the respect, trust, and favor of the international community.” The prospect of global media attention offered the opportunity for China to give a positive narrative of its ascendancy as a young superpower. Observers referred to the 2008 Olympics as China’s “coming out party” to signify the country’s “reinvention for world recognition.” China established its official game motto as “One World, One Dream” to highlight its membership in the international community.

3.4 China’s Early Response to the Darfur Conflict

Since its independence from Britain in 1956, Sudan has endured multiple civil wars, regional disputes and border skirmishes. In the early part of the 21st century, the international community devoted great energy to advancing the North-South peace process, ending 30 years of conflict between government forces and Southern rebel forces. But during the spring of 2003, reports surfaced with descriptions of a new pattern of violence in the western region Darfur. For decades, Darfur had long suffered at the hands of the ruling elites in Khartoum, which failed to address

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under-development, scarce resources and internal conflict.\textsuperscript{47} Now, a counter-insurgency movement sponsored by the government was sending waves of horsemen named \textit{janjaweed} to destroy villages and kill Darfur’s inhabitants.\textsuperscript{48} Despite extensive coverage and attention, the Darfur crisis revealed the turbidity and ineffectiveness of the conflict-resolution process.

With Khartoum’s threats to halt the North-South peace process, the international community hesitated to issue strong demands. Intensive political engagement and diplomacy failed to influence Sudan’s behavior.\textsuperscript{49} The UN initiated official visits, fact-finding missions, joint communiqués between the UN and Khartoum, and promises of assistance to the African Union. In 2004, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) passed five resolutions concerning Sudan; four were focused on the Darfur situation but the threats and timelines were continually ignored. Khartoum refused to allow peacekeeping troops from Western countries and also hampered humanitarian relief efforts; the African Union was the only institution permitted to deploy a peace monitoring force and mediate peace talks.

The situation of Darfur placed China in a quandary: how could China balance its strategic interests in Sudan and its foreign policy principles of noninterference against its rising prominence in the international community and humanitarian affairs? China’s leadership initially chafed at pressure to assist the international community in resolving the situation in Darfur. As a permanent member of the Security Council, China’s veto threats stymied early resolutions that would have imposed economic sanctions on


Sudan in July and September 2004. In both cases, China also abstained from voting on the diluted versions of the original resolutions. In the initial months of the conflict, China’s attitude towards Darfur followed its deep-rooted policy of noninterference, refusing to meddle in the internal affairs of sovereign countries. Meanwhile, as early as 2004, media coverage began linking China to the atrocities committed in Darfur drawing from various human rights reports that highlighted bilateral ties based on oil, arms, and diplomatic support.50

Soon, China began to modify its stance on its protection of Sudan. In 2005, China began to follow the international community’s lead on Darfur while being careful not to act too aggressively towards its ally Sudan. On the Security Council, China was presented with two resolutions that offered “juicy veto opportunities” but ended up abstaining under pressure from other member states.51 The specter of China’s veto rarely came to pass; as one observer put it, “Vetoes are threatened, or hinted at, far more than they are used.”52 While not blocking wholesale action at the international level, China was still protecting Sudan to some degree. In the meantime, China reaffirmed its support for Sudan in a renewal of military ties during a November 2005 meeting between state officials that led to China to “increase military exchanges and cooperation.”53 China appeared to be showing one face to the international community while showing another to its longtime ally Sudan.

51 These United Nations Security Council resolutions authorized targeted sanctions against Sudan and referred the situation in Darfur to the International Criminal Court. Observers noted that proposals for an oil embargo were dropped and that even members who hadn’t signed onto the ICC permitted the passage of the referral resolution. Don Cheadle and John Prendergast, Not on Our Watch: The Mission to End Genocide in Darfur and Beyond (New York: Hyperion, 2007), 96.
52 Adam LeBor, "Complicity with Evil": The United Nations in the Age of Modern Genocide (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), 246.
Startlingly, China’s foreign policy towards the Darfur situation took a major shift over the course of 2006. When the UNSC voted to impose targeted sanctions on four Sudanese officials in April, China abstained following a pattern of noninterference. As the following months saw rising violence and growing instability in Darfur, there was discussion of a possible Western military intervention. China became concerned for the security of its installations in Sudan. By September, China was working with UN Secretary General Kofi Annan on arrangements surrounding the deployment of a hybrid United Nations-African Union force of 20,000 troops mandated in UNSC Resolution 1706. During the November UNSC meeting on Darfur, Chinese Ambassador Wang Guangya worked behind the scenes to obtain Khartoum’s support for the plan. President Hu also took up the cause and lobbied Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir at the Beijing Africa Conference summit and on a visit to Khartoum in early 2007. Ambassador Wang noted, “Usually China doesn’t send messages, but this time they did.”

Rather than sitting on the sidelines, China entered the diplomatic fray over negotiating peacekeeping forces in Sudan. But these actions did not represent the full extent of pressure that many believed China could wield in Sudan.

4. The China Campaign

4.1 The Search for Additional Targets

An organized response to the Darfur conflict came early and swift in the United States. On July 14, 2004, concerned individuals and organizations gathered at the Darfur Emergency Summit, sponsored by the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum Committee of Conscience, the American Jewish World Service and the City University of New York. As an outcome of the Emergency Summit, the Save Darfur Coalition (SDC) was formed with the commitment of more than 75 organizations. Quickly, the Coalition established an umbrella organization in Washington, DC to

coordinate advocacy efforts. In its first years, the SDC left China alone and focused mainly on channeling public pressure to domestic targets. Between 2005 and 2006, the SDC successfully lobbied Congress to pass over ten pieces of legislation allocating funds for the African Union troops, supporting divestment campaigns, and denouncing the violence in Darfur. At the direction of Congress, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) poured hundreds of millions of dollars into addressing the humanitarian situation in Darfur.

From the White House, President George W. Bush signaled his concern for Darfur by decrying the mass killings as “genocide”, signing the Darfur Peace and Accountability Act (2006), and directing the US representatives at the United Nations to propose resolutions taking Khartoum to task for not resolving the conflict. But with ongoing engagements in Afghanistan and Iraq, the US could not take unilateral steps. Critically, moral authority at the international level had been compromised over rising concerns of US hegemony. At the United Nations, the US was unable to wield effective leadership within the international community.

According to Darfur advocates, it was clear that domestic pressure would not deliver the response needed to the situation in Darfur. Many in the SDC believed that President Bush had reached the limit of what he was willing to do. The US and China initiated a sub-dialogue on Africa in 2006 and bilateral discussions raised the possibility of coordinating actions around Sudan. China’s diplomatic efforts failed to convince the SDC that

55 Today, the SDC is made up of domestic actors in both official political capacities and non-governmental advocacy and relief organizations. While not always acting as a uniform body, the SDC encapsulates the spectrum of strategies and tactics for ending conflict in Darfur.
56 For a list of Darfur related legislation that has been passed, see www.darfurscores.org/darfur-legislation
58 Early on, the President had considered and then vetoed the possibility of a unilateral military intervention into Sudan. See Peter Baker, “Bush Says He Considered Action in Darfur,” The Washington Post, 20 July 2007, A06.
59 Gitta Zomorodi, Interview with Author, 5 December 2008.
Sudan was taking concerted steps to end the Darfur conflict. Advocates despaired that the humanitarian situation in Darfur would continue to deteriorate without attention from the international community. In light of this, some advocates began to search more aggressively for additional targets of pressure outside of the domestic arena as part of an international venue-shopping strategy.

As early as August 2004, there were public calls from Americans to pressure the Chinese government to address the situation in Darfur. In a letter to The Washington Post, Roberta A. Cohen, a Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institute, noted, “Were China to use even a small part of its leverage to call Sudan to account, it would go a long way towards saving lives in Sudan.” China and its economic partnerships with Sudan began to figure prominently in the news as a result of a divestment campaign that had been initiated on university campuses. A group called the Sudan Divestment Task Force (SDTF) published reports highlighting the extensive economic ties between Sudan and China. As part of their divestment campaign, the SDTF targeted US-based assets that included investments in the many Chinese companies doing business with Sudan.

Due to its overlap with the ongoing crisis in Darfur, China’s shining moment on the world stage as host of the 2008 Olympics became a venue of great potential for the SDC. The media circus surrounding the Olympics promised months of lead-up stories as well as extensive coverage beamed to homes in every country. Spurred by the search for levers on Sudan, the SDC rested its sights on China as a vulnerable target for exerting mass pressure. Indeed, the SDC would not be alone in contesting China’s image of itself. The 2008 Olympics had already taken on a new

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61 In April 2005, the Harvard University Advisory Board on Shareholder Responsibility bowed to student demands and divested the university’s endowment fund from the Chinese parastatal oil company Petrochina, the primary oil field operator in Sudan. Other divestment campaign targets such as state pension funds soon followed.
importance as longstanding human rights advocacy campaigns jockeyed to challenge China’s official representations. By 2007, global criticism of the human rights situation in China was mounting: newspapers covered stories of domestic repression that included forced removals, jailed journalists and dissidents. Numerous agendas would clash as both outsiders and internal reformers sought to “hijack” the official Olympic platform with its positive presentations of China’s domestic policies. Joining the chorus, the SDC maneuvered to shape China’s foreign policy towards Sudan.

4.2 Dream for Darfur Is Born

In 2006, long-time Sudan activist Eric Reeves persuaded The Washington Post editorial board to publish an editorial incorporating the provocative phrase “Genocide Olympics.” He continued to publicize the connection between China and Sudan through Op-Ed articles and website postings. As a phrase, “Genocide Olympics” banked on global familiarity with the Darfur situation and summed up “the accumulated discontent, anxiety, and suspicion about China and human rights.” In January 2007 during a SDC strategy meeting, Reeves proposed targeting the Beijing Olympics. Surprisingly, the coordinating organization of the SDC wasn’t enthusiastic about the idea; Reeves recounted, “Save Darfur was interested in selling bracelets and in consciousness-raising.” With the aim to target China more aggressively, Reeves and a couple of other activists sought to

68 Quoted in Ilana Greenberg, “Changing the Rules of the Game.”
found a separate organization but were slow to find funding and support.

The tide changed in the spring when actress and UNICEF goodwill ambassador Mia Farrow published an Op-Ed in *The Wall Street Journal* that ratcheted the stakes a bit further. Singling out Beijing for not doing enough to address the conflict in Darfur, Farrow and her son Ronan noted that “rather than “One World, One Dream,” people are beginning to speak of the coming, “Genocide Olympics.” In their Op-ed, the Farrows also took Hollywood director Steven Spielberg to task as “the Leni Riefenstahl of the Beijing Games.” In 2006, China had invited Spielberg to be an artistic adviser to the opening and closing ceremonies of the Beijing Olympics. Mia Farrow began to lambaste the government of China in newspapers and on TV with vitriolic attacks.

Reeves recalled, “Now we had a campaign, a phrase and a target.” Shortly after the Op-Ed was published, the organization Dream for Darfur was born with Mia Farrow and Eric Reeves serving as advisors. The Dream for Darfur was buoyed by a half a million-dollar grant from Humanity United, a foundation that addresses slavery and mass atrocity. But the Campaign against China began in an atmosphere fraught with skepticism. Executive Director Jill Savitt recalls, “People just said that it wasn’t going to work. Can’t influence China; can’t influence China on Darfur.” Still, the organization aimed high. Dream for Darfur explicitly distinguished its mission as not leading a boycott campaign; rather, the goal was “to leverage the Olympics to urge China to use its influence with the Sudanese regime to allow a robust civilian protection force into Darfur.” Within the US advocacy community, the consensus was that bilateral negotiations between the US and China had failed to secure the results needed.

70 Quoted in Ilana Greenberg, “Changing the Rules of the Game.”
71 Jill Savitt, Interview with Author, 10 March 2009.
The first task was to increase *linkage awareness*, which I identify as a measure of the extent to which a particular relationship is highlighted within global politics. The China Campaign deployed extensive efforts for publicizing the many ties between China and Sudan. Dream for Darfur consulted with experts on China to better understand the unique leverage points. In directing attention beyond the government of Sudan, Dream for Darfur was unrelenting when it came to pointing the finger squarely at China for its implicating role in the conflict in Darfur. On the organization’s website, Dream for Darfur laid out the case as follows:

> No country has done more to support the regime in Khartoum than the People’s Republic of China: no country has offered more diplomatic support, nor done more to provide money to buy the weaponry that fuels the engine of genocidal destruction. And no country has done more to insulate Khartoum from economic pressure or human rights accountability.73

The strategy included targeting both the government of China and a number of indirect targets to place pressure on China. In its direct targeting, Dream for Darfur initiated correspondence and requested meetings with senior government officials including the Chinese Ambassador to the United States. In eight formal encounters with Chinese officials, Dream for Darfur held meetings that were “pleasant and diplomatic, but not productive.”74 In what the campaign called “bank shots,” Dream for Darfur focused attention on a number of indirect targets, which included the International Olympic Committee, the US Olympic Committee, corporate sponsors, Steven Spielberg, athletes, media, and decision-makers in US Congress and the United Nations. For the most part, Dream for Darfur was unable to persuade corporate sponsors75 or the International Olympic Committee to strongly condemn the host, China.

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By this time, the coordinating organization of the SDC had joined the China Campaign\textsuperscript{76} and produced graphics, briefing papers, and fact sheets outlining the “problematic partnership” between China and Sudan and how China could “contribute to solving the Darfur crisis.”\textsuperscript{77} On its website, SDC offered a petition for visitors to send to President Hu stressing China’s “tremendous responsibility to help end the violence in Darfur.”\textsuperscript{78} With the Coalition’s combined global membership of 130 million\textsuperscript{79}, the campaign gained tremendous political power as a mass movement. Wielding this vast membership became a threat to corporate sponsors and China alike. As 2008 rolled around, the China Campaign gathered speed in the months leading up to the Games.

4.3 Enlisting the US Government as an Ally

As part of the China Campaign, the SDC engaged in indirect targeting through the US Government. Domestic pressure on the US government to condemn China proved a relatively easy course since many Congressmen had long been concerned with China, either from a human rights standpoint or security.\textsuperscript{80} Targeting China for its inaction on Darfur found little resistance.\textsuperscript{81} The support for the China Campaign was unsurprising to the advocates; as Savitt noted: “Congress likes to beat up on China.”\textsuperscript{82} Longtime critics saw the nexus of complicity with Sudan as further evidence of China’s poor behavior. US legislators took

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{76} Henceforth, the China Campaign refers to the body of activities undertaken by Dream for Darfur along with the coordinating organization of the SDC and its member organizations.
\item \textsuperscript{78} Save Darfur Coalition, “China Please Bring the Olympic Dream to Darfur,” [database on-line]; available at: www.savedarfur.org/page/content/china/(accessed 5/28/2009)
\item \textsuperscript{79} Save Darfur Coalition, “About Us,” [database on-line]; available at: www.savedarfur.org/section/about/ (accessed 1 June 2009)
\item \textsuperscript{80} A Congressional-Executive Commission on China, created in October 2000, held the specific legislative mandate “to monitor human rights and the development of the rule of law in China, and to submit an annual report to the President and the Congress.” Congressional-Executive Commission on China, “ About the Commission,” [database on-line]; available at: www.cecc.gov/ (accessed 26 June 2009)
\item \textsuperscript{81} Congressional Hill Staffers, Interviews with Author, 18-20 March 2009.
\item \textsuperscript{82} Jill Savitt, Interview with Author, 10 March 2009.
\end{itemize}
a bold step in May 2007 when 108 members of the US House of Representatives and the Senate signed a letter to President Hu Jintao with veiled threats against China’s image during Beijing’s 2008 Olympics. Without mincing words, the US legislators declared that “if China fails to do its part, it risks being forever known as the host of the ‘Genocide Olympics.’”

Throughout 2008, the reception to the China Campaign was warm on Capitol Hill and last minute hearings and resolutions supported the campaign in its final days. Special public appeals were made to Presidential candidates Senators Barack Obama and John McCain to support China-targeted legislation. Resolutions in the House and Senate, which included references to an Olympic Truce submitted by the SDC, met with considerable support. Over a dozen Congressmen signed a letter requesting that President Bush not attend the Olympics Opening Ceremonies; this plea was ultimately unsuccessful. With these measures, the US government enthusiastically joined the chorus of China critics.

In addition to Congressional support, the US government made no effort to curtail the activities of the SDC in their engagement with Chinese diplomats and officials. The SDC met with the US Department of State to discuss the Campaign and there was no opposition to the SDC conducting meetings with Chinese officials. Meanwhile, Dream for Darfur held regular calls with Special Envoy for Sudan Richard S. Williamson (appointed in 2008) to discuss putting pressure on China through the UNSC.

84 Some observers viewed the focus on China as an abnegation of the US failure to halt the violence. Critics assailed: “In pointing the finger at China, proponents of stronger action on Darfur are merely helping the White House evade moral responsibility for a humanitarian disaster that it labels a “genocide.”” Morton Abramowitz and Jonathan Kolieb, “Why China Won’t Save Darfur,” Foreign Policy, June 2007, [database on-line]; available at: www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=3847 (accessed 26 June 2009)
86 Confidential Interview with Author, 13 April 2009.
87 Allison Johnson, Interview with Author, 19 November 2008.
SDC engaged directly with political spheres in China with the tacit support of the US government.

4.4 Pivotal Month: February 12, 2008

Six months before the Games, China received two prominent messages. In February 2008, Steven Spielberg resigned as artistic adviser to the opening and closing ceremonies. After his role as artistic director was highlighted in the Farrows’ Op-ed, Spielberg had immediately responded by twice writing to the Chinese president urging him to help resolve the conflict in Darfur. When this effort failed to yield any results, Spielberg publicly issued a statement to the Chinese ambassador and the Beijing Olympic committee saying that his “conscience will not allow me to continue with business as usual.” Spielberg’s resignation followed on the heels of a dramatic Day of Action on February 12th coordinated by the Dream for Darfur campaign. A letter to President Hu was delivered to the Chinese Mission at the UN that had been signed by eight Nobel Peace Prize laureates, 13 Olympic athletes and 46 parliamentarians from around the world.

4.5 Global Dimension of the China Campaign

Though the main organizations of the China Campaign were based in the US, there were concerted efforts to foster a global movement by mobilizing resources to both raise linkage awareness to China’s relationship with Sudan and foster transnational networks among particular swathes of the global public. To raise linkage awareness globally, the SDC poured millions of dollars into an ad campaign, which ran in leading European, Asian, African and U.S. publications in February 2008. The advertisement said “The games China is hosting in Beijing can’t hide those it’s playing in Darfur.” A network called Globe

89 The Save Darfur Coalition Olympic advertisement reads: “China is doing everything possible to publicize its role as host of the 2008 summer Olympic Games. But that won’t make the world forget about China’s role in Sudan – which is anything but a game. As Sudan’s largest foreign investor, key arms supplier, and chief diplomatic sponsor, China has more power than any other nation to stop the suffering of people in Darfur. Yet
for Darfur led by SDC’s main European partner Crisis Action launched a sub-group on the China Campaign to coordinate activities across the world. During the February 12th protests, advocates in eleven countries on four continents paid visits to Chinese embassies and consulates. While efforts were made to link a global audience around Darfur, outreach to groups within China was considered risky.

In addition to engaging concerned citizens across the globe, the SDC took steps to foster transnational networks of like-minded groups in various countries with high degrees of media visibility and credibility. One transnational network was a set of Olympic athletes who became advocates for Darfur. US Olympic Gold Medalist Joey Cheek and UCLA Water Polo player Brad Greiner founded Team Darfur in the summer of 2007 as “an international coalition of athletes committed to raising awareness about and bringing an end to the genocide in Darfur, Sudan.” Team Darfur received funding and staff from the SDC and opened up its own office in Washington, DC. As the Executive Director Martha Bixby described, the idea was to make Darfur a public issue in the international community as it was in the US. Team Darfur grew to include over 450 athlete members from over 60 countries. As ambassadors, the transnational network of athletes formed a media savvy network eager to help journalists fill sports pages with athlete biographies and the cause of Darfur.

Besides participating in protests and symbolic torch relays, Team Darfur athletes were among many to deliver testimony to Congressional representatives. But the organization found itself hampered in its ability to send a strong message due to the

China’s gestures at Darfur diplomacy have been little more than attempts at public relations. Any cheers for Beijing will be silenced by our tears for Darfur. JOIN CITIZENS FROM AROUND THE GLOBE IN SAYING: CHINA MUST DO MORE TO SAVE DARFUR.” Save Darfur Coalition, "Olympic Ad,” [database on-line]; available at: www.savedarfur.org/olympic_ad (accessed 26 June 2009).

90 The organization Crisis Action also facilitated high-level advocacy discussions in European Union Capitals and launched a Muslim Coalition on Darfur. See crisisaction.org/en/

91 Martha Heinemann Bixby, "Introducing Team Darfur,” Blog for Darfur, [database on-line]; available at: blogfordarfur.org/2008/07/18/introducing-team-darfur/ (accessed 26 June 2009)

92 Martha Heinemann Bixby, Interview with Author, 4 November 2008.
sensitivity surrounding protest and politics at the Olympics. Indeed, the Team Darfur campaign moved hesitantly as it tested the waters of advocacy during the Olympics. Athletes began to be concerned about possible repercussions for their engagement. 93 With these concerns in mind, Team Darfur limited their plans for the Games to encouraging its roster of athletes to raise awareness to Darfur during interviews and panels held outside of official venues.

Dream for Darfur financed and coordinated a transnational network of survivor communities in countries that had experienced genocide. This linkage tapped into an international group that could speak with moral authority and held great potential for media coverage. Over the course of the year leading up to the Games, Dream for Darfur orchestrated a symbolic Olympic torch relay through Rwanda, Armenia, Germany, Cambodia, and Bosnia. Members of Dream for Darfur along with a Darfur survivor traveled to each country for a torch lighting ceremony with other genocide survivors holding events and press conferences. Critically, the Torch lighting in Cambodia garnered over five days of press coverage on Darfur when the government, under pressure from the Chinese government, withdrew the permit for the relay. Mobilizing a global survivor network had never been done before and as the Dream for Darfur International Organizer Allison Johnson noted, “that message was really powerful.” 94

**Beijing Summer Olympics 2008**

Since activism during the Olympic Games is limited by strict codes of conduct, there were few plans for promoting the Campaign inside China during August 2008. Indeed, China’s forceful responses to other human rights organizations like the Free Tibet campaign and the arrests of domestic activists had

93 Sponsors threatened to cancel contracts and the national committees of the International Olympic Committee contacted their athletes and warned them not to sign public statements.
94 Johnson, Interview with Author. After the Olympics, the transnational network survivor network transitioned into the Genocide Prevention Project.
made many nervous.\textsuperscript{95} For Team Darfur and its participating athletes, how China would behave as a host was a “big unknown.”\textsuperscript{96} Meanwhile, the Olympic Charter of the International Olympic Committee restricts political demonstrations within Olympic arenas and sites.\textsuperscript{97} Proscriptions against clothing bearing “propaganda” meant that the Team Darfur athletes and other activists could not identify themselves except outside of Olympic areas. Away from Beijing, Dream for Darfur held a parallel event called the “Darfur Olympics,” a weeklong, daily broadcast that was hosted by Mia Farrow from a Darfuri refugee camp.

In advance of the Olympics, China demonstrated its wariness at importing hotbeds of Darfur activism. China waited until two days before the start of the Games to revoke the visa of Joey Cheek, the co-founder of Team Darfur. When China was asked to explain its action, the organization’s director noted, “The Chinese said they weren’t required to give a reason.”\textsuperscript{98} Subsequently, the media storm surrounding the Cheek story once again brought Darfur to the forefront of the Olympic Games. The White House and various Congressmen protested the visa revocation and stories about Cheek and Team Darfur appeared in major newspapers across the globe. As a message to the Chinese government, the US Olympic team chose a Sudanese-born athlete and Team Darfur member Lopez Lomong to represent the US as flag-bearer during the Opening Ceremonies.

The SDC’s lobbying of US official circles made an impression on the White House Administration. During an interview held at the Olympics, President Bush was asked his thoughts on Joey Cheek’s visa revocation and the prospect of leveraging China on the


\textsuperscript{96} Bixby, Interview with Author.

\textsuperscript{97} Article 51 (3) reads “No kind of demonstration or political, religious or racial propaganda is permitted in any Olympic sites, venues or other areas.” International Olympic Committee, “Olympic Charter,” (Lausanne: International Olympics Committee, 2007): 98.

subject of Darfur during his time in Beijing. The President responded that he was sorry about the revocation but assured, “Joey Cheek has just got to know that I took the Sudanese message for him.” Further, Bush acknowledged the Sudan-China connection: “My attitude is, if you got relations with Mr. Bashir, think about helping to solve the humanitarian crisis in Darfur. That was my message to the Chinese government.” While athletes may have been barred from campaigning, the US President picked up the torch.

5. Measuring the Impact of the China Campaign

5.1 Degree of Influence

Let us now turn to measuring the incremental outcomes of the SDC’s campaign to shape China’s foreign policy towards Sudan. On the whole, the goal of ending conflict was not achieved. Yet, in terms of lobbying China to take certain steps, a degree of influence can be measured. Below, I assess the outcomes of the SDC’s campaign based on Schumaker’s typology of policy responsiveness with some modifications. Schumaker tracks responsiveness to an issue by zeroing in on stages of policy or issue acceptance. The increments highlight the path by which a lobbying group or an NGO insinuates itself and its issue into the decision-making process of a governmental body. These stages are: access, agenda, policy, output and impact. Though conceived as domestic markers, I adopt these categories to analyze the response of an international actor like China. As one modification, within the categories of policy and output responsiveness, I include the prospect for a “plan of action” in addition to legislation that might be adopted by the political system. Adopting a plan of action better reflects the behavior of an international target such as a government, which might not necessarily pass a specific piece of legislation on a foreign policy.

concern. By moving through these stages, we can elucidate the broader impact of the SDC:

The first step of gaining access is the critical point of entry for any group or issue. As Schumaker defines, “access responsiveness” is “the extent to which authorities are willing to hear the concerns of such a group.” Not all advocacy groups are given access to political spheres. Overall, the SDC gained a high degree of access to the official channels of the People’s Republic of China. The Chinese gave audience to the SDC through official meetings on a number of occasions to hear the concerns surrounding Darfur. There is much evidence that China was closely following the Campaign. During a meeting at the Chinese Consulate in New York, the acting general consul had printed out the entire Campaign website and written notes on what he called “inaccuracies.” Significantly, China made efforts to understand the issue and took special care to respond to and refute the claims made by the SDC.

Subsequent to various events in the China Campaign, the Chinese leadership took pains to respond publicly to the SDC through statements and position papers. The high profile defection of Steven Spielberg prompted the dismay of the Chinese leadership who had expected Spielberg’s star power to add glamour and prestige to the Olympic ceremonies. The Chinese Embassy in Washington issued a response to Spielberg’s resignation in February 2008 alluding to the claims of the SDC’s campaign noting, “As the Darfur issue is neither an internal issue of China nor is it caused by China, it is completely unreasonable, irresponsible and unfair to link the two as one.” Meanwhile, China responded crisply to US government measures; when resolutions criticizing China were brought before Congress, Chinese foreign ministry spokesman, Liu Jianchao decried, “This action itself is a blasphemy to the Olympics and runs counter to

101 Ibid 494.
103 Helene Cooper, “Spielberg Drops out as Adviser to the Beijing Olympics in Dispute over Darfur Conflict.”
the aspiration of people of all countries including the U.S.”\textsuperscript{104} The public criticism of the Campaign indicated that the SDC had touched the nerves of the Chinese government.

\begin{table}[h]
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\hline
\textbf{Stage} & \textbf{Description} & \textbf{China’s Response to the SDC} \\
\hline
Access Responsiveness & the extent to which authorities are willing to hear the concerns of such a group & China met with the SDC on numerous occasions \\
Agenda Responsiveness & The demand...is made into an issue that is placed on the agenda of the political system & China responded publicly to the claims made by the SDC \\
Policy Responsiveness & The degree to which those in the political system adopt legislation [or a plan of action] or policy congruent with the manifest demands of protest groups & China took steps to address the situation in Darfur; China took steps to curtail SDC activities \\
Output Responsiveness & Measures are taken to ensure that the legislation [or plan of action] is fully enforced & China supported the establishment of an AU-UN peacekeeping mission \\
Impact Responsiveness & The underlying grievance is alleviated & none \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{China’s Responsiveness to the SDC}
\end{table}

With intense global criticism being leveled against China’s domestic and foreign policy during the period leading up to Olympics, the China Campaign succeeded in entering the issue of Darfur on the agenda of the Chinese government. As Schumaker defines, “agenda responsiveness” occurs when “the demand...is turned into an issue that is placed on the agenda of the political system.”\textsuperscript{105} In addition to publicly rebuffing the claims of the Campaign, China took a number of steps to curtail its activities. Various cyber attacks that seemed to originate in China began to

\textsuperscript{104} Josh Gerstein, “Senate Presses on Darfur as China Fumes over ‘Evil’ House Vote,” The Sun, 1 August 2008.

\textsuperscript{105} Schumaker 494.
plague the email accounts of the Save Darfur Coalition, Team Darfur and Dream for Darfur.\textsuperscript{106} In response to the torch relays held around the world, Dream for Darfur maintains that the Chinese government attempted to restrict activities in Rwanda and was successful in shutting down the relay portion in Cambodia. China’s revocation of Joey Cheek’s visa indicated the close attention paid to SDC leadership and expectations for potential disruption of the Olympics. Team Darfur would later learn that a number of its athletes had been placed on a special watch list that was given to the United States Olympic Committee by the Chinese Embassy in Washington DC.\textsuperscript{107}

Strikingly, there is further evidence of a shift in policy within the decision-making realm. As Schumaker defines, “policy responsiveness” is “the degree to which those in the political system adopt legislation [or a plan or action] or policy congruent to the manifest demands of protest groups.”\textsuperscript{108} In the month following the publication of the Farrows’ Op-Ed in the spring of 2007, the possibility of boycotting the Olympics over China’s relationship to Sudan was raised in Congress and in media circles. Steven Spielberg’s letter to President Hu added a highly public figure to the chorus of critics.\textsuperscript{109} China began to more forcefully address the situation in Darfur. Chinese Assistant Foreign Minister Zhai Jun made a well-publicized visit to three Darfur refugee camps. At a press conference following his trip, Zhai insisted “China is willing to continue to play a constructive role on the issue of Darfur” and described efforts to urge the Sudanese to accept a UN peacekeeping plan.\textsuperscript{110} Days later, the Chinese government convinced Khartoum to allow the deployment of over 3000 interim UN troops to strengthen African Union forces.\textsuperscript{111}

\textsuperscript{106} Greenberg, “Changing the Rules of the Game.”
\textsuperscript{107} Christine Brennan, “China listed U.S. athletes as possible troublemakers,” USA TODAY, 10 October 2008.
\textsuperscript{108} Author’s modifications in brackets. Schumaker 494.
These reinforcements included 300 Chinese military engineers, an act signaling a shift in foreign policy towards Sudan.

At the same time, China took the extraordinary action of appointing its first Special Envoy for African Affairs to focus on the Darfur issue. In one formulation, Beijing’s appointment of Liu Guijin, who had been the former Chinese ambassador to South Africa and Zimbabwe, was regarded “almost certainly a result of global activist pressure.”

The fourth stage of “output responsiveness” denotes “measures taken to ensure that the legislation [or plan of action] is fully enforced.” In terms of an “output” response, China did accord with the wishes of the China Campaign on the critical subject of peacekeeping troops debated during the summer of 2007. On the UNSC, Beijing shifted its stance when Resolution 1768 came up for vote and laid aside its opposition to the proposed joint African Union-United Nations peacekeeping force. Moreover, Chinese leadership began publicly urging Khartoum to give entrance to the force. On July 31st, on the ultimate day of its control of the UNSC, China signaled its support for the establishment of a 20,000-member UN-AU mission. Through private channels, Beijing insisted that Khartoum accept the resolution. The US deputy of state John Negroponte credited China with playing “a pivotal role in brokering the agreement.” While these policy steps can never be directly linked with the campaign’s activities, there are grounds for a strong time-ordered correlation.

The combination of epistolary messages and global protests during February 2008 may also have pushed China to take action. In the wake of Spielberg’s resignation, the Chinese Special Envoy paid another trip to Sudan and made numerous statements attesting to the efforts of the Beijing to utilize its relationship with

113 Author’s modifications in brackets. Schumaker 495.
Khartoum. Liu also traveled to the UK, France, and the US to raise the subject of Darfur in diplomatic circles.

The Chinese downplay the influence of the SDC’s campaign, as it does not befit a superpower to succumb to global pressure. In conversations with Chinese officials, the appointment of the Special Envoy was shrugged off; China was following a global trend for appointing Special Envoys for hot spots like North Korean and the Middle East.\textsuperscript{115} Per China’s view, its shifting stance on Darfur can be seen as part of program to ensure stability in Africa. China emphasizes this stability in order to ensure economic development; this makes for good friends and good partners. Yet, in engaging with the SDC, China signaled its willingness to listen and take into account the concerns of the global community. Indeed, one official signaled to this author that he was interested in learning more about the SDC and its protests against China.

In conceiving the campaign, Dream for Darfur’s mission was “to use the 2008 Beijing Games as a way to press China to use its influence with the Sudanese regime to bring security to the Darfur region.”\textsuperscript{116} Dissenters to the China Campaign will rightly note that the conflict in Darfur continues. Ultimately, the Campaign did not reach the final stage of “impact”, whereby “the underlying grievance is alleviated.”\textsuperscript{117} As the Olympics came to a close, one observer bemoaned, “Darfur is today as it was a fortnight ago, and as it was when Steven Spielberg chose to boycott these Olympics in February.”\textsuperscript{118} China continues to support Sudan’s leadership despite widespread criticism. As Mahmood Mamdani concluded, “the anti-China campaign failed because China was strong enough to uphold its own

\textsuperscript{115} Confidential Interview with Author, 17 March 2009.
\textsuperscript{117} Schumaker 495.
sovereignty.” In sum, China’s interests in Sudan remained paramount.

Despite the prevailing wisdom surrounding China’s realist stance towards Sudan based on strategic interests, the SDC ignored the experts and launched their campaign. The SDC sought to gain China’s attention and shape the course of decision-making on foreign policy towards Sudan. Using the above typology to track the Campaign’s influence, the overall response of China can be considered robust, for China could have simply ignored the Campaign’s provocations. Instead, through its direct communications with the SDC and engagement with the Campaign’s concerns, China’s responsiveness moved through “access” and “agenda” to adopting policies and enforcing them according to the SDC’s demands. Moreover, we see evidence of “policy” responsiveness and some “output” responsiveness. The case of the China Campaign challenges the realist understanding of China’s foreign policy by demonstrating that a state can modify its stance out of concern for global censure. While the “impact” is still lacking since the conflict in Darfur remained unresolved, the SDC targeting of China opened up a new channel for leveraging additional actors to pressure Sudan.

6. Conclusion

The decision to target China reflects the SDC’s international venue-shopping strategy to seek additional leverage on Sudan. Since 2004, the SDC’s success in pushing US legislation had not ended the violence in Darfur. With the US limited in its ability to work with the international community to address the situation in Darfur, the movement needed to look elsewhere to apply pressure. China’s diplomatic efforts to work with Sudan behind the scenes had failed to convince activists that necessary steps were being taken. Pursuing an international-venue shopping strategy, the SDC moved beyond targeting the domestic arena and traditional venues of diplomatic interaction for states and international institutions. The movement’s targeting of China

leading up to the Beijing Olympics reflected the expanding political scope of the Darfur advocacy movement as well as the rising status of China in an interdependent world. As a potential venue, the Beijing Olympics promised global media attention. Here was an opportunity to highlight China’s foreign policy alongside the Olympic showcase of international values of harmony.

By choosing to target China, the SDC’s Campaign manipulated critical linkages in the geopolitical landscape. China’s emergence as a target of the Darfur advocacy movement stemmed from the country’s position on a complex and integrated world stage. As part of its ascent as a global superpower, China held mounting importance in international affairs. Crucially, China’s foreign policy was considered malleable due to the country’s global aspirations to be a responsible member of the international community. Divestment campaigns had already directly targeted the financial connections between Sudan and China. Using the vehicle of the Olympics, the SDC capitalized on this link between China’s extensive economic ties and its diplomatic capabilities. During the China Campaign, the SDC was successful in crafting a persuasive argument that China could play a key role in ending the conflict in Darfur. The SDC also tapped into China’s growing interest in conforming to international norms around humanitarianism and peacekeeping. The targeting of China intended to influence the country’s foreign policy around Sudan by raising linkage awareness to these features of Chinese foreign policy. The SDC maneuvered advocacy efforts to apply global pressure on China to incorporate moral suasion within its policy-making.

The SDC’s actions shaped global politics in numerous ways. In devising its campaign, the SDC mobilized resources to internationalize its advocacy efforts and amass a worldwide audience to target China. Many non-governmental organizations and individuals had long been wary of China’s human rights record and were eager to cast dispersion on the country’s behavior and motivations. Using the venue of the Olympics, the SDC sought to take advantage of the media circus surrounding the event. The Beijing Olympics were an attractive venue for advocacy campaigns to target the intersection of global
interdependence, the international community, and commerce. Additionally, the SDC fostered a number of transnational networks that brought together particular swathes of the global public including Olympic athletes and genocide survivors. Coordinated and funded by the SDC, these transnational networks became crucial vehicles through which to channel attention to the China Campaign.

In pursuing an international venue-shopping strategy, the SDC set its expectations low. That China responded to the Campaign came as a surprise to many in the Darfur advocacy circles. There is evidence that the China Campaign influenced the behavior of the Chinese leadership. While the violence in Darfur still continues, the Chinese engaged with the Campaign and took steps to address the cause of peace. As demonstrated by the typology of policy responsiveness, China was compelled to temper its realist stance and incorporate the liberal objectives of a more responsible stakeholder in the international community. Overall, the confluence of China’s positive image promotion, the Olympics 2008 as a global event, and its developing foreign policy on Africa, left China exposed to the aggressive tactics of the campaign. The SDC was successful in directing attention to China’s relationship with Sudan and pressuring the Chinese leadership to engage more publicly and forcefully with Sudan.

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ONLINE CAMPAIGN STRATEGY, WEB 2.0 TOOLS, AND VOTER PREFERENCE IN THE 2008 U.S. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

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Abstract

Can particular campaign strategies influence voters? How and why do campaigns adopt such strategies and how do these strategies help the campaign effort? Using journalistic and professional accounts to describe Barack Obama’s and John McCain’s presidential campaigns and their online strategies focused on Web 2.0 tools, the author argues that Obama’s strategy was more innovative, comprehensive, and gave him an advantage in online campaigning over McCain. Using polling data from the Pew Research Center’s Mid-October Election Survey, the extent to which voter engagement with campaign Web sites in fostering candidate support is presented. The study claims that campaign strategies do have an effect on voter preferences and that engaging with candidates via their Web sites greatly increases partisan voter support for candidates.

1. Introduction: The 2008 Election and Web 2.0 as a tool in the campaign process

The 2008 United States Presidential election was a landmark election. Its conclusion marked the rise of America’s first African American President, Barack Obama. To win, Obama and his campaign team executed one of the well-planned campaigns of the modern era. The campaign made substantial use of new media and new technologies to mobilize large numbers of supporters. In contrast, the McCain was slower and less proactive in adopting newer forms of online communications in its

1 I would like to acknowledge Assistant Professor Levente Littvay’s help on my statistical analysis, which could not have been done without his superb guidance and comments. I would also like to thank Professor Miklós Sukosd for his exceptional guidance and recommendations.
online strategy. How did the Obama campaign execute an online, Web 2.0 based strategy so much more effectively than the McCain campaign and to what extent did it aid them in the election process?

While numerous factors affected the results of this election, it is evident that engaging voters online provides numerous voters with information about candidates, engages them to gain support from others, and inspires them to go and vote. Through phenomena such as viral marketing, user-generated content, and online social networks, Web 2.0 tools were able to spread a candidate’s message to millions of voters. If campaigns recognize the potential of Web 2.0 tools, then they will benefit hugely in terms of voter mobilization and reinforcing support among their core supporters. This research will demonstrate that campaigns and campaign strategies focused on the use of Web 2.0 tools have the potential to generate large sums of money, to increase voter mobilization, and to solidify partisan support for candidates.

This article seeks to add to the existing literature on the importance of campaign effects and to move further away from traditional political science models of voter behavior which assign little to no importance to campaigns. It also stresses the necessity of candidates to adopt new technologies and new forms of political communication through new media as tools to aid them in the electoral process. A campaign which adopts a strategy with an emphasis on Web 2.0 tools which takes advantage of current and popular technological advancements to effectively spread a candidate’s message to supporters will greatly increase and solidify its partisan support.

The potential for new technology and online tools to aid campaign communication and the role of campaign effects (a campaign’s ability to influence voter preferences) on Presidential elections has not been sufficiently recognized in the existing political science literature. Media outlets, bloggers, citizens, and the campaigns themselves have all recognized the importance of campaign activities, so why have numerous political scientists, who focus instead on election forecasting models that assign little
to no importance to campaign effects, not recognized this importance?

The article will begin by exploring the role of new technology in elections and discuss how they have the potential to create advantages for campaigns. Once the role of technology is established, a definition of Web 2.0 tools will be elaborated and the benefits of an online strategy focusing on Web 2.0 tools will be provided. A brief analysis of the precise effect of campaigns in influencing elections will then be discussed. Then an in depth analysis of both the Obama and McCain campaign strategies, the reasons why each candidate pursued an online strategy, and the effectiveness of each particular strategy will be discussed. Following that analysis there will be an in-depth look at each campaign Web site and the effectiveness of the utilized Web 2.0 tools. A logistical regression analysis of polling data conducted by the Pew Research Center will provide us with concrete empirical evidence for the effectiveness of an online strategy in substantially solidifying partisan support for candidates. The final section will consider a few alternate explanations for Obama’s success and will finish by arguing that campaign effects interact with the variables that led to Obama’s victory.

2. Methodology

There has not yet been much scholarly information published about this election nor have there been many articles published about the direct role of Web 2.0 tools in voter mobilization and increasing voter support. An innovative approach to gathering information on campaign strategies and events relied on journalistic and industry accounts of the campaigns and their strategies.

There were innumerable journalistic and professional articles written about the election which included benchmarks for social network popularity throughout the campaign. These figures provide information about the number of supporters in online social networks at different moments throughout the campaign. Polling data conducted by the Pew Research Center and CNN will be used to determine voter turnout and the potential for voter
mobilization using Web 2.0 technologies. In order to obtain information on campaign finance and fundraising, the Web site and blog Opensecrets.org, which compiles and aggregates financial information on candidates directly from sources published by the Federal Election Commission, will be referenced.

To determine the effectiveness of Web usage on voter preferences, a logistical regression analysis on 6 hypothetical models using different combinations of variables including candidate preference, age, education, party affiliation, and Internet usage from the Pew Research Center’s “Mid-October 2008 Political Survey Poll” will be conducted. Data from this analysis will demonstrate whether visiting any candidates' Web site affected partisan voter choice and a voter's level of support for candidates.

3. The Role of New Technology in Elections

There are significant advantages to using the Internet as a form of new media over other forms of communication for reaching voters. The Internet “provides candidates with unmediated and inexpensive access to voters while also offering new technological options for communication and information presentation.” By taking advantage of technological advancements and incorporating those advancements into an effective campaign strategy, candidates gain advantages over their opponents in the quest for political office. “It took years for politicians to utilize television as a campaign tool,” writes David Nickerson, “and candidates are just now beginning to figure out how to use the Internet.” Obama and his campaign understood this importance much more than McCain and his campaign did.

Recently, candidates have taken advantage of technological advancements to help them raise large sums of money. “The low transaction costs and the massive economies of scale of the

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Internet,” writes Nickerson, make it a highly desirable tool for campaigning. The New York Times reports that politicians view the Internet “as far more efficient, and less costly, than the traditional tools of politics, notably door knocking and telephone banks”.

Not until 1999 did a Presidential candidate attempt to use the Internet as a campaign tool. Bill Bradley was the first to make use of online fundraising in a presidential race and he was quickly followed by Senator John McCain as each sought to gain their respective party nominations. Online fundraising was effective as a party tool not only for raising money but also for enabling supporters to feel directly involved in helping the campaign. The percentage of money raised online was minimal in comparison to the rest of their fundraising efforts and neither won their nomination. Their efforts, however, paved the way for future innovations in online fundraising and Internet-based campaign strategies.

In 2004 Presidential candidate Howard Dean changed the way that candidates could use the Internet. Dean, an early front-runner for the Democratic nomination, strategically used the Internet to mobilize a large number of supporters through Meetup.com, a Web site designed to facilitate the meeting of supporters in real life. Dean raised large amounts of money in the early stages of the Democratic primary by drawing small amounts from many. Despite Dean’s early advantage over John Kerry, Dean would inevitably end up losing the Democratic nomination. Dean still demonstrated to politicians, the media, and campaign professionals the tremendous potential of the Internet to attract attention among supporters and the mainstream media, and to

8 Nevena Rsumovic, “Obama's 2008 election campaign online: Top-down strategy meets social movement” (Final Paper for Political Communication, Central European University, 2009), 2.
raise significant amounts of money. While technological advancements in campaigns may not be the determinant factor for success, they certainly have the potential to influence the course of a campaign and their prominence in electoral campaigns is steadily increasing.\(^9\)

4. The Role of New Media in Campaign Communication

Through *new media* candidates acquire new ways to reach supporters, to tailor particular messages to be more entertaining, and to engage particular segments of society. Once supporters receive an engaging message, they can easily respond to messages and spread them to others through new forms of online media.

What particular effect can the use of new technology as a strategy by a campaign have on election results? Chapman Rackaway claims that variables such as “legislative professionalism, party affiliation, professionalism of a campaign, and money raised were not significantly related to technology use in [state legislative] campaigns”.\(^{10}\) Rackaway, however, found significant results for the use of online fund-raising technology for earning votes.\(^{11}\) His study concludes that “technology in and of itself does not bring more votes to a candidate”.\(^{12}\)

Dylan Kissane analyzed the integration of Web 2.0 technologies into the 2007 Australian Federal election in an attempt to influence voters; particularly voters in the 18-35 demographic. While Kissane hypothesized that the online efforts played a role in winning the majority of votes for the Australian Labor Party, a subsequent analysis of polling data indicated that voters were not influenced by the campaign’s online strategies.\(^{13}\) Instead, the polling data indicated that most people changed their preferences after there was a drastic shift in party leadership.

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9 Nagourney, “Internet”.
11 Ibid, 479-80.
12 Ibid. 480.
13 Kissane, “Kevin07”.

Other studies, however, have found some effect for new technology on voter turnout and support. Mary Joyce argues that the citizen journalism Web site “OhmyNews” in South Korea, an example of a new Web 2.0 application, served as a platform for mobilizing voters during the 2002 Presidential election. While the Internet is just a tool, the author argues that this tool was a significant part of the many factors that enabled a minority candidate to unseat the incumbent candidate in a Presidential election. The Internet has become, according to Costas Panagopoulos, “a formidable medium that has inspired tremendous and influential innovations in campaign communications.”

5. “Web 2.0”

In order to understand the possible effect of using Web 2.0 applications as tools during a campaign, the term “Web 2.0” must first be explained. Tim O’Reilly first explained the term and gave some basic principles for Web 2.0 applications. Firstly, the new Web 2.0 paradigm signaled the triumph of Internet platforms over individual applications, the increase of user participation, the harnessing of collective intelligence, the use of specialized databases, the potential to reach out to all users of the Web, and finally the use of that software on multiple platforms such as cell phones. These principles have led to the development of Web-based communities and applications in the form of social-networking sites, video-sharing sites, wikis, and blogs. Campaign professionals sought to take advantage of the Internet and Web 2.0 developments as their influence spread throughout American society.
This article focuses on campaign Web sites and social-networking Web 2.0 tools that allow users to interact with each other and with the publisher, to promote viral marketing, and to contribute their own content. Each of these characteristics is valuable for a political campaign in helping to increase the number of supporters, to engage with those supporters, and to promote the campaign message. New media platforms offer candidates’ direct access to increasingly larger numbers of voters.

Web-based technology has numerous advantages over older forms of technology. One key advantage that candidates sought to capture in recent elections was the use of viral marketing to spread their message. “Viral marketing”, writes Ralph Wilson, “describes any strategy that encourages individuals to pass on a marketing message to others, creating the potential for exponential growth in the message's exposure and influence.”

Web 2.0 applications provide an excellent environment for viral marketing as a result of the ease of message transmission, the vast reach of the message, and the ability of the message to expand exponentially which can also help to reinforce grassroots mobilization. New media and new technologies are particularly effective at engaging voters online but do campaign effects actually matter in elections?

6. The Interaction between Forecasting Models and Campaign Effects

It still remains disputed whether campaigns have an effect on the outcomes of elections or not. Most political scientists disagree with the media and communication scholars about the effectiveness of campaigns and have created elaborate forecasting models which attempt to predict election results months before an election. These forecast models are based entirely on data for a few key variables that often include the “popularity of the incumbent president, the state of the economy,

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20 Wilson, The six simple.
and the length of time that the president’s party has controlled the White House.”

The forecasting models created by political scientists, however, offer some compelling evidence for their case. Abramowitz’s model predicted that Obama would win with 54.3% of the major-party vote vs. 45.7% for McCain and was remarkably close to the actual percentages for the popular vote as reported by CNNPolitics.com: 53% for Obama and 46% for McCain. Finding a compelling alternative explanation is a difficult task despite the success of many of these models. Campaign effects, however, are seen as a viable alternative by communication scholars, social scientists, and media outlets.

The role of campaign communication in elections can interact with many of the variables espoused by political scientists. Johnson et al. acknowledge the disparity between the two research traditions and provide their own solution. The first tradition claims that campaign communication has a major effect on the electorate by providing information, which helps increase voter mobilization. The second tradition claims that numerous factors drive models of voter behavior including: social structure, geography, party identification, ideology, incumbent popularity, and the state of the economy.

In their landmark study, Johnston et al. question the effectiveness of forecasting models. If the models were correct in the 2000 election, they argue, then Al Gore should have won handily because President Clinton had a high approval rating and the economy was booming. Therefore, something else must have influenced the course of the election. They contend that campaign communication influenced and perhaps activated many

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22 Abramowitz, “Forecasting,” 695.
24 Johnston et al., The 2000 presidential election, 1.
25 Ibid. 3.
of these crucial variables in the forecasting models. In their theory, Johnston et al. manage to combine elements of both research traditions on elections into one cohesive theory which claims that the traditional variables espoused by political scientists “were activated and...altered by campaign communication – its overall volume, the consistency of messages across communications channels, and the rhetorical sophistication of the messages themselves.”

The authors claim that campaign “communication is critical in determining whether and if so how the economy, candidate traits, and issues function in a campaign”. Thus, while Al Gore should have prevailed in the 2000 election, he lost support due to his failure to focus on or “prime” the success of the economy, an essential variable in most forecast models.

In their study Johnston et al. provide a direct test of a view of political cognition first espoused by Lodge and his colleagues called the on-line view. Instead of voters returning to their original view once they were influenced or shocked by a message or event, they instead “quickly forget the reason for the reevaluation” and only change their minds about a political object if they receive another compelling message or get shocked again. The authors provide direct evidence for this view by relying on rolling cross-section data from the National Annenberg Election Survey for the 2000 election and by then assessing the impact of television ads on this data. When a significant shift in public opinion represented in the data follows close behind an influential message about a candidate in the news or by a large amount of campaign communication in the form of television ads,

26 Ibid. 1.
27 Ibid. 2.
28 Ibid. 4.
29 Ibid. 7.
32 Johnston et al., The 2000 presidential election, 7.
33 Ibid. 3.
the authors argue that they have demonstrated shifts in public perception based on campaign persuasion.\textsuperscript{34} Johnston and his colleagues’ unique view, therefore, allows room for chance and contingency to impact the outcome of an election and, more importantly, it allows for strategic decisions by candidates and campaigns to affect the results of an election.

7. Campaign Effects: Role of Information Dissemination

The effectiveness of a campaign in influencing public opinion also includes its role as a \textit{disseminator of information}. Research by Carpini and Keeter demonstrates that the more knowledgeable the voters are, the more likely they are to vote.\textsuperscript{35} Increased knowledge, writes Carpini and Keeter, “promotes a number of civic attitudes and behaviors that motivate participation.” Campaigns act as information disseminators in ways that are aimed at increasing the knowledge of their supporters.

In a study on both European national and parliamentary elections Gábor Tóka adds empirical evidence to the claim that information provided by campaigns can influence voter behavior if voters have fixed preferences.\textsuperscript{36} Tóka’s findings support his “different-campaign-information account” which states that the “vote gains of small parties in European elections...stem from the relatively greater campaign effort by small vis-à-vis big parties in EP elections.” It is typically perceived that European citizens tend to vote more for smaller parties in European Parliamentary (second-order) elections and then strategically vote for big parties in national (first-order) elections.\textsuperscript{37} Tóka’s empirical findings instead find that citizens are moving towards smaller parties in both national and parliamentary elections and that another factor besides strategy motivations is causing this shift—\textit{campaign}

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\textsuperscript{34} Ibid. 7.
\textsuperscript{37} Tóka, “Information,” 167.
information. The accelerated campaign efforts by small parties to inform voters, therefore, influences vote gains. Campaign effects have the potential to increase vote gains not only in European elections but also in all elections, including the American Presidential election.

8. Reaching Voters Online

The role of television as the primary agent of information dissemination is steadily decreasing as more and more Americans go online to receive information about elections and politicians. It remains unclear whether the Internet can perform the same roles as television in priming voters and setting the agenda but there is growing evidence that it can. As more voters become increasingly engaged online, campaigns must change and evolve the way that they communicate with voters. Popkin explains that voters are still “open to influence by campaigners who offer more information or better explanations of the ways in which government activities affect them.” 38 Salmore and Salmore argue that one of the results of the decline of partisanship is that parties are used less and less as a source of information about the candidates. 39 Instead, campaigns are replacing parties as a source of information about candidates. 40 Johnston and his colleagues provide empirical evidence for the role of campaigns as information disseminators by demonstrating that the “correct perception of candidates’ positions on issues was greater at the end than at the beginning”. 41 The campaign effects from competing campaigns, however, have the potential to interfere with the effectiveness of the other. Gelman and King argue that if both campaigns are waged seriously, then the

40 Salmore, Candidates, 9.
41 Johnston et al., The 2000 presidential election, 3.
information dissemination will cancel each other out. A campaign will only have a real effect if there is an information asymmetry, which could arise from one campaign being run better than the other. If this is true then a campaign that adopts a more successful strategy should then create an information asymmetry and thereby influence more voters and increase vote gains.

The particular strategies chosen by campaigns have a role in determining a campaign’s success. If campaigns did not perform any of their usual activities, then the forecasting models promoted by political scientists would not predict results accurately because campaign communications play a crucial part in activating the dependent variables.

9. Web 2.0 Strategy: The Obama Campaign vs. the McCain Campaign

This section begins by trying to understand some of the motivations and reasons for pursuing a particular Web 2.0 strategy. A four-tiered argument will be developed for explaining the reasons why each campaign adopted divergent online strategies by focusing on 1) candidate personality, 2) the influence of a candidate’s political party, 3) the involvement of industry professionals, 4) and the number of staff and volunteers working on the online strategy.

Many crucial differences between campaign strategies can be attributed to the many factors that differentiated the candidates and their campaigns from one another. The first influential factor is both candidates’ personalities and attitudes towards the Internet. John McCain for instance was purportedly unable to

even check his own e-mail, while Barack Obama was almost addicted to his mobile Blackberry device.

Much of Obama’s past helped to shape his attitudes toward the Internet. “One of my fundamental beliefs from my days as a community organizer is that real change comes from the bottom up,” Mr. Obama said in a statement. “And there’s no more powerful tool for grass-roots organizing than the Internet.” Joe Rospars, Obama’s “New Media” director also attributed Obama’s community organizer background for shaping his campaign’s technology strategy and organizing his field strategy. Obama, like Clinton, was successful because he had the drive and the “ability to set up an organization that could successfully implement and communicate his vision for the country to the voters.”

Additionally a candidate’s party affiliation can influence the nature of their online strategy. Candidates not only share the same ideology as other party members but also the negative perceptions created by other party members. Unless they break their ties with a party, these politicians are often grouped together through the good times and the bad. A look at the particular Republican and Democratic strategies in the recent congressional elections demonstrates that party affiliation can have an effect on an individual candidate’s campaign strategy.

Democratic candidates as a group were quicker to use the Internet than their Republican counterparts. In 2006, it was reported that Democratic House candidates were more likely to use the Web to mobilize voters than Republican candidates. One possible explanation for this partisan difference was perhaps that

44 Toby Harnden, "John McCain 'technology illiterate' doesn't e-mail or use Internet," Telegraph, (July 2008).
48 Newman, The marketing of the president, 14.
49 Gulati and Williams, "Closing the gap", 457-8.
“Web site mobilization was not seen as an effective means to overcome negative perceptions of congressional candidates linked by party affiliation to a now unpopular Republican administration. These Republican candidates felt that pursuing an online strategy would not help them disassociate themselves from the unpopular Bush administration.

The third crucial factor that influenced campaign strategy development was the role of direct involvement of Internet industry professionals in electoral campaigns. Unlike McCain, Obama’s campaign managed to recruit industry professionals to help to develop and manage his online strategy in conjunction with BSD, the company hired by Obama’s campaign to help develop and implement its online strategy. Chris Hughes, co-founder of Facebook, left his job to help develop Obama’s new-media campaign. Google CEO Eric Schmidt was brought on as a technology advisor for the campaign. McCain’s campaign had no such high-profile industry figures to help with its online campaigning efforts. With the help of such industry professionals Obama’s team built a stellar campaign Web site that not only improved as the campaign progressed, but also became more locally oriented and accessible.

The Obama campaign had an advantage by receiving preferential access to some of the industries best Web strategists. Blue State Digital was founded by four former members of Howard Dean’s campaign. BSD was a shrewd contribution to Obama’s campaign because “the firm can do a lot with a little: According to filings, the Obama campaign has paid Blue State not much more than $1.1 million so far [June 2008]. This firm had tremendous

50 Gulati and Williams, “Closing the gap”, 459.
51 Stelter, “The facebookeer”.
55 Lowry, “Obama’s secret”.

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previous experience in online campaigning and their foresight into recent technological trends enabled the firm to develop Obama’s widely successful social networking site My.BarackObama.com.

McCain’s 2008 online campaigning and early attempts at creating a social network faltered from the start. In July 2008 Adam Ostrow, the editor of Mashable, said that McCain’s social network McCainSpace was “virtually impossible to use and appears largely abandoned”. In contrast, under the leadership of industry professional Chris Hughes, Obama’s online social network helped supporters “join local groups, create events, sign up for updates and set up personal fund-raising pages”. From the start it seems clear that Obama had a substantial advantage over McCain.

The final reason for the success of the Obama campaign was the increased amount of resources and the number of staff and volunteers they had in comparison to the McCain campaign. In June and July of 2007, as McCain was struggling in the primaries, the organization “went from a great big campaign down to about 35 people trying to run a national campaign”. Following McCain’s New Hampshire victory on January 8th he gained much more financial support and his campaign grew back to its “great big campaign” status. The size of his campaign and the amount of resources available to the McCain campaign were still no match for the ever-growing Obama campaign. The Web site OpenSecrets.org reports that in the month of January 2008, Obama raised $20.2 million vs. $6.5 million for the month before while McCain managed to only raise $8.8 million up from $2.2 million for December 2007. The Obama campaign easily outpaced the McCain campaign’s early fundraising efforts.

While there are no official numbers available for the size of the staff for each campaign, interviews with campaign officials

56 Stelter, "The facebooker".
57 Ibid.
portray very asymmetric numbers. In a recent conference on the use of online campaigning McCain’s ‘eCampaign’ chief said that the Obama campaign had “10 times the staff we had and outspent us five to one online, three to one everywhere else”. By all accounts it appears that, from the beginning until Election Day, Obama’s campaign was much more equipped to pursue an effective online campaign than their rivals, the McCain campaign. These advantages in staff and resources helped the Obama campaign pursue an effective online strategy that was far superior to McCain’s campaign.

10. Online Support

Obama received considerably greater online support online in terms of campaign Web site hits, youtube videos watched or uploaded, or numbers of friends and supporters on social networking Web sites during the campaign. Table 1 shows numbers of followers and friends on Nov. 3, the day before Election Day. Obama dominates McCain across the board, often having up to 3.8 times more supporters on both MySpace and Facebook.

Obama was demonstrably more popular among Internet users and there are several reasons that could account for this increased popularity. First, Obama’s supporters may be more likely to be Internet users than McCain users. Second, Obama’s campaign message was more powerful than McCain’s and Obama’s favorable image in the mainstream media drove more people to support Obama on the Internet. Finally, as a result of the four factors elaborated in the previous section, the Obama campaign simply had more online presence because they had more resources and support to put into a Webcentric strategy, which then translated into greater online support.

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59 Newsmax.com, "Obama, McCain".
60 Ibid.
### Table 1. Snapshot of Presidential Candidate Social Network Stats: Nov 3, 2008

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Obama</strong></td>
<td>2,379,102 supporters</td>
<td>833,161 friends</td>
<td>1792 videos uploaded since Nov 2006</td>
<td>Subscribers: 114,559</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>McCain</strong></td>
<td>620,359 supporters</td>
<td>217,811 friends</td>
<td>329 videos uploaded since Feb 2007</td>
<td>Subscribers: 28,419</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data from a June 2008 Pew Report reports that more than one third of online Democrats (36%) have a profile on a social networking site in contrast to only 21% for online Republicans.\textsuperscript{61}

For the question “Have you signed up as a friend of any of the candidates on a social networking site?” 12% of social network users reported they had signed up as a friend of Obama while only 7% had signed up as friends of McCain.\textsuperscript{62} The differences in these percentages translate directly into numbers of reliable supporters. The Pew report claims that much of these differences can be attributed to “the relative youth of those who self-identify as Democrats”.\textsuperscript{63} While both young Republicans and Democrats use online tools such as online video at nearly the same rates, there are simply more young, tech-savvy Democrats than there are Republicans.\textsuperscript{64} The focus of the Obama campaign on Web 2.0 tools and online campaigning was aimed at capturing and influencing these young voters.

Interestingly though, the basic measures of Internet use by party reported by Pew show that more Republicans go online than Democrats (78% compared to 74%) and roughly the same percentage of Democrats and Republicans claim to use the Internet, email, or text messaging to learn about the campaign and engage in the political process (49% of Republicans and 50% of Democrats).\textsuperscript{65} While Democrats and Republicans are using the Internet in roughly the same numbers, Democrats are increasingly more active in social networking sites. Perhaps Democrats who visit Obama’s campaign Web site find it easier to register to become a

\textsuperscript{62} Smith and Rainie, “The Internet”, 15.
\textsuperscript{63} Ibid. 12.
\textsuperscript{64} Ibid. 12.
\textsuperscript{65} Ibid. 12.
supporter and to join his unique social network than Republicans visiting John McCain’s Web site and his online social network.

11. Campaign Web Sites and Web 2.0 Strategy

Near Election Day, both McCain and Obama had innovative and well-designed campaign Web sites. Each had sections for volunteering, providing contact information, donating money, and spreading the message among others. From the beginning of the campaign season McCain’s Web site was not always as fine-tuned as Obama’s. By the end of the campaign, however, McCain had caught up with the Obama team in terms of soliciting donations, registering supporters and volunteers, and in overall Web site design. By the end of the campaign, McCain’s Web site looked remarkably similar to Obama’s and included many of the same features. “The [Obama] campaign’s successful new-media strategy is already being studied as a playbook for other candidates, including the presumptive Republican nominee, Senator John McCain.” So how exactly did the Obama team develop such an excellent Web site laden with easy-to-use interactive features and Web 2.0 tools?

A case study of Obama’s campaign Web site by Blue State Digital reports that “the campaign of President Barack Obama knew they needed to build an unprecedented community outreach program”. Obama’s team used the 2004 Presidential race as a guide, noting the importance of “online contributions, online activism, and online community-building”. BSD claims they were chosen because the campaign needed a powerful technology platform that could power these Web 2.0 features. The Obama campaign also

66 Refer to Appendix B for screenshots of each campaign’s Web site.
67 Refer to Figure 1 in Appendix B.
68 Stelter, “The facebooker”.
70 Blue State Digital, “Case study”.
111 Ibid.
took many cues from the success of MySpace and Facebook.\textsuperscript{72} Obama’s team realized the power of Web 2.0 tools in social networking sites and sought to harness them as a formidable campaign tool.

In Mid-September the Pew’s Project for Excellence in Journalism (PEJ) noted that for much of the campaign Obama clearly had an online advantage.\textsuperscript{73} However, the study finds that following the Republican National Convention, McCain’s official Web site covered significant ground in catching up with Obama’s official Web site by “substantially improv[ing] its customization and socialization tools to encourage online networking with fellow supporters and offline grassroots activity”.\textsuperscript{74} Despite the advances of McCain’s online campaign, his official campaign Web site still lagged behind in many ways. The numbers of visitors reflects this asymmetry between the two sites. Of the all the visitors to campaign Web sites 72\% of visitors went to Obama’s page while only 28\% visited McCain’s.\textsuperscript{75} What were some of the particular features of Obama’s Web site that attracted so many more unique visitors?

12. Online Campaign Tools

Barack Obama’s social networking site (MyBarackObama.com) was “extensive and active for months”.\textsuperscript{76} McCain’s social networking site (McCainSpace.com) was clumsy and difficult to use and was only fully operational in August 2008, less than 3 months before Election Day. When it finally did become operational, it enabled users to post videos, pictures, and blogs to their home pages and to forward information to numerous other social networking sites.\textsuperscript{77} McCain’s site

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{72} Stelter, “The facebooker”.  \\
\textsuperscript{73} PEJ. “McCain vs. Obama”, 1.  \\
\textsuperscript{74} PEJ. “McCain vs. Obama”, 1.  \\
\textsuperscript{75} PEJ, “McCain vs. Obama”, 2.  \\
\textsuperscript{76} PEJ. “McCain vs. Obama”, 3.  \\
\textsuperscript{77} PEJ. “McCain vs. Obama”, 4.  \\
\end{flushleft}
included basic functions for grassroots support but Pew reports that because of the poor design of many of these functions it was often difficult for the user to become involved.\textsuperscript{78}

In contrast, MyBarackObama.com allowed users to join groups, connect with other users, plan events, raise money, and volunteer.\textsuperscript{79} During the primary season, Obama’s success at using these online tools to generate offline activities is remarkably apparent in Table 2. In the major cities of upcoming primary contests, the number of events organized by Obama supporters far surpassed the number of events organized by Hillary Clinton and John Edwards supporters.\textsuperscript{80}

**Table 2. Number of Offline Campaign Events Organized by Online Tools January 15, 2008**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Los Angeles</th>
<th>Denver</th>
<th>New York</th>
<th>Raleigh</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Obama</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>292</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clinton</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edwards</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Data retrieved from techpresident.com/blog-entry/democratic-race-obama-dominating-online-organizing-offline-events (accessed on June 1, 2009).

Users on Obama’s Web site had several tools at their fingertips to help them engage with Obama’s campaign efforts. Through MyBarackObama.com users could track their progress and report it back to the campaign to earn “points” for their achievements as an added incentive.\textsuperscript{81} McCain also included a “leader board” that ranked the top activists on his site for the week. The kind of online support for grassroots

\textsuperscript{78} PEJ. “McCain vs. Obama”, 8.
\textsuperscript{79} PEJ. “McCain vs. Obama”, 7.
\textsuperscript{81} PEJ. “McCain vs. Obama”, 8.
mobilation on Obama’s site greatly helped to organize Obama’s ground operation.

Obama took a uniquely Web 2.0 approach to updating his supporters by crossing platforms from the Internet to mobile phones. His campaign notified supporters of Obama’s Vice-Presidential pick via sms. While the success of this tactic was debatable, it could have helped drive people to check the official Web site for more details and to have people alert others as well.

The prevalence of candidates on social networking Web sites was very asymmetrical and reflects the organization of each campaign’s Web site. Unlike the Obama Web page in September 2008, Pew reports that “McCain’s Web site does not link to any social networking sites on its home page but maintains a presence on six: MySpace, Facebook, YouTube, Digg, Flickr and LinkedIn. But is it up to supporters to find these pages on their own”. Obama maintained a substantial advantage in numbers of supporters on social networking Web sites and also had official presence in many more social networking sites than McCain. Both candidates made use of their Web sites as platforms for informing their supporters about issues and news about the campaign in similar ways.

Lastly, each campaign Web site offered users the opportunity to watch videos of the candidates’ recent speeches, campaign ads, and streaming video from the campaign trail. The Obama campaign benefited much more from political action committees such as MoveOn.org to use video as a viral marketing tool to spread their message. MoveOn.org created two opportunities for the spread of viral videos. The first was a public contest asking supporters to create their own creative 30 second ads “that will engage and enlighten viewers and help them understand the grassroots energy that's driving

83  PEJ. “McCain vs. Obama”, 10.
84 PEJ. “McCain vs. Obama”, 12-14..
85 The winning videos can be viewed at obamain30seconds.com/ (accessed May 22, 2009).
Barack Obama’s campaign. Celebrity judges helped decide the winners along with 5.5 million votes for 1,100 videos. The second humorous video “prompts the user to personalize it by adding a name of the recipient, who would then be featured throughout the video as the single person whose failure to vote brought about Obama’s alleged election defeat.” Clever videos such as these gained a lot of attention and incentivized people to spread Obama’s message virally.

For the entire course of the Election the Obama campaign dominated the McCain campaign in nearly every aspect of online campaigning. Their strategy involved creating a user-friendly Web site full of Web 2.0 tools designed to make it easy for supporters to join in the campaign effort from providing contact information and listing the ways they would be willing to volunteer, donate money, call other potential voters from their own homes, organize events, and interact with one another on social networking Web sites. McCain’s team made a strong effort to compete with Barack Obama’s success but they lacked industry support, an effective user-friendly design for their campaign Web site, and the innovative new online Web 2.0 based tools used for organizing supporters. In the end, McCain’s social networking site could never be as popular or engaging as Obama’s site. While one candidate was clearly superior to the other in the Internet realm, can a significant effect on voter preference be demonstrated from being an Internet user, receiving campaign e-mails, or visiting a campaign Web site? The following section demonstrates that yes, these variables can have an impact on voter’s preferences.

26 MoveOn.org. “Obama”.
87 The video can be viewed at www.cnnbcvideo.com/?referred_by=10960978-RuXw.3x&combined=Sherri%20Freeman&first=Sherri&name_id=3753325&last=Freeman&id=&nid=DdXHoqe..1fan1VFgsuTcTM3NTMzMJu- (accessed May 22, 2009).
13. Logistical Regression Analysis: Campaign Effects

Using the Pew Research Center’s Mid-October Political Survey, a comparison of several variables were used to try to understand the effect of the Internet and Web 2.0 tools on voter preferences in the 2008 Presidential election. The Pew Center’s poll asks numerous questions about Internet usage. The variables for 6 unique models of voter behavior include the dependent variable—voter preference for either McCain or Obama—and three independent control variables for voter preference: age, party ID, and education level. All the findings are presented in Table 3 with the B coefficients placed on top of the Exp (B) coefficients.

All of the control variables performed as expected. The third model gets to the core of the issue of the effectiveness of Web 2.0 tools in a campaign by asking the question: “Thinking about this year’s elections, have you visited any of the candidates’ Web sites on the Internet, or not?” By using the results of this question as an independent variable we can directly test the effectiveness of visiting a campaign Web site on voter preference for Obama and McCain. The logistical regression analysis of this model found that any person who visited a candidates’ Web site is 2.2 times more likely to vote for Obama. This result coincides with the hypothesis that the use of Web 2.0 tools as a strategy has some effect on voter preference. As mentioned before, the result could also reflect the fact that more Democrats are viewing campaign Web sites than Republicans. Pew reports that Obama’s “draws almost three times as many unique visitors each week”. This asymmetry of visitors skews the likelihood of preferences and also strongly indicates a positive role for campaign effects: the Obama team simply did a much better job at attracting and engaging voters through their Web site than the McCain team.

89 For a list of questions and variables found in Pew’s survey please refer to the Appendix A.
90 Descriptions for the variables in each model are given in the Appendix.
91 PEJ. “McCain vs. Obama”, 1.
Table 3. Logistic Regression Data from Pew Mid-October Poll 2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Model 1 (iuser)</th>
<th>Model 2 (q421)</th>
<th>Model 3 (q43e1)</th>
<th>Model 4 (q441)</th>
<th>Model 5 (partyWeb)</th>
<th>Model 6 (RepWeb)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age by demographic</td>
<td>-.389</td>
<td>-.329</td>
<td>-.300</td>
<td>-.296</td>
<td>-.319</td>
<td>-.319</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party ID 1 (Rep/Dem)</td>
<td>5.511</td>
<td>5.72</td>
<td>5.623</td>
<td>5.623</td>
<td>5.079</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education level</td>
<td>.106</td>
<td>.026</td>
<td>.064</td>
<td>.093</td>
<td>.047</td>
<td>.047</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internet user</td>
<td>1.112</td>
<td>1.027</td>
<td>1.066</td>
<td>1.098</td>
<td>1.048</td>
<td>1.048</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have you received e-mails about</td>
<td>.501</td>
<td>1.651</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5.079</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the candidates or campaigns?</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have you visited any of the</td>
<td>.797</td>
<td>2.218</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3.173</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>candidate’s campaign Web site?</td>
<td>**</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do you ever use social networking</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3.559</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Web sites?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>35.2*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction variable with Party</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ID 1 and campaign Web site</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>question</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party ID 2 (Dem/Rep)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5.079</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.006*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The fifth model is unlike the other models and includes an interaction variable created by multiplying the first party ID variable with the campaign Web site variable. The coefficients for this variable show the impact of being a Democrat who visited campaign Web sites on their preferences for Obama. When the coefficients from the party ID variable and the interaction variable are added and the exponent is taken the result demonstrates that Democrats who also viewed a campaign Web site are 5,642 times more likely to prefer Obama than McCain. The likelihood of voters choosing Obama based on party ID alone is only 160 times.

A huge increase in the likelihood of Democrats choosing Obama, based on whether Democrats viewed a campaign Web site (5,642 times) or not (only 160 times), is reported. Such a huge difference between these two variables indicates that Democrats who viewed Obama’s campaign Web site were much more likely to choose him. These findings demonstrate the insurmountable effect of campaign strategy, campaign communication, and online engagement for increasing the amount of partisan support for candidates. The difference between Democrats who viewed a campaign Web site and those who did not was nearly 30 fold. This substantial increase could be the result of 1) the user’s engagement with Web 2.0 tools on the Web site and their interaction with other supporters, 2) donations from users online which helped to

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interaction variable with Party ID 2 and campaign Web site question</th>
<th>** 1</th>
<th>-</th>
<th>3.559</th>
<th>.028*</th>
<th>**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% Correct</td>
<td>93.9</td>
<td>94.5</td>
<td>94.3</td>
<td>94.3</td>
<td>94.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>.808</td>
<td>.828</td>
<td>.823</td>
<td>.820</td>
<td>.831</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chi Squared</td>
<td>148.2*</td>
<td>1238.7</td>
<td>1235.</td>
<td>1229.</td>
<td>1256.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>**</td>
<td>***</td>
<td>8***</td>
<td>6***</td>
<td>1***</td>
<td>1***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Significant at .1. **Significant at .05. ***Significant at .01.
create a stronger connection with the campaign effort, and 3) user’s signing up to volunteer on campaign Web sites.

While voters who reported not viewing a campaign Web site are still very likely to prefer Obama, the reason for the considerably lower amount might be an indication that these voters are less engaged, less willing, and perhaps too busy to support the campaign effort than voters who did view the campaign Web site. Clearly many voters are very responsive to online campaign efforts because these efforts had a remarkable role in increasing partisan support among Democrats for Obama. Does the same hold true, however, for Republicans who also visited a campaign Web site?

To test this theory I ran a sixth model with a recoded party ID variable to analyze the effectiveness of visiting a campaign Web site with their preference for John McCain. A second interaction variable was created and the results were consistent with the theory. Identified Republicans were 166.7 times more likely to indicate a preference for McCain and Republicans who viewed any campaign Web site were 5,649 times more likely to prefer McCain as well. These results help to strengthen support for the claim that campaigns and particularly campaign Web sites have an effect in solidifying partisan support for candidates.

Even if an opponent’s Web site is more engaging and interactive it will nonetheless fail to convince a Republican to vote for Obama. However, both Democrats and Republicans who did visit campaign Web sites became considerably more engaged with and supportive of their candidate of choice.

14. Additional Factors That Contributed to Obama’s Victory

No single factor can determine an election. An election is the result of an aggregate of factors coming together in some form to persuade voters to vote in higher numbers for one candidate over the other. In offering some alternative...
explanations it becomes possible to understand the successful interaction of these factors with Obama’s online strategy.

The crucial factors for election forecasting models are visible in a society months before an election. In the 2008 election there were several key variables which foreshadowed Obama’s victory including the state of the economy, the unpopularity of the Bush administration, and the fact that Republican’s had been in office for two terms. If people are satisfied with the state of the economy they will be more willing to vote for the incumbent party but, with the onset of the world economic crisis in September 2008, voters were more willing to blame the Bush administration and the Republican Party for the poor state of the economy and to look towards Obama and the Democrats for a viable solution.

Bush’s unpopularity in the months (and even years) leading up to the 2008 election provides more support for Abramowitz’s time-for-change model. In mid July 2008, he reports, Bush saw only a 31% approval rating vs. a 61% disapproval rating. If voters disapprove of the job of the incumbent administration, why would they then vote for a new McCain administration that many saw as just a continuation of the Bush administration?

Voters tend to shift their preferences over time, becoming dissatisfied with the incumbent party and shifting their allegiance. Obama’s message resonated with millions of Americans who were deeply dissatisfied with the current administration. With all of these factors accounted for in Abramowitz’s model, he predicted that Obama would win with 54.3% of the major-party vote vs. 45.7% for McCain, which demonstrates the potential power of these factors in predicting and explaining election results. The role of the campaign effort throughout the many months of the campaign cannot be discounted though.

92 Abramowitz, "Forecasting," 695.
93 Ibid. 695.
There are two basic lines of reasoning for a campaign effects explanation. The first is that particular events during the campaign can impact public opinion and make voters more or less likely to vote for a campaign. The second is based on the idea that steadfast campaign trends such as a candidate’s personality and campaign strategy can also affect voter preferences. Most voters who identify with a particular party are unlikely to shift their preferences based on campaign effects but there is a growing number of undecided voters who are more susceptible to campaign persuasion.

There were a few key events that journalists emphasize contributed to McCain’s downfall. For instance, when McCain chose Sarah Palin as his Vice-President at the Republican convention he was lambasted by liberal pundits and but also by the conservative right in his party. Furthermore, there was significant and outspoken doubt among many in the media about Sarah Palin’s lack of credentials and qualifications.

Lastly, the Obama campaign was run in superb fashion, severely limited mistakes, and created tremendous amounts of support through grassroots mobilization. The Obama campaign’s strategy incorporated unprecedented reach and thoroughness to contact voters. Their field campaign could call voters and also to go door-to-door to canvass supporters all across the country. Obama’s campaign volunteers created an organization focused at the neighborhood level, which gave local volunteers exceptional training to enable them to lead their very own organization efforts. These well-trained volunteers became team leaders who were capable of managing their own field teams, organizing more supporters, and spreading the campaign message. These splinter cell volunteer groups then reported their progress back to the

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campaign headquarters and were given advice but also considerable independence in their campaigning efforts.

The motto of Obama’s field campaign was “Respect. Empower. Include.” Obama’s field campaign empowered volunteers, gave them significant responsibilities, and turned them into effective organizers. Exley explains the significance of Obama’s organizing campaign and why it was so effective:

But the Obama campaign is the first in the Internet era to realize the dream of a disciplined, volunteer-driven, bottom-up-AND-top-down, distributed and massively scalable organizing campaign.

It appears overall that Obama’s campaign was more expertly run on many different levels—starting from the top with Obama himself to the canvasser going door-to-door in Middletown, Ohio—than the McCain campaign. Obama and his campaign made deliberate and coordinated use of the Internet and Web 2.0 tools to aid them in their campaign efforts which succeeded in significantly increasing partisan support. Obama’s field campaign used online technology to recruit and coordinate their volunteers. When users registered on Obama’s Web site they had the opportunity to list the ways in which they would be willing to volunteer and the interaction between campaign and supporter was brought off-line to incorporate, mobilize, and include supporters in the campaign effort. By working in tandem with successful online and offline strategies, Obama’s campaign built a vast and extensive network of volunteers and supporters that proved crucial in his victory.

16. Conclusion

The effectiveness assigned to campaign effects and campaign strategy with regard to technological innovation is much more influential than is currently espoused in the mainstream

95 Exley, “The new organizers”.
96 Exley, “The new organizers”.

596
political science literature. Forecasting models provide some degree of explanatory power but many of the variables active in these models first require priming and activation by campaign communication. This research demonstrated that Obama’s campaign deliberately pursued an online strategy to make the greatest use of new media and new forms of technology to generate support among Democrats and undecided voters by engaging voters to easily participate in the campaign process and providing them with campaign information to increase their knowledge and their likelihood to vote. An effective online strategy focusing on the use of Web 2.0 tools can substantially increase partisan support for a candidate by spreading that message to others both online and offline.

Obama and his campaign understood the advantages of having an innovative online campaign strategy early on and pursued this strategy very aggressively. Obama’s campaign strategy was successful because of Obama’s personality, the large amount of staff and resources available to his campaign, and the incorporation of Internet industry professionals into the campaign effort. The McCain campaign only recognized this advantage much later in the race but was never able to put together the same kind of expertise or dedicate the same amount of staff and resources to its online effort as the Obama campaign.

Both candidate Web sites encouraged users to conduct offline activities, such as volunteering their labor or planning events with the help of online tools. But Obama’s Web site did so in a way that was more comprehensive, more sophisticated and easier to use than McCain’s. The Obama campaign saw a distinct advantage in online supporters because of this extraordinary effort: voters who viewed a campaign Web site were almost 2.2 times more likely to vote for Obama. He also received significantly more support in major Web 2.0 websites including Facebook, MySpace, and youtube. Lastly, the project demonstrated quite visibly the impact of viewing a campaign Web site in substantially increasing the likelihood of partisan
voters supporting their candidate over partisan voters who did not view campaign Web sites.

These findings demonstrate the increasing power and influence of the Internet as a form of new media in political communication. The Internet is overtaking the role of Television and Newspapers as an agenda-setter. Obama’s success will certainly be studied and copied by candidates in upcoming elections. Foreign campaigns can also learn from Obama’s success and adopt online strategies that can aid in the promotion of democracy by engaging more voters and increasing their political knowledge. Lastly, this research shows that by engaging voters online, candidates can substantially increase their connection with their supporters and the likelihood of them voting and convincing others to vote as well. No longer will the Internet be a neglected or secondary form of campaign communication in political elections.

Theories of campaign fundraising and campaign mobilization were only briefly touched upon in this analysis. An emphasis on fundraising can demonstrate how Obama’s online effort helped him to raise so much more money than McCain. By elaborating on theories of mobilization, future researchers can understand the intricacies behind the rise of partisan support generated from voters interacting with campaign Web sites and what sort of advantage this gives candidates for increasing political support. A detailed look at the interaction between Obama’s field organizing efforts and his online strategy could help to contribute to our understanding of how the Internet can help mobilize and engage people offline.

A more precise study of the effects of Web site use on voter support using detailed opinion polls and an in-depth content analysis of campaign Web sites for the 2008 Election could show a relationship between Internet use and candidate support. Future research could also focus on the role that online strategies play in fostering support among young voters, aged 18-29, and whether an online strategy directly increases voter turnout and its effect on election results.
This project focused primarily on Republican and Democratic voters and future studies could research whether online strategies for third party candidates can help increase vote share. Future research can also demonstrate the growing effect of undecided and independent voters on determining election outcomes. Lastly, a greater synthesis can be created between election forecasting models and theories of campaign effects to provide a greater understanding of election results now that there is a clearer picture of the impact of campaigns and online strategies on election outcomes.

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Nickerson, David W. “The ineffectiveness of E-vites to democracy: Field experiments testing the role of E-mail on voter turnout” Social Science Computer Review 25, no.4 (2007): 494.


Appendix A: Pew Mid-Oct 2008 Political Survey Variables

Pew Research Center Poll # 2008-10MID:
Mid-October 2008 Political Survey--2008 Presidential Election

The variable “age” was recoded into “agedem” to be continuous and to place people into demographic brackets. (1 = 18-29, 2 = 30 – 44, 3 = 45-64, 4 = 65+)

The variable “party” was recoded into “newparty” to include only democrats and republicans. (0 = republicans, 1 = democrats)

EDUC What is the last grade or class that you completed in school?
1 None, or grade 1-8
2 High school incomplete (Grades 9-11)
3 High school graduate (Grade 12 or GED certificate)
4 Business, Technical, or vocational school AFTER high school
5 Some college, no 4-year degree
6 College graduate (B.S., B.A., or other 4-year degree)
7 Post-graduate training or professional schooling after college (e.g., toward a master's Degree or Ph.D.; law or medical school)
9 Don't know/Refused (VOL.)

The variable “educ” was recoded into “edu” and changed None, or grade 1-8 to 1, and so forth and eliminated the “Don’t know/Refused” choice to make the answers continuous in scale.

The variable iuser remained unchanged. (0 = Not a user, 1 = Internet user)

All of the question variables (q42, q43e, and q44) were recoded and labeled with a 1 at the end so that 0 = no and 1 = yes (q421, q43e1, q441).
Q.42 Have you received e-mails about the candidates or campaigns from any groups or political organizations, or not?
   1 Yes
   2 No
   9 Don’t know/Refused (VOL.)
Q.43 Thinking about this year’s elections, have you [INSERT ITEM; RANDOMIZE a THRU d, WITH e AND f ALWAYS LAST] on the Internet, or not?
   e. Visited any of the candidates’ Web sites {11-07 GP}
      1 Yes
      2 No
      9 Don’t know/Refused (VOL)
Q.44 Do you ever use online social networking sites like MySpace or Facebook? {12-07} {QID:qid20240}
   1 Yes
   2 No
   9 Don’t know/Refused (VOL)

Appendix B: Screenshots of Campaign Web sites
Figure 1. Screenshot of early McCain campaign Web site March 7, 2007.

Figure 2. Screenshot of McCain Web site on June 5, 2008.


Figure 3. Screenshot of Obama campaign Web site on June 5, 2008.

“Whose Affirmative Action is Affirmative?”
Lessons from Tanzania

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Abstract

Elections in Tanzania have resulted into the underrepresentation of women in the formal decision making organs particularly the parliament. To address this problem the government introduced women special seats as one of the ways to empower women to participate in making decisions that affect their concerns. The threshold level for such special seats was set at 15 percent in the 1995 elections, 20 percent in the 2000 elections and it was increased to 30 percent of all the parliamentary seats in the 2005 elections. This article argues that while there is a positive trend in terms of the numerical representation via an affirmative action system, the same is yet to be owned by women themselves. The affirmative action in Tanzania is strategically used to divide women and to further the interests of political parties, particularly the ruling party. Thus, women struggles for their inclusion in the formal decision making organs should simultaneously demand for the need to owning the affirmative action itself.

1. Introduction

The invisibility of women in politics is a worldwide historical phenomenon. Such exclusion traces back to the first democracy of the Athenian society in Greece. Lakof1 observes that not only women but also slaves and metics were barred from participating in the Greek democracy. Indeed, Athenian democracy was by and large a democracy for slave-owners. As such Nzomo2 contends that “…democracy in a class society

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1 Sanford Lakof, Democracy: History, Theory, Practice (United States: Westview Press 1996), 1
is an ideological weapon that serves the interests of the dominant class, that the dominated class have, through history, been subjected to varying degrees of exploitation and oppression, depending on such intervening factors as the historical period, sex and cultural identity. It is argued that women, as an intra-class sexual category, have historically suffered and continue to experience the worst forms of oppression and exploitation, despite the central position they occupy in the production process of current and future wealth and labour." It should be noted that the invisibility of women in politics is also a common phenomenon in classless societies since patriarchal culture predated classes. Yet Ferree\(^3\) sees the invisibility of women in politics to be neither natural nor inevitable. To address the invisibility problem, most governments adopted affirmative action. The centrality of that action is to affect inclusion of the marginalised groups into the major decision making organs, employment, and education to mention a few.

Thus, Brest and Oshige\(^4\) define an affirmative action as a program initiated to seek remedy of the significant underrepresentation of members of certain racial, ethnic or other groups through measures that take group membership or identity into account. This definition emphasizes on descriptive representation where inclusion of the underrepresented group is assumed to cure exclusion. It does not focus on substantive representation of the agenda and interests of the members to be represented. However, critics of affirmative action pose one fundamental question: Is affirmative action inherently preferential, discriminatory, and thus inconsistent with the constitution’s guarantee of equal protection?\(^5\). Collier responds to this question in the

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\(^1\) Myra Ferree, "Beyond Separate Spheres: Feminism and Family Research, Journal of Marriage and Family", 52 (1990): 866-884


affirmative. Similarly, Farber\(^6\) sees affirmative action as the reverse discrimination. To them if the constitution stipulates the equality of opportunity and avoids in any way mentioning any sort of discrimination, that alone is sufficient to protect every individual. The underlying emphasis of this view is “equality of opportunity” and not “equality of outcome”. Writing on the American political system, Jeffrey\(^7\) puts that “No matter how hard politicians run from it, this issue is not going away. The Declaration of Independence, for example, does not say that because of past discrimination some are more equal than others. It does not say that for some pursuit of happiness needs to be constrained because of past privileges; no, it insists, boldly, that here in America, we are all equal under the law”. While this argument is convincing, it is narrow and too legalistic. For one thing, it fails to point out important issues like who enacted that Declaration and for whose interests. It is ridiculous to argue that all people are equal before the law without looking deeper into those laws themselves. One may raise questions, for example, were women in the process of enacting that Declaration? How are their concerns taken care into account? The fact that women in America won the voting franchise around 1920 raises doubt on the fairness of the laws themselves.

In Tanzania women constitute the majority of the population\(^8\) and the most voters\(^9\) countrywide. They also provide 80 percent of labour force in rural areas and 60 percent of food production\(^10\). However, they are often not motivated to invest on land protection or management because they are


\(^8\) According to the last National Census of 2002 women constituted 17,658,911 and male 16,910,321 out of the total population of 34,569,232 (Tanzania mainland and Zanzibar). See the United Republic of Tanzania, 2002 National Census, Government Printer.

\(^9\) Women registered voters in the 1995 elections were 48 percent, in 2000 were 49 percent and in 2005 were 51percent (National Election Commission Reports 1996, 2001, 2006)

prevented from receiving bank credits or support. The land tenure system prevents women from owning land and making decisions over its use. Indeed, the overall economic situation of women worsens even in other sectors as indicated by the African Gender and Development Index (AGDI) that the equality in economic power “opportunities” between women and men decreased by 10 percent between 1995 and 2000 while equality in access to resources deteriorated by 50 percent. This has led to women having lower incomes than men, though it is not possible to assess differences in consumption between individuals. Yet, women experience sexual assault and rape with the number increasing every year. The actual situation is more alarming because many rape cases are never reported due to social stigma, biased laws and complicated legal procedures. It was believed that if women were to sit in the decision making organs they would change the situation by influencing decisions that address their problems. And therefore at the eve of multiparty system in 1992, the Nyalali proposed 15 percent of women’s representation in the parliament through the affirmative action. This numerical representation of women was increased to 20 percent in 2000 and 30 percent in 2005. But one strict condition associated with the affirmative action in Tanzania is that it should be effected through political parties. And as a general rule, parties endorse individuals who are more likely to defend their ideological interests, even if those interests

11 Fennela Mukangara and Betha Koda, Beyond Inequalities, Women in Tanzania, (WIDSAA/SARDC, 1997), 23
12 Report on African Gender and Development Index (AGDI)-the Tanzania Report, Prepared by Tanzania Gender Networking Programme (TGNP), February, 2005, 4
13 See the report highlights of the 2000/01 Tanzanian Household Budget Survey (HBS), conducted by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). It was the largest-ever household survey in Tanzania, covering more than 22,000 households – and an important achievement for the NBS.
14 Beyond Inequalities, 58
15 The Presidential Commission on Single Party or Multiparty System in Tanzania 1992 (Volume 1), Dar es Salaam University Press. The Chairman of this Commission was the late Chief Justice, Francis L. Nyalali, and hence the commission is popularly known as “Nyalali Commission”. The report was submitted on 17 February 1992.
16 The 30 percent was also a target set by the Beijing Platform for Action and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) for the national parliament.
contradict with the interests of promoting women’s and gender equality issues. In the context of Tanzania’s male dominated political parties, the parties will only support some quotas or affirmative action which favour their position, rather than those which will substantially transform party politics and finally have a larger impact on the political playing field. Brown argues thus, “In terms of the reform process’s effects on women, the most apparent change has been an increase in women’s representation within the state itself. However, while changes in legislation leading to greater recognition and support of women’s rights and concerns have occurred, they are limited and somewhat disappointing”.

Against the above backdrop, the intention of this paper is threefold: firstly, to address the question as to why women’s representation in Tanzania is so strictly tied to political parties; secondly, to investigate whose interest does the current arrangement of the affirmative action in Tanzania serve; and thirdly, to question whether political parties are viable instruments for women’s interests representation. These questions are relevant as far as representative democracy is concerned. As Tripp correctly posits, “one of the most complex and critical issues facing organized societal actors in Africa today is the need for political space to mobilize autonomously from the state and the ruling party in power. Those organizations that have asserted the greatest autonomy have generally been able to select their own leaders, push for far-reaching agendas, and involve themselves in politics to a greater extent than organizations that have been tied to the regime and or dominant party, either formally or through informal patronage networks”. To accomplish the aforesaid objectives, this study uses election data, laws, surveys and documents which relate to representation of women in the

parliament. This type of data is the only data available in relation to party politics and women representation in Tanzania. The study focuses on the ruling party for three reasons: One, the ruling party, the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) and later the Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) is the only dominant single political force in the history of Tanzania since independence in 1961. As such, all laws in the country, including but not limited to the affirmative action, were designed by the ruling party through its majority members of parliament and hence it benefits enormously from such laws. Two, affirmative action is tied to the parties’ electoral performance in which CCM has always won landslide victories\(^20\). Three, the ruling party whose candidates are more likely to be elected as members of parliament is still reluctant to nominate as many women as possible to contest in an election. For example, in 1995 it nominated 7 females against 232 males, in 2000 the party nominated 13 females against 218 males, and in 2005 it nominated 19 females against 213 males. But through affirmative action the party benefited 28 women seats out of 37 in 1995; it also had 41 women seats out of 48 in 2000 and the party had 58 seats out of 75 in 2005 (National Election Commission 1996, 2001, 2006). Thus, Meena argues that the special seats arrangement seems to be more beneficial to the ruling party than to any other party in terms of increasing numbers\(^21\).

This study has dual significance. Practically, it questions the architectural design of the affirmative action via political parties and interrogate the role of feminist organisations in the struggles to liberate women. For one thing, some feminist organisations consider the mere increase of women in the parliament via special seats as significant achievement. Tanzania Media Women’s Association (TAMWA), for example,

\(^{20}\) In 1995 Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) won 61.8 percent of the total valid votes for the presidential election, in 2000 it won 71.7 percent and in 2005 it won 80.2 percent (NEC 1996, 2001, 2006).

takes this as a breakthrough\textsuperscript{22}. While this ‘achievement’ seems to add value on the numerical representation of women, it does not seek to address both gender practical and strategic needs\textsuperscript{23}. At the time when the ruling party is working towards the 50-50 percent of female-male representation in the house by 2010 to meet the claimed 2004 African Union Parity Declaration, a critical examination of the current special seats arrangement in terms of its impact on women is needed. Tamale\textsuperscript{24} cautions us, “[T]hus the affirmative action policy did not evolve directly from the struggle and demands of women’s grassroots organizations. Rather, it was imposed from above for reasons having more to do with political manoeuvring than a genuine commitment to women’s rights.” At a theoretical level, this work challenges the descriptive representation that emphasizes on identity and physical presence of the underrepresented in the decision-making organs.

\section*{2. Representation Revisited}

Political scientists have developed an impressive body of work arguing that in order for historically marginalized groups to be effectively represented in democratic institutions, members of those groups must be present in deliberative bodies\textsuperscript{25}. It is often argued that a parliament that closely reflects the demographic distribution of the electorate is important to

\textsuperscript{22} Ananilea, Nkya. “Advocacy and Participatory Governance: Improvement of Women Condition in Tanzania, example of TAMWA”. For a Lecture Series planned in conjunction with the International Advisory Council Meeting 2008 held in Oslo on Friday 5th of September 2008. In this lecture, the executive of TAMWA, Ms. Ananilea, Nkya claimed that TAMWA decided to do an advocacy campaign to increase the number of women in the Parliament and Council from 20 percent in 2000 to more than 30 percent in 2005.

\textsuperscript{23} Practical gender needs are concerned with biologically determined roles such as maternal health care service, child care centre, provision of water and energy consumption. In contrast, the strategic needs are the ones that seek fundamental changes of the oppressive and exploitative system. It is about issues like education, access to political power, ownership of economy and above all addressing the concern to overthrow the entire patriarchal system.


democracy\textsuperscript{26}. This is because demographic representation is seen as a full embodiment of citizenship of the hitherto excluded group. Besides, it is considered as a means of bringing together diversity and experiences of multiple groups to the deliberations of the house. In his seminal model, Pitkin identifies four distinct, but interconnected meanings or dimensions of representation including: formal representation, referring to the institutional rules and procedures through which representatives are chosen; descriptive representation, referring to the compositional similarity between representatives and the represented; substantive representation or responsiveness, referring to the congruence between representatives’ actions and the interests of the represented; and symbolic representation, referring to the represented feelings of being fairly and effectively represented\textsuperscript{27}. Although Pitkin’s integrated model provides a comprehensive framework to analyze representation, the bottom line remains interest representation. Rehfeld argues that the concept representation is critical because contemporary accounts of political representation explain why one is or why one fails to be a representative at all by reference to democratic norms: a representative is purportedly someone who looks out for the substantive interests of those who elected them through free and fair elections\textsuperscript{28}.

As we argued at the beginning of this paper, one of the historically marginalized groups is women. Writing on the parliaments of the advanced industrial democracies, Caul\textsuperscript{29} argues that women participate little in the national decision-making process and this severe underrepresentation of a

\footnotesize
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{27} Hanna Pitkin, The Concept of Representation. (Berkeley: University of California Press 1967).
\end{itemize}
significant number of the population not only limits diversity but also contradicts one of the central tenets of representative democracy. It is along this line of reasoning that Brown submits that “No process could adequately address gender interests without taking into account female representation within formal political institutions. Higher levels of women’s representation can empower women as a result of both the creation of more equitable opportunities for women to participate in politics and the greater concern with gender interests that female policy-makers are supposed to have”. The above quotations shortly mean that women’s interests should be represented by women themselves. The Tanzania Election Monitoring Committee (TEMCO) specifically points out that “Women are best placed to articulate their own needs and concerns. Women’s exclusion from power in public arena therefore is in sharp contrast to their ability to make crucial decisions related to survival of families, the community and the nation. Excluding women from decision making deprives us of their talents and wisdom as well as a different style of decision making”. Although this view seems to be favourable to women in terms of their visibility in politics, it is silent on who should ultimately determine their fate in their political life. Meena posits that political parties are ‘gate keepers’ deciding on who is in and who is out, who gets what resources and at what time.

It should be noted that many women in Tanzania enter the parliament through the quota system. There are three main categories of gender quotas. First, 14 countries have adopted ‘constitutional quotas’ in which the country’s constitution mandates a particular kind of gender representation. For example, Uganda’s requires one female representative from every district of the country. Second, 31 countries now have ‘election law quotas’ which utilize rules governing elections to ensure some representation for women. Third, 130 parties in

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61 countries have adopted ‘political party quotas’ in which parties set out rules or targets for the gender balance of the individuals they place in office\textsuperscript{33}. In Tanzania, the quota system is essentially constitutional as per Article 66(1),(b) of the Constitution of the United Republic 1977. Despite some numerical gains in terms of descriptive representation following this constitutional requirement, women’s agenda and interests are still not represented. Meena argues that special seats have indeed helped the ruling party to continue to enjoy an overwhelming majority in the multi-party parliament. It is a special arrangement to engage women without necessarily threatening the chances of their male competitors in regard to accessing parliament. Also, it is a safe way of involving women without transforming the male-dominated culture of parliamentary politics\textsuperscript{34}. In the same vein, Koda\textsuperscript{35} emphasizes that while numerical representation is important, that should be reflected in the substantive representation. In this work, representation is taken to mean substantive representation. Toward that end, the question of whose interests are being served by the affirmative action is central to this paper.


Tanzania (then Tanganyika) got its independence from the British colonial power on 9 December 1961 based on a multiparty system. However, the 1961 elections did not see any women in the parliament. On 26 April 1964 Tanganyika and Zanzibar united to form a United Republic of Tanzania (URT). It was on 10 July 1965, the URT officially became a One–Party State. The interim Constitution of 1965, Article 3(2&3) recognized the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) in Tanzania mainland and the Afro-Shiraz Party (ASP)

\textsuperscript{34} Ruth, Meena. "The Politics of Quotas in Tanzania", 5-6
in Zanzibar. The rest of parties were banned. It should be noted, however, that the moves to establish a one party state in Tanzania had already started back in 1962 when Tanganyika became a republic with an imperial president. Nyerere\textsuperscript{36} argued that that political development was necessary for unity and development. But a single party system does not necessarily amount to unity. Unity can still be possible when discussion and consensus are allowed\textsuperscript{37}.

Similarly, under the one party system all autonomous organizations were either banned or co-opted and made appendages of the ruling parties. To be sure, at that material time trade unions, youths and women's associations were made the ruling party’s structures. In 1955, TANU formed officially a Women’s Section through its constitution. The main objectives of this section were to mobilize women and men to join the party, to mobilize them for liberation struggles for independence, to ensure the security of the leaders of TANU and to raise funds through various cultural activities such as dances. The Women's Section was headed by Bibi Titi Mohamed. Seen from these initial objectives, two things stand out. One is that women actively participated in the political struggles for independence and second is that the Women's Section of TANU was not in any way intended to address women's issues but rather stood to promote and defend the interests of the party. In 1962 TANU’s annual conference resolved to take efforts to mobilize and integrate women in a single organization nationwide. The outcome of that conference therefore was the formation of \textit{Umoja wa Wanawake wa Tanganyika (UWT)} – the Union of Women in Tanganyika. Again Bibi Titi Mohamed became its first chairperson. The main objectives of UWT included, among other things:

\begin{quote}
To unite all women of Tanganyika under one organization; to maintain unity and respect of the
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{36} \textit{See TANU Annual Report 1965}
nation; to foster the development of women in respect of economic, political, cultural, educational, and health matters; to work jointly with the ruling party and government for all; to fight for and maintain respect, justice for the women of Tanganyika, Africa, and the world at large; to collaborate with all women organizations in the world whose policies were not in contradiction with national policies and objectives; and to maintain mutual relationships with all friendly parties with TANU in accordance with the policy of socialism and self-reliance for the benefit of the country regardless of skin colour, tribe, religion, material well-being or nationality.38

A close analysis of these objectives reveals that UWT was an instrument of the party to further its interests and the policy of socialism and self-reliance. However, one major development unlike the Women's Section of TANU, was at least to mention the well being of women albeit under the auspice of the party. After the Union of 1964, the women's wing of the party changed its name to reflect the Union but retained its abbreviation i.e. it was called the Jumuiya ya Wanawake wa Tanzania (UWT). The objectives did not change much but rather were reviewed to bring women closer to the party. The objectives included:

To unite all Tanzanian women through which the national policy of socialism and self-reliance and party policies regarding women's liberation could be spread and interpreted to the Tanzanian women; to co-operate and lead all women in various activities concerning family welfare, development, defence, culture and many others; to unite all women mentally and practically under the leadership of the party, to maintain the policy of Ujamaa and self-reliance; to defend and promote equality and dignity of the whole nation; to liberate all women of Tanzania from oppression and from all traditional beliefs and values which deny their development and of the nation as a whole; to co-ordinate UWT with other national organisations under the party to foster national

38 Constitution of the Umoja wa Wanawake wa Tanganyika, 1962.
development; and to maintain mutual relationship with UWT and other African women and the rest of the world for the common struggle of their liberation, and the struggle against imperialism and all kinds of exploitation\(^9\).

From the development of UWT, it is evident that the organization did not emerge from women themselves for the purposes of liberating them from all forms of exploitation and discrimination in political, economic and social cultural spheres. UWT was an imposed tool to strategically galvanize women into forming autonomous organizations that would be concerned with women specific issues and interests. Reaffirming this position, Nyerere\(^4\) submits that under the one party system elections are to be conducted on a party basis. There was no way UWT could push its own agenda without the endorsement of the party as a whole. It is of interest to note, however, that almost all leadership positions in the party were dominated by men. UWT remained a recruitment mechanism of female members and a tool to propagate party policies for implementation. On 5 February 1977, ASP and TANU were finally merged to form the *Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM)*. The UWT continued to be an organization of the party. Thus, it should be noted at this juncture that the invisibility of women in politics was not an overnight process.

Under the one party system, Tanzania held general elections after every five years i.e. in 1965, 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990. With the exceptions of the 1985 and 1990 elections, where only one woman was elected in 1985 and two in 1990, the rest of the elections did not see any woman elected through the constituency. However, the party initiated proportional representation seats to take care of different groups in parliament. Thus, the national member of parliament (NMP) system was introduced. The groups that

\(^9\) Constitution of the Jumuiya ya Wanawake wa Tanzania, 1978
were to be elected through this arrangement included women, trade union, youths, cooperatives, and the army, to mention some. It must be made clear here that these were not intended for affirmative action. For one thing, the initial objective of these seats was not to redress a historical imbalance, which had excluded them from parliament, but to add more voices, to enhance the representation of varied interests under a one-party regime. It may safely be concluded that during the single party era there was no such arrangement as women special seats but rather women got into the parliament through the national members of parliament (NMPs) who represented national interests and not necessarily those of the marginalized groups. Table 1 below presents the visibility of women in parliament during the single party system:

**Table 1. Members of Parliament by Gender 1961-1990**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Male (Elected from Constituency)</th>
<th>Female (Special Seats)</th>
<th>Total MPs</th>
<th>% of Females</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>9.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>242</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Meena 1997; Koda 1995

However, in 1992 Tanzania became a multiparty state following the pressures from both domestic and external actors. But the whole process of transition from a one party system to a multiparty one was dominated by the ruling party CCM alone. CCM and its government have managed to design a multiparty system in a way that the party benefits enormously from the rules of the game and hence wins
landslide victories. During this time, association life resurfaced although not to its fullest level. Opposition parties were registered and civil societies came to life again. But CCM did not free its women wing organization as well as the youths. Although in principle the trade unions were freed as well as the security officers, the old ties with the party are still forged practically41.

4. The Owner of Affirmative Action in Tanzania

Affirmative action in Tanzania is a constitutional issue. Article 66(1) (b) of the URT Constitution 1977 stipulates the proportion of women in parliament through women special seats to be not less than 30 percent of all members42 in the House. As a general requirement, one of the qualifications for any person to become a member of parliament (MP) in Tanzania is that he or she must be a member of, and a candidate proposed by a political party (Article 67(1)(b) of the URT Constitution 1977). But specifically to women special seats there is one more requirement of party victory above the set threshold level. Article 78(1) states “For the purpose of election of women Members of Parliament mentioned in Article 66(1) (b), political parties which took part in the election and which won at least 5 percent of the total valid votes for members of parliament, shall in accordance with the procedures laid down propose to the Electoral Commission the names of women on the basis of the proportional representation among the parties which won elections in constituencies and secured seats in the National Assembly”. An interesting question should be therefore why are women special seats tied so strictly to political parties?

42 Members elected from the constituencies, five members from the Zanzibar House of Representatives and at least two of them must be women, ten members appointed by the president and at least five of them must be women, the attorney general and the speaker if is elected from amongst the members of the parliament.
There are two main explanations in relation to the above posed question. One is historical. Tripp\(^43\) aptly argues that one of the reasons that women’s groups have the potential to bridge sectarian affiliations has to do with women’s common fight for inclusion in the political process and within public life. From the early 1960s up to the mid-1980s, Tanzania’s ruling party, known as TANU and after 1977 as CCM, increasingly curtailed opportunities for independent organizations, especially economic ones, and attempted to bring all formal associational activity under state control while discouraging the formation of new organizations. Local women’s activities were to come under the direction of the party’s mass organization, the UWT. Other scholars\(^44\) maintain that the ruling party and its government suffocated the political space by eliminating all forms of associations including political parties and civil societies. The process was both in *de jure* and *de facto* forms. In some instances the autonomous organizations such as trade unions, women and youths were subsumed and made appendages of the ruling party.

Under the multiparty system, CCM has retained its UWT while the new parties have introduced women wing organizations. By comparison, UWT is much well organized and established as opposed to other women organizations in the new parties. The UWT just like other women organizations in the new political parties is not in any way an independent organization of women, for and by women. It is for all intents and purposes a branch of the ruling party through which it sends its policies to women and through them to the rest of the population, particularly in the rural areas. Anything intended by women has to get the approval of the CCM, even alterations in the


objectives of the UWT, while those seeking to become elected to any post have to be scrutinized and approved by the ruling party which eventually, in its own discretion, nominates the final candidates. Since the introduction of a multiparty system CCM has been winning landslide victories meaning that it enjoys a lion’s share of the special seats. Table 2 below shows the distribution of special seats in the previous multiparty elections:

Table 2. Multiparty Election Results by Party 1995 – 2005

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election Year</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Number of Constituency Seats</th>
<th>Number of Special Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>CCM</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CUF</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CHADEMA</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NCCR-Mageuzi</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UDP</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>CCM</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CUF</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CHADEMA</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TLP</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UDP</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NCCR-Mageuzi</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>CCM</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CUF</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CHADEMA</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TLP</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UDP</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In 1995 and 2000 special seats were allocated according to the seats won by a political party. However, in 2005 that requirement was changed to the 5 percent of the total valid votes won in parliamentary election. CUF has been the second party to benefit increasingly from the special seats arrangement due to the fact that the party enjoys overwhelmingly support from Pemba in Zanzibar. It should be noted that in the 2005 elections, for example, CUF did not win even a single seat in Tanzania mainland and therefore all of its members of parliament are from Pemba.\footnote{Pemba has 19 constituencies for members of the Union parliament. In all the previous general elections, CUF had been able to win all these seats. It is around that background that the party has also increased its ability to win a significant number of seats on special seats basis.}

In an attempt to continue enjoying the women seats, albeit under the justification of promoting women as per international\footnote{The Southern African Development Community (SADC) requires its members to provide space to women representation of at least 30 percent while the African Union demands for 50 percent. Tanzania being a member of these organizations feels obliged to implement the same. However, the requirements provided by these organizations do not specify the arrangements to be used by a specific country. Thus while some countries are seen as reaching the set targets however it is questionable whether such moves are really owned by women as opposed to the political parties themselves.} requirements, CCM stipulated in its 2005 election manifesto to increase the women representation in political leadership to 50 percent by 2010 (CCM Manifesto 2005). This means that it is likely that the 2010 elections will see more women in the House. In implementing its commitment, CCM has already started to initiate the move towards the 50 percent agenda. In its meeting of November 2008, the National Executive Committee (NEC) of CCM passed a resolution to review the present constituency system to ensure that all the administrative districts are made constituency districts. The aim is to get 137 members of parliament (MPs) from the 137 districts of Tanzania mainland and 20 Representatives from 10 administrative districts of Zanzibar (i.e. 2 representatives from each district of Unguja and Pemba). To do this soon, CCM nominated a committee of
nine (9) people\textsuperscript{48} to work on how this arrangement can be put in operation. Similarly, the committee was assigned to work on the possibility of reviewing and reducing the present constituencies so that each constituency to have two members of parliament or representatives, one to be a female and the other a male as much as that number does not exceed 360 members of parliaments. In this new arrangement, the party and not a candidate, will be voted for. The party then will determine who should be its MPs depending on its proportion votes won in a given election. This process is problematic in two ways. One, it interferes with the mandate of the National Election Commission (NEC) which is responsible for any changes of the electoral formula. With its majority members of parliament, there is no doubt, this proposal will be passed in January 2010. Second, it is non-participatory implying the hegemony of CCM in designing the rules of the game for its benefits\textsuperscript{49}.

While this will numerically increase the number of women and possibly end the special seats phenomenon, it is still questionable whether women will be the intended beneficiaries. Arguably, the special seats system and even the new formula expected to come are tailored around the divide and rule system. Women are made unable to mobilize themselves together outside the party system and contest for seats in the parliament. In 1993 Rev. Christopher Mtikila filed a case to challenge the article which compels candidate to contest in an election via a political party. In that case of Rev. Christopher Mtikila vs. the Attorney General\textsuperscript{50} (the ‘first independent candidate’ case) the court ruled that it shall be lawful for independent candidates, along with candidates

\textsuperscript{48} The committee members included Hon. Dr. Mohamed Gharib Bilal – Chairperson, Hon. Anne S. Makinda – Deputy Chairperson, and other members were Hon. Dr. Maua Daftari, Hon. William Lukuvi, Hon. Jenista Mhagama, Hon. Machano Othman, Hon. Andrew Chenge, Hon. Mtumwa Kassim Idd, and Hon. Makongoro Mahanga. The committee was given one month to complete its assignment. Source: Daily News, Monday, 10 November 2008


\textsuperscript{50} Civil Case No. 5 of 1993, High Court of Tanzania
sponsored by political parties, to contest presidential, parliamentary and local council elections. After this decision the Attorney General filed an appeal\(^{51}\). While this appeal was still pending in court the government processed a bill to amend the constitution in such a way it had the effect of rendering the ruling of the court ineffective or a nullity. In this incidence the Government was pursuing two parallel causes of action to reach the same destination. The first cause of action was to deal with the matter through the legislature while the other was through the court of law. This amendment led to a new petition by *Rev. Christopher Mtikila\(^{52}\) (the ‘second independent candidate’ case) in 2005. Despite the fact that the High Court of Tanzania ruled in favour of an independent candidate, the government seems to be reluctant to accept it. It has lodged an appeal which is yet to be determined. If an independent candidate would be allowed in the Tanzanian electoral system, women will be able to organize themselves outside the party structure\(^{53}\). To force an individual to be a member of a political party is against the Bill of Rights which guarantees individuals to seek leadership without necessarily being members of a political party.

The second explanation is that CCM and its government have already proven that women are very strong and if left to mobilize freely it is likely that they will be a formidable force to the status quo. In an attempt to found an autonomous women based organization countrywide, the University of Dar es Salaam organized a four-day national conference in July 1994 on the position of women in a multiparty system. The

\(^{51}\) Civil Appeal No. 3 of 1995, The Court of Appeal of Tanzania
\(^{53}\) In a survey conducted by the Tanzania Media Women’s Association, (TAMWA), between April and June 2003, the Executive Director of the Tanzania Gender Networking Programme (TGNP), Mary Rusimbi, said the government needed to remove a clause in Article 39 and 67 of the Constitution which prevents independent candidates. She remarked “Independent candidates should be institutionalized to allow women who do not want to associate themselves with party politics to be able to contest privately”. See Ananilea Nkya, Politics-Tanzania: Women still Face Political Marginalization ipsnews.net/11 November, 2009
conference was attended by representatives from all over Tanzania, as well as top government officials and leaders of political parties. One of the outcome of this conference was the formation of Women’s Council of Tanzania (Baraza la Wanawake Tanzania – BAWATA) to address women specific issues. This was because the meeting resolved that in addressing women problems there is no need of any ideology and hence women were ready to bury their differences. Thus on 16 May 1995 BAWATA was registered in accordance with Cap 337 of the 1954 Societies Ordinances. Article 4 of its constitution outlined the following objectives: to liberate women from all forms of gender exploitation, oppression, discrimination and degradation and to condemn the same; to work as an institution or a forum on behalf of women and through which they would be able to initiate and further their targets and interests in all aspects of social life; to unite all women without regard to their religious, colour, age, creed, status, levels of education or authority, political parties, ideology or any other thing so as to strengthen their efforts in the struggle for protecting their rights and equality; to mobilize all women for purposes of giving them leadership whereby they would effectively be participating in the bringing about economic and social development; to educate women on their basic rights and duties in the society; to maintain women’s respect; to foster women’s participation and implementing of various national projects; to make a follow-up on law reforms, particularly in the area affecting women activities.  

Seen from its objectives, BAWATA could be a stepping stone for women to liberate themselves and address their issues as opposed to those by parties. In July 1995, BAWATA designed a comprehensive manual to educate women voters for the October 1995 general elections and identify their agenda for the benefit of potential candidates. Similarly, the document aimed at supporting those candidates who would address issues affecting women such as land ownership, health care, water, education, inheritance to mention some. BAWATA  

54 BAWATA Constitution 1995
therefore presented its views on the qualities needed by any presidential candidate.\textsuperscript{55} Tenga and Peter\textsuperscript{56} argue that “Given that the ruling party had been used for so long years to having all women in Tanzania under its control, the emergence of a strong and independent organization was not universally welcomed. Indeed, its leaders felt obliged to reduce their level of political engagement in the run-up to the elections, following threats from the CCM, and several ‘warnings’ by the President\textsuperscript{57} of the United Republic.” After its mobilization activities of the 1995 elections, the government flung a barrage of accusations at BAWATA, among others, that it was run more-less like a political party, and that it did not submit its annual accounts to the relevant authorities. The government finally de-registered it on 30 June 1997\textsuperscript{58}. On behalf of BAWATA, Prof. Shivji(an advocate) filed a case against government’s action for deregistering BAWATA, arguing that it was unconstitutional and violated Articles 13(6)(a), 18, and 20 of the URT Constitution providing for the right of fair hearing, expression, and association and assembly, respectively. The petition also alleged that the government of Tanzania is in violation of international human rights instruments, including the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the African Charter on Human Rights, and the Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)\textsuperscript{59}. In April, 2009, the High Court of Tanzania ruled in favour of BAWATA and also challenged sections in the Societies Act which go against the Constitution by giving too wide discretionary powers to the

\textsuperscript{56} Tenga and Peter, ”The Right to Organise as Mother of All Rights” 162
\textsuperscript{57} The President is also a chairperson of CCM. The line of his powers is therefore fused and sometimes used to favour his or her party.
President to abolish any civil society organisation, and called upon legal amendments within one year of the ruling\textsuperscript{60}.

If women organize well outside the party structure they would be able to make a difference. By now, Tanzania has strong, institutionalised feminist organisations such as Tanzania Media Women’s Association (TAMWA), Tanzania Gender Networking Programme (TGNP), Tanzania Women Lawyers Association (TAWLA) which are able to provide sufficient force to mobilise women to vote for the candidates that will articulate their agenda. Experience has shown that it is difficult for women to

\textbf{Table 3. Candidates Nominated by Parties in the 1995 and 2000 Parliamentary Elections}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1995</th>
<th>Election Year</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>Election Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S/N</td>
<td>Political Party</td>
<td>Male Female</td>
<td>% of Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>CCM</td>
<td>232   7</td>
<td>2.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>CHADEMA</td>
<td>157   5</td>
<td>3.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>CUF</td>
<td>177   3</td>
<td>1.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>NCCR</td>
<td>196   9</td>
<td>4.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>NLD</td>
<td>44    1</td>
<td>2.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>NRA</td>
<td>78    4</td>
<td>4.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>PONA</td>
<td>34    4</td>
<td>10.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>TADEA</td>
<td>118   8</td>
<td>6.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>TLP</td>
<td>55    5</td>
<td>8.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>TPP</td>
<td>39    2</td>
<td>4.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>UDP</td>
<td>125   11</td>
<td>8.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>UMD</td>
<td>47    2</td>
<td>4.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>UPDP</td>
<td>34    1</td>
<td>2.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1336</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>4.43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


\textsuperscript{60} See the Tanzania Gender Networking Program’s Press Release on BAWATA Ruling, Thursday, 9 April, 2009
reform the parties to serve their interests. It is for this reason political parties have limited women through the nomination processes to contest for constituency seats. The Tanzania Monitoring Election Committee (TEMCO)\textsuperscript{61} reaffirms that “given the community view of women as hopeless leaders, and women not being in positions of power within their political parties, the internal elections conducted within the parties are mostly in favour of men. For instance, in Songea urban constituency women aspirants wishing to be nominated were harassed and abusive language was used against them”. There is not even a single party which has deliberately initiated efforts to set the affirmative action by adopting quotas to promote women. This is evidenced by the nomination of candidates in the previous elections as shown in Table 3.

In the 2005 elections, the number of political parties increased to 18. Similarly the number of female candidates rose from 8.12 percent of 2000 to 13.01 percent (Table 4). However, it is surprising for the strong and largest party like CCM to have only nominated 7 candidates in 1995, 13 in 2000 and 19 in 2005. If CCM strongly believes in supporting women rather than using them to further its power interests, one would have expected to see more women nominated. It is interesting to note that in Tanzania only women nominated by strong parties are likely to be elected through the constituencies. Thus, Yoon\textsuperscript{62} observes that women through constituency seats nominated by CCM which has resources and a well-established electoral support base from the national to the village level have a higher probability of winning than female candidates of other parties. Of eight women elected in constituencies in 1995, seven were CCM candidates, and all twelve women elected in 2000 were CCM candidates and the seventeen women elected in 2005 belonged to CCM. It was only CUF

\textsuperscript{61} Tanzania Monitoring Election Committee (TEMCO 2001), 145
Table 4. Candidates Nominated by Parties in the 2005 Parliamentary Elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S/N</th>
<th>Political Party</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>% of Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>CCM</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>8.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>CHADEMA</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>CUF</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>NCCR</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>NLD</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>51.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>NRA</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>22.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>CHAUSTA</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>19.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>TADEA</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>TLP</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>FORD</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>27.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>UDP</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>26.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>UMD</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>28.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>UPDP</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>30.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Jahazi Asilia</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>16.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>PPT-Maendeleo</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Democratic</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>24.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Sauti ya Umma</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>19.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>D’krasia Makini</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1063</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>13.01</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


which managed to have a female elected through a constituency seat in 1995. Against that backdrop, one would argue that the new system of representation of women to 50 percent is likely to further the interests of the parties rather than those of women.

The so called affirmative action is typically a “divide – and – rule” tactic that is used by the CCM and its government to make sure that the voice of women is not collectively mobilized to contest for political leadership. In line with this view, Meena would argue that in the male dominated multiparty system, membership in political parties is

63 Ruth Meena, “Gender Differences in Political Orientation” in Mushi Samuel S, Mukandala Rwekaza S and Baregu Mwesiga L (eds) Tanzania’s Political Culture: A Baseline Survey, (Department of Political Science, University of Dar es Salaam 2001)
insufficient in the process of redefining political culture to empower women. Women should organize themselves for action and challenge the primacy of male power and corresponding biases in political processes. The fact that CCM and its government did not welcome BAWATA as well as the court ruling in favour of an independent candidate suggests strongly that it is not in the interest of CCM to see women organize autonomously outside the party structure. Independent candidate would be one of the entry point through which women could organize outside the party structure and therefore to push and control their agenda in formal decision making bodies.

Related to the whole question of ownership of the affirmative action is the issue of accountability. Since women are required, just like any member of parliament, to be a member of the party prior to their nomination by the parties, it follows that they will be accountable to those parties and not women. Meena⁶⁴ argues that the procedures to elect women for the special seats have to be revisited so as to make the MPs who go to parliament through the women’s ticket more accountable to women whom they are supposed to represent. The current arrangement forces women to be loyal and accountable to their parties. In other words, the constituencies for such women become parties and not women. In this way women’s interests are surpassed by those of the parties.

5. Conclusion

This study made three major observations. One is that the affirmative action in Tanzania is by and large a property of political parties and particularly CCM. Women are strategically used to further the interests of CCM at the expense of their gender practical and strategic needs. And therefore, the current women special seats system may not effectively bring

the intended impact on women as a whole. Second is that the organisation of women outside political parties may bring impact in terms of advancing their interests. The example of BAWATA testifies to this fact. But this will need significant reforms of the Societies Act, Cap. 337 R.E 2002 and the Non-Government Organisation Act, No. 24 of 2002 which suffocate political space for autonomous association life from the interests of the ruling party and its government. The recent High Court ruling in favour of BAWATA is evident to this democratic reform. It should be noted that, by now feminist activity in Tanzania is well institutionalised and can be exemplified by organisations like TGNP, TAMWA and TAWLA to mention a few. Third is that CCM’s behaviour of monopolising the rules of the game undermines the whole notion of representative government. The current move towards 50-50 percent proportional representation on men and women in the House by 2010 is an obvious example. The party has initiated the move without involving other stakeholders particularly women themselves leave alone other political parties and civil societies organisations. The new system of 50 percent women representation advocated by CCM should clearly be examined in terms of its agenda and particularly who will own it and for whose interests. The general implication of the results of this study is that women’s invisibility in politics is a systemic problem. The legal framework which purports to empower women through the affirmative action on the one hand deprives them of their struggles to participate fully in public political arena on the other hand. The study therefore challenges the descriptive representation which seems to favour the interests of the ruling party at the expense of women’s substantive representation. It will be of interest to political parties, women based organisations and students of political movements. This study focused much on political life of women in Tanzania. It is useful for future research to investigate other aspects of women’s marginalisation like social and economic life.

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BOOK REVIEWS


Author: Konstantin Kilibarda
York University

Stuart Mitchell’s foray into the first decades of post-World War II British history is a welcome addition for those scholars who took an interest in the burgeoning historiography of this period. Mitchell’s main focus is on the administrations of Harold Macmillan (1957-1963) and Sir Alec Douglas-Home (1963-1964), whose brand of ‘modernizing Conservatism’ antagonized both traditionalists and neoliberals within the Conservative Party. Mitchell thus seeks to painstakingly illuminate Macmillan’s attempts to ‘modernize’ Britain during a period when its postwar consensus – dictated by the 1944 White Paper on Employment Policy - was beginning to unravel.

Mitchell’s primary concern is to illuminate the trajectory of Macmillan’s modernizing agenda within the Conservative Party, conceived as a form of “creative dirigisme” needed “to maintain state legitimacy and social harmony during a period in which such blessings were being assailed by considerable cultural and social change, and as a domestic statecraft strategy designed, foremost, to secure the perpetuation of the Conservative Party in power” (3).

The fact that Macmillan was able to steer the Conservative Party away from certain electoral defeat in the aftermath of Anthony Eden’s failed attempt to impose imperial discipline on Egypt during the Suez Crisis (1956), speaks to his acumen as a politician according to Mitchell. Although a supporter of the brutal British, French and Israeli aggression on Egypt (claiming an estimated one-thousand Egyptian civilian lives in one week of fighting), Macmillan was nevertheless able to redirect the British public's attention to domestic issues and
the pressing need for both external and internal modernization.

In fact, under Macmillan the British outlook on the imperial rhetorics of ‘kith and kin’ and the attendant domestic anxieties over British ‘decline’ were radically redefined as Mitchell shows. It was in this period that a fateful turn to the European Common Market was attempted as means of adapting to Washington’s newly acquired superpower status around the globe and to Britain’s “loss” of Empire (represented by Suez and other successful anti-colonial struggles curtailing Britain’s attempts to exert control over its alleged ‘Commonwealth’).

Though the discussions of Britain’s attempts to recalibrate its international relations are illuminating, Mitchell’s main concern is with the peculiarities of Macmillan’s brand of Toryism – which drew on the traditions of ‘One Nation’ Toryism and Tory Socialism– when applied to the ‘home-front.’ Along these lines, he takes particular issue with later Tory historians who dismiss the legacy of this period by refracting it through the light of later Thatcherite austerity: “This brand of modernizing Conservatism was not the milky, dewy-eyed, spendthrift creed that some later commentators have been wont to portray... [Instead], the state was to be a tool to effect a transformation of Britain, not a cash cow for the pitiable and hopeless” (7).

Throughout his text Mitchell highlights the complex internal dynamics animating the turbulent relationship between Party-cadres and civil society actors faithful to Macmillan’s modernizing agenda and those who opposed it. To this end, Mitchell weaves together a narrative that attempts to reconstruct the social, political and cultural environment within which Macmillan’s agenda unfolded through the use of contemporaneous media accounts, leaflets, political cartoons, and social movements. As Mitchell contends, while “High politics may create a fascinating narrative...its power to illuminate the workings of government is limited: Other quarters must also be investigated” (8).
It is through such cues that Mitchell navigates us through the initial period of Macmillan’s ‘minimalist statecraft’ (1957-1959) to the drama of the ‘night of the long knives’ (the mass-dismissal in July 1962 of key government Ministers), the ‘Profumo affair’ (one of Britain’s most infamous Cold War sex and spy scandals), the politics of Britain’s attempted turn to the European Common Market (in the end vetoed by French President Charles de Gaulle), and the pitched polemics that characterized debates over the abolition of resale price maintenance (leading to one of the largest back-bench rebellions in postwar British history).

Overall the book achieves what it sets out for itself: providing a detailed account of a critical period in Britain’s postwar history that sheds light on a Conservative Party at odds with its later neoliberal and Euro-skeptic incarnations. The book is particularly captivating in its discussions of the cultural milieu in which Macmillan’s modernization agenda was employed. Here, the influence of right-wing extra-Party movements – particularly on the Douglas-Home administration – over issues such as national and moral ‘decline,’ youth delinquency (compounded by the panic caused by the ‘Mods-and-Rockers’ riots during the spring of 1964 in places like Clacton, Margate, and Brighton), Mary Whitehouse’s campaign to ‘Clean Up TV’ (CUTV), etc. are expertly recovered from the archives by Mitchell in an engaging way (see discussion in Chapter Six).

Along these lines, it is perhaps apropos to inject some mild criticism into this review. While Mitchell is not insensitive to the gendered aspects of postwar British electoral politics - interesting, in this regard, is Mitchell’s discussion of the class character and profile of female Tory voters - he nonetheless fails to take into consideration important feminist typologies of the postwar welfare state. It is hoped that Mitchell can expand on such research in future works given the attention he does give to the particular role of ‘housewives’ and newly professionalized women in setting the tone of debate throughout postwar Britain. Here the pioneering work of feminist political scientists like Linda Gordon (1990) and Jane Lewis (1992) on the gendered dynamics of the welfare state.
would have been useful in illuminating how the paternalism of Macmillan and Douglas-Homes’ ‘modernizing’ vision may have contributed to the alienation of an increasingly empowered female electorate.

Similarly, although infused with references to Empire, Commonwealth and Macmillan’s turn to ‘Europe,’ the text lacks a more detailed discussion of how Commonwealth and immigration policies were redefined during this period. Here the insights of postcolonial theory, British cultural studies and anti-racist historiography could have cast greater light on the racialized aspects of Macmillan and Douglas-Homes’ modernizing agenda. Decolonization is thus merely portrayed as a top-down process coming from the Prime Minister and his inner circle at the Foreign Office and not the product of broader anti-colonial movements – primarily those in the colony, but also some within the British polity – that sought to terminate the violent legacy of such segregationist statecraft.

Nevertheless, Mitchell’s text does provide us with hints concerning the internal dynamics of Conservative Party discussion on the shifting grounds of British identity and illuminates the sources of some of the more reactionary interests seeking to stall ‘modernization.’ In fact, Mitchell does a remarkable job at both illuminating the class profile of some of the more intransigent elements within the Party that opposed Macmillan’s agenda and in questioning the ready assumption that this pressure was coming from the ‘grassroots’ of the Party.

Summing up, Mitchell’s text draws an elaborate picture of a critical turning point in the British social-history through an examination of the complex internal political dynamics that animated policy discussions within the ruling Conservative Party in this period (1951-1964). In particular it lays an important background to understanding the later administrations of Edward Heath (1970-1974) and the constituents and pressure groups that would later consolidate around the policies of Margaret Thatcher in the 1980s.
The collapse of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s has by now been thoroughly analyzed by journalists, social scientists and historians. An entire spectrum of theories about conspiracy theories have emerged, varying from interpreting the break up of Yugoslavia as a byproduct of ‘ancient hatreds’ all the way to looking at it as a mere power struggle between former-communists-turned-nationalists. It is impossible to understand the break up of Yugoslavia without having to go back at least to the Second World War. Once the 50 years between the formation and the collapse of Yugoslavia are analyzed, including the gradual rise of nationalism in the 1970s and 1980s, the picture becomes somewhat clearer.

Nick Miller’s *The Nonconformists* is a book based on his 1999 article of the same name published in the *Slavic Review*. In his book, Miller looks at the works of some leading Serbian intellectuals, but pays most attention to Dobrica Cosic, Mica Popovic, and Borislav Mihajlovic Mihiz and attempts to decipher the motives that led to the transformation of loyal communists into nationalists. He is clearly critical of the three main assumptions to the collapse of Yugoslavia; the power relations in the state; the historical analogy; and the assumption that Serbs have *always* been aggressive and xenophobic.

Miller starts by pointing out to a particular event in the 1960s – the failure of the League of Writers to break down barriers and reorganize along aesthetic criteria instead of being limited to regional associations – as having quite an impact on Cosic. After this failure, Cosic’s faith in the Yugoslav communist supranational state began dwindling and he started feeling that further divisions in Yugoslavia would continue to the detriment of the Serbian nation.
Another example that Miller illustrates is a lecture delivered by Cosic titled ‘How we view ourselves’ (180) which pointed to a new direction in Cosic’s line of thought: he increasingly started showing signs of abandoning Yugoslavism and drifting towards the reaffirmation of Serbian culture and national identity.

Miller’s work shows that Cosic felt that the Serbian nation was being fragmented and was threatened under communist Yugoslavia and hence it further convinced him of the need to preserve the Serbian national identity and culture. In the 1970s along with increasing Croatian national demands, Cosic even began feeling that Serbs were the actual victims of Tito’s regime.

Along similar lines Miller follows the works of Mica Popovic, a painter, who also roughly at the same time began to doubt the abilities of the communist Yugoslav regime to respond to the demands of its people and of its state of being. Popovic, as his work suggested, seemed to have been leaning towards three specific points: firstly, he explored explicitly Serbian topics; secondly, he began introducing a message of ‘anti-totalitarianism,’ and thirdly; his works suggested disappointment with what the communist regime failed to achieve by questioning the communists’ promise for a better and more rational future (227).

A friend of Dobrica Cosic and Mica Popovic, Borislav Mihajlovic Mihiz did not indulge in romanticizing the image of Serbs as did Cosic with his image of the Serb peasant. Rather, he associated bad behavior and negative traits to other Yugoslav people. As Miller shows, Mihiz - although no nationalist himself - was also something of a disappointed leftist and what disappointed him most was the authoritarianism of the Yugoslav regime and its impact on the Serbs.

Miller’s aim throughout the book is to prove that Serbian nationalism was neither inherited nor ancient. He employs a critical literary analysis of an impressive number of books,
articles and speeches and arranges them in such a way that he almost proves his point.

Miller draws a number of conclusions on the three intellectuals he studied. Firstly, the negative responses of the Serbian intellectuals were a result of developments in Yugoslavia and were originally rational. Secondly, their focus was on culture and they did not attempt to gain power or at least it wasn’t their primary goal. Thirdly, their work was introspective rather than aggressive. And fourthly, Miller claims that although Cosic, Popovic, and Mihiz argued for continuity with the Serbian past, they never did so as manipulators or propagandists.

However, some of Miller’s conclusions are debatable. One such conclusion is when he compares Adam Michnik and Vaclav Havel to Dobrica Cosic. He rightly claims that all the three mentioned recognized, on time, the unpleasantness of the Stalinist regimes and they all sought truth. Yet, Michnik and Havel were considered humanists, while Cosic a bloodthirsty nationalist (350). This was perhaps an abrupt conclusion and there are a number of books by authors such as Milorad Tomanic (Serbian church at war, and the war within it), Norman Cigar (Genocide in Bosnia) and David Bruce Macdonald (Balkan Holocausts) which showed or at least mentioned otherwise the role played by the intellectuals in the Yugoslav breakup and the subsequent wars.

The other pitfall of the book is that Miller analyzes the works of Serbian intellectuals during a period of accelerated collapse of Yugoslavia and makes hardly any mention of the bloody war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and Kosovo, although it is a known fact that intellectuals played a significant role in spurring national emotions leading up to the war and some even played a crucial role injustifying killings.

The Non-Conformists is not a book for absolute beginners on Yugoslavia, it is based on an enormous amount of well researched literature and provides an in-depth analysis that no other book has done in the recent past. Unlike a number of
books on Balkan nationalism which are more often than not mere commentaries based on secondary and tertiary sources, this book is an originally styled and worthy piece of work based on less known and little researched primary sources. However, a significant amount of literature ought to be read before this book could be understood and rightfully comprehended. The author offers neither an introduction nor a conclusion; rather he gives the reader the freedom to individually conclude the evolution of nationalism in a Serbian intellectual circle.


Author: Gabriella Borgovan
University of Trento (Italy), University of Ljubljana (Slovenia), Corvinus University of Budapest (Hungary), and University of Regensburg (Germany).

After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, former Soviet Republics were facing the challenge of building/rebuilding a nation. Authoritarianism, colonialism and command economy were dropped on behalf of democracy, de-colonization and market economy. This affected not only the newly nationalizing states, including the case studies presented in this book, Estonia and Latvia, but also the "25 million Russophones living outside Russia". The nation-building process was a result of historical grievances from the part of the titular communities, which lead to nationalist movements and to a growing importance of ethnicity in politics.

David J. Galbreath tests the conditions under which minority politics can best be understood by analyzing events in Estonia and Latvia in the period following the reestablishment of independence until the withdrawal of the permanent OSCE missions. His book, *Nation-Building and Minority Politics in Post-Socialist States – Interests, Influences and Identities in*
Estonia and Latvia, focuses on the process of minority politics in the two Baltic States by adding to Brubaker’s “triadic nexus” - which contains the interplay of nationalizing states, national minorities and external national homeland - the regional and international organizations. Analyzing Estonia and Latvia because “the staring points of these states are the closest conditions political science can get to laboratory settings”, questions like “How do we go about analyzing minority politics in the current European system?” and “What role have traditional actors, such as the Russian federation, and non-traditional actors, such as the EU, played in affecting policy changes?” are addressed. The structuralist theory of ethno-nationalism is supported, with the argument that “although culture, political elites and basic group dynamics play a part in the larger majority-minority relationship, the structure of the system is the key determinant of minority politics”. While traditional IR theorists have concentrated on state-to-state relations this book aims to highlight the role of international organizations in internal state affairs, following the neo-liberalist theories of IR.

The book is structured in ten chapters out of which the first five provide a wide theoretical basis and a solid contextualization of the study. Without wanting to overstate the events in Estonia and Latvia, the author is testing the conditions of better understanding minority politics in democratizing states. The next four chapters represent the core empirical part of the study by focusing on politics and policies in Estonia and Latvia, especially minority policies, and on external influences on the policy-making process, from the Russian Federation and international institutions. In order to eliminate bias, the author analyzes Baltic, international and Russian sources. The last chapter offers not only conclusions, but also a brief comparison of the two case studies.

Besides offering a comprehensive view on the already existing theoretical approaches, the author also conducts a detailed analysis of the evolution of politics and minority policies in the two countries contributing with empirical findings. Regarding the democratic institutional design best fitted for Estonia and
Latvia, the author chooses democratic liberalism, where differences are negotiated through compromise. Complementary to ethno-nationalist movements, the increasing economic difficulties are listed among the reasons for the collapse of the Soviet Union. Along with independence came the goals of EU and NATO membership for the Baltic states. Nation-building and policy making were mostly based on nationalist movements (disfavoring minority communities who were excluded from this process by language and citizenship obstacles) but the Baltic states also had to cooperate with the OSCE, EU and CoE, playing a two-level game in order to satisfy the electorate and to keep international commitments.

The value of this book lies mostly in its detailed overview and analysis of the policy making process after independence. Language, Citizenship and Education policies (i.e. that mostly affected the minority communities) have experienced several amendments due to changes in government and to international pressures. The negotiations, difficulties and different viewpoints of the actors participating in the policy-making process offer a clear view not only on the internal situation of the two Baltic states but also on the international context since (among others) the EU and the OSCE (mostly through the HCNM) had a say in the evolution of the minority policies.

After independence, both states introduced similar naturalization requirements for non-citizens. Estonia introduced immigration quotas and applied the jus sanguinus principle in the citizenship law, while non-citizens had to pass through a naturalization process which implied a loyalty oath to the Estonian state, competence in Estonian language and permanent residence since the passing of the resolution on independence. Along with the 1993 Law on Aliens a one year period for residency applications was introduced, and, after international pressure, a one year extension was granted to the deadline. Only temporary five-year permits were to be issued. Permanent residents had the right to vote in local elections and military pensioners could obtain permanent
resident permits. Similarly, Citizenship Law in Latvia required a language test, a Latvian history and culture test and introduced the “naturalization windows”, giving a specific time period for different segments of the population to register for citizenship. Regarding language, both states started to implement the official language not only into the public but to some degree also into the private sphere. Estonian became the sole language of the country while in Latvia bilingualism became an official policy, with a three-year transition period for Russian-speakers in the public sphere to learn Latvian. After several amendments to these and other policies, the OSCE permanent mission withdrew from the Baltic states with the acknowledgement of normalization of majority-minority relations.

Although the author denies intentional criticism towards Moscow, while reading the book a slight preference toward the Baltic states can be noticed. Although Russia, as the external national homeland, attempted to influence Baltic policy making either by linking issues such as borders and troop withdrawals to reforms (especially minority policies- the Russian Federation claimed that the Russophone community was being discriminated against) or by appealing to international organizations, it had little to no effect. The reason was not only because it was unclear whom exactly Moscow wanted to protect but also because of the impression of the Baltic governments (supported by the author) that the Russian Government was hiding behind the human rights issues in order to delay troop withdrawal rather than making a real effort to protect Baltic Russians from discrimination.

One issue that remains unclear is the level of uniqueness of the two analyzed countries and therefore the applicability of the measures regarding minority politics discussed in this book. Although finding similarities with the Serbian minority in the Yugoslavian successor states, Hungarian minorities in the neighboring countries or Russian minorities in Moldova and Ukraine, a clear and exhaustive answer is not provided here; this is left for further research along with questions like “How much are international organizations a product of the
will of member-states rather than international actors unto themselves?” and others.

Although minority issues are very well described and analyzed, the view of the members of the minority communities on their situation is mostly absent. The relations between Russia, international organizations and the Baltic states, Russia’s foreign policy regarding not only its Diaspora but also the will to maintain influence in the Baltic area and the evolution of minority policies in Estonia and Latvia are however, very broadly depicted. Overall, this book is well written, making it an excellent reading for IR, political science or minority studies scholars, for practitioners, and policymakers dealing with minority issues.


Author: Christine Zubrinic
Royal Military College of Canada

Since the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the subsequent wars, Bosnia has become a symbol of emerging ethnic nationalism as well as a model for studies in peacekeeping and post-conflict reconstruction. *The New Bosnian Mosaic: Identities, Memories and Moral Claims in a Post-War Society* edited by Xavier Bougarel is a rich contribution to the study of post-conflict transition and reconstruction from an anthropological and ethnographic perspective that allows the reader to better understand the quandaries faced by Bosnia and those involved in post-Dayton reconstruction. *The New Bosnian Mosaic* is a collection of academic essays written by researchers in the fields of anthropology, ethnic studies and international relations between the most pivotal years of Bosnia’s reconstruction between 1999 and 2003. The wealth of academic and field experience brought forth by the contributors gives the work a completeness often lacking in
other works of the same subject matter. By incorporating these experiences this work succeeds in answering the large and daunting questions which surround Bosnia’s past, present and future without falling victim to the generalizations which often plague academic research on the problems facing Bosnia.

Explaining the complicated situation and challenges of post-Dayton Bosnia can at times seem like an intimidating undertaking, but Xavier Bougarel and his contributors have managed to tackle the subject in an effective manner. The impressive group of contributors which Bougarel has assembled bring with them a great deal of empirical knowledge based on both academic and field research. As a result of the breadth of knowledge of the contributors a wide array of aspects surrounding the Bosnian post-conflict reconstruction and transition are examined, including the work of individuals and organizations, in an attempt to better understand the challenges faced post-Dayton. The book's emphasis on the perspective of local and native Bosnians sheds some light on the problems that have plagued reconstruction and transition efforts thus far.

The complex nature of the subject matter as well as the ambitious amount of information loaded into this book necessitated a strong structural lay out. This was achieved through the divisions of the essays into three sections entitled, ‘beyond ethnicity’, ‘beyond ancient hatred’ and ‘beyond protectorate’. This strengthened the overall readability of the book in part or as a whole making it a very useful resource for academic research. The first section, entitled ‘beyond ethnicity’, examines the role ethnicity has played in the post Dayton environment. Each essay examines a different aspect of ethnicity in Bosnia; however all have included the use of sources of information from ‘locals’. This emphasis of inclusion of local sources enriches the arguments laid out and gives the theories a more plausible applicability than other works in this area.
The second section, ‘beyond ancient hatreds’, deals with the collective memory of victims of violence and its impact on the future of Bosnia. This topic is especially important to the reconstruction and transition of Bosnia specifically due to the blame often placed on ‘ancient hatred’ for its role in the violence of the war. This section is well done and a balance has been struck by examining the issue of ‘ancient hatred’ from a number of different perspectives. One criticism that can be levelled at this section is the lack of perspective from the Bosnian Serbs; this inclusion would have been an interesting and enriching addition. The third and final section, ‘beyond protectorate’, concentrates on the transition of the political systems of Bosnia following the Dayton Agreements. Of particular interest in this section is the examination of the economic issues facing Bosnia with emphasis on the emergence of a strong black market. This section is particularly important as it emphasizes the problems faced by the international community as well as the Bosnian leadership when attempting to rebuild a fully functional Bosnia. The chapters included in this work all possess one refreshing characteristic: the chapters concentrate on the rich and vast Bosnian situation rather than reaching to make comparisons or theories of applicability to other conflicts.

The most important contribution this work offers is its emphasis on the social understanding of Bosnians themselves and the social life within Bosnia. This work has successfully avoided the many pitfalls associated with writing on Bosnia and the Balkans as a whole. It has not fallen victim to the generalizations which often plague studies of Bosnia and this is in part due to the consistent objectivity present throughout the work from author to author. Despite the hundreds of works dedicated to the study of Bosnia, none have made as much effort to unearth the societal road blocks to progress in Bosnia; by doing so Bougarel and his contributors have made an exceptional contribution to the literature on Bosnia post Dayton.

Author: Svetla Baeva
La Sapienza University

The Roma’s history is one associated on the one hand with romanticized wanderings and on the other hand with centuries of persecution. Their historical documentation is often squeezed in with other memoirs and accounts. In recent years, researchers have tried to track their history but more often than not the research is fragmented and contradictory particularly on subjects such as Roma origins or population demographics. Even so, as the Roma situation has evolved into a human rights issue, it is taking a more important place on the agenda of European policy.

Who are the Roma? Are they an ethnic minority or not? What is their history? These are all questions that the present volume tries to address and plump up the somewhat underweight research on the many facets of the Roma. The Roma: A Minority in Europe, a compilation of ten essays, is the result of a conference held in the Tel-Aviv University by the Stephen Roth Institute in December 2002 to discuss the history and current situation of the Roma in Europe. The book is edited by two of its authors – Roni Stauber and Raphael Vago. The contributors are distinguished scholars in Roma studies or related fields from a multitude of countries: Israel, Germany, Hungary, Austria, Czech Republic and Romania.

Organized chronologically, the anthology begins with Shulamith Shahar’s essay on the perceptions of Gypsies throughout the centuries, particularly in Early Modern Europe. It explores their origins and the differences within groups denoted as ‘Gypsy’ (10). A considerable chunk of the book is devoted to the persecution of the Roma and its culminating point during World War II. Peter Widmann discusses the rise of eugenics and criminal biology and the correlation with Roma treatment prior to World War II. Several essays discuss how Nazi Policy varied in Germany, Austria, Hungary and 652
Romania. The Margalit-Matras and Stauber-Vago essays focus on the complexity and interconnectedness of identity and commemoration. The authors discuss in detail the Sinti in Germany and Hungarian, Czech and Slovak Roma. In this way, the book does a brilliant job in shedding light on Romani groups and whether they consider themselves ‘a diaspora’ or transnational group (111).

Eva Sabotka and Pal Tamas’ essays deal with the post-communist transition period and divulge the ways Roma policy has changed in Eastern Europe since 1989. The Roma situation improved from being a ‘security issue’ to a human rights-orientated issue (146). Pressures from the EU and other international organizations for democratic representation and formulation of a human rights framework have moved this positive change. In addition to the need for a formal channel for dialogue, much research is still needed to understand the Roma as a culture and community. The authors show that there is a large difference within these concepts from country to country or even region-to-region to indicate that Roma integration and social inclusion does not have a one-fit-all approach.

The historical, social and political issues arising from the friction between the Roma and European communities are laid out in this writing. The central theme recurring throughout the book is the persecution of the Roma throughout the centuries and in particular their genocide during World War II, a subject that has not yet been “properly and exhaustively researched.” (ix) The book propagates the idea that their genocide needs to be acknowledged in order for commemoration and the creation of collective memory to take place and furthermore to act as a catalyst for future activism.

Moreover, the essays are historically significant as they mark an important meeting point between the Jewish and Romani communities. The book also broaches the issues of what constitutes ethnic identity and its boundaries, collective memory, myth-making and social constructivism. The authors draw parallels from the impact of the Jewish Holocaust,
Shoah, on the consolidation of ethnic identity and the process of nation building to better understand the role that Porrajmos, Roma Holocaust, has played in Roma identity creation and collective memory. By addressing these issues, the contributors hope to spur other institutions and countries to follow their example into further research.

The authors try to illustrate the Roma as an ethnic minority through methods of comparing and contrasting. The first approach compares treatment of victims such as Jews and Soviet POWs under the Nazi regime (44) and how that related to Romani treatment. The book draws on the Jewish experience to show through similarities that the Roma’s persecution was on a racial basis and their fight to be recognized as a minority. The second approach utilizes case studies from different states such as Austria, Germany, Hungary, Romania, Czech Republic and Slovakia. The authors compare the varying Romani groups and their treatment across these states. The research addresses scholars and historians as well as the general public in hope to raise greater awareness about the Roma’s unique history, culture and identity.

One of the merits of the book is that it successfully contributes to bridging the apparent gap on Roma discourse. The research builds on our knowledge of the genocide of the Roma by Nazi Germany and its allies. For example, Viorel Achim’s essay fills a lacuna in Romanian histography of World War II on Roma deportation to Transnistria. The author is noted to be one of the few scholars researching the fate of the Roma during World War II in Romania. Katlin Katz’s essay on the persecution of Hungarian Roma also offers new information on victims, who passed through Komarom camp (70). She also stresses that the Komarom camp, only vaguely mentioned in most texts, plays an important role in the collective memory of the Hungarian Roma. Nevertheless, one shortcoming is the lack of discussion about the treatment of Roma under communist regimes and how that experience has in any way reinforced or suppressed the feelings of ethnic belonging.
Overall, the essays are short and easy to read, filled with insightful information that could serve as a basis for further research. Essays are on average twenty pages complete with a full bibliography. Additionally the end of the book includes short descriptions about the contributors. Each author tries to reflect on the various existent perceptions but leaves readers to make their own conclusions. The anthology brings us closer to what lays behind statistical numbers often mentioned in the passing in historical texts; to illuminate individual stories and the fate of communities and families.

The book is a reflection of the need in today’s society to address the growing tensions between the Roma and European communities. Rising xenophobia and discrimination in various forms from employment to legislation across the old continent shows that the situation requires careful attention. The authors express concern that the Roma situation may receive less attention as the CEE states enter the EU. The book in many ways hopes to push the Roma issue into public space to encourage discussions and dialogue on social integration and ease growing anxiety.


Author: Stenia Paparella
University of Bologna

In the last five years the European Union (EU) has established increasingly close relations with Ukraine thanks to the Action Plan in 2005 and the pro-European policy adopted by Yushenko. However, the EU is reluctant to include Ukraine as a member due to its weak and instable democracy. Alternatively, the Russian Federation (Russia) exerts considerable influence on Ukraine through the Single Economic Space, use of Sebastopol harbour, and gas pipelines. Thus, Ukraine appears to be a country caught between two highly dissimilar realms. Ukraine, the EU and
Russia, edited by Stephen Velychenko, endeavours to shed some light on this multifaceted state of affairs.

For its complex situation Ukraine has aroused the interest of many scholars, who try to individuate the forces which govern it. However, little research gives such an inclusive picture of the Ukrainian case as Ukraine, the EU and Russia does. Most of them do not focus on Russian and European influence on Ukraine and provide mostly only a descriptive political perspective. On the contrary, Ukraine, the EU and Russia gives a comprehensive overview of the current relations of Ukraine between the EU and Russia. Velychenko’s book not only focuses on Ukrainian endeavours to improve relations with its Western neighbours, but also describes the political impact of the cultural inheritance left by two centuries of Russian domination. Ukraine has trouble escaping the Russian legacy and the EU cannot easily welcome a country which is still so strictly bound to its past. Thus the book tries to outline Ukrainian international performance of the past eighteen years and indicates major future trends in foreign policy.

In the first chapter Martin Beisswenger tries to find the answer to the cultural dependence on Russia in the Neo-Eurasianist movement, which justifies Ukrainian subordination to Russia and its exclusion from the EU with the geopolitical weakness of Ukraine. However, Mykola Riabchuk strongly believes in the Europeanness of Ukraine. From his point of view, after two centuries of Russian control Ukraine finally can ‘return to Europe’ (73). The results of this “counter-migration” are revealed not only by literature, in which the ‘geographical rhetoric’ (p.104) is nowadays directed to Ukraine and Europe, but also by politics, where in 2004 the majority of the population voted for the pro-European candidate Viktor Yushenko. Nevertheless, Roman Serbyn states that Russian culture has yet to lose ground in Ukraine. One example of this is the celebration of the Day of Liberation, a holiday introduced in Soviet Ukraine to commemorate the German-Soviet war of 1941-1945.
The following chapters move from a cultural to an economic and political overview of the position of contemporary Ukraine between the EU and the CES. According to Oleksiy Semeniy, since 1991 Ukraine has been promoting a successful EU policy, although it will not become a member in the near future. As stated by Iryna Solonenko, EU cooperation also means a deep democratic transformation. The 2004 presidential elections have not been considered free and fair, even though Ukraine participated in several partnership and cooperation agreements for the promotion of democracy. However, Solonenko underlines that the EU has yet to provide adequate tools to Ukraine as it did to Poland and Hungary. Additionally, the improvements towards democratisation made by Ukraine have been slowed down lately by a stronger Russia and weaker EU. John R. Gillingham finds the solution to this problem in NATO-membership for Ukraine. In the conclusive chapter James Sherr delineates the ‘key asymmetries’ (165) of Ukrainian policy and proposes a series of solutions to reduce their consequences following Gillingham’s final considerations.

Throughout the book the authors manifest a strong support for the pro-European policy adopted by Yushenko and patriotically denounce the view of Ukraine being part of Russia. They believe in the necessity of creating an autonomous entity, less connected to Russia and more oriented westwards. The bulk of the book harshly criticises Putin’s ‘imperialist’ presidency and Yanukovich’s strategies. Velychenko openly accuses Russia of promoting a policy of economic, political and cultural domination on Ukraine. The anti-Russian sentiments of the book continue steadily in the following chapters, where Riabchuk and Semeniy argue in favour of Yushenko’s policy and in strong opposition to Yanukovich and those who support him. Sometimes this perspective is professed too strong and subtly mingles personal sentiments with objective analysis. The general tone of the book nonetheless remains of high scholarly value thanks to its richness of data and examples, and its interdisciplinary character.
Also, the argumentations are presented rather fluently, so that the chapters fit in with one another and represent a coherent description of the cultural, social, political, and economic situation of contemporary Ukraine. In addition, the book provides a balance between cultural aspects, such as the language question and Ukrainian literature, and aspects concerned with politics. Different fields of study are weaved together harmoniously in an encyclopaedic sort of matter.

Nonetheless, *Ukraine, the EU and Russia* lacks a thorough description of the gas crisis between Russia and Ukraine, which has strongly influenced Ukrainian foreign policy since 2006. However, the book does provide a thorough description of the Ukrainian attitude towards the EU and the subsequent European reaction. In several chapters the idea of joining the EU and NATO is regarded as the only sensible option for transforming Ukraine democratically and for assuring regional stability (introduction, chapter 6). In this sense, they follow the previous trends in studies on EU-Ukraine relations, while the first chapters are more original because they provide an overview of the Ukrainian stand and combine cultural and political aspects. However, the book does not adequately contemplate the reasons why the EU lately has become unwilling to include Ukraine. The authors limit their analysis to a description of the achievements in EU-Ukraine relations and the reasons why Ukraine belongs in the EU. *Ukraine, the EU and Russia* is written in order to define what the Ukrainian points of view are and to describe flaws and slip-ups in Ukrainian foreign policy. This becomes evident from the seventh chapter onwards, where the authors, not foreseeing membership in the EU in the near future, suggest to concentrate on NATO. Thus, the book has apparently been conceived as a support for policy makers who want to conduct an effective pro-European programme. For this reason, the book fulfils its aims rather well.

Despite the clearness and fluency of the language the complexity of the issue may render the comprehension of the Ukrainian question difficult. For this reason the book may be difficult for those who are not conversant with the subject.
However, the book is highly useful for students who are interested in exploring the question in a possible thesis. It allows the reader to fully comprehend the reasons for a strong Ukrainian propensity in joining the EU.
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