

Welfare State and Class Cleavage: Impact of Welfare State Policies on Electoral Divisions

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1. Introduction

Studies of cleavages in countries of Western Europe mostly ignored the potential of contextual variables in explaining mobilization of political divisions and in explaining cross national variation in cleavage patterns. Comparative studies of religion or class voting as a rule ignore the importance of social context in the mobilization of political divisions and producing divergent patterns of voting behaviour (Manza, Hout and Brooks 1995, Nieuwbeerta 1996, Brooks, Nieuwbeerta and Manza 2006, Knutsen 2006). More or less explicitly, the literature on class voting presumes it to be natural that various segments of working class vote for the left parties while segments of the middle class vote for the right parties (see Nieuwbeerta 1996, Manza and Hout and Brooks 1996, Nieuwbeerta and Ultee 1999a and 1999b). Very rarely do these studies consider the impact of socioeconomic context and how context shapes the actions of political actors in the mobilization of political divisions.

The importance of welfare state and corporatist institutions on the development of political divisions in western societies can hardly be understated. It also is hard to dismiss the influence of these factors in the process of formation of electoral divisions in the long run, both on the demand and supply side. Research about the development of welfare state established that political factors play a decisive role in this process and it is highly unlikely that these developments would not affect political divisions (Huber and Stephens 2001, Huber, Stephens and Ragin 1993, Swank and Hicks 1992, Hicks and Misra 1993, Swank 1988).

The main argument of the dissertation posits that pre-existing socioeconomic conditions and actions of various political actors within given context are responsible for the reshaping of political divisions in post-industrial societies. This chapter goes somewhat deeper in history and aims to assess the influence of these factors as sources of variation in political divisions of western societies at the height of welfare state development. The purpose of this chapter is to provide continuity in the argument of the dissertation and provide additional support for the main thesis advanced in the dissertation regarding the interaction between the policies and socioeconomic context in the formation of political divisions.

The chapter brings the role of agency and political context in the analysis through argument that the intensity of electoral divisions based on class, as the dominant cleavage in industrial societies, are likely to be linked to the ability of social democrat and Christian democrat parties to mobilize support of their core constituencies (working and middle class respectively) and to build cross class coalitions by integrating segments of the middle and working class in their electoral coalition.

Parties from both families of played an instrumental role in the development of the welfare state, though they used fairly distinct policies in the process (Huber and Stephens 2001, Huber Stephens and Ragin 1993). These policies targeted different segments of the middle and working class and created links between parties and social groups benefiting from these policies. Also, policies partially shaped future preferences of these voters and increased their stakes in keeping parties responsible for their implementation in power (Huber and Stephens 2001). Consequently, I expect to find different patterns of electoral divisions between classes in countries where left parties implemented and maintained welfare policies with strong support of centralized trade unions, countries where Christian democrat parties controlled the creation of the welfare relying on corporatist system in of economic coordination and countries where right parties controlled the government and established residual welfare state. To be more specific, I expect to see stronger mobilization of the working class and split within the middle class in the first context, opposite pattern in the second and clear divisions between middle and working class in the third.

The shape of electoral divisions between middle class, working class and petty bourgeoisie in industrial societies is in large part shaped by policies dominant political actors used during the development of the welfare state since the Second World War. Historical divisions over religion and cleavages present before and during the initial phase of industrialization (Lipset and Rokkan 1967, Wilensky1986) shaped opportunity structures of political parties in mobilizing middle and working classes. But political parties used policies over long term in order to mobilize certain segments of the electorate and build stable link with particular constituencies (see Esping Anderson 1985, Keesbergen 1995, Lynch 2006). In effect, this would mean that parties in control of government engaged in what Patrck Dunleavy (1991) describes as preferences shaping

strategies where particular policy is used to change position of a particular group of voters on one particular issue or change their political preferences by increasing the salience of another issue. But it does not mean that parties aim to establish a link between themselves and voters that is based solely or mainly on the proximity of voter`s positions to positions held by political parties, as is presupposed in Downsian spatial model of voting (Downs 1957). This link can also be based on a symbolic identification with party or ideology or on clientelistic exchange or a combination of both (see Kistchelt 2000, Grofman 2005). The exact nature of this link does not matter for the argument advanced here. What matters is that this link is shaped over the extended period of time and does not change until underlying conditions change.

In this chapter I rely on elements from research on welfare state falling within the power resource hypotheses approach to build and test a set of propositions about the impact of policies and parties in the development of electoral divisions in advanced industrial societies. To a lesser extent I also rely on research on the impact of socioeconomic context on variation in the incidence of class voting across countries.

Power resource hypotheses approach to the development of the welfare state (or democratic class struggle in Esping Anderson`s words) holds that variation in welfare regime characteristics is in large part shaped by the partisan composition of government, strength of trade unions and feminist movement and institutional setup allowing for easy implementation of policies. Some studies link particular social programs, notably the establishment of pension or unemployment insurance more explicitly to the formation of linkages between parties and voters (Lynch 2006, Keesbergen 1995).

The chapter will proceed as follows. First I will discuss segments of the power resource approach and studies focusing on contextual effects on class voting to anchor the argument and put it in a theoretical perspective. In the second step I will outline the main argument of this chapter and state propositions regarding the impact of actions of political parties and use of policies as a tool for mobilization of electoral support. In the third section I will present the data and discuss analytical methods I use, while in the final section I will present and discuss the results of the statistical analysis.

2. Class, Vote and Socioeconomic Context

Research about the impact of class on voting largely ignored the role of policy preferences and party programmes in structuring of electoral behaviour of social classes. Studies of class voting took it to be more or less self-evident that members of working class vote for the left parties while members of middle class and petty bourgeoisie votes for the right parties (see Nieuwbeerta 1996, Manza, Hout and Brooks 1995, Niweubeerta and Ultee 1999b, Evans 1999, Goldthorpe 1999, Korpi 1972, Evans 1993). The comprehensive theory linking social position, preferences and political choice is largely missing in class voting theory. As is shown in chapter 2, only in studies dealing with post-industrial cleavages we find more comprehensive treatment of social position-political preferences-electoral behaviour link (Kitschelt 1994, Kitschelt and Rhem 2004, Oesch 2007, Werfhorst and de Graaf 2004).

But more importantly for the purpose of this chapter, what is missing from the analysis of class voting is the impact of agency, or to be more precise, the impact of efforts of left and right parties to mobilize their respective class support, and the impact of socioeconomic context structuring their opportunity structure. So far we do not have a clear picture under what economic and social conditions is class voting likely to be higher and why. We also do not know the impact of a range of policies implemented since the Second World War during the development of the welfare state and corporatist regimes on political behaviour of different classes.

In a rare attempt of analysing the impact of political context, Weakliem and Heath (1999) introduced polarization between left and right in the analysis of class voting only to find that levels of class voting in Britain and other countries in their analysis were highest at the time when polarization between left and right parties was weakest. Nieuwbeerta and Ultee (1999a and 1999b) looked into cross-national variation in class voting and aimed to explain differences in voting behaviour of particular classes across a number of countries in the post-war period. In their analysis of the impact of contextual factors, Nieuwbeerta and Ultee tested for a number of variables including income inequality, social mobility, working class strength, union density and economic performance. However, apart from union density, they did not find any of the contextual

variables to be linked with the prevalence of class voting. Neither investigated the impact of characteristics of the welfare regime and their potential role in the mobilization of class voting. Study of Brooks, Nieuwbeerta and Manza (2001) focusing on cleavage voting (sex, gender and class) in six western countries and relying on more detailed class scheme and operationalization of vote choice found that that cleavage voting overall and as particular components exhibit stable and enduring differences across countries without providing explanation for this finding.

Findings of Weakliem and Heath as well as those of Nieuwbeerta and Ultee, point in the direction of mechanism which could be at work here. Aggregate measures of class voting show it to be the strongest in the 1950s and 1960s, in the period when welfare states experienced their strongest growth and when most of social security programs aimed at industrial workers were created and welfare effort hugely expanded compared to their pre-war level. This period was followed by precipitous decline in class voting in Norway and Sweden in 1970s, the period when left actively started to seek support among middle class and implemented policies which created large constituencies of women and middle class left voters. Furthermore, class voting appears to be the strongest in the period when industrialization in European countries was at its peak (see Franklin, Mackie and Valen 1992, and Nieuwbeerta and Ultee 1999a and 1999b). As these countries moved toward post-industrial societies, which brought about expansion in education and in number of middle class jobs, class voting defined as difference in voting behaviour between middle and working class declined and was replaced by more complex patterns of within-class and across-class divisions (Muller 1999, Werfhorst and De Graaf 2004, Oesch 2005 and 2006).

Class voting is defined as clear distinctiveness between middle and working class in voting for right and left parties respectively (Korpi 1972, Weakliem 1991, Nieuwbeerta 1996). It follows from this that the intensity of class voting can be considered to be a function of the ability of left parties to mobilize working class constituencies, the ability of right parties to mobilize that same constituency using cross-class appeals and the ability of left parties to mobilize the middle class voters and create cross-class coalition.

This brings us to another important issue, what is the mechanism which mobilizes social groups to vote for one or the other party, and what are the contextual factors which make particular form of mobilization possible. This is the topic of the following section.

3. Welfare State as the Source of Cleavage Mobilization

Research on the establishment of the welfare state within power resource hypothesis approach sees the development of the welfare state, and differences between welfare regimes, as a result of political contestation where political parties, sometimes in conjunction with trade unions brought about particular welfare regime into existence (see Huber and Stevens 2001, Huber, Ragin and Stevens 1993, Hicks and Swank 1992, Swank 1988, Hicks and Mira 1993, Pempel and Williamson 1989, Hicks, Swank and Ambhul 1989). Numerous studies found political composition of the government to be relevant determinants of the level and type of spending programs. While social democrats favored universal welfare state with universal programs funded from general taxation and high service provision, Christian democrat parties opted for occupationalist welfare state which relies heavily on transfers from occupational social funds and almost completely transfer based family policy (Esping Anderson 1999a).

In study of welfare spending in advanced industrial democracies Hicks and Swank (1992) find governmental dominance of Christian democrat and social democrat parties to be strongly related to higher overall welfare effort. Furthermore, welfare effort is found to be stronger in countries where combined effects of strong and concentrated unions, working class mobilization and left party governmental dominance were present in the post-war period. On the other hand, similar effect is found to be present where Christian democrat parties were dominant in government. Looking into patterns of electoral competition, Hicks and Swank also found that increasing strength of left parties forced right parties in government to increase welfare spending, while opposite happened when left parties faced strong right or center opposition. This suggests that parties in government modified their policies in order to build cross-class coalitions and prevent the rise in opponent strength.

In another study, Hicks, Swank and Ambhul (1989) find welfare spending in crisis and expansionary economic conditions to be mediated by dominance of left or right party in government, strength and concentration of trade unions as well as the strength of corporatist coordination mechanisms. They find that left parties are more prone to engage in countercyclical policies where unions are strong than where unions are weak. Left and right parties are also found to implement policies with different distributive consequence in the context of economic crisis. In a study of public employment, Cusack, Notermans and Rein (1989) find that strength of the left parties in government and levels of unionization to be positively related to levels of public employment, while the opposite can be said for the impact of right parties.

Hicks and Misra (1992) also find left government dominance to be positively related to both level and change in welfare spending. In their analysis, center government is positively but not significantly related to government spending, and in this they differ from other studies. Looking at political resources of particular social groups, they found that strong corporatism, but also protest and pressure activity of working class to be positively related with welfare state expansion. On the other hand incidence of petty bourgeoisie protest activity is found to be negatively related to welfare spending. Estimating the effect of political protest separately for periods before and after 1973 economic crisis, they find that political protest effects of working class to play a stronger role in pre 1973 period and petty bourgeoisie protest to be stronger in post 1973 period. This finding suggests that political parties in control of government reacted to changes in pressures from the demand side, which in themselves were consequence of changing economic and social conditions

In a separate study, focusing at determinants of government spending in a period before and after 1973 economic crisis, Swank (1988) finds that in pre 1973 period left and Christian democrat control of government was associated with higher levels of government spending as was level of unionization and working class protest activity. In the period following 1973 economic crisis, the impact of political parties weakened, impact of unionization persisted but only in a setting of centralized unions. In a period following 1973 economic crisis, the impact of class protest activity on government spending increases. Working class protest activity increases in importance and maintains

to be positively related to government spending, while at the same time upper class protest activity becomes significantly and negatively related to government spending.

Boix (1997 and 2000) finds partisan composition of government to be not only related to welfare spending, but to overall economic policy. Boix finds that right parties in government favor deregulating, reduction in taxation and policies that favor private investment. Left parties on the other hand favor policies which increase overall competitiveness of the economy such as improving education, infrastructure and public services. These policies, including public sector development, cater to very different constituencies and can be considered to have direct consequence on the social structure and through it on the distribution of preferences.

In a comprehensive study of welfare state development based on a power resource hypotheses (*Development and Crisis of the Welfare State*, 2001) Huber and Stephens provide a more comprehensive picture of the impact of political factors on the creation of different welfare regimes (see also Huber, Ragin and Stephens 1993). The authors argue that overall measures of welfare effort are not sufficiently sensitive to capture the variation which takes place among countries with higher levels of spending and to capture the variation in institutional characteristics of welfare regimes. Huber and Stephens differentiate between welfare states with strong provision of services and programs financed through general taxation and welfare state with low service provisions and high income transfers financed through social security contributions. They link differences in welfare policies to dominance of particular political parties and find that differences in characteristics of welfare regimes are clearly linked to strength of social democratic or Christian democrat parties in government. Dominance of left parties in government is found to be strongly related to overall government revenue, non-transfer government spending and public sector employment. On the other hand, dominance of Christian democrat parties in government was clearly linked to higher spending on social security transfers.

It is clear that partisan composition of government and strength of particular interest groups in interaction with institutional structures affects policies. The question is whether social democrats and Christian democrat parties devised policies in a way described above with a purpose to mobilize particular social groups.

In a study of social democracy in Scandinavia Esping Anderson (1985, see also Iversen 1998) suggest this to be the case. Social democrat parties used social policy at different junctions to build coalitions between different social groups. At first in 1950s they used social policy to build coalition between working class and agricultural sector (Esping Anderson 1985, Huber and Stephens 2001). Afterwards with the development of the public sector they used pension policy, expansion of education and public sector services to include segments of the middle class in their coalition (Esping Anderson 1999a). Julia Lynch (2006) also shows that in development of pension and unemployment programs parties in countries such as Italy, France or Germany, politicians in control of government largely had logic of coalition building in mind. Studies of Lynch and Esping Anderson link more explicitly particular social programs to electoral fortunes of political parties. They argue that welfare state programs were deliberately used to mobilize certain groups of voters.

But even if these policies were not deliberately designed to boost support for particular parties, this could have been its unintended consequence as these could have created link, based on symbolic identification or interest, between parties and voters. In the following section I will outline the mechanism how the use of policies can affect the development of electoral divisions. I will also state hypotheses about the impact policies have on the exact shape of political divisions and their differences between countries.

4. Policies of Welfare State and Political Cleavages

Power resource approach studies find clear link between development of the welfare state, ideological orientation of governmental parties, strength of interest groups, especially those mobilizing working class, and political competition. Other studies find these policies to be more explicitly linked with attempts of political actors to build links (either clientelistic or programmatic) with particular groups of voters (Esping Anderson 1985, Keesbergen 1995, Lynch 2006). studies of political cleavages find differences in voting patterns between countries based on class, religion and left-right economic

attitudes which on closer inspection broadly correspond to differences between welfare regimes (Nieuwbeerta and Ulte 1999a and 1999b, Knutsen 1989, 1995a, 1995b). Finally studies of class voting find that levels of class voting as one of the most important cleavages of industrial societies were highest in few decades after the second world war coinciding with the development of the welfare state (see Nieuwbeerta and Ultee 1999a and 1999b, Nieuwbeerta 1996, Manza, Hout and Brooks 1995).

This leads us to the following conclusion. If, as power resource hypotheses posits, choice of policy had a purpose of satisfying preferences of particular social groups, than it can also be said that it mobilized these same social groups in favor of particular policy outcomes. When political actors acting as agents of interest or social groups, implement policies meeting demands of these groups, than it follows that groups on whose behalf they acted develop vested interests in keeping these political actors in power. In other words, implementation of policies created mobilization effect by delivering preferred outcomes to targeted constituencies. As political parties delivered policy outcome that was favored by segments of the electorate supporting them, this created stakes their electorate has in keeping them in power. Keeping parties associated with preferred policy outcomes in government guarantees continuity of policies producing these outcomes.

This is why we can expect different voting patterns in countries where social democrat and Christian democrat parties in government pursued different policies in the process of welfare state development. I expect these differences to be a function of two developments. On the one hand a function of the ability of social democrat parties to mobilize the bulk of working class and segments of the middle class dependent on the welfare state services. On the other hand a function of the ability of Christian democrat parties to mobilize the bulk of the middle class and petty bourgeoisie together with segments of the skilled working class.

Moving one step forward from power research hypotheses I would argue that social democrat and Christian democrat parties used policies of welfare state development to mobilize support of various segments of the working class and the middle class. Social democrat and Christian democrat parties in this effort followed different strategies. Both strategies had elements of cross-class coalitions building. The difference being that social democrats aimed to increase the mobilization of workers as their core

constituencies combined with segments of the middle class while Christian democrat pursued the opposite strategy.

Social democrat parties, either in coalition or as single party minority or majority governments, increasing the social protection of industrial workers through development of universal, tax financed benefit schemes in the process where trade unions had a significant role in the process of policy development. This strategy was complemented with an effort aimed at attracting women and the elements of middle class through expansion of earnings related pensions, publicly funded education and public services funded from general taxation (Esping Anderson 1985, Iversen 1998, Moene and Wallerstein 1999).

Christian democrat parties on the other hand pursued strategies aimed at mobilizing the majority of middle class and petty bourgeoisie and segments of the working class. Christian democrat parties used fragmented occupation based schemes to build a coalition of middle class, petty bourgeoisie and segments of the working class. Occupation based social security programs allowed Christian democrat parties to avoid controversies over taxation and redistribution and allowed them to offer preferential treatment to petty bourgeoisie and farmers giving tax free access to programs for this particular group (Keesbergern 1995, Lynch 2006). Christian democrats used similar strategies with an aim to mobilize segments of the working class attached to catholic unions and skilled workers. Such strategy allowed Christian democrat parties to build a cross-class coalition, split the working class and prevent the rise of public sector middle class that would be more inclined to vote for social democrats.

I expect that in countries where social democrat parties controlled government and used it to develop universalist welfare state, working class will be more homogenous in their support of left parties while middle class is likely to demonstrate visible splits depending on the exposure of particular groups of middle class to market and their dependence on public services.

On the other hand, in countries where Christian democrat parties controlled government and established corporatist welfare state, we can expect to see higher homogeneity in middle class and petty bourgeoisie voting behaviour in their support for

right parties as well as lower probability that working class vote will be concentrated on social democrat parties.

In both cases, class voting as usually defined is likely to be subdued because strategies aimed at cross-class coalition building would reduce clear-cut class division, even where there is no religion to produce cross class cleavage. Therefore, in the context of cross-class coalitions, class voting is a concept that fails to capture the complexity of political coalitions merging larger or smaller segments of the middle and working class.

Looking generally at class voting, I would argue that the analysis focusing on differences in voting of particular classes in different political and economic contexts has much higher potential to reveal lines of political divisions than simple and context blind analysis of differences in voting patterns of particular classes. Such analysis also has a potential to deepen our knowledge about the nature of political divisions as they emerged in western societies in postwar period and provide a solid ground for understanding of what happened afterwards.

5. Hypotheses

The discussion brings us to the following hypotheses regarding the influence of parties and policies on voting behaviour.

H1: Probability that working class will vote for SD parties is higher in countries where SD parties in power, in conjunction with strong unions, implemented universal social policies.

In countries where social democrat parties in conjunction with strong unions implemented universalist social policies I expect to find higher likelihood that working class will vote for social democrat parties. Social democrat control over government was a necessary precondition for implementation of universalist social policies and the longer and deeper the social democrat control of control of government the larger is the

likelihood that implemented policies will not be changed (see Huber and Stephens 2001). Trade unions had the resources to mobilize working class support for welfare state and social democrat parties. The potential of unions to deliver support to social democrat parties is higher in countries where union density and union concentration was high. High concentration means that unions members were not divided between politically aligned confederations affiliated to different parties (Golden, Wallerstein and Lange 1999). In countries where SD parties did not control power for any significant period of time and where they could not rely on strong and concentrated trade unions, the mobilization potential of SD parties is likely to be lower and consequently, probability that working class vote will crystallize around SD parties will be lower as well.

H2: Probability that members of working class will vote for a CD parties is higher in countries where CD parties implemented transfer heavy social policy.

In countries where CD parties were controlling government and unions were fragmented between politically aligned confederations conditions needed for mobilization of working class were absent. CD parties could use policies related to welfare state development to mobilize segments of the working class, while the existence of confessional trade union confederations enabled CD parties to mobilize a share of the working class voters. Hicks and Misra (1994) find the presence of Christian democrat parties to be instrumental in the emergence of catholic trade unions as these parties provided an agent which could mobilize working class for Christian democratic ideology.

H3: Probability that petty bourgeoisie will vote for a CD party is higher in countries where CD parties in power implemented transfer heavy social policy.

Self employed farmers and petty bourgeoisie are a natural constituency of CD parties given their generally conservative. However CD parties in power targeted this constituencies with policies which provided self employed artisans, craftsmen and farmers with generous social security benefits without taxing them (Lynch 2006), which is likely to increase their support for these parties.

The voting behavior of middle class is likely to vary depending on the context. Where left parties were dominant and complemented universalist welfare policies with extensive government service provision, expansion of public sector employment and education spending, we can expect to see the middle class support divided between social democrat and right parties. In countries where social democrat parties could not implement such policies and where they could not create a segment of middle class employed in the public sector, we can expect to see middle class much less likely to support SD parties and support more clearly concentrated on parties of right.

H4: The voting behavior of middle class is likely to vary between context dominated by SD government and universal welfare state and CD government and transfer heavy welfare state.

H4A: Probability that middle class will vote for the left parties (or split vote between left and right) is higher where SD parties in control of government implemented policies increasing the size of the public sector and creating new constituencies in it.

H4B: Probability that middle class vote will be split between left and right parties are much lower in countries where left parties are not in control of government and could not use public sector in the mobilization of middle class support.

6. Method and Data

The data for test of these hypotheses are taken from the International Social Mobility and Politics Data File collected by Nieuwbeerta and Ganzeboom. This data set compiles a number of individual level datasets such as electoral surveys and public opinion surveys from various sources conducted between 1956 and 1990. For this analysis I selected a set of eleven surveys from the same number of countries conducted between 1968 and 1974. This time frame was chosen as this is the period when welfare

state programs were already institutionally fully established and distributive outcomes were clearly visible. Also, at this time structural developments related to shifts toward postindustrial social structure which brought splits within middle and working classes did not begin to show their effects. The effects hypothesized in the previous section can be expected to have the highest visibility within this period. The countries included in the data set are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Great Britain, Finland, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland.

Since the effects hypothesized in the previous section are based on the interactions between micro and contextual variables, I added three types of macro variables in the dataset. First type of variables measures participation of Christian democrat and social democrat parties in government. Each variable is intended to capture the impact of these parties on policies over the long term as we can expect that partisan impact on policies, and also voter identification with policies implemented by particular party, could materialize only if party was in control of government over a longer period of time. To this end both variables measure cumulative share of seats these parties have in government since 1945 and up to the year of the survey individual level data are taken from. The data for this variable are taken from the Comparative Welfare State Data Set compiled by Huber, Ragin and Stephens.

The second type of variables measures characteristics of welfare policies. General measure of welfare spending is not considered to be sensitive enough to capture variation in welfare policies (Huber, Ragin and Stephens 1993) as they do not reveal which policies are actually in place. Because of this Huber, Stephens and Ragin (see Huber and Stephens 2001 and Huber, Ragin and Stephens 1993) propose to use measures which capture the most distinctive features of welfare regimes. As social democrat welfare state are based on universalist tax financed policies and service provision they propose to use the measure of overall government revenues as % of GDP as a measure of social democrat welfare policies. On the other hand, since Christian democrat welfare state are based on fragmented insurance based programs financed mostly through social security contributions, with low provision of services and dominance of transfers, they propose the use of measure of overall social transfers as a share of GDP to measure the prevalence

of welfare policies characteristics for Christian democrat welfare regime. These variables are also taken from the Comparative Welfare State Data Set.

Final macro variable captures the strength and centralization of trade unions. High density of membership and organization concentration is considered to be instrumental in the mobilization of the working class political support for welfare policies and social democrat parties. The higher the density of union membership and the higher the centralization of trade unions, the higher is the potential of trade unions to deliver working class support for left parties but also to influence what left party does in government. If trade unions are divided politically (see Hicks and Misra 1994) than we can expect that their members will follow political affiliation of their unions. Therefore we can expect that in trade unions with high rate of membership and organizational concentration will be able to mobilize the working class to support the left parties and social democrat welfare policies. On the other hand, if trade unions are divided politically, members will most likely follow the political affiliation of their particular union, leading to political divisions within working class on those supporting the left parties and those supporting Christian democrat parties. Therefore I use here a variable which combines trade union density with an index of trade union concentration. New variable is constructed by multiplication of overall trade union density and Herfindahl index of union concentration across all confederations. The data for this variable are taken from the “Union Centralization among Advanced Industrial Societies” data set collected by Golden and Wallerstein.

On the micro level I use measures of social class, religiosity, education, sex and age. Some relevant measures, notably union membership, were not available in the dataset and could not be included. Social class is operationalized through four categories indicating class position within the middle class, non-manual routine class, manual class and self employed. Special group is made for non-employed. Classes are derived by collapsing nine categories of Erikson Goldthorpe class scheme into four categories representing four most significant classes of industrial societies with distinct social position, preferences and collective action potential. Also, given the extensive use of interaction terms in the analysis in this chapter, the use of smaller number of categories in the class variables makes the analysis more parsimonious.

Dependent variable measures voting behavior and is operationalized with two dichotomous variables. First variable measures vote for social democrat parties as opposed to voting for right parties, including Christian democrats, conservatives and liberals. The second variable measures vote choice for Christian democrat and centrist parties as opposed to parties of the left, including social democrats, communists and other left parties. Collapsing of vote choice into dichotomous variable reduces variation of vote choice variable somewhat and takes a certain number of cases out of the analysis. However, the dichotomization of dependent variables helps in avoiding trappings of compositional differences of party systems across countries. As the focus is on comparison between Christian democrat and left parties and social democrat and right parties the loss of information in categories I use is smaller that would be if simple left-right dichotomy is used.

I estimate a total of eight models. Of these four models use dependent variable indicating vote choice for social democrat parties or right parties and four models with variable indicating voting for Christian democrats as opposed to left parties. Due to dichotomous dependent variable, all models are estimated with logistic regression. Models include individual level variables and interactions between class dummies and macro variables. Two of these models include a full set of variables included in the analysis with all interactions. Because of the high degree of colinearity between macro variables, namely between measures of social security transfers and Christian democrat participation in government on the one hand and total tax revenue, left government participation in government and union density one the other, as since there are only eleven cases at the macro level, I estimate six additional models. Each of these models includes one macro variable in interaction with selected indicators of class at a time. The use of several models allows for more reliable assessment of the interaction effects.

The first model has vote for social democrat party as dependent variable. I expect to see differences in the voting behavior of manual, routine non-manual and middle classes between countries where social democrats are in government, trade unions are strong and universalist welfare state is present and countries where this is not the case. Therefore, I include in the analysis interactions between manual, non-manual and middle class dummies with union density, total tax revenue and left party control of government.

Also, since I expect that the strongest working class support for social democrats is found in countries where left parties in government implemented universalist social policies, I include three-way interaction terms in the analysis including these two macro variables and dummies for working class and non-manual class in the first model. Dummy for self-employed are left out of interaction since there is no evidence in the literature that suggests that members of petty bourgeoisie support social democrats in any significant number, or that social democratic policy has potential to mobilize this particular social group. In fact there is plenty of evidence for the opposite, meaning that social democrat policies are actually causing this group to mobilize in opposition to social democrat parties, as happened in 1970s tax revolts in Denmark and Norway (Gibson and Harmel 1995). The equation of the first model therefore looks as follows.

Model 1:

$$\mathbf{PVote(SD/RP)} = \mathbf{C} + \mathbf{Bx}_1(\text{education}) + \mathbf{Bx}_2(\text{age}) + \mathbf{Bx}_3(\text{sex}) + \mathbf{Bx}_4(\text{public sector}) + \mathbf{Bx}_5(\text{class}) + \mathbf{Bx}_6(\text{religiosity}) + \mathbf{Bx}_7(\text{occupation*union density}) + \mathbf{Bx}_8(\text{occupation*left government}) + \mathbf{Bx}_9(\text{occupation*taxation}) + \mathbf{Bx}_{10}(\text{occupation*left government*taxation})$$

Three following models include interactions of class dummies with one macro variable at time. The first model uses union density, the second uses strength of left parties in government and the third uses overall taxation level. The equations of these three models include following variables.

Model 2:

$$\mathbf{PVote(SD/RP)} = \mathbf{C} + \mathbf{Bx}_1(\text{education}) + \mathbf{Bx}_2(\text{age}) + \mathbf{Bx}_3(\text{sex}) + \mathbf{Bx}_4(\text{public sector}) + \mathbf{Bx}_5(\text{class}) + \mathbf{Bx}_6(\text{religiosity}) + \mathbf{Bx}_7(\text{occupation*union density})$$

Model 3:

$$\mathbf{PVote(SD/RP)} = \mathbf{C} + \mathbf{Bx}_1(\text{education}) + \mathbf{Bx}_2(\text{age}) + \mathbf{Bx}_3(\text{sex}) + \mathbf{Bx}_4(\text{public sector}) + \mathbf{Bx}_5(\text{class}) + \mathbf{Bx}_6(\text{religiosity}) + \mathbf{Bx}_7(\text{occupation*left government})$$

Model 4:

$$\mathbf{PVote(SD/RP)} = \mathbf{C} + \mathbf{Bx}_1(\text{education}) + \mathbf{Bx}_2(\text{age}) + \mathbf{Bx}_3(\text{sex}) + \mathbf{Bx}_4(\text{public sector}) + \mathbf{Bx}_5(\text{class}) + \mathbf{Bx}_6(\text{religiosity}) + \mathbf{Bx}_7(\text{occupation*taxation})$$

Fifth model has vote for Christian democrat as opposed to left parties as dependent variable. With respect to this dependent variable I expect to see differences in the electoral behavior of manual and non-manual class and self-employed. Interaction terms are based on these three class categories. As middle class is the natural constituency of right parties I do not expect to see particular mobilization effects caused by policies implemented by Christian democrat parties. Therefore I do not interact middle class dummy with any macro variables. Class dummies are interacted with union density, presence of Christian democrat parties in government and size of social security transfers. Similar to the effects expected in model 1, I expect to see that the impact of high social security transfers on vote choice for Christian democracy among manual and routine non-manual workers depends on Christian democrat control of government. Therefore, I use three-way interaction terms composed from these variables to model this effect. The equation for the fifth model includes following variables.

Model 5:

$$PVote(CD/LP)=C+Bx_1 \text{ (education)} + Bx_2(\text{age}) + Bx_3(\text{sex}) + Bx_4(\text{public sector}) + Bx_5(\text{class}) + Bx_6(\text{religiosity}) + Bx_7(\text{occupation*union density}) + Bx_8(\text{occupation*CD government}) + Bx_9(\text{occupation*social transfers}) + Bx_{10}(\text{occupation*CD government*social transfers})$$

The following three models include interaction of class dummies with one of the each macro variable, and these models have following equations.

Model 6:

$$PVote(CD/LP)=C+Bx_1 \text{ (education)} + Bx_2(\text{age}) + Bx_3(\text{sex}) + Bx_4(\text{public sector}) + Bx_5(\text{class}) + Bx_6(\text{religiosity}) + Bx_7(\text{occupation*union density})$$

Model 7:

$$PVote(CD/LP)=C+Bx_1 \text{ (education)} + Bx_2(\text{age}) + Bx_3(\text{sex}) + Bx_4(\text{public sector}) + Bx_5(\text{class}) + Bx_6(\text{religiosity}) + Bx_7 \text{ (occupation*CD government)}$$

Model 8:

$$PVote(CD/LP)=C+Bx_1 \text{ (education)} + Bx_2(\text{age}) + Bx_3(\text{sex}) + Bx_4(\text{public sector}) + Bx_5(\text{class}) + Bx_6(\text{religiosity}) + Bx_7 \text{ (occupation*social transfers)}$$

7. Results and Discussion

The results of regression analysis generally support advanced hypotheses. In logistic regressions with both dependent variables most of the interaction terms modeling impact of policies and political actors on electoral behavior of particular classes are significant and their effect is more often than not in the expected direction. I will start first by presenting results from the first set of regressions with vote for social democrat vs. right parties as dependent variable. Table 1 presents results of four logistic regressions corresponding to first four model specifications from section 6.

Apart from socioeconomic variables, model 1 includes full set of interactions between occupational dummies and macro variables including three-way interaction terms between class dummies, total taxation and left parties share in government.

Interaction terms are primary variables of interest in this analysis. Their effects are visible and strong and almost all coefficients indicating interaction terms are significant with the exception of interaction between middle class and left share of government and three way interaction term between middle class, left share of government and total taxation.

The results of model 1 in general provide support for the first hypotheses. Interactions between manual classes and left government on the one hand and manual class and total taxation are positive and significant. Similar results are found for the same set of interactions with non-manual class dummy. On the other hand interactions between the middle class dummy and total taxation are significant but negative. This finding, however, is not in line with expectations since hypothesis 4A states that elements of universalist welfare state, with large segments of middle class employed in the public sector, public provision of services, publicly provided education and generous pension benefits for the middle class are likely to boost middle class support for social democrats.

Three way interactions terms with manual and non-manual class are significant but negative. These interaction terms are intended to model link of the political and policy context and with it capture the actual mechanism of cleavage mobilization. However, because of high colinearity between macro variables it is very likely that two-way interaction terms captured most of the effects modeled by three way interactions

Table 1. Results of logistic regression with vote for social democrat as dependent variable.

	Model 1 B/S.E	Model 2 B/S.E	Model 3 B/S.E	Model 4 B/S.E
Education	-0.022** (0.011)	-0.078*** (0.008)	-0.078*** (0.008)	-0.079*** (0.008)
Age	-0.004*** (0.002)	-0.005*** (0.001)	-0.005*** (0.001)	-0.005*** (0.001)
Sex	-0.625*** (0.053)	-0.432*** (0.044)	-0.450*** (0.044)	-0.433*** (0.044)
Public sector	0.451*** (0.111)	-0.010 (0.082)	0.019 (0.082)	-0.007 (0.083)
Middle class	7.358*** (1.205)	0.824*** (0.208)	0.149 (0.128)	2.570*** (0.487)
Self-employed	1.940*** (0.725)	-0.213 (0.209)	-1.031*** (0.116)	1.128*** (0.340)
Non-manual	1.523 (1.087)	0.850*** (0.270)	-0.155 (0.124)	1.617*** (0.440)
Manual	ref	ref	ref	ref
Not employed	3.516*** (0.722)	1.218*** (0.196)	0.402*** (0.089)	2.557*** (0.332)
Religiosity	-0.014*** (0.001)	-0.005*** (0.000)	-0.004*** (0.001)	-0.004*** (0.001)
Manual*union density	-0.090*** (0.013)	0.032*** (0.004)		
Non-manual*union density	-0.094*** (0.015)	0.000 (0.004)		
Manual*left government	1.010*** (0.114)		0.082*** (0.008)	
Manual*total taxation	0.160*** (0.028)			0.074*** (0.009)
Non-manual*left government	0.784*** (0.123)		0.022*** (0.008)	
Non-manual*total taxation	0.118*** (0.033)			0.015* (0.008)
Middle class*left government	0.007 (0.120)		-0.016** (0.008)	
Middle class*total taxation	-0.121*** (0.025)			-0.010 (0.009)
Manual*left gov.*total taxation	-0.019*** (0.002)			
Non-manual*left gov.*total taxation	-0.014*** (0.003)			
Middle class*left gov.*total taxation	0.002 (0.003)			
Constant	-2.672*** (0.718)	-0.379* (0.214)	0.451*** (0.129)	-1.702*** (0.340)
Nagelkerke R ²	0.203	0.114	0.101	0.108
-2 log likelihood	9492.557	12851.422	12955.195	12899.507

***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10 (all entries are logistic regression coefficients and standard errors)

leaving some residual effects reflected in negative coefficients of three way interactions. If this interpretation of three-way interaction effects is correct, overall conclusion is that results do show that the support for social democrat parties among working class and lower non-manual class is higher in countries with universalist welfare state where left parties had control over government.

The effect of the interaction between union density and manual and non-manual dummies in model 1 is also found to be negative but significant. This result also can be explained by strong correlation between union density, left control of government and total taxation. The effect of two way interaction between union density and class dummies in this case might also be captured by interactions of class dummies with variables measuring the strength of left parties in government and total taxation.

Because of the possibility that high correlation between these macro variables might affect coefficients of interactions between individual and contextual variables in a full model, three additional models are included in the analysis. In these models only one macro variable was interacted with class dummies at a time. The results for the model 2 where class dummies are interacted with union density show that in countries where union density is higher, working class members are more likely to vote for the social democrat parties. This effect is also in line with the first hypotheses. But similar effect is absent for routine non-manual class.

In model 3, the effects of interactions between class dummies and left share of government seats are generally in line with expectations. Interactions between left government and manual and routine non-manual class are found to be significant and positive. On the other hand the interaction for left government and the middle class is found to be negative. It seems that hypothesis 4A describing expected link between middle class vote and social democrats in government is not correctly specified. Not only we do not find increased support of middle class for left parties when these are in government, but we see the opposite effect indicating that support for social democrats among middle class actually declines as the hold of social democrat parties on government increases. It could be expected that interaction of middle class with taxation might show high taxation disliked by middle class to be the reason behind this trend, but as results of the model 4 show, this effect is not significant. The expectations that social

democrats will be able to forge cross-class coalitions with middle class might have been focused on the wrong class. The findings in this analysis suggest that cross class coalitions are more likely to involve lower non-manual workers as large segment of this class are employed in public sector services created by social democrat policies captured by the variable in question. The second potential explanation is that splits within middle class between left leaning social and cultural professionals and right leaning business and technical professionals did not fully develop at the time the analysis covers.

In the second set of regressions, with vote for left or Christian democrat parties as dependent variable, the effects of interactions are fairly similar. Most interaction terms are significant and generally in the expected direction. However, in model 5, most of the two-way interactions are in the direction opposite to the expected. Exceptions are interactions between union density and working class and low non-manual class which are significant and in the negative direction as expected. These interactions show that large and concentrated trade unions are reducing the probability that members of the working class will vote for the Christian democrat parties and this is very much in line with expectations about their effects.

Interactions of non-manual and manual class with social transfers and Christian democrat government dominance are all in the opposite direction than expected. However, this time three-way interaction terms are found to be significant and in the expected direction. Three-way interactions test expectations stated in the second hypotheses about the combined effect of Christian democrat government and high social transfers. The results are in line with expectations that Christian democrat parties in government could mobilize working class and lower non-manual constituencies with policies aimed at the creation of occupationalist welfare state.

In the same model the interaction between self-employed class and Christian democrat government is also found to be significant and in the expected direction in line with expectations stated in the third hypotheses. However, for this social class coefficient of three-way interaction term is not significant and was omitted from the final analysis.

Table 2. Results of logistic regression with vote for Christian democrat as dependent variable.

	Model 5 B/S.E	Model 6 B/S.E	Model 7 B/S.E	Model 8 B/S.E
Education	0.034*** (0.010)	0.045*** (0.010)	0.044*** (0.010)	0.020** (0.010)
Age	0.007*** (0.002)	0.008*** (0.002)	0.008*** (0.002)	0.008*** (0.002)
Sex	0.711*** (0.051)	0.588*** (0.049)	0.669*** (0.050)	0.596*** (0.049)
Public sector	-0.441*** (0.109)	-0.203** (0.104)	-0.214** (0.104)	-0.348*** (0.105)
Middle class	-4.344*** (1.404)	-0.184 (0.222)	2.814*** (0.284)	2.663*** (0.348)
Self-employed	-7.025*** (1.477)	0.779*** (0.216)	3.101*** (0.362)	-0.200 (0.555)
Non-manual	-0.597 (1.944)	-0.387 (0.298)	2.394*** (0.277)	2.143*** (0.335)
Manual	ref	ref	ref	ref
Not employed	-4.860*** (1.402)	-0.580*** (0.205)	0.841** (0.363)	-0.293 (0.461)
Religiosity	0.013*** (0.001)	0.013*** (0.001)	0.010*** (0.001)	0.015*** (0.001)
Manual*union density	-0.079*** (0.013)	-0.015*** (0.004)		
Non-manual*union density	-0.072*** (0.016)	0.003 (0.005)		
Manual*CD gov.	-0.594*** (0.106)		0.149*** (0.017)	
Manual*social transfers	-0.273** (0.128)			0.149*** (0.024)
Manual*CD gov.*social transfers	0.053*** (0.009)			
Self-employed*CD gov.	0.256*** (0.033)		0.044*** (0.015)	
Self-employed*social transfers	0.000 (0.016)			0.266*** (0.032)
Non-manual*CD gov.	-0.525*** (0.109)		0.127*** (0.015)	
Non-manual*social transfers	-0.175 (0.116)			0.205*** (0.023)
Non-manual*CD gov*social transfers	0.045*** (0.009)			
Constant	3.571*** (1.401)	-0.778*** (0.223)	-3.797*** (0.308)	-3.271*** (0.346)
Nagelkerke R ²	0.206	0.153	0.180	0.177
-2 log likelihood	10201.309	10596.160	10394.297	10416.445

***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10 (all entries are logistic regression coefficients and standard errors)

Given relatively high correlation between Christian democrat share of government seats and size of social security transfers and the small number of second level cases (countries) included in the analysis, I estimated three more models using interactions with only one macro variable in each model. Reducing the number of macro variables perhaps reduces the correspondence of each model to original theoretical propositions, however it does provide for a more reliable and robust estimate of the effects of interaction terms.

In the regressions with model 6 I used interactions between union density on the one hand and working class and non-manual class on the other. The results here confirm findings from model 5 for manual workers but for low non-manual class this effect is absent. In the next model with Christian democrat government the effect of all interactions, with manual class, low non-manual and self employed is significant and in the expected direction. In countries where Christian democrats have stronger presence in government the support for these parties is higher among working class, lower non-manual and the self employed. The following model suggests that this impact has more to do with policies of Christian democrat government than with these parties being in government. In the model 8 interactions include class and measures of size of social transfers. All these interactions are significant and in the expected direction. Self employed, working class and low-non manual class are found to be more likely to support Christian democrat parties when strong transfer policies were implemented.

The analysis with both dependent variables confirms expectations about the impact of welfare state policies on electoral mobilization of particular social classes. Policies are found to be important equally in mobilizing the core constituencies of Christian democrat and social democrat parties, notably of working class for social democrats and petty bourgeoisie for Christian democrats. Policies were also found to be instrumental in mobilizing classes which are not natural constituencies of the left and right parties, such as working class for Christian democrat and lower non-manual classes for social democrats. Overall, analysis gives support to claims that parties can actively use policies to shape electoral coalitions and guide social development in a manner which can affect long term political outcomes and provide parties implementing these same policies with electoral advantage in the long term.

8. Conclusions

The aim of this chapter is to investigate the role of policies and actions of governmental actors in the formation of political cleavages. I argue that policies used in the formation of welfare state were also used as mechanism for the development of long term links between politicians and voters. The analysis in this chapter focuses on social democrat and Christian democrat parties as principal builders of the welfare state. These parties used very different policies in the process and these policies catered to different constituencies. Implementation of these policies increased the stakes the these constituencies had in keeping social democrat or Christian democrat parties in government leading to electoral mobilization of these constituencies for their preferred parties.

The analysis in this chapter broadly confirmed these expectations. In countries where Christian democrat parties were in government used occupation based and transfer heavy social policies, these parties managed to increase their support among the segments of the working class, petty bourgeoisies and lower non-manual class. Interaction effects clearly indicate that support of these groups in this context was higher than in countries where this was not the case.

Social democrat parties in government used a very different set of policies with similar results. In countries where social democrat parties implemented universalist and service intensive welfare policies they managed to boost their support among working class and include significant segments of lower non-manual classes in their coalition. Expectations that such type of policies might increase support among segments of the middle class were not borne out in the analysis.

The analysis also confirmed the role centralized and strong trade unions might have in the mobilization of the working class for social democrat parties. However, due to the strong link between union strength and presence of social democrat policies this link did not come out very clearly in the analysis. On the other hand, it emerged that the presence of strong and centralized trade unions had negative impact on the support of working class for Christian democrat parties.

The analysis in this chapter showed that socioeconomic context and the action of political actors matter in the formation of political cleavages. The analysis covered the impact of policies used in the period when welfare state was established and its impact on the structure of industrial cleavages was most likely to occur.

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