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Europe à la carte ? The European citizenship and its dimensions in the views of national elites

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Summary : The purpose of this article is:

- I. to provide a systematic presentation of the results of the 2007 Intune survey of attitudes of national elites vis-à-vis Europe and to discuss the main dimensions defining their interpretation of the present and future European citizenship
- II. to explore how the positions of national elites on different aspects of European integration combine to compose multidimensional profiles
- III. to suggest some directions for further analysis and causal interpretations

Introduction.

Over the years new elements of a European citizenship have been progressively included in the “constitution” (the treaties), laws and judicial rulings of the European Union and by now compose a highly significant, albeit complex, legal, institutional and policy reality (Castiglione, etc.). This testifies to an increasingly explicit self-understanding of Europe as a polis: a polity with democratic (albeit imperfect) foundations. Yet citizenship as a political phenomenon does not entail only a system of legal regulations: a fundamental aspect involved is the penetration of this idea (and of its different components) in the minds of all the crucial components of the European political system. Citizenship exists and develops as a true political phenomenon only as long as citizens, political actors and authorities understand themselves and their roles as part of a “citizenship game” and translate this mentality into an appropriate behaviour. This applies also to Europe.

What is then the relevance for the European citizenship system (Cotta 2008) of national elites and of their beliefs, attitudes, value judgements with regard to Europe ? Is their point of view that of “external observers” or something more ?

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It is quite obvious that the modern system of citizenship as it has developed in the framework of national states was closely anchored to a strong and dynamic relationship between citizens and their political representatives (Marshall, etc.). This because representative mechanisms have been the central instrument through which citizens have affirmed their citizenship rights and fought for their defence and expansion, but also because representative political elites in their quest for popular support and legitimation have contributed in a fundamental measure to defining and shaping the ideas and the instruments of citizenship and to make them part of a political “supply” proposed to the voters. In the end it can be rightly said that both the political self-understanding as citizens and the implementation of this idea in the national democratic systems is the result of interactions between the public at large and their political representatives. An obvious example is the expansion of the right to vote (a central element of political citizenship) for which pressures from below and supply from above have typically fed one into each other (Quotations).

When we move from the national to the European landscape the citizenship system and its dynamics are necessarily more intricate. European citizenship is a “compound system” (Fabbrini 2007) that combines elements of an indirect citizenship (European citizenship as a consequence of national citizenship of Member states) and of a direct citizenship (European citizenship deriving directly from the institutional mechanisms and policy processes of the EU) (Cotta 2008, Cotta and Isernia 2009). Due to the persistent and dominant role of mechanisms of national representation for the functioning of the EU, for its institutions and policy-making processes and thus also for the implementation of the European citizenship, we can assume that national elites and their views about the European Union play a crucial role also in the making of the European citizenship. The analysis of their views in these matters is therefore well warranted.

In the following pages we will conduct a systematic exploration of the positions of national elites of a sample of member States of the EU with regard to the crucial themes – identity, representation, scope of governance – which contribute to defining the nature and content of a European citizenship. Our research effort does not cover however only political elites, but has been extended also to economic elites. Even if they are not directly part of the institutional system of representation, there is no doubt that economic elites exert a strong influence in the national systems and, given the strong economic dimension of the European polity, have important interests at stake at the European level. It seems therefore useful to consider their views and to compare them with those of their political counterparts.

What are the basic expectations, with regard to the views that national politicians and national economic elites hold of Europe as a citizenship based polity, that we want to put to the test of our exploration? Two preliminary considerations should concur to orient our expectations.

The first is that citizenship (at the national level and presumably also at the supranational one) is a multifaceted phenomenon. In a simplified version it can be interpreted as defined both by an horizontal and a vertical dimension: the horizontal dimension concerns the set of provisions which define the membership and nature of a polity, and the vertical dimension the set of rights of political action and the portfolio of entitlements with which citizens are endowed with (Cotta and Isernia 2009). The positions of national elites have consequently to be analyzed with regard to these two basic dimensions: we can also expect that views concerning the different faces of citizenship may be relatively independent from each other.

The second consideration has to do with the “compound” nature of the European citizenship which is closely connected with the way the European polity has been shaped by the process of integration. Europe, we must never forget it, was not the product of a unified and coherent design formulated and implemented by a centralized and dominant actor, but the result of a process of voluntary association and of the consensual delegation/pooling of sovereignty (Milward..., Moravcik 1998) by the governments of the member states, which have kept a close control over the process. This does not mean that all the solutions adopted have always been the most highly preferred by each MS, but that in any case they have been seen as preferable to a non agreement. At the same time it is probable that different member states and different elite groups inside them must prefer certain aspects to others.

What are the consequences of this ?

1. European citizenship has been constructed as a supplement to national citizenship rather than as an alternative to it.
2. It has been constructed in a “ patchy” more than in a systematic and “cartesian” way
3. It is the result of compromises among the different preferences of MS

The views of national elites should presumably reflect this state of affairs and thus show a composite picture across countries, political positions and also across dimensions and aspects of citizenship. In general we can expect that the position of national elites (except for relatively marginal groups) should be characterised by an instrumental and pragmatic orientation more than by a principled and dogmatic one. Evaluations of benefits and costs should prevail over expressions of affection. Views about supranational identity and affiliation should not be framed as antagonist to national identity and affiliation. And similarly for what regards European institutions and their role and powers, they should be seen as complementary to national ones. For what concerns policy competencies a sharing of responsibilities between national and supranational authorities should be seen in general with favour rather than a drastic devolution from one level to

the other (unless national elites become convinced that national authorities have become unable to face the challenges of new problems). Finally we may expect that views of economic and political elites should differ on some aspects. Contrary to politicians economic leaders do not have to represent a broad spectrum of opinions but can express more directly their own interests. We should therefore expect more homogeneity and cohesion from them. They should also be obviously more concerned with the potential economic consequences of certain aspects of citizenship and less with the political ones. At the same time we should not expect differences vis-à-vis political elites to be too extreme: in the end economic elites are generally not in a position of systematic opposition to their national political system, but tend rather to maintain strong links with governing parties.

I. THE MAIN DIMENSIONS OF ANALYSIS

1. Views about the EU as a political community beyond the national states

The first dimension of citizenship to be considered is the horizontal one. As a result of the historical process of integration the EU defines today a new political community which is composed at the same time of (member) states and of individual citizens. We can therefore talk of a combination of “collective” and “individual” citizens as it happens with federal states. When exploring the positions of national elites on this dimension we must distinguish between two main aspects: a. the evaluation of the supranational polity and of the process of integration; b. the interpretation of its meaning.

a. Attitudes towards the EU

What is the degree of support for the supranational polity ? and what are its bases ? to what extent rational calculations and affective mechanisms of identification are at work ? If we start from an **instrumental perspective**, i.e. from an evaluation of the benefits deriving from the European membership, attitudes of national elites towards Europe appear widely positive. There are almost no doubts that the European Union has had beneficial effects for the countries represented by the politicians surveyed (table 1). Only a very small minority has different views. Even more clearly positive are economic elites².

² Data presented in this chapter are from the Intune survey unless otherwise mentioned and refer to all the countries surveyed in this project with the exception of Serbia.

Table 1. Europe as beneficial for the country of the respondents (%)

<i>Utilitarian Evaluation</i>	<i>Political elites</i>	<i>Economic elites</i>
Positive	94,4	98,2
Negative	5,6	1,8
N	1287	669

It is well known that at the national level established political communities are not valued only from an instrumental point of view. They normally generate also fairly strong feelings of affection among their members. It is therefore relevant to ask if the positive instrumental evaluation about the EU is matched by a feeling of attachment to this community; and how this compares to the levels of attachment to other political communities such as the national or regional ones. Our data confirm that also the supranational community has generated diffuse feelings of affection. A very large majority within national elites declares indeed to be attached to Europe. But when we consider the strength of these feelings the EU is clearly at a disadvantage compared to other communities. The attachment of elites to their country and town/village, but also to regions are clearly stronger. Only a minority (albeit a significant one) declares a strong feeling of belonging to the EU. At the same time however the percentage of those expressing a strong rejection of the EU is very low.

Table 2. Attachment to region, country and Europe (%)

<i>Attachment level</i>	<i>Region</i>		<i>Country</i>		<i>Europe</i>	
	<i>Pol</i>	<i>Ec</i>	<i>Pol</i>	<i>Ec</i>	<i>Pol</i>	<i>Ec</i>
Strongly attached	54,0	29,0	76,5	63,9	37,0	36,6
Somewhat attached	35,3	40,7	19,0	29,8	49,5	47,1
Not very attached	9,1	22,1	2,7	5,4	11,2	14,4
Not at all	1,6	8,2	1,7	0,9	2,3	1,9
N	1313	673	1326	681	1312	675

As might be expected given their role, economic elites are somewhat less strongly attached to their country and region than political elites. On the contrary their degree of attachment to Europe is


more or less the same. As a result the attachment differential between country and EU is substantially lower for economic elites (-27.3% of strongly attached to EU as against - 39.5% for politicians) .

We may then ask which is the relationship between feelings of belonging to one's own country and Europe: are they in conflict or are they compatible ? The answer to this question, which is quite important for understanding the meaning of these two phenomena, is rather straightforward: the two feelings appear quite compatible (Spearman's $\rho = 0.290$, correlation significant at the 0.01 level).. The proportion of those displaying a strong attachment to Europe is in fact highest among those with strong feelings of affection for their country than among any other category. Negative feelings toward Europe increase with negative feelings for one's country. This direct relation between attachment toward one's country and toward Europe is stronger for Economic Elites ($\rho = 0,329$) than for politicians ($\rho = 0,267$)

Europe is thus not seen, on average, as a challenge to national bonds but probably as an acceptable complement. A complement which perhaps does not warm the hearts as much as the attachment to one's country, but something which in any case does not create strong feelings of rejection.

At least in Europe national polities are by now "mature products" for which not much is to be expected in terms of future political growth (for some in fact the future seems even to propose the possibility of a deconstruction). Future developments are on the contrary much more relevant for the European polity which under many points of view (territorial and functional) has still the features of a "work in progress". It is therefore relevant to take into consideration the views about its future: should unification stop here or go further ? Our survey indicates that the positive views with regard to the past are matched also by favourable views for the future: a majority wants to move further. Here however the proportion of those sharing more clearly the idea that unification should be strengthened is still a majority but less strong (69,8%). And the share (a minority) of those who have serious doubts about the project, even if small, is here twice as big as that of those who give a negative utilitarian evaluation(15,5%). A sizable proportion is in the middle in a somewhat more uncertain position (Figure 1). The distribution of replies to the question "unification has already gone too far or should be strengthened" is similar for economic and political elites, having a three-modal shape: the first peak consists of a 15% of respondents who are satisfied with the level of integration already achieved and think that process has neither gone too far nor should be strengthened. The second peak, which is also the tallest, is made of the respondents who take a moderate but positive stance towards further integration. Finally, the distribution has a third peak at the extreme right which gathers those who stress that the process of integration should definitely go further.

Figure 1. Frequency distribution of the variable “unification has already gone too far (0) or should be strengthened (10)?” for political and economic elite



In general economic elites are slightly more in favour of moving further ahead on the road of unification (as they are even more positive about benefits), but the difference is modest. Although a positive attachment to Europe is correlated with a positive attitude towards further integration the coefficient of correlation is less than impressive with regard to both economic (Spearman’s rho= 0,297, significant at the 0.01 level) and political elite (Spearman’s rho =0.228, significant at the 0.01 level).

We can easily see that orientations in the two dimensions are distributed in a way which is not completely expected. Those expressing a stronger attachment for the EU should also be in favour of strengthening the integration. However about one fourth of those strongly attached to Europe display only medium or weak support for further unification; and of those who are not attached to Europe only one third is consequential in opposing unification (Table 3). From these results it appears that a significant amount of support for further unification of Europe comes also from the sector of politicians that do not share strong feelings of attachment (and in some cases have also negative feelings). This suggests the impact of a more utilitarian calculus that can even overcome the indifference for Europe. A rational evaluation of the benefits of integration is probably at work here. Not so surprisingly this position is even more significant among economic elites: among those indicating a negative attachment to Europe more than 40% shows a strong support for further unification !

Table 3 Attachment to Europe and support for unification (%)

	Strong Attachment	Mild attachment	Negative attachment
Strong support unification (7-10)	Patriotic Europeanism 27.0 (27.0)	Utilitarian Eur. 26.4 (27.1)	Unconsequential anti-eur. 4.7 (7.5)
Medium support unification (4-6)	Satisfied Europeanism 7.1 (8.7)	Prudent Eur. 18.5 (17.0)	Calculating anti-eur. 4.6 (5.4)
Negative support unification (0-3)	Unconsequential Eur. 2.2 (1.5)	Minimalist Eur. 5.1 (2.9)	Consequential anti-eur. 4.5 (2.9)

Percentages for politicians and within brackets for economic elite. Negative attachment includes answers “not very attached” and “not at all attached”

These data suggest that the views about the future of the EU are not simply based on affective feelings, but are shaped in more complex ways that deserve to be analysed in the final part of this chapter .

b. The nature of the EU citizenship

The second aspect to be considered concerns the meaning national politicians assign to the European citizenship as a “community bond” and how this compares with the meaning they attribute to the national one.

On the basis of the different elements of identity proposed to the interviewees, national elites define rather neatly a scale of importance for the national and for the European level (Tab. 4). It is interesting to notice that the two scales mirror each other almost perfectly. The order and the importance of the factors are extremely similar. As could be expected for all the elements the

support is a little weaker when European identity is to be defined. A relatively newer and incrementally constructed identity elicits less strong views.

Both for national and for European identity the “naturalistic traits” (being born in the country/Europe and having national/European parents) as well as the religious one play on average only a limited role. The “civic traits” (feeling national/European and respecting the laws) are the strongest elements. But two cultural elements (sharing the cultural traditions and mastering the language of the country/Europe) follow at not too great distance.

Tab. 4 Elements defining national and European identity (%)

<i>Importance of different elements</i>	<i>Political elites</i>		<i>Economic elites</i>	
	<i>National Identity</i>	<i>European Identity</i>	<i>National Identity</i>	<i>European Identity</i>
Being a Christian	14,3 (36.4)	9.6 (31.8)	9,3 (30,5)	5,1 (24,7)
To be born in the country/Europe	24,3 (56.4)	15.5 (49,2)	16,9 (53,0)	15,4 (49,3)
To have national parents	28,0 (62.2)	14.9 (49.3)	25,0 (62,8)	15,5 (51,0)
Share cultural traditions of country/Europe	49,7 (88.7)	38.7 (84.3)	45,1 (88,3)	44,7 (86,8)
To master the language/s of country/Europe	66,6 (94.2)	63,4 (92.5)	66,6 (96,4)	71,7 (95,1)
To feel national/European	68,4 (91.2)	64.5 (93.8)	60,9 (90,1)	65,3 (93,2)
Respect the laws of the country/Europe	72,6 (96.0)	65.0 (93.2)	64,1 (91,7)	67,4 (93,7)

Percentages answering “Very important” (within brackets the sum of very important+somewhat important).

From the point of view of the elements defining the identity of the political community the EU is thus not very different from national states in the eyes of national political and economic elites. Can we suggest that this is confirming again the derivative nature of the supranational construction which is built on the basis of the values that define its constituent units, the national states?

Within this general picture of similarity between the two levels we can however notice that the naturalistic aspects, the religious and cultural traditions are even less important at the European level. The more artificial and less homogeneous nature of the EU probably explain this. Economic elites do not differ significantly from political elites, except for the fact that they seem to pay slightly more attention than politicians to the role of language and cultural traditions in defining European identity. Is this perhaps due to an instrumental evaluation (which is probably more natural for economic elites) of what can affect the functioning of the European Union ?

c. Threats to European cohesion

A somewhat more indirect way to assess how national elites view the supranational polity is to examine what are their perceptions of the potential impact upon the cohesion of Europe of a number of challenges that the Union is facing from different directions (Table 5). Our question asked them to evaluate the seriousness of these threats. Among the possible threats submitted to the attention of national politicians only two: the “growth of nationalist attitudes in members states” and “economic and social differences among member states” were considered important by a clear majority. And the first was definitely the most relevant. Both threats have an internal origin. The other threats mentioned and linked to external factors were important for a more limited number of politicians. Among them “entry of Turkey”, “interferences from Russia”, “immigration” and “effects of globalisation on welfare systems” were important for a significant plurality of politicians.

What about economic elites? Do they show a similar profile ? The results indicate that the perceptions of threats and of their importance is not so different among the economic elites of our countries. In general economic elites are a bit more anxious than politicians about threats to the cohesion of the EU, with the only clear exception of globalisation which they see as one of the minor problems.

The nature of the threats that are perceived as more significant by national elites suggests a greater preoccupation for the internal problems of the European polity and for its lack of homogeneity than for its external role and relationship with other international actors. Could we suggest that an inward looking perspective predominates among national elites when thinking about Europe?

Tab. 5 Threats to European cohesion (%)

	Political Elite	N	Economic Elite	N
Nationalists Movements	33,4 (74,4)	1313	37,4 (78,2)	679
Differences among states	11,3 (54,0)	1324	9,9 (49,2)	687
Turkey in the EU	13,6 (42,4)	1307	13,8 (50,6)	673
Russian interference	10,6 (41)	1284	14,5 (44,5)	671
Immigration from non EU states	10,2 (39,4)	1314	8,5 (42,2)	671
Effects of globalization on welfare state	8,8 (40,6)	1289	4,8 (26,7)	663
Enlargement to other countries	4,9 (26,4)	1211	6,1 (32,3)	653
Special relation with USA	4,7 (20,7)	1318	2,2 (18,9)	683

Percentages of “big threat”, within brackets strong+quite a big threat.

It is clear that most threats perceptions are closely linked to one another. A principal component analysis (Tab. 6) shows that respondents feel that EU cohesion is challenged by at least two broad phenomena: on the one hand by the emergence from the outside of cultural differences (immigration and enlargement), and on the other hand by the crisis of a socially oriented state (economic differences among members, the effects of globalization, the special relation of some members with the “capitalist” USA). The threat posed by Russia forms a third dimension on its own, while rising nationalism, the threat that is felt more than any other, has not a significant importance for any of the dimensions.

Table 6. Principal components analysis of threats perceptions, rotated component matrix

	Component		
	1	2	3
Do you think that Immigration from non EU countries is a threat for the cohesion of the EU?	,748	-,053	,161
Do you think that Enlargement of the EU to include Turkey is a threat?	,829	,061	-,004
Do you think that Enlargement of the EU to include countries other than Turkey is a threat?	,719	,177	-,014
Do you think that the growth of nationalist attitudes in European member states is a threat?	-,283	,387	,382
Do you think that the close relationships between some European countries and the United States are a threat?	,060	,714	-,095
Do you think that the effects of globalization on welfare countries are a threat?	,181	,726	-,091
Do you think that economic and social differences among member states are a threat?	-,014	,680	,304
Do you think that the interference of Russia in European affairs is a threat?	,209	-,066	,877

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.

a. Rotation converged in 5 iterations.

2. Views about the scope of governance of the Union

In the previous paragraph we have shown that national elites are almost unanimously convinced of the benefits of European integration for their countries, show a broad (but not always very warm) attachment to the supranational polity and express a majoritarian support for continuing the process of integration. These elements indicate that the new polity is largely accepted as a significant feature of the political landscape and as one which can positively coexist with the traditional national polities. But what is the (accepted/desired) scope of activity of this supranational level of

“membership” established side by side with the national one ? And more specifically what are the policy responsibilities to be assigned to the European Union?

These questions are obviously relevant. First because any polity is to a significant extent defined by the policy responsibilities that are (legitimately) attributed to it (Rose..). And in the case of the EEC/ EC/EU the policy dimension has been from the start a particularly crucial founding element. It can be said that the EU was from the start a “policy driven polity” (quotation). Second, since contemporary national states have acquired with the passing of time a very broad panoply of policy competences the new supranational polity has to pass in this field the difficult test of the comparison/competition with the national ones. The views of national elites on this point are especially interesting as they are directly involved as decision-makers (the politicians) or as advocates and customers (the economic elites) in the policy responsibilities of the national state. How ready they are to accept a redistribution of policy roles between the two levels?

This survey enables us to explore first the more general purpose of the EU and then specific policy competencies. On the first point the two alternatives offered (“a more competitive economy” and “better social protection”) may refer to the broad ideological orientations of the respondents, but also evoke (the first) the original pre-eminent purpose of European integration (the creation of a broader market) and (the second) a dominant focus of contemporary national welfare states (providing for a social citizenship).

The views of national politicians are evenly split among those assigning to the EU the role of promoting a more competitive economy and those who expect a better social protection (Table 7). To these should be added a large group which would prefer a combination of the two goals. These answers show that probably for a large section of national elites the scope of the European polity is conceived in terms that are not too different from those of the national states. The EU is more than a purely economic organisation (if there was still any doubt about this). At the same time the well balanced distribution between the two opposite models and the large weight of the intermediate position may raise doubts about the future advances of EU: are we to expect a stalemate between the two different views ? or a compromise leading perhaps to a slow but two pronged development?

Tab. 7 The broad goals of the EU (%)

<i>Aim of the EU</i>	<i>Politicians</i>	<i>Economic elites</i>
A more competitive economy	38	72,6
Better social protection	36,3	9,5
Both	23,9	16,4
N	1309	679

It is worth noticing that this is so far the aspect which produces the strongest difference between political and economic elites. Economic elites - not a surprise - are particularly keen about the role of Europe in ensuring a more competitive economy and much less interested in its promotion of social protection.

As we said before it might be discussed whether the answers to this question really express a carefully assessed view about Europe and what it should be, or rather the basic values of the respondents.

We can further explore the views about the aim and competences of the EU by analysing the answers of the members of national elites about the specific directions along which Europe should develop in the near future (ten years was the time frame proposed in the question). With regards to four possible directions of evolution of the EU (“greater aid to regions in difficulty”, “a single foreign policy”, “a common system of social security”, a “unified tax system”) the answers are positive for a majority of both political and economic elites (Table 8). But width and intensity of support vary significantly. The developments which receive the greatest support are the one which implies a greater solidarity across the territory of the European polity and the one which asks for a common foreign policy. More lukewarm is on the contrary the support for the other two perspectives.

Table 8. Views about Europe in the future (10 years) (%)

<i>Approval for Europe in 10 years</i>	<i>Politicians</i>	<i>Economic elites</i>
More aid to regions in difficulty	57,7 (90,0)	38,4 (82,5)
A single foreign policy	53,0 (85,7)	57,5 (90,4)
Common social security	31,3 (66,3)	27,2 (63,5)
A unified tax system	25,4 (57,1)	29,9 (61,1)

Percentages of strong support, within brackets strong+medium support.

Is this a surprise in view of what we know about the developmental trends of the nation states in Europe in the period of European integration (Hoffman, Milward, etc.) ? Probably not. The answers of political elites indicate, first, that there is a large acceptance of the idea of the EU as a necessary instrument of economic re-equilibration among European countries (support for aid to regions reflects the well established policies adopted by the EU from the 1980s to promote greater levels of territorial equilibrium). The national definition of the public interest is thus balanced, to some extent at least, by a European definition of solidarity. Second, there is a common feeling of the inadequacy of national foreign policies in the current world and of the need of pooling resources in order to act effectively in the international arena. On the contrary national political elites are more


prudent when it comes to what has been the main playing ground for internal politics of the past decennia, i.e. the welfare state (social security), and the crucial instrument for ensuring its resources (the tax system) (Ferrera....., Cotta 2007). We must remember that for most of the countries internal political alignments have been defined more on social than on foreign policies (Budge.....).

Economic leaders are more cautious than politicians about extending the role of Europe in (socially and territorially) redistributive matters : they are less supportive than politicians of a European social security and even more clearly about aid to regions. On the contrary they are slightly more in favour of a unified tax system (probably perceived as an instrument of economic simplification) and of a common foreign policy (with obvious spillovers on trade matters).

With questions and answers about the goals and scope of the European Union we have come to deal with the vertical dimension of citizenship, which defines what citizens are entitled to expect from public authorities. What are the policies that European citizens should expect to be dealt by the European Union and its authorities ? A number of questions enable us to explore in a more detailed way how national elite would prefer to allocate some of the crucial policy fields between the different levels of authority existing in Europe.

It is immediately clear from our results that national political elites have a rather clear ranking of policies in mind. As suggested by the data displayed in Figure 2, there are “national policies” - health care, taxation and unemployment - for which the states (or sub-national authorities or a mix of the two) are seen as the preferred level and “European policies” for which the European level as such (to which we might add also the choice of mixed solutions combining the European and other levels) are rather clearly preferred to a purely national (and sub-national) level. This is the case of immigration and environment. Other policies (such as fighting crime) are somewhat in between.

Figure 2. Preferences about levels of responsibility for different policies (%)



These policy preferences confirm what we have seen so far: for policies related to the welfare state the national level is clearly preferred. Europe and its institutions here would probably be felt by a majority of national political elites as a competitor in their traditional *domaine réservé*. For other policies (either new or that are receiving a renewed attention because of recent developments) Europe is seen as a way of solving problems that national politicians probably feel they are not able to deal effectively with at home. Europe is seen here as a solution by a large majority (but we should not forget the existence of a not irrelevant minority which defends also in these fields the role of the state (or of regional authorities)).

If we now consider the preference of economic elites we find a very similar ordering of preferences. Economic elites seem to share more or less the same opinions of political elites when it comes to allocating policies to different authorities, but show in general a somewhat greater propensity to subtract competencies to both state and sub-state levels, which becomes particularly clear for health care, taxation, fighting crime and environment.

To these questions we can add the one about the army (which could be taken as an indicator of preferences for the allocation of international security policy to the different levels of authority). This question was worded somewhat differently from the others as the choice offered to respondents was only between a purely national, a purely European and a mixed solution. Politicians express a slight preference for a purely national solution as compared to a European one, but the largest plurality is for a mixed solution. Economic elites are on the contrary much more in favour of the supra-national solution, which reaches a level not far behind the mixed one. The national solution is shared only by a rather small minority of economic leaders.

If these are the views about what Europe should do, what is then the amount of resources national politicians would be ready to allocate to the European level in proportion to the global amount of taxes raised ? As one would expect the range of variation in the answers is very large, but the mean is in any case quite high if compared with the current distribution of resources: if these views were accepted they would make for a dramatic increase of Union resources and raise the level of the European budget by many times (table 9)!

Table 9. Share of taxes to be allocated to the European level (%)

<i>Amount of taxes allocated to Europe</i>	<i>Politicians</i>	<i>Economic elites</i>
Up to 5%	17.7 %	10,9
6%-10%	29.7 %	31,1
11%-20%	31.3.0 %	34.4
21% and more	21.5 %	23,8
<i>Mean</i>	<i>16.4</i>	<i>18,3</i>
<i>St. Deviation</i>	<i>11.12</i>	<i>11,67</i>
<i>N</i>	<i>1183</i>	<i>606</i>

We may ask whether national politicians, when answering to this question, have well calculated the consequences their words would have upon national policies and thus also upon some of their petty projects.

3. Representation in the European Union

The elites we have surveyed are national elites: in different ways they are significantly involved in the national processes of representation. The politicians we have sampled, as members of the national parliaments, are by definition national representatives: their duty (and their daily job),

which derives from the national process of electoral representation and its mechanisms of accountability, is to represent the interests (however defined) of their country. Economic elites are not institutionally linked to the national arena: the firms they rule may have interests that go beyond the national scene. However, given the strong links existing between the economic arena and national politics, they too are typically and significantly involved in the national representation process (as promoters – individually or collectively - of the interests of their firms and more broadly of the economic sector). Given their direct or indirect role in the national process of representation and the fact that the European process of representation is strictly connected to the former it is especially relevant to explore how these two groups view the European representation. The question entails at least two faces: from a substantive point of view how do they assess the representation of the national interests in the European framework; and from a procedural and institutional one to what extent they support and trust the existing mechanisms of representation of Europe ?

We have already seen through a previous question that an extremely large majority of national politicians and even more of economic leaders think that their country has drawn benefits from European integration (see Table 1 above). This means that they must implicitly believe the European representation mechanisms as being not completely flawed. However when more detailed questions are asked, this broad positive evaluation is balanced by some significant feelings of dissatisfaction with regard to the representation of the country interests in the process of EU decision and even more to the balance between countries (Table 10).

Both politicians and economic leaders are almost evenly split among those who believe that the interests of their country are not taken enough into account and those who disagree from this judgement. And when it comes to evaluating the degree to which the interests of the different countries are taken into account an overwhelming majority believes that some countries are “more equal than the others”. Who are the others was unfortunately not asked.

Table 10. Views about European representation (%)

Opinions	Politicians		Economic elites	
	Agree strongly (Str+somewhat)	Str. Disagree (Str+somewhat)	Agree strongly	Str. Disagree (Str.+Somewhat)
Country interests not taken enough into account at EU level	10.6 (48.0)	10.1 (52.0)	8.8 (50.2)	9.7 (49.6)
Interests of some country carry too much weight	32.5 (84.0)	2.7 (16.0)	34.9 (83.8)	3.7 (16.2)

Is this somewhat sceptical (but fundamentally realistic) reading of the effects of the European representative process matched by a position of distrust vis-à-vis European institutions ? Our results indicate that this is not the case. The levels of trust for the three main institutions of the EU are

significantly positive (Table 11). Differences among the three institutions considered here are not dramatic. When we analyze politicians they show however an (apparent) paradox: of the two institutions which have a more pronounced supranational character (the Commission and the EP) one (the EP) is the most trusted, the other (the Commission) is the least trusted, while the Council of Ministers is in between. A possible interpretation is that the least trusted institution is the one which is also the least directly connected with the national processes of representation (i.e. the Commission). Albeit in rather different ways the two other institutions are more closely linked to national politics.

The positions of economic leaders are different. Their preferences follow another order: the European Commission comes first, followed by the Council and then by the European parliament. Here we probably see the typical preference of economic executives for the governing bodies that have a greater decision-making power, and the lesser trust in a debating body.

Table 11. Trust in European institutions (within brackets economic elite)

<i>Levels of trust in different institutions</i>	<i>High (7-10) %</i>	<i>Medium (4-6) %</i>	<i>Low (0-3) %</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>N</i>
EP	48.9 (30.4)	39.9 (52.0)	11.2 (17.6)	6.13 (5.36)	1295 (674)
Council of Ministers	40.8 (32.8)	47.2 (54.4)	12.0 (12.8)	5.82 (5.58)	1289 (663)
European Commission	36.5 (34.5)	49.0 (52.8)	14.5 (12.8)	5.6 (5.62)	1290 (675)
National Parliament	- (35.2)	- (42.2)	- (22.6)	- (5.34)	(685)
National government	- (39.2)	- (40.3)	- (20.5)	- (5.48)	(659)

The last two questions have been asked only to economic elites.

Unfortunately the comparison with national institutions is possible only for economic elites (to ask national MPs about their trust in the national parliament but also in the national government had been considered embarrassing when the survey was designed). For economic leaders available results show almost no difference in the level of trust between the national and the European Parliament and only a very small advantage for the European Council of Ministers or the European Commission over the national government. But behind the averages one can detect a somewhat more polarized distribution in the views about national institutions: the levels of distrust for national parliament and national government are higher than for the corresponding European institutions. If we move from the question of trust to that of the powers to be attributed to various European institutions, national politicians show again what could be considered a not very consistent position. They defend strongly the role of member states in the decision making process (because they think they are the most effective instrument of representation of country interests ?); they have balanced positions with regards to the role of the European commission (only a minority is strongly against and only a minority is strongly in favour); they are quite ready to increase the powers of the

European parliament (only a small minority is strongly against) (Table 12). Does the last position contradict the first ? Not necessarily; the European Parliament is probably seen by many as an instrument of representation first of all of national interests (in a way very much as national parliaments are perceived as performing also the representation of local interests !).

Table 12 Views about European institutions (%)

Political elites					
	+ Degree of Supra-nationalism -				
	High	Medium	Low	Very low	N
Role of Member states in the EU	5.1	17.8	33.9	43.1	1306
Governing role of the EU Commission	13.9	36.9	28.8	20.4	1292
Powers of the EP	36.6	35.9	17.3	10.3	1297
Economic elites					
Role of Member states as central actors in the EU	3.7	20.4	39.2	36.7	676
Governing role of the EU Commission	13.8	38.8	31.8	15.5	672
Powers of EP	25.7	42.3	22.6	9.4	673

Wording of questions.....The values of the first question have been inverted in order to have the most pro-European position on the most left column and so forth as for the other variables.

We cannot however infer without doubts from the answers to our questions that national elites are more in favour of the European parliament than of the European commission. The two questions were formulated in a different way: the one about the Commission was stronger and talking about the role of this institution as the “true government of the EU” set a higher threshold for positive answers; that for the Parliament asking simply about greater powers had a less strong wording. Moreover the question about the role of the Commission probably induced the respondents to evaluate an alternative, suggested by the question about the role of member states.

Economic elites share in general rather similar positions except for being a bit more lukewarm about the powers of the European parliament. The majority in favour of extending its powers is significantly less numerous and less intense than the one among politicians. It remains in any case quite large.

Using these data we can move a step further and explore how these different attitudes concerning the institutional shape of the EU combine with each other. For the sake of simplicity our proposal is to concentrate at this stage our attention upon the attitudes toward the role of the European Commission and of the Member states. These are as of today the two crucial poles in the institutional setting of Europe. Answers to the relevant questions can define three different conceptions of the institutional system of the EU: a. the *federalist position* (the positive answer to

the question “the European Commission should become the true government of the EU” is combined with the negative answer to the question “member states ought to remain the central actors”); b. an *inter-governmentalist position* (a negative answer to the first question is combined with a positive one to the second); c. a position of *support for a “compound institutional model”* (when the answer is positive to both questions); and d. a residual position combining incoherently the different aspects which probably reflects rejection of the EU.

Table 13. Who should govern the EU ?

		The European Commission should become the true government of the EU	
		Yes	No
Member states ought to remain the central actors	No	<i>Federalism</i> 16.1% (19.9%)	<i>Negativism</i> 7.0% (4.5%)
	Yes	<i>Compound model:</i> 35.3% (33.0%)	<i>Inter-governmentalism</i> 41.4% (42.9%)

Note: Yes includes answers “strongly agree” and “agree somewhat”; No includes “disagree somewhat” and “strongly disagree”. Percentages within brackets refer to economic elites

Our data show that national elites are (with a limited exception) distributed among the first three models (see Table 13). The truly federal model is supported only by a minority, but the purely intergovernmental model is more or less balanced by the solution that combines national and supranational mechanisms. Differences between the two elite groups are not very significant here (but federalists are stronger among economic elites).

The last aspect of the representation dimension that we can cover with our survey concerns the instruments of action which members of national elites think most effective for influencing EU decisions. Are the national channels of “representation” seen as more or less effective than European ones ? The answers for politicians offer a double sided view (Table 14). Among the instruments proposed in our survey the action through the national parliament is seen as the least effective. But on the other side the national government is, as expected, considered by a large majority a very important instrument. At the same time (somewhat unexpectedly) action through European parties receives also a fairly good rating. But direct contacts with European institutions are considered even more important. National politicians confirm the view that in the process of

European integration national parliaments have been to a significant extent sidestepped; at the same time they are aware that Europe works on the basis of more than one channel (direct and indirect) of representation.

Economic elites are even more sceptical about the role of the national parliaments and on the contrary they see action through business organisations and direct contacts with European institutions as the two most important instruments of action. Even more effective than the national governments.

Table 14 Instruments of influence on EU decisions (%)

<i>Instruments of influence</i>		<i>Not at all effective</i>	<i>Rather ineffective</i>	<i>Rather effective</i>	<i>Very Effective</i>	<i>N</i>
Via the national Parliament	Pol. El Ec. El	13.3 22.6	44.2 47.3	35.7 24.8	6.8 5.3	1304 669
Via a European partybusiness organisations	Pol. El Ec. El	11.4 2.9	33.6 28.6	45.7 55.4	9.3 13.1	1270 664
Via the national Government	Pol. El Ec. El.	8.3 9.7	28.2 32.1	49.7 48.4	13.8 9.7	1307 669
Direct contact with EU institutions	Pol. El. Ec. El.	8.5 5.5	30.3 22.2	50.4 49.0	10.9 23.3	1207 635

4. Summing up.

The analysis so far has shown that:

1. a positive instrumental evaluation of the EU is shared by an extremely large proportion of national elites (of both types). European integration is seen as beneficial for national interests;
2. an affective connection with the EU is shared by a very large majority, but its intensity is significantly lower than that felt for the national community;
3. a predominant majority defines European identity in a “civic way”, while “naturalistic” elements count generally less than for the national identity;
4. among possible threats to the cohesion of the EU national elites seem particularly concerned by nationalist movements emerging from within and by inequalities among member states (i.e. by internal threats);

5. when confronted with the dilemma between a Community focused on creating a more competitive economy or providing better social protection political and economic elites differ very significantly. The latter elite group being heavily in favour of the first option, while the politicians spread their positions in a more balanced way among the two;
6. with regard to the future of the EU a broad majority is ready to envisage a common foreign policy, some degree of common solidarity with the less prosperous regions, and even a common social security and taxation systems. But politicians are ready to express a strong support only for the first two aspects, while economic leaders only for foreign policy;
7. when it comes to a more precise and comparative choice between the national (or sub-national) level and the supra-national one for the conduct of specific policies, only with regard to immigration and environment national elites are ready to express a clear preference for the European solution against the national one. For healthcare, unemployment and taxation the preference is for the national level. Economic and political elites show in this domain rather similar alignments; with one exception: for the army economic elites are more ready to adopt the supranational solution than politicians.
8. with regards to the European process of representation a very large majority shares the view that member states do not have the same weight, but questioned whether the country interests are taken into account the views are evenly split between optimists and pessimists. Overall the evaluation of European representation is not too critical;
9. quite in line with the former results the trust in European institutions is more positive than negative. Where it is possible to compare with the trust for similar national institutions differences are not so significant (but in any case favourable to the EU);
10. when faced with more concrete choices about the (relative) role and weight of different European institutions national elites are generally conservative: a large majority continues to defend the role of national states, and only a minority is ready to accept a transformation of the Commission in a true government of the Union. However they are open to accept increased powers for the European Parliament.
11. when asked to assess the possible channels of influence national elites are ready to acknowledge the importance of both nationally mediated and direct channels.
12. A majority for Europe, but areas where minorities are strong and can challenge developments in view of the decision-making structure of EU.

II. TOWARDS A MORE SYNTHETIC PRESENTATION OF ELITE POSITIONS

After a rather analytical presentation of the positions of national elites it is time to try a more systematic interpretation of this rather wide array of positions about the different aspects of European integration that have been expressed by national elites. Our previous analyses have already shown with regard to some variables that attitudes toward Europe cannot be compressed into a single pro-European/anti-European continuum and that we must reckon with the existence of a variety of (relatively independent) positions. But if such a high degree of reductionism seems impossible to attain, there is however the need to extract a more reduced number of dimensions behind the different questions and answers. Only in this way we will be able to interpret in a satisfactory way the elite views and we can try to identify a relatively limited number of elite groups defined by different mixes of attitudes .

For the time being we will concentrate our analysis on political elites

Factor analysis seems to provide the best initial instrument for answering these questions. We have thus conducted an analysis of what we thought to be the most interesting variables of our data set for the definition of attitudes towards European integration and conceptions of a supranational citizenship (Table 15). We have not included in this analysis variables that might be used as explanatory variables (as for instance the variable about the preference for a social Europe or a more competitive economy) as our main aim here is not to explain positions but rather to elucidate the variety of positions toward Europe and to explore their connections.

Table 15 Attitudes toward Europe of national political elites. A principal component analysis.

	Component			
	Trust in European institutions	Support for institutional integration	Support for new policies delegatio	Support for traditional policies delegation
Attachment to EU (1-4)	,290	,324	,307	-,281
Unification should be strengthend (1-10)	,378	,547	,148	-,023
Trust in the European Parliament (1-10)	,763	,211	,032	,057
Trust in the European Commission (1-10)	,871	,155	,012	-,012
Trust in the European Council of Ministers (1-10)	,845	-,105	,040	-,021

		Component		
Member States ought to remain central actors	,158	-,658	-,126	,062
European Commission as EU government	,218	,666	-,130	,097
European Parliament strengthened	,128	,598	-,003	,188
European Army (1-3)	,024	,621	,159	,104
EMPLOY2 (1-3)	-,044	,142	,275	,481
IMM2(1-3)	,046	,091	,713	,068
ENV2 (1-3)	,031	,009	,797	,047
CRIME2 (1-3)	,033	,056	,610	,330
HEALTH2 (1-3)	,058	,032	,054	,817
TAX2 (1-3)	-,016	,341	,359	,403

Rotated factor loadings greater than .450 are in bold. The variables concerning the allocation of policy fields to the different polity levels have been recoded to a simplified scale (1= only national and sub-national levels; 2= mixed European and national/sub-national levels; 3= only European level).

This table suggests the existence of four main dimensions, that can be fairly easily interpreted:

1. Trust in European institutions
2. Support for further institutional integration
3. Support for delegation of “new policies” to the European level
4. Support for the delegation of traditional welfare state policies to the European level

It is interesting to notice that the variable “attachment to Europe” shows more or less the same (not very strong) load on all dimensions. It seems thus to discriminate much less than other variables. The same can be said also for the variable concerning the level of competency for the tax system.

The first dimension is defined by the variables concerning trust in the three main institutions of Europe. The second associates the level of support for a further strengthening of the process of integration, and for assigning to the European commission the role of a true government of Europe and greater powers to the European parliament, but is negatively linked to maintaining a central role for Member States. To the same dimension belongs the support for a European army.

The last two dimensions are linked to the policies and to the allocation of competencies to different levels of authority. But as we have previously noticed not all policies elicit the same responses from politicians. They define thus two different dimensions. One (the third dimension) is clearly characterized by the willingness to delegate to European institutions policies – such as the

protection of the environment, immigration and the fight against crime - that have a potentially international dimension, but also that have acquired in relatively recent times new importance and probably new contents. The other (the fourth dimension) is defined by two other policies that are part of the traditional concerns of the welfare state (health care and employment).

We can then say that in defining attitudes of national politicians towards Europe there are positions that are more concerned with the institutional dimension of the European integration and positions which are more policy oriented. With regard to the former there is however a further distinction between a position dominated by trust and another which probably considers institutions in a more objective way. With regard to the policy dimension we have seen that there are different types of policies which elicit rather different responses. The low loadings of the Army question on the two policy dimensions suggests that this is not a policy as the other ones but has to do more with the concepts of power and sovereignty which are also probably at play behind the other questions concerning institutions.

3. Clusters of attitudes among political elites.

Having ascertained the multidimensionality of the attitudes of national political elites with regards to European integration we propose to explore how these different dimensions are distributed and combined among the national elites of our European countries. Are they evenly distributed across countries or not? The answer is obviously relevant when we consider that decisions about the future of the EU, its institutional frame, its policy competencies depend largely on the reaching of broad majorities (if not unanimity) among member states. It is also interesting to see how clusters of positions are distributed across European party families as this can enable to understand better how homogeneous these families are and how distinctive between one another.

For this purpose we have run a two step cluster analysis³ including again only the interviewees belonging to the political elite. The variables on which we clustered the respondents are the four dimensions discovered by principal components analysis. Five clusters of relatively similar size emerged (Table 16). The smallest group, cluster 2, includes 188 cases while the largest, cluster 4, included 263 cases (255 cases are excluded from the analysis due to missing data).

³ The SPSS two-step cluster analysis was applied using the noise handling function (25%) to minimize the effect of outliers. This technique is often preferred for large dataset since hierarchical and k-means clustering do not scale efficiently when N is very large. The algorithm was developed for BIRCH clustering (Zhang et al. 1996) under which a very large dataset is reduced to sub clusters (first step) which are then analyzed by traditional hierarchical clustering methods.

Table 16 Attitudes towards Europe. Clusters among politicians.

Cluster Distribution		N	% of Combined	% of Total
Cluster	Reluctant to policy delegation	199	18,4%	14,9%
	Euro-minimalists	188	17,4%	14,1%
	Rational Euro-skeptics	218	20,2%	16,3%
	Euro-federalists	263	24,4%	19,7%
	Supporters of a social Europe	212	19,6%	15,9%
	Combined	1080	100,0%	80,9%
	Excluded Cases	255		19,1%
	Total	1335		100,0%

The Centroids table (Table 17) shows mean differences between the clusters on the four continuous variables used in the analysis (i.e. principal components factors). For each group we highlighted in bold the statistics that are significantly different from the overall mean. A reading of these results suggests the existence of the following profiles of European attitudes among national politicians.

Reluctants to policy delegation: Members of the first cluster have an average trust in the European institutions and do not have extreme views about further political integration. However, the fact that they do not distinguish themselves from the average respondent on these two dimensions means that they are quite warm towards European institutions and mildly in favor of the integration process. On the contrary, they are generally against further policy delegation, especially when new policies such as crime, immigration and environment are concerned.

Euro-minimalists: The second group has a very positive attitude of trust towards European institutions, clearly warmer than the already good attitude shared by most respondents, but strongly opposes further political integration, the strengthening of European institutions and delegation of welfare state policies.

Rational euro-skeptics: Members of the third cluster do not trust European institutions very much and object further political integration. However, they are strongly in favor of delegating to the EU the competence to decide on emerging policy areas such as the environment, crime and immigration (probably because they believe the national governments cannot effectively cope with them).

Euro-federalists: Members of the fourth cluster have a rather positive trust in European Institutions and hold extremely positive attitude towards further political integration. Likewise, they strongly wish to delegate competences to the EU in new policy areas but they are more reluctant about the possibility to delegate also welfare state policies.

Supporters of a social Europe: Finally, members of the fifth cluster have an average (which means quite good) trust in European institutions and a moderate stance towards further political integration, but clearly distinguish themselves from the other interviewees because they want to delegate welfare state policies to the EU.

It is worth noting that no group emerges with completely negative attitudes on Europe: from the enthusiasm of Euro-federalist to the more cautious stance shared by Rational euro-skeptics most interviewees find at least some aspects of the integration process that is seen as favorable. In fact, this is hardly a surprise if we consider that only about 5% of respondents do not share the belief that European integration has been beneficial to their country.

Table 17 Elements defining clusters of European attitudes among national politicians

		Centroids			
		Trust in European institutions (factor score 1)		Support for further institutional integration (factor score 2)	
		Mean	Std. Deviation	Mean	Std. Deviation
Cluster	Reluctant to policy delegation	-,0580786	1,06156606	,0267122	,80824087
	Euro-minimalists	,8103200	,65641553	-,7573766	,60470362
	Rational Euro-skeptics	-,9239472	,76424028	-,7508886	,74998646
	Euro-federalists	,1570787	,71675194	,8817251	,71153928
	Supporters of a social Europe	,0911617	,96253578	,3248636	,89451266
	Combined	,0000000	1,00000000	,0000000	1,00000000


		Centroids			
		Support for delegation of new policies (factor score 3)		Support for delegation of welfare state policies (factor score 4)	
		Mean	Std. Deviation	Mean	Std. Deviation
Cluster	Reluctant to policy delegation	-1,4679132	,54840436	-,3709586	,47304092
	Euro-minimalists	,0946585	,62781582	-,2663820	,65655856
	Rational Euro-skeptics	,5318879	,72844825	-,3776753	,62686040
	Euro-federalists	,6670771	,67599418	-,4874508	,57334258
	Supporters of a social Europe	-,0805373	,68948389	1,5775157	,75665503
	Combined	,0000000	1,00000000	,0000000	1,00000000

It is interesting to explore how these clusters are related to that variable which in the end has not been used to define them, i.e. attachment to Europe ? A ranking of our clusters by this variable sees first the Euro federalists, followed by euro-minimalists, euro-socialists and finally by rational

euro-skeptics and reluctant to policy delegation. A post hoc Anova indicates that the degree of attachment to Europe of Euro federalists is significantly higher than that of the other clusters (Table 19 Appendix). In addition, Euro minimalists and Rational Euro-skeptics are in favor of a more competitive EU while Eurofederalists and supporters of a social Europe prefer more social security. Finally, Reluctant to policy delegation and Rational Euro-skeptics tend to think that their country is not well represented in the

With regard to the ideological connotation of these clusters (see Fig. 3) it should be stressed that, though they all cut across the left right continuum, there are some differences. The distribution of their members along such line shows that Euro Federalists and Supporters of a social Europe are mainly left wing, Reluctant to policy delegation are moderate, and Rational euroskeptics and Euro minimalists are more right wing.

Figure 3. Distribution of respondents along the left-right continuum by clusters



The next step is to ask how these groups are distributed on the European arena. We will briefly explore this from the point of view of the ideological position and of the geographical location.

With regard to the first aspect, the answer is positive: both the Euro socialists and the Euro federalists are significantly more left wing than the other groups (see Appendix table 20).

With regards to the geographical distribution no national parliament is dominated by members of only one of these groups. However, for each cluster we list the countries in which that cluster accounts for more than 25% of the interviewees.

Reluctants to policy delegation: Bulgaria (33,3%), Estonia (47,2%), Lithuania (31,3%);

Euro-minimalists: Denmark (41,9%), Great Britain (36,6%), Lithuania (34,3%);\\

Rational euro-skeptics: Austria (25,4%), Czech Republic (38,2%), Great Britain (36,6%), Poland (31,3%), Portugal (30,1%), Slovakia (28,2%);

Euro-federalists: Austria (28,2%), Belgium (44,6%), Denmark (25,6), Germany (44,3%), Hungary (31,4%), Italy (47,8%), Portugal (28,8), Spain (39,5%);

Supporters of a social Europe: Belgium (26,2%), Bulgaria (35,3%), France (39,5%), Greece (51,9%).

In general, the first three groups (Reluctants to policy delegation, Euro-minimalists and Rational euro-skeptics) are more common in Eastern and Northern Europe (table 18), where they respectively account for 71,3% and 78,6% of the total. By contrast, Euro-federalists and Supporters of a social Europe are more widespread in Western Europe (together they account for 60,1% of the total)

Table 18. Cluster membership per geographical area (%).

	Western Europe	Eastern Europe	Northern Europe (DK&UK)	Total
reluctant to policy delegation	13,6	25,7	10,7	18,4
euro minimalists	10,3	21,9	39,3	17,4
rational euroskeptics	16,0	23,7	28,6	20,2
euro federalists	34,0	14,4	15,5	24,4
supporters of a social Europe	26,1	14,4	6,0	19,6
N	544	452	84	1080

III. Europe à la carte ? Conclusions and further steps

Our (essentially descriptive and configurative) analysis has demonstrated the variety of views about Europe that are present among national elites (parliamentary politicians and economic leaders). It indicates rather clearly that members of national elites, when asked to express their attitudes and positions towards Europe and supranational integration, do not define themselves along a simple one-dimensional continuum (pro-Europe↔ anti-Europe) but rather display variable combinations of positions depending on whether they are asked to express their views on aspects that concern the nature of the European polity, its institutional configuration, or different sets of policy goals. Put in front of an articulated “European menu” the components of national elites order rather diverse combinations of courses. We should not be too surprised by this finding if we

consider how the process of European integration has developed . It has not been the result of the victory of one front against the other defining a neat cleavage between pro-Europeans and anti-Europeans, but rather of a long series of compromises negotiated among a plurality of national positions carefully aware of their specific interests and trying to exploit as best as possible the advantages offered by integration (and to contain the disadvantages entailed by it). The positions of national elites fundamentally reflect this background. All this obviously makes for rather multifaceted and kaleidoscopic and not necessarily rational and consistent views of the European polity and citizenship.

It remains to be explored what factors more specifically contribute to determine the different positions of members of national elites across countries and across ideological positions.

References to be attached

APPENDIX

Table 19 Attachment to Europe and the five clusters among national politicians

Report

Attachment to EU (1-4)

TwoStep Cluster Number	Mean	N	Std. Deviation
reluctant to policy delegation	2,9799	199	,71746
euro confederalists	3,2394	188	,62149
rational euroskeptics	3,0780	218	,71738
euro federalists	3,6312	263	,52139
euro socialists	3,1604	212	,71725
Total	3,2389	1080	,69845

ANOVA

Attachment to EU (1-4)

	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	60,773	4	15,193	35,079	,000
Within Groups	465,594	1075	,433		
Total	526,367	1079			

Post Hoc Tests

Multiple Comparisons

Attachment to EU (1-4)

LSD

(I) TwoStep Cluster Number	(J) TwoStep Cluster Number	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.
reluctant to policy delegation	euro minimalists	-,25946*	,06693	,000
	rational euroskeptics	-,09808	,06452	,129
	euro federalists	-,65128*	,06183	,000
	euro socialists	-,18048*	,06496	,006
euro minimalists	reluctant to policy delegation	,25946*	,06693	,000
	rational euroskeptics	,16138*	,06550	,014
	euro federalists	-,39182*	,06285	,000
	euro socialists	,07898	,06593	,231
rational euroskeptics	reluctant to policy delegation	,09808	,06452	,129
	euro minimalists	-,16138*	,06550	,014
	euro federalists	-,55320*	,06028	,000
	euro socialists	-,08240	,06348	,195
euro federalists	reluctant to policy delegation	,65128*	,06183	,000
	euro minimalists	,39182*	,06285	,000
	rational euroskeptics	,55320*	,06028	,000
	euro socialists	,47080*	,06074	,000
euro socialists	reluctant to policy delegation	,18048*	,06496	,006
	euro minimalists	-,07898	,06593	,231
	rational euroskeptics	,08240	,06348	,195
	euro federalists	-,47080*	,06074	,000

*. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.

Multiple Comparison

Attachment to EU (1-4)

LSD

(I) TwoStep Cluster Number	(J) TwoStep Cluster Number	95% Confidence Interval	
		Lower Bound	Upper Bound
reluctant to policy delegation	euro minimalists	-,3908	-,1281
	rational euroskeptics	-,2247	,0285
	euro federalists	-,7726	-,5300
	euro socialists	-,3079	-,0530
euro minimalists	reluctant to policy delegation	,1281	,3908
	rational euroskeptics	,0329	,2899
	euro federalists	-,5151	-,2685
	euro socialists	-,0504	,2084
rational euroskeptics	reluctant to policy delegation	-,0285	,2247
	euro minimalists	-,2899	-,0329
	euro federalists	-,6715	-,4349
	euro socialists	-,2070	,0422
euro federalists	reluctant to policy delegation	,5300	,7726
	euro minimalists	,2685	,5151
	rational euroskeptics	,4349	,6715
	euro socialists	,3516	,5900
euro socialists	reluctant to policy delegation	,0530	,3079
	euro minimalists	-,2084	,0504
	rational euroskeptics	-,0422	,2070
	euro federalists	-,5900	-,3516

Table 20. Left-right positioning of politicians and clusters of European attitudes

ANOVA
LEFTRIGH

	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Between Groups	58,127	4	14,532	13,298	,000
Within Groups	1133,224	1037	1,093		
Total	1191,351	1041			

Multiple Comparisons

LEFTRIGHT

LSD

(I) TwoStep Cluster Number	(J) TwoStep Cluster Number	Mean Difference (I-J)	Std. Error	Sig.	95% Confidence Interval	
					Lower Bound	Upper Bound
reluctant to policy delegation	euro minimalists	-,05462	,10827	,614	-,2671	,1578
	rational euroskeptics	-,06842	,10479	,514	-,2740	,1372
	euro federalists	,44679*	,10010	,000	,2504	,6432
	euro socialists	,41171*	,10540	,000	,2049	,6185
euro minimalists	reluctant to policy delegation	,05462	,10827	,614	-,1578	,2671
	rational euroskeptics	-,01381	,10583	,896	-,2215	,1939
	euro federalists	,50141*	,10119	,000	,3028	,7000
	euro socialists	,46633*	,10643	,000	,2575	,6752
Rational euroskeptics	reluctant to policy delegation	,06842	,10479	,514	-,1372	,2740
	euro minimalists	,01381	,10583	,896	-,1939	,2215
	euro federalists	,51521*	,09745	,000	,3240	,7064
	euro socialists	,48013*	,10289	,000	,2782	,6820
euro federalists	reluctant to policy delegation	-,44679*	,10010	,000	-,6432	-,2504
	euro minimalists	-,50141*	,10119	,000	-,7000	-,3028
	rational euroskeptics	-,51521*	,09745	,000	-,7064	-,3240
	euro socialists	-,03508	,09811	,721	-,2276	,1574
euro socialists	reluctant to policy delegation	-,41171*	,10540	,000	-,6185	-,2049
	euro minimalists	-,46633*	,10643	,000	-,6752	-,2575

rational euroskeptics	-,48013*	,10289	,000	-,6820	-,2782
euro federalists	,03508	,09811	,721	-,1574	,2276

*. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.