PANETHNICITY AND SOCIAL SOLIDARITY
IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

Keith Doubt
Department of Sociology
Wittenberg University

Harry Khamis
Statistics Department
Wright State University

Adnan Tufekcic
Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences
University of Tuzla

Abstract
This article examines the social cohesion of Bosnia-Herzegovina's inhabitants through the concept of panethnicity. Panethnicity is exemplified through an array of shared marriage practices and kinship patterns. The marriage customs analyzed are prenuptial parties, elopements, affinal visitations, fictive kinships, and homogamy. A statistical analysis with a loglinear model using data collected in 2014 on marriage customs from a clustered, stratified, random survey of the population is conducted (n = 2,900). Despite the political structures of the Dayton Peace Accords that reify ethnic identities, there remains a shared cultural identity in Bosnia-Herzegovina reflected in the marriage customs and kinship relations of its inhabitants. Panethnicity structures a social cohesion that blends the contrasting Durkheimian concepts of organic solidarity and mechanical solidarity.

Keywords: Bosnia-Herzegovina, Dayton Peace Accords, panethnicity, marriage customs

Authors’ correspondence e-mails: kdoubt@gmail.com, harry.khamis@wright.edu, adnan.tufekcic@gmail.com
Panethnicity and Social Solidarity in Bosnia-Herzegovina

Introduction

This study considers whether the concept of panethnicity can answer the question of how one keeps a complicated, complex country like Bosnia-Herzegovina together. The question is important not only to Bosnia-Herzegovina, but also to other socially conflicted and war torn regions in the world such as Iraq, Syria, and Ukraine. The study examines the degree to which an array of shared marriage customs and kinship patterns (prenuptial parties, elopements, affinal visitations, fictive kinships, and homogamy) exemplify panethnicity in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Marriage practices and kinship patterns are meaningful in the decisive ways they draw upon culture, making marriage and kinship a vibrant setting to study identity and ethnicity.

The heuristic frame that the study provides to explain the collective identity of Bosnians is panethnicity, a concept that before now has been primarily used to study ethnicity in the United States. Although distinguished otherwise by religion, language, nationality, or history, ethnic groups may share a panethnic identity. The ethnic identity option for Cuban, Puerto Rican, and Mexican Americans is their national origin; at the same time, they share the panethnic identity of Latino. The ethnic identity option for Korean, Japanese, Chinese, and Filipino Americans is their language and national heritage; at the same time, they share the panethnic identity of Asian Americans. This study extends the concept to Bosnia-Herzegovinia. The ethnic identity option for Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs is their ethno-religious identities or nacija; at the same time, they share a panethnic cultural heritage. While ethnic groups emphasize cultural distinctiveness and resist categorizations that compromise their particularity, panethnic identities are available and used in social and even political discourse (Lopez and Espiritu 1990; Okamoto 2003).

In 2014, a survey question about how people married and what type of kinship relations were maintained after marriage was included in an omnibus survey conducted by Mareco Index Bosnia in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Mareco Index Bosnia conducts survey research for universities, embassies, and governmental agencies and is a member of Gallup International. A clustered, stratified, random sample of 2,900 subjects was drawn from the country’s population, including the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Republika Srpska. The survey contained categorical questions with yes or no answers: Did you marry with a prenuptial party, arranged marriage, elopement, traditional wedding, civil ceremony, dowry, or religious ceremony? These marriage rituals are not mutually exclusive. The data was then analyzed using a loglinear model to determine if there is a relationship between ethnicity and the outcome variables listed below, after adjusting for the sociodemographic variables age,
income, and religiosity (Khamis 2011; Agresti 2013).

The study examines how five of the marriage customs and kinship structures measured in the survey (prenuptial parties, elopements, fictive kinship, affinal visitations, and homogamy) exemplify ethnic particularism or panethnicity in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Marriage customs and kinship patterns have not only an expressive but also an instrumental function in terms of identity. The five outcomes are selected because of their distinctive relation to the concept of panethnicity. Some marriage customs are native to Bosnia-Herzegovina; some are shared with countries such as Serbia or Turkey. After providing background on Bosnia-Herzegovina, a theory overview, and a methodology section, the study describes in detail the background of a marriage custom and then reports the variation by ethnic group analyzing the structural association using a loglinear model to conduct inference tests.

Background
One over-looked casualty of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina from 1992 to 1995 is its collective commitment to a pluralistic and integrated society. Unconscionable violence and vicious propaganda were brought to bear against Bosnia-Herzegovina’s heritage, cultural convictions, and social practices. The result is Bosnia-Herzegovina’s trans-ethnic traditions, cultures, and histories are damaged. The tragedy is that, although Bosnia-Herzegovina has a trans-ethnic history, there are few trans-ethnic institutions to support, respect, and sustain these traditions.

The three major ethnic groups in Bosnia-Herzegovina are named in various ways for political and historical reasons: One is Muslim, Bosnian Muslim, or, after the war, Bosniak (spelled Bosnjak in Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian language, the academic way of referring to the language widely used throughout ex-Yugoslavia, previously called Serbo-Croatian); a second is Croat, Bosnian Catholic, or Bosnian Croat; and a third is Serb, Serbian Orthodox, Bosnian Orthodox, or Bosnian Serb. These ethnic groups are described within Bosnia-Herzegovina as well as Yugoslavia with the term nacija. The term nacija does not identity a national, racial or geographical identity but a religious or ethnoreligious identity, encompassing social and cultural attributes as well (Bringa 1995, pp. 22-23). No longer is the term Yugoslav used as an ethnic or a national identity as it was a few decades ago (Sekulic et al. 1994). Bosnian Jews and Bosnian Romani are small minority groups in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The signing of the Dayton Peace Accords in Dayton, Ohio in 1995 established a constitution and state structure that reifies ethnic particularism at the political
level and denies the poly-ethnic realities of the country, its inhabitants, and its civil society. To note one issue, since a Bosnian Jew or Bosnian Romani is neither a Bosniak, Croat, or Serb, someone from these minority groups is prohibited from becoming president of Bosnia-Herzegovina or holding a position in the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Dayton Peace Accords violates the democratic rights of the Bosnians who do not fall into the three dominant ethnic categories (Mujkic 2008; Bardutzky 2010).

A common political view of Bosnia-Herzegovina is that it was a mini-Yugoslavia. Since Yugoslavia did not remain a united country after the death of Tito, neither could Bosnia-Herzegovina. Banac (1993, p. 139) critiques this view of the social identity of Bosnia-Herzegovina vis-à-vis the Yugoslav social identity:

If Bosnia were a collectivity of separate entities, then it would have been a mini-Yugoslavia. But it is not that. Bosnia is a historical entity which has its own identity and its own history ... I view Bosnia as primarily a functioning society which Yugoslavia never was. My question is how does one keep a complicated, complex identity like Bosnia-Herzegovina together?

There are scholars who disagree with Banac arguing that Bosnia-Herzegovina was never a functional society and could not be kept together (Hayden 2007). In a sociological study, Hodson et al. (1994) find that in comparison to other republics and autonomous regions in Yugoslavia, Bosnia-Herzegovina was the most tolerant. Not only Bosniaks as the majority group but also Serbs as the principal minority group were more tolerant than any other ethnic groups in comparison with all other republics and autonomous regions throughout Yugoslavia. Hodson et al. (1994, p. 1555), though, conclude their study with this paradox: “Bosnia enjoyed the highest level of tolerance of any Yugoslav republic, but this increased tolerance proved insufficient to outweigh the political forces emanating from its extremely diverse social fabric”.

Like any country, Bosnia-Herzegovina has a collective personality reflective of its history (Malcolm 1995). Bosnia’s enigmatic mixture of historical epochs (a distinctive medieval period from the 13th to 15th centuries, the Ottoman Empire starting in the 15th century, the Austro-Hungarian Empire during the 19th century, and communist Yugoslavia during the 20th century) structures this collective personality. Bosnia-Herzegovina is not a mini-Yugoslavia with a supra-ethnic identity reflecting Yugoslavism (Djokic 2003). Nor is it a mixed bag of mono-ethnic entities.

Ethnic personality is the exemplification of socially meaningful behavior
(Devereux 1975). Since religion (Catholicism, Islam, Orthodoxy) rather than observable racial differences distinguishes Bosnia's ethnic groups, ethnic personalities are associated with religious traditions. Bosniaks are Muslims and follow a certain set of religious observances; Croats are Catholic and follow another set of religious observances; and Serbs are Orthodox and follow another set of religious observances. While religious traditions inform the ethnic differences in Bosnia-Herzegovina, their ethnic personalities result overlapping and common cultures in everyday life. While studies of ethnicity typically focus on identities as a nominal variable, Brubaker (2002, pp. 185-186) argues that it is more fruitful to focus on the social practices that inform ethnic personalities:

What are we studying when we study ethnicity and ethnic conflict? ... it may be more productive to focus on practical categories, cultural idioms, schema, commonsense knowledge, organizational routines and resources, discursive frames, institutionalized forms, political projects, contingent events and variable groupness. It may be that 'ethnicity' is simply a convenient—though in certain respects misleading—rubric under which to group phenomena that, on the one hand, are highly disparate and, on the other, have a great deal in common with phenomena that are not ordinarily subsumed under the rubric of ethnicity.

After the succession wars in former-Yugoslavia, ethnic cleansing, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and genocide were widely studied (Banac 1993; Hodson et al. 1994; Silber and Little 1996; Malcolm 1996; Popov 1996; Udovicki & Ridgeway 1997; Campbell 1998; Mahmutcehajic 2000a; Doubt 2000; Djokic 2003; Broz 2004; Doubt 2006; Gagnon 2010). Rather than revisit these subjects, this study is about something resilient within the society of Bosnia-Herzegovina, that is, the degree to which its inhabitants share a heritage and culture despite suffering immense social violence and a crushing destruction of their national institutions.

Panethnicity
Bringa (2012, p. 35) puts forth the idea of a collective cultural identity in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Neither Bosniak, nor Croat, nor Serb identities can be fully understood with reference only to Islam or Christianity respectively but have to be considered in a specific Bosnian context that has resulted in a shared history and locality among Bosnians of Islamic as well as Christian backgrounds.

Bringa says there are not multiple cultures co-residing in the same vicinity in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Nor are there multiple cultures coexisting independently
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of each other. Bringa is not even saying that Bosnia-Herzegovina is a poly-ethnic society, although it is that. Bringa is instead saying there is a shared culture that encompasses each ethnicity and makes different faiths—Catholicism, Islam, Orthodox—culturally interdependent (Broz 2004; Tufekcic 2014; Mahmutcehajic 2000b). Multiculturalism thus is a misnomer. Although panethnicity has not been used to explain the collective identity of inhabitants in Bosnia-Herzegovina, this study applies the concept for recounting a collective personality in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

To theorize the concept, panethnicity mediates the tension between the two poles of assimilation and ethnic particularism. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the two possibilities are Yugoslavism (assimilation) and nationalism (ethnic particularism). Lockwood (1975) predicted in the seventies a movement toward assimilation. Given the influences of modernization, industrialization, and Yugoslav socialism, Lockwood predicted that ethnic identifications like Croat, Serb, and Muslim would gradually be replaced by “a feeling of Yugoslavness” (1979, p. 223). At the political level, his prediction proved false; at the social level, there is evidence still today to support his prediction.

Simic (1991) likewise conducted studies of ethnicity in Yugoslavia; he predicted in the eighties, in contrast to Lockwood, a movement toward nationalism, particularly in Serbia but spilling over to other Yugoslav republics. Simic said ethnic particularism would morph into a fervent nationalism, and the Yugoslav identity would be too weak to curtail this movement. Simic predicted that nationalism would erase the Yugoslav identity in everyday discourse and its significance in political practice (Silber & Little 1996; Sekulic et al. 1994; Sekulic et al. 2006). At the political level, Simic’s prediction proved true and at the social level proved to be tragic.

This study considers a liminal identity space. There is a third option, panethnicity. Panethnicity resists assimilation, on the one hand, and ethnic particularism, on the other hand, residing in the continuum. Panethnicity does not dilute itself into a broad category with universal import. Nor does panethnicity reify itself as a supra-ethnic identity. Panethnicity shares the same social ontology of other ethnic groups; it is not a meta-ethnicity, encompassing the whole of humanity, which Marx refers to as our “human species-being,” which falls outside the category of what an ethnic group is (Weber 1958).

It helps to cast the study’s question of how one keeps a complicated society like Bosnia-Herzegovina together in terms of Durkheim’s account of organic solidarity in modern times. “Not only, in a general way, does mechanical
solidarity link men less strongly than organic solidarity, but also, as we advance in the scale of social evolution, it grows ever slacker” (Durkheim 1964, p. 214). Durkheim’s point is counterintuitive. In societies structured through industrialization by a division of labor, organic solidarity (whose social cohesion is “centrifugal”) is stronger than mechanical solidarity (whose social cohesion is “centripetal”). Individuals unlike each other due to specialization and individualization, nevertheless, have greater social solidarity than individuals like each other due to shared traditional customs and faiths.

This study argues that panethnicity reconfigures Durkheim’s dichotomy, turning the concept of panethnicity from a descriptive one to an explanatory one. With panethnicity, social cohesion becomes a dialectic between organic solidarity and mechanical solidarity. Panethnicity resists assimilation, on the one hand, and ethnic particularism, on the other hand, residing in the continuum or in a liminal space. Given its connectedness to the mechanical solidarity of shared traditions, local customs, and common social and political practices, panethnicity does not dilute itself into a broad category with universal import. Nor does panethnicity reify itself as a supra-ethnic identity, which is what Yugoslavism did for some (Djokic 2003). Panethnicity disavows political arguments that stipulate that when there is organic solidarity there must not be mechanical solidarity or when there is mechanical solidarity there must not be organic solidarity. The result of the dialectic is that organic solidarity and mechanical solidarity stand together without sacrificing the virtue of one for the other and without demonizing the vice of either. By extending the concept of panethnicity to the sense of social cohesion among inhabitants in Bosnia-Herzegovina, we develop the concept of panethnicity as an explanatory one for understanding the problem of social order.

Methodology
In fall 2014, a survey question about how people married and what type of kinship relations were maintained after marriage was included in an omnibus survey in Bosnia-Herzegovina conducted by Mareco Index Bosnia. Following prescribed guidelines regarding ethical inquiry, transparency, and protection of human subjects, a clustered, stratified, random sample of 2,900 subjects was drawn from the country’s population, including the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Republika Srpska. The survey contained categorical questions that were answered yes or no to generate binominal variables: Did you marry with a prenuptial party, arranged marriage, elopement, traditional wedding, civil ceremony, dowry, or religious ceremony? The questions are not mutually exclusive. For example, a bride could elope, have a traditional wedding at the groom’s home, go later to a civil ceremony, and, at a suitable time, have a
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religious ceremony. One question asked whether affinal visitations or in-law gatherings occurred four or more times a year after marriage. The question measures kinship by marriage, the affinity called prijatelji (Simic 1975; Lockwood 1975; Bringa 1995). The question was repeated regarding the frequency of visits with the best man (kum) after the marriage and whether the visits occurred four or more times a year. The question measures the strength of fictive kinship, kinship through neither blood nor marriage but ritual, called kumstvo (Filipovic 1962; Hammel 1968; Simic 1975; Filipovic 1982). Independent variables included in the omnibus survey were age, religiosity, and income. To test the concept of panethnicity vis-a-vis ethnic particularism, we selected five culturally distinctive outcomes: engagement parties, elopement, affinal visitations, fictive kinship, and homogamy.

The data from the survey was analyzed using a loglinear model (Agresti 2013; Khamis 2011). Specifically, a backward elimination model selection procedure was used with entry criterion $P < 0.01$ and with model goodness of fit criterion $P > 0.1$. This model along with the association graph is used to determine if there is a relationship between ethnicity and each of the outcome variables, after adjusting for the sociodemographic variables age, income, and religiosity. Each of the outcome variables is listed, and for each one the loglinear model analysis determines if the proportion of respondents who answered “yes” differs significantly among the three ethnicities.

The three age groups used in these analyses are defined by the tertiles of age: (1) 18 – 43 (“young respondents”), (2) 44 – 55 (“middle age respondents”), and (3) over 55 (“old respondents”), taking the points that divide the sample into thirds. Religiosity is defined as “more religious” (attending religious service one or more times a month) and “less religious” (attending religious service less than once a month). Income is defined as “poor” (999 KM or less per month) and “wealthy” (more than 999 KM per month). In each case, the loglinear model analysis is based on a sample of 1867 (respondents married, widowed, or divorced). [Subtable sample sizes may not add to 1867 due to missing values for some variables.] The respondents who identified as Croat was 28.3% (n=820), Bosniak 42.6% (n=1,235), and Serb 29.1% (n=845). This distribution mirrors the population census. None of the respondents identified as Other, for instance, Yugoslav, Roma, or Jew. The technical report from Mareco Index on sampling design and interview protocols, data, and the question in English and Bosnian are available for at Open ICPSR (Doubt 2017).

Engagement Party
We start the study with the engagement party (vjeridba) since marriages often
are initiated with this rite of passage. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, an engagement party is not a bachelor's party, nor a bridal shower. It instead is hosted by the groom and the bride's families together. In Turkey, engagement parties are common if not the rule, where the custom is for marriages to be family-initiated. Even if a marriage in Turkey is not formally arranged, it is generally family-initiated. Before the wedding ceremony, there is an engagement party as well as several additional rituals involving ring exchanges between the bride and groom with their families (Tekce 2004). The hypothesis is that, given the shared faith of Islam with the inhabitants of Turkey, Bosniaks will have engagement parties at higher rate than Croats or Serbs. The hypothesis is the custom exemplifies the ethnic particularity of Bosniaks and the social cohesion of mechanical solidarity. Table 1 below presents the proportion of Yes’s to the statement “We had an engagement party” for each ethnic group.

| Table 1: Engagement party (vjeridba) in Bosnia-Herzegovina by ethnicity |
|-----------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|-----------------------|---------------------|
|                             | Croat | Bosniak | Serb | Row Total | N |
| All respondents             | 69.7% | 47.9%   | 44.6% | 52.5%     | 1,867 |
| Young respondents           | 81.8% | 64.6%   | 50.8% | 64.9%     | 643   |
| Middle-age respondents      | 71.9% | 43.6%   | 48.1% | 53.2%     | 609   |
| Poor older respondents      | 53.3% | 32.0%   | 34.4% | 37.9%     | 459   |
| Wealthy older respondents   | 52.9% | 29.7%   | 40.7% | 40.8%     | 98    |

Source: Mareco Index Bosnia, Sarajevo, September 2014.

The hypothesis is not supported. It is, in fact, Bosnian Catholics who have prenuptial parties before a wedding more frequently, and Bosniaks and Serbs less frequently. The custom reflects the ethnic particularism of Croats rather than Bosniaks. For example, in the Catholic faith, the engagement party is called prstenovanje. After a marriage proposal, prosnja, the couple with their partners go to the church and ask for prstenovanje. The man gives a ring to his fiancé in front of their parents and the priest so as to announce their intention to marry. After the news of the engagement is shared with the community, the marriage ceremony is held in the church. The loglinear model analysis reveals that the relationship between engagement party and ethnicity is different for the three age groups.

The proportion of Yes’s who had engagement party is higher for Croats than Bosniaks and the proportion of Yes’s higher for Bosniaks than Serbs among young respondents (P < 0.0001). Engagement parties are occurring more frequently among young respondents, especially young Bosniaks in contrast to elder Bosniaks, reflecting changes over time in the marriage custom. “The location and meaning of particular ethnic boundaries are continuously
Middle age Croats had engagement parties significantly more frequently than middle age Bosniaks and middle age Serbs ($P < 0.0001$) proportionately. There is not a significant difference between middle age Bosniaks and middle age Serbs. For elder respondents, the relationship between engagement party and ethnicity is different for the two income groups, reflecting a difference in terms of economic class. The proportion of Yes’s among poor elderly Croats who had engagement parties is significantly higher than among poor elderly Bosniaks and poor elderly Serbs ($p = .001$); there is no significant difference in the proportion of Yes’s between poor elderly Bosniaks and poor elderly Serbs. While suggestive, the proportion of Yes’s among wealthy, elderly respondents, in fact, does not differ significantly for the three ethnicities ($P = 0.139$).

Religion influences marriage customs, and different faiths influence corresponding ethnic groups or nacija in different ways. When a marriage custom is panethnic in character, the influence of religion is weaker. When a marriage custom reflects ethnic particularism, the influence of religion is stronger. Religiosity is increasing in Bosnia-Herzegovina within each nacija after the recent war, and so marriage customs today are more influenced by religion than during Yugoslav socialism. The social cohesion of ethnic groups becomes more mechanical (centripetal) than less organic (centrifugal).

**Elopement**

Elopements (ukrala se, meaning the young woman stole herself from her natal home into marriage) have been previously studied in Bosnia-Herzegovina. One of the earliest is Hangi’s ([1906 & 1907] 2009) ethnography, while in the 1970s, Lockwood carried out an ethnography in a remote Muslim village in the mountains of central Bosnia-Herzegovina. Lockwood (1974, p. 260) reported that “by far the majority of marriages, easily ninety percent are formed by elopement.” In the eighties, Bringa conducted an ethnography in a Muslim/Croat village in a valley in central Bosnia-Herzegovina. She noted that “The most common form of marriage during my stay in the village and I believe over the last thirty years was marriage by elopement” (Bringa 1995, p. 76).

Elopement is different from a bride abduction, called otmica, although sometimes studies discuss the two different phenomena interchangeably. Coercion and violence are used. (One question in the survey was whether you were stolen against your will into marriage or did you steal your spouse into marriage. The percent of respondents who said yes was 1.3% [n=1,867]).
Unlike bride theft (*otmica*), elopement (*ukrala se*) occurs with the complicity of the girl and without her parents’ knowledge or, at least, their overt knowledge and sometimes with their tacit approval. Elopement in its ideal form exemplifies a choice, whether informed or not. The girl rather than her parents chooses to whom she will give herself in marriage. The choice, however, is not made in a vacuum but within a social context that both constrains and provides incentives giving meaning to the social behavior (Lockwood 1974; Bringa 1995; Doubt 2013; 2014).

In a study of marriage conducted before World War II in what at that time was called the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, the sociologist Erlich observed something distinctive about marriage customs in Bosnia-Herzegovina in comparison to other regions in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. Her study, which employs extensive survey data from throughout the region, is worth citing. “In patriarchal regions [referring to Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia] the bride was chosen almost exclusively and autonomously by the parents of the young man” (1966, p. 183). The situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina was different; Erlich (1966, p. 188) found “The most important point is that the two young people are fond of each other and that they have some means. Everything else is of secondary significance.”

The anthropologists Lockwood (1975) and Bringa (1995, pp. 132-33) suggest that elopement is a marriage custom particular to Muslims and Croats and Serbs more commonly marry with traditional weddings. Given the findings from these ethnographies, the hypothesis is Bosniaks elope at a higher rate than do Croats and Serbs, reflecting ethnic particularism. Table 2 below presents the proportion of Yes’s to the statement “We eloped” for each ethnicity.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2: Elopements (<em>ukrala se</em>) in Bosnia-Herzegovina by ethnicity</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ethnicity</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All respondents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Young respondents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle-age respondents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Older respondents</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

The hypothesis is supported (p < .0001). The loglinear model analysis reveals that the relationship between elopement and ethnicity is different for the three age groups. The proportion of Yes’s for young Croats who eloped is significantly lower than for young Bosniaks (p = 0.009); there is not a significant difference in the proportion of Yes’s between young Croats and
young Serbs nor between young Bosniaks and young Serbs. It is easier for Bosniaks to attain divorce if a marriage does not work out (Bringa 1995; Lockwood 1975). It is harder for Croats who are Catholic. There are some changes in this custom over time.

The proportion of Yes’s who eloped to marry is significantly higher for middle age Bosniaks than for middle age Croats, and it is significantly higher for middle age Croats than for middle age Serbs ($P < 0.0001$). For Croats, the influence of the Catholic Church was less during Yugoslav socialism. Table 2 shows how this pattern changes among elder inhabitants. The proportion of Yes’s who eloped to marry for elder Bosniaks is significantly higher than for elder Croats and elder Serbs ($P < 0.0001$); there is no significant difference in the proportion of Yes’s between elder Croats and elder Serbs. Elopement was relatively common fifty or more years ago, particularly in rural areas. The notably higher proportion of elder inhabitants in each ethnic group who eloped indicates the custom is a traditional and a panethnic one in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Elopements strengthened the organic solidarity of the community (Doubt 2014).

**Affinal Visitations**

Bringa (1995) describes the social importance of affinal relations (*prijatelji*) among Bosniaks. She says the marriage process is not complete until certain prescribed rituals occur after marriage. It is not that a married couple visits either the wife or the husband’s parents; it is that the wife and the husband’s parents come together for a gathering with the married couple. The rituals create affinity, an important kinship between the bride and groom’s families. Marriage strengthens not the agnatic group vis-à-vis another agnatic group, but the affinal group, creating the opportunity if not the imperative to establish bonds between nonagnates for their own sake (Lockwood 1975; Donia & Lockwood 1978).

Two questions were asked. First, do affinal visitations occur four or more times a year and, second, do affinal visitations occur twelve or more times a year. The hypothesis is that this kinship structure is particular to Bosniaks and not shared with other ethnic groups. Table 3 reports the variation of Yes’s to parents visiting four or more times a year by ethnicity.

There is no significant difference in the proportion of Yes’s among the three ethnicities ($P = 0.383$). The survey results do not support the hypothesis. The custom reflects a panethnic practice rather than a particular ethnic identity. Among Croats, after the wedding party, the new bride goes to visit her parents, and the first visit often occurs on a religious holiday. The first time the
new wife goes to visit her parents she does not go alone; she goes to her parents with her husband, her husband's father and mother, and sometimes cousins and neighbors. This visit initiates the formation of prijatelji. Among Serbs, when the young married woman goes to visit her parents the first time; the visit is called prvine (isla u prvine). Prvine is the first visit to her parents after getting married. The new wife goes with either just married women, her husband’s parents, her sister-in-law, her husband's uncle or some other relatives. She does not go with her husband, who stays at their home.

Table 3: Affinal visitations (prijatelji) in Bosnia-Herzegovina by ethnicity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Croat</th>
<th>Bosniak</th>
<th>Serb</th>
<th>Row Total</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Parents visiting four or more times a year</td>
<td>73.1%</td>
<td>71.2%</td>
<td>74.5%</td>
<td>72.7%</td>
<td>1,867</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Mareco Index Bosnia, Sarajevo, September 2014

Everyone who goes prvine spends the night in the home of the recently married woman's parents. The next day, the relatives of the married woman gather together in her parent’s home and meet with the husband's parents and his other relatives who are going in prvine. After that, the parents and relatives of the married women will go to visit the husband’s parents' home. It is believed the number of wife's relatives who go in the first visit to the husband's parents’ home must be greater than the number of husband's relatives who go on their first visit to the wife’s parents' home because this brings a good omen to the newly married couple. After these visits, the young couple can visit their parents on their own. Among Bosniaks, the first visits between in-laws is called pohode. The visit is obligatory. The parents of the newly married woman first invite the husband’s parents and their relatives in pohode; after that the wife’s parents and relatives go in pohode to husband’s parents’ home. Pohode could be velike pohode (big) or male pohode (small). When it is male pohode, only the parents, the bride, and bridegroom go in pohode. When it is velike pohode, the parents’ numerous relatives go in pohode. The number of persons who go in pohode from the bride’s side is usually somewhat bigger because it is believed to increase good fortune (nafaku) for the young married couple.

The inference test shows that there is no significant variation by ethnicity. Affinal kinship reflects a strong panethnic identity in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This kinship structure, which does not appear to be as strong in Croatia and Serbia, is shared in parallel ways by the three major ethnic groups. The marriage custom is not changing through the generations. Age and income are
insignificant variables. While the social cohesion of affines is initially organic (centrifugal), through frequent visitations it also becomes mechanical (centripetal).

Fictive Kinship

Marriage can serve two kinship functions in a society, which anthropologists refer to as the “vertical” function and “horizontal” function. The “vertical” function preserves continuity by sustaining a family’s blood line, the descent line, typically patriarchal (Simic 1975; 2000; Nagel 1998). There is the desire to preserve the memory of the family's name and honor through succeeding generations of off-spring. One example that serves the “vertical” function is when the daughter marries the son of her father's brother. Among folk Bosniaks, these marriages are traditionally scorned even though allowed in Islam. Only the wealthy among the Bosniaks (begs) married first cousins, in part to protect their inheritances (Filipovic 1982).

Marriages that serve the “horizontal” function tie society together across a single generation. Relations outside one’s bloodline are established through marriage or fictive kinship, creating a wider solidarity within the society, making society less clannish. In the Balkans, there is also the kinship called kumstvo, which is an important fictive kinship. “Ritual kinship of various forms was of great importance among South Slavs” (Filipovic 1962, p. 77). South Slavs include Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs. Fictive kinship is neither agnatic nor affinal. Kum and kuma name a variety of fictive kinships: They refer to a best man at a wedding, a male or female witness at a wedding, a godparent at a baptism or witness at a circumcision, a witness at a child’s confirmation or first communion, a sponsor during a child’s first hair cutting, or a woman who nursed a child not her own.

Hammel’s (1968) study of Serbian kinship in former-Yugoslavia points out that “horizontalness” is achieved through fictive kinship or kumstvo within the traditional Serbian Orthodox community. He observes that one function of fictive kinship within the Orthodox community is to cut off the development of and dependence upon affinal kin. Among Serbs kumstvo carries more respect and social capital than prijatelji, although in the Serbian Orthodox community the term prijatelji is also used to name in-lawship. Kumstvo serves the function of horizontalness and, at the same time, preserves the hegemony of agnatic kin and agnatic solidarity. Filipovic (1962, p. 77) found that this fictive kinship is “considered as being much stronger than kinship by blood” in traditional rural communities. This pattern has, of course, changed with modernization, as Hammel points out.
One survey question was if visits with the best man or *kum* occur four or more times a year after the marriage. Given the importance of *kumovi* among Serbs, the hypothesis is Serbs will visit the best man at a higher rate reflecting ethnic particularism (Hammel 1968; Simic 1979). Table 4 reports the relative frequency of Yes’s by ethnicity.

**Table 4: Visiting best man four or more times a year in Bosnia-Herzegovina by ethnicity**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Croat</th>
<th>Bosniak</th>
<th>Serb</th>
<th>Row Total</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All respondents</td>
<td>74.3%</td>
<td>63.5%</td>
<td>81.1%</td>
<td>72.0%</td>
<td>1,668</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Young respondents</td>
<td>78.2%</td>
<td>74.0%</td>
<td>81.3%</td>
<td>77.3%</td>
<td>643</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle-age respondents</td>
<td>78.7%</td>
<td>58.4%</td>
<td>85.1%</td>
<td>72.2%</td>
<td>609</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Older respondents</td>
<td>64.9%</td>
<td>56.3%</td>
<td>77.7%</td>
<td>66.3%</td>
<td>615</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Mareco Index Bosnia, Sarajevo, September 2014.

The hypothesis is generally supported. The relationship between “visiting best man four or more times a year” differs by the three ethnicities. The proportion of Yes’s who visit the best man four or more times a year does not differ significantly among young respondents in the three ethnicities (P = 0.165). This finding is in line with Filipovic’s (1962, p. 77) ethnography which asserts that “Ritual kinship of various forms was of great importance among South Slavs in the past, because it widened the circle of relatives beyond the family, the clan, and the tribe.” Here, somewhat unexpectedly, panethnicity is exemplified in how young respondents collectively sustain this marriage custom. Table 4 reports the variation for middle age respondents.

The proportion of Yes’s for Bosniaks who are middle aged who visit the best man four or more times a year is significantly lower than for Croats or Serbs (P < 0.0001); there is not a significant difference in the proportion of Yes’s between Croats and Serbs. Among Bosniaks *kum* may be simply the person who served as the witness to a marriage, making the relationship more formal and less long-term.

The proportion of Yes’s for elder Serbs who visit the best man four or more times is significantly higher than for elder Croats and Bosniaks (P < 0.0001); there is not a significant difference in the proportion of Yes’s between elder Croats and Bosniaks. The results here are that a strong relation to the best man or *kum* exists among not only Serbs but also Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Moreover, the importance of *kumstvo* is increasing among young Bosniak respondents where *kum* may mean the best friend who served as witness at a
Panethnicity and Social Solidarity in Bosnia-Herzegovina

marriage. This finding supports Nagel’s observation (1994, p. 164) that “One strategy used by polyethnic groups to overcome such differences and build a more unified pan-ethnic community is to blend together cultural material from many component group traditions”.

Homogamy

Previous studies of intermarriage among ethnic groups in ex-Yugoslavia use census data collected in 1990 or earlier in former Yugoslavia (Botev 1994; Sekulic et al. 1994; Sekulic et al. 2006; Smits 2009). This study uses data collected in 2014 in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Marrying someone in the same faith reflects ethnic particularism, and it may be called either endogamy or homogamy (Smits 2009). It may be misleading to say marrying outside of one’s ethnic group in former Yugoslavia is exogamy. Yugoslavs were marrying Yugoslavs. From the viewpoint of the Yugoslavs marrying, their marriages were endogamous. This study thus uses the term homogamy for marrying someone in the same faith.

Previous studies examine whether intermarriages in ex-Yugoslavia correlate with social cohesion in the context of the violence in ex-Yugoslavia in the nineties (Botev 1994; Sekulic et al. 1994; Smits 2009). While heterogamous marriages seemed to be increasing during Yugoslav socialism (which was seen as a movement toward assimilation), Lockwood (1975), Bringa (1975, pp. 142-154) and Botev (1994) report that they were still mostly homogamous with respect to ethnoreligious identity, particularly in rural areas.

Homogamy reflects boundary maintenance, where the function of boundary maintenance is to provide stability in a poly-ethnic society (Bringa 1995, pp. 149-155). Maintaining differences is as functional to stability as maintaining similarities; in turn, maintaining similarities is as dysfunctional to stability as maintaining differences. The latter thrive vis-à-vis similarities just as similarities do vis-à-vis differences. Poly-ethnic societies thrive on this truism. Social stability resides in the social structure where there are criteria for mutual identification as well as “a structuring of interaction which allows the persistence of cultural differences” (Barth 1966, p. 16). This dialectic explains an implicit function of homogamy in a poly-ethnic society, where panethnicity and ethnic particularity stand tall side by side. Each is able to stand tall vis-a-vis the other because of the society’s panethnic identity. The critical focus is not the cultural “stuff” that goes into and resides within the ethnic group per se, but the boundaries that define the group (Barth 1966; Barth 1969).

In socialist Yugoslavia, the public recognition by inhabitants of Yugoslavism
was positive. Exogamy thus reflected the presence of another, increasingly significant boundary, namely, Yugoslavism. Barth (1969, p. 16) writes, “The identification of another person as a fellow member of an ethnic group implies a strong of criteria for evaluation and judgment. It thus entails the assumption that the two are fundamentally ‘playing the same game.’” Yugoslavism was becoming another game to play vis-a-vis ethnic particularism. “Identifying as a Yugoslav thus avoided either assimilating into the majority or labeling oneself as a minority” (Sekulic et al. 1994, p. 86).

The hypothesis is that homogamy is a custom equally shared by the ethnic groups or, to put it in the opposite way, exogamy, reflecting the emerging of a Yugoslav national identity, is equally practiced by ethnic groups in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Table 5 shows the frequency of Yes’s to marrying someone in the same faith by ethnicity. The results support the hypothesis for certain subgroups; Serbs are more likely to be endogamous. The relationship between homogamy and ethnicity differs among the three age groups. For young respondents, the relationship between endogamy and nationality differs between those who are less religious and those who are more religious (as measured by the number of times the respondent attends religious service). The proportion of Yes’s among young respondents who are more religious does not differ significantly among the three nationalities (P = 0.286). Religion strengthens ethnic particularism; young respondents who are more religious are less likely to marry someone in another faith.

The proportion of Yes’s among young respondents who are less religious is significantly lower for Croats than it is for young Bosniaks or Serbs (P < 0.0001); there is not a significant difference in the proportion of Yes’s between young Bosniaks and Serbs who are less religious. Ethnic particularism is not necessarily associated with religion for young Bosniaks and young Serbs who are less religious. The proportion of Yes’s for middle age respondents is significantly higher for Serbs than for middle age Croats or Bosniaks (P < 0.0001); there is not a significant difference in the proportion of Yes’s between middle age Croats and Bosniaks. Middle age Serbs were less influenced by Yugoslavism than middle age Croats and Bosniaks. For elder respondents, the relationship between endogamy and ethnicity differs between those who are less religious and those who are more religious. The proportion of Yes’s does not differ significantly among the three ethnicities who are elder and more religious (P = 0.101).

The proportion of Yes’s is significantly higher for elder Serbs who are less religious than for Croats who are less religious (P = 0.001); there is not a
significant difference in the proportion of Yes’s between the elder Bosniaks and Croats who are less religious nor between the elder Bosniaks and Serbs who are less religious. Ethnic particularity of elder Serbs who are less religious is stronger than ethnic particularity of elder Croats and elder Bosniaks who are less religious.

Table 5: Homogamy with spouse of the same faith by ethnicity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Croatian</th>
<th>Bosniak</th>
<th>Serbian</th>
<th>Row Total</th>
<th>N</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All respondents</td>
<td>89.8%</td>
<td>88.2%</td>
<td>94.5%</td>
<td>90.7%</td>
<td>1,867</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Young respondents who</td>
<td>98.4%</td>
<td>94.7%</td>
<td>96.8%</td>
<td>96.7%</td>
<td>302</td>
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<tr>
<td>are more religious</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Young respondents who</td>
<td>71.8%</td>
<td>94.0%</td>
<td>94.6%</td>
<td>91.7%</td>
<td>337</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>are less religious</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle-age respondents</td>
<td>89.9%</td>
<td>82.8%</td>
<td>97.2%</td>
<td>89.2%</td>
<td>609</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Older respondents who</td>
<td>96.9%</td>
<td>89.2%</td>
<td>93.0%</td>
<td>93.0%</td>
<td>257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>are more religious</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Older respondents who</td>
<td>69.4%</td>
<td>84.8%</td>
<td>91.3%</td>
<td>85.8%</td>
<td>353</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>are less religious</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Mareco Index Bosnia, Sarajevo, September 2014.

Botev employs census data from Yugoslavia’s Federal Statistical Office 1962-1989 and, like this study, uses a loglinear model; Botev (1994, p. 475) finds that “The difference between the endogamy parameters for the Moslems and the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina is not statistically significant at p < .05; the Croats are significantly more endogamous than the other two groups.” For this omnibus survey conducted in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 2014, when broken down by age, economic level, and religiosity, the results show that Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina tend to be less endogamous than Serbs among (i) middle-age respondents and (ii) elderly respondents who are less religious; and they tend to be less endogamous than both Serbs and Bosniaks among younger respondents who are less religious. The level of endogamy does not differ significantly among the three ethnic groups for young as well as elderly respondents who are more religious. There was no instance in our study where Croats are more endogamous than other groups (Abelson 1995).

Conclusion
This study examined the degree to which marriage customs and kinship exemplify panethnicity in Bosnia-Herzegovina. A non-nationalistic way of understanding a national personality is to recognize how a national personality is based in a panethnic rather than a monoethnic heritage. Nationalism reduces not only another but also one's self to one-dimensionality through the inflation
of a singular dimensionality. Other meaningful identities cease to signify anything after being encased by an X ethos. Nationalist politicians in former-Yugoslavia established independent states based on a nation-state model favoring the hegemony of one ethnic group and glorifying that ethnic group’s mechanical solidarity. Bosnia-Herzegovina, based on a different and superior model of social order, then needed to be attacked and destroyed. We find that the concept of panethnicity supports the sociological findings of Hodson et al. (1994, p. 1555), “Bosnia enjoyed the highest level of tolerance of any Yugoslav republic, but this increased tolerance proved insufficient to outweigh the political forces emanating from its extremely diverse social fabric.” The political forces that undermined Bosnia-Herzegovina emanated from outside rather than from inside Bosnia-Herzegovina, that is, from Croatia and Serbia (Silber & Little 1996; Campbell 1998; Mahmutcehajic 2000a).

The Dayton Peace Accords established a constitution and federal structure that reifies ethnic particularism at the political level and denies the panethnic realities of the country and its civil society. The longer the Dayton Peace Accords and the current political institutions continue to structure Bosnia-Herzegovina along nationalistic lines, the panethnic heritage and social norms that sustain the poly-ethnic society as a poly-ethnic society will wane (Bass 1998; Chandler 2000; Listlang & Ramet 2013). There is a panethnic identity in Bosnia-Herzegovina that carries historical and social significance, more so than the panethnic identities studied in the United States. This panethnic identity in Bosnia-Herzegovina, however, goes unrecognized in political and academic discussions.

Panethnicity protectively disavows political arguments which stipulate that when there is organic solidarity there must not be mechanical solidarity (which historically was the political problem of Yugoslavism). Panethnicity prudently shuns political arguments that when there is mechanical solidarity there must not be organic solidarity (which is the agenda of today’s nationalist politicians). Panethnicity instead holds organic solidarity and mechanical solidarity together without sacrificing the virtue of one for the other and without demonizing the vice of either (Lovrenovic 1996; Mahmutcehajic, 2000b; Komsic 2016). This study frames the concept of panethnicity as an explanatory concept by developing its positive relation to social cohesion. Rather than ask how can one keep a complicated, complex society like Bosnia-Herzegovina together, this study asks how can one not keep (even after a genocidal war) a complicated, complex identity like Bosnia-Herzegovina together. The inability of international politicians and nationalist leaders of their nacija to acknowledge the shared cultural and social heritage of inhabitants prevents this question
from being taken up. The hope of this study is that its comprehensive statistical analysis demonstrates empirically the shared cultural heritage and history of this tragically maligned country and its importance to social stability.

Future research could replicate the study’s questions on marriage and kinship along with its representative sampling in countries that were part of former Yugoslavia and surround Bosnia-Herzegovina, namely, Croatia, Serbia, Macedonia, Slovenia, Kosovo, and Montenegro. The goal would be to measure the variation and non-variation among national identities and ethnic identities. For example, there are a half million Muslims in Serbia living in an area called Sandžak around the city of Novi Pazar. Are the marriage customs and kinship structures of Muslims in Serbia comparable to the marriage customs and kinship structures of Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina or Orthodox Serbs in Serbia instead?

The replication of the survey study could also occur throughout East Europe and in Turkey. In Bulgaria, for instance, affinal kinship (prijatelji) and ritual kinship (kumovi) are important relations, and similar words are used to identify the relations. How do these relations structure Bulgarian society and its different ethnic groups? A multinational study would address the interrelation of ethnic and national identities as they are reflected in the country’s marriage customs and kinship patterns, which are not just symbolic but functional with respect to social solidarity. Finally, it would also be informative to study the marriage customs and kinship structures of Slavic and Baltic post-socialist countries in Eastern Europe. How are marriage customs and kinship structures in Slavic and Baltic countries both similar and different vis-a-vis Western Europe? Such a multinational study would provide a basis for understanding the complexity of social and cultural identities in East Europe; its framework would be objective and transcend nationalist politics.

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable</th>
<th>Subgroup</th>
<th>Proportion of Yes's</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Engagement</td>
<td>Young</td>
<td>C &gt; B &gt; S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Middle Age</td>
<td>C &gt; B = S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Older, Poor</td>
<td>C &gt; B = S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Older, Wealthy</td>
<td>C = B = S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Elopement</td>
<td>Young</td>
<td>B &gt; C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Middle Age</td>
<td>B &gt; C &gt; S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Older</td>
<td>B &gt; C = S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parents Visit 4+</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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</tr>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>S &gt; C = B</td>
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<td>Homogamy</td>
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<td>C = B = S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Young, Less Religious</td>
<td>C &lt; B = S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Middle Age</td>
<td>S &gt; B = C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Older, More Religious</td>
<td>C = B = S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Older, Less Religious</td>
<td>S &gt; C = B</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: For each dependent variable and each subgroup (if appropriate), the comparison of the proportion of Yes’s among the three nationalities (abbreviated C, B, and S for Croats, Bosniaks, and Serbs, respectively) is given symbolically; e.g., “C > B” means that the proportion of Yes’s for Croats is higher than for Bosniaks, “B = S” means that the proportion of Yes’s for Bosniaks does not differ significantly from that of Serbs, etc.