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**Structure, Determinants and Political Consequences  
of Political Attitudes: Evidence from Serbia**

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by  
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I hereby declare that this thesis contains no materials accepted for any other degrees in any other institutions. This thesis contains no materials previously written and/ published by another person, unless otherwise noted.

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I dedicate this dissertation to my wife Olja (although she deserves something better).

Bojan Todosijević

Tavankut

## Table of contents

Acknowledgements .....	iii
List of Tables .....	1
List of Figures.....	2
ABSTRACT .....	3
INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEM: IDEOLOGY AND POLITICAL BEHAVIOR.....	4
<i>Ideology as an object of research</i> .....	6
<i>General conceptual framework</i> .....	8
The Problem of Individual Differences .....	10
Understanding Political Action .....	12
Why New Democracies? .....	14
<i>The case of Serbia</i> .....	16
Relevance of the Main Research Problem.....	17
General Methodological Approach .....	20
The Problem – A Recapitulation .....	23
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH ON THE STRUCTURE OF SOCIO-POLITICAL ATTITUDES.....	27
The Basic Paradigm.....	28
Early Studies.....	30
The Two-dimensional Model of Hans Eysenck .....	32
Conservatism as Unidimensional and Bipolar Dimension (Wilson) .....	36
Kerlinger’s Dualistic Theory.....	41
Outliers .....	44
Summary and Implications.....	46
<i>Substantive implications</i> .....	47
<i>Methodological implications</i> .....	50
DIMENSIONS OF POLITICAL SPACE IN POLITICAL SCIENCE LITERATURE.....	53
Attitude Consistency .....	53
Conceptualization and Measurement of Ideology .....	55
<i>Left-right ideological dimension</i> .....	58
<i>Multidimensional models</i> .....	63
<i>Multidimensional ideology on the philosophical and concrete level</i> .....	64
<i>Grid-group model</i> .....	68
<i>Marriage of information and predisposition</i> .....	69
<i>Summary</i> .....	70
Explanatory Accounts .....	71
<i>Social cleavage model</i> .....	73
<i>Cleavages and value orientations</i> .....	75
<i>The role of occupation (Kitschelt 1994)</i> .....	76
<i>New politics - the emergence of new issues and conflicts</i> .....	81
<i>Parties as factors influencing structuration of attitudes</i> .....	85
Post-Communist Context.....	88
<i>The role of the regime divide</i> .....	90
<i>The role of social structure</i> .....	94

<i>Historical legacies</i> .....	97
DEVELOPMENT OF THE SERBIAN PARTY SYSTEM 1990-2002 .....	107
The First Pluralist Elections for the Serbian Parliament, December 1990 .....	108
The Formation of the Authoritarian – Democratic Division .....	110
War and Peace .....	112
Nationalism is Out of Fashion: Elections from 1995 to 1997 .....	115
Kosovo and NATO.....	117
The First Regime Change.....	119
Two Years in Democracy: Split within the Democratic Bloc .....	121
Resume: Political Transformations on the Level of Elite Politics.....	123
SUMMARY AND HYPOTHESES.....	126
Social-psychological Literature.....	129
Political Science Literature.....	131
Hypothetical Model of Political Attitudes.....	133
<i>Explanation of individual differences</i> .....	135
Hypotheses .....	137
<i>Hypotheses about the structure of ideology</i> .....	139
<i>Hypotheses about the causal model</i> .....	142
<i>A cleavage of world-views</i> .....	148
Broader Framework.....	150
METHOD.....	152
Surveys and Samples.....	152
<i>2002 Survey of Belgrade residents</i> .....	152
<i>1990 and 1996 Data</i> .....	153
Measures.....	154
<i>Political attitudes</i> .....	154
<i>Authoritarianism</i> .....	155
<i>Ideological self-identification</i> .....	156
<i>Party preferences</i> .....	156
<i>Criterial variables</i> .....	157
<i>Additional measures</i> .....	158
Data Analysis.....	158
RESULTS.....	160
Primary Dimensions of Political Attitudes.....	160
<i>Initial first-order factor analysis</i> .....	160
<i>Initial factor extraction: sources of attitude constraint</i> .....	166
<i>Induction-deduction next round: Substantive and methodological aspects</i> .....	168
<i>Mini-scales</i> .....	171
<i>Political attitude scales and relevant variables</i> .....	185
<i>Political attitude scales and support for political parties</i> .....	188
Second-order Factor Analysis: General Dimensions of Political Attitudes .....	191
<i>Higher-order ideological dimensions and criterial variables</i> .....	194
<i>Higher-order ideological dimensions and political parties</i> .....	196
Causal Model of Ideological Orientations and Political Preferences .....	199
<i>Causal model with the second-order ideological factors</i> .....	202

<i>Causal analysis, the second step: Explanation of ideological dimensions</i> .....	205
<i>Causal analysis, the third step: Explanation of mediating variables</i> .....	207
<i>Causal model with the first-order factors</i> .....	209
<i>Causal model with the first-order factors: Explanation of primary attitudes</i> .....	214
<i>Sociological, socio-psychological, and attitudinal models of party preferences</i> .....	217
Ideology and Political Preferences in Serbia: Dimensions of Political Competition .....	219
<i>Discriminant analysis, 1990</i> .....	221
<i>Discriminant analysis, 1996</i> .....	224
<i>Discriminant analysis, 2002</i> .....	227
<i>Continuities and changes over time</i> .....	230
DISCUSSION.....	233
Structure of Political Attitudes .....	233
<i>Initial factor extraction and sources of attitude constraint</i> .....	234
<i>Attitudinal Mini-scales</i> .....	235
<i>Relationships between the mini-scales</i> .....	243
<i>Criterial variables</i> .....	245
<i>Political parties</i> .....	247
General Dimensions of Political Attitudes .....	249
<i>Socialist conservatism</i> .....	249
<i>Right-wing conservatism</i> .....	251
<i>Social order and hierarchy orientation</i> .....	253
<i>Post-materialism</i> .....	254
<i>Sources of constraint on the higher level of generality</i> .....	255
Causal Model of Political Preferences with General Ideological Dimensions .....	260
Causal Model with the Primary Dimensions of Political Attitudes.....	264
Diachronic View on Political Divisions .....	269
Cleavage Politics: The Serbian Lessons.....	277
<i>Parties and cleavages in historical perspective</i> .....	281
CONCLUSION .....	284
<i>About the structure and constraints</i> .....	284
<i>About the causal model</i> .....	287
<i>The politics of world-views</i> .....	290
The Bigger Picture.....	294
APPENDIX: VARIABLE SPECIFICATIONS.....	296
Appendix 0 Political Attitude Scale, 2002 Survey .....	296
Appendix B Criterial Variables .....	298
<i>SDO scale and two SDO subscales</i> .....	298
<i>Prejudice scales</i> .....	299
Appendix C Eigenvalues and Variance Explained After the First-Order Factor Analysis.....	300
Appendix D Variables Used in Discriminant Analyses .....	301
<i>Scales in 1990 survey (ZA Study 2903)</i> .....	301
<i>Scales in 1996 survey (ZA Study 2911)</i> .....	302
REFERENCES .....	303

## **List of Tables**

Table 1 Early studies: basic methodological features and results.....	31
Table 2 Methodological features and results of studies within Eysenck’s model of attitudes.....	34
Table 3 Basic methodological features and results of Wilson’s main studies, and of other authors’ studies using Wilson-Patterson Conservatism Scale.....	38
Table 4 Kerlinger’s studies and studies testing his Dualistic theory of social attitudes .....	43
Table 5 Outliers: Methodological features and main results of some relevant studies out of the three main approaches.....	45
Table 6 Hierarchical model of political attitudes .....	134
Table 7 Factor structure of the first seven attitudinal factors (Oblimin rotation) .....	162
Table 8 Factor structure of the attitudinal factors 8 through 15 (Oblimin rotation) .....	164
Table 9 Factors extracted in initial factor analysis.....	167
Table 10 Correlation between the 15 Oblimin factors .....	169
Table 11 Nationalism scale .....	172
Table 12 Militarism.....	173
Table 13 International integration.....	174
Table 14 Clericalism .....	174
Table 15 Traditionalism.....	175
Table 16 The regime attitude .....	175
Table 17 Socialist economy .....	176
Table 18 Environmentalism.....	176
Table 19 Work ethic.....	177
Table 20 ‘Philosophical’ Liberalism.....	178
Table 21 Economic liberalism .....	178
Table 22 Collectivism.....	179
Table 23 Punitiveness .....	180
Table 24 Elitism.....	180
Table 25 Feminism .....	181
Table 26 Attitudinal mini-scales.....	181
Table 27 Correlation between the attitudinal mini-scales.....	184
Table 28 Correlation coefficients between attitude scales and criterial variables .....	187
Table 29 Correlation between attitudinal scales and support for political parties .....	190
Table 30 Factor structure of attitude scales after Oblimin rotation.....	192
Table 31 Correlation between the second-order ideological factors.....	194
Table 32 Correlation between the second-order ideological dimensions and criterial variables .....	196
Table 33 Second-order ideological dimensions and preference for political parties .....	198

Table 34 Zero-order relationships between background and dispositional variables with party preferences .....	200
Table 35 Multivariate model of party preferences with second-order ideological factors, 2002.....	205
Table 36 Causal analysis, the second step: Multivariate model of ideological variables (second-order ideological factors), 2002 .....	206
Table 37 Causal analysis, the last step: Multivariate model of mediating variables, 2002.....	208
Table 38 Multivariate model of party preferences with first-order ideological factors, 2002. ....	212
Table 39 Causal analysis, the second step: Multivariate model of ideological variables (first-order ideological factors), 2002.....	216
Table 40 Sociological, socio-psychological, and attitudinal models of party preferences .....	218
Table 41 Structure matrix of two significant functions that discriminate supporters of four main presidential candidates in 1990.....	223
Table 42 Structure of two significant functions discriminating five political parties in 1996.....	225
Table 43 Structure matrix of functions discriminating four main political actors in 2002.....	229

**List of Figures**

Figure 1 Hypothetical causal chain explaining individual differences in ideological orientation and political preferences .....	137
Figure 2 Mean left-right self-placement score and vote choice.....	201
Figure 3 Group centroids, 1990 .....	223
Figure 4 Ideological differences between supporters of different presidential candidates in 1990 ....	224
Figure 5 Group centroids, 1996 .....	226
Figure 6 Vote choice and ideological dimensions in 1996 .....	227
Figure 7 Group centroids, 2002 .....	229
Figure 8 Vote preference and ideological dimensions in 2002.....	230



# **Structure, Determinants and Political Consequences of Political Attitudes: Evidence from Serbia**

## **Abstract**

This dissertation analyzes the organization of political attitudes in Serbia, and tests the implications of general models of attitude organization (Kerlinger 1984, Middendorp 1991a), as well as of models developed for the post-communist condition (Evans and Whitefield 1993, 1995; Kitschelt et al. 1999). The analysis is based on an original survey research conducted among Belgrade residents ( $N=502$ ) in the Spring of 2002, but it also contains secondary analysis of national samples. The results of structural analyses show that Serbian mass political attitudes vary along fifteen latent dimensions, including dimensions such as nationalism, militarism, economic liberalism, and environmentalism. Second-order factor analysis revealed four general ideological dimensions: 1) socialist conservatism or “regime divide” dimension, 2) right-wing conservatism, 3) social order and hierarchy orientation, and 4) post-materialist orientation. Nationalism, anti-west orientation, and regime-change orientation are attitudinal dimensions with the strongest influence on political preferences. Causal modeling showed that preferences for authoritarian political options and ideological orientations are tied to personal authoritarianism, and to specific socio-structural characteristics.

This dissertation provides insight into the structure of political and ideological space and its determinants in a deeply polarized democratizing country. It also offers an interpretation of Serbian politics in terms of a cleavage of world-views.

## Introduction to the Problem: Ideology and Political Behavior

"When there is a question as to whether it is the people who do not understand what they are doing or we social scientist who do not understand people, I am inclined to think that *we* have fallen down." (Wildavsky 1987, 8)

SINCE THE FRENCH REVOLUTION it has been a custom in Western Europe and North America to classify ideologies, political movements, events, and the political parties along a single dimension: from political Left to political Right. Common political discourse and political journalism could hardly have been conceived without these labels. Political scientists have also found the left vs. right distinction theoretically and empirically relevant in different ways (e.g., Dalton 1988; Fuchs and Klingemann 1990; Huber and Inglehart 1995; Laponce 1981; Shikano and Pappi 2004). Other authors, however, see authoritarianism versus libertarianism as the main overarching ideological dimension characterizing the European political culture (Flanagan and Lee 2003). Furthermore, in order to clarify the ideological space within which existing parties and movements could be less ambiguously located many authors have suggested the introduction of additional dimensions. For example, Dalton (1988) proposed orthogonal dimensions of the *Old* and *New* Left and Right, for better understanding of different political actors. Kitschelt (1994, 1995b) views political space in Western Europe divided along two dimensions: state socialism vs. laissez faire, and libertarianism vs. authoritarianism, though he also sees some 'inherent affinity' between the left and libertarian poles.

The disparities in multi-dimensional theoretical models of ideologies and reported research findings are complemented by a disciplinary divide between political science and social psychology. While social psychologists excelled in expanding the number of supposedly basic attitudinal dimensions, they never doubted that citizens actually possess organized attitudes. Political scientists, on the other hand, spend considerable time discussing not only whether mass political attitudes are structured along ideological lines and whether they are relevant for predicting behavior, but even whether

anything like 'mass political attitudes' actually exists or is just an artifact of methodology (Converse 1964; Nie and Andersen 1974; Sullivan, Pierson and Marcus 1978; Zaller 1992). The fact remains, however, that ideology and references to ideologies permeate even the very perception of social and political world. Understanding of the role of ideology at micro and macro levels is thus a paramount task for political science.

Conceptualization and operationalization of ideology in terms of the abstract left-right schema, based on the assumption of "the comparability, continuity, and relevance of the left-right dimension" (Kim and Fording 2001), has been very fruitful and indispensable for research and theory. Yet, there is mounting evidence that a one-dimensional description of ideological differences is incomplete and that the meaning or the content of the left-right labels tends to change over times and spaces. Despite the many doubts concerning citizens' ability to think ideologically, scholarly literature on the dimensionality of socio-political attitudes provides one-dimensional models (e.g., Wilson 1973a), various versions of two-dimensional models (e.g., Eysenck 1954; Kerlinger 1984; Middendorp 1992; Shikano and Pappi 2004), three dimensional (Eysenck 1975), four dimensional (e.g., Heaven 1992), and even nine-dimensional models (Sidanius and Ekehammar 1980). Although for comparative purposes one uniform dimension might indeed be preferable (Budge and Bara 2001), in cases when theoretical problems demand to place emphasis on the accuracy of representation and the logic of attitude structuration, as well as on understanding the specific case in question, the approach that allows multidimensional structure of ideology is preferable. The present research aims at contributing to this wide-ranging debate on the structure of mass attitudes, through both development of more comprehensive theoretical framework, and through applying more pertinent methodological solutions compared to the existing scholarship.

Structure of ideology/attitudes in this framework refers to the relationships between attitudes toward various social and political objects, including specific issue positions and policy preferences, held by individuals in a certain population. According to Gabel and Anderson, "Fundamental to this approach is the assumption that policy positions are structured by underlying ideological dimensions that account for covariation in these positions. These ideological dimensions represent the structure of

political discourse, representing a linguistic shorthand for political communication and competition" (2002, 896).

The major questions addressed in this dissertation are: What are the main dimensions of political attitudes? How many dimensions exist? How crystallized are they? How are they related to one another? How are they related to socio-demographic differences, socio-psychological dispositions, and party preferences? In order to address these questions one would need a comprehensive survey data that include a wide selection of attitudinal items and country-cases with different social and political contexts and historical backgrounds. The existing comparative databases typically include a narrow selection of items and therefore are unsuitable for more detailed analysis of attitude organization. The remaining possibility is to address these research questions on the basis of detailed study of individual country-cases. Comparative character of research would be then involved in the research design and interpretation on findings rather than in strict quantitative comparisons. The survey I organized in Serbia was specifically designed to respond to the raised questions. Thus, in addition to addressing the general questions about the organization of political attitudes the present research is useful for better and deeper understanding of Serbian politics, especially concerning the sources of the popular support for the authoritarian leadership.

### Ideology as an object of research

The research on the dimensionality of socio-political attitudes has gone a long way since the early attempts of Thurstone (1934) and Ferguson (1939, 1940), and later Converse's (1964) influential disqualification of citizens' ability to think about politics coherently. Increasingly, the debate developed not so much about the question whether mass political attitudes are organized, but how this organization could be best conceptualized, how it can be explained, in what ways it is related to different political contexts, and how it could help in explaining political behavior (cf. Middendorp 1991a; Moreno 1999). The issue of the character and number of ideological dimensions necessary to define a particular political space gave rise to a variety of empirical models of attitude organization, details of which are elaborated in chapters reviewing the existing literature. The disagreements among scholars and between theoretical models are based on different theoretical assumptions (or the lack

thereof), on methodological peculiarities and are exacerbated by the lack of communication across disciplines.

An even more fundamental source of controversy is the ambiguous nature of the units of analysis: the ideologies. The content of ideologies changes according to time and space.<sup>1</sup> The same label (socialism, conservatism, etc.) is applied to so different bodies of thought that one wonders whether something like “misnomer” can exist in this field. Even traditions that have distinct, well-specified origin borrow extensively from each other.

While interpreting attitude clusters as ideologies, researchers should always emphasize in what regard the cluster represents the specific ideology, admitting the tentative nature of the definition. The model emerging from this study is expected to be comparable to others. The intellectual currents associated with the main ideologies have never been limited to the several West European countries that gave birth to them, regardless of how different their local interpretations and adaptations might appear. Despite the many apparent differences, modern societies face similar internal structural problems, while domestic political actors have to take stands towards international issues as well, thus providing a basis of a cross-cultural similarity in many attitudinal and ideological dimensions. Globalization of the contemporary world certainly does not favor insulation of particular political spaces.

Notwithstanding the many factors favoring a degree of global similarity in the structure of ideology, it is clear that particular forms of attitudinal organization are embedded in social, cultural, and political contexts. Therefore, one should be careful to distinguish genuine specificities of a particular case from different manifestations of the same or comparable underlying processes and phenomena. Being explicit about the specific aspects of the general model that are compared across cases can only help

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<sup>1</sup> It has been often noted that political right or conservatism was initially opposed to the free-market doctrines, or that political left was more revolutionary between the two world wars than afterwards (Middendorp 1991a). Scholars studying the New Politics phenomenon noted that the left has been taking a more post-materialist outlook since the 1960s. In addition, it was noted that the public can become more ideologized in different time periods. Nie and Andersen (1974), for example, obtained evidence of more coherent political attitudes in the United States in politicized 1960s and 1970s comparing to Converse's findings for 1950s.

in making meaningful comparisons and thus enhance the advancement of knowledge. For example, on one level, post-communist cases might be specific in providing evidence of the association between political left and authoritarianism (e.g., Enyedi and Todosijević 2002; McFarland, Ageyev, and Djintcharadze 1996), yet on another level, the same evidence supports the general association between authoritarianism and psychological conservatism, or anti-democratic orientation more generally (cf. Altemeyer 1988, 1998).

### General conceptual framework

When the meaning of the basic terms is fiercely debated and when basic relationships are subject to temporal and cross-cultural variations, it is not surprising that existing theories and models reflect this variety. Yet, on the more general level, it is possible to find a certain common ground in the shape of a general conceptual framework that is applicable in comparative perspective. Explication of such a framework is particularly needed in this area characterized too often by proliferation of non-cumulative research findings (cf. Middendorp 1991b).

The present research begins with the hierarchical model of the organization of political attitudes. Such a framework is explicitly adopted by a number of scholars especially within the socio-psychological tradition (Eysenck 1954, 1975; Middendorp 1991a). Others implicitly build on similar models (e.g., Sniderman, Brody and Tetlock 1991). At the bottom of the attitudinal hierarchy are specific opinions and beliefs, often similar to individual items in attitude scales. Their measurement tends to be difficult due to unreliability and idiosyncrasy of individually held specific opinions. According to their semantic similarity or logical constraints, specific opinions tend to converge into slightly more general *habitual opinions* that can be also represented by individual items in a scale. Convergence of habitual opinions into more general attitudes is increasingly based on elite discourse or psychological functioning rather than on logical constraint, since they generally refer to several and different attitude objects. Finally, more general ideological dimensions consist of and are expressed in a number of relatively general attitudinal orientations, which are no longer bound together by semantic or logical connection, but rather by elite discourse and features of political culture or traditions, party

competition, or psychological functionality (Katz 1960), or their reference to common political values (Middendorp 1991a; Sniderman, Brody and Tetlock 1991).

I adopt Middendorp's definition of ideology as "A system of general ideas on man and society, centered around one or a few general values, which has manifested itself historically as a doctrine adhered to by some major groups and categories, and which expresses the interests of some important category e.g. a social class" (1991a, 60). At the same time, following the same author, it is important to clarify what is not implied by this definition. Namely, an ideology does not necessarily contain ideas that are "untrue, biased or incorrect", nor ideologies have to be consciously held; ideological thinking does not have to be seen as "dogmatic or rigid and fanatic, intolerant thinking", and finally, no special psychological 'functions' are implied by this definition of ideology (Middendorp 1991a, 60). In more operational terms, "a particular population [...] is capable of thinking ideologically to the extent that its ideas - in terms of operational forms of some particular ideological model - show a degree of interrelatedness - along one or a few dimensions - which can be meaningfully interpreted" (Middendorp 1991a, 60-61).

Hence, throughout the text, notion of 'the structure of socio-political attitudes' is treated as synonymous with the notion of 'structure of (mass) ideology', and used interchangeably. This is also broadly congruent with Converse's definition of a belief system "as a configuration of ideas and attitudes in which the elements are bound together by some form of constraint or functional interdependence" (1964, 207).

Referring back to the hierarchical model of political attitude organization, it is important to observe that on different levels of the hierarchy, different factors are relevant for covariation of the corresponding elements. Semantic similarity and logical constraints operate predominantly on the lower levels. Common psychological functionality, elite discourse, basic political values are more relevant for the structuration at higher levels. Moreno (1999), for example, sees the source of the most general ideological configuration in elite divisions and visibility of different elite fractions. Middendorp (1991a) attributes the strongest influence to the elite discourse and influential intellectual traditions, as well as to the general political values from which the main ideological streams are

derived. As will be shown in the subsequent chapters, scholars have elaborated the role of factors such as social structure, personality traits, culture, historic trajectories, and political parties.

The benefit of this approach is the possibility to discuss interactions of different general factors, including psychological characteristics relevant for individuals' relationships towards social and political objects, structure of political conflicts, political actors, and local traditions of ideological discourses. In this sense, the presently adopted approach to the relationship between politics and the individual is expected to reveal the interplay of micro and macro factors.

### ***The Problem of Individual Differences***

While the structure of ideology (higher levels in the hierarchy) may be explained by such general or systemic factors as social structure, elite discourse and divisions, party systems, and historical paths, scholars typically use a different set of factors to explain individual differences. Individual differences here refer, on the one hand, to differences between individuals in their position on particular ideological dimensions (e.g., person *a* is more libertarian than person *b*), and, on the other, to quantitative and qualitative differences in ideological structuration. Thus, for example, attitudes of more interested and involved citizens may be more constrained or better organized (e.g., elites are often found to be more ideologically consistent and articulated than the masses; Barton and Parsons 1977; Converse 1964; Jacoby 1991; Middendorp 1991a).<sup>2</sup>

In explaining individual differences, investigators typically rely on standard 'background' variables, such as age, education, occupation, rural versus urban residence, and occasionally income. The influence of these variables is commonly explained through rather vague references to the effects of socialization, or economic interests whether real or perceived.

For example, Gabel (1988) finds that those likely to benefit from European integration are those who support membership in EU, i.e. policy preferences are related to expected or experienced tangible benefits. Likewise, Kitschelt (1994) provides elaborate hypotheses about the influence of different

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<sup>2</sup> However, the latter aspect of individual differences is not addressed here.



occupational positions (or 'resource endowments' in connection with post-communist cases, Kitschelt 1992; Kitschelt, Dimitrov and Kanev 1995) onto certain key ideological orientations. However, when it comes to the statistical explanation of individual differences in positions on ideological dimensions, percentages of explained variance often do not reach two-digit figures (e.g., Evans and Whitefield 1998, 1029, Table 3; Rempel 1997, 203-4, Table 9.3).

The interest-based explanations are rivaled (though rarely contrasted) by psychology based explanations. Researchers in the socio-psychological tradition offer potentially universally applicable models, attempting to explain not only individual differences in ideological orientations, but more ambitiously, the entire ideological configuration. Thus, for example, Caprara, Barbaranelli and Zimbardo (1999) found in a large Italian sample that vote preference is better explained by personality (Big Five traits) than by standard explanatory variables such as gender, age, and education. Despite occasional slips of such attempts into simple over-psychologization, the introduction of concepts such as authoritarianism, or the 'need for cognitive closure' (Jost et al. 2003; Maltby and Price 1999) contributed significantly to the understanding of these questions.

In order to develop a comprehensive model of attitude organization, I build on the Middendorp's (1991a) model by including a particular dispositional construct, authoritarianism, into his somewhat mechanic and cognitivistic framework. Relying on the long tradition of research on psychological bases of ideological leaning (for a recent extensive overview, see Jost et al. 2003), I include authoritarianism as a key element in the model explaining individual differences.

The conceptualization of authoritarianism as a reified worldview (Gabennesch 1972; cf. Bojanović 2004) rather than as an original psychoanalytical construct (Adorno et al. 1950) is attractive for several reasons. Not only that authoritarianism can account for some aspects of the attitude structure by reference to common psychological functionality, but it seems an indispensable variable for explanation of individual differences, since it has repeatedly been shown as a strong predictor of general ideological orientations (e.g., Adorno et al. 1950, Altemeyer 1988; Bouchard et al. 2003; Duckitt and Fisher 2003; Todosijević 2005), as well as of specific ideological dimensions, such as

nationalism (e.g., Blank 2003; Enyedi, Erős and Fábíán 1997; Scheepers, Felling and Peters 1990; Todosijević 1999).

On the other side, authoritarianism is a construct that mediates the effect of background variables in those aspects of the latter that are not covered by traditionally presumed 'interests' of different social categories (cf. Gabennesch 1972). In this sense, authoritarianism conveys the effects of socialization. Finally, authoritarianism can reflect contemporaneous factors – especially through its well-established connection with social threat (Duckitt and Fisher 2003).

Thus, authoritarianism as an individual-level dispositional variable seems to be especially suitable not only for the purpose of the present research, but for analysis of political behavior generally, as well. This approach seems especially valuable in periods of transition from authoritarian rule towards more democratic regimes (cf. Moreno 1999), especially when the usual background variables show little direct relevance for the explanation of the main political oppositions (e.g., in Slovakia, see Krause 2004).

Through this multiple relevance, the current research seeks to contribute to the body of research on political preference formation and change. As it is clear from Druckman and Lupia's (2000) review of the research on political preference formation, the main current research programs are close to treating the bearer of political preferences as a tabula rasa. Cognitive processing of current or stored information, however, cannot exhaust all explanatory relevant factors. Thus, the current emphasis on psycho-social dispositions is intended to fill this gap.

### ***Understanding Political Action***

Describing how political attitudes are structured in a certain society and explaining individual difference thereof are important topics in their own right. The significance of such knowledge, however, vastly increases if it helps understanding political action. Thus, the third major aspect of the present research is to examine how political behavior, especially party preference, is related to the obtained attitudinal structure, and how these relationship change over time. It is not expected that all attitudinal dimensions will be politically relevant. In addition, political salience of specific ideological

dimensions is bound to change over time. To complicate the matter, even those attitudinal dimensions that differentiate parties do not necessarily explain political oppositions in the sense of *causing* political divisions. They might be 'side-effects' of some other more relevant differences (e.g., environmentalism might be a covariate of politicized status differences). Thus, the task is to "explore how political divides convert into competitive dimensions in party systems" (Kitschelt et al. 1999, 70).

As Moreno (1999, 76) rightly points out, specific issue dimensions or divisions or configuration may or may not be related to party preferences, and may cross-cut or reinforce socio-structural divisions. This is an example of reciprocal relationship where party system features both shape and are shaped by attitudinal dispositions of the public. Yet it is certainly expected that the main political divisions and conflicts will be reflected on the level of attitudinal dimensions - unless the operationalization is biased and unrepresentative. The causal direction is always problematic. However, there are certain theoretical guides that could be applied in order to establish potential causal priority. For example, psychological foundations of political attitudes may be seen as 'pre-political', and therefore causal in relation to attitudinal variables.

A chapter presenting the qualitative review of Serbian politics between 1990 and 2002 is intended to help in this regard, by bringing in the specific social and political context. The context of democratic transition, for example, calls for a deeper examination of the pro-democratic versus authoritarian political division (cf. Moreno 1999), and more specifically, a transitional cleavage of pro-communist versus liberal-democratic political divide (cf. Berglund, Ekman, and Aarebrot 2004). Likewise, given the role of nationalism and strength of nationalist mobilization, it is also reasonable to expect the strong role of nationalist ideological orientation. The relationship between these two ideological dimensions, namely pro-communist and nationalist orientations, and their role in differentiating political parties will be given special attention.

The utility of general ideological dimensions is not only in predicting vote preferences, but also in understanding and explaining positions of specific policy preferences vis-à-vis other issues and attitudes. Knowing ones ideological profile should help predicting ones position not only on familiar

issues, but also on newly formulated and politicized issues. Gabel and Anderson, in line with this, see ideological dimensions as “constraints on citizens’ policy positions” (2002, 896).

Another key factor that influences structuration of attitudes are political parties seen as active agents binding or separating various issues into coherent or opposed attitudinal dimensions (‘parties as combiners’, Enyedi 2003). Therefore, I discuss also the role of parties and their strategies and maneuvers as factors influencing the relationships between attitudinal dimensions.

In sum, the adopted approach can help in understanding individual political action, e.g. voting behavior, but also in understanding macro-political features, such as the structure of political oppositions or political cleavages (whether or not based on social divisions). The heuristic value of dimensions constructed in a hierarchical and inductive way must be higher than the explanations based on identification with the standard general ideological labels such as left-right or liberal-conservative. While the operationalization of ideological leanings in this latter way certainly shows that those labels can serve orientation and communication function (Pappi 1996; Todosijević 2004b), the meaning of these labels for the respondents often remains unclear. Hence, better understanding of political action at micro level can be achieved if the attention is paid to the content and meaning of the basic ideological cleavages/axes. The hypotheses about specific relationships between attitudinal structure and political behavior will be developed in subsequent chapters.

### ***Why New Democracies?***

'New democracies' of Eastern Europe provide an attractive ground for the discovery of non-standard ideological configurations. On the one side, these countries are, in the global perspective, relatively close to the 'West' in terms of cultural and social features, and in their exposure to the main ideological currents and intellectual traditions inspiring them. The most important elements here seem to be relatively educated public in the region, and more or less extended pre-communist experiences with ideologically differentiated political pluralism. Yet the unique differentiating experience of a half a century of the communist monopoly over political discourse must have left its mark on the way citizens organize and express their basic political views, as argued by a number of authors (e.g.,

Berglund, Ekman, and Aarebrot 2004; Evans and Whitefield 1993; Kitschelt 1992, 1994; Kitschelt et al. 1999). The possibility to study the influence of different factors from the initial stages of democratic politics is especially attractive because factors such as party loyalties or group encapsulation are still weak and thus leave more room for the play of individual attitudinal orientations.

Recent studies have demonstrated that inclusion of ideological orientations into explanatory framework improves our understanding of political processes in countries in question, as well as the similarities and differences between different post-communist countries (Kitschelt et al. 1999; Berglund, Ekman, and Aarebrot 2004). While a great advantage of some of the studies is their comparative character (e.g., Kitschelt et al. 1999), operationalization of ideological orientations has often served the goal of differentiating political parties, explaining voting behavior, or other issues related to the party system formation and change. Even those studies which are focused on the structure of ideology are typically limited by the restricted pool of indicators used for defining ideological dimensions, and the lack of the diachronic perspective (i.e., whether and how the relationships between issues, ideological dimensions, and political preferences change over time) (e.g., Evans and Whitefield 1993, 1995; Enyedi and Todosijević 2003; Moreno 1999).

In developing models that would accommodate varieties among the post-communist cases, researchers have taken into account factors such as the presence of ethnic cleavages, degree of economic development, and the status of the state (Evans and Whitefield 1993, 1995), and applied concepts such as path-dependency (Kitschelt et al. 1999). Inclusion of such macro social and historical factors is undoubtedly a very significant contribution but it represents only a part of the picture concerning the structure and function of ideological orientations. In order to reach more comprehensive explanations of the structure of ideology as well as to examine its explanatory utility more completely, we need detailed case studies that can provide insight into the interplay of relevant micro and macro factors.

## The case of Serbia

In addition to the above outlined general theoretical problem, an equally important task undertaken in the present research is to provide insight into Serbian politics – to help explain particular structuration of political oppositions that characterized the first dozen years following the collapse of communism. Notwithstanding the importance of the analytical elements of this research, the value of the descriptive aspect surpasses that of typical case studies. The often encountered simplistic image of the Serbian politics as an epic struggle between good and evil has its roots, among other factors, in the conspicuous absence of serious academic investigation into the political processes in this country. Tucker's (2002) review, for example, shows that Yugoslavia/Serbia is among the least studied post-communist countries in terms of voting and elections. In his database of articles on voting and election studies in all post-communist countries published in sixteen leading journals, there was only one article that included Serbia/Yugoslavia. Only the former Soviet republics in the Caucasus and Central Asia are less studied.

The particularly painful transition makes Serbia unique, but the integration of this case into the general scholarship on post-communist politics is nevertheless both necessary and feasible. The country experienced a number of competitive elections, which, though neither fair nor completely free, basically reflected the political preferences of the citizens.<sup>3</sup> Academic studies and public opinion surveys have been carried out regularly, generally at an appropriate professional level. These two kinds of sources of information provide researchers with sufficient data for assessing the profile of the main political blocs. The present study intends in part to fill this gap of knowledge about Serbia, and to provide a much needed counterbalance to all too often encountered 'explanations' based exclusively on the personality of Slobodan Milošević.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Although none of the elections in the 1990s could be called fair nor completely free, little evidence of overt electoral fraud was found (Lučić 2002).

<sup>4</sup> Consider, for example, the following argument: “the major problem, the cancer at the heart of Balkan affairs which has distorted and radicalized the politics not only of its own people, but also of all the neighbouring states with which it alone has been in conflict, is the regime of Slobodan Milosevic.” (Kearns 1999, 23; see also

Based on the prevailing literature about Serbia, one would expect a scene where charismatic and populist leaders are the dominant actors. And indeed, most parties in Serbia are better recognized for their leaders than for their political programs. Among literally hundreds of parties that tested their luck over the last dozen years, responsible programmatic parties have certainly been a rarity. I argue, however, that there has been a system in this apparent political chaos. The political system – but not the society at large – did display some features of stability. The fact that it took ten years for the first crucial political change to materialize testifies to the underlying political stability, which kept producing a party system with few electorally relevant actors.

The present research will help explain the fact that the socialists' rule enjoyed widespread (if not always majority) public support during 1990s, despite the extreme economic hardships and escalating conflict with virtually the entire world. The general hypothesis is that the observed political immobilism was an expression of a particularly deep political divide based on different socio-structural categories and different values and world-views.

### ***Relevance of the Main Research Problem***

While at the first glance the problem of dimensionality of mass political attitudes may seem of a purely descriptive importance, it actually has substantial theoretical and practical weight (cf. Middendorp 1978, 1991a,b). Ideological differences are commonly assumed to be primary movers of political phenomena, and we should remember that the very definition of 'interest' is embedded into a broader ideological framework.

More concretely, however, the main research problem concerns, on the one side, the *existence* and the *role* of ideologies in political reasoning and behavior of citizens. On the other side, proper conceptualization and measurement of ideological orientations can be embedded into the nomological

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Pappas 2005). Arguments based on the heritage of the ancient times are not less frequent nor less enlightening (e.g., Anzulovic 1999; Cohen 2002).

network of theories of political behavior, and thereby demonstrate its potential heuristic value and ability to integrate various separate research fields (cf. Middendorp 1978, 1991a).

The main integrating assumption is that various determinants of political belief and behavior, e.g., psychological dispositions, social structural factors, political and cultural context, in the final instance exercise their influence through individual (un)consciousness, which at the (observable) surface manifests itself in political attitudes and preferences for general ideological orientations. Hence, the political attitudes may be seen as a crux where the interplay of different factors may be detected. Operationalization of ideological dimensions is methodologically based on the *relationships* between specific attitudes that are *generalizable* from the uniformities in the opinions and behavior of many individuals. Hence, because the thesis is not a study of attitude organization and function *within* individuals, the emerging structure is expected to reflect common determining factors, whether psychological universalities or the broadest political and social factors (cf. Kerlinger 1984; Middendorp 1991a,b). In this sense, the research also aims at helping to bridge the gap between micro and macro level processes (and theories, of course), the gap that is pervading contemporary social sciences (cf. Mouzelis 1995).

This reasoning can be illustrated by the following very simplified example of the possible chain of relationships. In interaction with individual-psychological processes, broader cultural and more specific social factors may favor development of the reified, authoritarian world-view (cf. Gabennesch 1972; Grendstad 2003; Wildavsky 1987) among certain social categories. In periods of social and political upheaval and change, these individual-level dispositions may provide the basic underpinning of political divisions. It is well documented, for example, that social threat tends to activate authoritarian dispositions and their politicization (e.g., Doty, Peterson, and Winter 1991; Duckitt and Fisher 2003; Feldman and Stenner 1997). Thus, on the level of ideological orientations, one would expect convergence of, for example, anti-democratic attitudes, proneness to prejudice and nationalism, preference for (pseudo)conservative orientation into a more general opposition between authoritarian and pro-democratic orientations. When it comes to political behavior, this predisposition should incline an individual to support authoritarian parties and leaders. In the existing scholarship,



relationships between elements in this hypothetical chain are usually dealt with in isolation. The needed process of integration can be helped through giving a more prominent place to individual political attitudes like in the present research.

The present study does not examine the connection between philosophical foundations of ideologies, in particular their roots in more general political values, and their manifestation in specific attitudes and orientations. A number of authors, especially Middendorp provided insightful analysis of these issues in a series of studies (e.g., 1978, 1991a,b). Therefore, it does not seem fruitful to go down this path again. Moreover, the connection between abstract values and concrete attitudes still remains rather ambiguous in terms of causality and general heuristic value (e.g., Hechter, Kim and Baer 2005).<sup>5</sup> Middendorp (1991a) himself does not claim that specific attitudinal elements that converge into a broader 'philosophical' dimensions are arrived at by deductive reasoning of respondents starting from specific very general value orientations. In his view, the ultimate source of attitudinal convergence is elite discourse.

Although various elements of the general model have been examined by various authors, analyses of more complete and complex models have been rare (apart from Middendorp 1991a). In literature dealing with political preferences especially, the role of individual-dispositional factors has been often neglected. Hence, one of the aims is to expand the knowledge of the role of psychological sources of ideological constraint, or, in other words, to expand the commonly utilized explanatory framework. Drawing on David Katz's (1960) seminal elaboration of the attitude functions, I pursue the argument that common functionality might be one of the elements that binds various logically unrelated specific attitudes together. This is accomplished by introducing an individual-dispositional variable into the conceptual framework, represented by authoritarianism. This helps to understand the attitude structure - why logically unrelated attitudes covary. At the same time it is relevant for understanding individual

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<sup>5</sup> An important methodological obstacle in measuring general values is that "respondents often provide little variance with respect to discriminating among values" (Hitlin and Piliavin 2004). Enyedi and Todosijević (2003), for example obtained that virtually all Hungarian respondents endorse values such as 'freedom', or 'order'.

differences in ideological orientation, and helps bridge the gap between so-called background variables and political preferences.

### ***General Methodological Approach***

The present research is not organized in the style of the hypothetico-deductive research, but neither is it purely an inductive enterprise. Rather, it follows Cattell's (e.g., Nesselroade and Cattell 1988) notion of the inductive-hypothetico-deductive spiral (IHD model) as a model of scientific development, both in relation to the existing research, and in its internal structure.<sup>6</sup> Namely, in this view, scientific research is conceived as a never-ending spiral, consisting of both inductive and hypothetico-deductive aspects that follow one another. On the one hand, the present research can be seen as testing the *plausibility* of the existing models of the structure of mass ideology to the specific case in point. However, since the study will be based on different attitude scales, samples and analytic techniques, it cannot be seen as a strict test of the hypotheses derived from the existing literature. Hypotheses pertaining to the later phases of the research depend on the results of the inductive, exploratory 'type-1' analysis, namely operational definition of ideological dimensions (see also Middendorp 1991b; Faber and Scheper 2003).

One of the problems that plagued this research field, especially concerning the comparative perspective, has been the difficulty in overcoming cross-cultural differences and changes over time. Items relevant for operationalizing particular ideological facets can be highly context-specific.<sup>7</sup> For example, early western studies contained references to 'pajama parties' or 'Sunday observance'. The difficulty is that in order to preserve 'functional equivalence' of ideological indicators, one has to develop contextualized indicators that would be comparable on a higher level of abstraction. Yet this

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<sup>6</sup> It is also close to some of the recent challenges to the norm of hypothetico-deductive model, such as Gorski (2004). According to his Constructive Realist Model, "science seeks to reveal the underlying structures of the world" (Ibid., 15). And, "explanations are constructed through a *work of interpretation, in which theoretical terms are used to construct causal models of social processes*" (Ibid., 19, italics in original).

makes direct quantitative comparisons nearly impossible - thereby the lack thereof as well as of developed general theories applicable across political-historical contexts that could provide a background for more elegant hypothetico-deductive approach.<sup>8</sup>

For the present purpose, the most appropriate methodological strategy is to start with a rather broad set of items or specific attitudes, and then arrive at ideological configuration relevant for the specific case in point. It is important that relevant dimensions or facets of ideology are not omitted if the representative picture is to be obtained.

One of the improvements of the present research relative to existing scholarship concerns this issue. The main data set utilized in the present research, based on a 2002 survey in Serbia, includes attitudinal scales created with the aim of capturing the key general ideological dimensions in their contemporary manifestation and with reference to local conditions. Out of more than 70 items, there are some that are conceived as indicators of general ideological dimensions, applicable across contexts, for example, concerning the value of free enterprise, or the proper role of political authority. On the other side, a number of items contain elements specific for the Serbian context, such as particular expressions of the nationalist attitude or the attitude towards the communist past.

In general, the goal is to strike a useful balance between comparability and generalizability on the one side, and descriptive accuracy or 'faithfulness' to the 'true' structure of the underlying attitudes on the other (cf. Budge and Bara 2001, 58-62). Thus, the present research attempts to combine the predominant 'bottom-up' type with the 'deductive' or 'top-down' approach of Kerlinger (1984) and Middendorp (1978, 1991a).<sup>9</sup> On the one hand there are items that could be deductively related to a

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<sup>7</sup> In fact, as Faber and Scheper (2003) argue, all aspects of social science are highly context-specific, from the phase of problem formulation to theory evaluation.

<sup>8</sup> For example, the fact that with increasing cultural distance decreased constraint in Wilson's operationalization of conservatism (Walkey, Katz, and Green 1990; Green et al. 1988) could be seen as evidence about the cultural sensitivity of the particular attitude scale, or of the construct of conservatism, as well of both.

<sup>9</sup> The bottom-up approach has generally dominated social-psychological approaches. Researchers often start from arbitrarily selected set of items assuming their 'representativeness' of the realm of political discourse, and

more general or ‘philosophical’ ideological level (cf. Middendorp 1991a), while on the other, there are items thought to be relevant politically but with non-obvious or non-unique theoretical connections with more general ideologies.

The empirical analysis will proceed in several steps. The first deals with the factor-analytic examination of the structure of political attitudes, and interpretation of the extracted factors.<sup>10</sup> This part of the analysis is primarily based on an original survey of a random sample of Belgrade residents, conducted in the spring of 2002. Items that on the basis of (a) initial factor analysis, and (b) theoretical investigation belong to a certain attitudinal dimension, are scaled onto a first principal component that represents the underlying theoretical construct, or latent dimension. Next, second-order factor analysis is utilized to reduce the constructed narrower attitudinal dimensions onto a smaller number of ideological orientations. The reason why this strategy is favored to the application of factor analysis onto individual items lies in the low reliability of single items, and the consequent tendency that due to their possible multiple significant loadings they occasionally “miss” their theoretically relevant factors.

This methodological approach ensures solid empirical grounding for theoretical concepts such as ideological orientations. Given the context-dependent nature of social science theoretical concepts, according to Faber and Schepers it is important that “the meaning given to a theoretical concept becomes identical to its operationalization in terms of observable phenomena” (2003, 140).

The second step will focus on the examination of the explanatory role of relevant variables, such as socio-economic background, authoritarianism, and ideological self-identification. The purpose is to both enhance the interpretation of ideological dimensions and to provide basis for explanation of individual differences. Drawing on social psychology literature, the present research includes two of

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then the obtained dimensions are interpreted in ideological terms (e.g., Eysenck 1954, 1975; Wilson 1973a). The two approaches, i.e., bottom-up and top-down, are called by Ray (1973) ‘factorial’ and ‘conceptual’, respectively.

<sup>10</sup> "Factor analysis provides the most straight-forward method to determine the clustering of issues around underlying not directly observed variables or dimensions." (Kitschelt et al. 1999, 219).

the most often used concepts that are claimed to be relevant for political preferences and behavior: authoritarianism (e.g., Adorno et al. 1950; Altemeyer 1981, 1988; Feldman 2003), and Social Dominance Orientation (Pratto et al. 1994; Sidanius and Pratto 1999).

No analysis of the ideological dimensions can be considered complete unless its utility for discriminating support for political parties is examined. At the same time, the knowledge of how party preferences are related with the latent ideological dimensions throws additional light on their meaning. Hence, the crucial step is the analysis of the relationship between ideological dimensions and party preferences. In order to obtain a broader picture about possible causal chains, connecting background variables and political preferences, thought authoritarianism and ideological orientation, the main part of the analysis ends with causal modeling of party preferences.

Finally, thanks to the availability of two elections studies, from 1990 and 1996, that contain the needed variables, it is possible to follow the changes in the interrelationships between some of the key ideological dimensions over the examined time period. More specifically, it enables following the 'evolution' (Carmines and Stimson 1989) of the relationships between nationalist and pro-socialist orientations, as well as their relationships with party preferences.

By proposing a more comprehensive theoretical framework, by including a diachronic perspective, and offering more rigorous and innovative methodological solutions, the proposed research will substantively contribute to the existing scholarship. In addition to these general theoretical problems, an equally important aim is to better understand Serbian politics, without such notions as the exotic 'Balkan character', but rather within a broadly applicable conceptual and theoretical framework.

### ***The Problem – A Recapitulation***

The present research aims at contributing to the debate on the structure of political attitudes in post-communist societies. The research concentrates on the examination of the structure of mass ideology in Serbia by addressing three related problems:

1. The first problem is mainly descriptive and taxonomic. It concerns the question of whether political attitudes are organized and how. It has been claimed that ideologies either belong to the past, or that

they are irrelevant for political reasoning and behavior of ordinary citizens. Advocates of the ‘end of ideology’ thesis have claimed that ideology “had come to a dead end” (Bell 1960, 370-3). Dealing more with individual-level analysis, Converse (e.g., 1964, 1970) concluded that the general public’s political attitudes are unstable, disorganized, inconsistent, and hence non-ideological.<sup>11</sup> On the other side, some authors contend not only that individual-level political attitudes exhibit a considerable degree of coherence and structure (if adequately measured) but also that they are generally organized along familiar ideological lines (e.g., Kerlinger 1984; Middendorp 1992, 1991, 1978; Shikano and Pappi 2004).

However, even scholars who believe that political attitudes are organized disagree on how this organization is best conceived. The views range from, for example, one-dimensional models where all specific attitudes are seen as reflecting one basic underlying attitudinal dimension (e.g., conservatism dimension in the model of Wilson 1973a), to multi-dimensional models where related attitudes are grouped together in a number of specific factors, which are themselves unrelated (e.g., nine-dimensional model of Sidanius and Ekehammar 1980).

In line with existing models (Eysenck 1954, 1975; Middendorp 1991a), it is hypothesized that attitudes are organized hierarchically - the first or lowest level on the principle of semantic similarity (similar to Converse's logical constraints). Higher levels of organization would be related to the underlying values. Yet, since values and specific attitudes are not related in unique way, this connection should be moderated by elite discourse (the third source of constraint according to Converse), psychological functionality, as well as dynamics of political actors. These, and related hypotheses, are presented in more elaborate form after the presentation of the relevant research.

2. The second major issue pertains to the ‘*causal*’ explanation of the obtained attitudinal structure. It includes two related sub-problems.

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<sup>11</sup> See, for example, Zaller (1992) for more contemporary presentation of this view.

A. Explanation of the obtained structure *per se*, i.e., the number and content of the ideological dimensions. For example, it has been attempted to explain the general left-right or liberalism-conservatism dimension by referring to the classical socio-economic cleavage (e.g., Eysenck 1954; Knutsen 1995a,b), but also as reflecting basic personality structure (e.g., Wilson 1973b), or Judeo-Christian cultural heritage (e.g., Walkey, Katz, and Green 1990). This problem roughly corresponds to Converse's (1964, 1970) concept of attitude 'constraints', which in his view can be logical, psychological, or reflecting the elite discourse. Additionally, the explanation can include macro political factors and psychological variables.

B. Explanation of individual and group differences in location on the dimensions. The most common practice is examination of socio-demographic determinants (e.g., Himmelweit et al. 1981). For example, Middendorp (1992) examines the role of variables like age, education, income, class, and religion. Adorno et al (1950) and McClosky (1958) initiated another approach, common in the socio-psychological literature, which explains differential attraction to competing ideologies by reference to personality traits. Wilson (1973b), for example, proposed that the psychological basis of conservatism is 'fear of uncertainty'. Eysenck's (1954) model contains both approaches. Position in the socio-economic stratification, in his view, determines one's R (radicalism-conservatism) score, while personality trait of extraversion predisposes one for more or less tough-tender minded attitudes (T scale score).

3. The third level of analysis concerns the explanatory value of the adopted theoretical and methodological approach. Findings about the structure of political attitudes should significantly contribute to our understanding of relevant theoretical and empirical problems. This task can be performed primarily by systematically relating the operationally defined concepts of ideological dimensions to the set of relevant independent (e.g., socio-demographic background, personality traits) and dependent variables (e.g., political action).

For example, the connection between ideology and political behavior is most often examined via *ideological self-identification*. The volume of the literature is quite large, and findings generally suggest that ideological self-identification is usually more relevant for party preferences than stands

on specific issues. However, the meaning of the left-right self-placement from the perspective of voters is often unexplained and there seems to be no adequate explanatory account of individual differences in it since socio-demographic variables explain modest amount of variance. Hence, it could be hypothesized that operationalized ideological dimensions can *explain* both the meaning of the left-right self-placement and individual differences in party preferences. In addition, if more than one ideological dimension is proved to be needed, then their measurement can increase the ability to predict voting behavior (e.g., Middendorp 1992, 1989). Possible discrepancies between the ideological level and political divisions might indicate opportunities for parties to politicize new issues and dimensions (cf. Gabel and Anderson 2002).

The broad relevance of the knowledge about how citizens' attitudes are organized is well expressed by Gabel and Anderson, who argue that "if [...] an ideological structure exists, this represents the political structure of political discourse. If such a structure does not exist, political competition and communication may be inefficient at best and impossibly complicated at worst." (Gabel and Anderson 2002, 896). In Middendorp's terminology, problems 1. and 2. belong to the 'Type-1' analysis, namely definition of theoretical constructs and their operationalization, while problem 3. represents the 'Type-2' analysis, namely "theory construction by means of systematic exploration" of the relevant relationships (1978, 24-30; 1991b).



# **Social Psychological Research on the Structure of Socio-Political Attitudes**

There are three main theories or models of the structure of social attitudes in contemporary social-psychology literature: Eysenck's, Wilson's and Kerlinger's. Besides many important differences between these theories, common for all of them is that they operate with terms Conservatism and Liberalism (or Radicalism), which roughly correspond to the traditional Left-Right political division. It indicates the prominence of that concept or dimension for discriminating political and social attitudes, at least in countries where their studies were conducted. Almost all of the studies on which these theories are based were conducted in Western Europe, Australia, and North America. Furthermore, as it will be later presented in more detail, there is evidence that when models are tested in culturally different countries, results have been less supportive. Comparable studies in socialist or former-socialist countries are still rare (for an example see Enyedi and Todosijević 2003).

The following literature review summarizes the available information and findings and outlines the main theories in the field of the studies of the structure of social attitudes. *Structure* of attitudes in this framework refers to the relationships between attitudes toward various objects, held by individuals in a certain population, not to the relationships between components (i.e., cognitive, emotional and behavioral) of single attitudes within individuals. This literature typically refers to *social* attitudes rather than explicitly to ideologies or political attitudes. Attitudes are regarded as *social* when they refer to objects which have "shared general societal relevance in economic, political, religious, educational, ethnic, and other social areas" (Kerlinger, Middendorp, and Amon 1976, 267). When adjective 'political' is included, that often means that items referring to specific policy issues are included into the analysis (e.g., Durrheim and Foster 1995).

The review is divided in six parts: 1) brief presentation of the basic paradigm of the research field, 2) early studies, 3) Two-dimensional model of Hans Eysenck, 4) Wilson's theory of Conservatism as unidimensional and bipolar dimension, 5) Kerlinger's Dualistic theory, and 6) Outliers. The three aforementioned authors conducted a large number of studies, and, what is more important, they

provided methodological and theoretical frameworks within which many other authors have done their own research. From the following presentation it is evident that these three authors and their theories actually shaped the field of the studies of the structure of social attitudes. All other reviewed authors either were not explicitly interested in the structure of general social attitudes or they conducted smaller number and less systematic studies, without developing any specific and elaborated theory. Because the differences in the proposed models of attitude structure are often due to differently applied methodologies, the emphasis is placed on methodological properties of the reviewed studies.

### ***The Basic Paradigm***

Individuals have more or less organized and integrated attitudes toward various objects, material or symbolic. Normally it is not expected, though some might find it understandable, that someone who has a very negative attitude toward, for example, premarital sex has very positive attitude toward striptease bars. Such observations, namely that different attitudes tend to correlate with each other, led to the investigation of so called primary, latent, or basic attitudes, which could explain the correlation between many concrete or manifest attitudes.

The basic paradigm of this approach is well represented by the Eysenck's (1954; Eysenck and Wilson 1978) studies of social attitudes<sup>12</sup>. In this view, attitudes are hierarchically organized in four levels, as in the following figure:

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<sup>12</sup> See also Kerlinger, 1984, 74.

- 4        IDEOLOGY        (Conservatism)
- 3        ATTITUDES        (Anti-Semitic)
- 2        HABITUAL OPINIONS    (“Jews are inferior.”)
- 1        SPECIFIC OPINIONS    (“Finkelstein is a dirty Jew!”)

(From: Dator 1969, 74).

At the bottom level is a large number of *specific opinions*, “which are not related in any way to other opinions, which are not in any way characteristic of a person who makes them, and which are not reproducible” (Eysenck 1954, 111). On the second level are *habitual opinions*, which are reproducible and more constant features of a certain individual. They are expressed through different specific opinions. The first two levels are usually represented by various items in attitude questionnaires. *Attitude* is built of a certain number of related habitual opinions. For example, an antisemitic attitude consists of and is expressed through a number of negative opinions about Jews. In research, this level is represented by the total score on a certain attitude scale or by the primary factors emerging from factor analyses of attitude scales. Attitudes at this level usually are not independent of each other; they tend to correlate, forming the fourth level - *ideologies*. For example, attitudes like anti-Semitism, ethnocentrism, patriotism, pro-religious attitudes and strict up-bringing of children form the Conservative ideology (*Ibid.* 112-3).

Ideologies, or basic social attitudes are usually defined through factor analysis and correspond to second-order factors. Thus, the investigation of the structure of social attitudes in this framework means investigating how various specific and habitual opinions are related, building different attitudes, and how attitudes are related between themselves creating different ideologies or basic social attitudes.

This "bottom-up" or empiricist model is widely, though not always explicitly, adopted among social psychologists. It is occasionally implied that such hierarchical organization suggests that entities at higher levels are abstractions or even artifacts created by scholars through specific methodological

tools. Thus they lack 'real' existence in the way specific attitudes have. However, the prominent scholars in the field argue for the primacy of the general ideological dimensions, which are seen as latent factors, shaping the manifest specific opinions (e.g., Eysenck 1954). As it will be shown, the substance to these general factors is often given in terms of underlying personality features, such as tough-mindedness (Eysenck 1954) or fear of uncertainty (Wilson 1973b).

The other most often used model assigns the primary integrative role to one or several general values. Here, more specific ideological dimensions and opinions are seen as derived from general values (e.g., Rokeach 1973; Maio et al. 2003). Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock (1991) argue for a model where general values, i.e. ideology, determines (causally) intermediate values, which then determine specific policy attitudes. The idea can be illustrated by the following sequence: conservatism - general economic attitudes - health policy attitudes. The main point relevant here is their belief that 'deep' values, that is general ideology, is an important source of attitude constraint.

In many respects this view is similar to Middendorp's theory (1991a), which in much more elaborated way assigns the prominent role to general political values. His model will be presented in more details later, but for the time being, it is sufficient to say that the 'theoretical' source of general conservative ideology can be found in two general values applied to their respective domains: equality to socio-economic and freedom to politico-cultural domain (1991, 113). In his words, "the interrelatedness of various ideas – expressed by statements about reality – comes about through the common reference of these ideas to one or a few underlying values" (Middendorp 1991a, 60-61, italics in original). However, Middendorp does not assume that each individual derives specific attitudes from general values on her own nor that ideologies have to be consciously held.

### ***Early Studies***

Thurstone (1934) and Ferguson (1939) were among the first to use factor analysis in order to determine the structure of basic social attitudes. The attempts were inspired by the studies of the structure of intellectual abilities. At that time, possible research designs were limited by the unavailability of fast and powerful computers. Thus, factor analysis was applied not on correlations

between scale items, but rather on correlations between scores on scales for measurement of various specific attitudes. Table 1 summarizes the main methodological features and findings of Thurstone (1934) and Ferguson (1939, 1940, 1942, 1973).

**Table 1 Early studies: basic methodological features and results**

AUTHOR /YEAR	SAMPLE	ATTITUDE SCALES/ITEMS	FACTOR ANALYSIS METHOD	RESULTS
Thurstone (1934)	N=380, students, USA; ad hoc	11 scales; Equal-appearing-interval scale type; scoring: mean on each scale	Centroid extraction method; Orthogonal/graphic rotation	1. Radicalism-Conservatism; 2. Nationalism-internationalism
Ferguson (1939)	N=185; students, USA; ad hoc	10 scales, each of 20 items; Equal-appearing-interval scale type (Thurstone); scoring: mean on each scale	Centroid extraction; 2 significant factors; graphic/orthogonal rotation (excluded not in accordance with the two basic dimensions).	1. Religionism; 2. Humanitarianism
Ferguson (1940)	N=144; reanalysis: N=790 students; USA; ad hoc	2 scales of 38 items each, on the bases of the above results	Same methods as above	Previous two factors confirmed
Ferguson (1942)	Reanalysis of data from 1939	Same methodology, previously excluded scales included in analysis	Same methods as above	Earlier two factors confirmed; added 3. Nationalism
Ferguson (1973)	N=1471 students; ad hoc	the same 10 tests as in 1939	Centroid 3 factors (G-K crit.) graphic/orthogonal and oblique	1. Religion 2. Humanitarianism 3. Nationalism

Ferguson began his analysis with 10 scales for the measurement of attitudes toward war, reality of God, patriotism, treatment of criminals, capital punishment, censorship, evolution, birth control, law, and communism (Ferguson 1939). The first factor, *Religionism*, was defined as the acceptance of God's reality and negative attitude toward evolution and birth control. The orthogonal factor of *Humanitarianism* was defined by the attitudes toward the treatment of criminals, capital punishment and war. Later, he included the factor of *Nationalism* defined by positive attitudes toward law, patriotism, censorship and by negative attitude toward communism. His reanalysis in 1973 confirmed the stability of factors during time, with the suggestion that factors 1 and 3 could be collapsed into one dimension - Eysenck's *Tender-mindedness - Tough-mindedness*.

Thurstone's first factor, radicalism versus conservatism, should also be described, because it is representative of major factors in many subsequent models, though usually labeled as conservatism versus liberalism in the US context. The *Radicalism* pole was defined by positive evaluation of evolution theory, birth control, easy divorce and communism (and with higher IQ), while the *Conservative* pole was defined by a positive evaluation of religion, patriotism, Prohibition and Sunday observance (Thurstone 1934).

None of the authors provided more detailed justification for the inclusion of a particular set of attitudes for analysis. It seems that they relied on common sense to include attitudes that are representative for the whole complexity of relevant social attitudes in a particular context. However, this point is crucial regarding the purpose of the studies. Final factors can only be defined by the variables entered in the analysis. Hence, the obtained results should be interpreted as the structure of the *analyzed* attitudes, not as the structure of *general* socio-political attitudes, but this remark applies to all studies.

### ***The Two-dimensional Model of Hans Eysenck***

Eysenck's model of the structure of social attitudes is directly connected to the previously presented studies. His first study (in 1944) is partly a reanalysis of the Thurstone and Ferguson's results and partly based on his original data. A rather complete overview of Eysenck's studies, and studies by other authors directly related to his model, are presented in Table 2.

In Eysenck's model, there are two basic social attitudes: Conservatism *vs.* Radicalism (R-factor), and Tender-mindedness *vs.* Tough-mindedness (T-factor). Radical pole is defined, for example, as positive evaluation of evolution theory, strikes, welfare state, mixed marriages, student protests, law reform, women's liberation, United Nations, nudist camps, pop-music, modern art, immigration, abolishing private property, and rejection of patriotism (Eysenck 1954, 1976; Eysenck and Wilson 1978). The conservative pole is characterized by positive attitudes toward white superiority, empire building, Sunday observance, birching, death penalty, antisemitism, and opposition to nationalization of property, birth control, etc. (*Ibid.*). Tender-mindedness is defined by items such as moral training,

inborn conscience, Bible truth, chastity, self-denial, pacifism, anti-discrimination, being against the death penalty, and harsh treatment of criminals, etc. (Eysenck 1951, 1954, 1976; Eysenck and Wilson 1978). Tough-mindedness is expressed through favorable attitudes towards compulsory sterilization, euthanasia, easier divorce laws, racism, antisemitism, compulsory military training, wife swapping, casual living, death penalty, harsh treatment of criminals, etc. Thus, tough-minded individuals tend to be in favor of more harsh and tough social measures, including rejection of ethnic and other minorities (*Ibid.*). Since Eysenck argued for significant genetic determination of basic personality traits (approximately two-thirds of variance is attributed to inheritance), social attitudes are seen as partly genetically determined as well (Abrahamson, Baker, and Caspi 2002; Bouchard et al. 2003; Eysenck 1982).

Only the first dimension is interpreted as a “true” attitude dimension, in content similar to Thurstone’s factor with the same name (Conservatism). The T-factor was explained as the projection of personality traits (extraversion in 1954, and in later works psychoticism), onto the social field, and hence there were very few items loading exclusively on this factor. After one study with a more representative sample the possibility of the existence of a *third dimension* was suggested (Eysenck 1975). The conservatism factor was split into two dimensions: predominantly religious and predominantly economic. The latter factor was labeled as Politico-Economic Conservatism *vs.* Socialism (Eysenck 1975).

**Table 2 Methodological features and results of studies within Eysenck's model of attitudes**

AUTHOR/YEAR	SAMPLE	ATTITUDE SCALES/ITEMS	FACTOR ANALYSIS METHOD	RESULTS
Eysenck (1944)	a) reanalysis of Thurstone and Ferguson's results; b) 694 adults, members of various organizations, ad hoc sample	a) same as Ferguson (1939) b) 32 'propositions' for social change, 6-point, Likert-type	Centroid method of extraction, graphic rotation, 2 significant factors (GK <sup>a</sup> )	2 orthogonal factors: 1) Conservatism-radicalism; and 2. Practical-theoretical <sup>13</sup> . Support for two additional factors: 3. Aggressive-restrictive, and 4. Freedom of interference-coercion.
Eysenck (1947, 1954)	N=750 (250 conservatives, 250 liberals, 250 socialists)	40 item Inventory of Social Attitudes (ISA); Yes-no scoring	2 <i>interpreted</i> factors	2 independent factors ( $r=-.12$ ): 1. Conservatism-radicalism (R); 2. Tender-tough mindedness (T)
Dator, (1969)	192 High Court and 15 Supreme Court judges from Japan	24 items selected from Eysenck 1947. Translated, and considerably modified.	Unspecified	Confirms Eysenck's two dimensions, but with different names: 1. Progressive-conservative (or Superiority-equality), and 2. Religiosity.
Eysenck (1971)	N=2000, ad hoc sample, but covered gender, age and class	28 items, selected from ISA, 5-point Likert- type scoring	PC extraction; Promax rotation; 9 primary and 2 second-order factors	1. Authoritarianism-humanitarianism, 2. Religionism. Factors are interpreted as rotated versions of the familiar R and T factors.
Eysenck (1975)	N=368, quota sample from London	88 items, 5-point Likert type	PC extraction, 29 factors with eigenval.>1; retained 15 factors, in Promax rotation; 10 factors interpreted, 3 second-order factors extracted	1. Conservative-radical factor, 2. Tough-mindedness – tender-mindedness, and 3. Politico-economic Conservatism – Socialism.
Eysenck (1976)	N=1442, quota sample	68 items; Wilson-Patterson type of scale; Yes-no scoring	PC extraction, 13 primary factors out of 19 with eigenvalues>1; 2 second-order factors extracted	1. R. and 2. T factors.
Stone and Russ (1976)	N=206; univ. students; USA, ad hoc	20-item Mach IV scale, and 18 items from Eysenck's ISA	PC extraction; first 2 components Varimax rotated (23% variance)	1. Radicalism-Conservatism, 2. Machiavellianism
Bruni & Eysenck (1976)	N=850, heterogeneous, ad hoc sample (students, teachers, priests, adults); Italy	48 items, three point, Likert-type scoring; Italian version of Eysenck's ISA	Image extraction, Varimax+graphic rotation of two significant factors	1. R, and 2. T factors.

<sup>13</sup> Later named tough mindedness vs. tender-mindedness.



AUTHOR/YEAR	SAMPLE	ATTITUDE SCALES/ITEMS	FACTOR ANALYSIS METHOD	RESULTS
Hewitt, Eysenck, & Eaves (1977)	N=1492 volunteer adults, 70% females; Canada	60 items Public Opinion Inventory; Yes-no scoring	Principal Component extraction, ad hoc retained 2 factors out of 40 with eigenvalue above 1, oblique rotation	1. Conservatism-radicalism; 2. Tender-tough mindedness
Singh (1977)	N=215, probability sample (mail survey; response rate=43%;	28 items, adapted from ISA; 5-point Likert type scoring	Varimax rotation; 4 factors with eigenvalues>1, retained 2 factors (scree test), expl. 53.8% of var.	1. R, and 2. T factors.
Smithers & Lobley (1978a,b)	N=539 univ. students	40 items Rokeach's D-scale,	Extracted 1 <sup>st</sup> principal component	Dogmatism factor, independent of Conservatism; suggested similarity between Dogmatism and Eysenck's T-factor.
Stone, Ommundsen & Williams (1985)	286 students, USA; 273 students, Norway	60 items measuring left-right orientation and tough-mindedness; various formats various types	PF analysis, Varimax rotation; imposed No. of factors (2)	1. Conservatism (bipolar), 2. Tender-mindedness (Humanism)
	N=286 univ. students, USA			1. Nonpolitical Humanism, 2. "Normative and tough-minded with a tinge of Conservatism" factor

<sup>a</sup> Guttman-Kaiser criterion for factor extraction.

<sup>b</sup> Principal component method of factor extraction.

Replying to Adorno et al.'s positive psychological portrayal of (genuine) liberals, and an unflattering depiction of the (false) conservatives, Eysenck (1954; Eysenck and Wilson 1978) suggested that British communists and fascists are both equally tough-minded, that is authoritarian. Thus, tender-minded liberals are contrasted with tough-minded extremists on both sides of the political spectrum (fascists are 'tough conservatives', while communists are 'tough radicals'). In this way, Eysenck tried to supply empirical support for what is to be known as the 'extremism theory' of the relationship between ideology and authoritarianism (e.g., Greenberg and Jonas 2003; Shils 1954).<sup>14</sup> However, the evidence provided turned out to be insufficient to support such conclusions, just as in a number of

later studies trying to demonstrate the 'authoritarianism of the left' (cf. Altemeyer 1996; Stone and Smith 1993).

Regarding the methodology in Eysenck's studies, it can be noted that none of the surveyed samples were truly randomly selected, although in comparison with samples from studies that will be presented later, they were considerably large and heterogeneous. Most cases used statement-scales in Likert-format, with various possible degrees of agreement. The most interesting feature of data analysis is quite subjective determination of the number of significant factors. It is difficult to refute the model if two-factors solutions are imposed on the data. Relatively restricted range of items also favored obtaining of desired results. It seems that later works were aimed more to support the model than to test it. Nevertheless, the revision in 1975, i.e., dividing conservatism in economic and religious-moral part, is a significant change. Also, it can be remarked that research reports frequently do not contain enough methodological information to examine their internal and external validity.

### ***Conservatism as Unidimensional and Bipolar Dimension (Wilson)***

Wilson began his investigations as Eysenck's collaborator and co-author in several studies. While Eysenck shifted his interest towards the etiologic explanation of his model, particularly relating it to his personality theory, Wilson remained focused on attitudes. Eysenck paid attention more to the T-factor and Wilson to the R-factor. He postulated unidimensionality and bipolarity of social attitudes: all or most of social attitudes are various aspects of one underlying dimension - Conservatism, with its opposite pole Radicalism (occasionally also called Liberalism, or Progressivism). In Wilson's description, typical adherent of conservative ideology is characterized by the following features: religious fundamentalism (belief in absolute authority of church), pro-establishment politics, insistence on strict rules and punishments, militarism, ethnocentrism and intolerance of minority

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<sup>14</sup> Shikano and Pappi (2004), though coming from entirely different research tradition, recently reported broadly corresponding findings. They obtained the second dimension of political space in Germany defined as "the degree of radicalism in the sense of non-established vs. established parties" (*Ibid.*, 10).

groups, preference for the conventional in art, clothing, institutions; anti-hedonistic outlook and restricted sexual behavior, opposition to scientific progress, and superstition (1973a, 5-9).

According to factor analysis results (Wilson and Patterson 1970), these traits tend to form four related attitudes or components of the general conservative ideology: 1. Militarism or Punitiveness, 2. Antihedonism, 3. Ethnocentrism, and 4. Religious Puritanism. On the higher level, these sub-dimensions create a general factor of Conservatism. Table 3 presents not only studies on the base of which Wilson formulated his theory, but also works of other authors applying his scales in different settings.

Wilson and Patterson (1968, 1970) developed a new technique for measuring social attitudes: the so-called Wilson-Patterson Conservatism Scale (later known as the C-scale). It consisted of a list of words or 'catch-phrases', like *Religion*, *Death Penalty* or *Abortion*, with which respondents were asked to express their approval. Most frequently respondents are offered only three answer options: *yes*, *no* and ? (not sure). Such a restricted range of possible answers together with the particular factoring method strongly favored confirmation of the unidimensionality assumption. The first principal component, by definition, accounts for the largest proportion of common variance and has the largest number significant variable projections. Nevertheless, Wilson and some other authors presented in the Table 3 inferred the confirmation of unidimensionality hypothesis sometimes relying on quite weak support. For example, when the first principal component accounted for only 18% of variance (Truett 1993).

**Table 3 Basic methodological features and results of Wilson’s main studies, and of other authors’ studies using Wilson-Patterson Conservatism Scale**

AUTHOR / YEAR	SAMPLE	ATTITUDE SCALES/ITEMS	FACTOR ANALYSIS METHOD	RESULTS
Wilson & Patterson (1970)	Samples from: UK, Netherlands, New Zealand, West Germany	50 items Wilson-Patterson (W-P) Conservatism Scale (C-scale), yes-no scoring	PC extraction, no rotation	Conservatism as general factor, consisting of 4 components: 1. Militarism-Punitiveness, 2. Anti-Hedonism, 3. Ethnocentrism, 4. Religion-Puritanism,
Nias (1972)	N=441 children between 11-12, England	50 items, adapted WPAI scale	PC extraction, interpreted 1 <sup>st</sup> PC, and 4 Promax factors	a) special version of Child Conservatism, and sub-dimensions: Religion, Ethnocentrism, Punitiveness, and Sex (hedonism).
Robertson & Cochrane (1973)	N=329 students, Edinburgh	50-items WPAI	PC, Varimax, 17 eigenval.>1; interpreted 1 <sup>st</sup> component, and 4 Varimax factors explaining 28% of total variance (1 <sup>st</sup> comp. only 12,9%)	1 <sup>st</sup> component: Religiosity; 4 factors: 1. Religiosity, 2. Prurient Sexuality, 3. Racism, 4. unnamed. “C scale does not measure a general dimension of conservatism”.
Wilson & Lee (1974)	N=356, adults, ad hoc, Korea	WPAI, adapted version	PC extraction, oblique rotation of 4 factors	General factor of Conservatism; 1 <sup>st</sup> order factors: 1. Militarism, 2. Antihedonism, 3. Ethnocentrism, 4. Religious Puritanism
Sidanius, Ekehammar & Ross (1979)	N=327 Australian & N=192 Swedish psychology students	36-item, S5 Conservatism Scale (W-P type), (3 answer options: yes, no, ?)	PAF extraction, Oblimin rotation, “psychological meaningfulness” as a criterion for the no. of factors	6 factors, of which 5 common in both samples: Auth. aggression or Punitiveness, Soc. Inequality, Religion, Pol.-eco. Conservatism, & Racism. Unique: Australia - Pro-west; Sweden: Xenophobia factors.
Sidanius & Ekehammar (1980)	N=532; “relatively representative for students in Stockholm”; Sweden	36 items WPAI (Conservatism) scale	Principal factors extraction, 9 factors with eigenval.>1; no inf. about rotation or correl. between factors	1. Political-economic Conservatism, 2. Racism, 3. Religion, 4. Social inequality, 5. Pro-West, 6. Authoritarian Aggression, 7. Conventionalism, 8. Ethnocentrism, 9. Xenophobia
Green et al. (1988)	N=499 college students and nurses; USA and New Zealand	50-items; W-P Conservatism scale	PC extraction; Varimax; 3 ad 4 factors solutions tested	General factor of Conservatism, but not previously defined sub-dimensions
Katz (1988a)	N=356 Israeli undergraduates (252 Jews & 104 Arabs)	50-items, W-P Conservatism Scale	PC extraction; Varimax; 4 factors according to scree-test	General Conservatism, and the same 4 factors as in Wilson 1970, neglected differences between two sub-samples
Katz (1988b)	N=217 Israeli schoolchildren (Mean age=12.8)	Children’s Scale of Social Attitudes (W-P type)	PC extraction; Varimax; 7 factors with eigenval.>1; retained 4 factors according to scree-test	The same as above

AUTHOR / YEAR	SAMPLE	ATTITUDE SCALES/ITEMS	FACTOR ANALYSIS METHOD	RESULTS
Ortet, Perez & Wilson (1990)	N=185 university students; Catalonia	50-items WPAI	PC extraction; scree-test for No. of factors; 5 factors extracted; no rotation	1. General Conservatism and 'specific content' factors: 2. Realism-Idealism, 3. Permissiveness-Conventional Institutions, 4. Women's Liberation, 5. Punitiveness.
Walkey, Katz & Green (1990)	Volunteers: 203 from South Africa, 252 Jews and 104 Arabs from Israel, 219 from Japan	23 items from W-P Conservatism scale	PC extraction; no rotation; interpreted only 1 <sup>st</sup> principal component	C scale measures concept "related to the Judeo-Christian religious tradition, with its firmest roots in the English speaking branch of that tradition" (p.988)
Heaven (1992)	N=273, heterogeneous sample, Australia	50-items revised C-Scale (W-P)	PC extraction, Varimax rot., 15 eigenval.>1; extracted 4 factors, according to scree-test	1. Religion/morality, 2. Equality, 3. Punitiveness, 4. Hedonism
Truett (1993)	N=29055 (!) volunteers; 14466 twins & 14589 their family members; USA	28-items W-P Conservatism Scale; Likert 3-point	PC extraction; no rotation; interpreted only 1 <sup>st</sup> principal component which explained 18% of total variance	General Conservatism
Riemann et al. (1993)	N=184; univ. students; Germany	162 items - "political issues currently discussed in Germany"; W-P type; 7-point Likert	PC extraction; 10 factors eigenval.>1; 4-factor Varimax solution retained	a) 1 <sup>st</sup> principal component as General Conservatism dimension; b) 4 Varimax factors: Conservatism, Social welfare and women equality, Liberalism and technological progress, and Taxation for environmental purposes.

Strategy of the data analysis, i.e., the interpretation of the 1<sup>st</sup> principal component as a general dimension, and then *orthogonal* rotation of theoretically correlated four factors – elements of conservatism – is wrong. If lower-order factors are elements of the higher-order factor, they have to be correlated, and thus obliquely rotated. Interpretation of the lower-order factors in Varimax position is inconsistent with their hypothesized role as related components of a general dimension. In cases when analytic methods were less restrictive, the results provided less clear support for a general overarching dimension. For example, Sidanius, Ekehammar, and Ross (1979) and Sidanius and Ekehammar (1980) ended their analyses with 6 and 9 factors respectively, thus suggesting rather loose organization of primary social attitudes.

Riemann et al.'s (1993) research is a good example of recent studies following Wilson's approach. Using a relatively small student sample from Germany (thus providing a cross-cultural test), they applied a 162-item W-P type of scale referring to a wide set of "political issues currently discussed in Germany". The first principal component was interpreted as General Conservatism dimension. Varimax rotation of four factors (out of 10 factors with eigenvalues above unity) resulted in the following components of the general conservatism: (1) Conservatism, (2) Social welfare and women equality, (3) Liberalism and technological progress, and (3) taxation for environmental purposes. Although the results lend some support for Wilson's model, it is clear that particular attitudinal configuration depends on the context, but especially on the particular set of items included in the analysis. This explains, for example, the emergence of an environmentalist factor. However, Riemann et al. provided an independent test of the psychological roots of ideological orientations. Namely, they correlated a Big-Five operationalization of the basic personality traits with the isolated attitudinal dimensions. They found that Openness to experience was strongly related with general conservatism. This is important since this trait is related both to Wilson's concept of the fear of uncertainty and to Eysenck's concept of psychoticism.<sup>15</sup> Conscientiousness correlated with general conservatism as well. This personality trait is similar to what was in earlier psychological vocabulary referred to as anal character or obsessive personality. In this sense, their results are in line with Adorno et al.'s (1950) hypotheses. Finally, agreeableness, as well as openness to experience, was positively related with the social welfare factor and with environmentalism.

Sampling of respondents and items in this group of studies is again far from being representative, making the conclusions difficult to generalize on non-student populations. However, an interesting and valuable feature of the studies in this group is the attempt to test the scale and theory in various cultural environments. Several studies (e.g., Green et al. 1988; Heaven 1992; Robertson and Cochrane 1973; Walkey, Katz, and Green 1990) supported the almost abandoned idea about the multidimensionality of social attitudes and their cultural determination. For example, Walkey, Katz,

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<sup>15</sup> And to recently elaborated concept of the need for cognitive closure as well (Jost et al. 2003).

and Green (1990) found that the first principal component was less consistently structured the more the samples were culturally distant from the Western, English-speaking samples. However, their conclusion that the C-Scale measures a concept “related to the Judeo-Christian religious tradition, with its firmest roots in the English speaking branch of that tradition” (Walkey, Katz, and Green 1990, 988), is not necessarily a difficult theoretical problem for the Wilson’s theory. He actually psychologized the concept of conservatism, viewing it as “a reflection of a generalized fear of uncertainty, whether *stimulus uncertainty* (complexity, ambiguity, novelty, change, etc., as states of the physical and social environment) or *response uncertainty* (freedom of choice, need conflict, etc., originating from within the individual)” (Wilson 1973b, 187, italics in original). Hence, it is predictable that in different environments the fear of uncertainty (i.e., the personality foundation of conservative attitudes) should be expressed in different ways.

### ***Kerlinger’s Dualistic Theory***

The main feature of Kerlinger’s (1984) model is *dualistic* conception of social attitudes: Conservatism and radicalism (or liberalism) are not opposite extremes of one dimension. Rather, they are orthogonal, independent dimensions. One’s position on the conservative dimension does not tell anything about one’s position on liberalism. The explanation is that for the conservatives, *critical referents* are different than for liberals. Private property or religion are, for example, critical referents for the conservatives, while civil rights and socialized medicine are for liberals. Thus, according to the theory, one can be both: conservative and liberal, or neither of them. Frequent negative correlations between Conservatism and liberalism according to Kerlinger (1984) are the result of improper scaling, factoring, or sampling bias (too many extremists in samples, who are by definition *against* something).

Results of his analyses led him to the conclusion that higher-order Conservatism factor is defined by three lower-order factors: 1. *Religiosity* (and corresponding referents: religion, church, Christian, faith in god, etc.); 2. *Economic Conservatism* (referents: profits, money, business, free enterprise, corporate industry, capitalism, private property, etc.), and 3. *Traditional Conservatism* (referents: discipline, law

and order, authority, family, tradition) (Kerlinger 1984, 239). Five Liberal factors received repeated confirmation: 1. *Civil Rights* (civil rights, blacks, racial integration, desegregation), 2. *Social Liberalism* (social security, socialized medicine, poverty program, economic reform, social welfare, etc.), 3. *Sexual Freedom* (equality of women, women's liberation, birth control, abortion), 4. *Human Warmth and Feeling* (love, human warmth, affection, feeling), and 5. *Progressivism* (child centered curriculum, children's interests and needs, pupil personality, etc.) (Kerlinger 1984). Kerlinger's main results and works of some of his associates are presented in Table 4.

Middendorp and deVries (1981) performed an important methodological test in their research. Namely, they compared the catch-phrase and statements types of scales (80 items in each of the two types of scales), and, despite some differences, obtained generally similar results. In this way, the claim that some differences between various models are entirely based on methodological grounds was refuted. Although they started from the Kerlinger's model, their conclusions provided the basis for the later more elaborated Middendorp's (e.g., 1991a) model of the structure of ideology. They concluded that behind the obtained structure, one can detect a theoretical ideological model of the "progressive-conservative domain". In their words, "progressive attitude 'applies' the value of *equality* to the *economic* realm (equality of income, property, life chances, etc.) and the value of *freedom* to the *non-economic* realm (e.g., tolerance, permissiveness). Conservative attitudes are the opposite of this: freedom is applied to the economic realm (free enterprise, opposition to government interference) and equality, in some sense at least, is applied to the non-economic realm (e.g., conformist to conventional social norms and to traditional standards of behavior)." (Middendorp and deVries 1981, 252, italics in original).



**Table 4 Kerlinger’s studies and studies testing his Dualistic theory of social attitudes**

AUTHOR /YEAR	SAMPLE	ATTITUDE SCALES/ITEMS	FACTOR ANALYSIS METHOD	RESULTS
Kerlinger (1972, 1984)	N about 530; students of education, teachers; USA	50 items/referents selected from the sample of 400; 7-point, Likert	Principal factors (PF) extraction, Promax rotation, 6 first-order and 2 second-order factors	Two independent factors: 1. Liberalism, 2. Conservatism
Marjoribanks & Josefowitz (1975)	N=460, secondary school students; England and Wales	50-items Conservatism Scale (W-P), + 2 other Likert-type scales	a) PF analysis of each scale, b) PF of 41 selected items, 8 factors extracted 2 <sup>nd</sup> -order factoring - 2 factors; Varimax rot.	8 1 <sup>st</sup> -order factors: Racial prejudice, Nationalism, Patriotism, Social conservatism, Disrespect for authority, Political activism, Modern art, and Sexual freedom; Conservatism and Liberalism as 2 <sup>nd</sup> -order factors.
Kerlinger, Middendorp and Amon (1976)	N=1925; students from USA & Spain & random sample from Netherlands	72-78 items, W-P type REF VIA scale; “freely adapted” for European countries	PF extraction; subjective criteria for No. of factors; 8-12 1 <sup>st</sup> -order factors; Promax rotation; three 2 <sup>nd</sup> -order factors	”General support” for independent factors of Conservatism and Liberalism which “underlie many or most social attitudes”.
Kerlinger (1984)	12 samples, N from 206 to 685; mostly students; USA and West Europe	Total ~200 items; 6 different scales, mostly W-P type; 30-78 items, 7-point Likert	Principal Factors analysis; Analysis of covariance structures (LISREL program)	Two independent dimensions: 1. Conservatism, 2. Liberalism
Middendorp and deVries (1981)	N=815; general population; Netherlands	80 items - referents (W-P type); 6-points of dis/agreement	Principal factor extraction; Varimax & Promax rotations; extracted 4 factors - the ‘best interpretable’ solution; 2 2 <sup>nd</sup> -order factors	1 <sup>st</sup> -order: 1. Consensus, 2.Libertarian-Traditional, 3. Left-Right, 4. Liberalism-Conservatism; unclear 2 <sup>nd</sup> -order factors
	N=1927; general population; Netherlands	80 items - statements, based on the above referents; 5 or 7-point Likert		1 <sup>st</sup> -order: Liberalism-Traditionalism, 2. Left-Right, 3. Liberalism-Conservatism, 4. Att. towards social change

Many methodological features of studies in this group are similar to the previously reviewed studies. Samples are again not representative, but the selection of items was given much more explicit attention and theoretical consideration. Kerlinger (1984) adopted Wilson-Patterson type of scales (calling the items ‘referents’), but he selected referents out of more than 400 possibilities found through the systematic analysis of literature in political philosophy, public discourse, etc. He was more methodical also in data analysis, systematically performing higher-order extraction and even applying confirmatory procedures. However, the applied strategy favored the confirmation of the

theory through subjective determination of the number of significant factors and through the orthogonal rotation of the second-order factors.

### ***Outliers***

There is a considerable number of socio-psychological studies more or less directly related to the problem of the structure of general social attitudes which for various reasons had smaller influence on the development of the field (hence the label 'Outliers'). Some of them are presented in the Table 5.

The importance of these studies is twofold. On the one side, they show the dependence of the results on the sample of analyzed variables and on various decisions in the data analysis procedure. Data are not the only factor which influence whether the result will be one general dimension, or two, three, or more independent factors. On the other hand, there is an apparent similarity between factors in these studies and those from previous three groups, in spite of the differences in methodology.

**Table 5 Outliers: Methodological features and main results of some relevant studies out of the three main approaches**

AUTHOR /YEAR	SAMPLE	ATTITUDE SCALES/ITEMS	FACTOR ANALYSIS METHOD	RESULTS
Sanai (1950)	N≈300 adults; London, UK	16 items; 7-point Likert type, for analysis collapsed to 2 points	Burt's Bipolar Analysis; extracted: 1 general factor and 2 bipolar factors	1. Progressivism-conservatism, 2. Atheism/socialism vs. Social progressivism, 3. Socialism vs. atheism/agnosticism
O'Neil & Levinson (1954)	N=200 university students	32 items: 10 from Traditional family ideology, 8 - ethnocentrism, 8 authoritarianism, and 6 religious conventionalism	Centroid method, 4 orthogonal factors extracted	1. Religious Conventionalism, 2. Authoritarian submissiveness, 3. No name, 4. Masculine strength facade.
Rokeach & Fruchter (1956)	N=207 college students; anonymous answering	43-item Dogmatism scale (D), and 9 other scales	Analyzed are summarized scores on scales; Centroid extraction, orthogonal rotation of 3 factors	1. Anxiety, 2. Liberalism-conservatism, and 3. Dogmatism/authoritarianism/rigidity
Comrey & Newmeyer (1965)	N=212 volunteers; USA	120 items: 4 homogeneous items for each of 30 attitude variables; 9-point Likert	a) FA of items intercorrelations and construction of 25 'micro' attitude scales for the main analysis; b) 'homogeneous-item-dimension' extraction, Varimax rotation	One second-order factor: Radicalism-Conservatism, and 5 first-order factors: 1. Welfare-State attitudes, 2. Punitive att., 3. Nationalism, 4. Religious att., 5. Racial Tolerance.
Kerlinger & Rokeach (1966)	N=1239, mostly students, USA	D-Scale (40 items) F-Scale (29 items); 7-point Likert type	Principal axes analysis; Promax rotation, 2-nd order analysis	2 <sup>nd</sup> -order factors: 1. Dogmatism, 2. & 3. Authoritarianism (fascistic version)
Durrheim and Foster (1995)	N=244 psychology students, South Africa	27-item, shortened C scale	4 factors (Scree test), Orthoblique rotation	1. Inequality, 2. Religious conservatism, 3. Political and economic conservatism, 4. Punitiveness.

A particularly interesting example is Comrey and Newmeyer's study. It is one of the methodologically best studies reviewed here, but without much visible influence on later research. Yet, the results fit the Eysenck's and Wilson's models well. A serious problem in many of the reviewed studies based on item analysis is low commonalty and consequent low percentage of explained variance. The root of the problem is in the inadequate reliability of the single items. One solution is to use hierarchical factor analysis. Another answer to the problem, adopted by Comrey and Newmeyer (1965), is to construct 'micro-scales', consisting of several semantically close items, thus

providing more reliable measures for the beginning of analysis. At the end of their analysis a single second-order factor accounted for 42% of variance, which is considerably more than, for example 18% in Truett 1993.

### ***Summary and Implications***

It is difficult to make firm generalizations about the reviewed studies because of many differences in the applied methods and in the amount of details reported. However, some principal tendencies and features can be outlined. Three models of the structure of social attitudes are dominating in the field for several decades: Eysenck's, Wilson's and Kerlinger's. Eysenck's model has been the most influential – and controversial. His Conservatism-Radicalism dimension served as the basis for the development of Wilson's and Kerlinger's models, disputing over its bipolar or dualistic nature (Kerlinger 1972, 1984; Wilson 1973a; Wilson and Patterson 1968). Tough-mindedness has been linked to more psychological variables, such as authoritarianism (e.g., Eysenck and Wilson 1978; Ray 1982) or dogmatism (Rokeach 1956, 1960). However, it is difficult to see which of the models is on firmer empirical grounds.

Most studies are based on *ad hoc* samples, usually social science students. Samples are frequently small, especially regarding the usual requirement that factor analysis should not be based on samples below 300 respondents. Two types of instruments are dominant: lists of statements in Likert format, and Wilson-Patterson lists of referents. The size of scales varies from less than 20 to more than 200 items, while the content of items most frequently remains unexplained, except in notable cases of Kerlinger and Middendorp.

Supporters of particular theories usually use similar scales and methods of data analysis. Changes in methods frequently produce theoretically unexpected results. Data analysis strategies are frequently determined by expected results, thus reducing the theory falsifiability. Crucial problems in data analysis include determination of the number of significant factors, methods of rotation, and use of second-order analysis. The problem is actually circular: theory determines the method, method later

confirms theory; or method favors certain results, which are then presented as a well-supported theory. However, without some external criteria these problems can not be solved unequivocally.

Despite the occasionally tendentious attempts to 'adjust' the data and theories, all the three theories evolved over time. Eysenck (1975) introduced the third dimension, representing the economic left-right division. Wilson and collaborates extensively compared results from various cultures. They observed that with the greater cultural difference from English speaking Judeo-Christian tradition there is less evidence of ideological unidimensionality (Walkey, Katz, and Green 1990). Middendorp and deVries' (1981) results provide the basis for the integration of Kerlinger's dualistic and Wilson's bipolar theories.<sup>16</sup> When there is a consensus in the population about certain referents, they are not the basis for the left-right division. Inclusion of referents about which opinions are polarized produces polarized factors.

### Substantive implications

The reviewed theories propose a number of hypotheses concerning the structure of political attitudes and causal explanations of individual differences in the ideological dimensions as well. Eysenck's theory suggests that we should expect multi-dimensional structure of ideology, where one 'purely ideological' dimension reflects socialization and presumably class interests. The extremeness with which one holds on to the preferred ideology is supposed to reflect a tough or tender-minded personality. Eysenck's model leads to the following three general hypotheses: (1) Ideology is multidimensional, (2) the two most general dimensions have different roots: psychological and social,

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<sup>16</sup> Birenbaum and Zak (1982) argue that Kerlinger and Eysenck models can be integrated as well. Birenbaum and Zak's results provide support for Kerlinger's idea about criteriality, as well as for Eysenck's hypothesis about the role of personality. They obtained two orthogonal factors in Israel, one similar to Kerlinger's conservatism factor, and another one similar to Kerlinger's liberalism second-order factor. Personality correlated only with one of the dimensions, i.e., "only traditional attitudes correlate with personality traits" (Birenbaum and Zak 1982, 512). This personality trait is described as consisting of "the tough-poise, extroversion and rigidity" (*Ibid.*, 512).

and (3) political extremists are psychologically similar, i.e. tough-minded (or authoritarian). Hence, on the most general level, one can observe the interplay of psychological and social factors.

For Eysenck's respondents, typically coming from the UK, social class represented one of the most salient socializing experiences. Therefore, this social division defined the main ideological dimension (R factor). In different social and political contexts, socialization forces might aggregate attitudes in a different manner. In the case of Serbia, for example, experiences with the former socialist regime might be decisive. For those socialized during the 'growth' phase of the Yugoslav self-management socialism, that is between 1950s and 1970s, socialism should represent a more salient element of their identity and world-view than for the later generations for whom socialism is more associated with decline of the 1980s and final collapse during the 1990s (cf. Searing, Wright, and Rabinowitz 1976). Given the salience of the issue of the regime change, it is certainly logical to expect that attitudes towards socialist regime is at the core of ideological divisions and that age should strongly correlate with this dimension.

The extremism hypothesis suggests that supporters of the extreme right wing Serbian Radical Party should be more authoritarian than supporters of the moderate parties. However, this hypothesis cannot be submitted to a fair test in the present research, since an authoritarianism scale will represent tough-mindedness. Although they are closely related constructs, authoritarianism contains elements that suggest connection in the opposite direction. Namely, conventionalism, inherent in the definition of authoritarianism, would imply weaker connection with extreme – and by definition non-conventional – ideologies.

Implications of Wilson's theory are also based on psychological functionality of political attitudes. Psychological uncertainty induced by the social changes at the beginning of 1990s in socialist countries, and consequent conservatism, could be expressed through a specific set of attitudes. If Wilson's claim (1973b) that the fear of uncertainty constitutes the psychological root of the conservative ideology is correct, then we should expect a functionally similar dimension of Conservatism in the Serbian case. Moreover, authoritarianism (representing a proxy operationalization of the fear of uncertainty) should correlate with such a dimension. However, the ideological content is

likely to be different. Fear of uncertainty is supposed to induce the rejection of social change and preference for non-conflictual but hierarchical and authoritarian society. Hence, conservatism in Serbia is perhaps comprised from the support for the old, dogmatic socialist system and state-regulated economy (worker's self-management, egalitarianism, etc.), anti-capitalist, and anti-west orientation, especially among the population socialized in the old regime. Serbian conservatism might also include religiosity, nationalism and rejection of libertarian values, more in line with the standard conception of this ideology, since these attitudes might be psychologically functional across political contexts. However, religiosity in socialist Yugoslavia was connected with the wish for major social change rather than for the status quo. In different contexts, psychological dynamics should be expressed in different specific attitudes.

Both Eysenck and Wilson advocate primarily psychological explanations of individual differences. The former in terms of extraversion (later psychoticism) and, the latter, in terms of the fear of uncertainty. The present research includes an authoritarianism scale, in order to account for the possible psychological roots of specific attitudinal dimensions. This construct is relevant for Eysenck's and especially for Wilson's theory, since according to the latter, fear of uncertainty binds together various elements of the general conservatism. On the one side, authoritarianism is close to the concept of tough-mindedness, and even psychoticism, and on the other, it contains elements of anxiety, or 'fear of uncertainty'. Hence, the present research will tackle some of the psychological hypotheses inherent in these two models of the structure of socio-political attitudes. Eysenck explains individual differences in his R factor in terms of different socialization experiences induced by different class position. This hypothesis will be examined as well but will be developed in more details in the review of political science research tradition.

One possible implication of Kerlinger's theory for the structure of attitudes in post-Socialist countries is that because of profound social change, attitudes are much less systematically organized. Various referents could be criterial or irrelevant for many different social groups, thus producing more than just two independent factors. Since it seems that in Kerlinger's view, intellectual and political traditions are the major factors behind convergence of specific attitudes towards more general

ideologies, the lack or weakness or multiplicity of such traditions might result in a weak correlation between specific attitudes. If this is the case, it is possible to obtain relatively large number of specific factors and weak evidence of higher-order factors. Yet, Kerlinger does not clearly specify what other possible factors may make certain referents criterial, so it is difficult to derive hypotheses that are more specific.

Incorporating Kerlinger's ideas about the causes of bipolarity of ideological dimensions and Middendorp and deVries' (1981) results, it is possible to argue that political context, including elite discourse, intellectual traditions, and politicized issues of the day, are factors that determine whether certain ideological dimensions are bipolar, correlated, or orthogonal. At the same time, this reveals the limits of the explanatory power of purely psychological theories of the structure of political attitudes.

For the present case, one could, therefore, hypothesize that in Serbia during the 1990s, specific issues such as nationalism or support for the former socialist regime are much more divisive and hence 'criterial', than in other times and/or places. Due to the break-up of the former socialist regime and former Yugoslavia and consequent ethnic conflicts, these referents probably have become exceptionally important and have been more strongly than usually either accepted or rejected. At the same time, these key ideological 'codes' might have provided a basis for organization of other, less criterial and divisive, attitudes. In Serbia, one could expect, for example, the association between economic liberalism and pacifism. The connection could be based on the fact that both pacifists and economic liberals were opposed to the ruling socialists, though these attitudes are commonly on the opposite sides of the standard left-right divide. Hence, nationalism and socialism should be strongly divisive, bipolar dimensions, related with a broader set of other attitudes. Additionally, the other less divisive attitudes should be more independent of each other (e.g., economic liberalism should be weakly integrated with other attitudes).

### Methodological implications

A useful methodological improvement, adopted in the present research, would be to first develop more reliable measures of primary attitudes, through creating 'mini-scales' for measuring habitual



opinions, something that Comrey and Newmeyer (1965) already have attempted. Without more reliable measures at the lower level, it is difficult to have reliable and valid measures on higher levels. Kerlinger's three second-order factors (Kerlinger, Middendorp, and Amon 1976), for example, accounted only for 18% of total variance of 11 primary factors. With results such as these, it is difficult to justify the claim that higher-order factors are really relevant 'underlying dimensions' of all social attitudes.

There are, thus, two possible strategies of data analysis: to perform factor analysis of the intercorrelations between all items, and afterwards higher-order analyses, or to start with separate analyses of items belonging to each of the included 'facets' of ideology. Then, either the first principal components could be extracted, or in the case of a strong evidence for multidimensionality, two or more factors might be preferable. However, if the 'facets sub-scales' prove to be really homogeneous, both strategies would produce similar results.

Interpretation and labeling of the extracted factors is a separate and demanding problem. Many proposed labels are synonymous. Sometimes the same label denotes different factors, and not infrequently the same factor has different labels in the literature. Frequently, there is not enough information to compare the content of factors besides their labels. For example, Ortet, Perez, and Wilson (1990) named one of their second-order factors as *idealism vs. realism*. However, the real meaning of this factor is clearer after finding that the *realism* pole is defined by the support for apartheid and white superiority.

More than thirty different factor labels are proposed in the reviewed studies, with various versions of conservatism and liberalism being the most frequent. Other frequent labels are nationalism (with varieties like ethnocentrism, racism, or patriotism), tender-mindedness (and similar factors like authoritarianism, Machiavellianism, Punitiveness, dogmatism), and religiosity (with non-synonymous but corresponding Antihedonism, traditionalism). This difficulty could be, at least partly, surmounted by pre-defining the ideological meaning of the items based on previous theoretical research. In this way, the obtained factors will be interpreted in a more 'objective' manner, but also the results will have more explicit theoretical importance. Namely, if, for example, obtained dimensions contain

items or subscales that are supposed to measure *different* ideological dimensions, yet they still appear on a single factor, that could be interpreted as ‘factor convergence’ specific for the analyzed case. This strategy is not applicable in purely inductive research.

Additional important methodological problems include the determination of the number of significant factors and choice of factor rotation method. Concerning the former, it seems best to apply Cattell’s Scree-test (Cattell 1966), for it seems to perform well in preventing the emergence of insignificant or artifact factors. The predominant method of factor rotation in the reviewed studies is Varimax. However, from the theoretical point of view, there are no reasons to *impose* orthogonality on the dimensions of social attitudes. Rather, it is important to *allow* orthogonality if that fits the data and that can be done with oblique rotation methods.

## **Dimensions of political space in political science literature**

Political science is the discipline expected to study and explain ideologies. In fact, a large part of theoretical and empirical research in political science, in one way or another, involves ideologies. Among the variety of problems and approaches, this review will focus on theoretical and empirical research on the structure of belief systems or ideology, primarily on the level of the electorate.

The chapter will first critically analyze the relevant contribution of the authors who developed relatively comprehensive dimensional models of the political space. In contrast to the socio-psychological models, political scientists are more concerned with explicitly political variables, especially demarcation of different party supporters. A large part of the chapter is devoted to studies that not only describe attitude organization, but are focused on explanation of both the structuration of main political divisions, and individual and group differences in their preferences for particular ideological orientations. This is primarily related to the political sociology tradition of research on social cleavages. Finally, special attention will be devoted to studies examining ideological orientation in the post-communist context.

The chapter opens with a brief review of the well-known debate on the issue of attitude consistency and structure (e.g., Conover and Feldman 1981; Converse 1964, 1970; Feld and Grofman 1988; Feldman 1988; Inglehart 1985; Judd and Milburn 1980; Judd, Krosnick, and Milburn 1981; Nie and Andersen 1974; Page and Shapiro 1992; Pierce and Rose 1974; Sullivan, Pierson, and Marcus 1978). This is important because if the conclusion that voters' political attitudes lack basic organization and coherence is true, there is no sense in further dealing with mass ideological orientations.

### ***Attitude Consistency***

An elementary level of attitude consistency is obviously a necessary basis for more elaborate interattitudinal structure. The controversy started with Converse (e.g., 1964, 1970), who concluded that "large portions of an electorate do not have meaningful beliefs, even on issues that have formed the basis for intense political controversy among elites for substantial periods of time (1964, 245). In

other words, the general public's political attitudes are unstable, disorganized, inconsistent, and hence non-ideological.

There are in fact two major arguments in Converse (1964). One is that attitudes exhibit low consistency (low correlation between items), and low stability (low correlation between same items in two time points). The second claim is that there is a small ideologically articulate elite, or 'ideologues', whose attitudes are highly articulate and organized, while the bulk of the public often lacks even basic logical constraints.<sup>17</sup>

Converse's conclusions were very persuasively argued, and have been very influential (e.g., Zaller 1992). Converse's findings about large 'vertical' social differences in levels of sophistication which are broadly congruent with education level were confirmed and explored in more details by Jacoby (1988, 1991; but see also Goren 2004). However, various more critical responses to Converse's conclusions have also been formulated. Nie and Andersen (1974), for example, found increasing attitude constraint in the politicized 1960s and 70s, comparing to Converse's 1950s. Hence, low attitude constraint might be related more to specific temporal and geographical peculiarities, than to intrinsic qualities of the masses.<sup>18</sup>

Sullivan, Pierson, and Marcus (1978), however, responded that the increased constraint is in large part due to different item wording. Namely, in newer surveys respondents were offered bipolar items, which produce answers that are more reliable. This points towards the role of methodology in specific claims about mass political sophistication (e.g. Green and Citrin 1994). On the other side, a number of authors argue that despite low consistency on the individual level, the evidence reveals considerable consistency on the aggregate-level (Feld and Grofman 1988; Page and Shapiro 1992).

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<sup>17</sup> Converse distinguishes five categories of political sophistication. In the two most sophisticated categories, i.e., 'ideologues' and 'near-ideologues' he found 2.5% and 9% of the total sample, respectively (Converse 1964, 218, Table I).

<sup>18</sup> For example, Granberg and Holmberg (1988) found higher ideological consistency in Sweden than in the USA.

Abandoning earlier either/or views of mass political competence, there is a growing consensus that ideological thinking is something that characterizes the public in different degrees (Jacoby 1995; Niemi and Westholm 1984; Niemi and Weisberg 1993). According to Tetlock, "the cognitive miser characterization of the decision-maker is incomplete" (1986, 825), since in the condition of high value conflict, people tend to think in more complex and integrated ways.<sup>19</sup> As will be discussed below, the later research has demonstrated not only that there are basic levels of attitude consistency, but also that specific attitudes can be meaningfully related to ideological dimensions on a 'philosophical' level (e.g., Middendorp 1991a), and to abstract or 'terminal' values (Tetlock 1986). Goren, on the basis of five NES studies and using confirmatory factor analysis, finds that abstract beliefs in various domains are "structured coherently and equivalently in the minds of citizens at different levels of sophistication", and that "individuals are, for the most part, equally adept at grounding policy preferences in these principles" (2004, 462). In other words, he concludes that "all citizens hold genuine core beliefs and values and rely more or less equally on these when taking positions on many specific issues" (Goren 2004, 462).

### ***Conceptualization and Measurement of Ideology***

A vast amount of literature has been devoted to the theoretical discussion of what ideas and values constitute particular ideologies. However, this body of research, belonging to political philosophy and history of ideas rather than to empirical political science, is beyond the scope of the present research. Here, the question of interest is how ideologies are conceived and measured in political science. The focus is not on those who develop and elaborate ideologies, but rather those that follow and support them, such as voters, party leaders, and activists. Thus, scholars in this branch of research have to deal with the problem of how to define and measure ideological orientations among subjects of their research.

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<sup>19</sup> See also Carruba and Singh (2004) for a related argument that individuals can have complex and sophisticated public policy preferences.

A prevalent underlying assumption in many attempts at defining the content of ideological dimension(s) can be termed criterial approach. Since parties and party systems are often the focus of empirical political science research, this approach follows the logic that what differentiates parties constitutes the ideological cleavage. Thus, for example, scholars examined political elite discourse in order to establish important ideological differences. Searing (1978) used party membership of MP's in the UK as the criterion for construct validation of his 36-item value scale. He found that Labor and Conservative MP's are best separated by values implying equality, and expressed by value items such as social equality, economic equality, but also freedom, socialism, social planning, and public order. Crewe and Searing used a similar approach and found that MP's and other candidates display very little consensus about their central political values: "we find only 3 values out of the total of 36 where 8 out of 10 Conservative politicians concur: they endorse freedom and, not surprisingly, reject socialism and economic equality" (1988, 364-5). In their view, Thatcherism as an ideology was built on "three principal political ideals: discipline, free enterprise, and statecraft" (Crewe and Searing 1988, 363). Contrary to the common view, they find that the new conservatives cherish the "ideal of strong central government" (*Ibid.* 364). They aimed at diminishing government only in the economy; otherwise the goal was "to increase its influence over despised institutions like trade unions, over big-spending institutions like nationalized industries and local government, and over privileged and socially 'elitist' institutions like universities, the civil service, and the BBC" (*Ibid.* 364). Hence, we see that elites, not only ordinary citizens, sometimes display ideological inconsistency and lack of constraint.

Judgments of political scientists about ideological positions of political parties are also often considered as a valid measure of ideology in so-called "expert surveys". For example, Castles and Mair (1984) and Huber and Inglehart (1995) provide such evidence. According to Huber and Inglehart (1995), in most countries the primary dimension of conflict seems to be economic left-right cleavage. In many countries there is *some* consensus on the secondary dimension of political conflict. For example, in Switzerland and Sweden, more than 40% of experts found that economic growth vs. environmental protection is the secondary cleavage. However, particularly in the recently

democratized and non-democratic countries, a substantial proportion of experts claimed that authoritarianism vs. democracy is the central element of the main political cleavage (i.e., the one that defines the content of the left-right scale). Although in most countries (including the East European ones), the economic or class conflict is central for the meaning of the Left-Right dimension, in many cases there are other categories used for placing parties on left-right scale. Some of the examples are: centralization of power, authoritarianism vs. democracy, isolationism vs. internationalism, traditional vs. new culture, xenophobia, conservatism vs. change, property rights, or national defense.

It is clear that left-right language can take on very different meanings. Whatever the associated meanings are, however, these aggregated expert judgments reflect what academics consider left and right rather than political elites or masses. This approach still proved to be a particularly handy way for comparative research, but it has to be kept in mind that the content of ideological dimensions established in this way does not necessarily reflect attitudes among the masses. It is a question for empirical research to establish the degree of correspondence in ideological thinking between the elites and masses. Despite the often unflattering portrayal of 'ordinary citizen's' ability to organize political views, there are findings that find many parallels between the elites and masses in this regard (e.g., Middendorp 1991a).

Analysis of party manifestos is still another source of measuring parties' ideological positions (Budge et al. 2001). This is sometimes done according to preconceived 'policy content' of the left-right dimension (e.g., Klingemann 1995), or by "making as few *ex ante* assumptions as possible about the specific issues that constitute left-right ideology" (Gabel and Huber 2000, 102). The latter approach, tellingly, seems to be superior.

In public opinion research, the most exploited method for estimation of respondents' ideological orientation is the self-placement scale. In continental European research, this most often involves a left-right scale, while in Anglo-Saxon countries liberal-conservative anchors are common.<sup>20</sup> Other ideological labels, such as socialist, or nationalist, are relatively rarely used. Thanks to the simplicity

of this method, it became extremely popular in empirical surveys. It is argued that a particular advantage of the self-placement method is its ability to capture the abstract nature of the Left/Right ideological dimension, i.e., its ability to represent party/candidate's stands on many issues simultaneously, and to shift its meaning by incorporating the principal political oppositions of the day and place. In this way it can serve as a 'cognitive short-cut' that helps orientation and communication in the political realm (cf. Dalton and Wattenberg 1993; Todosijević 2004b).

In many instances, respondents' ideological orientations are inferred based on their expressed voting intentions or 'feeling thermometer' scores concerning parties and/or candidates. This approach is in line with the social psychological model of the 'Michigan school' (Campbell et al. 1960), and the concept of *party identification*. However, this is even less meaningful from the point of view of the content of respondent's ideological beliefs. In addition, the correspondence between voters' and parties' issue positions is less than perfect (e.g., Granberg and Holmberg 1988), so inferring a respondent's ideology based on party choice is a risky endeavor.

A somewhat less often used strategy in mass surveys is to ask respondents for their stands on various political issues, and then to assign them an ideological position according to the researchers preconceived criteria of which side of an issue is left or right. It is relatively simple in the case of a single issue with clearly differentiated positions of opposing political actors. The situation is more complicated if one deals with more issues that can be less than perfectly related to each other. Then arises the question of the dimensions of ideology, the topic to be discussed below.

### Left-right ideological dimension

Political scientists have found the left vs. right distinction theoretically and empirically relevant in different ways (e.g., Dalton 1988; Huber and Inglehart 1995; Inglehart and Klingemann 1976; Knutsen 1995a,b; Laponce 1981). According to Listhaug, Macdonald and Rabinovitz, for example,

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<sup>20</sup> NES surveys often use 7-point scale, but most often are used 10 or 11-point scales.



“in advanced industrial democracies left-right ideology is usually the single most important dimension of political competition” (1994, 111).

As already mentioned, the flexible meaning of left-right semantics is regarded as advantageous because it can perform communication and orientation functions. If left-right dimension is interpreted as bearing fixed and immutable meaning, the L/R scale could serve as a cue for only a rather specific set of policies, which could, in addition, be less than the most relevant for political struggle within a certain polity. Hence, according to Huber and Inglehart, the left right dimension "can be found almost wherever parties exist, but it is an amorphous vessel whose meaning varies in systematic ways with the underlying political and economic conditions in a given society" (1995, 90).

Bobbio is among theoreticians that argue for the flexible nature of the left-right axis. In his view, Left and Right are not “intrinsic qualities of a political universe” but terms located within a particular “political space” (Bobbio 1997, 56). The two sides of the political spectrum “are not words which designate immutable meanings, but can signify different things in different times and situations” (*Ibid.* 56). However, a constant element, or the basic “criterion” for the left-right distinction is the “attitude of real people in society to the idea of equality” (*Ibid.* 60), where the Left is characterized by the idea of reducing inequalities.

Laponce’s argument is similar. On the basis of semiotic, neurophysiological, and election studies, he asserts that “the essence of the left/right contrast [...] rest in the contrast between the sacred and the profane on the one hand, between the powerful and the weak on the other.” (1981, 9). A vertical dimension, previously used to conceptualize the political realm (authority - subjects), has not been replaced by the left/right dimension, but rather reappeared by connecting the up with the right, and left with the down.<sup>21</sup> The left-right dimension is treated here in a more abstract, context-specific way,

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<sup>21</sup> Concerning the economic aspect of the dimension, he argues that it is not necessary to believe that “egalitarianism, a permanent feature of the left, is now necessarily and permanently associated with the notion of state economic control” (Laponce 1981, 12).

but anchored in the relationships to the value of equality. Only after the empirical evidence is examined can it be seen what specific policies are attached to its poles.

Unidimensionality and flexibility of the left-right dimension proved a convenient feature for development of formal models of vote and political preferences. In the economic approach to voting (Downs 1957), voters are seen as active and rational decision makers, driven by the expected utility of an election outcome. While the early voting behavior researchers (e.g., Michigan school) believed that issue stands ought to be related to voting decisions but found weak evidence for it, the Downsian approach typically simply assumes that policy preferences determine voting. The most straightforward derivation from the Downsian approach is the spatial theory of voting (cf. Enelow and Hinich 1984; Hinich and Munger 1992; Merrill and Grofman 1997, 1999; Westholm 1997). In this view, voters cast their votes for parties that are closest to them on a continuum on a given issue. The model is simple if there is only one dimension of policy preferences. However, that is frequently not the case. In order to accommodate this fact, the model is extended. Now voters chose a party that is closest to them when distances on all relevant dimensions between a voter's and the parties' positions are summarized. According to Merrill and Grofman the "Downsian proximity model ... specifies that utility is a declining function of distance from voter to candidate" (1997, 30).

The other approach is to treat the left-right dimension as a summary stance on all or most relevant issues of the day. According to Downs "each party takes stands on many issues, and each stand can be assigned a position on our left-right scale" (1957, 132). In this perspective, the left-right scale is a symbolic dimension that can serve as a clue to various specific policy issues, as ideological commitments in general function as clues or codes for predicting political action in many unforeseeable situations and concerning various issues.

This view was provoked by the early voting studies that demonstrated unexpectedly low levels of knowledge and interest in politics among the public. Closer look at citizens' political beliefs revealed "the stunning contrast [...] between the classic image of the democratic citizen and the actual nature of the electorate" (Dalton and Wattenberg 1993, 194). Campbell et al. concluded that the American electorate "is almost completely unable to judge the rationality of government action; knowing little

of the particular policies and what has led to them, the mass electorate is not able either to appraise its goals or the appropriateness of the means chosen to secure these goals” (1960, 543). Converse's views on this issue have already been discussed.

Thus, to compensate for the apparently too high cognitive demands that more complete familiarity with politics would require, ideological labels serve as cognitive tools that simplify political reality. Unidimensionality of political space is seen as a necessary consequence of low interest, involvement and cognitive capacity of the public. According to Budge and Bara, "Only in terms of a single dimension of differences can complex issues be rendered intelligible for mass debate" (2001, 61). Still, findings showed variable degrees of ability among the electorate to organize political attitudes in terms of a single left-right or liberal-conservative dimension. Jacoby, for example, concluded that "the cognitive application of ideology – the use of liberal-conservative abstractions to organize beliefs about specific political objects – is much more pronounced among the more educated strata of the general public" (Jacoby 1988, 326; 1995).

The 'flexibility' of the left-right dimension may be seen also as its main disadvantage, since it makes it difficult to interpret its meaning, especially in cross-cultural perspective. Middendorp (1989, 1992), among others, showed empirically that left-right self-placement does not have unique meaning, i.e., that it is related to both socio-economic left-right dimension, and to the authoritarianism-libertarianism ideological dimension. In addition, he showed also that prediction of vote might be more efficient if parties are ordered along the authoritarianism-libertarianism dimension, than according to the left-right positions (Middendorp 1989).

As an example of the use of the left-right ideological dimension, it may be useful to present a study by Granberg and Holmberg (1988). It illustrates well the way left-right self-placement scale is used, and the connection between theoretical interpretation and empirical operationalization of ideology. In order to measure the “subjective ideology”, Granberg and Holmberg use 11 (and 7) point left-right self-placement scale on samples from Sweden and USA. As evidence that the scale is used meaningfully by the respondents, they report that about 94% of Swedes and 62% of Americans managed to place themselves somewhere on the scale, and that the self-placements are relatively

stable over time (though more stability is observed in Sweden). In order to explore the substantive meaning attached to the left-right scale, they analyze correlations with 'positions on contemporary issues', and find that the relationships are stronger in Sweden (correlation with an attitude index  $r \approx .70$ ), than in USA ( $r \approx .54$  and  $.43$ ). Their conclusion thereby is that the "left-right ideology is more coherent, meaningful, and salient in Sweden than the liberal-conservative dimension in the U.S." (Granberg and Holmberg 1988, 23; see also Niemi and Westholm 1984).

They also report that 'subjective ideology' significantly correlated with various political attitudes and values (e.g., socialist society, market economy, industrial democracy, Christian values, environmentally oriented society; Granberg and Holmberg 1988, 79, Table 4.4), both among the masses and elites. They obtain higher correlation among the elites, mostly above  $.50$  and even above  $.80$ , than on the mass level, where correlations are between  $.30$  and  $.60$ , in Sweden. In USA, the coefficients (with liberal-conservative scale) are considerably lower, the typical size being around  $.20$ s.

Attitudinal correlates of the subjective ideology in Sweden pointed towards more classical socio-economic left-right dimension, represented by attitudes such as support for wage-earner funds, socializing large companies, taxes on large incomes, privatization of medical care, social welfare programs. In the USA, correlates of the liberal-conservative scale were more cultural in content, represented by attitudes towards marijuana use, status of women, racism and aid to minority groups, but also government social services, health insurance, etc. Granberg and Holmberg conclude that the Swedish public appears to be more guided by "rational democratic processes" than public of the USA.

They also performed factor analyses of political attitudes. In the USA sample, they obtained the following factors: social welfare, traditional vs. modern attitude (i.e., women, abortion, equal rights amendment, prayer in schools), environmental factor, and a factor with foreign policy items. Factors obtained in the Swedish sample are: public-private economy, social welfare, an environmental factor, and a factor containing 'moral' issues (abortion, pornography, Christian values). When measured in this way, in both countries (though more in Sweden) attitudes appear to be ideologically constrained, i.e., they explicitly refute Converse's claims. Average within-factor inter-item correlations are

significant and relatively high (in the USA between .29 and .39; in Sweden: from .29 in case of the 'moral' factor, to .52 in case of private versus public economy factor). In addition, they observe that in the USA various relationships are more dependent on education. Namely, the discrepancy between more and less educated is much weaker in Sweden, suggesting the more thorough ideologization of the Swedish public.

Granberg and Holmberg's study demonstrates several important points for the present purpose. First, in these two countries with rather different political cultures, the public demonstrates reasonable levels of political sophistication, but the differences are worth noting. Next, the public is capable of using the left-right terminology and in a relatively similar way as the political elite. However, the most important point is that various attitudinal dimensions do not uniformly correlate with the left-right scale. Even though the evidence shows that the left-right semantics incorporates various specific issues and domains, it is clear that more accurate description of the ideological structure is obtained if political attitudes are treated as multidimensional. In this regard, this study can serve as a bridge towards studies presenting multidimensional structure of ideology.

### Multidimensional models

There are obviously many reasons that justify the continued wide use of the language of left and right. Yet, there is accumulating evidence that political attitudes are generally better described as multidimensional, and, as the 'new politics' research suggests, there is a growing number of conflicts that resist assimilation into a single dimension.

More direct information about citizens' ideological thinking can be obtained by a more open-ended approach. They can simply be asked for their attitudes concerning many different issues and then examine whether these attitudes are constrained and how. Here belong studies that start from interrelationships between political attitudes and beliefs and then construct ideological models, similarly to those described within the social psychology tradition.

Granberg and Holmberg's (1988) factor analysis of attitudes in Sweden and USA has already been presented. A study by Fleishman (1988) can be taken as an example of the so-called bottom-up

approach, where the initial item pool is not assembled on the basis of theoretical consideration. Based on a rather *ad hoc* set of items available in the GSS surveys, Fleishman obtained two independent second-order factors. They were interpreted as *social welfare* and *individual liberty* dimensions, in content not unlike the often described authoritarianism-libertarianism and economic left-right dimensions.

Heath, Evans and Martin (1993) argued for the relevance of the latter two dimensions. In their operationalization, left-right dimension was defined by items dealing with economic redistribution but mainly with items expressing the conflicting perception of the society (e.g., *Management will always try to get the better of employees if it gets the chance*). The second dimension dealt with respect for tradition, punitiveness, authority, and intolerance (e.g., *People who break the law should be given stiffer sentences*). Elsewhere, the same authors renamed the left-right dimension into the Socialist/Laissez Faire dimension (Evans, Heath and Lalljee 1996). Kitschelt (e.g., 1992) also argues in favor of a comparable model in the Western context.

Ideological multidimensionality is suggested also from the cognitive schema approach. According to Kumlin (2000), his "research has detected several schema which structure political choices among the Swedish electorate. Three of these [are] (1) state -market orientations, (2) Christian traditionalist orientations, and (3) growth-ecology orientations" (Kumlin 2000, 7). Not all schemes are, however, consequential for political preferences. Politically relevant and salient schemas are those that "are clearly and persistently mirrored by stable party conflict" (*Ibid.* 7).

#### Multidimensional ideology on the philosophical and concrete level

Cees Middendorp conducted perhaps the most systematic series of studies of the structure of ideology. His studies cover a period of more than 20 years, though they remained confined to the Netherlands. One of the most important characteristics of his approach is the attention devoted to building a theoretical model and closely relating it to its operationalization. Hence, his research is, in addition to Kerlinger's (1984), the best example of the top-down approach, where specific items in attitudinal scales are explicitly related to higher-order theoretical constructs and conception of ideology.

In one of his early studies (Middendorp 1978) on a Dutch nationally representative sample ( $N=1937$ ) he constructed a number of shorter 'abstract' and 'concrete' ideological dimensions, and submitted them to multiple analyses and factor extractions. The final results revealed "2 fundamental dimensions of ideological controversy [...] - labeled left-right (LERI) and libertarianism-traditionalism (LITR) - and one subdimension of LITR: authoritarianism" (Middendorp 1978, 233). After a series of studies that traced continuities and changes in the structure of ideology in the Netherlands, and documented continuous improvements of the theoretical model and its empirical operationalization, his final model is presented in Middendorp 1991a.

He starts from the ideal-type conception of the progressivism-conservatism dimension or 'antithesis', which he regards to be central for the ideological controversies over the last two centuries in Europe. The theoretical input comes from his examination of theoretical literature on the general European model of the progressivism-conservatism 'antithesis' (not unlike Kerlinger 1984), and its Dutch variety. Middendorp then isolates key elements of this antithesis, and elaborates their relationships with the two basic values: equality and freedom. The next step was construction of the operationalization of these ideological dimensions, through a series of bipolar items, all of which are directly related to the elements in the ideal-type theoretical model (hence, this is called *direct* operationalization).

Attitudinal scales are then constructed through deduction of specific statements from the general philosophical level so that each attitude item reflects one of the two values applied to their respective domains: equality to socio-economic and freedom to politico-cultural domain. This is termed *indirect*, or attitudinal level or conceptualization of the basic ideological dimensions (indirect because it is mediated "through values") (see summary in Middendorp 1991a, 113).

On the 'philosophical level', four dimensions have been re-confirmed over several surveys (during 1970s and 1980s). These are: (1) General conservatism ("positive attitude towards traditions and customs, law and order, long-established institutions and 'prudent', moderate social change"; (2) Authoritarian conservatism (includes "pessimism regarding possibilities for social improvement and full democracy, and accepting the desirability of authority to be carried out by an elite"; (3)

Liberalism (support for free enterprise, limited government interference); and (4) Socialism ("an orientation which is against class relations and authority relations and opposes private enterprise and inequality of opportunity", (Middendorp 1991a, 110). In three-factor solutions, the first and second factors converged into a single general conservative factor. Oblique rotation showed small correlations between the liberalism and conservatism factors, and they were all negatively related with the socialism factor. Middendorp's conclusion was that "the dimensions reflect the mainstreams of ideological thought in Western Europe" (1991a, 114).

On the 'concrete' or attitudinal level, two dimensions of ideological attitudes were obtained on the mass level: socioeconomic left-right, and libertarianism-authoritarianism dimension. It is worth noting that the included short F-scale loads on the second factor. These findings re-appeared in nearly identical form in four large-scale surveys conducted in the 1970s and 1980s.

Left-right dimension expresses the support for equality in the socio-economic field, together with the support for government policies that would favor such equality (support of the welfare state). The authoritarianism-libertarianism dimension is essentially a political-cultural dimension, including various attitude scales in this domain but separated in two realms: politics, and social and family life. This dimension could be interpreted also as essentially pro- versus anti-democratic political orientation, including preferences for non-authoritarian family and social relations.

"The theoretical rationale for the existence of the two-dimensional ideological space at the attitude level in the Dutch population" (*Ibid.* 109), i.e., for the discrepancy between the philosophical and concrete levels, according to Middendorp (1991a), includes several factors. First, in his view, there is *one* progressive-conservative antithesis as the overarching ideological dimension. However, *two* values underlie this antithesis, each applied to its own domain: equality applied to the socio-economic realm, and freedom applied to politico-cultural domain. On the political level, the Dutch society has been split by two political cleavages: class and religion, which are essentially independent of each other. The final outcome is that "the *class* cleavage is sensitive to the value of *equality* in socio-economic terms", while "the religious cleavage is [...] sensitive to the value of traditional ways of life", or more generally: "the value of freedom applied to socio-cultural life" (Middendorp 1991a,



109, italics in original). Middendorp argues that these findings are in accordance with Kerlinger (1984): different values/referents are criterial for different categories of people - thereby the independence of the ideological dimensions.

In the final step of analysis, Middendorp brought the two levels, philosophical and 'concrete', in relationship to each other in the mass samples, and included in addition the shortened F-scale. As predicted, in all four examined points in time (1970, 1975, 1980, 1985) 'philosophical' dimensions of conservatism (both general and authoritarian conservatism) and the F scale together with a modest loading of Socialism in a negative direction, load the same factors with the attitudinal dimension of libertarianism vs. authoritarianism. Socialism philosophical factor loads together with attitudinal left-right dimension, including a modest and negative loading of liberalism philosophical factor. Middendorp concludes that "the left-right dimension is 'truly ideological', not only in terms of the underlying basic value of equality, but also because the two 'opposed' philosophies of socialism and liberalism load consistently negatively and positively, respectively, on this dimension" (1991a, 111). Hence, "At various levels of abstraction, Dutch political culture has proven to be ideologically multidimensional; it can therefore be conceptualized as 'pluralist'" (Middendorp 1991a, 115).

It is clear that Middendorp did not have problems in finding convincing evidence of ideological articulation, not only on elite samples, but on mass samples as well, including what he calls the 'philosophical level' of ideological thinking. He in fact admits that had he known of Converse's research, he would probably have not started his studies on mass ideology at all. The explanatory scheme Middendorp uses relies on the one side on the role of the elite discourse, i.e., locally specific traditions of philosophical thought, which explains particular configurations of various elements of ideology. For example, he points out at the specificity of the Dutch conservatism, which tends to be more socially liberal than in Anglo-Saxon tradition. On the other side, he emphasizes the role of social cleavages, especially class and religion. He also employed Kerlinger's ideas about differential criteriality of specific referent, but otherwise does not rely on social-psychological research, despite his use of the F scale.

## Grid-group model

One way of breaking with the dominance of the left-right schema is offered by the ‘grid-group’ theory (Coughlin and Lockhart 1998; Grendstad 2000, 2003; Wildavsky 1987). The objection to the left-right representation of the politics from this perspective is that it “does not consistently account for asymmetrical or hierarchical power relations, or address the views of those inactive, fatalistic and vote abstaining individuals often found at the fringes of society” (Grendstad 2003, 2). In this view, a better representation is obtained through a four-fold typology based on two dimensions: strength of the social *grid*, and strength of the social *group* (Grendstad 2003). The former refers to the restrictions on individual behavior (strong or weak), while the latter refers to “degree to which an individual is incorporated into a tightly knit group” (Grendstad 2003, 2). Intersections of these two dimensions give “four types of *social patterns*: hierarchy (strong group, strong grid), fatalism (weak group, strong grid), individualism (weak group, weak grid) and egalitarianism (strong group, weak grid)” (Grendstad 2003, 3, italics in original). Each of these corresponds to a specific orientation, or “bias”, which in a more usual terminology would mean values, ideological orientations, or world-views. The distinction is based on different notions of equality: “The central feature of grid-group theory's cultural biases [...] is found in their varying notions of the concept of equality. These are as follows: egalitarianism – equality of result/condition; individualism – equality of opportunity; hierarchy – procedural equality; and fatalism – ‘no equality on this earth’” (Grendstad 2000, 218).

Hence, Grendstad measures fatalist, egalitarian, individualist, and hierarchical ideological orientations, and finds for example, that in the Nordic countries the left-right dimension “is a surrogate for the conflict between equality of outcome (i.e., egalitarianism) and equality of opportunity (i.e., individualism)” (2003, 16). A more interesting finding is that the left-right dimension *conflates* dimensions that the grid-group theory keeps separate – namely, that conservatism conflates individualism and hierarchy, while radicalism (left pole) conflates egalitarianism and fatalism.

Here it is important to note that with several terminological changes the argument of this tradition fits with other two-dimensional models. Namely, ‘biases’ should be read as ideological orientations, while

hierarchy can be interpreted as authoritarian orientation, individualism corresponds to liberalism in other accounts, and fatalism can be read as political alienation. Another important point in this model is that it sees ideologies as rooted in socio-structural location: “orientations and biases are core values and, in turn, [...] they are generated and constrained by the social pattern in which individuals find themselves” (Grendstad 2003, 4).

### Marriage of information and predisposition

The emphases on values as underlying organizing principles behind manifest political attitudes, apparent in Middendorp's and Grendstad's accounts, is not new (e.g. Feldman 1988; Rokeach 1973). John Zaller's *The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion* (1992) presents an interesting argument about the role of values. Although he does not present a complete model of the organization of political attitudes, his argument is in many respects similar to those encountered in the political psychology literature, and other multidimensional models.

In Zaller's view, every opinion is “a marriage of information and predisposition: information to form a mental picture of the given issue, and predisposition to motivate some conclusion about it” (1992, 6). In other words, for the understanding of mass opinion, one should learn about the elite discourse (source of political information) and the ‘predisposition’ of individual recipients of the information. Now, the predispositions are of prime interest here. Political predispositions are defined as “stable, individual level traits that regulate the acceptance or non-acceptance of the political communications the person receives” (Zaller 1992, 22). Of the different possible predispositions, political *values* are given the greatest attention, “because they seem to have a stronger and more pervasive effect on mass opinions than any other predispositional factors” (Zaller 1992, 23). Values are in turn defined as “domain-specific organizing principles” (*Ibid.* 26), i.e., as relatively general and stable standards according to which particular features of reality are evaluated, and stands on specific issues determined. He illustrates the definition with the example of the value of ‘economic individualism’ (*Ibid.* 23). According to Zaller, to the extent that various values are *interrelated*, one can speak also of *ideology*. Hence, he defines ideology as “a more general left-right scheme capable of organizing a wide range of fairly disparate concerns, where the concerns being organized include various values or

issue dimensions or both” (*Ibid.* 26). In his view, the proposed framework contains “two significant novelties. First, the various value dimensions are no longer conceptually independent; rather each is one among several correlated dimensions of a master concept, ideology. Second, ideology is no longer the strictly unidimensional concept that many discussions have considered it to be, but a constellation of related value dimensions” (*Ibid.* 26). Zaller also argues that a “shortcoming of the values literature arises from its failure to, so far, specify the nature of the theoretical relationship of different value continua to one another and to political ideology” (*Ibid.* 26).

However, for those familiar with the hierarchical structural models of general socio-political attitudes, Zaller’s novelty is not so novel. One can easily recognize in Zaller’s definition of issue opinions, values and ideology, Eysenck’s concepts of habitual opinions, attitudes and ideology, respectively (e.g., Dator 1969; Eysenck 1954). In Kerlinger’s (1984) terminology for example, economic individualism would be one of many possible ‘referent objects’ that may be more or less criterial for the conservative or liberal ideology.

Moreover, an additional common element for both Zaller’s and the social psychology approaches is their reference to analogous research performed earlier in the field of human intelligence (e.g., Kerlinger 1984, 27; Zaller 1992, 26). Interestingly, the same author who advanced the structural approach to intelligence applied it also to the field of political attitudes already in the 1930s (Thurstone 1934). It seems that contemporary authors rarely read the old ones, nor do separate disciplines communicate with each other, even when they deal with the same problems.

## Summary

As the above presentation of the several multidimensional models of ideology suggests, political science literature has been obviously more consistent concerning the number and character of ideological dimensions. One of the important reasons behind this, perhaps, is that political scientists are constrained by the need to establish politically relevant dimensions, while such a constraint does not seem to be troubling social psychologists, hence their liberty in including more and more dimensions. There are also peculiar methodological reasons. Social psychologists usually use scales

with large numbers of diverse items, which makes emergence of more than two dimensions more likely. Political scientists, on the other hand, often rely on a small number of items available in large-scale surveys and election studies. In addition, those items are often closely related to political debates of the day, and actual political parties often hold distinct positions on such issues. These factors, then, would favor a smaller number of ideological dimensions.

In most multidimensional models in political science literature, there is one dimension based mostly on economic redistribution concerns, and is often labeled using left-right terms. If there are two dimensions, the second one is typically conceptualized either as the libertarian-authoritarian opposition, or as a related dimension representing the 'new politics' issues. Flanagan, for example, interprets a materialism-post-materialism dimension in terms of authoritarian-libertarian divide (Flanagan 1987; Flanagan and Lee 2003; see below for more details on this perspective). Rempel (1997) even hints at the possibility that economic views could be split into two dimensions. He found that a redistributive economic dimension is not the same as the attitude towards non-redistributive spending. They are unrelated dimensions, and while the middle strata support the latter, redistribution is supported only by the lower class. This suggests the need to consider the three dimensional models in the Western context, but the problem has not received sufficient attention yet.

One thing is clear, however, namely that the two most often described dimensions correspond to the two most influential social cleavages: economic left-right corresponds to the class division, while the authoritarianism-libertarianism dimension corresponds to the religious-secular division. These issues are addressed in the following chapter.

### ***Explanatory Accounts***

Thus far, the review of the relevant political science literature illustrates the dominance of one and two-dimensional models. This literature is also more consistent in describing the dimensions. The socio-economic left-right dimension, centered basically on redistribution issues is taken as universally valid and is present in both uni- and bi-dimensional models. The second dimension is most often libertarianism-authoritarianism opposition. The 'New Politics' models also fit this image. The 'New

Left' would represent the libertarian side, and 'new right' the authoritarian pole, though this authoritarianism is somewhat different from the classical conservative authoritarianism. The next question to be addressed concerns the typical explanatory accounts of ideological dimensions.

In the twentieth century in most Western countries, the socio-economic conflict gave meaning to the left-right division. According to Knutsen, "left-right materialist value orientations are central features of political beliefs in West European societies" (1995a, 194). Similarly, Gijsberts and Nieuwbeerta believe that "the left-right distinction clearly is the most relevant distinction between political parties, when investigating class-based voting" (2000, 408). However, cultural aspects have been involved too. Although Bobbio (1997) argued for the changeable content of the left-right opposition, he believes that the *value* of equality is the central element of the left political orientation, where the left promoted reduction of inequalities. In addition, we may recall that the early socialists were also rather liberal in life-style matters.<sup>22</sup>

Some of the studies that will be presented here could have been included in the section on multidimensional models. However, the reason for separating them is that here, the models of ideology are more embedded in given explanatory schemes, whether the cleavage model or otherwise. In other words, models presented here are outcomes of research focusing on party system explanation, emergence of new issue dimensions, or other factors, rather than on the structure of ideology per se. The obtained models of the structure of ideology are thus elements in broader research problems. Hence, the following sections review relevant studies within the cleavage politics model, studies focusing on the emergence of the 'new politics', research that points at the role of specific political institutions on ideology, and on the role of political parties.

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<sup>22</sup> One may wonder whether the *separation* of libertarianism and economic egalitarianism is actually at the core of the post-materialist shift, rather than what is often claimed to be the convergence of post-materialist and traditional-left poles.

## Social cleavage model

In the sociological tradition, the explanatory role is attributed to primary social groups, whether through common group interests (e.g., 'Columbia school', Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954), or as a reflection of social cleavages (Bartolini and Mair 1990; Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Kriesi 1998). Already Lipset and Rokkan's (1967) multidimensional conception of social cleavages pointed towards ideological multidimensionality.

In this perspective, cleavage is defined as social division, accompanied by specific group identities and attitudes (we may call it specific group ideology), and politicization of the division by specific political parties (cf. Lawson, Rommele, and Karasimeonov 1999). Knutsen and Scarbrough's recent formulation of the concept of cleavage emphasizes the three key elements of the construct of social cleavage. In their words,

"First, a cleavage is rooted in a relatively persistent social division which gives rise to "objectively" identifiable groups within society – according to class, religion, economic, or cultural interests, or whatever. Secondly, a cleavage engages some set of values common to members of the group; group members know a "common life" in so far as they share the same value orientation. Thirdly, a cleavage is institutionalized in some form of organization – most commonly a political party ... which transforms social divisions into cleavages by giving coherence and organized political expression to what are otherwise inchoate and fragmentary beliefs, values and experiences among members of some social group or some cluster of groups." (Knutsen and Scarbrough 1995, 494)

However, Knutsen and Scarbrough go one step further than the original model. Namely, they admit that political allegiances are not always based on fully-fledged cleavages. They differentiate structural voting - when structural and status variables relate to voting directly. Value cleavage exists when voting is based on values but not structurally rooted (Moreno labels this as a value-based cleavage (1999, 16)). Finally, when all three elements are present, Knutsen and Scarbrough speak about cleavage politics proper (see also Tóka 1998).

According to the Lipset-Rokkan perspective, the socio-economic content of ideology is a reflection of industrial revolution and cleavage between social classes. Urban-rural, center-periphery, and church-state cleavages have their corresponding ideological ramifications as well. The religious cleavage (religious-secular opposition) especially achieved political weight, in addition to the class cleavage. The ideological dimension that reflects this cleavage is generally conceived as the authoritarian-libertarian dimension (cf. Middendorp 1991a; Thomassen 2004).

One reason more why cleavage politics model is relevant for a student of ideology is that it attempts to explain also the persistence of particular political divisions over time, though the famous Lipset-Rokkan "freezing hypothesis". In a more recent discussion of the freezing hypothesis, Peter Mair (1997) points at the role of political parties as active agents in structuration of political divisions. In his view, "a given party system, and a given structure of competition, act to 'freeze' in place a specific language of politics. Party competition [...] then becomes dominated by a particular overriding choice, to which other considerations are subordinated" (Mair 1997, 13-14).

In other words, the existing parties are interested in perpetuating the divide that made them successful initially. Thus, it is difficult for new issues and ideological dimensions to achieve political prominence once a particular issue/ideological dimension becomes dominant. The freezing of a party system in fact freezes a particular conflict. Hence, the political conflict that could change the political landscape involves those who are against the system frozen in a particular way, i.e., those who want to change the dimension of competition, or definition of the principal political conflict.

For new democracies, one could speculate, politically salient dimensions may reflect the divisions at the stage of relative fixation of the party system, and not necessarily structural and ideological oppositions among the electorate. For example, in Serbia the period during the 1990s was defined largely in terms of the democratic/reformist versus authoritarian/nationalist opposition, thus preventing the authentic politicization of the socio-economic cleavage.



## Cleavages and value orientations

Building on the cleavage politics model, that emphasizes left-right materialism and religious dimensions, and 'new politics' theories, pointing at the role of authoritarian-libertarian opposition and environmental values, Jacques Thomassen (2004) arrives at four value orientations that, he argues, represent the main ideological dimensions in Western Europe. They are (1) Religious versus secular values or moral values, (2) Economic left-right, (3) Libertarian/authoritarian, (4) Ecology versus growth orientations" (Thomassen 2004, 25).

He analyzes changes in the ability of these dimensions to predict vote over time in the west European countries. The results showed that "the old politics value orientations" (religiosity and socio-economic left-right) to a certain extent decrease in importance over years. The 'new politics' values (authoritarianism-libertarianism and environmentalism) are becoming more relevant, yet the old values are still stronger predictors of vote than new ideological dimensions. He also finds that the voting of the "European Voter" can be much better predicted based on these ideological dimensions than just relying on social structure variables. In addition, Thomassen found that the more polarized the party system is, the stronger is the influence of values compared to structural variables.

Thomassen arrived at the four ideological dimensions on the basis of theoretical considerations, that is, not by empirically establishing that these dimensions are independent of each other and sufficient to account for the broader 'space' of political attitudes. Nevertheless, their relationships with party preferences and other variables strongly emphasized the utility of the multidimensional conception of ideology across the examined West European polities.

Knutsen (1988) earlier reported similar findings. He found that *value cleavages* have a rather strong impact on party preferences in Western Europe, although "the old structural cleavages in the Lipset-Rokkan model still have the strongest impact in most Western democracies" (Knutsen 1988, 349). Materialism-post-materialism and left-right materialism (as ideological dimensions) proved to have relatively similar and strong impact across the 10 countries he examined. However, it is important to emphasize that actually *religion* proved to be the strongest single structural factor, i.e., not the class cleavage. Knutsen treats left-right materialism as an ideological or value cleavage, i.e., not just as a

manifestation of the class division. He argues that the L-R dimension itself "has altered from a structural class or status cleavage to an independent ideological cleavage (in a causal sense) and that this is a characteristic of the industrial/post-industrial transformation" (Knutsen 1988, 349)

More recently, Knutsen (2004) corroborated his findings that religion is a very important determinant of party choice over time and countries, though with significant variations. His explanation of why religion and religious values have remained so influential politically rests not so much on structural divisiveness of religion, as on religion as a source of values and world-views. In his words,

“The religious cleavage is also important because it reflects deeply held human values, which have a great potential for influencing behavior. Although religious issues are not very prominent on the political agenda, religious values are related to a wide range of social and political beliefs: work ethics, achievement aspirations, lifestyle norms, parent–child relations, morality, social relations, attitudes toward authority, and acceptance of the state. Religion signifies a *Weltanschauung* that extends into the political area” (Knutsen 2004, 99).

I emphasize this argument of Knutsen, because it gives meaningful substance to the often encountered relationships between voting (or any other aspect of political behavior) and simple variables of church attendance and religious denomination. Interpretation of religion as a source of world-view, or *Weltanschauung* is close to my treatment of authoritarianism as a world-view (Gabennesch 1972; Bojanović 2004). In both cases structural factors are mediated through dispositional constructs with broad effects on an individual’s social outlook.

#### The role of occupation (Kitschelt 1994)

Many aspects of Herbert Kitschelt's *The Transformation of European Social Democracy* (1994) can be used as a rather representative example of the political sociology approach, with all its virtues and weaknesses, and therefore deserves a bit more extended discussion. Kitschelt's theoretical argument starts from the often encountered (though empirically largely unsubstantiated) claim that after some

‘threshold’ until which they go together, liberty and equality are values opposed to each other.<sup>23</sup> He claims that those who rank liberty above equality also rank market higher, while those who favor equality above liberty prefer state redistribution. This scheme is a basis for development of a two-dimensional ideological model. One axis is labeled as *fraternity*, and consists of an opposition between communitarianism and libertarianism. The second axis concerns distribution, and is based on the opposition between capitalism and socialism.<sup>24</sup>

Kitschelt also formulated “two master hypotheses” (1994, 12) concerning the relationships between the social structure, ideological orientations, and political preferences. The first hypothesis states that (1) experiences in everyday life shape political preferences (i.e., not only relationship to ownership of the means of production, that is class position). The second master hypothesis resembles the marginal utility theorem, and states that (2) those preferences are politicized that are individually salient and perceived to be least realized in the existing order.<sup>25</sup>

Kitschelt's conception of human motives comes from the rational choice tradition: humans are seen as motivated by the desire to maximize monetary income. Realization of this desire, however, depends on an individual's place in the market: it is different for manual workers, state officials, those employed in international companies, and so on. In this simple way, the bridge between the socio-structural location, interests, and political preferences is established.

In addition to economic interests, there are also other relevant (psychological) factors. He believes that everyday ‘organizational experiences’ are important, especially for the communitarian axis (the

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<sup>23</sup> The argument goes back at least to Rokeach's (1973) model of values. However, this scheme lacks support in empirical data, especially when voters are examined. It seems that only for rightists it is true that they value equality less than the others (the extreme right values liberty less as well), while the left seems to be equally concerned both with liberty and equality (Helkama, Uutela, and Schwartz 1992).

<sup>24</sup> Throughout the book, the two axes are generally treated as capitalism vs. socialism and libertarianism-authoritarianism dimensions despite the initial exotic labels.

emphasis here generally shifts on libertarianism). The control over work, interpersonal communication, and other related experiences are seen as particularly important. Yet, this complexity is generally reduced to different consequences of levels of education, and the claim that higher levels of education predispose one to higher libertarianism, but even greater emphasis is put on occupational categories (see also Kitschelt and Rehm 2004; Svallfors 2005).<sup>26</sup>

One of the central arguments in Kitschelt's book concerns his two-dimensional model of the West-European political space. The two orthogonal dimensions, as aforementioned, are the libertarian-

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<sup>25</sup> It is hard to escape the impression that it must be methodologically difficult to prove or refute particularly the second hypothesis, because of inherent possibility of reversed causation – the politicized preferences may become perceived as the least realized

<sup>26</sup> In general, Kitschelt does not seem to be troubled by the possibility of alternative causal sequences. He argues, for example, that “higher education predisposes individuals toward more libertarian view” (1994, 17). However, level of education does not simply befall on individuals. The hypothesized relationship might be a spurious one. By way of an illustration, it can be argued that poor children have less chance to be educated, and they have more chances to feel manipulated as objects, and therefore experience and develop a weaker sense of autonomy compared to typical middle-class children (cf. Kasser et al. 1995). (Simultaneously, it is in their interest to demand greater economic redistribution.) Thus, the correlation between education and libertarianism could be a consequence of specific objective conditions but without causal relationship between them. The problem is even more obvious with Kitschelt's explanation of why women tend to be more communitarian-libertarian. The explanation rests on gender-specific work specialization, namely concentration of women in 'nonroutine client-interactive' jobs. According to Kitschelt, “Nonroutine client-interactive labor individualizes workers' occupational experience and dilutes authority relations. It is likely to instill an antiauthoritarian vision of work autonomy and greater sense of other-regardingness and reciprocity with interaction partners than does work on objects and documents” (1994, 17). A straightforward counter-argument would be that there is something that makes nonauthoritarian individuals chose non-authoritarian or 'status-attenuating' professions. Consider, for example, a theory of Felicia Pratto and Jim Sidanius and their coworkers (e.g., Pratto et al. 1997) that tries to explain differential distribution of individuals into hierarchy-attenuating and hierarchy maintaining professions, the division that is strongly correlated with gender. In addition to an evolutionary explanation of the observed gender differences, the theory also rests on an individual difference variable, namely social dominance orientation, which motivates differently disposed individuals into different roles. Most importantly, however, this theory is submitted to rigorous empirical tests, while Kitschelt's argument is by and large speculative and based ad hoc reasoning. The point I wish to make here is not that Kitschelt's model is wrong—his arguments are indeed plausible—but that there are missing elements in the general explanatory scheme and the linking mechanism is not explicated.

authoritarian dimension, and the socialist-capitalist dimension. Following the political sociology tradition, occupational categories are treated as one of the principal explanatory variables (e.g., different occupational categories are placed in specific places in the two-dimensional space that supposedly reflect their political outlook, see Kitschelt 1994, 27).

His main, and subsequently widely quoted, argument is that the main axis of competition in Western Europe shifted from traditional left-right opposition, to a left-libertarian and right-authoritarian dimension (see graph on p. 32). In addition to the sociological factors, values and ideas are also considered important: “Overall, some argument based on the *coherence of ideas* suggests some affinity between libertarian and socialist views, on the one hand, and authoritarian and capitalist views, on the other, but ultimately remains inconclusive” (Kitschelt 1994).<sup>27</sup>

It is always difficult to submit such a complex theory, as Kitschelt's, to a straightforward empirical test. In cross-country comparative research, selection of sufficient and representative variables is always a serious problem. Hence, in order to test his theoretical model, Kitschelt was able to enter into factor analysis the following set of variables: age, education, occupation (white collar or student), left-right self-placement, religiosity, materialism–post-materialism (MPM) index, and three items indicating support for ecology, antinuclear, and peace movements. And that is all. Libertarian-authoritarian dimension is measured principally with the MPM index (Inglehart), since according to Kitschelt, “In conclusion, the MPM index primarily measures libertarian versus authoritarian views” (1994, 28).<sup>28</sup> Capitalist-socialist dimension is measured by left-right self-placement item.<sup>29</sup>

The listed variables were then entered into factor analysis in order to get the two theoretical political dimensions. Results across countries seem to be considerably inconsistent and puzzling, but the

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<sup>27</sup> However, numerous studies in the Western democracies demonstrate clear evidence of the connection between authoritarianism and conservatism and other right-wing ideologies (Stone and Smith 1993).

<sup>28</sup> There are, however, serious methodological concerns about reliability and validity of Inglehart's post-materialism indexes (e.g., Clarke and Dutt, 1991; Evans et al. 1996; Flanagan 1987).

conclusion was that the two factors obtained across cases could be interpreted as (1) left-libertarianism vs. right-authoritarianism dimension, and (2) Yuppies vs. working class sympathizers of social movements factors. The first factor (actually the first non-rotated principal component) contains loadings of virtually all entered variables, while the second factor is saturated mostly by three items on new social movements, and white-collar occupation. When factor analysis is performed on all countries together, the only difference between the two factors is in positive or negative loading of the support for new social movements. Thus, the difference might as well reflect the method rather than content variance. The question remains, however, to what extent the original theoretical model is confirmed.

One of the reasons for this more detailed presentation of Kitschelt's (1994) research is to show the not so infrequently encountered discrepancy between the attractive theoretical arguments, their empirical operationalization, and subsequent leap back to the abstract theoretical level. Yet, Kitschelt's (1994) argument about the shifting of the principal axis of competition became widely quoted and treated as an empirically substantiated fact. The speculative hypotheses about consequences of different positions in the economy make sense only as long as one is willing to examine the so-called background variables only. The argument connecting socio-economic background and ideological orientations rests in fact on a number of un-explicated and unsubstantiated psychological assumptions. The corresponding mechanism is not really explicated and examined.

It might be more realistic, for example, to hypothesize that one's world-view has broader and 'longer' (in terms of personal history) roots.<sup>30</sup> One does not change attitudes and world-views that easily with the changing of her sector of employment. A particular occupational category (whether chosen or befallen) is often itself an element expressing and reinforcing a particular developing (reified) world-

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<sup>29</sup> Despite the evidence that the index might be 'contaminated' by non-economic considerations, or even the libertarianism-authoritarianism dimension (Middendorp 1989, 1992).

<sup>30</sup> For the role of political socialization, see for example Searing, Wright and Rabinowitz 1976, or Sears and Valentino 1997. Kasser, Koestner and Leke (2002) for example, comparing family SES at age 5 and values at age 31, found that it is occupation of *parents* that matters for later values and attitudes.

view (Pratto, Stallworth, and Sidanius 1997). Hence, the progress could be achieved by explicating the mechanism that connects socio-economic background with values, attitudes and ideological orientations. The present research relies on the conception of authoritarianism as world-view (Gabennesch 1972) and the related research.

### New politics - the emergence of new issues and conflicts<sup>31</sup>

Another and very influential source of two-dimensional models in political science was the rise of the so-called '*new politics*' issues and new social movements (Dalton and Kuechler 1990; Rempel 1997). It has been argued that the classic Western ideological structures were shaken by new social and political developments. The previously dominant economy-centered unidimensional ideological structure came under the attack of the New Politics, the post-materialist left and the radical right. In addition, the Thatcherite-Reaganite revolution turned neo-conservatism into a radical political force, promoting social changes, against which the left appeared as 'conservative', striving to preserve the remnants of the 'dying out' welfare state (cf. Giddens 1994).<sup>32</sup>

Although there seems to be a consensus about the declining role of traditional socio-economic cleavages in explaining political behavior, there is less agreement about what interests or values have replaced the old cleavages. Postmodern theorists and also many empirical researchers see no new order arising. They speak rather about general de-alignment, particularization, de-massification, and fragmentation of political behavior (for empirical evidence see Franklin et al. 1992). As opposed to this view, the theorists of post-materialism see a new cleavage taking over the role of the traditional divisions. According to this school, growing affluence, the absence of wars and the high level of education turns an ever-increasing number of people towards post-materialist values (Inglehart 1971, 1977, 1990; Trump 1991).

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<sup>31</sup> Part of the discussion in this chapter was earlier presented as Enyedi, Zs. and Todosijević, B. *Post-materialism and authoritarianism in Hungary: Multivariate models of values*. Paper presented at the XXIII Annual Scientific Meeting of the International Society of Political Psychology, Seattle, July 2000.

<sup>32</sup> Wildavsky (1987) also rejects that conservatism means simply a resistance to change.

According to Dalton (1988), one of the more pronounced students of the "new style of citizen politics", there is a number of factors that contributed to the changes in the outlook of West European politics over last several decades. Some of the most important factors, in his view, are "unprecedented expansion of economic well being", increased governmental involvement in society, "restructuring of the labor force", expanded educational opportunities, and "increases in informational resources" (*Ibid.* 6-7). These factors influenced changes in "life conditions and life styles", and lead to "a growth of political skills and resources, producing the most sophisticated public in the history of democracies" (*Ibid.* 7-8). In the political sphere, these changes are reflected in the increased political participation, appearance of new issues, and new modes of participation. Or, in Dalton's own words: "The political conflicts in advanced industrial societies have created a *new dimension of cleavage* in recent years. This *New Politics* dimension involves conflict over a new set of issues - environmental quality, alternative life styles, minority rights, participation, and social equality" (1988, 133-4).

Closely related is Ronald Inglehart's famous thesis on post-materialist 'cultural shift' (e.g., 1977, 1987, 1990), which refers specifically to the changes in values and attitudes. His theory opposes the view that 'modernization' signifies the end of history. In his view, the 'silent revolution' has been going on in the most modernized societies during the second half of the 20th century. It consists in decreasing appreciation of core modern values such as the improvement of the material standard of living, public order, or national security and military strength. Increasingly popular values are, for example, environmental protection, or civil liberties especially for different minority groups (ethnic or life-style ones).<sup>33</sup> The former set of values Inglehart labeled as *Materialist values*, while the latter are known as *Post-Materialist values*, arguing that this opposition represents the new competing political and ideological cleavage.

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<sup>33</sup> The empirical findings are, however, not unambiguous. Easterlin and Crimmins (1991) report that youth values changed between 1970s and 1980s in the direction of increasing private materialism and away from personal self-fulfillment.



While some observers find the power of post-materialist vs. materialist opposition falling behind the influence of class, religion and left-right identification in terms of affecting the vote (Middendorp 1989, 1992; Oppenhuijs 1995), others argue that at least in such countries as the Netherlands post-materialism both shapes and rivals Left-Right identification in importance (Van Deth and Guerts 1989). Inglehart's (1984) original claim was that the very meaning of left and right is gradually changing, being increasingly filled with connotations of the materialist-post-materialist value opposition.

There are many scholars, however, who prefer to label the new dimension that crosscuts socio-economic left-right opposition with the old labels of authoritarianism and libertarianism. The relationship of the concepts of post-materialism and authoritarianism seems to be rather complex. Inglehart refers to Adorno et al.'s (1950) authoritarianism as a potential alternative to his own model. He dismisses the challenge embodied in this rival concept, however, rather swiftly, pointing at the methodological problems of TAP and at the fact that the early socialization theory does not explain the significant difference between countries and generations (Inglehart 1977, 66-69; 1990, 70-71). In addition, he argued that "authoritarianism, as originally operationalized, has a poor empirical fit with Materialism/Post-materialism" (Inglehart 1997, 48).

There are, nevertheless, reasons to expect a rather close relationship between the two *value orientations*. Post-materialists are tolerant because they take survival for granted, while materialists feel threatened in their basic existence, so they follow strict community rules, sanction deviant behavior and respect authorities (Flanagan 1987; Inglehart 1990). Authoritarians, on the other hand, should be conservative, and, therefore, less supportive of anything new, especially radical parties and movements. They should be definitely embarrassed with unconventional speeches and public actions that challenge existing social hierarchies - activities that characterize post-materialists so much.

An additional similarity between the two concepts is revealed if we scrutinize their content more closely. For example, antiintraceptiveness is considered one of central components of the authoritarian syndrome (Adorno et al. 1950). It is expressed as opposition to subjective, psychological life and introspection, rejection of art and imagination, and through emphasizing the material side of life and

material values. Thus, post-materialist emphasis on freedom of expression, subjectivity, and related values, obviously is in contradiction with antiintraceptiveness.

Some of the items that Inglehart uses for measuring post-materialism sound very much like items used in authoritarianism scales. Actually, it is often noted that Inglehart's "materialist" items can be grouped in two categories. On the one hand there are those, like punishment of terrorists, stronger defense, which are close to the classic concept of authoritarianism, while others, like the desire for higher wages or the strong preference for an aesthetic, undisturbed environment, are further from it. Flanagan (1987) claimed that Inglehart simply mixed together the essentially distinct materialist and authoritarian items, and thus created a serious conceptual confusion (cf. Thomassen 2004). The authoritarian value orientation "designates a broader cluster of values, which, along with concerns for security and order, includes respect for authority, discipline and dutifulness, patriotism and intolerance for minorities, conformity to customs, and support for traditional religious and moral values" (Flanagan 1987, 1305). The scale classifies authoritarians as materialists, even though there may exist both libertarian and authoritarian materialists, as well as materialist and non-materialist authoritarians.

The critiques argue not only that Inglehart mixed two value clusters, but that among the two the authoritarian attitudes form the really important cluster. According to Middendorp (1989, 1992), for example, the authoritarian element of the post-materialism scale is in fact the more relevant for electoral behavior. As he put it: "The political 'kernel' of postmaterialism seems to be its libertarian authoritarian aspect" (Middendorp 1992, 257).

The relative explanatory superiority of authoritarianism, or at least the difference between authoritarianism and post-materialism, is also highlighted by Flanagan's observations. While he finds that the materialist - non-materialist opposition, understood in the narrow sense of the words, describes two stagnant class cultures, a genuine world-wide revolution is detectable along the

libertarianism-authoritarianism axis, the new generations taking more tolerant positions on social issues than their parents (Flanagan 1987; Flanagan and Lee 2003).<sup>34</sup>

There are two reasons why Inglehart's post-materialism theory deserved this extended presentation. One is that I agree with the view that post-materialism is a construct close to authoritarianism, which in my model serves as an important mediating variable between social structure and attitudes. Second, my argument is also similar to Inglehart's emphasis on psychological disposition, at least in his early formulation of the theory. Inglehart's application of Maslow's theory of need hierarchy points at the role of early socialization in the development of later values and attitudes, in a similar way as suggested by the view of authoritarianism as world-view (Gabennesch 1972). One important reason to favor the application of the authoritarianism construct to a post-communist context is that post-materialist values have poor explanatory power, considerably weaker than authoritarianism (Enyedi and Todosijević 2000).

#### Parties as factors influencing structuration of attitudes

Political parties as active agents have also received attention of scholars interested in the political role of ideologies. One of the central roles for political parties is that "Parties help citizens and politicians to overcome collective action problems in mobilizing demands and resolving problems of social choice in coordinating a myriad of diverse policy preference schedules" Kitschelt et al. 1999, 59).

Perhaps the most influential tradition stems from the cleavage politics model. As aforementioned, one way the parties exhibit their influence is related to the freezing hypothesis. Parties actively try to

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<sup>34</sup> On the surface the proposition that the distribution of *personality types* can be radically different from one generation to another might appear as controversial, unless broader social transformation includes also changes in functioning of the major socializing agencies (e.g., Lederer 1993). Moreover, for most political scientists the problem of the changing distribution of personality types does not exist, since they simply employ the common sense meaning of authoritarianism as the opposite of enlightened, tolerant and democratic views. The disregard of deeper-level psychological mechanisms is general, since Inglehart also dropped ("silently") the reference to Abraham Maslow's need hierarchy model and replaced it with the model of diminishing marginal utility. And if one treats post-materialism and authoritarianism as two clusters of values, there is no *a priori* reason to suspect one to be more sensitive to age and generation than the other.

capture a particular division and maintain it out of their self-interest. The mechanism is seen in parties' organizational work and encapsulation of the electorate. According to Peter Mair, "Through the encapsulation of sections of the mass electorate, and through the inculcation of political identities which proved both solid and enduring, the mass party became the agency by which political behavior was structured, and by which partisan stability was ensured" (Mair 1990, 3).

Samuel Barnes is one of the scholars who emphasized the active role of parties as well. He tried to answer "the most pressing problem" of "how ideologies affect the structure of political conflict on the macro level and individual action on the micro level" (1966, 513). He argues, in contrast to later theories of Kerlinger (1984) and Middendorp (1991a), that, given the evidence of minimal ideological sophistication of ordinary citizens (and here he quotes Converse), mass publics are "largely devoid of genuine constraints in their belief systems stemming from ideological considerations" (Barnes 1966, 519). Instead, "it is likely that organizational ties are as important as ideology in the development of individual constraints within mass publics (*Ibid.* 519). Ideological thinking is a task for elites, and therefore "it is through organization that the ideologies of elites become politically relevant" (*Ibid.* 522).

In broader interpretation, this suggests that parties as organizations to a large extent shape the structure of ideological thinking among the masses. Yet, in contemporary politics, parties do much less organizational work than the classical mass parties. Instead, the role of mass media is much more important in transferring party messages to the voters. The implication is that parties might have smaller or different roles than the early students of electoral behavior observed. Instead, the heavy reliance on mass media implies the relevance of the receptivity of particular sections of the electorate for particular types of messages. In this way, distinct world-views accompanied by negative stereotypes about political enemies, can become the central dividing lines of national politics. The depth of such divisions can be large enough to prevent cooperation across the camp-borders, as happens in cases where socio-economic groups are pitted against each other. One of principal arguments of this research is that political attitudes, values, or ideologies, with only marginal or indirect links with social structure, but heavily rooted in distinct world-views, can provide ground for

exceptionally stable political orientations. Thus, I would argue that this is another place that warrants paying attention to the role of individual dispositions.

This does not mean that parties are becoming less relevant, but primarily that their influence is exercised through different mechanisms, i.e., not relying on extensive organizational work. Thus, I examine changes and stability in interrelationships between some of the key ideological dimensions. In some cases the origin of changes can be attributed to the changing relationship between parties, while changes of the attitudinal structure followed party moves over the ideological spectrum. This addition to my general explanatory framework is important because it shows that voters' ideological orientations do not necessarily constrain political parties. The relationship is rather interactive and mutual.

Finally, electoral systems may also have significant consequences for the structure of ideology. Systems favoring two party systems would provide incentives for elites to aggregate issues into a single ideological dimension, while proportional systems might be more favorable for multidimensional ideological competition (Kostadinova 2002). The underlying rationale is well expressed by Karp and Banducci, who argue that "In a proportional electoral system, where multiple parties have the opportunity to gain representation without appealing to a plurality of voters, parties do not have an incentive to widen their appeal to the largest group of voters, which allows them to maintain ideological purity" (Karp and Banducci 2002, 126). Comparing "the relative importance of ideology and issues in their influence on party support" before and after change in New Zealand's electoral system, they find that "the effects of ideology are almost twice as great under PR than under FPP" (Karp and Banducci 2002, 132; 'FPP' - first past the post system). Hence, given Serbia's proportional system, one would expect multiple competitive dimensions.

In many accounts of the logic of party system formation in Eastern Europe, it has been argued that early or founding elections are of crucial importance for later developments. Cox (1997, 151–172) argues that because of uncertainty of success of any of the participating parties and candidates, they have basically equal chances of gaining representation. The likely outcome of founding elections is therefore a high level of fragmentation. The next expected phase is a "shake-down period" (Taagepera

and Shugart 1989, 88), i.e., when smaller parties are 'squeezed out' due to consolidation of support for larger parties and to the influence of electoral system. However, Reich finds "little evidence that new party systems experience a "shakedown" effect as electoral systems exert a squeeze on small parties" (2004, 248). Instead, there is "more evidence that parties that win founding elections are likely to experience significant declines in voter support across the next few elections and that support for minor parties is generally stable" (*Ibid.* 248). In general,

"party systems [...] exhibited stable to highly increasing patterns of fragmentation and volatility in the wake of founding elections, consistent with the hypothesis that new dimensions of political conflict emerge following a regime transition, especially when economic crisis coincides with regime transition" (*Ibid.* 248).

Following the line of argument of Cox (1997) and Taagepera and Shugart (1989), when applied to ideological dimensions of competition, one would expect a decrease in the number of relevant dimensions, and/or convergence on different specific dimensions into a smaller number of broader dimensions (e.g., socio-economic left-right). Yet, in line with Reich (2003), it is possible to expect actually increasing ideological pluralization over time.

### ***Post-Communist Context***

Much of research on post-communist countries has been done under the assumptions of the cleavage model. At least initially, the overwhelming concern has been about the viability and durability of newly established democratic regimes, and the cleavage model seems natural due to the presumed association between cleavage politics and political stability (e.g., Whitefield 2002). The rationale is well expressed by Kitschelt et al.:

"If conflicts between group interests, however, are somehow 'grounded' in the distribution of scarce material and cultural resources in society and show an association with partisan preferences even in an era of turmoil due to profound market liberalization and restructuring of the state apparatus, then one might have considerable confidence in the expectation that currently visible

group and party alignments have the potential of becoming durable political 'cleavages'." (1999, 269).

In Peter Mair's (1997) speculative argument about the specificities of the post-communist party systems one can find a number of hypotheses about the structuration of political oppositions, and hence about ideological structuration. Following the freezing hypothesis, he emphasizes the initial period of consolidation of a party system.

He argues that there are different obstacles to consolidation of party systems in post-communist countries from those encountered in the period of western democratization (Mair 1997, 175). First, the democratization process is different: civil society is largely absent, while the 'triple transition', i.e., political, economic, and state-building, puts the three tasks at the same time for these countries, hence creating broader space for competition rather than cooperation among the political elites. The character of the electorate also differs: it is more open and available, i.e., there is no 'closure' due to developed cleavages and organizational links between groups and parties are missing. Hence, Mair predicts the persistence of elitist parties. Finally, there are important differences in the context of competition. Political elites are less loyal to their organizations, i.e., party changes, mergers, and secessions are easy to accomplish. In general, parties have no identity above their leaders, institutional framework is unstable, and so on and so forth.<sup>35</sup>

Under such conditions, according to Mair (1997) post-communist party competition should be more conflictual and adversarial than in the West. There are several arguments for this expectation. Political certainty fosters cooperation between elites (open electoral market means that elites can attract more votes by attacking others, i.e. the more you hope for your victory the more competitive you are). Given the triple transition, stakes in the political competition are high. The real-life consequences of government change in the west are relatively small, while in transitional cases the stakes are very high. Hence, based on Mair's (1997) speculative arguments about the post-communist conditions, we

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<sup>35</sup> For a similar reasoning about potential problems in party system stabilization in the post-communist context, see Lawson, Rommele, and Karasimeonov 1999.

should expect evidence of (a) ideological instability, i.e., fluctuating or changing attitudinal content of the main political divisions, (b) strong polarization in the main divisive ideological dimensions, and (3) relatively weak and unstable connection between party preferences and ideological orientations among the voters.

### The role of the regime divide

The role of regime change cleavage is emphasized by Alejandro Moreno (1999) in his comparative study of both old and new democracies. Moreno starts from the assumption that "the most salient issues determine the dimensions of political competition. These dimensions, in turn, shape the relevant political cleavages" (*Ibid.* 1). Answering the question "What are the main dimensions of political competition in the new democracies?" (*Ibid.* 2), he argues that "in many new democracies a democratic-authoritarian dimension or conflict constitutes the single most important political cleavage" (*Ibid.* 2). Furthermore, Moreno advances an almost tautological claim that "a democratic-authoritarian cleavage is likely to fade as democracy grows roots" (*Ibid.* 3), thus providing a hypothesis about longer-term changes.

Conceptually Moreno starts from Knutsen and Scarbrough's (1995) reformulation of the cleavage construct. He is interested in de-coupling structural and attitudinal aspects, arguing that value cleavage is essentially an issue-oriented cleavage, and that it reflects "the relevant ideological and value orientations in society, which in some cases may be anchored to structural differences" (*Ibid.* 16).

In empirical analyses, Moreno utilizes data from the second and third waves of the World Value Survey. Discriminant analysis is applied in order to define *cleavage dimensions* (or competitive dimensions in terminology of Kitschelt et al. 1999), while factor analysis is aimed to define *issue dimensions*. His findings for advanced industrial countries are not surprising. They indicate the existence of strong structural cleavages, as shown by religion in the Netherlands, regions in Belgium or Spain, as well as urban-rural divisions. Value or issue orientations are very important as well,



particularly the left-right materialist orientation, as well as what Moreno terms *postmodern-fundamentalist* (or libertarian-fundamentalist) issue dimension (*Ibid.* 72-3)

In his sample of nine post-communist societies, Moreno finds strong authoritarian-libertarian cleavages only in some post-communist cases. In a number of cases it appeared that "liberal-fundamentalist issue dimensions constitute the main cleavage" (*Ibid.* 77) (this dimensions deals with views toward religion, abortion, and nationalism). Factor analyses in the nine post-communist countries yielded three comparable *issue dimensions*. The first one aggregates *pro-reform versus antireform* issues (reform in the direction of pro-democratic, pro-market changes, but in some cases tinted with nationalism). The second factor loads *liberal-fundamentalist* issues, mostly defined by religiosity and the abortion issue, and in many cases nationalism. Finally, the third factor is composed in *democratic vs. authoritarian* issues, i.e. attitudes favoring more open and democratic government.<sup>36</sup>

Moreno claims that these three factors are obtained in all analyzed cases. It is, however, difficult to clearly differentiate factors from each other since items often load on more than one factor (perhaps because he did not perform any factor rotation). Moreover, the factors differ across countries quite considerably. For example, Hungary and Poland are not the most divergent cases in his sample, yet the factor congruence score for the first factor (reform) is .52. For the liberal-fundamentalist factor congruence coefficient reached a more respectable .75, but it is exceedingly low (.26) for the third factor. Overall congruence for the three factors is .48, meaning that they are considerably different from country to country.<sup>37</sup> Thus, one should be careful in treating these dimensions as equivalent across countries.

Political cleavages are analyzed via discriminant analysis based on the three extracted issue dimensions: materialism-post-materialism (MPM) index, and socio-economic background variables.

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<sup>36</sup> Note that there is no standard left-right dimension, perhaps because items that would operationalize this dimension are scarce in his item pool (it seems that 'left-right' label entered into some of his tables by mistake). Left-right items load mostly on the reform factor.

Moreno generally finds two dimensions across cases. In some cases, e.g., Russia, Belarus, Romania, the issue of reforms is the most discriminating, hence providing evidence of a comprehensive cleavage of political and economic reforms. In other cases, such as Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, but also the Czech Republic, the liberal-fundamentalist issue divides the parties best, while the attitudes towards reforms tend to form the secondary cleavage.<sup>38</sup> The authoritarian-democratic cleavage is less relevant in these countries, reflecting the general acceptance of democratic regime among the competing elites, according to Moreno. In the third group, exemplified by Bulgaria, authoritarian-democratic divides define the first discriminant function, but the issue of reforms is also quite a central issue (not unlike Kitschelt et al. 1999). In general, he finds that only in some of the new democracies the authoritarian-democratic cleavage is salient (e.g. in Latin America and Russia, but not in Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovenia or Poland, *Ibid.* 24).

Socio-economic status variables exhibit generally low loading on discriminant functions, except for example, in Hungary where older respondents tend to be more 'fundamentalist'. In general, Moreno does not provide support for the existence of strong social divisions behind party preferences and ideological orientations.

The results of discriminant analyses are, however, somewhat confusing, perhaps because small but extreme parties considerably influence the results though they might be politically marginal. Thus, for example, the second discriminant function in Hungary discriminated between KDNP (Christian-Democratic party), whose voters were characterized by relatively higher education, higher authoritarian, and pro-reform orientations, against FKgP (Smallholders party) and to a lesser extent the MSZP (Socialist party), with the opposite ideological-structural profile. This division was certainly never fundamental for the Hungarian politics. On the other side, no clear profile of the

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<sup>37</sup> My own calculation of factor congruence coefficients on the basis of the scores reported in Moreno 1999, 80, Table 3.1

<sup>38</sup> Note that in many accounts the Czech Republic is described as a case of a clear socio-economic divide (e.g. Kitschelt et al. 1999).

MSZP voters was outlined, although it has been a major party in the Hungarian party system. Thus, there are many reasons to take Moreno's conclusions cautiously.

What is, however, important to note, is that actually his *liberal-fundamentalist* dimension is very close to how the authoritarianism-libertarianism dimension is typically understood. Hence, if his findings would be interpreted in this way, it would support the political relevance of this dimension in the region. In addition, his *reform* dimension is actually close to the *democratic-authoritarian divide*, as Moreno admits. Although it is more focused on economic aspects, the "comprehensive dimension of reform involves the democratic-authoritarian divide as well" (*Ibid.* 153). Furthermore, partly because of a limited set of variables in the analysis, and partly because of a somewhat inflexible application of statistical analyses, it seems that Moreno misses some evidence that could in fact substantiate his main argument, namely that in countries with 'problems in democratic consolidation', the authoritarianism versus democracy division is politically relevant.

In his attempt to explain particular issue configurations, Moreno attributes the primary role to conflicting elites. More precisely, he states that "the existence of relevant issue cleavages may be linked to the salience of political elites who oppose each other on the issue concerned" (*Ibid.* 151). In this he follows the footsteps of a number of scholars, emphasizing the dominant role of the 'supply side'. For example, Carmines and Stimson (1989) believe that issue evolution starts with elite discourse (Zaller 1992, also argues for the top-down spread of political attitudes).

Moreno does not dwell much on the problem of individual differences on the 'demand' side, beyond the inclusion of structural variables in some of his analyses. Like in some previously discussed theoretical and empirical models, Moreno also does not have a concept that could bridge socio-structural background and ideological orientations. He speculates that "uncertainty, fears about the new democracy" (1999, 20) are probably important factors behind the democratic-authoritarian division, but this hypothesis, or rather a guess, is not tackled empirically.<sup>39</sup>

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<sup>39</sup> Note the striking similarity with Wilson's (1973a) theory about psychological bases of general conservatism.

## The role of social structure

Kitschelt (1992, 1995a) noted in the early nineties that post-communist East differs from the West by having the main political cleavage between pro-market libertarians and anti-market authoritarians, instead of reproducing the familiar pro-market authoritarian - anti-market libertarian opposition.

Some support for this thesis was obtained by Kitschelt et al.'s study of the 1991 elections in Bulgaria. They noted, echoing the above-mentioned concerns, that post-communist countries face many difficulties in establishing "party citizen linkages" (1995, 144-5). Resembling Kitschelt's approach to the West European politics, they expected that socio-economic background, i.e., the indicators of "cognitive and emotional competencies to learn and adjust to new environments" (1994, 147), will exhibit significant effects on party preferences. Those well equipped for newly emerging market competition would be in favor of pro-market and pro-democratization reforms. At the same time, their other characteristics, such as youth, education, and urbanization, would favor adoption of libertarian value orientation. The results showed that "most of the variables characterizing market position and future capabilities are indirectly related to voting behavior" (*Ibid.* 156), while only age had a direct effect. The lesson from this and other similar studies (cf. Berglund, Ekman, and Aarebrot 2004) is twofold: political behavior was structured even in the earliest phases of the post-communist transition and the direct influence of structural variables is modest, aside from age. Yet, at the same time, many scholars argue that economic model of voting (retrospective, sociotropic or prospective) provides a poor explanation of voter choice (e.g., Harper 2000 for such results in several post-communist countries).

Gijsberts and Nieuwbeerta's (2000) analysis of the class cleavage in nine Western and five East European democracies is interesting in this regard. They found that "in Great Britain, Australia, and the Scandinavian countries levels of class voting are highest", while "for the new democracies in Eastern Europe, however, a totally different picture emerges. Hardly any significant differences between classes in their voting behavior exist" (Gijsberts and Nieuwbeerta 2000, 412). This does not mean that classes in the East do not differ in their relevant attitudes, however. Namely, in both 'Old' and 'New' democracies, 'manual classes' are more egalitarian and support economic redistribution

(*Ibid.* 416-7). Gijsberts and Nieuwbeerta, therefore conclude that "regardless of the presumed anomic and/or 'flattened' situation in Eastern Europe after the transition, people seem to be able to recognize their class interests in these countries" (2000, 417). The real specificity of the 'Eastern' voters seems to be in the lack of connection between their economic justice attitudes (e.g. egalitarianism) and their party preferences, the link which is rather strong in the Western democracies.<sup>40</sup> Hence, "people in the new democracies in Eastern Europe seem not to know (yet) how to translate their economic justice attitudes into their voting behavior, or perhaps parties are not (yet) able to make their policy issues clear to them" (Gijsberts and Nieuwbeerta 2000, 418).

Thus, it is important to note that respondents' attitudes seem to be consistent with their socio-economic background, but that their voting behavior is either inconsistent with the attitudes, or is based on some other attitude dimensions. In other words, economic left-right ideological dimension is structured, but politically inconsequential in the East.

Evans and Whitefield (1993) argued against uniformity of the structure of ideological cleavages in post-communist countries. In their view, based on the elaboration of Lipset-Rokkan thesis,

"the distribution across east European countries of patterns of social bases and issue dimensions is conditioned by three national-level explanatory variables: economic development; levels of ethnic homogeneity; and the historic status of the state. Depending on the presence or absence of the conditioning factors three general categories of party competition are likely to emerge: socio-economic, ethnic or valence. Where there is a socio-economic basis to party competition it will be most strongly influenced by left-right issues. Where there is an ethnic basis to party competition it will be most strongly influenced by liberal-authoritarian and national-cosmopolitan issues. Finally in the absence of socio-economic or ethnic bases of competition, the principal issues around which parties will compete will be consensual; what will concern voters will be the ability of parties to achieve agreed-upon goals." (Evans and Whitefield 1993, 539-540).

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<sup>40</sup> Relative exception is again the Czech Republic.

For some cases they (*Ibid.* 542, Table 2) actually predicted a similar structure as in Kitschelt's model - convergence of redistributive and authoritarian options versus pro-market, liberal and cosmopolitan preferences.<sup>41</sup>

Markowski (1997) studied various correlates of the left-right self-placement and ideological structure in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Bulgaria. Four ideological factors reappeared in the first four cases, where mass surveys were conducted: economic liberalism versus populism, religiosity versus secularism, libertarian-cosmopolitanism versus authoritarianism-nationalism, and "a factor indicating alienation from democratic politics" (*Ibid.* 229). In Bulgaria, Markowski analyzed only an elite sample, and found "a much more diffuse political spectrum" (1997, 243), thus anticipating the findings reported in Kitschelt et al. (1999). According to Markowski (1997, 243) "In Bulgaria, the first dimension combines authoritarian, post-communist economic populism, at one extreme, against libertarian anti-communist market liberalism, at the other." The rationale for this structure is found in the "incomplete 'reformation' of the Bulgarian Communist Party" (*Ibid.* 243), whereas the communist heirs in other countries reformed in the direction of European social democracy. There are also three additional dimensions (e.g., one dealing with a Turkish minority, another one representing "a 'rural smallholders' liberalism" (*Ibid.* 243) but with lesser weight and political relevance. Given the structural and cultural similarities between Serbia and Bulgaria, political space in Serbia should be closer to the one obtained in Bulgaria than in the other cases. However, the Bulgarian results pertain only to the elite sample. The results based on mass surveys may be different - and it seems they are, as will be shown below when Kitschelt et al.'s (1999) research that also included Bulgaria is reviewed.

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<sup>41</sup> In later research, Evans and Whitefield found that, for example, "the Hungarian party system is shown to be structured mainly by issues of social liberalism, prejudice and attitudes towards the position of Hungarians abroad. Distributive questions along with nationalism comprise a secondary dimension" (1995, 1179-80). They also found that church attendance is the strongest predictor of party preference.

## Historical legacies

Many scholars quote historical legacies as important factors explaining country-specific features (e.g., Evans and Whitefield 1993). Contrary to Przeworski, who argues that all democratizing countries "are determined by a common destination, not by different points of departure" (1991, 12), Roper and Fesnic (2003) argue that even distant historic legacies matter. Roper and Fesnic are interested in long-term legacy, and argue that "the Austro–Hungarian legacy has left a lasting impression on these two regions" (Galicia, Ukraine, and Transylvania, Romania) (2003, 123), and find distinct voting patterns. For example, they find "a social cleavage between Romanian nationalists, ethnic Hungarian nationalists and (mostly Romanian) liberals" (*Ibid.* 124) in Transylvania. For Galicia, they find evidence of strong "relationship between the regional variable and voter choice for pro-democratic and pro-Western parties in Ukraine" (*Ibid.* 128). They conclude that:

"Unlike previous research, we find that socio-economic variables are only slightly influential in explaining voting patterns. Instead, we find that the historical legacy variable is much more significant in determining social cleavages and voting behaviour. Unlike earlier research which found that socio-economic variables were positively correlated with reform policies and politicians, we find that variables such as urbanisation and education are not necessarily positively correlated with reform support in the post-communist context. Therefore, we find strong evidence that history and culture do matter in determining how the electorate perceives choices." (Roper and Fesnic 2003, 120).

It is worth noting, however, that their operationalization of historical legacies is very simple, as "a regional dummy variable" (*Ibid.* 124).

Comparative studies dealing with post-communist countries are particularly relevant for the present research. Kitschelt et al. (1999) developed a comprehensive argument about the role of historical legacies, and provided empirical evidence about structure of ideological cleavages in several post-communist countries. They differentiate three "modes of communist rule" on the basis of degree of "formal bureaucratic rule and the balance of power between communists and their adversaries in pre-communist political regimes" (*Ibid.* 25).

The first type, "*patrimonial communism*", "relies on vertical chains of personal dependence between leaders in the state and party apparatus and their entourage, buttressed by extensive patronage and clientelist networks" (*Ibid.* 25). This type "was likely to emerge in historical settings where a traditional authoritarian regime, assisted by compliant religious leaders, ruled over societies of poor peasants [...], weak cities, a thin layer of ethnic pariah immigrant entrepreneurs and merchants, a small and geographically concentrated industrial working class and a corrupt coterie of administrators dependent on the personal whims of the ruler" (*Ibid.* 25-6). Here, weak communist and bourgeois parties characterized the pre-communist period.

The *national accommodative communism* was characterized by "more developed formal-rational bureaucratic governance structures that partially separated party rule and technical state administration. Moreover, such regimes evidenced a greater propensity to permit modest levels of civil rights and elite contestation at least episodically, while relying more on cooptation than repression as ways to instill citizens' compliance." (*Ibid.* 26). Such regimes "emerged from semi-democratic and semi-authoritarian interwar polities with rather vibrant political mobilization around parties and interest groups", where "the interwar period communist parties were marginal operations led by urban intellectuals, whereas middle class nationalist and pseudo-liberal parties, together with powerful peasant parties, vied for political power" (*Ibid.* 27-8).

The third regime type, *bureaucratic-authoritarian communism*, "came closest to the totalitarian model of a party state with an all-powerful, rule-guided bureaucratic machine governed by a planning technocracy and a disciplined, hierarchically stratified communist party. It relied on a tier of sophisticated economic and administrative professionals who governed a planned economy that produces comparatively advanced industrial goods and services" (*Ibid.* 28). This type "occurred in countries with considerable liberal-democratic experience in the interwar period, an early and comparatively advanced industrialization, and a simultaneous mobilization of bourgeois and proletarian political forces around class-based parties beginning in the late 19th century" (*Ibid.* 29).

In their view, decades of communist rule decreased the earlier economic inequalities between different regions. Therefore "the political institutions of communist rule, not levels of economic



development, are the key determinants of political transformation strategies in the late 1980s and early 1990s" (*Ibid.* 31).

Three different modes of transition from communist rule are related to the three regime types. *Preemptive strike*, that is political semi-reform by the (faction of) the ruling elite in order to preserve its leading position, is specific for patrimonial regimes (e.g., Bulgaria, Romania, Soviet Republics). *Negotiation* between communists and opposition representatives is likely to occur where "the ruling elites are too weak and divided to impose reform on their own initiative, but still sufficiently powerful to demand concessions from the challengers in exchange for a democratic opening" (*Ibid.* 33). This mode of transition is specific for the national accommodative regimes (e.g., Hungary, Slovenia). Finally, *implosion of the old order* characterizes transition from a bureaucratic-authoritarian regime, "where the elites, based on the monolithic coherence of the communist party machines and long-standing support from the working class, intransigently refused to bargain for change, thus delaying any reform that would have enabled them to rescue some of their resources into a post-communist order" (*Ibid.* 34-5). In addition, Kitschelt et al. emphasize the role of the choice of institutions, e.g., electoral laws, after the regime change.

This theoretical framework provides a context for various analyses Kitschelt et al. perform on data from four post-communist countries: Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, and the Czech Republic. For example, they argue that programmatic party competition is most likely to occur in the Czech Republic and the least likely to occur in Bulgaria. This argument is relevant for this research since it suggests that coherent ideological articulation on the mass level is not very likely in Serbia, a case categorized in-between patrimonial and national-accommodative communism (*Ibid.* 42, Table 1.2).

They discuss several major divides with chances to convert into fully-fledged cleavages. These are: regime divide, economic redistribution divide, socio-cultural (authoritarian-libertarian), national-cosmopolitan divide, and ethnic divide (Kitschelt et al. 1999, Chapter 2). Allocation of individuals onto different positions on these divides is basically explained within the sociological model, in terms

of interests associated with specific market locations and chances associated with them.<sup>42</sup> Thus, for example, those who expect to fare well under the liberal-democratic regime, who are likely winners of transition, and with favorable 'resource endowments', are likely to be in favor of democratic transition, to support market economy, and espouse social liberalism, and even cosmopolitanism (Kitschelt et al. 1999, Chapter 2).

In polities emerging after bureaucratic-authoritarian communism, Kitschelt et al. expect that the economic redistributive or classical left-right materialist issues play the most prominent role. This expectation is partly based on the strategic weakness of the communist successor parties, and relative economic development, and therefore salience of social class, in these cases.

Economic issues have smaller chances for achieving primacy after national-accommodative regimes since reformed communists often tend to "accept essentials of liberal market reform and convert themselves into "center-left" new social democratic parties " (Kitschelt et al. 1999, 81). Hence, socio-cultural, national, or ethnic divides are more likely to achieve political centrality, resulting in "tripolar political divide between a secular, libertarian and market-liberal camp, an equally secular and libertarian post-communist libertarian, and a national-authoritarian camp endorsing rather mixed economic positions" (*Ibid.* 83). Here, they also see development of a specific connotation of left-right semantics, where "Left and right relate primarily to socio-cultural issues, with rightist positions signifying policies of closure against autonomy of the individual, universalistic norms of conduct, multi-cultural tolerance and participatory decision making" (*Ibid.* 82).

Heritage of patrimonial communism is not favorable for the growth of market-liberal forces. The typically strong semi-reformed communists face the often disunited heterogeneous opposition, so the regime divide tends to persist as a major political division. As a result, other potentially salient issues, such as ethnic divisions, and socio-cultural authoritarianism, tend to covary with this divide, towards "the super-dimension of left-authoritarian versus right-libertarian politics" (*Ibid.* 86).

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<sup>42</sup> At the macro level, they also consider factors such as party strategies and political institutions.

The data analyzed in Kitschelt et al. (1999) come from 1993/4 surveys which covered both mass and elite ("middle level politicians and party functionaries", *Ibid.* 142) samples. Among many complex empirical analyses, their findings about attitude or ideological structuration are the most relevant for the present purpose. These analyses are performed on 5 "abstract ideological concept scales", and 17 more concrete policy issues (though not all of the questions were asked in all countries), items being presented in bipolar format and answered on a 20-point scale (*Ibid.* Table 4.1). The issues are divided into 'three bundles'. One bundle primarily concerns social and economic policies related to distribution of material resources (e.g., the rate of privatization process, primacy of fighting unemployment or inflation, or endorsement of free-market versus state interventionism). The second group of items combines economic distributive with socio-cultural connotations (e.g., attitude towards foreign investments, towards women's employment, environmental protection, and left-right placement scale). Finally, among 'purely cultural issues' items include attitude toward immigrants, towards the freedom of press, or separation of religion and politics, for example.

In order to "identify underlying dimensions of political disagreement" (*Ibid.* 219), they factor-analyzed the "the issue positions politicians [...] attribute to their own parties and their competitors" (*Ibid.* 220) (i.e., not politicians' own attitudes, but positions they attribute to parties). Applying the Guttman-Kaiser (GK) criterion for the number of factors and Varimax rotation, they obtained different factors across the four cases, yet the results are in line with the authors' expectations (see Chapter 7).

Four factors were obtained in the Czech Republic: socio-economic protectionism, secular libertarianism versus authoritarian-religious dimension, libertarian environmentalism, and civic tolerance (intolerance of communists and immigrants).<sup>43</sup> Poland yielded only two significant factors: socio-economic protectionism vs. market liberalism, and libertarian secular cosmopolitanism versus religious, authoritarian and nationalist attitudes. Three factors reached significance in Hungary: secular libertarianism versus religiosity and authoritarianism (with some economic items), socio-

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<sup>43</sup> Here and subsequently, factors are listed in order of their eigenvalue magnitude, i.e., relative 'weight'.

economic protectionism, and environmental protection. Finally, Bulgaria had four factors. They deserve somewhat broader presentation, since this is the case that in Kitschelt et al.'s theoretical model is the closest to Serbia. The first Bulgarian factor labeled as post-communist socio-economic protectionism (Table 7.4) joined anti-communist attitude with market liberalism, environmentalism, and liberal individualism. This was interpreted as mutually reinforcing regime and economic divides. The second factor is defined by attitudes concerning the Turkish minority and Bulgarian nationalism (Bulgarian cultural hegemony factor). The third factor, economic and cultural reform, "divides economic and cultural libertarians who are nevertheless willing to provide agricultural subsidies [...] from cultural traditionalists and socio-economic protectionists" (*Ibid.* 230). Finally, there was also an idiosyncratic fourth factor, dealing with the traditional role of women.

An especially interesting feature of the Bulgarian findings is that, unlike in the other countries, post-communists are associated with authoritarianism and nationalism. In addition, it was found that in Bulgaria, left-right assessments are related with economic issues (left with protectionism), and somewhat less with socio-cultural dimension (left with nationalism). The explanation offered is that it is due to the reinforcement or coincidence of regime and economic divides after patrimonial communism (*Ibid.* 237-8).

Kitschelt et al. (1999) also endeavored to test not only political issue dimensions but also which of the extracted factors represent *competitive* dimensions. They find that Bulgaria and the Czech Republic, "have only a single competitive dimension each. In both cases, that dimension revolves around economic policy issues, but is slightly "contaminated" by issues of socio-cultural authoritarianism in the Czech Republic and more profoundly shaped by decommunization in Bulgaria" (*Ibid.* 244). Polish and Hungarian cases are characterized by two-dimensional competitive systems (both including an economic and a socio-cultural dimension).

A set of similar items was applied in surveys of the mass public in these four countries and they were analyzed in the similar fashion. Here, however, the respondents expressed their own attitudes, i.e., did not assess party stances. Although the authors expectedly discover less constraint in mass attitudes (shown by larger number of independent factors, for example), they observe "striking similarities" in

the obtained structure in the elite and mass samples (*Ibid.* 253, Chapter 8; see also Tables 8-2 through 8-5).

Socio-economic protectionism versus market liberalism, a religion/morality dimension, civil liberties, and national autonomy factors, represent the four dimensions obtained in the Czech Republic (*Ibid.* 254).<sup>44</sup> Attitudes in Poland converged around four dimensions: socio-economic protectionism, religious values, cosmopolitanism and civil liberties, and nationalism (now with two significant items). Results for Hungary yielded even five factors: optimistic economic outlook, secular cosmopolitanism, socio-economic protectionism, support of Catholic tradition, and nationalism (again single item) (Table 8.4). Interestingly, in Bulgaria, only three factors were sufficient to account for item intercorrelations: socio-economic protectionism versus market liberalism, authoritarianism versus libertarianism, and attitudes towards Turkish minority culture. Contrary to their expectation about low ideological constraint after patrimonial communism, they conclude that Bulgaria is "at the high end of ideological constraint with voters organizing their political preferences in a relatively more coherent manner than the programmatic diffuseness of the country's political elite would have led us to believe" (*Ibid.* 257). The ad hoc explanation offered is that the strength of the regime divide forces convergence of other issue dimensions.

Concerning the competitiveness of the obtained factors, economic issues represent the single competitive dimension in the Czech Republic. Hungary and Poland again tend towards two competitive dimensions, with socio-cultural dimensions having relatively stronger impact. In Bulgaria, the market reform factors represent the main competitive dimension but is highly collinear with the authoritarian-libertarian factor (economic protectionists are more authoritarian). In addition, Bulgarian economic liberalism is associated with right-wing identification.<sup>45</sup>

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<sup>44</sup> The last factor has apparently only a single significant loading (Table 8.2 in Kitschelt et al. 1999).

<sup>45</sup> In Hungary and Poland, the left-right scale is more associated with the socio-cultural than with economic dimension.

Although Kitschelt et al.'s explanation of individual differences in issue and party preferences is placed mainly within the sociological model, they argue that it is "likely that the empirical association between voters' position in the social structure and their partisan choices is *indirect*, mediated through political issue preferences and *generalized self-interpretations*, such as one's left-right self-placement" (*Ibid.* 270, emphasis added, for more details see their Chapter 8). Several factors favor this pattern: the lack of preexisting party identifications, relative cognitive sophistication of the East European voters, lack of social closure coupled with easy access to mass communications, and given the "brevity of the democratic experience" parties have not invested in development of "elaborate economically based organizational network" (*Ibid.* 270).<sup>46</sup>

Economic liberalism is the issue dimension they discuss in more details. According to their expectations, economic liberalism is found to be generally related to variables indicating 'economic and cultural resource endowments' (e.g., younger age, education, high-skilled occupation, communist party membership (negative direction)) in all cases. Yet, it is worth noting, the explained variance ranges from 8% in Bulgaria, to 10% in the Czech Republic and Hungary.<sup>47</sup>

In their model, issue attitudes mediate the relationship between SES variables and left-right identification. The findings confirm that issue attitudes (economic liberalism, secular values, nationalism, and civic individualism) are significant predictors of left-right identification. Remarkably, nationalism is significant predictor only in Bulgaria and of the *left-wing* identification) (Table 8.14).<sup>48</sup>

Group affiliation variables (church attendance, communist party membership) are also strong predictors of left-right identification. In Bulgaria in particular, "the social and symbolic importance of

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<sup>46</sup> Note that this is very similar to my general argument for the introduction of individual-dispositional variables, namely authoritarianism conceived as a worldview, in addition to left-right self-identification.

<sup>47</sup> A clearly incomplete model for explanation of ideological orientations, implying the need to reconsider additional variables before discounting 90% of variance simply as 'noise'.

communist party membership" (*Ibid.* 276) is great. On the other side, the direct effect of socio-structural variables basically remained insignificant. The explained variance ranges from 6% in Hungary to an exceptional 34% in the Czech Republic.

In addition, Kitschelt et al. constructed a model explaining party preference, where parties were ordered according to the elite's assignment of market liberalism scores. Expectedly, left-right identification appeared as the strongest predictor of market liberal party preference. However, "With regard to social structure, the message is always that it has no direct impact on party preference, but works indirectly through issue opinions and left-right self-placements" (*Ibid.* 278).

Kitschelt et al.'s impressive research has many important implications for the current research, thus it warranted extended presentation. Their account of communist and pre-communist historic legacies and their consequences for post-communist politics represent an exceptionally useful theoretical framework for specific case analyses. Substituting Serbia for Bulgaria, for example, leads immediately to a number of hypotheses about the ideological structuration. Yet, it is at the same time clear, as the authors recognize, that the outline of the general historical paths cannot fully account for all features a specific case might exhibit. Kitschelt et al.'s post-hoc explanation of the peculiarities of the Bulgarian case could be extended to the Serbian case. Still, a more detailed narrative of Serbian post-communist politics, as presented in the following chapter, is necessary for better understanding the case in point.

Kitschelt et al.'s findings show that political attitudes, or in their terminology, issue opinions, are organized and intelligible, though the few items in the analysis converged into two (Polish elite sample) to five dimensions (Hungarian voters). Yet, variations across cases proved explainable within the given theoretical framework. Two broadly similar dimensions are obtained across cases: economic liberalism, and socio-cultural libertarianism vs. authoritarianism dimension, even though they combine with other attitudes depending on each case's peculiar features (e.g. nationalism plays a

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<sup>48</sup> Interestingly as well, civic individualism predicts right wing identification among the Czechs, while left-wing tendency in Hungarians.

strong role of in Bulgarian elite sample). These two dimensions obviously have much broader relevance than the four examined cases, or even the post-communist countries in general. They are rather familiar from western research, though, again, local peculiarities abound. Thus, in the Serbian case, next to these two general dimensions, the regime divide should play a major role and can be expected to covary with attitudes towards market economy. In addition, for obvious reasons, nationalism should play a more central role in Serbia.

Kitschelt et al.'s examination of individual differences in ideological dimensions confirms the hypothesis that resource endowments are of crucial importance. Yet, the indirect effect of structural background variables points to the intervening variables. Kitschelt et al. place the left-right ideology, as an indicator of "generalized self-interpretations" in this role (*Ibid.* 270). The hypothesis about mediation is very important, but it seems that it needs to be further developed by introducing additional dispositional variables.

To sum up, regardless of the political context, the literature explains the number and character of ideological dimensions in terms of social cleavages and social structure in general, elite discourse and intellectual traditions, wealth and security in the post-WWII Western world, political parties, and particular institutional features. Individual differences within specific societies are explained in terms of particular class or status location, wealth in formative age, and other socio-demographic variables.



## **Development of the Serbian Party System 1990-2002<sup>49</sup>**

Political pluralism was introduced in Serbia more as a reaction to external processes and events than because of the internal pressure coming from popular democratizing forces (Vukomanović 1998, 35). There was certainly no such strong popular anti-communist opposition as in Hungary, Poland, or the Czech Republic; nor was there a strong nationalist opposition of the kind found in Croatia and Slovenia. On 15 December 1989, the ruling communist party has simply declared the introduction of political pluralism.

Two factors are crucial for the understanding of the initial transition to pluralist politics in Serbia: the destruction of Yugoslavia and the Kosovo problem. Studies from the communist period show strong support for the system of self-management and widespread identification of democracy with socialism (e.g. Rot and Havelka 1973; cf. Goati 1998, 16). Part of the explanation can be found in the fact that the Yugoslav version of socialism was rather liberal and comfortable for the masses compared to what existed in the Warsaw Pact countries. In addition, Serbs identified with the Yugoslav state because they saw it as the only possible solution to the ‘national question’, i.e. the inclusion of all Serbs into one state. Thus, the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the secession of the other republics re-opened the Serbian national question, at a time when marketization threatened the widely accepted social and economic order.

Even before the collapse of the Yugoslav state, the ethnic conflicts in Kosovo had already prepared the public for a nationalist course. In fact, Milošević came to power in the late 1980s with the program to reverse the alleged injustices by previous non-national communists who had ‘betrayed’ Serbian national interests. Since both Kosovo and the break-up of Yugoslavia are linked to the Serbian national question, it is not surprising that the national question dominated the first elections or that it remained a dominant issue throughout the 1990s (Sekelj 2000a; Ramet 2004). These two

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<sup>49</sup> A significant portion of this section was published in Todosijević 2004a.

factors, thus, can go far in explaining the initial appeal of the ideological blend of nationalism and redistributive economy provided by the quasi-reformed communists.

### ***The First Pluralist Elections for the Serbian Parliament, December 1990***

Since the Serbian communists were neither overthrown nor seriously threatened by a popular anti-communist movement, they were able to adapt to political pluralism with relatively mild reforms and to inherit the assets of the dissolved League of Communists of Serbia (SKS) and some other related organizations (Vukomanović 1998). In July 1990, SKS merged with other related communist organizations and formed the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) under the firm leadership of Slobodan Milošević. Being in control of the inherited infrastructure, electronic media, and the state, it was easy for the party to refuse round-table talks, which might have secured more equal status for all competitors.

Thus, when the first multiparty elections came the Socialist party had huge infrastructural advantages, and felt no need for major ideological changes. The Socialists promised a large degree of continuity with socialist Yugoslavia, a solution to the Kosovo problem, and moderate reforms in economy. They faced a highly fragmented opposition – and won easily obtaining 194 (77.6%) out of 250 seats with just 46.1% of the votes cast (thanks to the majoritarian two-round electoral system). The remaining 56 seats were divided among thirteen parties and coalitions and eight independent candidates. Among these, only some proved viable and deserve to be mentioned here.

The strongest opposition party was the Serbian Renewal Movement (*Srpski pokret obnove*, SPO), headed by a well-known writer Vuk Drašković, winning 15.8% of the ballots cast (19 seats). This party, and some subsequent party formations within the nationalist bloc, has its roots in various non-political nationalist organizations, which had been engaged in revising the history of the Second World War, particularly the role of the *Četnik* (troops loyal to the exiled King Peter), and their leader, Draža Mihailović.

The Democratic Party (DS), at the time headed by Dragoljub Mićunović, offered a liberal-democratic perspective and adopted a moderate position on the national issue. DS won seven seats (2.8%) the

Parliament, with about seven per cent of the votes. Another important bloc consisted of parties representing national minorities. The party of ethnic Hungarians (DZVM) entered the first Serbian pluralist parliament as the third strongest party with eight elected representatives. The Party of Democratic Action (SDA), representing the Muslim minority from Sandžak, also participated and won three seats.

The Serbian Presidential elections, held at the same time, clearly showed the balance of power between the Socialists and the opposition: Milošević received approximately four times more votes than the main challenger, Vuk Drašković. However, the socialists' hold on power was not absolute. In local elections, the opposition parties took power in localities where national minorities were in absolute or relative numerical majority, often in coalition with the parties of the democratic opposition.

These initial pluralist elections were not simply about communists and anti-communists. The central theme of the election was the national issue, but more as a valence issue, since all parties but those of national minorities claimed to be fighting for supposedly threatened national interests. In 1990, the opposition, especially the SPO, was more nationalist than the socialists (Slavujević 1998, 89; cf. Table 14.1). However, it was difficult to beat Milošević on the nationalist ground, since he was already perceived as a statesman (i.e. not only a 'politician') defending the Serbian state and the national interests (Goati 1998).

The central role of the national issue is not surprising. The ongoing secession of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina meant that some 25% of Serbs would remain outside of Serbia, while Kosovo – a hot problem since the early 1980s – galvanized the Serbian public with almost daily reports about the exodus of Serbs from that 'heartland' of medieval Serbia and the place of the most important religious sites of the Serbian Orthodox Church. Albanians, for their part, firmly pursued the secessionist

strategy from the very beginning and never showed any interest in participating in the Serbian political system (Goati 1998).<sup>50</sup>

The SPO, the main opposition party, pursued a strongly nationalist and anti-communist rhetoric, largely neglecting the issues of economy and democratization. However, frequent references to the potential restoration of monarchy and occasional clericalism were not appealing to the highly secularized masses attached more to socialism than to the former Karađorđević dynasty.

The strength of the SPS was in its ability to appeal to voters in several different ways – by promising a degree of continuity with the former socialist regime while at the same time distancing itself from the ‘anti-Serb’ rhetoric of non-national communists, by presenting itself as a true defender of Serbian national interests especially concerning the Kosovo problem, and by promising moderate economic reforms which were supposed to increase living standard without the risks associated with quick marketization.

### ***The Formation of the Authoritarian – Democratic Division***

After the first pluralist elections, SPS and Milošević continued to ignore all demands for substantive democratization. This resulted in massive demonstrations in Belgrade on 9 March 1991, led by Vuk Drašković and SPS. The opposition demanded – with rather limited success – a new, democratically based constitution, a new election law, and liberation of mass media from partisan control.

The new constitution of April 1992, though not of Serbia but of Yugoslavia, was written without consultations with the opposition parties. Yugoslavia was defined as a federal republic consisting of Serbia and Montenegro. Simultaneously, a new electoral law was announced, which replaced the majoritarian system with a proportional one.

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<sup>50</sup> On 7 September 1990, in Kačanik, Kosovo, a secret meeting of 111 representatives of the dissolved Kosovo Assembly, all of Albanian nationality, announced the ‘Constitution’ of what was termed ‘Kosovo Republic’ – defined as an independent state (Vukomanović 1999).

On the party scene, this was a year of further diversification of the opposition bloc. Two new important actors appeared: the Citizens' Alliance of Serbia (*Građanski Savez Srbije*, GSS) representing the most pro-western, anti-nationalist, liberal and libertarian orientation, and the Democratic Party of Serbia (*Demokratska stranka Srbije*, DSS) combining a commitment to democracy with a concern for national interests and tradition. The leader of the DSS, Vojislav Koštunica, left the DS in 1991 after disagreements concerning the cooperation of DS with the regime (Vukomanović 1998).

This was also a year of elections in Serbia: Federal parliamentary elections were held in May and again in December, together with the Serbian presidential and parliamentary elections. The federal parliamentary elections of 31 May 1992 were boycotted by the democratic opposition<sup>51</sup> as a sign of protest for not being consulted in creating the electoral law, and generally against the unfair conditions with the media representation. However, this boycott was ineffective since the party of the Hungarian minority (DZVM) and the extreme nationalist Serbian Radical Party (SRS) took part in the elections. Milan Panić, a Serbian-born US businessman, was appointed Federal Prime Minister by the Socialists soon to become their main opponent in the issues of cooperation with the international community and the liberalization of the economy. He scheduled extraordinary Federal Parliamentary elections for December 1992 and was soon dismissed.<sup>52</sup>

Meanwhile, the democratic opposition managed to form a loose coalition named DEPOS, within in the framework of which some smaller parties joined the SPO. Altogether fourteen parties participated in this new formation. The results of the extraordinary elections for the Federal parliament in December 1992 revealed that the communist heirs in Serbia and Montenegro could not win an absolute majority against the relatively united opposition. In Serbia, SPS won 44% of the seats, SRS

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<sup>51</sup> The term 'democratic opposition' is a self-ascribed designation and refers to the Serbian parties who opposed Socialist Party of Serbia and Slobodan Milošević, with the exception of SRS.

<sup>52</sup> Dobrica Ćosić, another famous writer with a political career, was appointed Federal President. He also came into conflict with Milošević, and was consequently dismissed in June 1993.

won 28%, DEPOS managed to win 20% of the seats, the DS participated on its own and won five seats, while the Magyar party (DZVM) took three seats. These results made the Radicals a necessary partner for securing a comfortable majority, thus marking the beginning of the so-called 'red-brown coalition', though with changing agreement between the partners over the next ten years. The other side of the barricade was occupied by the democratic opposition, still headed by the SPO and joined by parties of the national minorities. This conflict between parties of authoritarian and democratic orientation was to be the central divide in Serbia for the rest of the 1990s.

In the elections for the Serbian parliament DEPOS did not participate as an integral coalition. Instead, SPO and DSS formed a mini-coalition, and won 50 seats (20%). SPS remained the strongest single party with 40% of the seats (101), while the Radicals came in second with 73 seats (nearly 30%). The Hungarian minority defended its position and obtained nine representatives, while SDA boycotted the 1992 elections. The Democratic Party was reduced to six MPs.

Although SPS remained the strongest single party, it obtained about one million votes less than in the 1990 election (now they won 1.3 million of votes, which was about 29% of the votes cast). Clearly, an increasing number of voters felt that the country was heading in the wrong direction. Yet, many of them opted for the Radicals and the effective nationalist-populist rhetoric of their charismatic leader, Vojislav Šešelj. Nevertheless, the support for the opposition was still too weak to challenge the Socialists' rule seriously. In the direct electoral clash between Milošević and Panić, the opposition's candidate for the Serbian presidency, Milošević obtained approximately one million votes more than his opponent.

### ***War and Peace***

While the tone for the 1990 elections was set by the secession of the former Yugoslav republics and the gradual escalation of the Kosovo problem, the elections of 1992 were framed by the war in Croatia and by the sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council in 1992. The national and state issue was still on the top of the agenda, but now it was filtered through the attitude towards the wars

in Croatia and Bosnia and consequently the attitude towards the sanctions and the 'international community'.

The Socialists appealed to the voters by presenting themselves as fighting for the 'salvation' of Yugoslavia. In cooperation with SRS, they pursued an aggressive campaign that pictured the entire opposition as 'traitors' of the national interests. The SPS-controlled media promulgated the idea of a worldwide conspiracy against the Serbs, not a difficult task given the objective situation. The attitude towards the international community became one of the central political issues, dividing those who preferred isolationism and/or friendship with Russia from those who were in favor of cooperation with the 'West'. This division largely coincided with the authoritarian-democratic divide.

On the opposition side, there were important ideological changes. The SPO abandoned its romantic-nationalist rhetoric and started campaigning against the on-going wars. At the time, most of the opposition still believed that Serbs should be given the right to stay in one state (Slavujević 1998, 94). Yet generally, the opposition remained fragmented and deeply divided ideologically, as clashes between republicans and royalists, and nationalists and cosmopolitans exemplified.

During the campaign for the December elections, SPS and SRS intensified their nationalistic rhetoric, while DEPOS started insisting on democratization and reduced its earlier heavy nationalist tone (Slavujević 1998). One side of the main issue dimension was defined by hyper-patriotism and full support for Serbs abroad, while the other side argued for yielding to the pressure of the international community, democratization, and economic reforms.

Although the DS tried to emphasize economic issues in their campaign, this was a topic rarely addressed by both camps, despite the sharply deteriorating economy (Slavujević 1998, 97). In practice, by the introduction of the new privatization law the Socialists actually slowed down the process of privatization, while the state assumed a strong redistributive role. Various policies were introduced aiming on the one side to retain the control of economy in the hands of the ruling party, and on the other, to secure basic survival for the population under the conditions of the UN sanctions.

Printing money mostly financed the new welfare programs and the support for the Bosnian and Croat Serbs. The result was hyperinflation, especially in 1993.

On 20 October 1993, President Milošević dissolved the Serbian parliament, since the SPS lost the parliamentary majority due to conflicts with SRS over policy towards Bosnian Serbs (SPS decided to accept the Vance-Owen Plan). In the third Serbian parliamentary elections, held on 23 December 1993 and 5 January 1994, the SPS won 123 seats (49%) with somewhat larger share of votes than in the 1992 elections. But without the support of the SRS, they were three seats short of an absolute majority. DEPOS, again headed by Vuk Drašković, obtained 45 seats (18%), Šešelj's radicals won 39 seats, DS had 29 MPs, and DSS seven; the Magyar party won five seats, and the Muslims of Sandžak had two representatives. After the elections, in a surprise move, the New Democracy (ND) left the DEPOS coalition and its six MPs joined the SPS to form the government.<sup>53</sup>

The SPS “repositioned itself as a party advocating peace” (Slavujević 1998, 101). Since Milošević accepted the Vance-Owen Plan for Bosnia, the socialists attempted to present it as a success for the Serbian side. The nationalist rhetoric was attenuated, while topics such as peace, social and economic recovery, and the fight against crime were emphasized (Slavujević 1998, 101). The changes advocated were moderate and slow, particularly within the economic sphere.

The opposition bloc now consisted of radical nationalists (SRS), the more democratically oriented DEPOS, DS and DSS, and ethnic minority parties. Under the influence of the SPO, DEPOS kept insisting on anti-communism. The Radicals continued their aggressive nationalist-populist rhetoric, but now also directed their attacks against the SPS and Milošević, blaming them for corruption and links with organized crime. The democratic opposition again had problems with building a coalition: two important parties, DS and DSS, remained outside of DEPOS. They expected to benefit from

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<sup>53</sup> The New Democracy (ND) has had political influence highly disproportional to its electoral base. The only time this party participated in an election on its own was in 1990 and it won only 1.3% of the vote and no representatives. Interestingly, ND was a member of the DOS coalition when Milošević was removed after the elections of 2000. Its leader, Dušan Mihajlović, became nothing less than a Minister of Interior in the Đinđić government.



public discontent; therefore they emphasized the scale of the problems and their own ability to solve them (e.g. lifting of the sanctions).

The fight between the opposition and the regime party was bitter but conflicts among the opposition parties and leaders were not much friendlier. This is one of the reasons for the continued weak electoral support for the opposition, despite the country's deteriorating conditions. Further splits in the opposition parties were inevitable. The most important event was Đinđić's 'ex-communication' of Mićunović from the DS in 1994, apparently because of personal conflicts (Vukomanović 1998, 38). Mićunović had been one of the main figures within the democratic opposition since 1990. Soon after, he formed his own party, the Democratic Center (DC).

### ***Nationalism is Out of Fashion: Elections from 1995 to 1997***

The events of 1995 had a particularly strong impact on Serbian politics. The wars in Bosnia and Croatia ended as a result of direct and indirect military intervention by NATO. The Dayton and Erdut agreements were signed, but some half a million Serbs fled from Croatia to Serbia. The dream of all Serbs in one state seemed increasingly hopeless. Milošević's position on the national issue weakened, and now not only nationalists blamed him for abandoning and betraying the Krajina Serbs.

In order to contest the third Federal parliamentary elections on 3 November 1996, the opposition formed a coalition, known as *Zajedno* ('Together'). At the same time, SPS formed a coalition with JUL (Yugoslav United Left; party headed by Milošević's wife), and ND. The Radicals, the party of the Magyar minority (SVM), and a coalition of regionalist parties from Vojvodina ran in their own right.

The regime parties again won, with about 43% of the votes (64 seats), while the *Zajedno* coalition polled some 22% of the votes (22 seats). Šešelj's radicals won about 18% of the vote, or 16 seats, somewhat less than previously. The party of the Magyar minority (DZVM had been replaced by the Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians, SVM) obtained three representatives, Coalition Vojvodina two, and Coalition Sandžak (Muslim minority) ended up with a single representative.

Throughout 1996, and especially during the electoral campaign, the SPS presented the events of 1995 as a triumph of their 'peace-making politics', arguing that the interests of Bosnian Serbs had been well preserved and protected by the signed agreements. The emphasis switched from the national issue to the issue of economic recovery (as a result of the Dayton Accord, the sanctions had been partially lifted). With the notable exception of the SRS, the opposition parties followed suit and reduced the nationalist rhetoric despite the massive exodus of the Krajina Serbs. The opposing blocs again competed on the valence issue of economic recovery and reintegration into international institutions.

Politically, the local elections held simultaneously with the elections for the federal parliament were the most consequential event in 1996. The *Zajedno* coalition was victorious in most of the major cities including Belgrade. The government attempted to annul the results of these elections, but under the pressure of massive public demonstrations and the OSCE, the initial results were finally acknowledged. With this victory, the democratic opposition gained control over some local media and access to additional financial resources. These results also demonstrated the importance of the urban-rural cleavage.

Milošević's monopoly on political power suffered several additional blows in 1997. In this year, the communist heirs in Montenegro (DPS) split into two wings. The stronger one, led by Đukanović, switched from collaboration towards increasingly open confrontation with the SPS and Milošević. In addition, the socialists suffered a defeat in presidential elections for the first time. In the second round of elections for the Serbian president in September 1997, Šešelj won against the socialist candidate Zoran Lilić. However, since the turnout was below the required 50%, the elections were not valid. Repeated elections were held in December, but this time the socialist candidate, Milan Milutinović, was victorious (Milutinović 59.23%, Šešelj 37.57%).

On 15 July 1997, Milošević switched from being Serbian President to becoming President of the FRY, since his second term in the previous post was expiring.<sup>54</sup> The new position was largely symbolic but he was able to control the political system through informal channels.

The fourth Serbian parliamentary elections were held in the same year, together with the presidential elections. Once again, the opposition parties had serious problems in forming a coalition. Despite the existing agreement within the democratic opposition to support Drašković for the Serbian presidency, the rest of the opposition decided to boycott the elections. Although some 12 parties participated in the boycott, the turnout was hardly affected. The so-called 'left coalition', consisting of SPS, JUL and ND, won the relative majority (some 34% of the votes cast). The Radicals came in second with nearly 30%, and the SPO third with about 20% of the votes. The relatively clear trend of decreasing support for the SPS thus continued.

These elections were a triumph for Šešelj, since the number of votes for the Radicals increased by about 400,000. The democratic opposition was the main loser. The boycott clearly failed and Drašković did not even get into the second round of the presidential elections. Only the SPO was in the parliament, yet too weak to exhibit any influence and open for charges of collaboration with Milošević. The main issue dimensions remained largely unchanged since the 1996 elections: the national issue, economic recovery, and the demands for democratization (Sekelj 2000a). Only the emphasis changed somewhat: the wars were lost, and only the Radicals heavily exploited the national issue.

### ***Kosovo and NATO***

1998 marks the transformation of the Serbian political system from a semi-democratic into an increasingly authoritarian system. Goati (2001a) divides the rule of the socialists into two periods: the period of 'pseudodemocracy' between 1990 and 1998, when certain minimal rules of democracy were

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<sup>54</sup> At the time, the Federal President was elected by the federal parliament i.e. not directly. Montenegrin representatives, under Đukanović's control, fully supported Milošević's appointment.

observed, and the period between 1998 and 2000 when the regime became increasingly authoritarian. The coalition government – formed on 24 March 1998 by the rightwing parties (SPS, JUL and SRS) – passed a number of openly undemocratic laws, such as the Law on Public Information, the Law on Universities, and the law regulating local self-government. Instances of open repression of the opposition had become increasingly frequent. And on 31 May 1998, the relationship between Serbian and Montenegrin institutions were almost entirely broken.

These events took place against the background of increasingly violent conflicts in Kosovo. Between 1991 and 1998, Albanian rebels in Kosovo killed 128 policemen and 199 civilians in 2,018 incidents.<sup>55</sup> In the beginning of 1998, Kosovo Albanians started an open armed rebellion under the leadership of the Kosovo Liberation Army (*Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës*), and soon Serbia lost control over more than a third of the province's territory (Antonić 1999). The increasingly repressive measures – to which Serbia resorted in its attempts to regain control – finally provoked a military intervention by NATO. After 78 days of NATO bombing, which started on 24 March 1999, and in which, all neighboring countries more or less actively participated, Kosovo was placed under the protection of the UN (UN Resolution 1244, of June 10, 1999).

Internal politics in Serbia started taking on an increasingly bizarre shape. The ruling SPS claimed victory in this war,<sup>56</sup> and promised extremely fast reconstruction of the devastated country without external assistance.<sup>57</sup> The reconstruction work actually went on at a rather fast pace, but at the expense of exhausting already weak resources.

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<sup>55</sup> Federal Government Report of 14 January 1999 (quoted in AntoniĆ 1999).

<sup>56</sup> Milošević distributed some 4,200 decorations after the 'victory' against NATO (Antonić 2000, 595).

<sup>57</sup> It was estimated that the immediate war damage was above 4 billion dollars. The indirect costs exceeded 100 billion dollars (Antonić 2001, 37).

### ***The First Regime Change***

Milošević's claim that Serbia had won the war, despite the loss of Kosovo and vast human and material losses, was perhaps too much even for his most faithful supporters. His popularity and that of his party and its coalition partners dropped sharply in the opinion polls, to the advantage of the opposition. The SPS-JUL leadership was not yet ready to recognize that their war was lost. Political repression marked the following period, featuring two aborted assassination attempts on Vuk Drašković. The efforts of the opposition were coordinated by a loose coalition known as the Alliance for Changes (*Savez za promene*), which was later transformed into the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS). In the autumn 1999, the coalition organized mass demonstrations against the regime.

On 6 July 2000, the federal government loyal to Milošević introduced two constitutional amendments, which instituted popular election of the federal president and of the second chamber of the federal parliament. The rationale was to give Milošević additional terms in power. The ruling coalition in Montenegro immediately declared that they did not recognize these constitutional changes and refused to participate in the scheduled elections.

The elections were held in September 2000. The opposition formed a broad coalition, the DOS, consisting of 18 parties (including ethnic minority parties and a syndicate). The joint list was headed by Vojislav Koštunica, the leader of the DSS and the opposition politician with the highest rating in the opinion polls. However, the SPO could not reach agreement with the rest of the opposition and remained outside of the coalition. In addition, strong explicit support came from non-political organizations, such as the Serbian Orthodox Church, and the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences. An exceptionally important role was played by various NGOs, such as *Otpor* ('Resistance'), which organized a number of creative and provocative actions.<sup>58</sup> There was a general feeling that broad social consensus had been reached on regime change. And that was essentially the 'program' of the

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<sup>58</sup> Foreign financial intervention was decisive in this respect. According to Antonić (2001), more than 40 million dollars were 'invested' from abroad in the campaign for removing Milošević from power. A similarly influential role of Western-backed NGO's reoccurred in several subsequent 'colorful revolutions' (Herd 2005).

DOS, as brought out by popular slogans like 'He is finished'. The governing parties, on the other hand, presented an extremely anti-West campaign, branding all opposition parties and leaders as 'servants of the West and NATO' (Matić 2002).

The federal presidential elections took the shape of a referendum for or against Milošević. As the results were counted, it became obvious not only that Milošević obtained considerably less votes than his challenger, but also that Koštunica was about to win the first round. The Federal Election Commission decided that a second round must be organized, while the Federal Constitutional Court ruled that the election was invalid. Koštunica, however, relying on independent counting, proclaimed victory in the first round and decided not to participate in the second round, nor, for that matter, in new elections. A series of demonstrations ensued throughout the country, which culminated in the storming of the Federal Parliament and the building of the national TV, on October 5, 2000 (the so-called 'bulldozer revolution', Birch 2002; Gordy 2000). Milošević finally stepped down and congratulated Koštunica on his victory.

The elections to the federal parliament provided the opposition with a convincing victory, particularly considering the high voter turnout (74%). The DOS coalition won 53% of the seats. SPS and JUL ended up with about 41% of the seats, while the election spelled defeat for the Radicals (five representatives).

After the inauguration, President Koštunica signed the so-called 'Political Agreement' with the socialists, which included extraordinary elections for the Serbian parliament. These elections were held on 23 December 2000. DOS won an even larger majority (70.4% of the seats), the Socialists and the Radicals together won only 24% of the mandates (14.8 and 9.2 respectively) while the JUL and SPO remained without a single MP. A new party, known as the Party of Serbian Unity (SSJ), programmatically close to the Radicals, won 14 seats (5.6%).

National and state issues dominated the elections of 2000 as well, though the main themes had to be different after the disastrous events of 1999. The incumbents emphasized the importance of economic reconstruction and of not giving in to international pressure. The opposition claimed that it was in

Serbia's best interest to get rid of a regime that had brought disaster and isolation upon the country. Thus, after the war against NATO and the loss of Kosovo, the opposition now took the opportunity to market itself as a reliable defender of Serbian national interests. Nationalists were angered by the loss of Kosovo, while the need for cooperation with the international community was appealing to those in the liberal segment of the political spectrum. The supply offered by the opposition elites was well matched by the demand of the population. By the end of 1999 and beginning of 2000, public opinions surveys were showing a marked decrease in nationalist attitudes and an increasing concern for the declining standard of living (Mihailović 2001, 67).

### ***Two Years in Democracy: Split within the Democratic Bloc***

The elections of 2000 spelled the transition to more genuinely democratic politics in Serbia, the gradual removal of UN sanctions, and the reintegration of the country into international institutions. The division of power agreed upon among the DOS members stated that since Koštunica was supported in the presidential campaign, the position of the Serbian prime minister was reserved for the leader of the second largest opposition party – DS and Zoran Đinđić. Soon after the two occupied their places, a series of clashes within DOS started. On the level of rhetoric, the division revolved around the relative priority of economic reform and cooperation with international organizations, such as ICTY, and IMF versus the building of democratic institutions. The government, headed by Đinđić, emphasized the former, while the DSS emphasized the need for constitutional reform and for establishing other institutional prerequisites of democratic consolidation. In addition, DS has been promoting a self-image of a strongly pro-European and liberal party, while DSS was perceived as more nationalist and traditionalist.

The increasing polarization between the DS and the DSS is evident if we compare correlation coefficients between respondents' perceived distance to these parties. In 1996, correlation coefficient was  $r=.78$  ( $p<.001$ ), while in 2002 the correlation disappeared ( $r=-.05$ ,  $p>.05$ ). Likewise, the loss of

power brought voters of the SPS and SRS closer to each other. In 1996, this correlation was negative  $r=-.15$  ( $p<.01$ ), while in 2002 it increased to  $r=.64$  ( $p<.01$ ).<sup>59</sup>

The division between these two key players in the post-Milošević period dominated the political agenda throughout 2001 and 2002.<sup>60</sup> The test of the public support for the conflicted DS and DSS came in September – October 2002, when Serbian presidential elections were held. The three main candidates were Koštunica (DSS), Šešelj (SRS), and Miroljub Labus, a member of DS and supported by the government parties.<sup>61</sup> Koštunica won approximately twice as many votes as Labus in the second round, but the turnout was below 50%, and new elections had to be organized. DOS-without-DSS decided not to have a candidate for the new elections since public opinion surveys and the just failed elections showed that their candidate was bound to lose against Koštunica (e.g. Goati 2001b). Moreover, some of the DOS member-parties openly called for a boycott.

An amendment to the electoral law removed the fifty per cent turnout requirement for the second round, but preserved it for the first round of elections. Despite his convincing performance at the polls (58% of the votes cast) Koštunica was not elected because the turnout was some 45%. The Chairman of the Parliament, Nataša Mičić (DS), was appointed caretaker president, and new elections were postponed, pending the adoption of a new constitution. Thus, during 2002 there were three unsuccessful attempts to elect a president, and Serbia did not manage to elect a president until June 2004 (Boris Tadić of DS).

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<sup>59</sup> Data source: 1996 data: ZA Study 2911; 2002 data: author's survey. In 1996, support for SRS was positively associated with sympathy towards the opposition parties (e.g., with DS  $r=.32$ ,  $p<.01$ ).

<sup>60</sup> The following example can illustrate the degree of conflict and the character of the struggle between DS and DSS. In early 2002, more than 40 DSS MPs were dismissed from Parliament for their alleged absenteeism. The decision was later ruled as unconstitutional by the *Federal Constitutional Court*. Yet, for a considerable time the decision of the Court was ignored, and when Prime Minister Đinđić appointed his own preferred judges to the *Serbian Constitutional Court*, this court decided that the removal of the DSS MPs was legal. However, in November 2002 the MPs returned to their places in the Parliament.

<sup>61</sup> The socialists could not agree on a candidate, although Milošević advised them from the Hague prison to support Šešelj.



On 12 March 2003, Serbia suffered another shock when a criminal clan assassinated Prime Minister Zoran Đinđić in collusion with members of certain special security forces. The assassins were apparently motivated by the desire to obstruct democratic reforms and to stop further extraditions to the Hague Tribunal. Vice president of the DS, Zoran Živković, who was appointed new Prime Minister, pledged to continue the policies of his predecessor. The tragic death of Zoran Đinđić and the following clampdown on organized crime, when hundreds of members of various criminal gangs were arrested, contributed to the upsurge in sympathy for the assassinated Prime Minister and his party. Public opinion polls from April 2003 list the DS as the most popular party in the country, with the DSS, the newly formed G17 Plus<sup>62</sup>, and SRS as its major rivals. Party G17 Plus transformed from an expert group closely affiliated with DOS (provided some ministers in Đinđić and Živković governments), into a political party under the leadership of former presidential candidate Miroljub Labus. Initially it appeared programmatically and politically close to DS, but as the December 2003 elections were approaching they came increasingly into open conflict with each other, mostly on valence issues, such as corruption allegation. As a result, the G17 Plus moved politically closer to DSS.

### ***Resume: Political Transformations on the Level of Elite Politics***

The purpose of this qualitative review of the development of the party system in Serbia is to provide the ground for understanding political conflicts primarily on the level of political elites. We can differentiate three stages in the development of the Serbian party system. Political pluralism started with the opposition between the former communists and anti-communist nationalists, just as in other countries in the region. The Serbian peculiarity was that the anti-communist side was far too weak and fragmented to seriously challenge the semi-reformed communists, partly because the communists had earned a strong nationalist reputation.

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<sup>62</sup> G17 Plus stands for “Group 17 Plus”. It originally had 17 members, hence the name. The “Plus” came with the expansion of the group.

Since this unequal balance meant bleak prospects in the long term, the opposition reframed the divide as the conflict between authoritarianism and democracy. This marked the second phase, which lasted throughout most of the 1990s. Socialists and radical nationalists laid claim to the authoritarian part of the spectrum; the democratic opposition was ideologically heterogeneous, united by the desire to remove Slobodan Milošević from power.

In the third phase, after the 'bulldozer revolution', it seems that two central divisions are consolidated. One is the emerging opposition within the democratic camp between the nationalist and conservative perspective represented by the DSS, and the economically liberal and culturally libertarian option promoted by the DS and some smaller affiliated parties from the DOS coalition. The second division is continuing the divide between authoritarianism and extreme nationalism on the one side (represented by the Radicals and the remains of the SPS), and liberal democracy on the other.

The regime change in 2000 represents the main change on the political scene since political pluralism was introduced. It produced several major consequences for the party system. The Socialists retained only a fraction of their former voters. For example, their candidate in the first round of the 2002 presidential elections won only slightly more than 100,000 votes. Moreover, they seem to be in a prolonged crisis and have already suffered several splits. SRS initially seemed weakened too but their recovery was fast: Šešelj was able to win about one million votes in the unsuccessful December 2002 presidential elections, attracting many of the former SPS voters. In addition, the extreme nationalist bloc obtained another party in the parliament, namely SSJ (though this party did not manage to enter the parliament in December 2003 elections).

More strikingly, and despite Šešelj being under arrest for the Hague tribunal, the Radicals emerged as the strongest single party after the December 2003 parliamentary elections, winning 82 seats (32.8%) in the parliament. Thus, it seems that the decrease of popularity of this political orientation after the Đinđić assassination was temporary. Their political weight is, however, limited by their low coalition potential - it turned out that there is no party, apart of the socialists, willing to accept the radicals as coalition partners. In general, parties of the so-called 'democratic bloc' still obtained a larger share than the ostracized SRS and SPS together. Although it seemed that once the main leader of the

democratic opposition was on the way out of the political stage in Serbia, Vuk Drašković and his party (in coalition with another party) successfully returned to the parliament by the end of 2003, with 22 seats, the same number as the Socialist Party (8.8%). Perhaps there is still some space for this 'romantic' brand of nationalism between the extremists associated with the Radicals, and the conservative traditionalists who are now closer to Koštunica.

The former democratic opposition remains divided into two main blocs. The DSS has built an image of a party firmly committed to democracy and the rule of law and committed to pursuing vital national interests. Culturally, they are more traditionalist and conservative. The DS, with particularly firm roots in elite circles of the capital, is ideologically liberal, oriented towards market reforms and European integration.<sup>63</sup> Among the other parties from the DOS coalition, there is an ongoing differentiation according to their proximity to DSS or DS, since most of them are too small for independent electoral competition. December 2003 parliamentary elections did not bring clear victory to any of the three political camps. Although SRS appeared as the strongest single party, none of the parties from the 'democratic bloc' seem to be willing to enter such a coalition and socialists have too few representatives. On the other side, DSS rejected forming a government with DS, and instead formed a minority government with the support from SPO and the newly formed G17 PLUS (and with tacit support from the socialists). As of May 2005, this post-electoral arrangement proved to be an unexpectedly stable political constellation.

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<sup>63</sup> However, party programmes and ideological commitments are not always reliable predictors of promoted policies once a party comes to power. For example, a minister from the GSS – one of the apparently most liberal and libertarian parties within the DOS – introduced religious classes into Serbian schools.

## Summary and hypotheses

Early empirical research revealed exceptionally low levels of political interest, involvement, and political knowledge among 'ordinary citizens'. Their attitudes appeared to be unstable, unpredictable, incoherent, and certainly not organized along familiar ideological lines (Campbell et al. 1960; Converse 1964, 1970). Later research, however, qualified those findings in several respects. It was found, for example, that more sophisticated methodology depicted a more sophisticated public, or that political sophistication varied not only over time and across societies, but also within societies, generally in correlation with education. Thus, even those authors critical of the general public's cognitive abilities when applied to politics, present more qualified, nuanced, and complex images of the public (e.g. Batista-Foguet and Saris 1997; Zaller 1992).

Much of theoretical and empirical research in political science has been done under the assumption of ideological unidimensionality, specifically in terms of the socio-economic left-right dimension. Not only does the left-right continuum summarize positions of various specific issues and policies, but it also has other normatively important functions. According to Kitschelt et al. "the left-right semantics facilitates relations of democratic accountability and responsiveness" (1999, 238). However, ideological unidimensionality is more often assumed than empirically established. Hence, the question of how well such a simple and apparently functional model corresponds to the 'reality' cannot be escaped. Middendorp (1989) for example, found not only that political space in The Netherlands is two-dimensional, but also that party preferences are better explained by the authoritarian-libertarian axis than the economic left-right axis.

Virtually all multidimensional models in political science literature, not surprisingly, include the economy-based left-right dimension. If a model contains two dimensions, the other one is typically conceptualized either as the libertarian-authoritarian axis or as a related dimension based on the 'new politics' issues. To complicate the matter, the left-right continuum itself is not always associated with economic or only economic matters. According to Kitschelt et al., "Left-right self-placement is policy-based, if economic liberalism and socio-cultural orientations are its best predictors. But it may

be symbolic, organizational and cultural, if associational affiliations or social-structural group attributes directly determine such placements" (1999, 275).<sup>64</sup> Three or more -dimensional models are relatively rare, and even if additional dimensions are established they are rarely seen as politically relevant, or are conceptualized in more idiosyncratic manner.

Political science generally operates with a small number of ideological dimensions, perhaps because of the discipline's need to distinguish political parties. Depending on the number of parties, only a small number of independent dimensions might in principle be competitively relevant. Two general reasons for aggregating issues into a smaller number of divisions, are, according to Kitschelt et al., the limited cognitive capacities to handle more complex structure (voter as a 'cognitive miser'), and the fact that "politicians tend to map issue positions onto broader ideological dimensions as a coordinating device in legislatures" (1999, 70).

As we saw, political science largely focused on macro-level factors in explanations of the structure of ideological and political oppositions. The greatest theoretical weight is given to political-historical and social-structural factors, and to their interaction as presented in the cleavage politics model. In the post-communist context, researchers take into account the related set of factors such as pre-communist political history, presence of ethnic cleavages, degree of economic development, and the state status (Evans and Whitefield 1993, 1995). More specific is the emphasis on the importance of the political regime divide, i.e. of the rejection or support for the former communist regime, and on its major influence at initial stages of transition (Berglund, Ekman, and Aarebrot 2004; Kitschelt et al. 1999; Moreno 1999). Hence, variously defined, we should expect evidence of ideological dimension(s) reflecting this divide (most likely authoritarian versus democratic or liberal division).

In empirical studies of mass political behavior, the basic socio-demographic characteristics are the most often examined variables, again under the framework of the cleavage politics model. For

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<sup>64</sup> The changing nature of the left-right semantics is discussed in, for example, Kitschelt and Hellemans 1990, Knutsen 1995, Inglehart 1984.

example, Kitschelt (1994) provides elaborated hypotheses about the influence of different occupational positions on ideological orientations.

There are several important characteristics of the reviewed studies that are particularly relevant for the present research problem, and should be briefly explicated. In many cases, even in those where authors explicitly address the problem of the structure of 'political space', operationalization of political attitudes tends to be rather narrow in content. Typically, scholars use ad hoc sets of items available in large-scale surveys that do not necessarily cover all potentially relevant ideological dimensions (Middendorp's studies represent a clear exception to this rule). An illustrative example is the already discussed Kitschelt's (1994) research on ideological structuration in Western Europe. The relationship between the attractive theoretical argument and the empirical analysis remained rather distant. This habit is an additional factor that makes conclusions about only a few politically relevant ideological dimensions more likely.

When it comes to the explanation of individual differences in positions on ideological dimensions, percentages of explained variance often do not reach two-digit figures. For example, Evans and Whitefield (1998, 1029, Table 3), using a broad set of socio-demographic variables, were able to explain exactly zero percent of variance in the left-right self placement in Russia in 1995. It should be noted, however, that the situation is not very different in many Western countries. Rempel (1997), using a rather comprehensive list of background variables, was able to explain a quite modest amount of variance in various political attitudes (e.g., from 9% in the case of "spending on welfare" issues, to 29% in the case of 'new social movements' issues; even in the case of "rich-poor income redistribution" issue these variables explained only 9% of variance; Rempel 1997, 203-4, Table 9.3). One possible reason for the pervasiveness of these findings is that the standard sociological model is underspecified. In other words, there seems to be a space for the expansion of the explanatory framework, and the present research will suggest that this can be accomplished, in part, by the inclusion of individual-dispositional variables.

Thus, the problem of the role of ideology in individual political behavior still represents a considerable puzzle – not only to the scholars dealing with ideology in new democracies. The goal of

the present research is to expand our knowledge in this area. More detailed discussion of the implications of the reviewed studies, especially with reference to the Serbian case, is included in the following sections.

### ***Social-psychological Literature***

There are several ideas in the social psychology literature that are of central importance for the present research. Hierarchical organization of political attitudes (e.g. Eysenck 1954; Middendorp 1991a; Zaller 1992) represents a powerful model that enables differentiation of attitudes according to their generality as well as their manifest or latent nature. Disagreements about the exact nature of this organization, in terms of the number and content of attitudinal dimensions, as well as about the underlying factors that explain particular manifest attitude structure, e.g. in terms of values or psychological functionality, abound (cf. Schiff 1994). Yet, this is probably a necessary outcome not only of different methodologies and theoretical assumptions, but also of the nature of the phenomenon under investigation.

Social-psychological literature, not surprisingly, emphasizes the psychological factors behind the attitude structuration. Psychological functionality of particular attitudes is the most often presumed mechanism. Value expressive function is presumed when general values are considered to be 'behind' covariance of specific attitudes.<sup>65</sup> Ego-defensive function of attitudes is often presumed in literature applying the concept of authoritarianism (Maltby and Price 1999). In many accounts, however, the psychological functions are not clearly specified and differentiated, even less measured. Instead, the explanatory role is played by specific individual-dispositional constructs that are supposed to explain why certain logically unrelated attitudes in fact tend to covary. Constructs such as authoritarianism, social dominance orientation, Machiavellianism, need for cognitive closure, openness to experience,

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<sup>65</sup> Consider, for example, Tetlock arguing that "underlying all political ideologies are core or terminal values that specify what the ultimate goals of public policy should be – values such as individual freedom, social equality, economic growth, national security, environmental protection, and crime control" (1986, 820; see also Rokeach 1973).

and fear of uncertainty, received the greatest attention. Despite the apparent differences between them, they in fact share much in common. Jost et al. (2003) claim that the need for cognitive closure can explain individual differences in inclination to subscribe to conservative ideology, and argue that research on authoritarianism or social dominance, supports this claim.

Psychological dispositional constructs are used in explanatory accounts of individual differences in ideological orientations as well. Thus, for example, in Wilson's (1973a) model of conservative ideology, fear of uncertainty explains on the one side why various attitudes correlate with each other, and on the other why some individuals obtain higher or lower scores on his conservatism scale.

The social-psychological literature, however, suffers from a number of limitations. First, it lacks the macro-perspective and conceptual tools to address the obvious cross-cultural variations. Hence, purely psychological models are in danger to miss some of the central sources of attitude constraint, such as the political discourse and real political divisions and conflicts. It is not that psychologists would not see these factors, but psychology is not equipped well to address their role. This difficulty arises generally when problems under investigation cross-disciplinary boundaries.

Typically, the apparent cross-cultural differences, such as the correlation of authoritarianism with right-wing orientation in the west, and with left-wing leanings in the communist and post-communist settings, are explained in psychological models with reference to hypothetical common underlying psychological processes. This approach may be more or less persuasive, but such post hoc theoretical adjustments may damage the verifiability and generalizability of the respective theories. Attempts at establishing the connection with political system variables have been scarce, and often lacked deeper theoretical foundation (e.g., Sidanius, Ekehammar, and Ross 1979; Walkey, Katz, and Green 1990). Not surprisingly, such attempts occasionally slip into simple over-psychologization of sociological and political processes.

A peculiar problem for this tradition concerns the operationalization of the dispositional constructs. Although they are generally theorized as personality dimensions, they are rarely operationalized like standard personality scales (cf. Feldman 2003; Greenberg and Jonas 2003; Stone, Lederer, and



Christie 1993). Thus, measures of authoritarianism and other related constructs are often too close to variables that they are supposed to explain, e.g. conservatism.<sup>66</sup>

Nevertheless, there is some variability in this regard. Openness to experience (Costa and McCrae 1989; McCrae 1996; Van Hiel, Mervielde, and De Fruyt 2004) is clearly a personality scale, though its predictive power tends to be comparatively weak. Adorno et al.'s F scale is also somewhat more of a 'personality' type scale than Altemeyer's RWA, or Jim Sidanius' SDO. The present research advances a more sociological interpretation of authoritarianism as a world-view to circumvent these objections (Gabennesch 1972; see also Feldman 2003).

### ***Political Science Literature***

Political scientists have generally posited stricter conditions for acknowledging that the public understands politics in ideological terms compared to social psychologists. For the latter, virtually any structure obtained via factor analysis was considered as evidence of the structuration of socio-political attitudes. Political scientists, on the other side, expected the structure to be more in line with theoretical conceptions of ideologies, and that specific attitudes should be related, at least in principle, to general ideologies via logical deduction. Hence the widespread view of the public as consisting of 'cognitive misers', unable or unwilling to reach more respectable levels of political sophistication.

Yet, the recognition of ideological thinking among the masses proved indispensable, partly for normative reasons and partly because of the accumulated positive evidence relativizing the earlier critical findings. Precisely because of the public's low political knowledge and interest, the left-right ideological continuum was considered important due to its ability to serve as a clue to a wider set of attitudes and policy preferences. The accumulated evidence rather consistently shows that the public is able to use the continuum in a meaningful way, and that self-description in terms of left-right

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<sup>66</sup> For example, Bouchard et al. (2003) obtained correlation of  $r=.75$  between authoritarianism (RWA scale) and conservatism (W-P scale). The problem is whether such strong relationships indicates overlap in the content, or rather the relationships can be interpreted in causal terms.

orientation predicts a wide set of political behaviors and attitudes, even though these might differ from one country to another.

The meaning attached to the left-right continuum, however, has remained elusive. This and other related problems prompted political scientists to examine multidimensional models of ideology, not unlike those encountered in the social psychology tradition (Schiff 1994). The most typical findings are that the left-right dimension is interpreted in socio-economic terms and concerns various redistributive issues. Not infrequently, however, left and right are associated with socio-cultural issues, where the right is coupled with more authoritarian, socially conservative, traditionalist, and religious views. In many accounts (e.g., Fleishman 1988; Middendorp 1989), left-right and authoritarian-libertarian dimensions are conceived as separate and independent ideological dimensions. The second ideological dimension is also often interpreted in terms of the 'new politics' issues, or materialism-post-materialism.

Political scientists rarely saw individual psychology as useful in explaining the ideological space. They more often focused on the role of the elite discourse and intellectual traditions, as well as conflicts between political elites, and between different social groups. Socio-economic left-right is thus seen as reflecting class cleavage, while the libertarian-authoritarian axis reflects the religious-secular conflict. At the same time, political science has to be concerned with the political relevance of the ideological dimensions. Thus, in this tradition attention is devoted more to the dimensions that are able to differentiate supporters of different parties, rather than to all possible facets of ideology.

On the micro-level, ideologies are seen as embedded in the social structure, typically in conflicts between real social groups with different interests and identities (the cleavage model). The role of institutions and political parties as active agents is also emphasized. Yet, this tradition also suffered from certain 'blind spots'. Predominant focus on the left-right dimension, and concern with differentiation of political parties, impeded political scientists from more serious consideration of multidimensional models (cf. Svallfors 2005). When methodology allowed, the findings usually suggested more complex structures than the typical one- or two-dimensional models (e.g. Middendorp 1991a; Schiff 1994).

Concerning the micro-level explanations, scholars dealing with themes from 'new politics' pointed at the insufficiency of the basic socio-economic background variables in explaining ideological orientations and voting behavior. They emphasized the role of values, or 'value-cleavages', and, in some accounts, psychological constructs, such as psychological needs, achieved theoretical prominence (e.g. Inglehart 1977).

### ***Hypothetical Model of Political Attitudes***

The model I wish to examine in the present research relies on the reviewed social-psychological and political science literatures. It can be best presented by separating two aspects: one dealing with the hierarchical structure of political attitudes, and the other dealing with explanation of individual differences in positions on ideological dimensions and their role in predicting political action. The two aspects are separated for analytic purposes, although they should be seen as two aspects of the same interrelated phenomena.

I start from the hierarchical conception of political attitudes that broadly corresponds to those presented by, for example, Eysenck (1954), Wilson (1973), or Middendorp (1991a). Table 6 presents the three key elements of this hierarchical model. The *level of abstraction* column specifies the concepts applied to specific levels of the hierarchy. Each of the levels is accompanied by specific *operationalization*. Thus, specific opinions represent the manifest level, and are operationalized typically as single attitude items. Attitudes or ideological facets represent the latent level, and can be operationalized, as well as defined, through primary factors of attitude scales with relatively narrow scope.

The more hypothetical aspect of the model concerns the *integrating mechanisms* that correspond to different levels of abstraction. On the lower levels of the hierarchy, integration of different specific opinions is based on semantic similarity, or 'logical constraint'. Broader attitudes or ideological facets are bound together by logical constraint only to a limited extent. In fact, what is seen as logical constraint might depend on one's broader ideological and value commitments. For example, support for privatization of state-owned enterprises and of foreign investments might be seen as logically

related by economic neo-liberals, but not necessarily by those more inspired by nationalist sentiments. Thus, on the higher levels, values and psychological functionality play a larger integrative role. On the highest level, the one that concerns the most general ideological dimensions, one can hardly speak about logical constraints. Factors discussed on this level concern terminal values, psychological functions, intellectual traditions, discourses associated with conflicted elites, or the basic and deepest social divisions.

Much of theorizing in the field addresses these problems, yet there are few reliable findings and widely accepted positions. The reason is that this theorizing is often interpretative, i.e. is rarely directly addressed in empirical research, but rather relies on ad hoc interpretation of the isolated factors or dimensions and their correlates.

**Table 6 Hierarchical model of political attitudes**

<i>Level of abstraction</i>	<i>Operationalization</i>	<i>Integrating mechanism</i>
Ideology	Higher-order factors (latent)	Terminal values, psychological function, intellectual tradition, political tradition
Attitudes / Ideological facets	Specific attitude scales / primary factors (latent)	Values; psychological function, political discourse
Habitual opinions	Individual items / 'mini' attitude scales (manifest)	Logical constraint / semantic similarity
Specific opinions	Individual items (manifest)	Individual items—no integration necessary

The present research design brings several improvements in approaching the problem of the structure of ideology. Special attention is devoted to the selection of items, which should be as much as possible substantively representative for the domain in question. Biased and partial coverage of the ideological dimensions very often characterizes both empirical models and more theoretical accounts.<sup>67</sup> Reliance on ad hoc sampling of variables tends to violate one of the basic requirements for discovering the 'laws of structure', namely, representativeness of the sample of variables for the

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<sup>67</sup> For example, reading of Van Deth and Scarbrough's (1995) volume *The Impact of Values* would basically suggest that nationalism is not a politically relevant political value or ideology.

domain under investigation (Nesselroade and Cattell 1988).<sup>68</sup> In the present case, the existing theory and research, especially the ideas about relevant political-ideological dimensions in post-communist countries and Serbia in particular, guided the selection of items.

The method of data analysis will also be adjusted to the analytical problem. For example, higher-order ideological factors will be rotated using the oblique method since the imposition of the orthogonality cannot be theoretically justified. Interpretation of the obtained factors will be enhanced by systematically relating the isolated factors to a broad set of theoretically relevant independent and dependent variables. The former group, for example, would include standard socio-demographic background variables, dispositional variables such as Social Dominance Orientation and authoritarianism, prejudice, and political preferences. Here, the focus will be not so much on 'explaining' variance in the ideological dimensions, or on testing their explanatory utility, but rather on improved interpretation of the obtained dimensions.

I will not have direct operationalization of the abstract values that possibly inspire aggregation of specific attitudes into an ideological dimension.<sup>69</sup> Neither can I devote much attention to intellectual traditions that might have had some consequences for the Serbian respondents. However, the interpretation of factors will be enhanced on the one side by examination of their empirical relationship with a wide set of relevant variables, and on the other by the narrative review of the recent Serbian past presented here in a separate chapter.

### Explanation of individual differences

In the previous section, the mentioned systematic examination of the relationships between ideological factors and relevant dependent and independent variables is intended to serve the purpose of enhanced interpretation of the obtained factors. Thus, this problem will be analyzed through zero-order bi variate relationships (Huberty 2003).

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<sup>68</sup> Saucier's (2000) lexical study of ideology is clearly an example of the care given to the selection of variables.

<sup>69</sup> Measurement of abstract values has proved to be very difficult (e.g. Rohan 2000; Hitlin and Piliavin 2004).


In order to *explain* individual differences in ideological orientations in a theoretically meaningful manner, it is necessary to perform more complex analyses.<sup>70</sup> Figure 1 shows four categories of variables that are supposed to represent a relatively complete causal chain. Relationships between them will be analyzed through a specific modification of path analysis. The model starts from the socio-economic background variables that can exhibit their influence directly on ideological orientations and political preferences, but also via mediating dispositional variables. The authoritarian world-view is supposed to be strongly rooted in structural variables, and to influence individual susceptibility to specific ideological orientations. Ideological orientations are explained by dispositional variables and, directly and indirectly, social structure. Finally, political or party references can be related to all variables on the left side, also directly and indirectly.

The possibility of the reversed causal direction cannot be completely discounted, however. Political party preference might determine one's ideological views. Ideological commitments may as well exercise some influence onto one's worldview. However, this possibility will not be examined here. The substantive reason is that the presented order of variables and presumed causal direction follows the hypothetical temporal order of formation of the characteristics operationalized by the included variables, and their stability. In addition, the order corresponds to the generality of the assumed influence of the characteristics. Socio-economic background may exhibit very general and diverse influences, including development of particular individual dispositions. Worldview is a rather general dispositional construct, and can be expressed in different ideological preferences. Finally, it is generally assumed that individuals choose parties that express their views and promote the desired policies. The opposite relationship, that is that people develop attitudes in accordance with party affiliations is particularly implausible in a new political system with short-lived political parties and a low level of party identification.

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<sup>70</sup> Explanation of individual differences here refers to the determinants of one's positions on the isolated ideological dimensions. Individual differences in the *level of constraint*, i.e. the degree of attitudinal coherence, are not the topic of the present research (cf. Barton and Parsons 1977). Exploration of this problem would require analysis of the role, for example, of political sophistication, involvement, interest, etc.

**Figure 1 Hypothetical causal chain explaining individual differences in ideological orientation and political preferences**



The model escapes traps of both sociological and psychological reductionism, and I believe is more complete and theoretically grounded than most models reported in contemporary literature. It is close to Middendorp's model (1991a, 38, Figure 2.6), but I include individual dispositional variables in between structural and ideological variables.<sup>71</sup> Although, as Hitlin and Piliavin (2004) argue, social structure is among the most often considered antecedents of values (in the present model ideological orientation), it is crucial to specify the process that generates values. Thus, while Middendorp was able to define direct economic voting, class-voting (direct and indirect), religious voting and ideological voting, the present model allows me to examine expressive voting as well (the effect of worldviews on vote), as well as to explain ideological preferences when they are not directly based on structural factors, which is often the case.

### **Hypotheses**

The main problem of the study, namely the dimensionality of mass ideological attitudes, will be approached primarily in the explorative manner. The existing relevant theories and models are either

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<sup>71</sup> Middendorp also includes 'contextual factors' behind the structural variables. Yet, these factors, namely 'socio-economic development' and 'politico-cultural developments' are not directly operationalized in his study. They represent general sociopolitical changes, such as secularization, that provide the context for the relationships between the other elements of the model.

(a) not sufficiently elaborated and general to allow deduction of testable hypotheses across different contexts and newly developed operationalizations, (b) or if they contain formalized general elements the deduced hypotheses would rarely imply interesting and non-trivial testable hypotheses.<sup>72</sup> The reported findings, especially in their details, by and large depend on the applied instruments and samples surveyed. Still, the body of the reviewed theories, models and findings rather clearly suggest what the most interesting problems are and what methodological difficulties require innovative approaches.

I try to balance between theoretical generality and broad comparability, on the one hand, and the case-specific operationalizations, on the other hand. Hence, my thesis does not include testing of a single research hypothesis, or *the* research question in the literal sense (cf. Middendorp 1978, 1991a). The goal is rather to test the plausibility of the existing models using contextually defined operationalizations. The strategy and techniques I apply are analytic, but with the aim to obtain a holistic picture of the case. This approach does not examine just tiny bits of information for each individual, but essentially incorporates all that is known about each respondent after the interview is completed.<sup>73</sup>

The general hypothesis that mass political attitudes are interrelated and that it is therefore possible to speak of ideological orientations among the respondents is already present in the hierarchical model outlined above. It also includes more specific ideas about the hierarchical organization of political attitudes, and about the sources of attitude constraint (e.g. logical, psychological, structural).

The hypothetical causal model can be seen as a general hypothesis as well. It embodies a number of specific relationships that represent themselves a set of testable hypotheses that can be clearly related to the existing theoretical background. Throughout the literature review, I emphasized various points

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<sup>72</sup> Following Gorski (2004), one would find such situation across social sciences.

<sup>73</sup> The questionnaire from 2002 survey contained more than 200 items and almost all are included various analyses.



relevant for the present research and here I shall elaborate some of the more important hypotheses that my analysis will address.

### Hypotheses about the structure of ideology

The hypothetical hierarchical model specifies the general structure of attitudes, and the role of different sources of constraint at different levels of the hierarchy. It says little about the content of the possible ideological dimensions, which attitudes should 'go together', or what ideological dimensions should be politically relevant.

In the context of the 'triple transition', it is possible to expect a somewhat higher degree of attitudinal *incoherence* in post-communist cases. Given the relatively brief experience with competitive politics it is likely that many issues are still not integrated into a few broader general ideological dimensions. In the context of high volatility and the instability of party systems, there is little constraint coming from elite discourse and the actions of political parties. Both parties and voters may have little incentives to frame issues into clear ideological alternatives. Hence, it is likely that second-order factor analysis will not converge into a small number of general dimensions. Next, it is possible that many attitudinal dimensions will lack political relevance, namely that they will not differentiate supporters of different parties.

The most politically relevant ideological dimensions, however, should be related to the real conflicts and problems that the society faced. Thus, the general structure of ideology should reflect various characteristics of the case in point. For example, historic legacy is generally seen as a very influential factor. Specific cleavage actualization and politicization might also be case-specific (cf. Budge and Bara 2001, 61). Even an idiosyncratic power balance between competing elites in the initial stages of the regime change may be very consequential. Nonetheless, it is not very difficult to make prediction for Serbia in the 1990s: the regime change and the national issue were at the center of societal and political conflicts, and are expected to shape the structure of mass ideology accordingly.

The political relevance of these dimensions is facilitated also by the fact that they could be seen as "easy issues" (Carmines and Stimson 1989), i.e. issues about which opinions can be created without

much knowledge or cognitive sophistication. It is easier to polarize the public on easy issues because on hard issues different subsets of the public might organize their views differently and/or incoherently, and therefore such issues might not appear as structured dimensions. Regime change and nationalism have strong mobilization potential also because they can easily evoke strong affective reactions. Given the lack of ground for other bases of political mobilization ("flattened society", Wessels and Klingemann 1994), psychologically based commitments might play an extraordinarily strong role.

According to Moreno among others, in new democracies initially the "democratization creates a polarization between supporters of the newly created democratic regime and supporters of previous nondemocratic regime" (Moreno 1999, 18). Normally, "because the process of democratization ... is temporary, it is likely that the democratic-authoritarian divide is also temporary" (Moreno 1999, 18). The regime divide may therefore be a transitory cleavage (Berglund, Ekman, and Aarebrot 2004). Yet, case-specific conditions may lead to different transitional trajectories. The authoritarian-democratic cleavage may remain the central polarizing divide for a long time.

The reason that structured political space might be expected even in Serbia is suggested by Kitschelt et al.'s (1999, Chapter 8) discussion of the 'anomaly' that despite the weak issue crystallization among political elites, Bulgarian voters still exhibit comparatively strong constraints in their ideological and political preference. In their words,

“where the regime divide remains salient, citizens have strong intuitive judgments of who is right and who is wrong, who is good and who is evil, and who is 'left' and who is 'right.' In programmatic terms, voters may thus associate fundamental questions of democracy – for or against – and economic organization – social protectionism or market liberalism – with the regime divide and organize cognitive maps that may have little to correspondence to the actual programmatic coherence of parties' appeals." (Kitschelt et al. 1999, 280).

Thus, the salience of the regime change issue acts as a center of gravity for many other more or less related issues. We may also note a kind of psychological assumption underlying this argument,

concerning the strong affective involvement in the regime change issue, yet the assumption is not explicated nor empirically analyzed.

The regime change issue, however, always has a particular ideological coloring. It matters whether the 'old regime' was, for example, right-wing authoritarianism or 'really existing socialism'. Hence, fifty years of state socialist experience should leave a strong mark on the structuring of ideological orientations in Serbia. Above all, the attitude towards socialism and the former regime should give the meaning to the regime change division. The clearest implication following Moreno and Kitschelt et al. is to expect evidence of the regime divide on an ideological level, and that it should correlate with other divisions, especially concerning the economic reform.

Following Evans and Whitefield (1993), since ethnicity and nationalism played an exceptionally significant political role in Serbia, its reflection on the structure of ideology is expected to be obvious. Since this has been the conflict that divided both political parties and the public, it should be able to structure relevant specific opinions into a more general nationalism dimension. Moreover, this dimension must be politically relevant i.e. differentiate political parties.

The quick rise of nationalism and the issue of state and nation building on the Serbian political agenda very much followed Carmines and Stimson's (1989) ideas about how new issues appear and evolve. As they argue, new issues appear often from "exogenous shocks to the system", as well as from other sources such as "unsatisfied constituencies" or "political leaders in search of electoral leverage" (Carmines and Stimson 1989, 4).

Yet, one does not really need any theory to develop this argument in the situation when the former country, including the dominant regime and ideology, broke-up along ethnic lines, leaving significant numbers of co-nationals across the newly established borders, and where the national community still does not have clear boundaries. When the 'national community' felt threatened by competing nationalisms of the same former country (cf. Brubaker 1996), and by potential secessions of symbolically important territories, it is not surprising that nationalism became a major political issue.

It should be even less surprising that the anti-nationalist camp was relatively weak throughout the 1990s.<sup>74</sup>

As already mentioned, socialism and extreme nationalism were initially opposed doctrines in Serbia. Subsequently, nationalism was increasingly characteristic both for the supporters of the semi-reformed Socialist Party *and* for the supporters of the radical right parties.<sup>75</sup> Hence, nationalist attitudes could be related to both right and left wing. The tendency was emphasized also by the constellation of the principal political opposition: on the one side was the 'red-brown coalition' ruling throughout the 1990s, while on the other were liberal, pro-democratic and reform forces.

This research will examine to what extent the convergence of nationalist and pro-socialist orientations was based on their potential common psychological foundation (authoritarianism), and/or common structural foundation (support of the lower strata or 'losers of transition'), and/or the nature of the party competition (SPS and SRS have been jointly opposed to pro-Western 'democratic' opposition).

#### Hypotheses about the causal model

The present research involves a number of additional, specific hypotheses about the relationships between ideological dimensions and a number of relevant independent and dependent variables. In fact, all possible direct and indirect relationships between the boxes in the above-presented model of individual differences could be treated as specific hypotheses and related to specific relevant literature.

Instead of elaborating expectations and controversies about each and every possible relationship, I would prefer here to outline some of the broader ideas that can represent the theoretical background of

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<sup>74</sup> It seems that 'variance' in nationalist programs of different political parties in Serbia increased over time. The extreme right was gaining in strength, and therefore 'flanked' (cf. Hislope 1996) the dominant party in the nationalist direction, while it took some time for parties of the 'democratic bloc' to give up of most of their nationalist baggage.

the presented model. Innovative elements/aspects in my model can be best seen in relation to the 'new politics' research tradition, on the one side, and with research on the post-communist countries, on the other side.

Although the body of research on 'new politics' and post-materialist value change has exhibited very strong influence on research on West European politics, the notions of the 'new politics' and post-materialism are rarely used in connection with the third-wave democracies. This is not surprising given that the model was developed to account for social, political, and ideological changes in the most developed or advanced industrial countries. On the one hand, it has proved difficult to deduce straightforward testable hypothesis for the post-communist context, while on the other, the obtained findings in the few studies on post-communist cases often were unexpected and difficult to interpret. For example, in a study involving several Hungarian national surveys and samples of different generations, it proved not only very difficult to find any post-materialists, but more importantly it was found that Inglehart's PM index does not correlate with any of the theoretically relevant variables (Enyedi and Todosijević 2000).

Inglehart admits that the less developed part of the world might exhibit tendencies that diverge considerably from the Western pattern. While the Western citizen is looking for roots and belonging, the young Easterners want to get rid of too much community and concentrate on materialistic goals. Kitschelt (1992), for example, argued that libertarians in Eastern Europe should be pro- rather than anti-market, or in Inglehartian words, post-materialists should be also materialists. Moreover, Inglehart (1971) offered an interesting interpretation of the relatively high post-materialism among separatist nationalist parties in Belgium as reflection of the need for belonging (a 'higher' need in Maslowian model) of post-materialists.<sup>76</sup>

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<sup>75</sup> Hilde Weiss (2003) found that in several post-communist countries anticapitalist feelings correlated with nationalism. The Serbian peculiarity is not in the anticapitalist orientation of the nationalists, but rather in their affiliation with former communists.

<sup>76</sup> Similar findings are reported for Northern Ireland, where Sinn Fein supporters are the most post-materialist, although they are not particularly well off in economic terms (Curry and O'Connell 2000).

Yet, there is a basis for taking the new politics tradition and post-materialist value change model seriously in its implications for the post-communist context. The common ground can be found in social factors favoring the emergence of the new politics phenomenon. Namely, the increasingly important role of values and cultural issues for politics is understood as a consequence of, among other factors, social atomization and individualization, where traditional social bonds, as well as encapsulation of key social groups by political organizations, had been declining.

The emergence of the so-called 'mass society', thus favored individualist explanations of political behavior (cf. Schiff 1994). According to the mass society model, "individuals are separate, isolated social beings with direct, simultaneous relations to the institutions of the larger society unmediated by intervening social networks" (Schiff 1994, 287). What is especially important is "the unmediated access of elites to the masses [...] and the direct access of the masses to elites" (Schiff 1994, 287).<sup>77</sup>

Similar descriptions of the social situation in the former communist bloc are often encountered, though typically in grimmer colors. Clientelist political parties, undeveloped civil society in the former East, or 'flattened' social structure, are among the often mentioned additional factors. Hence, this would suggest even fewer external constraints on the individual political behavior in the East than in the post-industrial West. In such conditions, and taking into account the relatively cognitively sophisticated public in the former communist bloc, values and related individual-dispositional constructs come to the fore as explanations of individual-level variation.

World-view refers to the general perspective on how the world is and ought to be organized, about the individual's place in it and about the relationships between individuals and groups. Particular values can be seen as inherent for specific world-views, but the latter concept has a much broader scope.<sup>78</sup>

While values seem to be more prescriptive and evaluative principles, the world-view involves the very

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<sup>77</sup> The former is achieved through the means of mass communications, and the latter generally through public opinion surveys.

<sup>78</sup> And more realistic, since it does not imply deduction of specific beliefs from general values. Rohan (2000) for example, virtually identifies concepts of values and worldviews.

perception of the nature of the social world and implies relatively integrated systems of values and beliefs. In addition, world-view involves clearer expectations about determinant factors. Values have more individualist connotation, and therefore are explained often in terms of individual socialization. World-view, however, implies closer links with 'objective' conditions that may determine one's perspectives on the world. Socialization within particular social structure is only one, though very important factor. Hence, world-view should be closely related to variables that imply larger socializational differences, such as age and education. To sum up, the concept of world-view is the theoretically and methodologically more attractive construct for the present research.

In case of Serbia, one can expect large differences between generations that were socialized in decades after WW2, for whom socialism was associated with an increasing economic standard of living and improvements in virtually all directions; economic, social, and cultural. Post-war generations, similarly to West European post-materialist generations, experienced profoundly different socialization than the earlier generations. On the one side, to a somewhat more limited extent than their Western counterparts, they experienced material security (less wealth but perhaps more secure). On the other side, partly through mass-media sources and though travel abroad (Serbia was open in that regard), Serbian post-war generations grew up immersed in western cultural products, and simultaneously faced unfavorable comparisons with the westerners in the standard of living especially towards the end of the century. Thus, in the situation of the regime change, it is likely that a particular cleavage of world-views would occur, which should strongly be related to age, and be much broader than the simple division into winners and losers of transition would suggest.

In the West, individual differences in positions on the socio-economic left-right dimension are often better explained by class or status position, while libertarianism or post-materialism, which is a dimension closer to the meaning of world-view, correlates with education, age and religiosity (e.g., Brint and Kelley 1993; Flanagan 1982; Rempel 1997). According to Thomassen, "because of the persistence of value orientations during people's lifetime, a change in values will mainly occur by

generation replacement. This is a main element in Inglehart's theory of value change" (Thomassen 2004, 11).<sup>79</sup>

The question of the role of economic self-interest in the political behavior of the post-communist citizen, however, remains puzzling. The prevailing view is that, unless some other highly inflammable symbolic issues, such as ethnic divisions, achieve dominance, the normal state of affairs is that politics is about economic interests. According to Kitschelt et al, for example, "whether left-right party placements are wedded to the economic dimension of competition or also to a socio-cultural dimension depends primarily on the salience of socio-cultural issues for the competitive struggle" (Kitschelt et al. 1999, 246). The often encountered findings, such as the fact that potential losers of transition still support neo-liberal economic reforms (Gijssberts and Nieuwbeerta 2000), are explained away by various ad hoc hypotheses.<sup>80</sup>

The hypothesis offered here is that to a large extent the relationship between socio-economic status or even resource endowments and political preferences and behavior, is mediated through specific world-views and related ideological orientations. On the one side, it might be difficult to recognize clearly one's economic self-interest in the often incoherently offered political options and in the volatile and changing circumstances (Gijssberts and Nieuwbeerta 2000). On the other side, it might be very easy and simple to differentiate worldviews embedded in different political discourses. The present model allows both direct relationships between structure and political preferences, and

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<sup>79</sup> In cases when 'natural authoritarianism' of the older generations is divided between the political options, age may become less relevant predictor of political preferences, even in situation when the regime change is salient. In Hungary, for example, older sections of the electorate are divided between supporters of the communist successor Socialist Party, and anti-communist Christian Democrats (Enyedi and Todosijević 2001).

<sup>80</sup> Basing the potential losers-winners division on the presumed calculation of individual self-interest seems to be too simplistic. It is not clear, for example, why the lower strata, who enjoyed relatively less privileges in the communist regime compared with the intellectual elites, for example, still tend to be nostalgic about the 'old times', instead to welcome the opening of new opportunities and the freedom of economic competition. In general, the strict division between winners and losers cannot really *divide* the public given the disproportional sizes of the respective groups.



indirect connections, whether through world-view, and/or through ideological orientations. What is important to note is that socio-demographic variables are entered into the model on explicit theoretical grounds, i.e., they do not “serve simple descriptive and control functions” (Timpone 1998, 54).<sup>81</sup>

In the model I develop in the present research, the left right identification is a *mediating* variable, and in turn it explains political attitudes and political preferences. In more general perspective, the relationship between specific opinions and ideological identification is of course interactive, i.e. causality is not unidirectional. However, it is theoretically more appropriate to argue that ideological identification, as a more general disposition including both abstract value orientations and more concrete political preferences, predicts attitudes towards concrete issues. In extraordinary situations, specific attitudes might change more general orientations, but such events should be rare, more typical case being the incorporation of specific new attitudes into the existing broader scheme. This interpretation is corroborated, for example, by frequent findings in post-communist countries that left-right self-identification is best predicted by former communist party membership rather than with specific ideological orientations (e.g. Kitschelt et al. 1999).

The placement of ideological self-identification before specific attitudinal dimensions in causal terms is not necessarily controversial, and is in accordance with, for example, Conover and Feldman (1981) and Jacoby (1988). The latter sees the liberal-conservative continuum as a 'content-free schema', where "A content-free schema represents a person's tendency to view the world in a particular way [...] "[I]t provides the individual with a set of organized categories, which are used to process and organize incoming information" (Jacoby 1988, 317).

In substantive terms, left-right self-placement should have somewhat different ideological correlates than in the West. According to Moreno, for example, "if the left-right axis of political competition reflects the main issue or issues in a given society, then it should reflect the conflict between

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<sup>81</sup> Tendency to include demographics into regression equations without clear theoretical rationale is criticized by, for example, Achen (1992). He argued that "When researchers are being theoretically serious, demographics should be discarded. They belong neither in party ID nor in vote equations." (Achen 1992, 198).

democratic and authoritarian positions in new democracies" (1999, 15). It is not clear in what way should nationalist attitudes correlate with the left-right scale. Commonly, it is the political right that is associated with nationalist and related attitudes. However, in Serbia both left and right wing parties excelled in nationalist rhetoric. Thus, the relationship might be curvilinear. Moreover, association between political left and nationalism should be different in the early and late 1990s, because both the extreme right was gaining in strength, and communist successors on the left became more nationalist themselves.

### A cleavage of world-views

In mass society, without mass parties or other institutions capable of organizationally encapsulating segments of the electorate, there have been few conditions favorable for the freezing of the initial structure of social conflicts in Serbia, or for that matter many other post-communist cases. Links between the elite and masses seem to be established in different, one might argue more post-modern ways. At the end of the twentieth century, the emerging post-Communist political parties possessed alternative methods for mobilizing potential voters than parties that provided ground for the classical cleavage-politics model. Mass media in particular provide efficient access to a much wider audience, thus making most of the organizational work of the earlier times superfluous. Today, party elites might find it much more efficient, especially in the short run, to appeal to voters' socio-psychological characteristics, and not necessarily or directly to the interests associated with their socio-structural location. In this way, distinct world-views accompanied by negative stereotypes about political enemies, can become the central dividing line of national politics. The depth of such divisions can be large enough to prevent cooperation across the camp-borders, as happens in cases where socio-economic groups are pitted against each other. One of the major arguments of this research is that political attitudes, values, or ideologies, with only marginal or indirect links with social structure, but heavily rooted in distinct world-views, can provide ground for exceptionally stable political orientations (for an argument along similar lines see Kitschelt et al. 1999, Chapter 8).

The specific contribution this paper seeks to make is through the elaboration of a particular individual-dispositional trait that connects social structure with ideological orientations and further

with political preferences, namely authoritarianism. This concept, conceived as a personality or attitudinal dimension has frequently been used for explaining anti-democratic political preferences (Adorno et al. 1950; Altemeyer 1988; Canetti-Nisim 2004). Originally, authoritarianism was associated with ego-weakness and sadomasochistic character (Adorno et al. 1950, 759), and related constructs such as 'compulsive-dependent personality' (Schlachter and Duckitt 2002), or obsessive personality (Kline and Cooper 1984). In more contemporary literature it is often associated with aggression (Todosijević and Enyedi 2002), need for cognitive closure (e.g., Chirumbolo 2003), but most consistently with openness to experience trait from the Big-Five model of personality (e.g., Butler 2000; Heaven and Bucci 2001; Riemann et al. 1993).

The perspective adopted presently, however, emphasizes socialization experiences rather than the intra-family processes and personality, in line with Gabennesch's (1972) conception of "authoritarianism as world view". Authoritarianism on the individual level is conceived as a world-view rooted in reified perception of the social reality. Particular positions in social structure, such as low education or cultural deprivation, constrain development of broader social perspectives. If an individual's "social perspectives are narrow, the social world will tend to *appear to him* as a reified entity" (Gabennesch 1972, 869, emphasis in original). Those coming from an authoritarian micro-world tend to see the entire social world as organized in authoritarian fashion, and the hypothesis proposed here is that they tend to support authoritarian political options. World-view defined in this way, therefore, has roots in individual psychology and in social structure,<sup>82</sup> and has broad consequences for specific attitudes and preferences.

Given the extended salience of the regime change cleavage in Serbia, various issue dimensions should converge into an overarching authoritarianism versus democratic orientation (or liberalism) division, and it should be strongly related to an authoritarian world-view on the individual level. The authoritarian world-view should in turn be related to very specific ideological orientations and

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<sup>82</sup> One may add the heritability factor as well given the recent findings about heritability of authoritarianism (e.g. McCourt et al. 1999), and conservatism (e.g. Bouchard 2003).

political preferences. Authoritarianism is established as a robust predictor of anti-democratic orientations across different contexts, although its relationships with specific political leanings may be context-specific. Thus, authoritarianism is expected to be related to nationalist and prejudiced streams within the extreme right-wing ideology, just as it is in the West. At the same time, as a post-communist specialty, authoritarianism is also expected to be related with the support for state socialist ideology (cf. McFarland, Ageyev, and Djintcharadze 1996; Krauss 2002), since certain aspects of socialism in this context represent really a conservative, even reactionary ideology.

### ***Broader Framework***

Kitschelt et al.'s critical observation that "Most published research on public opinion and voting rationales in post-communist democracies operates with single equation models that do not reveal this "causal depth" of phenomena such as citizens' left-right self-placements and party preferences" (1999, 277), is certainly accurate. Still, I would argue that their own introduction of the hypothesis about the mediating role of issue opinions is only one step in the direction of the development of a more complete model.

The model I present here goes even more 'in-depth', in the sense that it includes socio-structural, individual-dispositional, and ideological variables into account. It is more complete as well, not only because it includes additional variables, but also because it more clearly explicates the involved psychological and other mechanisms through which the hypothetical causal chain operates. Finally, the hypothetical causal sequence is theoretically grounded.

According to Zaller, "efforts at integration of research findings are uncommon in the public opinion field. With only a handful of exceptions, the trend is in the other direction - toward the multiplication of domain-specific concepts and distinctions. [...] The result of all this specialization is that the public opinion field has devolved into a collection of insular subliterations that rarely communicate with one another" (1992, 2). The present research should demonstrate the *integrative ability* that Zaller called for. The analysis of the structure of the ideology at the mass level can connect psychological literature on the individual differences; on social, psychological and political determinants of political attitudes;

studies of political socialization; public opinion research; and political behavior studies into a single general framework. The outcome will, however, still be imperfect, but even if it does not go far enough, it does go in the right direction.

Huber and Inglehart (1995) found that authoritarianism versus democracy is an important political cleavage in many countries. The present research will contribute to the better understanding of how authoritarian leaders using apparently formally democratic methods succeed in maintaining the status quo, and why those who should be most interested in democratization often seem to prefer authoritarian options.

## Method

### **Surveys and Samples**

#### 2002 Survey of Belgrade residents

The main source of data is the author's survey of a random sample of Belgrade residents ( $N=502$ ), conducted in the February 2002.<sup>83</sup> Polling was conducted by the Center for the Advancement of Empirical Research, Belgrade, Serbia, (*Udruženje za unapređenje empirijskih istraživanja*) under the guidance of Professor Srećko Mihailović.

Sampling was done according to the random route method, where the random selection of streets was done in 25 randomly chosen localities in 13 Belgrade municipalities (with three stages in street selection: municipality, local community, and street). Face-to-face interviews with adult respondents (18 years and over) were conducted in respondents' homes and completion of each interview lasted approximately 90 minutes. The entire questionnaire contained 210 questions.

The non-response rate was relatively high – nearly 60% (including respondents who rejected interviews, and those who were not at home for the initial interview). Given the objective limitations, it was not possible to re-approach absent respondents a sufficient number of times. Instead, the interviewers turned to the next household or 'reserve' street according to the predetermined procedure.

According to the polling agency report, the situation for data collection was in part worsened by the fact that Slobodan Milošević's trial in The Hague started at the time of the survey. It created considerable tension in the society. In addition, workers' strikes were going on in some parts of the capital with the lowest response rates. Some of the interviewers provided observations such as: "People are sick of politics, the state, life, and especially of surveys" (from the Polling agency final

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<sup>83</sup> The data collection was made possible by the Doctoral Student Research Grant, Political Science Department, CEU, Budapest.

report). Independent control of the survey (10% of the locations were double-checked) confirmed the authenticity of the data collected.<sup>84</sup>

These limitations in the data collection made the sample somewhat unrepresentative according to some demographic variables, but the bias is rather small. Comparison with an independent national survey from the same period reveals very similar distribution of several key variables that appear in both surveys (e.g., left-right distribution)<sup>85</sup>.

### 1990 and 1996 Data

Data for years 1990 and 1996 come from Serbian and Yugoslav election studies, provided by the Central Archive in Cologne (*Zentralarchiv für Empirische Sozialforschung*), hereafter referred to as ZA Studies. Neither the original collectors nor the Central Archive in Cologne (ZA) bear any responsibility for the analysis or the interpretation presented here. The following studies are used: ZA Study 2901 and 2903 (3<sup>rd</sup> wave), 1990; and ZA Study 2911, 1996. These data sets have sufficient variables to provide comparisons with the findings from the author's 2002 survey.

Samples in these studies are generally national random quota samples, covering the entire territory of Serbia, excluding Kosovo. The sample sizes are generally between 1000 and 2000, including adult respondents (18 years and over). The sampling method is generally multi-stage stratified sampling, designed to be representative according to major demographic variables (e.g., age, sex, residence, education). The field research is conducted as face-to-face interviews in respondents' homes, and organized by established local polling agencies.

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<sup>84</sup> The control was based on re-visiting 10% of the visited households. Five sections were randomly chosen out of 25 sections of the capital, 10 households were then randomly selected in each of the five selected districts, and 10 questions from the surveys were randomly selected for checking the consistency in the respondents' answers.

<sup>85</sup> The comparison refers to the ZA Study 3894, which was conducted in November 2002.

## **Measures**

### Political attitudes

There were several general objectives that guided construction of the political attitude scale. One was to include both abstract or more 'philosophical' items, and more concrete ones, as advocated by Middendorp (1992a). The rationale is that in this way the scale would allow emergence of separate more abstract, and hence possibly more universal factors, and more contextually specific factors, but without preventing their combination within single factors. Initially I intended to include an approximately equal number of items representative of various ideological facets. The rationale would be again two-fold: to intentionally give approximately equal weight to all theoretically expected factors, and to obtain relatively reliable measures at the most basic level.<sup>86</sup> In practice, however, some ideological facets, it seemed, could successfully be covered by relatively few items, while some were more complex and included various attitudinal subdimensions. The adopted analytic strategy, as it will be seen, minimizes the effect of the unequal number of items for different ideological facets. In general, the relative size or 'weight' of factors does not figure very prominently in the present model.

Finally, great care was devoted not to miss any of the important ideological facets. The items in the scale were selected to represent various political attitudes that are relevant for constructing more general ideological orientations, as well as for specifically Serbian and post-communist ideological controversies.

The scale construction started first with outlining the most important ideological dimensions that should be measured, relying on the existing literature, and on examination of the specific case in point. The next step was to review the existing questionnaire operationalizations of various ideological dimensions. Analysis of their content and of their metric characteristics (reliability, validity, and discriminativity) was necessary to narrow the potential items to a manageable pool. The

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<sup>86</sup> This is important due to the known unreliability of single items. Since creation of the 'tautological items' as a strategy to increase reliability has to be avoided because it would result in too a large number of items, this seems to be the best strategy.



content analysis of items was especially relevant, because many items from the well-known scales would appear obsolete and/or inapplicable to respondents due to cultural differences. Likewise, psychometric performance of various items in the existing studies helped both choosing the more valid items and presenting them in more efficient format. There is no need to recapitulate the procedure in details.<sup>87</sup>

The outcome of this informal deductive procedure was the presently applied political attitude scale. It consists of 70 statement-type items, presented in Likert form, with five degrees of agreement-disagreement (from 1 - doesn't agree at all, to 5 - agrees completely). Appendix A lists all the included items. In the right-hand column are shown preliminary assessments of the hypothetical ideological content of particular items.

Most of the included items have already appeared in various studies and have often been treated as indicating the named ideological orientations. For example, item 47, "*In general, full economic security is harmful; most men wouldn't work if they didn't need money for eating and living.*" comes from Adorno et al.'s (1950) Politico-Economic Conservatism scale (PEC) (item 9 has the same genealogy). Some of the items, in more or less adjusted form, come from Eysenck, Middendorp, and other scholars, from several comparative databases, as well as from my previous research (e.g., Enyedi and Todosijević 2001, 2003).

### Authoritarianism

In addition to this 2002 survey, comparable authoritarianism scales were included in ZA surveys from 1990 (10 items scale) and 1996 (8-items scale), thus making possible the examination of the role of authoritarianism in ideological orientation over the 1990s. Only a couple of items appear in all three surveys (1990, 1996 and 2002), often with small differences in the exact wording. For example, all scales contain the prototypical authoritarianism item concerning the expected obedience of children. I

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<sup>87</sup> By way of an example, an earlier application of the catch-phrase item types in Hungary, with abstract formulation of various values (e.g. 'freedom', 'nation'), proved relatively unsuccessful because such items showed very weak discriminativity (Enyedi and Todosijević 2003).

decided to analyze the whole scales and not to concentrate only on the common items, since the longer scale provided more reliable measures. The remaining items represent various related facets of the same construct of authoritarianism as described in classical models (Adorno et al. 1950; Altemeyer 1988).

Although the scales are not identical, they are certainly comparable, and clearly measure similar underlying dispositions. Items in the scale from the 2002 survey were put together on the basis of previous studies based mainly on Hungarian samples (Enyedi and Todosijević 2000, 2003). Authoritarianism scales applied in the ZA studies were compiled by the authors of the respective ZA studies. Despite the different immediate origin, the scales share the more distant ancestors. They are generally built on items from the F and RWA scales (Adorno et al. 1950; Altemeyer 1988).

Items are presented in Likert format, with five degrees of dis/agreement in the 2002 survey (1: strongly disagree, 5: strongly agree), and four degrees in the ZA studies. Sample items: *The most important virtues a child has to learn are obedience and respect for authority*; *Most of our social problems would be solved if we get rid of immoral and perverted persons*.

In subsequent analyses, authoritarianism is operationalized as the first principal component of the corresponding scales. In each sample, virtually all authoritarianism items loaded significantly on the first principal component. Reliabilities (*Alpha*) are excellent in all cases:  $\alpha=.84$  in the 2002 Belgrade sample,  $\alpha=.90$  in the 1996 national sample, and  $\alpha=.89$  in the 1990 national sample.

### Ideological self-identification

Each of the surveys asked respondents for their left-right ideological self-identification via the standard Left-Right self-identification scale. The 2002 scale applied a 10-point scale, while the ZA studies employed 7-point scales, with the higher number denoting the right-wing identification.

### Party preferences

All samples included an open-ended vote choice question. Additionally, in some surveys there were feeling barometer scales asking for the positive-negative evaluation of the major political

parties/candidates. The vote choice question often resulted in a higher proportion of “Don't know” and “Refused” responses. In some cases, therefore, voters of different but closely related parties were put together in a common category, as will be indicated appropriately.

In addition, certain analyses were performed using the feeling barometer scores, i.e., the expressed degree of dis/liking of a particular party/leader. Both 2002 and 1996 surveys employed similar 5-point items asking for affective distance from different political parties. In the ZA 1996 a response of “1” expressed the smallest degree of distance between the respondent and a particular party, while in the 2002 survey a response of “1” represented the most negative possible view of a party. The analyses are mainly focused on the five most influential Serbian parties, with strongest electoral base and continuity over time in the period examined: SPS, SRS, DS, DSS and SPO.

#### Criteria variables

A number of variables included in the 2002 survey are used in order to enhance the interpretation of ideological dimensions. These variables are not of primary interest here, but they are necessary to illuminate the nature and meaning of the extracted ideological factors. This set of variables includes the Anti-Gypsy and Anti-Jewish prejudice scales, and Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) scale (Pratto et al. 1994). The Anti-Gypsy and Anti-Jewish prejudice scales are translations of the corresponding scales earlier applied in Hungary (Enyedi and Todosijević 2003). Despite their brevity, they proved reliable operationalizations of the corresponding prejudices. In the present sample, reliability of the anti-Gypsy scale is  $Alpha=.67$ , and of the anti-Jewish scale  $Alpha=.82$ .

Social dominance orientation is conceptualized as “general attitudinal orientation toward intergroup relations, reflecting whether one generally prefers such relations to be equal, versus hierarchical” and the “extent to which one desires that one’s ingroup dominate and be superior to outgroups” (Pratto et al. 1994, 742). In the present research I use 10-item version of the Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) scale (Pratto et al. 1994). The Hungarian version of the scale was applied earlier, with ambiguous results (Enyedi and Todosijević 2003). Most important is that the scale does not support a one-dimensional interpretation in the post-communist context. The scale generally splits into two

blocs of items formulated either in a positive or a negative direction. This finding has been encountered elsewhere as well, but the correlation between the two subscales in the present sample is rather low ( $r=-.14, p<.01$ ). Therefore, the subsequent analyses generally include findings for the two SDO subscales: Egalitarianism and Group-Based dominance. Further details of these scales are given in Appendix B.

### **Additional measures**

The usual set of socio-demographic variables (e.g., age, sex, education, income) was included in all surveys, though with minor differences. Despite the emphasis on occupational categories in many scholarly accounts, I do not use this variable. The reason is its inconsistent coding in the surveys. Categorization of occupations seems quite arbitrary and unclear even in the ZA studies. Preliminary analyses showed rather inconsistent relationships between occupation categories and various relevant variables. The problem is not entirely in measurement. Throughout the 1990s it has been rather common in Serbia to hold more than one job, and often the 'nominal' occupation, that is one's registered employment, would not be the one that provided the main income.

### ***Data Analysis***

The first part of the analysis is focused on item and scale analyses. Initial factor analysis of the entire set of political attitude items serves to construct basic attitudinal dimensions and examine sources of attitude constraint at the lower level of generality. Based on these results, the next step focused on creation of mini-scales. The criteria for creation of these scales included the initial factor analysis, content homogeneity, and internal consistency of the scales.

In the field of political sociology, ideological orientations are routinely measured by a few, ad-hoc collected attitude items. Even otherwise sophisticated studies base the selection of the scale-items on simple factor analyses and/or on the author's subjective judgment. Given that the entire final conclusion depends on the reliability and validity of these indicators of ideological orientations, special attention is devoted to the construction of the scales. I employed both deductive and inductive logics. That is, on the one hand, I selected items based on the principal tenets of major political

philosophies and ideologies. Then, in the second step, I checked with explorative factor-analysis whether the covariation among the entire pool of items coincides with my initial grouping. On the basis of the results of factor analysis I revisited many of the original scales and either improved them by adding new items to them or deselecting some of the original items, or completely eliminated them. My decisions concerning these changes were based on how relevant the particular items were for the respective orientation and for the Serbian political conflicts. The aim of this eyeballing was to reach coherent, meaningful, one-dimensional mini-scales. These mini-scales were conceived as constitutive elements of ideologies proper. In order to reach the level of generality the concept of "ideology" implies, I continued to identify the commonalities among the mini-scales, following the logic of hierarchical factor analysis.

Relationships between ideological dimensions and independent and dependent variables were analyzed by means of different methods, the most appropriate for the specific problems. More complex causal hypotheses were analyzed using path analysis or other methods of multivariate causal modeling (e.g. Cox and Wermuth 1996), while discriminant analysis was employed to examine dimensions of political competition.

## Results

### ***Primary Dimensions of Political Attitudes***

Due to the low reliability of single items, studies that perform factor analysis on larger samples of items often end up in obtaining a too large number and/or idiosyncratic factors, especially if second-order factoring is not attempted. To solve this problem, my first step was to construct 'mini-scales' of very specific attitudinal dimensions, something similar to Comrey and Newmeyer's (1965) strategy. However, distribution of items to specific mini-scales should not be entirely based on their pre-conceived ideological meaning. That approach would neglect the necessity to establish coherence of attitudinal items within a dimension at the very lowest level as well. The method should allow 'unpredictable' behavior of attitudinal items.

Thus, selection of items for specific mini-scales based on their beforehand established semantic similarity and interpretation of their ideological 'coloring' was the initial deductive aspect of the adopted research approach. Results of a number of factor analyses of the entire attitude scale were the other, more inductive, source of information for constructing the final mini-scales.

Many rounds of such analyses were performed, with changing number of factors retained for rotation and interpretation. A certain number of items were problematic in the sense that they did not load on the expected attitudinal dimensions. They either loaded on a related dimension and could be incorporated into that factor, or occasionally created 'dual factors' that did not contribute to any of the other ideological dimension, but would not be sufficiently 'strong' to define a separate factor.

### **Initial first-order factor analysis**

First, I report results of the initial first-order factor analysis that served as a starting point for the creation of the attitudinal mini-scales. Several preliminary analyses on the complete set of 70 attitudinal items suggested dropping several items for reasons of easier interpretability. When applied

to the 67 retained attitudinal items, the Guttman-Kaiser criterion for the number of factors suggested extraction of 19 factors (with Eigenvalues above 1.00).<sup>88</sup> This large number of suggested factors, and relative weakness of the first principal component, accounting for 15.76% of the total scale variance, clearly demonstrates that a one-dimensional model could not account for the observed relationships between attitudinal items. Closer inspection, however, showed that not more than 15 factors could be meaningfully interpreted as attitudinal dimensions. Table 7 and Table 8 show the structure (correlation of the items with factors) of the extracted 15 factors after Oblimin rotation. These factors account for 54.20% of the total scale variance.<sup>89</sup>

The first thing that can be noticed is that a number of items correlate with multiple factors. For example, item I6\_R has virtually equal loading on factors 2 and 6 (.52). Some items have even triple relatively substantive loadings. Despite the fact that multiple loadings decrease the clarity of the factor structure, in most cases it is not difficult to interpret the extracted factors.

Factor 1 consists of two main groups of items. One contains items expressing militarist attitude (items I1\_34 to I1\_37). The army is here seen as a guarantee of the security and as an object of admiration and respect. Item with the highest loading (.80), for example, expresses a demand for more funding for the then Yugoslav army. Items in the second group express nationalist sentiments and views in various ways. Several items express national pride and feeling of superiority (e.g. I1\_53, I1\_54). More peculiar for Serbian nationalism are items I1\_61 and I1\_63, expressing the belief in an anti-Serbian conspiracy and betrayal by neighboring nations. There are also several items with negative though lower loadings. All of them (I1\_11, I1\_39 and I1\_40) concern foreign policy, specifically an anti-Western orientation, including the belief that Milošević is not to be blamed for the 1999 NATO aggression against Yugoslavia (item I1\_39). Thus, Factor 1 unites nationalist and militarist attitudes into a single dimension.

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<sup>88</sup> In this and subsequent factor analyses I used principal component extraction method, while missing values were replaced with corresponding means.

<sup>89</sup> Eigenvalues and variance explained by the extracted components and rotated factors is given in Appendix C.

**Table 7 Factor structure of the first seven attitudinal factors (Oblimin rotation)**

No.*	Items	F1	F2	F3	F4	F5	F6	F7
I1_1	It is harmful for the economy if the government tries to reduce income differences between rich and poor.				.62			
I1_2	Every individual has to take care of him/herself and it is no state business to worry about individual welfare.				.43			
I1_3	The state ought to be involved in economy as little as possible.				.70			
I1_5	For workers it is better to be employed in state-owned firms, than in private of privatized ones.					-.41		
I1_6_R	The transfer of state-owned companies to private hands will help very much in solving the economic problems of our country.		-.52			-.52		
I1_7_R	Unprofitable factories and mines should be closed down immediately even if this leads to unemployment.					-.52		
I1_10	We should welcome openings of international companies, banks and other firms in Yugoslavia.		.58			.35		
I1_11_R	Yugoslavia should rely on its own forces to develop economically, without foreign capital or credits.	-.32	.62					
I1_20	Sex relations except in marriage are always wrong.					-.55		
I1_22	Important is freedom of the individual, not the economic equality.				.50			
I1_23	Economic inequalities are a natural outcome of differences in abilities.				.40			
I1_27_R	There are more important problems the state should care about than it is environmental pollution.						.71	
I1_29	I would accept paying additional tax for environmental protection.						.42	
I1_30	It is more important to preserve and improve nature than to achieve economic development.						.75	
I1_31_R	Sexual discrimination is not a serious problem in contemporary Yugoslavia.							.51
I1_32	Women should politically organize in order to fight against sexual discrimination.							.64
I1_34	Strong army is the only guarantee of our security.	.67	-.32					
I1_35	More money from the budget shall be devoted to modernizing our army.	.80						
I1_36	It is a great honor to serve in our army.	.73						
I1_37	We can be proud of great courage and heroism of our army shown in the heroic fight against the NATO aggression.	.70						
I1_38	Yugoslavia's future is joining the EU.		.52			.37		.33
I1_39	Milošević's regime is mainly to be blamed for the NATO attack on Yugoslavia.	-.41	.55					
I1_40_R	Serbia's natural allies are Slavic nations, like Russia or Byelorussia.	-.49				.39		
I1_41	Western world is ready to accept and help democratic Serbia and Yugoslavia.		.75					
I1_53	Serbs should be proud of their people.	.58						
I1_54	No nation has such a glorious and at the same time tragic history as the Serbs.	.66						
I1_55	Our country should follow its own way, not caring about the expectations of the West.	.58	-.37			-.34		
I1_57	There are few nations that contributed to the world's culture and science as ours.	.61						
I1_59	It is more important that a politician be a strong patriot than that he/she be an expert.	.54				-.39		
I1_60	Our country should seek a peaceful reunification of those parts of the neighboring countries that are inhabited by ethnic Serbs with Serbia (e.g., Republika Srpska).	.52						
I1_61	Schools should pay more attention to the patriotic education of young people	.66		.35				
I1_62	The Serbian people are victim of an international conspiracy.	.61	-.45					
I1_63	The Serbian people often suffered because it was too good towards the others.	.67						
I1_64	Communism caused great damage to the Serbian people.					.57		
I1_65	The role of the Serbian Orthodox Church should be increased in managing the country's matters.			.78				
I1_66	Religious teaching should be compulsory, not only an optional course in all elementary and secondary schools.			.78				
I1_67	Religion, that is Christian faith should lead us in our life.			.76				
I1_68	The Karadorđević dynasty should return to their throne in Serbia.			.60				
I1_69R	It was better when Milošević and SPS led the country.		.58			.50		
I1_70	Since the fall of Milošević regime, the people can influence the fate of the country better.		.64					

Note: Loadings below .40 not shown if that was the highest loading in the row (within the displayed factors); loadings below .30 not shown at all.

\*Items with suffix "\_R" to their number are reversed for the analysis.



Most of the higher-loading items on Factor 2 express the support for the international integration of the country. Thus, for example, the highest-loading (.75) item I1\_41 expresses the belief that the *"Western world is ready to accept and help democratic Serbia and Yugoslavia."* In addition to these items, several items express negative evaluation of the Milošević's rule (items I1\_69 and 70), and support for economic privatization (item I1\_6). Thus, this factor unites the support for the international integration of the country with the negative evaluation of the Milošević's rule.

The third factor is simpler to interpret. Three items with the highest loading express the demand for greater role of the (Serbian Orthodox) Church in politics and education. The only additional factor with high loading demands the return of Karadžević dynasty to the throne in Serbia (I1\_68). Hence, the factor can be interpreted as clericalist orientation.

Factor 4 is also rather clear in meaning. Items I1\_1 to I1\_3 clearly express attitudes close to economic liberalism, while items I1\_22 and I1\_23 express more general liberal attitudes. Thus, the factor can be reasonably interpreted as (economic) liberalism.

The fifth factor is somewhat more heterogeneous in content. It seems that it joins the rejection of the socialist regime (I1\_64) including the Milošević's rule (I1\_69), with the rejection of the essential tenets of the socialist economy (items I1\_5 through I1\_7). The factor also includes an item intended to measure traditionalist orientation (with negative loading), and few items with lower loadings that are more indirectly related to the content of the higher-loading items. Thus, the factor could be interpreted as merging a negative evaluation of socialist economy and socialist regime.

Interpretation of Factor 6 is simple. The three highest loading items (I1\_27\_R, I1\_29, and I1\_30) all express environmentalist concerns. Situation with Factor 7 is similar: the two items that define this factor (I1\_31\_R and I1\_32) express pro-feminist views.

**Table 8 Factor structure of the attitudinal factors 8 through 15 (Oblimin rotation)**

No.*	Item	F8	F9	F10	F11	F12	F13	F14	F15
I1_2	Every individual has to take care of him/herself and it is no state business to worry about individual welfare.						.40		
I1_8	The state should provide job to everybody who wants to work.	-.41		.47					
I1_9	Trade unions should have more say in government business.	-.51							
I1_12	Education should be accessible to everyone, therefore, it should be free.	-.65							
I1_13	It is always better to stick to the old that is working than to experiment with something new.				.67				
I1_14	Law and authority is what holds the society not to turn into chaos and anarchy.							.68	
I1_16	The problem of crime cannot be solved without harsher punishments for criminals.o			.55					
I1_17	Death penalty is the best punishment for the worst criminals.		.51			.33			
I1_18	Television should support more the nation's traditions	-.34	.55						
I1_19	Sexual relationships between people of the same sex are always wrong.		.68						
I1_21	There are certain life-styles the state (law) should not allow, such as for example, smoking of marijuana, religious sects, and homosexual relations.		.53	.32	.34				
I1_23	Economic inequalities are a natural outcome of differences in abilities.			.37					-.50
I1_24	There are situations in which the individual should sacrifice his/her own interests and wishes for the benefit a community, such as for example the nation or the family.		.40					.39	
I1_25	Duties are more important than rights.	-.50				.39			-.32
I1_26	It is in the human nature to help each other.							.41	
I1_28	The state should influence the decrease of the city traffic order to decrease air pollution.				.33			.54	
I1_29	I would accept paying additional tax for environmental protection.							.58	
I1_33_R	Everybody is better off if the man works and the woman takes care of the household and the family.				-.63				
I1_34	Strong army is the only guarantee of our security.				.42				
I1_43	It would be better if Serbia and Montenegro would separate.						.32		.40
I1_44	Life is lived only once, so one has to take as much pleasure out of it as possible.			.61					
I1_45	The country should be lead by the capable; the average should follow the lead			.57		.35			
I1_46	Laziness is one of the greatest human sins.					.74			
I1_47	If only people would work and save more, the poverty would disappear from our society.					.57			-.37
I1_48	In general, full economic security is harmful; most men wouldn't work if they didn't need money for eating and living.					.40	.38		-.31
I1_50	In this life, it is important to rise above other, ordinary people.						.73		
I1_51	No formal schooling can make up for the lack of domestic education.	-.32							.43
I1_56_R	It is true that Albanians in Kosovo were victims of the persecution by the Serbian state.		.50						
I1_61	Schools should pay more attention to the patriotic education of young people		.42						
I1_62	The Serbian people are victim of an international conspiracy.		.42						

Note: Loadings below .40 not shown, if that was the highest loading in the row (within the displayed factors); loadings below .30 not shown at all. \*Items with suffix "\_R" to their number are reversed for the analysis.

Socialist, or at least an egalitarian perspective on the economy, is represented by three items that define the eighth factor (I1\_8, I1\_9, and I1\_12) (disregard the negative signs). This factor, however, also contains an item intended to capture the Burkean-style conservative view that 'duties are more important than rights' (item I1\_25) (similar flavor to the factor also gives the low loading of the item I1\_51). Tentatively, the factor is interpreted as representing an egalitarian economic attitude.

Factor 9 consists of a mixture of traditionalist attitudes (e.g. I1\_19), punitive attitudes (I1\_17, I1\_21), and nationalist views (e.g. I1\_18, I1\_56, I1\_61, I1\_62). Due to somewhat higher loadings of traditionalist items, it seems that the factor more reflects traditionalist orientation, where nationalism would be one of its constituting components.

A hedonist and an elitist attitude (I1\_44 and I1\_45) are the primary definers of Factor 10. Heterogeneity of the factor is increased by punitive attitudes (I1\_16 and I1\_21), and by further expressions of inegalitarian orientation (I1\_8, I1\_2). It seems that behind this configuration it is possible to detect a kind of individualist and inegalitarian orientation.

The highest-loading item on Factor 11 ('always better to stick to the old') was intended to cover 'philosophical' conservatism. It is joined with item I1\_33, intended to capture traditionalist orientation. Few lower-loading items generally fit the general conservative attitude, though it is interesting to note that in Serbia, an egalitarian item can contribute to this factor (item I1\_28).

Emphasis on work ethic (items I1\_45, I1\_46, I1\_47) seems to be mostly behind Factor 12.<sup>90</sup> A degree of punitiveness (I1\_17), an emphasis on duties (I1\_25), and elitism (I1\_45), as a set of less central elements of the factor, fit the image of the rigid attitude to work.

Hierarchical individualism seems to be an adequate interpretation of Factor 13 (highest-loading items: I1\_50 and I1\_2). It is difficult to offer reliable interpretation why attitudes favoring separation of

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<sup>90</sup> In the present context it might be inappropriate to interpret the underlying dimension as the 'Protestant work ethic' for obvious reasons.

Serbia and Montenegro appeared on this factor. In any case, the factor seems to be underspecified, primarily 'pulled' by a single elitist item (*“In this life, it is important to rise above other, ordinary people.”*).

Interpretation of the following factor (14) is also not straightforward. The factor is defined by two environmentalist items (I1\_28 and I1\_29), a belief that it is in human nature to help each other (I1\_26), a belief that community might be more important than individual interests (I1\_24), and by the positive view of the role of 'the law and authority' in society (I1\_14 - highest loading item). Such configuration of items was not expected. However, it is possible that a kind of communitarian perspective could be attributed to this factor.

Similarly puzzling is the last factor. It appears as a kind of rejection of certain components of classical conservative ideology – disbelief that economic inequalities reflect unequal abilities, rejection of the importance of duties (I1\_25), opposition to the 'Protestant' work ethic (I1\_47, I1\_48), and belief in the greater weight of “domestic education” than formal schooling (I1\_51). Tentatively, it could be hypothesized that a sort of populist orientation could aggregate this rather diverse set of items. To confuse the matter, the support for separation of Serbia and Montenegro loads here as well.

#### Initial factor extraction: sources of attitude constraint

The initial factor analysis, with 15 imposed factors, produced factors that are interpretable to various degrees. Some of the factors were clearly not expected and their interpretation demanded a certain level of creative imagination. Table 9 recapitulates the factor analysis results with the hypothetical interpretation of the factors. Attitudes may combine for various reasons. Semantic similarity, logics, social-group specific discourse, psychological functionality, and political ideology can all be responsible for their covariation. Some of the scales are dominated by one of these sources, but in the case of others a multitude of factors can be suspected. Semantic similarity or 'logical constraint' is clear in most of the factors. In fact, to the extent that semantic similarity was the main source of constraint, the interpretation of the respective factors seemed uncomplicated. Thus, for example, the factor of feminism consists of basically two semantically close items. Similarly clear is the clericalism

factor, where the three highest loading items have rather close meaning. Economic egalitarianism, international integration, and environmentalism, are also factors with relatively semantically homogenous items. Yet, it is equally clear that structuration of the factors is not exclusively based on the literal meaning of the involved items. Even the clericalism factor, perhaps the most clear-cut of the listed factors, contains an item whose convergence with the other items has to be explained on different grounds. Namely, it is conceivable that support of the increased role for religion in society and politics could be independent of one's attitude towards the former Serbian royal dynasty. The constraint in this case comes from societal tradition and from a broader perspective on the society where both royalist and clerical views are the constituting elements. For the same reason we can observe that an item expressing the favorable attitude towards the integration into international community hangs together with the two feminist items, though its loading is modest.

**Table 9 Factors extracted in initial factor analysis**

Factor	Factor label	Factor	Factor label
1	Nationalism / Militarism	9	Traditionalism /nationalism
2	International integration	10	Libertarian Individualism
3	Clericalism	11	'Philosophical' Conservatism
4	Economic liberalism	12	Work ethic
5	Socialist economy and socialist regime	13	Hierarchical individualism
6	Environmentalism	14	Communitarianism
7	Feminism	15	Populist orientation
8	Economic Egalitarianism		

The reflection of the way political actors combine issues on the structuration of attitudes is clearly visible in the first factor (the nationalism/militarism factor). The fact that the two main components of this factor, nationalism and militarism, formed a single factor cannot be attributed to logic exclusively. This is also how these dimensions are represented within the Serbian political discourse. Yet, this combination of attitudes is certainly not exclusively a Serbian specialty. Basically, wherever these two attitudes are measured, they have appeared as correlated dimensions (e.g. Wilson 1973a). This suggests that broader political traditions and doctrines are source of the convergence of nationalism and militarism. Yet this is still not the full story. These dimensions also generally tend to

correlate with specific individual-dispositional traits (e.g. authoritarianism, Adorno et al. 1950). Thus, this factor provides ground for speculation about diverse sources of convergence: logic, local and more general political discourse, and psychological functionality. Further analysis will shed additional light on these questions.

#### Induction-deduction next round: Substantive and methodological aspects

The unavoidable problem in this type of research, as aforementioned, is the relative low reliability of single items. For this reason, initial matrix of item intercorrelations is built of relatively low coefficients. In such a situation, especially when specific variables could potentially load on different factors, small nuances in the way in which items are formulated, as well as 'noise' from other sources matter in such measurement. It is worth recalling that factor extraction starts from intercorrelations of all included variables. Covariance 'taken out' with the extraction of a factor may cause a particular item that loads multiple latent dimensions, to appear as significant on less relevant dimensions. Presence, absence, or a 'strange' pattern of correlations of a single item may significantly alter the intercorrelation matrix and hence the structure of extracted factors. In exploratory analyses, such as the present one, it is worth experimenting with various subsets of items in order to obtain more interpretable results.

Despite the performed factor rotation, it is clear that factors extracted in the beginning are better defined than the factors extracted last. It seems that a significant proportion of covariance of items loading the factors from the end of the extraction procedure is 'exhausted' by smaller loadings of the factors extracted earlier. Factor rotation usually solves this problem rather successfully, but less so with a large number of modestly correlated initial variables. Thus, it is not accidental that later extracted factors are less well defined — stronger factors 'pulled' some items in their direction, thus leaving parts of the variance of a diverse set of items to covary creating factors extracted towards the end of the analysis.

One further consequence is that correlations between the extracted Oblimin factors are rather low. Table 10 displays the coefficients. It is clear that they are modest in magnitude. Since the sample is

relatively large, most of them are statistically significant. The first two factors, i.e. those that seem to be best defined in terms of the number of loading items (not necessarily substantively 'best'), are responsible for the several somewhat higher coefficients in the table.

It should be added, however, that the coefficients are generally in the direction that is substantively interpretable. For example, nationalism-militarism factor correlates with the clericalism and traditionalism factors (the later factor itself contains some nationalist items), and negatively correlates with international integration, rejection of socialist economy and regime and economic egalitarianism. Likewise, international integration correlates with the rejection of socialist regime and economy. One could easily detect here elements of the main axis of political and social conflicts in Serbia in the 1990s.

**Table 10 Correlation between the 15 Oblimin factors**

Factors	F1	F2	F3	F4	F5	F6	F7	F8	F9	F10	F11	F12	F13	F14
F1	1.00													
F2	-.23	1.00												
F3	.20	.02	1.00											
F4	.00	.09	.06	1.00										
F5	-.22	.18	.03	.01	1.00									
F6	.02	.04	.02	.04	.01	1.00								
F7	-.12	.10	-.09	.03	-.01	.01	1.00							
F8	-.25	.07	-.08	.01	.12	-.05	.07	1.00						
F9	.24	-.11	.09	.01	-.10	.00	-.08	-.11	1.00					
F10	.18	.06	.08	.08	-.01	.01	-.02	-.10	.10	1.00				
F11	.14	-.11	.06	.00	-.14	-.03	-.03	-.10	.04	.02	1.00			
F12	.17	-.03	.12	.09	-.09	.02	.00	-.07	.14	.08	.13	1.00		
F13	.01	.05	.02	.18	.00	-.02	.02	.01	.03	.06	.01	.08	1.00	
F14	.06	.13	.03	.07	-.02	.08	-.01	-.09	.02	.15	.05	.06	-.02	1.00
F15	-.10	.00	-.03	-.07	.06	-.02	.01	.04	-.01	.02	-.05	-.09	-.07	-.04

Note: Coefficients  $r > .08$  significant at  $p < .05$ , coefficients  $r > .093$  significant at  $p < .01$ .

Nevertheless, such a correlation matrix, where the highest coefficient is below .30, would hardly justify further factor analyses. Taking this analysis as a starting point, I proceeded to create mini-scales for the basic attitudinal dimensions. I started with the better-defined factors in the initial factor analysis, leaving out substantively and empirically less relevant items.

In some cases, what was initially a single factor was then separated into two mini-scales. This was the case, for example, with nationalism and militarism. Items substantively less relevant for these two attitudes, such as the attitude toward the Milošević regime or towards Serbia's relations with 'Slavic brothers' (item I1\_40), were left for inclusion in the other scales.

Several items were left out completely from further analyses because they neither converged with the theoretically 'proper' dimensions nor they sufficiently converged with other dimension. For example, item I1\_33 (*Everybody is better off if the man works and the woman takes care of the household and the family.*) was supposed to measure the feminist attitude, but it did not converge with the other two feminist items (I1\_31 and I1\_32). This item remained closer to the traditionalist dimension, but was not included there because it decreased the internal homogeneity of that scale.

Items I1\_13 (*It is always better to stick to the old that is working than to experiment with something new.*) and I1\_15 (*There are some who should not be entitled the right to vote.*) were intended to measure classical conservative rejection of change and elitism/hierarchical attitude, respectively. There were reasons to expect their convergence, but they could have loaded different factors as well. In reality, they 'hung together' so strongly that none of them could be incorporated in any of potentially relevant factors (e.g., elitism, traditionalism), nor could they be seen as defining an interpretable ideological attitude when separated. Hence, they were excluded from further analyses.

A particularly interesting case is item I1\_43 (*It would be better if Serbia and Montenegro would separate.*). It did not converge with the other nationalist items, although it expresses the very core of nationalist doctrine, if one follows Gellner's definition of nationalism. This attitude obviously has a complex meaning in Serbia and is subject to a different interpretation in the public. What is important to emphasize here is that a certain number of items was excluded from further analyses primarily on the basis of interpretability of the obtained dimensions and their internal consistency or reliability.

Finally, some of the findings obtained thus far should be given additional substantive weight. Most important is to note that attitudes in Serbia are not strongly organized, and certainly not into a single overarching ideological dimension (that should not be interpreted as indicating negative qualification



of the Serbian voters). It is also clear that structure of Serbian political conflicts is recognizable in the obtained attitude structure. However, further analysis should provide clearer and theoretically more meaningful picture.

### Mini-scales

The following set of tables presents the final results of the second step in the analyses - the fifteen mini attitude scales. For further analyses, each of these scales was constructed as the first principal component of the respective sets of items. Tables 5 through 19 show loading of attitudinal items on the respective principal components, as well as coefficients of internal consistency (*Alpha*, Cronbach 1951), as well as percent of variance explained by the extracted principal component. The order the scales are presented roughly corresponds to their internal consistency. That is, the order corresponds to the reliability with which the hypothesized underlying or latent constructs are measured.

Although nationalist items loaded different factors in the initial analysis, they can be easily put together into a single scale. Table 11 shows that eleven items with a nationalist content define an exceptionally consistent ideological dimension (*Alpha*=.85). Although individual items deal with somewhat different aspects of nationalism, it was impossible to empirically separate any of them. It is worth noting that the scale contains both general expressions of nationalist orientations that could be applicable across different contexts, and attitudes very specific to Serbian nationalist discourse. Thus, for example, items such as *Nationalism endangers the development of our country*, or *Schools should pay more attention to the patriotic education of young people*, could be, and in fact have been, applied in virtually any country. The sense of victimization, expressed in items such as *The Serbian people are victim of an international conspiracy*, is a noted feature of Serbian nationalism (e.g., Ramet 2004), but even that is hardly unique to Serbia.

**Table 11 Nationalism scale**

No.	Items	Hypothetical content	Loadings
I1_53	Serbs should be proud of their people.	Nationalism	.59
I1_54	No nation has such a glorious and at the same time tragic history as the Serbs.	Nationalism	.78
I1_55	Our country should follow its own way, not caring about the expectations of the West.	Nationalism	.65
I1_56_R	It is true that Albanians in Kosovo were victims of the persecution by the Serbian state.	Nationalism	.54
I1_57	There are few nations that contributed to the world's culture and science as ours.	Nationalism	.71
I1_58_R	Nationalism endangers the development of our country.	Nationalism	.17
I1_59	It is more important that a politician be a strong patriot than that he/she be an expert.	Nationalism	.58
I1_60	Our country should seek a peaceful reunification of those parts of the neighboring countries that are inhabited by ethnic Serbs with Serbia (e.g., <i>Republika Srpska</i> ).	Nationalism	.59
I1_61	Schools should pay more attention to the patriotic education of young people	Nationalism	.73
I1_62	The Serbian people are a victim of an international conspiracy.	Nationalism	.77
I1_63	The Serbian people often suffered because it was too good towards the others.	Nationalism	.76

Note: Items with suffix "\_R" to their number are reversed for the analysis. Alpha=.85; explained variance =41.74%.

The scale combines several attitudes measuring national pride (e.g. I1\_53) and belief in the nation's superiority (e.g. I1\_54, I1\_57), the desire for national sovereignty (I1\_55), unification with territories inhabited by co-nationals (I1\_60), request for introduction of 'patriotic' elements into school curricula, distrust of neighboring nations (I1\_63), and rejection one's own nation's possible guilt (I1\_56\_R). In general, the scale in many respects corresponds to various other operationalizations of nationalist orientation (e.g. Kosterman and Feschbach 1989) and contains most of the aspects of the usually encountered nationalist doctrines (cf. Dekker and Malova 1997). In fact, it is remarkable that so heterogeneous scale in terms of its literal content performs so consistently. Hence, it can be safely concluded that this scale can be used as a reliable tool to estimate respondents' nationalist orientation.

Militarist attitudes, now separated from the nationalist items, also converged into an internally consistent scale (Table 12). In fact, it is impressive that a four-item scale can achieve so high *Alpha* coefficient (.82). Obviously, respondents' attitudes toward the role of the (Yugoslav) army are well

organized. Consistently high loadings show that army is an attitude object viewed in rather general terms – as either positive or negative. Army is seen as a source of security and pride and at the same time it is admired for its role in “the heroic fight against NATO aggression”, or one rejects all these attitudes together.

**Table 12 Militarism**

No.	Items	Hypothetical content	Loadings
I1_34	Strong army is the only guarantee of our security.	Militarism	.78
I1_35	More money from the budget shall be devoted to modernizing our army.	Militarism	.86
I1_36	It is a great honor to serve in our army.	Militarism	.81
I1_37	We can be proud of great courage and heroism of our army shown in the heroic fight against NATO aggression.	Militarism	.77

Note: Alpha=.82; explained variance =64.70%.

Factor of international integration was obtained in the initial factor analysis. Here, it is defined in a more clear way, without lower-loading items dealing with the SPS rule. The result is a highly internally consistent scale ( $Alpha=.73$ ), with considerably clarified content. All the included items express positive (or negative) views of the integration of Serbia (Yugoslavia) into the international community. It is worth noting that a single item formulated in the opposite direction equally contributed to this scale. Typically, negatively formulated items (co called 'con-trait' items) are less successful measures. Concerning the content of this scale, it should be noted that it covers both economic (items I1\_79, I1\_11\_R) and more political (I1\_38, I1\_41) integration. This is a dimension that is encountered less often in the literature.

**Table 13 International integration**

No.	Items	Hypothetical content	Loadings
I1_10	We should welcome openings of international companies, banks and other firms in Yugoslavia.	International integration	.79
I1_11_R*	Yugoslavia should rely on its own forces to develop economically, without foreign capital or credits.	International integration	.70
I1_38	Yugoslavia's future is joining the EU.	International integration	.75
I1_41	Western world is ready to accept and help democratic Serbia and Yugoslavia.	International integration	.73

Note: \*Item coded in reverse. Alpha=.73; explained variance =55.30%.

The items concerning the Karadorđević dynasty is excluded from the clericalism scale. Although it psychometrically fit the scale well, the goal was to ensure the theoretical unidimensionality of the scale. In fact, nothing was lost in a psychometric sense by its exclusion from the scale – the reliability coefficient even slightly improved. Thus, the included items represent a remarkably consistent operationalization of the clericalist orientation. The attitudinal dimension dealing with religion/religiosity is present in virtually all models of social attitudes structure (e.g. Eysenck 1954; Middendorp 1991a; Wilson 1973a). The present scale is however, narrower in scope, and is more clearly focused on the influence of the church on political and social matters.

**Table 14 Clericalism**

No.	Items	Hypothetical content	Loadings
I1_65	The role of the Church should be increased in managing the country's matters.	Clericalism	.84
I1_66	Religious teaching should be compulsory in all elementary and secondary schools.	Clericalism	.84
I1_67	Religion, that is Christian faith, should lead us in our life.	Clericalism	.78

Note: Alpha=.76; explained variance=67.18%.

The traditionalism scale (Table 15) is relatively narrow in scope. Two items refer to traditional sexual mores (I1\_19 and I1\_20), one item expresses a punitive attitude towards “certain lifestyles”, and an item requests television to “supports nation’s traditions”. Although traditionalism as a value or political orientation can include more topics, this scale still covers a relatively heterogeneous set of items. Yet, the scale is empirically rather consistent, and items show uniformly high loading on the

first principal component of the scale. Counterparts to this dimension can be found in most of the models of attitude structure (e.g. Eysenck, Wilson).

**Table 15 Traditionalism**

No.	Items	Hypothetical content	Loadings
I1_18	Television should support the nation's traditions	Traditionalism	.67
I1_19	Sexual relationships between people of the same sex are always wrong.	Traditionalism	.79
I1_20	Sex relations except in marriage are always wrong.	Traditionalism	.63
I1_21	There are certain life-styles the state (law) should not allow (e.g., marijuana smoke, religious sects, homosexual relations, etc.).	Traditionalism/ Punitiveness	.78

Note: Alpha=.69; explained variance =51.72%.

It was not unexpected that such a survey would produce a relatively clear attitudinal dimension expressing respondents' attitudes towards the former socialist regime and the period during the 1990 under the rule of Slobodan Milošević. It was not certain, however, whether the two aspects (attitude to socialism and to the regime during the 1990s would necessarily converge into a single dimension. Part of the answer is offered in Table 16. This dimension shows that the two aspects covary only to a certain extent. Three of the four items explicitly mention Milošević, while only one expresses general evaluation of "communism" (I1\_64). Other items from the broader set that referred to various aspects of socialist views (e.g. on economy) would not contribute to this dimension. Thus, it seems that this dimension reflects the attitude towards the (Milošević) regime and regime change.

**Table 16 The regime attitude**

No.	Items	Hypothetical content	Loadings
I1_39	Milošević's regime is mainly to be blamed for the NATO attack on Yugoslavia.	Regime/Nationalism	.76
I1_64	Communism caused great damage to the Serbian people.	Regime change	.56
I1_69_R	It was better when Milošević and SPS led the country.	Regime	.77
I1_70	Since the fall of Milošević regime, people can influence the fate of the country better.	Regime	.72

Note: Items with suffix "\_R" to their number are reversed for the analysis. Alpha=.65; explained variance =49.66%.

Views concerning various tenets of the socialist organization of economy form a separate dimension of socialist economy (Table 17). The scale has six items, two of which are formulated in the opposite direction. Interestingly, they are among the highest loading items on this dimension. The dominant theme, despite its relative broadness, seems to be the opposition to privatization (I1\_6, I1\_7). The interpretation of the scale is not really controversial. In fact, related dimensions have been obtained previously in countries of the former socialist bloc (Enyedi and Todosijević 2003).

**Table 17 Socialist economy**

	Items	Hypothetical content	Loading
I1_5	For workers it is better to be employed in state-owned firms, than in private or privatized ones.	Socialist economy	.59
I1_6_R	The transfer of state-owned companies to private hands will help very much in solving the economic problems of our country.	Socialist economy	.69
I1_7_R	Unprofitable factories and mines should be closed down immediately even if this leads to unemployment.	Socialist economy	.60
I1_8	The state should provide job to everybody who wants to work.	Socialist economy	.46
I1_9	Trade unions should have more say in government business.	Socialist economy	.60
I1_12	Education should be accessible to everyone, therefore it should be free.	Socialism/Egalitarianism	.47

*Note:* Items with suffix "\_R" to their number are reversed for the analysis. Alpha=.54; explained variance =33.15%.

Although environmentalist views loaded on different factors in the initial factor analysis, it was not difficult to create a single environmentalist scale. As shown in Table 18, the scale is relatively consistent and clear in content.

**Table 18 Environmentalism**

No.	Items	Hypothetical content	Loadings
I1_27_R	There are more important problems the state should care about than it is environmental pollution.	Environmentalism	.58
I1_28	The state should influence the decrease of the city traffic order to decrease air pollution.	Environmentalism	.54
I1_29	I would accept paying additional tax for environmental protection.	Environmentalism	.69
I1_30	It is more important to preserve and improve nature than to achieve economic development.	Environmentalism	.76

*Note:* Items with suffix "\_R" to their number are reversed for the analysis. Alpha=.54; explained variance =41.80%.

Items dealing with work ethic did not fit into a single scale easily. Hence, the work ethic scale in its final version consists of three items with high loadings. The scale represents the view of work as rigid obligation, rather than as the expression of creative abilities. It is worth mentioning that a half-century-old item on economic security from Adorno et al.'s (1950) PEC scale still performs well (I1\_48). Most of the reviewed models of the structure of attitudes do not include this attitude as a separate dimension, though it is often present in various facets of conservatism.<sup>91</sup>

**Table 19 Work ethic**

No.	Items	Hypothetical content	Loadings
I1_46	Laziness is one of the greatest human sins.	Work ethic	.67
I1_47	If only people would work and save more, the poverty would disappear from our society.	Work ethic	.79
I1_48	In general, full economic security is harmful; most men wouldn't work if they didn't need money for eating and living.	Conservatism/Work ethic	.65

Note: Alpha=.50; explained variance=49.77%.

Liberal ideology has generally proven difficult for questionnaire operationalization. In the present case, as shown by the initial factor analysis, items conceived as potential indicators of liberalism loaded on very diverse factors and typically had multiple loadings. Three items, shown in Table 20, converged into a mini-scale of liberalism. Indeed, the items involve some of the prototypical beliefs associated with liberalism. This includes the emphasis on individual freedom rather than economic equality (I1\_22), belief that unequal abilities lead to 'inequality of outcomes' (I1\_23), and the belief in meritocracy (I1\_45). This scale captures a rather narrow attitude, but it still seems justifiable to label it as liberalism.

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<sup>91</sup> Compare the three items with the following statement: "The promotion of idleness leads, as it always does, to the growth of vice, irresponsibility and crime." (The Principles of Conservatism: Margaret Thatcher's Lecture to the Heritage Foundation, December 10, 1997. Retrieved on April 19, 2005, from [http://www.heritage.org/Research/reagan\\_lecture\\_thatcher.cfm](http://www.heritage.org/Research/reagan_lecture_thatcher.cfm)).

**Table 20 ‘Philosophical’ Liberalism**

No.	Items	Hypothetical content	Loadings
I1_22	Important is freedom of the individual, not economic equality.	‘Philosophical’ Liberalism	.72
I1_23	Economic inequalities are a natural outcome of differences in abilities.	‘Philosophical’ Liberalism	.77
I1_45	The country should be lead by the capable; the average should follow the lead	Elitism	.63

Note: Alpha=.50; explained variance =5.15%.

Attitudes expressing liberal, or neo-liberal, views of economy form a separate scale, as shown in Table 21. Economic liberals, from Smith to Ricardo and Mill, to more contemporary liberals, would not easily reject any of the items in this scale. Thus, the economic liberalism scale includes rejection of state involvement in economy in general and in the redistributive role specifically. It seems that only the progressive taxation fits the scale less well than the other items (and this would apply to classical theorists as well). For the Western context, it is typical that these attitudes correlate with right-wing ideological orientation.

**Table 21 Economic liberalism**

No.	Items	Hypothetical content	Loadings
I1_1	It is harmful for the economy if the government tries to reduce income differences between rich and poor.	Economic liberalism	.68
I1_2	Every individual has to take care of him/herself and it is no state business to worry about individual welfare.	Economic liberalism/individualism	.65
I1_3	The state ought to be involved in economy as little as possible.	Economic liberalism	.66
I1_4	The state does not have a right to tax the rich more than the less well-off citizens.	Economic liberalism/hierarchy	.38

Note: Alpha=.42; explained variance =36.49%.

The just described factor is the first one in the series of scales with relatively weaker internal consistency, and generally consisting of three to four items. The scale presented in Table 22 presents a considerable puzzle. Despite the relatively low *Alpha* coefficient, the three items have uniformly high loadings. The interpretation is however not obvious. The highest loading item (I1\_26) represents



belief that ‘*It is in the human nature to help each other*’, while the first listed item states that individual interests might be secondary to interests of the community. The remaining item emphasizing the importance of duties over right, also expresses the belief that community is important. This factor could be related to classical conservative emphasis on community. Thus, the underlying dimension has conservative, traditionalist, and communitarian flavors. In the present context, the dimension might reflect collectivist views and therefore this is offered as a provisional interpretation.

**Table 22 Collectivism**

No.	Items	Hypothetical content	Loadings
I1_24	There are situations in which the individual should sacrifice his/her own interests and wishes for the benefit a community, such as for example the nation or the family.	Traditionalism	.64
I1_25	Duties are more important than rights.	(Philosophical) Conservatism	.66
I1_26	It is in the human nature to help each other.	(Philosophical) Conservatism	.70

Note:  $\alpha=.40$ ; explained variance =44.66%.

Demand for harsher treatments of those who fail to observe social rules is an element in many accounts of social attitudes. Punitiveness is one of the sub-dimensions of the general conservatism dimension in Wilson’s (1973) model, and related constructs can be found in Adorno et al. (1950) and Eysenck (1954, 1975). The scale presented in Table 23 actually contains items that appear in some of the named studies and dimensions. Two of the three items explicitly call for harsher treatment of criminals, including the death penalty. The remaining third item expresses a belief in the necessity of ‘law and authority’ as barriers for ‘chaos and anarchy’.

**Table 23 Punitiveness**

No.	Items	Hypothetical content	Loadings
I1_14	Law and authority is what holds the society not to turn into chaos and anarchy.	(Philosophical) Conservatism	.57
I1_16	The problem of crime cannot be solved without harsher punishments for criminals.	Punitiveness	.81
I1_17	Death penalty is the best punishment for the worst criminals.	Punitiveness	.62

Note: Alpha=.37; explained variance =45.52%.

Although elitism (and its opposite) has been an important element in various ideologies, the operationalization of this construct has been rarely attempted. Inspiration for the present measure and some items (I1\_52 and I1\_52) came from Sidanius' research (e.g. Pratto et al. 1994). Three items included in the present elitism scale (Table 24) do not form a particularly internally consistent set. Their correlation with the total scale score (summarized) is generally low (below .20), hence the low *Alpha* coefficient.<sup>92</sup> Still, the items load rather significantly on the scale principal component, thus providing a basis for their involvement into a unitary scale.

**Table 24 Elitism**

No.	Items	Hypothetical content	Loadings
I1_50	In life, it is important to rise above other, ordinary people.	Elitism/hierarchy	.71
I1_51	No formal schooling can make up for the lack of domestic upbringing.	Elitism	.54
I1_52	Great art is not meant for the common folk.	Elitism	.66

Note: Alpha=.28 ; explained variance =4.66%.

Gender equality has been an issue on political agendas across different political contexts in recent years. Various attitudes dealing with the social and political role for women have been included in many attitudinal measures. The goal presently was to focus on the political aspect of the issue. Some of the items intended to measure this construct did not converge as expected. Hence, the present

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<sup>92</sup> Pratto et al.'s (1994) cultural elitism scale showed also rather low *Alpha* coefficients, though higher than here (their scale consisted of 17 items, however).

feminism scale consists of two items only. Since one item is formulated in the opposite direction, the scale is balanced.

**Table 25 Feminism**

No.	Items	Hypothetical content	Loadings
I1_31_R	Sexual discrimination is not a serious problem in contemporary Yugoslavia.	Feminism	.76
I1_32	Women should politically organize in order to fight against sexual discrimination.	Feminism	.76

Note: Items with suffix "\_R" to their number are reversed for the analysis.  $\alpha=.28$ ; explained variance=57.98%.

Table 26 summarizes the extracted attitudinal mini-scales and displays coefficients of internal consistency ( $\alpha$ ) and corresponding number of items in each scale. Note that reliability coefficients are based on summation while the subsequent analyses are based on scales defined through first principal components. Hence,  $\alpha$  reliability coefficients could be seen as estimates of lower bounds of internal consistency. Such coefficients are especially unstable for scales with a small number of items.

**Table 26 Attitudinal mini-scales**

Scale	$\alpha$	No. of items	Scale	$\alpha$	No. of items
Nationalism scale	.85	11	Work ethic	.50	3
Militarism	.82	4	'Philosophical' Liberalism	.50	3
International integration	.73	4	Economic Liberalism	.42	4
Clericalism	.76	3	Collectivism	.40	3
Traditionalism	.69	4	Punitiveness	.37	3
Regime attitude	.65	4	Elitism	.28	3
Socialist economy	.54	6	Feminism	.28	2
Environmentalism	.54	4			

Some of the presented scales clearly represent reliable operationalization of the underlying constructs. Their internal consistency and loadings on the first principal component are psychometric proofs that the scales can be used as reliable research tools. Furthermore, the conceptual consistency of items in the scales is considerably enhanced when comparing factors after the initial extraction.

It is clear as well that some dimensions are more difficult to operationalize than others. For example, in Pratto et al. (1994), nationalism, patriotism, political-economic conservatism, or sexism, had rather high *Alphas*, while elitism was on the low end. The present scales are generally listed in order of their psychometric soundness and conceptual clarity. Nationalism, militarism, clericalism, and international integration scales are clearly successful examples. Traditionalism, attitude towards the former regime, and liberal and socialist views of economy, are somewhat less internally consistent, yet clear in their content. Finally, some of the scales are relatively weak psychometrically, such as feminism or elitism. Feminism however, is conceptually clear, while interpretation of some dimensions remained uncertain (e.g., collectivism). Most scales contain items in the reverse direction, but they are not fully balanced.<sup>93</sup> Although this tends to decrease *Alpha* coefficients, it prevents the acquiescence objection, i.e., improves validity of the scales.

Attitudinal scales defined in this way are not only clearer in content, but their interrelationships are considerably stronger. Table 27 shows that many of the mini-scales are strongly correlated. Inspection of the table reveals a set of variables particularly strongly interrelated that include nationalism, traditionalism, militarism, international integration, and (negative) attitude towards the socialist (Milošević) regime. Correlation between nationalism and militarism is  $r=.73$  ( $p<.001$ ), while between nationalism and traditionalism it is  $r=.61$  ( $p<.001$ ). There are different factors that contribute to such strong relationships. One of them is certainly their political relevance in Serbia in 2002. These attitudes generally represent various aspects of the basic political divide – between supporters of the Socialists and the Radicals, and the more or less united democratic opposition. Considering the rather high correlation coefficients, it seems that these attitudes represent a rather well integrated system of beliefs and opinions, interpretable as a local variant of conservatism.

Another set of interrelated attitudes includes attitudes related with the positive end of the international integration dimension (and equally with the regime-change attitude). Here, we can see that liberalism

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<sup>93</sup> Evans and Heath (1995) find that balanced and unbalanced scales measuring ideology differ in their performance but that this effect is “not problematic”.

is positively related with international integration and regime-change attitude, as well as with environmentalism. The strongest correlate of feminism (though still rather low) is international integration. Economic liberalism, however, seems to be a rather poorly integrated attitude – its strongest correlate is general liberalism ( $r=.33, p<.001$ ), followed by the work ethic attitude, elitism and even punitiveness (all coefficients below .20, though significant at  $p<.01$ ). General liberalism has more correlates but they are ideologically rather diverse. On the one side, it is related with environmentalism, international integration, economic liberalism, support for the regime change and work ethic. These correlates could be somehow integrated with the traditional understanding of liberalism. However, it also correlated with nationalism, traditionalism, punitiveness, and even collectivism.

In general, it seems that attitudes that represent views associated with the former socialist regime and the rule of the Socialists during the 1990s are better integrated than any positive ideological alternative. Factor analysis of the mini-scales provided a more definite picture of the way ideological attitudes relate to each other in Serbia.

**Table 27 Correlation between the attitudinal mini-scales**

	Nationalism	Socialist economy	Environmentalism	International integration	Traditionalism	Feminism	Militarism	Clericalism	Elitism	Economic Liberalism	'Philosophical' Liberalism	Collectivism	Work ethic	Regime attitude
Socialist eco.	.49***													
Environmentalism	.04	.01												
International in.	-.39***	-.38***	.15**											
Traditionalism	.61***	.38***	.09	-.23***										
Feminism	-.09*	-.05	.12*	.22***	-.14**									
Militarism	.73***	.40***	.05	-.36***	.47***	-.05								
Clericalism	.28***	.08	.01	-.04	.24***	-.03	.20***							
Elitism	.23***	.12**	.05	.00	.19***	.00	.18***	.03						
Economic Liberalism	.07	-.09*	.03	.06	.11*	.08	.06	.00	.17***					
'Philosophical' Liberalism	.14**	-.03	.23***	.21***	.22***	-.02	.09	.05	.20***	.33***				
Collectivism	.43***	.28***	.18***	-.08	.39***	-.08	.36***	.16***	.25***	.05	.29***			
Work ethic	.32***	.15**	.09	-.04	.29***	.06	.28***	.08	.23***	.19***	.26***	.27***		
Regime attitude	-.41***	-.43***	.12**	.57***	-.28***	.12**	-.34***	.04	-.06	-.00	.15**	-.11*	-.06	
Punitiveness	.28***	.13**	.07	.07	.38***	-.09*	.25***	.10*	.18***	.12**	.31***	.30***	.25***	.00

\* $p < .05$ , \*\* $p < .01$ , \*\*\* $p < .001$ ; two-tailed.

## Political attitude scales and relevant variables

The nature of the attitudes measured with the previously constructed mini-scales can be enlightened by examining their relationships with a set of relevant variables. Table 28 show correlations between the 15 mini-scales and criterial variables that include authoritarianism, anti-Gypsy and anti-Jewish prejudice scale, Social Dominance Orientation (and its two factors: egalitarianism and group-based dominance (GBD)), left-right self-placement, religiosity, education, age, and income. The included dispositional variables represent some of the most frequently examined correlates of political attitudes (e.g., Van Hiel, Pandelaere, and Duriez 2004). It is also well established that different socio-economic groups differ in their attitudes (cf. Luttberg and Martinez 1990).

The goal here is not to look for causal relationships and explanations, but to enhance the understanding of the nature of the ideological dimensions. This part of the analysis could be seen as a ‘multi-trait, multi-method’ test of convergent and discriminative validity of the attitudinal scales (Campbell and Fiske 1959; Cronbach and Meehl 1955).

The nationalism scale is related with the included criterial variables in a predictable way: it strongly correlates with authoritarianism, with prejudice measures, and the group-based dominance subscale of SDO. The complete SDO scale is negatively related with nationalism, which is a rather surprising finding that might warrant some broader discussion of the SDO scale subject of measurement. The puzzle is, however, solved when separate SDO subdimensions are examined. The SDO factor of egalitarianism (containing con-trait SDO items) is positively correlated with nationalism, which contradicts findings from the west. The group-based dominance (GBD) subscale is however a considerably stronger correlate of nationalist views and the direction accords with the generally obtained findings. Left-right identification is not related to nationalism in Serbia, while religiosity is a relatively weak correlate of nationalism. The final three coefficients show that younger, better educated and economically better-off respondents are less nationalistic. In most respects, therefore, the present nationalism scale provides a measure of nationalism that is reliable and theoretically meaningful.

Views of the socialist economy parallel the relationships of nationalism with the criterial variables. It is related with authoritarianism, though to a smaller degree ( $r=.40, p<.001$ ), and even less so with prejudice. However, the egalitarianism subscale of the SDO and left-wing identification are two important definers of support for socialist economy. Not surprisingly, poorer, less educated and older respondents tend to support the idea of a redistributive economy.

The correlates of environmentalist and feminist attitudes are similar. That is, the two ideological factors are basically unrelated with the criterial variables. The only exception is correlation between environmentalism and SDO egalitarianism. Yet even that coefficient is weak ( $r=.13, p<.01$ ). It is surprising that these dimensions are not negatively related with some of the criterial variables such as authoritarianism or prejudice.

International integration and support for regime change also have very similar correlates. They are both negatively related with authoritarianism, prejudice, and group-based dominance. On the other hand, they are positively related with higher socio-economic status and younger age. An interesting difference is that international integration is considerably less embedded into the left-right semantics ( $r=.11, p<.05$ ) comparing to regime attitude ( $r=.37, p<.001$ ). Perhaps, the regime attitude is a much more political attitude and therefore related with the left-right identification.

Traditionalism, militarism, and collectivism follow the pattern of relationship observed in cases of nationalism and socialist economy. What is interesting to note is that Serbian traditionalism tends to be associated with left-wing identification ( $r=-.14, p<.01$ ). In addition, traditionalism is the strongest correlate of age – a rather clear validation of the scale. Clericalism is another scale with similar (though in lesser magnitude) correlates as nationalism or traditionalism. It is worth mentioning that clericalism is the strongest correlate of religiosity ( $r=.44, p<.0001$ ).



**Table 28 Correlation coefficients between attitude scales and critical variables**

	Authoritarianism	Anti-Gypsy prejudice	Anti-Jewish prejudice	SDO PC <sup>a</sup>	SDO Egal. <sup>b</sup>	SDO GBD <sup>c</sup>	Left-Right	Religiosity	Education	Age	Income
Nationalism	.61***	.35***	.40***	-.12**	.15**	.36***	-.07	.15**	-.31***	.14**	-.24***
Socialist economy	.40***	.11*	.20***	.15**	.36***	.18***	-.22***	.05	-.23***	.19***	-.26***
Environmentalism	-.01	-.00	-.03	.13**	.13**	-.06	-.08	.06	.05	.03	.00
International in.	-.26***	-.05	-.19***	.09	-.05	-.18***	.11*	-.03	.16***	-.12**	.14*
Traditionalism	.58***	.27***	.31***	-.05	.14**	.24***	-.14**	.16***	-.21***	.26***	-.18**
Feminism	.01	.02	-.05	.06	.07	-.02	.02	.01	-.02	-.06	-.07
Militarism	.49***	.25***	.24***	-.06	.16***	.27***	-.07	.10*	-.30***	.14**	-.24***
Clericalism	.27***	.18***	.14**	-.05	.09	.19***	.15**	.44***	-.09*	-.00	-.08
Elitism	.24***	.23***	.24***	-.23***	-.06	.31***	-.01	.05	-.08	.03	-.00
Eco. Liberalism	.13**	.14**	.22***	-.16***	-.08	.16***	.04	-.05	-.06	.07	.01
Philos. Liberalism	.18***	.09*	.09	-.05	.06	.14**	.08	.00	-.04	.06	.00
Collectivism	.38***	.17***	.16***	.02	.20***	.20***	-.09	.11*	-.12*	.19***	-.04
Work ethic	.39***	.16***	.20***	-.00	.16***	.19***	-.01	-.06	-.12**	.21***	-.08
Regime attitude	-.27***	-.03	-.20***	.06	-.04	-.15**	.37***	.06	.19***	-.18***	.07
Punitiveness	.31***	.16***	.16***	.01	.14**	.14**	.01	.02	-.07	.12**	-.15**

\* $p < .05$ ; \*\* $p < .01$ ; \*\*\* $p < .001$ ; two-tailed. <sup>a</sup>Principal component of the complete SDO scale. <sup>b</sup>SDO Egalitarianism factor. <sup>c</sup>SDO group based dominance factor.

Economic and general or 'philosophical' liberalism are weakly related with the criterial variables. Contrary to Kitschelt's early model, these attitudes are *positively* related with authoritarianism. In the case of economic liberalism, there is even a positive correlation with prejudice. Less surprising are their positive associations with group based dominance scale of SDO. However, all the relationships are rather weak. The same pattern of relationships is displayed by elitism. This could provide some explanation for the associations of the liberalism dimensions, since the elitist view of the world could be a common element in these attitudes.

Correlations of the work ethic scale support the view that rigid emphasis on work is often an element of the authoritarian world-view. Finally, punitiveness is associated with authoritarianism, prejudice, group based dominance, and somewhat with older age and lower income. Although Heaven (1992) found punitiveness to be correlated with support of the right-wing political parties, in Serbia the left-right identification is not associated with this attitude.

The presented findings generally confirm the content validity of the 15 attitudinal scales. If certain coefficients differ from those often reported in literature, the plausible explanation is that it is due to different political contexts. Obvious examples include support for the redistributive economy correlating with authoritarianism or traditionalism correlating with left-wing identification. It is also clear that some attitudes, such as economic and general liberalism, are poorly related with the criterial variables. It is true that their present operationalization is less than perfect. Nevertheless, it seems likely that these attitudes are not well organized and integrated among the public.

#### Political attitude scales and support for political parties

Are these 15 attitudinal scales able to differentiate supporters of different Serbian political parties? Correlation coefficients in Table 29 demonstrate that they are. Correlations for the support of DOS and DS are very similar and can be discussed together. Respondents who expressed support for DOS and/or DS tend to score low in nationalism, socialist economy, traditionalism, militarism, and even collectivism factors. They also support Serbia's international integration and favor regime change (the

highest coefficient,  $r=.52$ ,  $p<.001$ ). On the other end of the Serbian political spectrum, we can observe supporters of the SPS and SRS, who display the exact opposite attitudinal correlates. They tend to score high on nationalism, support for socialist economy, militarism, traditionalism, and collectivism. They are opposed to Serbia's international integration and are very much against regime change. This is not surprising since these parties, especially SPS, were 'the regime'. There are, however, certain subtle differences between these two parties' supporters. SRS supporters are somewhat higher in clericalism, while SPS supporters are more punitive. It is also important to note that SRS is somewhat less opposed to the regime change.

In-between these two blocs are supporters of DSS and SPO. It is very interesting to observe that support for DSS at the time of this survey had correlates somewhat more similar to those observed in the case of support for SPS and SRS. The coefficients are much lower and occasionally insignificant, but the direction of association is closer to SPS and SRS than to the DSS former partners in removing the SPS from power. Thus, for example, DSS support is associated with nationalism, weakly associated with socialist economy, with traditionalism, militarism, clericalism, collectivism and punitiveness. However, DSS support is barely correlated with the regime change factor and is not correlated with the international integration factor. These findings are partly specific for the time period of the survey – when the conflict between DS and DSS was dominating the Serbian political scene—and partly to the specific ideological appeal of the DSS. In addition, with the benefit of hindsight, it is clear that the electoral base of DSS has been rather unstable. Their support was still rather high in 2002 since many of the former SPS and SRS voters temporarily shifted to this party.

Finally, the included attitudinal dimensions are not really able to differentiate SPO supporters. They appear exceptionally unspecific in virtually all included dimensions. The single exception is that SPO supporters tend to be somewhat clerical, to the same degree as DSS and SRS supporters. This probably reflects the ideological changes of the party leadership and their low ideological profile at the time of the survey.

**Table 29 Correlation between attitudinal scales and support for political parties**

	DOS	DS	DSS	SPO	SPS	SRS
Nationalism	-.38***	-.41***	.30***	.04	.47***	.44**
Socialist economy	-.29***	-.35***	.17***	.04	.37***	.31***
Environmentalism	.04	.04	-.12**	-.04	-.03	-.08
International integration	.45***	.50***	-.02	.05	-.40***	-.46***
Traditionalism	-.24***	-.26***	.21***	-.02	.32***	.21***
Feminism	.08	.11*	-.05	-.02	-.05	-.10*
Militarism	-.26***	-.30***	.27***	.00	.38***	.34***
Clericalism	-.01	-.04	.17***	.15***	.04	.16***
Elitism	-.05	-.04	.08	.02	.06	.05
Economic Liberalism	-.03	.01	.02	-.02	.04	-.06
'Philosophical' Liberalism	.08	.10*	.09*	.05	.03	-.03
Collectivism	-.12**	-.09*	.12**	-.01	.19***	.14***
Work ethic	-.04	-.07	.08	-.05	.18***	.12**
Regime attitude	.52***	.54***	-.11*	.06	-.63***	-.48***
Punitiveness	-.02	-.04	.14***	-.01	.10*	.05

Note: Support for parties measured by 5-point feeling thermometer items.

It is also possible to make very interesting observations if we focus on attitudinal dimensions. Variables that are clearly linked to the main political division, that is support and opposition to the regime change, are strongly related to party preferences. Thus, the regime attitude is the strongest single correlate, followed by nationalism, international integration, socialist economy, militarism, and traditionalism.

It is clear as well that some of the attitudes are politically not relevant. Feminism and environmentalism belong here. This is not surprising, since these issues have not really been on the Serbian political agenda. Nevertheless, these attitudes could have differentiated party support at least spuriously, through the connection with socio-cultural background. Traces of these associations are noticeable in the case of a very slight tendency of DS to be more favorable towards feminist views, and the opposite tendency among the Radicals.

More surprising is the lack of association of liberalism, economic liberalism, and elitist attitudes with party support. According to various accounts, the authoritarian former communists should be opposed

by forces who believe in economic liberalism. This does not seem to be the case in Serbia, at least on the level of voters. Economic liberalism in this sample does not correlate with the support for any party. Liberalism factor, however, is very weakly correlated with the support for DS and DSS ( $r=.10$  and  $r=.09$ ,  $p<.05$ , respectively). It is clear, then, that at the time of the survey these ideological dimensions were not influencing party support.

### ***Second-order Factor Analysis: General Dimensions of Political Attitudes***

In accordance with the general scheme of hierarchical factor analysis, second-order extraction was performed on the 15 attitudinal mini-scales. The input variables therefore are not the original primary factors but the factors created on the basis of the initial factor extraction taking into account interpretability and unidimensionality of the scales.

The Guttman-Kaiser criterion suggested four factors for extraction, accounting for 55.11% of the total variance. Although the Scree-test suggested three factors, the four-factor solution proved more interpretable. Both Varimax and Oblimin rotation resulted a in very similar factor structure (correlations between the respective factors is above .90), corroborating the robustness of the adopted solution.

Although the weight of the first principal component is considerably greater than for the rest of the extracted factors (accounting alone for 25.63% of variance), half of the initial scales had loading below .40 thus showing the inapplicability of the unidimensional model. Clearly, political attitudes in Serbia cannot be fully reduced to a single higher-order ideological dimension.

Structure of the rotated factors (correlation of variables with factors) is presented in Table 30. The first factor is bipolar in nature. The positive pole is defined by nationalism, socialist economy, militarism, traditionalism, and with a small loading of collectivism. The negative pole is defined by support for international integration and favorable attitude towards the regime change. Interpretation of this factor does not seem problematic. The positive pole of the factor is represented by attitudes that are often expressed by and/or ascribed to the supporters of the socialists. The political opposition was not entirely ideologically unison in their support for the opposite attitudes. Especially their

position on the nationalism issue had been often ambiguous throughout 1990s. However, the common ground for the opposition parties was certainly in their rejection of the socialists and radicals, and in their affirmative view of the need for Serbia's international integration. Thus, the factor could be interpreted as the regime divide, or authoritarianism versus political reform division. It should be noted that the content of the reform is not obvious in this factor. The supposed democratic orientation is visible in the opposition to nationalist, militarist and other attitudes on the pro-regime side, rather than in any coherent positive perspective. Since the factor seems rather backward looking (sticking with socialist economy, tradition, nationalism, militarism, and rejection of international integration), it seems most useful to label this factor as socialist conservatism. Enyedi and Todosijević (2003) obtained a rather similar 'socialist conservatism' factor in Hungary.

**Table 30 Factor structure of attitude scales after Oblimin rotation**

Primary factors	F1	F2	F3	F4
Nationalism	.76	.52	.32	
Socialist economy	.71			
Environmentalism				.62
International integration	-.74			.32
Traditionalism	.53	.59	.38	
Feminism				.78
Militarism	.70	.43		
Clericalism		.60		
Elitism			.55	
Economic Liberalism			.69	
'Philosophical' Liberalism		.36	.68	
Collectivism	.31	.60	.38	
Work ethic			.56	
Regime attitude	-.77			
Punitiveness		.55	.48	
Eigenvalue after rotation	3.23	2.28	2.29	1.30

Note: Loadings below .30 not shown.

The second factor is defined by high loadings of clericalism, collectivism, traditionalism, punitiveness, nationalism, and to a somewhat lesser extent by militarism and liberalism. Most scholars dealing with attitude structure would not have problems in reading this factor as part of the classical social conservatism dimension. It closely corresponds, for example, to Wilson's conservatism factor

(1973a), Eysenck's R factor (1954), or Middendorp's attitudinal conservatism (1991a). Presence of collectivism might seem surprising, but we should recall that items defining this scale were initially intended to indicate pre-Thatcherite conservative emphasis on community and responsibility. Because some of the scales load on both the first and second factors, the question is whether they can be differentiated. The common variables for the two factors are nationalism, traditionalism, and militarism (and to a lesser extent collectivism). The major difference is that this factor does not have negative pole. The opponents of the regime do not oppose conservatism of the factor 2. Next and equally important, clericalism and punitiveness load only on the second factor, while socialist economy loads on only the first factor. Hence, it is clear that the second factor is very close to a traditional right-wing conservative ideology.

The highest loadings on the third factor belong to the two liberalism factors, followed by elitism and work ethic. Punitiveness, traditionalism, collectivism and nationalism are also significant variables, though to a quite smaller degree. It seems that a certain implication of the desirability or necessity of social inequalities is common for the highest loading attitudes. The 'philosophic' liberalism scale implies inequality as a part of human nature, while economic liberalism justifies economic inequalities as supposedly reflecting the economic and social laws. The elitism factor has similar implications - view of the world as hierarchically organized with those more capable and 'deserving' on top. Loading of the punitiveness factor fits this interpretation well: those who break the rules and norms should be punished. The work ethic factor expressed negative views of those who do not work hard enough. Loadings of nationalism and traditionalism could also be incorporated in this interpretation. Hence, the factor is interpreted as orientation towards social order and hierarchy. If the interpretation holds, this factor should correlate with social dominance orientation, specifically with group-based dominance.

The fourth factor is much simpler to interpret. It contains basically two first-order factors: environmentalism and feminism, with additional lower loading of international integration. Hence, the factor can be interpreted as post-materialist orientation, since it expresses a favorable view of the two ideologies central for the 'new politics'.

The four higher-order factors are weakly intercorrelated, thus suggesting that further variable reduction is not necessary (Table 31). Regime divide, conservatism and social hierarchy factors are weakly positively correlated (between  $r=.11$  and  $r=.21$ ). The common ground inherent in the three factors could probably be thought of along the lines of the psychological theories of conservatism (e.g., Wilson 1973a). The post-materialist orientation factor is not related with the socialist conservatism dimension, but it is weakly related with the right-wing conservatism and social hierarchy ( $r=.12$  and  $r=.11$ , respectively). These relationships suggest that post-materialist orientation shares with the right-wing conservatism a certain emphasis on community. A common ground for post-materialism and social order and hierarchy orientation could be the acceptance of social stratification. It should be emphasized, however, that these four factors are fairly independent of each other.

**Table 31 Correlation between the second-order ideological factors**

	1. Socialist conservatism	2. Right-wing conservatism	3. Social order and hierarchy
2. Right-wing conservatism	.17**		
3. Social order and hierarchy	.11*	.21**	
4. Post-materialist orientation	-.05	.12**	.11*

\*\* $p<.01$ , \* $p<.05$ ; two-tailed.

#### Higher-order ideological dimensions and criterial variables

The obtained second-order ideological dimensions were correlated with the already familiar set of socio-psychological and demographic variables in order to enhance their understanding and interpretation. Table 32 displays the obtained correlation coefficients. The socialist conservatism factor is strongly related with the included criterial variables. It strongly correlates with authoritarianism ( $r=.53$ ,  $p<.001$ ) and with both prejudice scales. It is not correlated with the SDO scale total score. The reason is that it correlates with *both* of SDO subscales *positively*, while they are supposed to be opposed to each other. Thus, support for the authoritarian regime and anti-reform orientation in Serbia is at the same time egalitarian and supportive of group-based dominance. This



interpretation is corroborated by the fact that the socialist conservatism factor correlates with the left wing ideological identification ( $r=-.25, p<.001$ ). Socio-demographic correlates of this factor are not surprising: less educated, less well-off, and older respondents tend to be skeptical about so-called democratic political reforms.

The right-wing conservatism factor has, in many respects, correlates that are similar to those of the socialist conservatism factor. It is related with authoritarianism, prejudice, SDO, and demographic variables in similar ways, though the coefficients are generally of lower magnitude. There are, however, two important differences. One is that the right-wing conservatism factor correlates with indicators of religiosity in the direction consistent with its interpretation as a dimension comparable with similar constructs from other political contexts. The other difference is that this factor is not actualized in terms of the left-right political semantics – it does not correlate with left-right ideological identification. In addition, it is somewhat less related with the group based dominance scale of the SDO and more with the egalitarian dimension.

Social hierarchy factor also has a number of similar correlates like the previous two factors. Some of the differentiating features are that social hierarchy is related exclusively with the group-based dominance scale of the SDO but not with egalitarianism.<sup>94</sup> Furthermore, socio-economic roots of this dimension are weaker than in the case of the previous two factors. Correlation with income, for example, fell below statistical significance.<sup>95</sup>

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<sup>94</sup> Perhaps, this subscale is closer to the core of the concept of social dominance orientation, since it is less sensitive to political context.

<sup>95</sup> Though in more stable societies one would expect the positive coefficient here (cf. Sidanius and Pratto 1999).

**Table 32 Correlation between the second-order ideological dimensions and criterial variables**

	1. Socialist conservatism	2. Conservatism	3. Social order and hierarchy	4. PM orientation
Authoritarianism	.53***	.43***	.37***	.09*
Anti-Gypsy prejudice	.20***	.23***	.24***	.07
Anti-Jewish prejudice	.32***	.16***	.29***	-.03
SDO	-.05	.04	-.16***	.14**
SDO Egalitarianism	.18***	.22***	.02	.20***
SDO GB Dominance	.29***	.19***	.28***	.00
Left-Right self-placement	-.25***	.07	.00	-.01
Education	-.30***	-.12*	-.12**	-.04
Father's education	-.26***	-.18***	-.17***	-.07
Age	.22***	.12**	.16***	.00
Income	-.29***	-.16***	-.08	-.10
Church attendance	.04	.23***	.02	.04
Religiosity	.06	.30***	.09	.08

\*\*\* $p < .001$ , \*\* $p < .01$ , \* $p < .05$ ; two-tailed.

The post-materialist orientation shows weak association with the included criterial variables. The only coefficient worth discussing is the one with egalitarianism - showing that post-materialist orientation is associated with the support for egalitarian social relations.<sup>96</sup>

#### Higher-order ideological dimensions and political parties

The socialist conservatism factor is strongly correlated with political party preferences. It strongly correlates with parties representing the opposed sides in the real-life conflict over regime change. The factor is positively related with the support for the Socialist party ( $r = .60$ ,  $p < .001$ ) and Radical party ( $r = .53$ ,  $p < .001$ ), while it is negatively related with DOS and DS support ( $r = -.52$  and  $R = -.57$ , both  $p < .001$ , respectively).

<sup>96</sup> This relationship is ambiguous, since we saw that post-materialist orientation factor was weakly positively associated with the social-hierarchy factor. The latter factor is, however, rather complex in nature. Thus, the present correlation with the egalitarianism subscale of the SDO could be seen as providing more reliable information about the nature of the post-materialist orientation factor.

It is interesting to note that support for Koštunica's DSS has a weak but *positive* association with this factor, while Vuk Drašković's supporters (SPO) are not differentiated by this factor. DSS was obviously the party that was able to somewhat bridge the gap between the opposed blocs, and to enable the regime change by attracting some of the former socialist and radical voters.

The conservatism factor differentiates the Koštunica's DSS, thus confirming the image of the party as being more traditionalist and socially conservative. To a lesser extent, this factor correlates with the SRS support and negatively with the support for the Magyar minority party SVM. Although conservatism of this type is often a very important political dimension in other political contexts, we can observe that the opposition along this dimension in Serbia has not developed well yet. This ideological dimension represents only a secondary dimension of competition.

Support for Social Hierarchy is somewhat higher among those who prefer DSS and the Socialist Party, though coefficients are of modest magnitude ( $r=.12, p<.01$ , and  $r=.15, p<.001$  respectively). It should be remembered that this factor was saturated by variables such as economic liberalism, work ethic, elitism – variables that were previously shown *not* to correlate with support for any of the included parties. It is perhaps the demand for social order that binds various mini-scales which comprise the social hierarchy factor, making traditionalist DSS and authoritarian SPS supporters to score higher on this factor. Thus, in a way, this corroborates the earlier interpretation of the social hierarchy factor as expressing the demand or preference for social order.

**Table 33 Second-order ideological dimensions and preference for political parties**

	1. Socialist conservatism	2. Conservatism	3. Social order and hierarchy	4. Post-materialist orientation
DOS	-.52***	.00	-.04	.11*
DS	-.57***	-.02	-.02	.12**
DSS	.21***	.22***	.12**	-.03
SPO	-.03	.09	-.03	-.01
SPS	.60***	.08	.15***	-.04
SRS	.53***	.11**	.02	-.10*
SVM	-.32***	-.12**	-.04	.06

\*\*\* $p < .001$ , \*\* $p < .01$ , \* $p < .05$ ; two-tailed.

Political relevance of the post-materialist orientation in Serbia is miniscule. It is very weakly related with the support for DOS and DS and with the rejection of the Radical Party. It comes as a not big surprise that political conflicts in Serbia are not very much about post-materialist themes such as feminism and ecology, yet, at the same time, they neither seem to be explicitly about economic or materialist interests.

The obtained findings have several implications for understanding the sources of integration or attitude constraint at the higher level of generality. If correlations coefficients presented in Table 32 and Table 33 are compared, it is clear that socialist conservatism has a generally high correlation with the criterial variables and with party preferences. Hence, this dimension seems to be constrained both by the social structure and socio-psychological predispositions and by political conflicts. In other words, we can observe several sources of constraint in the case of Factor 1.

The remaining three second-order ideological factors appear less constrained by political processes, since their correlations with party preferences are either small or insignificant. Yet, their psychological existence seems to be ‘real’—and explainable in terms of psychological predispositions and socio-demographic background variables. This applies more to the second and third factors, since the Post-materialism factor is equally unrelated with both party preferences and criterial variables. The source of constraint in these dimensions comes, therefore, more from psychological dispositions and social structure than from the day-to-day politics. It seems that DSS has been in the process of actualizing the classical conservatism dimension. DOS and DS voters appear to be somewhat more

inclined towards post-materialist values. This would suggest the possibility for these parties/blocs to appeal to voters on the basis of this ideological dimension in the future. Yet, given the weak structural and dispositional roots of this dimension, it is uncertain that it could provide a firmer ground for more stable political allegiances.

The strength and persistence of the regime divide has been based on a political division that coincided with specific socio-psychological predispositions among the electorate, which had firm roots in the social structure. The political division appears to be an expression of different world-views. The following chapters provide further tests of this interpretation.

### ***Causal Model of Ideological Orientations and Political Preferences***

In order to examine how socio-structural characteristics are integrated with ideological orientations I constructed an exploratory causal model of ideological orientations and political preferences. Support for political parties (operationalized as proximity towards each political party) is regressed on the scales of ideological orientation and on basic socio-demographic indicators.

The first causal model included the second-order ideological dimensions in order to examine the relationships at the more general level. The second causal model used the first-order ideological dimensions to examine which of the narrower ideological dimensions are more or less useful for explaining political party support in Serbia.

The complete model is constructed in the following way: first, the principal dependent variable is regressed on all independent variables. Next, the ideological variables are regressed on the so-called mediating variables, which in the present case are authoritarianism, social dominance orientation, and left-right ideological orientation, and on the background variables. Authoritarianism, social dominance orientation and left-right ideological identification are conceived as explanatory variables to the ideological orientations, since they represent more general orientations or world-views, rather than concrete political attitudes. Finally, authoritarianism, social dominance orientation, and left-right self-identification are regressed on socio-demographic indicators. In this way, it should be possible to establish the main paths of influence, starting from the social structure, via more general world-views

to concrete ideological dimensions, and party preferences. It is useful to refer back to Figure 1(p. 137), to see the implied relationship presented in the more figurative way.

Before constructing the causal model, it is worth examining the zero-order relationships between the dependent variables and the more distant explanatory variables, namely the dispositional and background variables. Unless such bi-variate relationships can be established, there is not much meaning in developing the potential causal sequence that explains those relationships. Hence, Table 34 displays the zero-order correlations.


**Table 34 Zero-order relationships between background and dispositional variables with party preferences**

	SPS	SRS	DOS	DS	DSS	SPO
Age	.22***	.09	-.12**	-.10*	.02	-.05
Education	-.23***	-.23***	.10*	.08	-.15***	-.09*
Church attendance	.06	.12**	-.08	-.06	.05	.10*
Religiosity	-.01	.10*	-.03	-.01	.09*	.10*
Subjective economic well being	-.09*	-.12**	.11*	.07	-.06	-.12**
Family income	-.24***	-.19***	.08	.08	-.11*	-.02
Authoritarianism	.39***	.31***	-.19***	-.22***	.21***	.04
Left-Right self-placement	-.30***	-.13***	.23***	.22***	.16***	.12**
SDO Egalitarianism	.05	.04	.01	-.03	.07	-.02
SDO Group dominance	.19***	.23***	-.16***	-.15**	.03	.09*

\*\*\* $p < .001$ , \*\* $p < .01$ , \* $p < .05$ ; two-tailed.

There is no need to discuss the results in detail. It is clear that the obtained zero-order coefficients could be used to support a sociological model as well as a social psychological model of party preferences, since both socio-demographic and dispositional variables are related to party preferences. In fact, each of the potential explanatory variables is related with preferences for at least some of the parties, except for the SDO Egalitarianism factor.

Among the background variables, the most relevant seem to be education, age, and income. Relatively older, less educated, and less well-off respondents tend to prefer SPS and SRS. Authoritarianism is correlated with preferences for all parties but SPO. SRS and socialist supporters are relatively more authoritarian comparing to the supporters of the other parties. Finally, socialist supporters clearly identify with the political left, while parties from the ‘democratic bloc’ are relatively more right-wing inclined. Interestingly, supporters of the radicals are relatively more left-wing. This result is partially due to the use of party preference items instead of the vote choice variable. The former pooled opinions of those for whom the radicals might be not the exactly first preference (i.e., SPS voters, who are themselves on the left wing).



**Figure 2 Mean left-right self-placement score and vote choice**

Analysis of the left-right differences in relation to the *vote choice* variable shows that the only group of voters that is significantly different from the rest is supporters of the SPS (Figure 2). Their score on the left-right scale is 2.68, a significantly lower score than for voters of DOS (5.65), SRS (5.50), DS (5.48), and DSS (5.17). Thus, the *voters* of the Radical Party clearly are not on the left wing, yet this party was attractive to the socialist voters.

### Causal model with the second-order ideological factors

Multivariate models explaining preferences for the five major political parties in 2002 are presented in Table 35. The indicators of socio-economic status include the key variables used in similar analyses: age, education, church attendance and self-descriptive degree of religiosity, subjective economic well-being, and family income. Authoritarianism, the left-right self-placement scale, and two SDO factors represent the dispositional or mediating variables. Finally, the four second-order factors represent the general ideological orientations.

As Table 35 shows, the constructed multivariate model is able to explain substantive portion of variance in preferences for most of the major parties in Serbia in 2002. In case of preferences for SPS, the model explains an impressive 41% of the variance, while in the case of DOS, SRS and DS, the model explains about one third of the variance (31%, 31%, and 36%, respectively). The model is less successful in explaining preferences for DSS (13%), and fairly unsuccessful in the case of SPO (mere 6%). This suggests that the model missed some of the relevant variables for explaining preference for the latter two parties. Additionally, it is clear that the support for the really major Serbian political forces at the time is rather well accounted for by the present model.

There are several observations that should be made about the aforementioned table. First, despite the rather broad set of explanatory variables included and the relatively high proportion of variance explained, it is clear that only some of the variables have significant *direct* influence on party preferences. This group of relevant variables with direct influence basically does *not* include any of the socio-demographic variables. Out of the 36 respective regression coefficients only two appear to be statistically significant at  $p < .05$  level. One of them shows that the preference for SPS is positively related with church attendance (zero-order correlation is  $r = .06$ ,  $p > .05$ ), and the other one shows that preference for SPO is weakly related with lower subjective economic well being. Thus, the background variables did not have any direct influence over party preferences in Serbia in 2002.

The dispositional or mediating variables appear to be more directly relevant than the background variables. The most relevant is the left-right ideological self-placement. It significantly directly



predicts preference for SPS (left-wing identification) and DSS. It also predicts preference for DOS and SPO, although to a lesser degree (*Beta* coefficients are .10, and .09 respectively).

Taking into account the salience of the so-called democratic-authoritarian division in Serbian politics, it is very interesting to observe that authoritarianism basically does not directly influence party preferences. The same is true for the two SDO factors, despite the two barely significant coefficients (SDO Egalitarianism is negatively related with SPS support, and SDO group based dominance factor is negatively associated with preference for DSS). Especially in light of the earlier presented zero-order relationships, it is important to note that authoritarianism and SDO completely lost their direct effect on party preferences.

Among the four second-order ideological factors, it appears that three of them are nearly irrelevant. In fact, social hierarchy and post-materialism factors are not related with any of the party support variables. Conservatism, however, is associated with the positive attitude towards DSS (*Beta*=.15,  $p<.01$ ). This coefficient is in accordance with the image of DSS, and shows that the party has been attracting voters of this particular ideological profile.

The most important variable among the ideological dimensions is obviously the socialist conservatism/regime divide factor. The coefficient is highly significant and positive for parties that represented 'the regime' during the 1990s (SPS and SRS), while it is negative for parties that opposed this regime (DOS, DS, DSS). The size of these coefficients clearly shows how salient the regime divide was at the time – this single ideological factor captures virtually the entire direct influence on party preferences. In the case of DS and SRS this is, in fact, the *only* significant coefficient in the multivariate model. Thus, for example, in the case of the preference for DS, 36% of the variance is explained by the direct influence of socialist conservatism. This attitudinal dimension was without doubt the core of the main political division in Serbia at the time. We should recall that this dimension does not include only the positive or negative attitude towards 'the regime' ruled by the SPS. It is a rather broad orientation that includes primary factors such as nationalism, militarism, regime attitude, negative attitude towards international integration, traditionalism, and positive view of the socialist

economy. Thus, while relatively broad, it is at the same time a well-integrated ideological orientation. The question of the relative importance of the primary dimensions is addressed below.

In case of DSS, the socialist conservatism factor has a relatively smaller weight than for the other parties (apart from SPO). This reflects the position of the party elite that was deliberately moved not so much towards the center of the regime divide, but to a certain extent outside or apart of the main divide. In this way, the party became accessible also to those voters who were relatively less outspoken antagonists of the 'regime' on the one side, and on the other, to those for whom the outright crossing of the huge 'regime divide' would be a too great leap both in political and psychological terms.

Curiously enough, support for the SPO remained unexplained by the present model. Even the regime factor is not related with preferences for the once leading opposition party. SPO was obviously on the margin of the political battle at the time.

The obtained model shows that in addition to the socialist conservatism factor, the left-right identification had an additional explanatory role for preferences of several parties (SPS, DOS and DSS). Regardless of the 'leftism' inherent in the socialist conservatism factor, those identified with the left had more positive attitudes towards SPS, while those who identified with the right are more positive towards DSS and somewhat less consistently towards DOS and SPO.

**Table 35 Multivariate model of party preferences with second-order ideological factors, 2002.**

	SPS	SRS	DOS	DS	DSS	SPO
Age	.06	.00	-.02	.02	-.05	-.01
Education	-.06	-.08	-.02	-.08	-.05	-.09
Church attendance	.08*	.08	-.08	-.07	-.02	.06
Religiosity	-.06	.02	.00	.02	.04	.02
Subjective economic well being	.04	-.01	.05	.00	-.01	-.11*
Family income	-.06	-.01	-.06	-.04	.00	.05
Authoritarianism	.10	.02	.09	.07	.09	.01
Left-right self-placement	-.16***	-.02	.10**	.07	.18***	.09*
SDO Egalitarianism	-.08*	-.04	.08	.04	-.01	.00
SDO Group dominance	-.04	.08	-.03	.00	-.12*	.10
Socialist conservatism	.49***	.47***	-.55***	-.63***	.19***	-.08
Conservatism	-.04	.01	.06	.02	.15**	.05
Social hierarchy	-.05	.06	.03	.00	-.07	.06
Post-materialism	-.02	-.07	.05	.07	-.06	-.02
$R^2$	.41***	.31***	.31***	.36***	.13***	.06**

Notes: \* $p < .05$ , \*\* $p < .01$ , \*\*\* $p < .001$ . Table entries: standardized regression coefficients (Beta). Data source: Author's survey, spring 2002.

To summarize, the obtained model of political divisions in Serbia has substantial explanatory power and is remarkably simple. The socialist conservatism or the 'regime divide' clearly and deeply divides the two opposed political camps. Only two additional qualifications are needed: DSS was somewhat outside of this division, and the left-right ideological identification plays some role that is not entirely captured by the socialist conservatism factor. Thus, the evidence reveals a single major bipolar division, with traces of the emerging though still weak additional dimension based on traditional conservatism.

#### Causal analysis, the second step: Explanation of ideological dimensions

In the second step of the causal modeling, the focus was on the explanation of the ideological dimensions. The four second-order ideological factors were regressed on the dispositional and

background variables. Table 36 shows that more than one third of the variance in the socialist conservatism factor can be explained by the included dispositional and background variables. The strongest direct effect is exhibited by authoritarianism ( $Beta=.38, p<.001$ ), left-wing identification ( $Beta=-.19$ ), and education ( $Beta=-.19$ ). Older age and SDO Group Dominance are also associated with this ideological dimension, albeit very weakly. The ideological factor of the right-wing conservatism can also be rather well explained by the model ( $R^2=.28$ ). The two main direct predictors of conservatism are authoritarianism ( $Beta=.36, p<.001$ ), and religiosity ( $Beta=.21, p<.001$ ). These associations are virtually universal correlates of conservatism, but the fact that egalitarianism correlated with conservatism ( $Beta=.16, p<.001$ ) is probably specific for post-communist societies (Enyedi and Todosijević 2003).

**Table 36 Causal analysis, the second step: Multivariate model of ideological variables (second-order ideological factors), 2002**

	Socialist conservatism	Conservatism	Social Hierarchy	Post-materialism
	<i>Beta</i>	<i>Beta</i>	<i>Beta</i>	<i>Beta</i>
Age	.08*	.03	.11*	-.05
Education	-.15***	.02	-.06	.04
Church attendance	-.02	.07	.02	-.01
Religiosity	.02	.21***	-.13**	.06
Subjective economic well being	-.04	.01	.09	.00
Family income	-.07	.01	.00	-.06
SDO Egalitarianism	.06	.16***	-.01	.19***
SDO Group dominance	.09*	.02	.16***	-.02
Authoritarianism	.38***	.36***	.27***	.08
Left-right self-placement	-.19***	.08*	.05	.00
$R^2$	.37***	.28***	.19***	.05**

Notes: \* $p<.05$ , \*\* $p<.01$ , \*\*\* $p<.001$ . Data source: Author's survey, spring 2002.

Approximately one fifth of the variance of the factor of social hierarchy can be explained by the direct influence of authoritarianism, SDO group based dominance, religiosity, and older age. Finally, post-materialism factor is poorly explained by the constructed model. Only some 5% of variance can be explained and only a single variable has direct influence – the SDO egalitarianism factor.

The model's ability to explain variance in the second-order ideological factors varies greatly, from 37% in case of the socialist conservatism, to a mere 5% in the case of post-materialism. Hence, this simple social-psychological model is not equally applicable to different ideological dimensions. From the substantive point of view, what is important is that those factors that are more relevant for explanation of party preferences are better explained by the model. The socialist conservatism is the most important directly influential variable for explanation of party preferences, while the right-wing conservatism is relevant for preferences for DSS only. The remaining two ideological factors were not related with party preferences.

It should be also noted that authoritarianism appeared as the most relevant variable with direct influence on the ideological dimensions, especially on the socialist conservatism and the right-wing conservatism factor. SDO factors and left-right identification are related to a smaller degree and with fewer ideological factors. Socio-demographic variables again showed small direct effects. Basically, religiosity is predictive of the right-wing conservatism and the social hierarchy factors while education is predictive of the socialist conservatism. Thus, it can be concluded that in the second step of the causal model building, the dispositional variables, especially authoritarianism, appeared as the most relevant.

#### Causal analysis, the third step: Explanation of mediating variables

The final step of causal modeling deals with the explanation of the mediating variables. Here, mediating variables, that is left-right ideological identification, authoritarianism, and the two SDO factors, are regressed onto the socio-demographic background variables. Left-right identification is, however, treated differently than the other three mediating variables. In comparison with authoritarianism and the SDO factor, left-right identification is a more attitudinal variable than a psychological-dispositional variable. It is in a sense less psychologically basic. Hence, it is meaningful to construct the model where authoritarianism and SDO factors could influence the left-right identification. Table 37 shows, however, that it was not possible to explain much of the variance in the left-right identification. Some 4% of variance is explained by age (older respondents tend to be

more left-wing), religiosity (associated with right-wing identification), and egalitarianism (associated with left-wing leaning).

Authoritarianism can be much better explained—some 20% of the variance can be explained by the model. The most influential variables are age and education. Predictably, older, less educated, and less well-off respondents tend to be more authoritarian – a rather universal finding (e.g., Altemeyer 1988; Dekker and Ester 1993; Scheepers, Felling and Peters 1990; Schuman, Bobo and Krysan 1992).

The SDO egalitarianism factor remained largely unexplained. Some 4% of variance is explained by older age and lower education. The SDO group based dominance factor is not explainable by the constructed model.

**Table 37 Causal analysis, the last step: Multivariate model of mediating variables, 2002.**

	Left-right self-placement	Authoritarianism	SDO Egalitarianism	SDO Group dominance
Age	-.13**	.27***	.12*	-.02
Education	.03	-.28***	-.12*	-.09
Church attendance	-.01	.09	-.05	.05
Religiosity	.12*	.05	.04	.05
Subjective economic well being	.01	.05	-.07	.00
Family income	-.03	-.13**	-.03	-.07
SDO Egalitarianism	-.10*	-	-	-
SDO Group dominance	-.06	-	-	-
Authoritarianism	.01	-	-	-
$R^2$	.04**	.20***	.04**	.03*

Notes: \* $p < .05$ , \*\* $p < .01$ , \*\*\* $p < .001$ . Data source: Author's survey, spring 2002.

It is also interesting to note that authoritarianism in Serbia is not associated with religiosity, although the evidence from western countries shows that they are firmly positively related (e.g., Altemeyer

1996; Canetti-Nisim 2004).<sup>97</sup> Canetti-Nisim (2004) showed that the relationship between religiosity and anti-democratic orientation is mediated through authoritarianism, but the Serbian evidence shows that if religiosity exhibits some influence onto ideological views, it is rather directly (onto the right-wing conservatism and somewhat less on social hierarchy dimension) than indirectly (a rather weak path goes through right-wing identification).

The obviously weak part of the model is that three out of four mediating or dispositional variables are not particularly well explained by the demographic variables. More positive aspect is that the most influential mediating variable, that is authoritarianism, is strongly related with the basic socio-demographic indicators.

#### Causal model with the first-order factors

The above presented analysis showed the place of the second-order ideological factors in the causal chain that explains party preferences in Serbia. The second-order factors are, however, complex constructs. It is possible that their components are not uniformly related with the explanatory and dependent variables in the model. Hence, causal modeling with first-order ideological factors is warranted since it may shed additional light on the examined relationships.

The causal model with the first-order ideological factors includes the same background and mediating variables as the previously presented model. Instead of the four second-order ideological factors, now there are 15 first-order attitudinal factors. Table 38 presents these findings. The obtained results replicate the basic findings from the model with the second-order factors. The proportion of variance explained is marginally higher in the models with the first-order factors, which is due to a certain extent to the larger number of included variables. According to the model with the first-order factors, half of the variance in preferences for SPS can be explained. In addition, approximately one third of the variance in preferences for SRS, DOS and DS can be explained.

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<sup>97</sup> For example, the correlation between religiosity and authoritarianism reported by Canetti-Nisim (2004) in Israel is  $r=.40$ , while in the present sample the zero-order correlation is barely significant ( $r=.12; p<.05$ ).

The key question is which of the primary factors are related with the dependent variable in the same way as the second-order factor(s) and which are not. In the case of preference for SPS, only two first-order ideological factors are significant predictors: the regime attitude and the nationalism factor. The regime attitude is indeed very strongly related with the preference for SPS while the coefficient for nationalism is considerably weaker. There is also the factor of liberalism on the margin of statistical significance, but its influence is much smaller. Hence, the support for the socialist party was very strongly rooted in the affirmative attitude towards 'the regime' and to a smaller extent in nationalism. In addition, left-wing identification characterizes the socialist voters just as in the previous model, but now authoritarianism gained statistical significance as well. Thus, if the socio-psychological basis of the support for the SPS is analyzed in more detail, we can see that authoritarianism was conducive for the SPS support in, addition to its indirect influence through ideological orientations.

The most interesting finding is that several of the primary factors that build the second-order socialist conservatism factor are *not* relevant for SPS support. This refers to the socialist economy factor, international integration factor, traditionalism, and militarism. Thus, it seems that the support for the SPS is stripped off of much of its potential ideological content. The socialist voters, according to these results, do not seem to be particularly favorable towards the socialist economy, militarism, or traditionalism, nor much against international integration, when controlling for their orientation towards the regime.

The remaining four parties can be discussed together since they have basically the same ideological predictors (SPO is not included in this part of the analysis since none of the predictors appeared as directly influential on the level of  $p < .01$ ). There are obviously three ideological dimensions relevant for the explanation of preferences for these parties. These include regime attitude, nationalism, and international integration primary factors. They are significant direct predictors in all four cases. The direction of the relationships, however, varies. Followers of the Radical Party tend to support 'the regime', just as the sympathizers of the Socialist Party do. DS and DOS supporters are on the opposite side of this dimension. Interestingly, backing of DSS is negatively, though weakly, related with the



regime attitude factor, again showing the party's position on this important dimension between the conflicted sides.

The parties are similarly distributed along the dimension of nationalism. The nationalism factor shows an interesting pattern. It correlates positively with the preference for the Socialist and Radical parties, but also for Koštunica's DSS, while support for DS and DOS decreases with increasing nationalist attitudes. The former three parties apparently comprised the nationalist bloc in 2002. The SPO had fallen in the political background temporarily, and with the return on the scene the party whitewashed its nationalist past.

The international integration factor differentiates supporters of the Radical Party from the 'democratic bloc'. Namely, this factor correlates negatively with the support for SRS, and positively with the support for DOS, DS, and DSS, while it is uncorrelated with the preference for the Socialist Party. Thus, on this dimension, DSS is with the rest of the 'democratic bloc'.

There are also several other significant relationships unique for specific parties, but they are generally of rather low magnitude. Thus, for example, support for SRS is related with traditionalism and economic liberalism factors (in both cases, negatively), while support for DSS is associated with opposition to environmentalism.

The most interesting of these relationships is the negative association between traditionalism and support for the Radicals. Recall that when zero-order relationships between ideological factors and party support were examined, the support for the Radicals was associated positively with traditionalism (see above Table 34, p. 200). Now, when the relationship is examined controlling for a wide set of variables, its direction reverses. Radicals appear as non-traditionalists.

**Table 38 Multivariate model of party preferences with first-order ideological factors, 2002.**

Predictor variables	SPS	SRS	DOS	DS	DSS
Age	.06	.01	-.02	.02	-.03
Education	-.06	-.08	-.02	-.07	-.03
Church attendance	.07	.06	-.08	-.05	-.04
Religiosity	-.04	.02	.00	.03	.04
Subjective economic well being	.03	-.02	.05	.01	.02
Family income	-.08*	-.02	-.04	-.04	.01
Authoritarianism	.13**	.05	.08	.06	.06
Left-right self-placement	-.10**	-.02	.08*	.06	.18***
SDO Egalitarianism	-.06	-.03	.05	.03	.00
SDO Group dominance	-.02	.06	-.03	-.01	-.13*
Nationalism	.18**	.23***	-.27***	-.23***	.20**
Socialist economy	.00	-.01	.00	-.07	.08
Environmentalism	.01	-.01	-.01	-.02	-.15***
International integration	-.03	-.21***	.23***	.26***	.20***
Traditionalism	-.06	-.15**	-.01	-.03	.03
Feminism	.02	-.01	-.04	-.01	-.03
Militarism	.00	-.02	.08	.03	.12
Clericalism	-.02	.07	.04	-.01	.08
Elitism	-.06	-.04	.01	.01	.02
Economic Liberalism	-.03	-.09*	-.03	-.01	-.01
'Philosophical' Liberalism	.08*	.07	.01	.02	.06
Collectivism	.01	.00	-.01	.05	-.03
Work ethic	.03	.03	.03	.00	-.03
Regime (change) attitude	-.47***	-.28***	.29***	.29***	-.12*
Punitiveness	.01	.02	-.02	-.03	.01
$R^2$	.50***	.37***	.35***	.39***	.19***

Notes: \* $p < .05$ , \*\* $p < .01$ , \*\*\* $p < .001$ . Table entries: standardized regression coefficients (Beta). Data source: Author's survey, spring 2002.

More detailed examination of this issue revealed that the control for the primary factor of nationalism is responsible for the reversal of the relationship. When traditionalism is entered as a single predictor of the SRS support, the *Beta* coefficient is .21  $p < .001$ . The addition of nationalism into the equation changes the coefficient for traditionalism into -.09,  $p = .08$ , and further introduction of controls increases the negative association in small increments. The reason behind is the strong association between nationalism and traditionalism ( $r = .61$ ,  $p < .001$ ). Thus, it is interesting to find out that if nationalism is discounted, the traditionalists do not find the Radicals to be particularly likeable.

Although the socialist conservatism second-order factor is interpreted as the general attitude towards 'the regime', it proved that only some of its components are actually relevant for party support. The socialist economy, traditionalism, and militarism factors lose their predictive power when their relationship with party support is controlled for the other primary ideological factors and background variables.

The ideological and attitudinal differentiation of different party supporters appears exceptionally simple. The primary ideological dimensions that matter are nationalism, international integration, and regime attitude. The pattern is still further simplified by the fact that these factors are relevant virtually for all major Serbian parties. Minor exceptions are that international integration is insignificant for predicting SPS support and the regime attitude factor is barely significant for DSS. Moreover, coefficients for the 'regime parties' tend to go in the same direction while coefficients for the 'democratic bloc' parties go in the opposite direction. The exception here is DSS, where its support is associated in the same way as the support for the 'democratic' parties on the dimension of international integration, on the dimension of nationalism the support for DSS goes in the same direction as the support for the 'regime parties'.

Another important general conclusion is that once the several key ideological dimensions are taken into account, social-psychological and socio-demographic background variables exhibit very little direct effect on party preferences.

### Causal model with the first-order factors: Explanation of primary attitudes

The second step in the causal modeling of political preferences, which deals with the explanation of the first-order ideological factors by socio-economic background and socio-psychological mediating variables, is presented in Table 39. The proportion of explained variance ranges from as high as .42 in case of the nationalism factor, to insignificant equations, in the case of the environmentalism and feminism factors (the two latter factors are not included in the table). The included independent variables certainly represent a meaningful model for the explanation of ideological orientation since the explained variance is in almost all cases statistically significant, and in many it is also substantive.

The first step in the analysis revealed that nationalism, international integration, and the regime attitude factors are the most relevant for explaining party preferences. Hence, it is encouraging to see that the model is significant in these three cases.

The model accounts for no more than ten per cent of the variance in the support for international integration, however. The relevant predictors are lower authoritarianism and higher education. Thus, although this factor is a strong predictor of political preferences, the background model can explain a relatively small portion of individual differences along this variable. Affirmative attitude towards the 'new regime' can be considerably better explained (21% of variance). Those with relatively more right-wing identification, low authoritarianism, relatively better education, and younger age, are opposed to the old regime. The finding is very much in accordance with what is generally expected to be the case in transitional countries. However, the nationalism factor is the best explained first-order ideological factor (42% of variance). The key variables in this case are, again, higher authoritarianism and lower education. Hence, we can conclude that the crucial variables that explain the most politically relevant primary ideological factors are authoritarianism, education, and to a certain degree age.

The remaining primary factors from the socialist conservatism second-order factor can also be explained by the constructed model, although they individually do not contribute much to the explanation of party preferences. This refers to the socialist economy factor (30% of variance explained, by SDO egalitarianism, authoritarianism, and left-wing identification), the traditionalism

factor (37% of variance explained, by authoritarianism, older age, and marginally by religiosity and *left* wing identification, and the militarism factor (29% of variance, explained by authoritarianism, lower education, and lower family income).

The constructed model also explains the clericalism, collectivism, and work ethic factors relatively well (30%, 20%, and 19% of variance respectively). Authoritarianism is highly relevant for all three ideological dimensions. Religiosity and frequent church attendance increase the clericalist orientation. Religiosity alone also increases collectivism, while, at the same time, it decreases the work ethic factor. Older age is conducive for collectivism and a stricter work ethic, as well as egalitarianism (SDO factor). In addition, right-wing identification is predictive of higher degree of the clericalist orientation.

The four remaining factors are less successfully explained by the constructed model. Eleven percent of variance in elitism can be explained basically by SDO group dominance factor, with the very minor contribution of authoritarianism. The same SDO factor contributes to the explanation of economic liberalism (mere 5% of variance). Non-economic liberalism is similarly (un)explained, but the predictive variables are right-wing identification and authoritarianism.<sup>98</sup> Finally, the 12% of explained variance in punitiveness is expectedly the contribution of primarily authoritarianism, though the effect of the subjective economic well-being is on the border of statistical significance.

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<sup>98</sup> Zero-order correlation coefficients between the two liberalism factors and authoritarianism are small and *positive*: with economic liberalism  $r=.13$  ( $p<.01$ ), and with Liberalism factor  $r=.18$  ( $p<.001$ ).

**Table 39 Causal analysis, the second step: Multivariate model of ideological variables (first-order ideological factors), 2002.**

	Nationalism	Socialist eco.	International integration	Traditionalism	Militarism	Clericalism	Elitism	Economic Liberalism	Philosophical Liberalism	Collectivism	Work ethic	Regime attitude	Punitiveness
Age	.00	.06	-.07	.11**	.03	-.03	.01	.08	.05	.11*	.12**	-.10*	.04
Education	-.12**	-.06	.10*	-.06	-.14**	.00	-.02	-.07	-.01	-.02	-.03	.13**	.02
Church attendance	.04	-.06	.03	.03	-.02	.23***	.00	.07	.04	-.06	.08	.01	-.06
Religiosity	.04	.03	-.03	.09*	.05	.26***	.01	-.10	-.04	.12*	-.15**	.05	.02
Subjective eco. well being	-.07	-.09*	-.02	-.03	.04	-.01	-.01	.08	.08	.03	.03	.03	.11*
Family income	-.03	-.08	.05	-.01	-.12**	-.02	.01	.01	.01	.09	-.01	.02	-.07
SDO Egalitarianism	.05	.27***	.00	.01	.07	.09*	-.05	-.08	.06	.15**	.10*	.05	.10*
SDO Group dominance	.11	.08	-.09	-.03	.08	.08	.24***	.12*	.09	.09	.06	-.03	.03
Authoritarianism	.49***	.24***	-.15**	.51***	.36***	.17***	.12*	.07	.13*	.29***	.31**	-.18***	.27***
Left-right self-placement	-.03	-.15***	.08	-.09**	-.03	.11**	.01	.05	.10*	-.04	.06	.32***	.04
R <sup>2</sup>	.42***	.30***	.10***	.37***	.29***	.30***	.11***	.06***	.06**	.20***	.19***	.21***	.12***

Notes: \* $p < .05$ , \*\* $p < .01$ , \*\*\* $p < .001$ . <sup>a</sup> Religiosity is coded in reversed direction, higher number indicating lower religiosity.

Data source: Author's survey, spring 2002. Environmentalism and Feminism factors not shown because regression equations were insignificant.

These findings corroborate the important role of the socio-psychological dispositional variables for explaining the primary ideological factors. Authoritarianism appeared as the major predictor of almost all the ideological factors, but especially of those associated with party preferences. Left-right ideological identification is relevant especially for ideological factors that explicitly refer to the former socialist and/or Milošević's regime (i.e., the regime attitude factor and the socialist economy factor).

The effects of the remaining independent variables are generally specific for particular ideological attitudes. Thus, for example, variables indicating religiosity are very important for predicting clericalism, as well as the work ethic factor. Income, age, and education are also relevant for a number of first-order ideological factors. The SDO factors have considerably narrower influence compared to authoritarianism but the obtained significant relationships are theoretically meaningful. Thus, the elitism factor is associated with the SDO group dominance factor while the SDO egalitarianism factor is linked with the socialist economy and collectivism factors.

The socio-economic variables have influence on specific ideological orientations rather than on general second-order factors. Hence, it seems that the more general dimensions are shaped by political divisions while one's socio-demographic milieu engenders rather specific attitudes. As a result, more general ideological dimensions appear unrelated to the background variables. To the extent that political divisions shape the convergence of specific attitudes into more general orientations, it is possible that the constitutive elements of those broader orientations have different relationships with socio-structural factors.

#### Sociological, socio-psychological, and attitudinal models of party preferences

If structural variables have no direct impact on party preferences in the multivariate model, it does not necessarily mean that the 'crude' sociological model has no predictive power. As the above presented zero-order correlations show, preference for each party is correlated with at least some background and criterial variables. The complete model is useful if it performs better than any of its components.

Table 40 shows explanatory power of three simplified models: the sociological, socio-psychological, and attitudinal. We can observe that, overall, the sociological model is the weakest, the most variance being explained in preference for SPS (13%). In the case of ‘democratic’ parties, the model is generally on the border of statistical insignificance.

**Table 40 Sociological, socio-psychological, and attitudinal models of party preferences**

Model	SPS	SRS	DOS	DS	DSS	SPO
<i>Sociological model</i>						
Age	.21 ***	.09 *	-.12 *	-.10 *	.02	-.04
Education	-.22 ***	-.21 ***	.10 *	.07	-.13 **	-.08
Church attendance	.10 *	.09	-.09	-.07	.00	.07
Religiosity <sup>a</sup>	.08	-.03	-.02	-.03	-.08	-.05
Subjective economic well being	.03	-.02	.07	.03	.01	-.11 *
Family income	-.12 *	-.07	-.01	.02	-.04	.05
<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	.13	.08	.04	NS	.03	.03
<i>Social-psychological model</i>						
Authoritarianism	.38 ***	.25 ***	-.15 **	-.18 **	.25 ***	.00
Left-right self-placement	-.27 ***	-.10 *	.21 ***	.19 ***	.16 ***	.12 **
SDO Egalitarianism	-.05	.00	.05	.01	.03	.01
SDO Group dominance	-.01	.11 *	-.07	-.06	-.08	.10
<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	.22	.12	.09	.09	.08	.03
<i>Attitudinal model</i>						
Socialist conservatism	.59 ***	.52 ***	-.52 ***	-.57 ***	.17 ***	-.04
Conservatism	-.04	.04	-.09 *	.06	.18 ***	.10 *
Social hierarchy	.09 *	-.04	-.01	.02	.06	-.05
Post-materialism	-.02	-.07	.07	.09 *	-.05	-.02
<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	.36	.28	.28	.33	.08	NS

Notes: \**p*<.05, \*\**p*<.01, \*\*\**p*<.001. Table entries: standardized regression coefficients (Beta).

<sup>a</sup> Religiosity is coded in reversed direction, higher number indicating lower religiosity. Data source: Author’s survey, spring 2002.



The socio-psychological model performs better, though still below the pure attitudinal model.<sup>99</sup> Yet, the explained variance is still higher in the case of the complete model (see above) (the incremental variance in case of upgrading to the complete model is significant for all parties). Thus, even the purely statistical criteria would warrant the use of the complete model. The real advantage of the complete model is, however, in its theoretical meaningfulness and completeness. The inclusion of causal factors at different levels enables the examination of a relatively complete hypothesis about the causal mechanism that explains party preferences and ideological orientations.

### ***Ideology and Political Preferences in Serbia: Dimensions of Political Competition***

The performed analyses showed that nationalism was highly relevant for explaining political preferences in 2002. The evidence concerning the attitude towards the socialist regime are however, mixed. The regime change attitude (one of the primary factors) is highly predictive of political preferences but it refers very specifically to the ‘regime’ ruled by the Socialist Party, and Slobodan Milošević in particular. The socialist economy factor, which explicitly deals with socialist ideology, appeared irrelevant for party preferences.

On the other hand, a qualitative review of Serbian politics suggested that attitude towards socialism was more important in the initial phases of transition. The review also suggested that parties shifted their positions on these dimensions. In the beginning, SPS employed less nationalist rhetoric than some of the opposition parties, especially SPO and SRS. On the other hand, Radicals appeared anti-socialist in the beginning but their later coalition with the socialists probably had some repercussions on the ideological profile of their supporters.

This chapter will provide a diachronic perspective on the role of the particular ideological dimensions, namely nationalist and socialist orientations, in differentiating the main political parties. By examining what differentiated parties in 1990, 1996, and 2002, it will be possible to trace the evolution of the position of these issues and changes in their interrelationships. Since this part of the

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<sup>99</sup> For the sake of brevity, the attitudinal model is presented only in the version with the second-order factors.

analysis aims to establish ideological and other differences between supporters of different parties, not what is best able to predict support for particular parties, the method of choice is discriminant analysis. At the same time, the goal is to examine whether the main political divisions could be interpreted in the sense of the cleavage of world-views. It may be that background variables predict individual-level authoritarianism and that authoritarianism predicts ideological dimensions that in turn are associated with party preferences. Yet these predictors do not have to load on competitive dimensions consistently.

The present principal hypothesis starts from the assumption that reified world-view implies resistance to change, preference for order, obedience to rules and established authorities, and a more general psychological conservatism, and at the same time, distrust of foreign influences, and negative attitude towards outgroups. It follows, then, that authoritarianism should particularly facilitate support for two ideological dimensions: socialism of the old regime and nationalism. The former reflects the preference for the established order, for the known and familiar (authoritarian conventionalism). The latter draws its appeal from the need for the rejected outgroups (authoritarian aggression), and to follow the lead of the authorities (authoritarian submission) (e.g., Altemeyer 1981, 1988). Variables facilitating development of the reified view of the social world, such as older age, low education, rural residence, should be accompanied by a higher level of authoritarianism (Gabennesch 1972). For this perspective, it is irrelevant whether these variables imply social closure as required by the classical notion of social cleavages.

Thus, if the hypothesis about the role of the authoritarian world-view is credible, the most relevant discriminating variables should include structural variables predictive of authoritarianism, such as lower education and age, then authoritarianism itself, and ideological orientations expressing the authoritarian worldview, that is preference for the old socialist regime and ideas, and nationalism. Finally, such dimensions should discriminate parties of democratic orientation from those endorsing socialist and extreme nationalist ideology. Given the element of conventionalism in the definition of authoritarianism, nationalism, in the beginning, should be less authoritarian than later since it was this ideology that challenged the established authorities and especially because of the radically different

political style pursued by the then nationalist leaders and parties (the second hypothesis). Thus, it is expected that the main discriminant functions will join together the demographic, dispositional, and ideological variables in the hypothesized manner. Eventual purely structural, or ideological, or dispositional discriminant functions would run contrary to this hypothesis, as well as functions that combine variables in an unexpected way (e.g., higher education with authoritarianism).

The aim of this part of the analysis is to establish empirically the most important dimensions that divided the relevant Serbian parties. Discriminant analyses were performed on the data from three time periods – 1990, 1996, and 2002. Variables entered into analysis include (1) the key socio-structural variables, such as age, rural or urban residence, level of education, and church attendance, (2) authoritarianism scales to capture the authoritarian world-view,<sup>100</sup> (3) the left-right self-identification scale as an indicator of broader ideological orientation, and (4) scales measuring nationalism and socialist or pro-communist orientations, to measure the two specific ideological orientations of interest. Appendix D shows items used to construct the socialist orientation, nationalist orientation, and authoritarianism scales, and associated reliability coefficients.

The dependent variable is the expressed vote choice for presidential candidates in 1990 and for parties in the other two years. This should not be problematic given the strong identification of parties and their leaders in the Serbian context. The order of presentation is chronological in order to trace temporal changes.

#### Discriminant analysis, 1990

Seven variables were entered into discriminant analysis in order to construct functions that are best able to differentiate supporters of the four main candidates participating in presidential election in 1990 (see Table 41). The first of the two statistically significant discriminant functions ( $Rc_1=.55$ ,  $p<.001$ ) is defined primarily by the left wing identification (correlation with the function is .74), high

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<sup>100</sup> Social Dominance Orientation, another potentially relevant dispositional construct, is not included for two reasons. First, the scale was not included in any of the available data sets, except in 2002. Second, the previous analyses showed that SDO has modest relevance for political preferences in Serbia.

scores on socialist egalitarianism dimension, and with older age, but also with significant projections of nationalism (in the *negative* direction), authoritarianism, and lower education. This dimension, therefore, unites pro-socialist orientation with the *opposition* to nationalism, and is, as expected, positively associated with authoritarianism. Socio-structural variables related to this dimension are those expected to be predictive of the authoritarian worldview: older age and lower education.

This function strongly divides voters of Slobodan Milošević from the supporters of the opposition candidates, especially from the nationalist opposition (SPO and SRS), as shown by group centroids in Figure 3. Comparing to the socialist supporters, nationalists were less authoritarian when this worldview was associated with the pro-socialist orientation, which is explainable if we take into account that their distinct ideological marker in this period was anticommunism.


The second function is a less powerful discriminator ( $Rc_2=.36$ ). Yet it shows specific differences between the nationalist voters and supporters of the democratic candidate Ivan Đurić. This dimension is primarily defined by nationalism (correlation with the function is .81), and, to a lesser, degree by authoritarianism and lower education. It seems that authoritarianism associated with the nationalist orientation is more psychological in nature, since age is unrelated to this discriminant function.

A positive coefficient for socialist egalitarianism shows that supporters of Ivan Đurić were those who were the most opposed to the rigid egalitarianism of the old system. Despite this, nationalism remains unrelated with left-wing identification.

According to the expectation, authoritarianism was related to both pro-socialist and nationalist ideological orientations. Mean voters' scores on ideological dimensions presented in Data source: ZA Study 2901, 1990.

Figure 4 show that the non-authoritarian perspective is associated primarily with supporters of the democratic opposition and, more interestingly, that the nationalist candidates attracted considerably less authoritarian voters than the socialists, thereby supporting the second hypothesis. Thus, strong parallelism between average scores for socialism and authoritarianism should be noted, as well as the sharp rise in nationalism scores on the right wing.

**Discriminant analysis 1990**  
(size reflects obtained vote in presidential elections)




Data source: ZA Study 2901, 1990.

**Figure 3 Group centroids, 1990**

**Table 41 Structure matrix of two significant functions that discriminate supporters of four main presidential candidates in 1990**

Variable	No. of items	<i>Alpha</i>	Function 1 <i>Rc</i> <sub>1</sub> =.55, <i>p</i> <.001	Function 2 <i>Rc</i> <sub>2</sub> =.36, <i>p</i> <.001
Socialist egalitarianism PC	5	.57	.43	.38
Nationalism (summarized)	3		-.38	.81
Authoritarianism PC	10	.89	.39	.44
Left-right self-identification <sup>a</sup>			.74	-.09
Age			.40	.16
Education			-.32	-.35
Urban residence			-.09	-.14

Data source: ZA study No. 2903, 1990. <sup>a</sup>Higher score denotes left-wing identification.



Data source: ZA Study 2901, 1990.

**Figure 4 Ideological differences between supporters of different presidential candidates in 1990**

#### Discriminant analysis, 1996

Two discriminant functions proved significant in the 1996 data as well ( $Rc_1=.77$  and  $Rc_2=.50$ , both  $p<.0001$ ), and the relationships are even stronger than in 1990. Their structure (correlation between variables and functions) is presented in Table 42. On the ideological level, the first function is defined by high scores of left wing identification, socialist regime support, and a zero coefficient for nationalism. This non-nationalist, pro-socialist orientation is strongly authoritarian (the highest coefficient) and is related with older age, lower education, and rural residence. It strongly divides socialist voters from all the other opposition parties, including the radicals (Data source: ZA Study 2911, 1996.

Figure 5).<sup>101</sup>

The second discriminant function is, similarly as in 1990, strongly determined by nationalism (the highest coefficient). This time, however, it is related with the explicitly right-wing identification,


<sup>101</sup> The latter were in heightened, at least rhetorical, opposition to the SPS after the fall of Krajina in mid-1995.

while the correlation with the pro-socialist orientation approached the zero level. Authoritarianism is again predictive of the nationalist discriminant function, as is lower education, but it remained unrelated to age. The second function shows specific appeal of the Radical Party, but especially against the parties of democratic (i.e., non-nationalist) opposition including previously strongly nationalist SPO (Figure 3), while the socialists are in-between the two camps.

**Table 42 Structure of two significant functions discriminating five political parties in 1996**

Variable	No. of items	<i>Alpha</i>	Function 1 <i>Rc</i> <sub>1</sub> =.77, <i>p</i> <.001	Function 2 <i>Rc</i> <sub>2</sub> =.50, <i>p</i> <.001
Nationalism	8	.85	.00	.83
Socialist regime support	4	.74	.52	.05
Authoritarianism	8	.90	.67	.41
Left wing identification			.55	-.50
Age			.47	-.02
Education			-.32	-.39
Church attendance			.07	-.06
Urban residence			-.21	-.06

Data source: ZA Study 2911, 1996.




Data source: ZA Study 2911, 1996.

**Figure 5 Group centroids, 1996**

It again seems that the first function, indicating pro-socialist orientation, is rooted in the authoritarian world-view given its strong basis in structural variables, especially age and education. We can also observe that in the mid 1990s, nationalist ideology already attracted an increasingly authoritarian population. In 1990, Šešelj's voters were rather non-authoritarian, while in 1996, their authoritarianism scores are higher than among the rest of the opposition (Data source: ZA Study 2911, 1996.

Figure 6).





Data source: ZA Study 2911, 1996.

**Figure 6** Vote choice and ideological dimensions in 1996

#### Discriminant analysis, 2002

Six years later, one discriminant function proved highly significant in ideologically differentiating the five main political actors ( $Rc_1=.62, p<.001$ ). The second function only approached the border of statistical significance ( $Rc_2=.34, p=.054$ ) (Table 43).<sup>102</sup> The main change, however, is in the content of the first function. While in 1990 socialism and nationalism loaded the first function in the opposite directions, and in 1996 nationalism was unrelated to the socialism dimension, nationalism has the highest loading on the first function, followed by socialism, and is related with left wing identification. Unsurprisingly, this function also strongly correlates with authoritarianism and

<sup>102</sup> DS and DOS voters who would not vote for DSS were joined. The sample contained too few SPO voters, so the party is omitted from this part of the analysis. A new parliamentary party SSJ is included.

accompanying demographic variables – in the first place low education, but also church attendance, lower economic position, and age<sup>103</sup>.

Supporters of DOS/DS obtained the lowest scores on this dimension (Data source: the author's survey, Spring 2002.

Figure 7), while both socialists and extreme nationalists are far on the opposite side. DSS is in-between, corresponding to its then middle-of-the-road ideological positioning.

The second function, that could be termed right-wing nationalism, is correlated primarily with the right-wing identification, somewhat less with the nationalism scale, and still less with church attendance. The function is *unrelated* to the socialism scale and authoritarianism, as well as to the background variables. The SPS voters are at the low end of this dimension, followed by the DOS/DS voters, while Koštunica and Šešelj supporters are among the high scorers. This could be interpreted as purely ideological dimensions, showing classical elements of the conservative-traditionalist ideology - right wing identification, nationalism, and religiosity.

A possible reason why this dimension is not related to authoritarianism could be that it partly captures non-conventional nationalism of the radicals and more democratically oriented nationalism of the Koštunica's DSS. The main reason, however, is that the low end of this dimension is occupied by authoritarian voters of the SPS (see Figure 8). We can also observe that the extreme rightists became more sympathetic to the left, whether in terms of self-identification or in terms of attitudes.

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
<sup>103</sup> The 2002 sample is somewhat biased in terms of age, which might explain the obtained unusually weak relationship between age and authoritarianism.

**Table 43 Structure matrix of functions discriminating four main political actors in 2002**

Ideological dimension	Function 1 <i>Rc</i> <sub>1</sub> =.61, <i>p</i> <.0001	Function 2 <i>Rc</i> <sub>2</sub> =.34, <i>p</i> =.054
Nationalism	.80	.50
Socialism	.53	.04
Authoritarianism	.59	.03
Left-Right identification	-.43	.78
Education	-.34	-.09
Church attendance	.28	.33
Self assessed economic situation	-.21	-.14
Age	.07	.02


Note: Metric characteristics of the ideological scales are reported in previous chapters.

**Discriminant analysis 2002**  
(size reflects proportions in the sample)



Data source: the author's survey, Spring 2002.

**Figure 7 Group centroids, 2002**



Data source: the author's survey, Spring 2002.

**Figure 8 Vote preference and ideological dimensions in 2002**

### Continuities and changes over time

The results showed that in all three periods, the entered variables are capable of strongly differentiating the Serbian political parties. In all cases, the first canonical correlation coefficient was higher than .50. The second discriminant function was also rather strong in 1990 and 1996, but only on the border of significance in 2002. This would suggest the change from two to one-dimensional competition about the time of the regime change.

Several further continuities as well as changes should be noted. Authoritarianism, *together* with the relevant structural variables (age and education primarily), was consistently related with the strongest discriminant functions. Thus, the main political divides included different worldviews, in addition to

ideological and structural layers, supporting the main hypothesis in this section. In all cases, high loadings of authoritarianism on a particular discriminant function were followed by significant loadings of variables, such as older age and lower education, but occasionally also by rural residence and poorer economic conditions. Authoritarianism had significant projection on five out of six discriminant functions and in all cases education loaded significantly and in the opposite direction.

In accordance with the hypothesis about the role of conventionalism, the authoritarians prefer more familiar political options. In 1990, nationalism and socialism were attitudes on the opposed sides of the main discriminant function. As a result, authoritarianism was related with the socialist orientation and negatively associated with nationalism. At the time, nationalism was too unconventional of an ideology to be related with authoritarianism. However, when nationalism was pitted against the liberal opposition, as documented by the second discriminant function in 1990, authoritarianism accompanied nationalist attitudes. In 1996, nationalism and pro-socialist orientation loaded orthogonal dimensions, and authoritarianism was related with both dimensions. In 2002, nationalism and socialism converged into a common discriminant dimension together with authoritarianism. In general, authoritarianism participated in discriminating the main Serbian political actors in accordance with the main hypothesis: it went along with the pro-socialist orientation, and with nationalism to the extent that the latter was not perceived as an unconventional attitude.

The particular trajectory of the relationship between nationalist and socialist ideological dimensions deserves particular attention. In 1990, they were opposed - they loaded onto the first function in opposite directions. In 1996, they loaded different orthogonal functions, where non-authoritarian democratic opposition was facing two authoritarian opponents - the nationalists and socialists. In 2002, the socialist and nationalist orientations finally converged into a single discriminant function, together with their common denominator authoritarianism. Zero-order correlations between them reveal their relationships as ideological dimensions on an individual level, regardless of their role in predicting party preferences. The correlation coefficients in three periods are: in 1990:  $r=.11$ ,  $p<.001$ ; in 1996:  $r=-.06$ ,  $p<.05$ , in 2002:  $r=.49$ ,  $P<.0001$ . Thus from being virtually independent in 1990 and 1996, they became strongly correlated dimensions.

The increasingly nationalist orientation among the SPS voters over time is also worth noting. Comparison of the graphs that show the relationships between vote preference and ideological dimensions demonstrates that SPS voters were rather non-nationalist in 1990. Their average relative to the other voters increased in 1996, and ended up on the high extreme in 2002. This trend is probably a consequence of flanking along the nationalist dimension (Hislope 1996).

From the theoretical point of view, the important result is that social structure consistently covaries with the authoritarian world-view, in accordance with Gabennesch's (1972) hypothesis, and the authoritarian world-view is at the roots of the main political divides in Serbia.

## Discussion

### *Structure of Political Attitudes*

The aim of the current research has been to contribute to the debate on the structure of socio-political attitudes through an analysis of survey data from Serbia. The main research problem, in its descriptive and taxonomic aspects, asks whether political attitudes are organized and, if so, how. The problem tackles two research traditions that have pervaded much of the political behavior literature over the past several decades. One debate concerns the very existence of stable political attitudes and ideological orientations among the mass public (e.g., Converse 1964; Batista-Foguet and Saris 1997; Lavine, Thomsen and Gonzales 1997; Zaller 1992). The other related issue is whether political attitudes can be seen as unidimensional or multidimensional (Middendorp 1992).<sup>104</sup> The review of social psychology and political science research strongly supports the view that not only is there a considerable degree of coherence and structure of individual-level political attitudes (if adequately measured), but, also, that attitudes tend to be structured along familiar ideological lines (e.g., Gabel and Anderson 2002; Kerlinger 1984; Middendorp 1992, 1978). Yet, the disagreements about how the structure of political attitudes or ideology should be best conceptualized remain.

The present analysis started from 70-item political attitudes scale. The items in the scale were selected so that they are theoretically relevant as indicators of the major ideological orientations, and applicable to and representative of post-communist and specifically Serbian ideological controversies. Initial factor analysis, after a number of preliminary analyses whereby several items were dropped from the original item pool, extracted fifteen primary attitudinal factors. Most of them were interpretable and theoretically meaningful. Yet, there were several factors difficult to interpret, partly

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<sup>104</sup> The two traditions are, of course, closely related. Issue multidimensionality is often seen as contradicting the 'cognitive miser' view of the mass public. According to classics such as Downs, cognitive misers "reduce all political questions to their bearing upon one crucial issue: how much government intervention in economy should there be?" (1957, 116).

due to a number of items with multiple factor loadings. Thus, taking into account these results, and the a priori assigned theoretical meaning (i.e., the ideological nature) of the items, I developed the fifteen attitude scales. As a result, the new set of variables was empirically grounded and theoretically meaningful.

In this way defined primary attitudinal dimensions were then correlated among themselves, with a set of criterial variables (demographic, psychological, and attitudinal variables), and with party preferences. Analysis of the structure of the factors and of their relationships with other variables provided a rich basis for the examination of various sources of attitude or ideological constraints – a question at the core of the present research.

#### Initial factor extraction and sources of attitude constraint

Semantic similarity or 'logical constraint' (Converse 1964) is clear in most of the first-order factors. It is important to emphasize that 'logical' here refers to elementary logic, not to what could be termed 'ideological logic'. Interpretation of the factors based on logical constraint was generally simple. Factors such as feminism or clericalism consist of several semantically close items. Economic egalitarianism, international integration, and environmentalism are also factors with relatively semantically homogenous items.

At the same time, it is apparent that structuration of these factors is not exclusively based on their literal meaning. In most of the factors, there are items whose convergence has to be explained on different grounds. In most cases, the constraint comes from societal and political traditions and from contemporaneous political divisions. On these grounds one can explain, for example, a finding that an item expressing a favorable attitude towards the integration into the international community hangs together with the two feminist items.

Contemporaneous political discourse and divisions could be clearly seen in the first initial primary factor, which contained a set of militarist attitudes, nationalist attitudes, and attitudes towards Milošević regime and friendship with 'Slavic' nations. However, combination of nationalist and militarist attitudes is certainly not exclusively a Serbian specialty. Basically, wherever these two



attitudes are measured, they have appeared as correlated dimensions (e.g. Wilson 1973a; Walkey, Katz, and Green 1990). This suggests that broader political traditions and doctrines are also sources of the convergence of nationalism and militarism. Yet, this is not the full story. These dimensions also generally tend to correlate with specific individual-dispositional traits, authoritarianism in particular (cf. Adorno et al. 1950), just as in the current study. Thus, this factor is an example of rather diverse sources of convergence: logic, local and more general political discourse, and psychological functionality.

A somewhat unexpected outcome at this level of analysis and with this large number of factors extracted, is that the semantic source of constraint is not clearly dominant. The composition of virtually all factors demonstrates additional sources of constraint. In most cases of the semantically heterogeneous factors it is possible to assume psychological functionality and, even more clearly, cultural and political influences.

From the substantive point of view, it is important to observe that attitudes in Serbia are not strongly constrained, thus providing some support for the Conversean view of the public's inability to organize attitudes ideologically. Much clearer than that, however, is the finding that attitudes are not organized into a single overarching ideological dimension. Semantically close items are closely correlated and, furthermore, attitudes converge toward the main lines of Serbian political divisions. Yet, they are far from unidimensional organization.

#### **Attitudinal Mini-scales**

Construction of attitudinal mini-scales brought considerable improvement in operationalization of the basic attitudinal dimensions. First, the attitudinal factors defined through the mini-scales are considerably clearer in content than the initial factors because semantic similarity was taken into consideration in the process of transition from the primary factors towards the mini-scales. Thus, for example, the primary factor that combined nationalist and militarist attitudes was divided into separate attitude scales. Relatively good metric characteristics of the mini-scales largely confirmed the

expectation that attitudes would converge according to their pre-defined ideological content. It also clearly confirmed the hypothesis about multidimensional attitude structure in Serbia.

The nationalism mini-scale consists of elements such as national pride, belief in the nation's superiority, the desire for national sovereignty, unification with territories inhabited by co-nationals, request for introduction of 'patriotic' elements into school curricula, distrust of neighboring nations, and rejection of one's own nation's possible guilt. It differs from what would usually be defined as patriotism (positive attitude towards the in-group), by including the negative attitude towards out-groups. In this sense, it is close to the concept of ethnocentrism (Adorno et al. 1950). Earlier analyses of nationalist attitudes in Serbia also found a combination of similar items that formed a rather coherent nationalist orientation (e.g., Todosijević 1995, 2001). Moreover, the present scale corresponds to various other operationalizations of nationalist orientation in many respects (e.g. Kosterman and Feshbach 1989), and contains most of the aspects of the usually encountered nationalist doctrines (cf. Dekker and Malova 1997). In fact, it is remarkable that so heterogeneous of a scale, in terms of literal content, performs so consistently. This nationalist attitude homogenization could be a reflection of the nationalist mobilization in the political sphere (cf. Todosijević 2001).

As expected, nationalism is related with authoritarianism, thus echoing similar findings across different countries (e.g., Blank 2003; Meeus 1991, 1994; Todosijević 1999). Its correlation with prejudice suggest that in-group attitudes are often related with out-group hostility, thus corroborating Adorno et al.'s (1950) definition of ethnocentrism. Both SDO factors are related with nationalism but the group-based dominance (GBD) subscale is a considerably stronger correlate of nationalist views: nationalists support group-based social hierarchy. Religiosity is a relatively weak correlate of nationalism while left-right identification remained unrelated. In addition, it was obtained that younger, better educated, and better-off respondents are less nationalistic. In most respects, therefore, the present nationalism scale provides a measure of nationalism that is both reliable and theoretically meaningful.

A militarist attitude proved possible to measure by a small set of items that converged into a highly consistent scale. Earlier research on elements of socialist ideology in Serbia also showed that attitudes

toward the role of the (Yugoslav) army are rather well organized (Todosijević 2005). Consistently high loadings show that army is an attitude object viewed in rather general terms – as either positive or negative. Army is seen as a source of security and pride and it is admired for its role in “the heroic fight against NATO aggression”. Regardless of the local specificities, this factor closely corresponds to related dimensions obtained elsewhere (e.g. Wilson 1973a).

An attitude towards international integration includes positive (or negative) views of the integration of Serbia (Yugoslavia) into the international community. It covers both economic and more political integration. This dimension is less often encountered in literature. Perhaps, its salience depends on a particular country’s position vis-à-vis the international community.<sup>105</sup> It is perhaps not only the ‘paranoid’ nature of Serbian nationalism (Ramet 2004), but the facts of a decade long economic sanctions, political isolation, and, finally, a war, that made the attitude towards the ‘international community’ so salient of a political theme. Conceptually related dimensions have occasionally been reported in Western countries. For example, Sidanius and Ekehammar (1980) obtained a factor labeled Pro-West orientation in Sweden.

Clericalist orientation is a rather narrow attitude concerned with the political role of the Church and religion. Similar dimensions dealing with religion/religiosity are present in virtually all models of social attitudes structure (e.g. Eysenck 1954; Ferguson 1939; Kerlinger 1984; Middendorp 1991a; Thomassen 2004; Wilson 1973a). The present scale is, however, narrower in scope and more clearly focused on the influence of the church on political and social matters. As a confirmation of the scale validity, it is worth mentioning that it is the strongest correlate of religiosity.

The traditionalism scale deals with traditional sexual mores, punitiveness towards transgressors of social norms, and support for the public promotion of the “nation’s traditions”. This scale represents a relatively narrow operationalization of traditionalism, not unlike conventionalism as described by Adorno et al. (1950). Counterparts to this dimension can be found in most models of attitude structure (e.g. Eysenck, Wilson), despite the fact that particular traditions may considerably differ. What is

interesting to note is that Serbian traditionalism is associated with left-wing identification. More in accordance with other studies, Serbian traditionalism is associated with authoritarianism, prejudice, religiosity, lower education and income. Additionally, it is the strongest correlate of age.

The speculation that the attitude towards the former socialist system and towards what is generally termed 'the Slobodan Milošević regime' might be relatively separate dimensions is confirmed. The attitude about the Slobodan Milošević regime is concisely expressed in the regime attitude factor. The fact that an item expressing general evaluation of "communism" loads on this factor testifies to its somewhat more complex nature than simply the view of Slobodan Milošević. This kind of attitudinal dimension generally does not appear in models developed in more stable political contexts. Thus, it may be a peculiarity of transitional cases, where regime change is the most salient issue (cf. Moreno 1999). The regime factor has similar correlates among the criterial variables as the international integration factor - both are negatively related with authoritarianism, prejudice, and group-based dominance, and positively related with higher socio-economic status and younger age. These findings show the outline of pro-reform oriented respondents. An interesting difference between the two attitudes is that international integration is considerably less embedded into left-right semantics compared to the regime attitude. The regime attitude is much more of a political attitude and, therefore, related with left-right identification.

Items dealing with various aspects of the socialist organization of economy, as specifically applied in Serbia/Yugoslavia, converged into a separate dimension, labeled the socialist economy factor. Hence, a positive attitude towards the socialist economy does not necessarily go hand in hand with support for the 'Milošević regime'. The dominant theme in this factor is opposition to privatization, but there are also items mentioning trade unions, state guaranteed employment, and free education. Similar dimensions have been obtained previously in countries of the former socialist bloc (e.g., Todosijević 2005; Enyedi and Todosijević 2003). In the Western context, items of this profile would often load on the left side of the left-right ideological dimension or on the opposite side of conservatism

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<sup>105</sup> Though early research in the USA discovered an internationalist-isolationist dimension (Thurstone 1934).

dimensions. Of course, instead of resistance to privatization the western attitudinal counterpart would include support for nationalization, especially in studies from 1960's and 1970s (e.g., Eysenck 1975; Middendorp 1991). Correlates of the socialist economy factor correspond to the correlates of other attitudes specific to the Milošević regime, though in smaller magnitude. The egalitarianism subscale of the SDO, and left-wing identification are two important markers of support for the socialist economy. The evidence also showed that poorer, less educated, and older respondents tend to support redistributive economy.

Environmentalism and feminism factors are conceptually pretty clear, although the former is operationally better defined. Environmentalism and feminism appear to be attitudes not very well integrated with other ideological dimensions, especially with the criterial variables. Thus, despite the presence of these themes in media and public discourse, they are not well integrated into broader ideological orientations. The existing significant associations are, nevertheless, in the expected direction. That is, both environmentalism and feminism are positively associated with the preference for international integration and for regime change. In addition, feminism and environmentalism are evidently on the political margin in Serbia since none of the two is associated with party preferences. The correlates of the environmentalist and feminist attitudes are similar – in the sense that they are basically unrelated with the criterial variables. The only exception is the correlation between environmentalism and SDO egalitarianism, but even this coefficient is weak. It is surprising that these dimensions are not negatively related with some of the criterial variables, such as authoritarianism or prejudice.

Similar factors dealing with these key post-materialist issues have been reported in the literature, if a particular study included the appropriate items. For example, Riemann et al. (1993) obtained a separate environmentalist factor in Germany (though it was mostly focused on taxation for environmental purposes) and a women's equality factor which merged with items on social welfare (consider also, for example, the Women's Liberation factor in Ortet, Perez, and Wilson 1990, or the sexual freedom factor as one of five primary factors of liberalism in Kerlinger 1984).

None of the general models of the structure of political attitudes includes the work ethic as a separate dimension. However, the related items are often found built-in in various definitions of general conservatism. The work ethic attitude has a considerable history in political psychology research. It received prominent place in Adorno et al.'s research, as well as in more recent studies (e.g., Altemeyer 1998; Katz and Hass 1988; Pratto et al. 1994; Verkuyten and Brug 2004). In Serbia, Ignjatović conceptualized this attitude as “praxophilia” (Majstorović, Salaj, and Ignjatović 1994). In the current research, the items intended to measure the work ethic spread on several factors. Three items remained for defining the attitude to work as rigid obligation rather than as the expression of creative abilities. Given that items with very similar content are often interpreted as “protestant ethic ideology” (Katz and Hass 1988; Verkuyten and Brug 2004), it is possible that in cultures with weak protestant influence this attitude is less structured. However, although the final work ethic scale might seem weak psychometrically, it is rather consistent given the fact that it consists of three items.<sup>106</sup> Correlations of the work ethic scale testify that it represents a construct comparable to the work or protestant ethic scales from other cultures. Thus, it correlates with authoritarianism, prejudice, and group-based dominance, showing it to be an element of the broader authoritarian world-view.

Liberal ideology has generally proved difficult to operationalize by questionnaire, even in countries with much stronger liberal traditions than Serbia. In many studies there is no separate dimension labeled “liberalism”. The opposite of conservatism is often interpreted as radicalism, especially in earlier studies (Thurstone 1934; Eysenck 1975). However, specific attitudes that could be seen as elements of liberal orientation are often found within general ideological factors. Thus, for example, emphasis on private enterprise and rejection of state involvement in economy are often elements of general conservatism. Cases when researchers report separate factors with liberalism in their labels testify to the multiplicity of meanings associated with this term. In Riemann et al. (1993) a factor labeled “Liberalism and technological progress” is one of four components of general conservatism

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<sup>106</sup> Compare, for example with Katz and Hass 1988 or Furnham 1990. In Verkuyten and Brug (2004) a 10-item scale had coefficient  $Alpha=.69$ .

obtained in Germany. In Middendorp (1981) liberalism as a label appeared on two factors: once as opposed to traditionalism and once as the opposition to conservatism. The most prominent and explicit position for liberalism is found in Kerlinger's (1984) two-dimensional model. There, liberalism is one of two 'big' independent factors, in addition to the conservatism factor. The meaning of Kerlinger's liberalism factor is, however, much closer to the American understanding of the term i.e., as dealing with social mores. Economic neo-liberalism would be much closer to one of Kerlinger's conservatism factors, namely, to the economic conservatism primary factor.

In the present case, as shown by the initial factor analysis, items pre-defined as indicators of liberalism loaded on a very diverse set of factors. They typically had multiple loadings which testify to the ambiguous interpretation of the respective items. In the end, two separate mini-scales dealing with liberalism were constructed. The scale of liberalism involved some of the prototypical beliefs associated with liberalism, such as the emphasis on individual freedom rather than economic equality, belief that unequal abilities lead to 'inequality of outcomes', and belief in meritocracy. The second factor captured liberal or rather neo-liberal views of economy (the two factors are moderately correlated:  $r=.33$ ,  $p<.001$ ). This factor includes rejection of state involvement in economy and, in particular, its redistributive role. In the Western context, these attitudes would typically correlate with right-wing ideological orientations and corresponding party preferences. In Serbia, this is not the case. In fact, these two factors are unrelated with the left-right self-identification and, more interestingly, unrelated with party preferences. They are, however, related with authoritarianism, prejudice, and the group-based dominance subscale of SDO. In this regard, the Serbian liberalism factors are not unlike their Western counterparts (especially economic neo-liberalism).

Economic and general liberalism are weakly related with the criterial variables. Contrary to the Kitschelt's early model, these attitudes are *positively* related with authoritarianism and, in the case of economic liberalism, even with prejudice. Less surprising are their positive associations with group based dominance scale of SDO. However, all the relationships are rather weak. The same pattern of relationships is displayed by elitism. This could provide some explanation for the associations of the liberalism dimensions. A common element in these attitudes could be an elitist view of the world.

Interpretation of the factor labeled collectivism proved somewhat difficult. Two of the items were originally meant to indicate conservative orientation, with a remaining item representing traditionalism. In all of them, however, one could find an emphasis on the importance of collectivity and relatedness with the group to which one belongs. This factor could be related to a classical conservative emphasis on community<sup>107</sup>, as well as to the socialist tradition of collectivism. It seems that the underlying dimension has equally conservative, traditionalist, communitarian, and collectivist flavors. As a whole, the factor seems closest to a collectivist orientation as opposed to individualism. This dimension has received considerable attention in cross-cultural research and found to have important consequences for other politically relevant attitudes (Triandis 1995). The current definition of collectivism has elements of both horizontal (based on fraternity) and vertical collectivism (based on hierarchically ordered structure of collectivity) (Triandis and Gelfand 1998; Kemmelmeier et al. 2003). The former is currently expressed in the attitude that ‘it is in human nature to help each other’; the latter, in the belief that ‘duties are more important than virtues’.

Punitiveness is one of the four main sub-dimensions of the general conservatism dimension in Wilson’s (1973) model of the structure of social attitudes. Similar attitudes can be found in Thurstone’s (1934) and Ferguson’s (1939, 1973) factors of humanitarianism (negative loading), in Adorno et al.’s (1950) conception of authoritarian aggression, and in Eysenck’s tough-mindedness. They are often found in descriptions of conservative ideology (e.g., Searing 1978). In Serbia, Majstorović, Salaj and Ignjatović (1994) obtained a similar factor, labeled as *penophilia*. The punitiveness factor obtained in the current study clearly belongs to this broader ‘family’. However, it is also clear that it is not equivalent with authoritarianism since their correlation is relatively modest ( $r=.31, p<.001$ ). Thus, the concepts are related, but not interchangeable. The punitiveness factor is a much more specific dimension. Finally, punitiveness shows a predictable pattern of correlations as well. It is related with authoritarianism, prejudice, group-based dominance, and to a lesser degree, with older age and lower income. Although punitiveness is generally correlated with the support for

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<sup>107</sup> Giddens (1994) for example, calls for revival of the communitarian aspect of classical conservatism.



the right-wing political parties (e.g., Heaven 1992; Searing 1978), in Serbia, left-right identification is *not* associated with this attitude.

Support for or rejection of social elites is evidently an important component of ideological thinking. Yet, attempts to operationalize the construct of elitism have been rather rare. The incentive to include elitism as a hypothetical dimension in the present research, as well as two of the three items in the scale, came from Felicia Pratto and Jim Sidanius' research (e.g. Pratto et al. 1994). The attitude outlined in this scale includes preference for hierarchical order and view of the social world as consisting of culturally superior and inferior layers. It is interesting to note that elitism here correlates with compatible ideological factors, such as liberalism factors, work ethic, punitiveness. Yet, there are also some less intuitively obvious relationships such as with collectivism (unless the collectivism factor is closer to vertical rather than horizontal collectivism). Elitism also correlates with authoritarianism and prejudice but the strongest association is with the group based dominance scale of SDO.

#### Relationships between the mini-scales

Analysis of the intercorrelations between the attitudinal mini-scales reveals a specific set of variables strongly interrelated that include nationalism, traditionalism, militarism, international integration, and (negative) attitude towards the Milošević regime. These dimensions represent various facets of the central political divide in Serbia at the time – the divide between the supporters of the Socialists and the Radicals, and parties of the 'democratic opposition'. The evidence suggests that these attitudes represent a rather well-integrated system of beliefs and opinions. In many respects, this syndrome of attitudes could be seen as representing the local variant of conservatism, i.e., the 'socialist conservatism'. The fact that the socialist economy factor correlates with the rest of the involved attitudes reflects the specific Serbian political background. In some other countries with similar backgrounds, the relationships are similar. In Hungary, for example, socialist views of economy converged with classical conservatism items (Enyedi and Todosijević 2003). When discussing the context-bounded interpretation of this cluster of attitudes as conservatism, it is important to note that clericalism is not a prominent member in this set.

Another discernible set of interrelated attitudes includes the international integration dimension, the regime-change attitude, the liberalism factor, environmentalism, and feminism. This seems to be a liberal-post-materialist set of attitudes, associated with the rejection of 'the regime'. This corresponds to Kitschelt's early model (1992) where liberals and libertarians are opposed to the former communists. The correspondence with this model is, however, partial, since economic liberalism is not well integrated in that cluster. Although it is associated with general liberalism, the remaining correlates are different – the work ethic attitude, elitism and even punitiveness. The question of liberalism's dimensions in Serbia is further complicated by the fact that the general liberalism factor is associated with nationalism, traditionalism, punitiveness, and even collectivism. The present operationalization of liberal attitudes is clearly imperfect, but it seems that the Serbian public does not demonstrate integrated understanding of the items in these scales. The conclusion is that liberalism (with or without the prefix "Neo") does not represent an integrated political perspective among Serbian respondents.

In the same direction points the finding that economic liberalism and socialist economy primary factors are basically unrelated, although they are supposed to be opposed to each other. There is almost a logical contradiction between them since one calls for greater involvements of the state in economy and the other one preaches economic self-reliance. How can the contradiction that those who preach economic self-reliance can also preach state intervention in economy, and that as those who reject socialist economy are not especially in favor of economic liberalism be explained? Clearly, the Serbian public does not have coherent views on the economy, so the lack of political or ideological sophistication might be part of the answer. Partly, it might be a reflection of populist economic views. According to Derks (2004) the populist *syndrome* (rather than ideological doctrine) is characterized by the lower strata rejecting the welfare economy for the alleged corruptness of the system and, at the same time, expressing complaints against inequality. Thus, economic populism might be responsible for the lack of negative association between socialist and neo-liberal views of economy.

In general, it seems that attitudes associated with the sharpest political conflicts during the 1990s are much better integrated than any positive ideological alternative. More details on these matters are revealed in the second-order factor analysis.

### Criteria variables

Analysis of the relationships between the attitudinal mini-scales and relevant criteria variables clarified the meaning of the extracted factors in a number of cases. Authoritarianism has a particularly large number of strong correlates: (in order of strength) nationalism, traditionalism, militarism, socialist economy, work ethic, collectivism, punitiveness – much like in the Adorno et al.'s conception, except that they included politico-economic conservatism instead of the socialist economy. Negatively associated with authoritarianism is the opposition to the socialist regime and support for international integration. Thus, authoritarianism appears to be strongly associated with the most politically salient ideological dimensions.

Prejudice scales are, in general, associated with ideological dimensions in a similar way as authoritarianism (not surprising given that authoritarianism is often seen as a dispositional variable that explains prejudice), though the coefficients are of smaller magnitude. The difference is that liberalism factors are better associated with prejudice than with authoritarianism. It could be speculated that the competitive view of economy facilitates seeing inter-group relations as a zero-sum game, in line with the realistic group-conflict theory of prejudice (Sherif 1966).

Although anti-Jewish and anti-Gypsy prejudice have parallel correlations, one interesting difference is that the anti-Gypsy prejudice is not associated with the regime attitude, while those supportive of the regime change are significantly less antisemitic, despite the low, though possibly increasing, salience of political antisemitism in Serbia (cf. Sekelj 2002b).

The group-based dominance scale proved close to what the entire SDO scale is supposed to measure. The other part of the scale is close to the socialist version of egalitarianism, as proved by its strongest coefficient of correlation – with the socialist economy factor. The remaining weaker associations are with collectivism, work ethic, militarism, nationalism, and traditionalism. The GBD subscale, on the

other hand, correlated with a larger number of ideological dimensions, with coefficients being generally parallel with authoritarianism but of lower magnitude. An interesting exception is its association with elitism, which it is more correlated with GBD than with authoritarianism, suggesting the correctness of the interpretation of the elitism factor.

Left-right self-identification is rather weakly associated with the primary ideological dimensions. But, the associations are apparently in the correct direction: the left-wing identification is associated with the socialist economy factor and the right with the regime change factor. It remained to be clarified in multivariate analyses whether its performance is influenced by the fact that the left (socialists) and right (radicals) appeared as the united force on the political scene in 2002.

Religiosity proved useful for validating the clericalism factor. Its other correlations are either low (traditionalism, nationalism) or insignificant. Analysis of the associations with age, education and income showed that older, less educated, and the less well off tend to be more nationalistic, traditionalist, militarist, collectivistic, and to favor the socialist economy. In several cases, education correlated with ideological dimensions but income did not. Thus, the better educated are somewhat more opposed to the socialist regime, are less collectivistic, and do not favor a strict work ethic. Income proved unrelated with the attitude towards the regime. Yet, it was associated with the less punitive attitudes while education remained not associated with this attitude.

The findings generally confirm the interpretation of the attitudinal mini-scales. The occasional deviations from those reported in the literature are generally accountable by the specific political-historical context. An obvious example is that support for the redistributive economy correlates with authoritarianism or that traditionalism correlates with left-wing identification. It is also clear that some attitudes, such as economic and general liberalism, as well as feminism and environmentalism, are poorly related with the criterial variables. It is true that their present operationalization is less successful than in the case of some other dimensions but it seems clear that these attitudes are not well-organized and integrated among the public.

## Political parties

Although the goal of the factor analysis was not the construction of dimensions that would be best able to differentiate parties, the isolated attitudinal dimensions differentiated supporters of different political parties. The most important is, however, that the interpretation of the attitudinal factors is in accordance with the obtained correlations with party preferences.

Preferences for DOS and DS are associated with the support for regime change and international integration, and, negatively, with nationalism, socialist economy, traditionalism, and militarism factors. The second group of parties, consisting of SPS and SRS, exhibits correlations in the opposite direction.. Thus, the constructed ideological factors very clearly divide the two opposed political blocs on the Serbian party scene. Consequently, part of the covariance of the ideological factors (i.e., affinity between specific ideological dimensions such as nationalism and the regime attitude) can be also attributed to the political sphere. Political divisions act as a source of attitude constraint, but it seems more at the level of association between the primary factors.

The third 'group' of parties is represented by DSS. Preference for this party is associated in some cases similarly with preferences for the 'regime parties', i.e., SPS and SRS. Thus, DSS sympathizers tend to be somewhat nationalistic, traditionalist, militarism, clericalist, non-environmentalist, and punitive. In these regards, the DSS resembles conservative parties worldwide. The difference, however, is that they are also supportive of the socialist economy. In addition, preference for DSS does not appear associated with the international integration and regime attitude factors. DSS seems to be in the intermediate position between the opposed blocs. Such results are partly explainable by the party's 'middle of the road' ideological positioning (middle of the road in the then Serbian context), and partly as a consequence of the shift of voters from both SPS and SRS, but more likely the former, towards DSS in the period after the 2002 elections. Thus, the arriving voters not only enabled the victory of the then opposition but also influenced the ideological profile of the DSS voters.

What is also important to note is the lack of association of liberalism, economic liberalism, and elitist attitudes with party support. According to various accounts (Kitschelt 1995, for example), the authoritarian former communists should be opposed by forces who believe in economic liberalism.

This does not seem to be the case in Serbia, at least on the level of voters. Economic liberalism in this sample does not correlate with the support for *any* party. It is possible that differences in these ideological dimensions between party elites are greater. It is not less difficult to assess the magnitude of the differences between the relevant policies they pursue or would pursue. What is clear is that at the time of the survey, these liberal ideological dimensions were not influencing party support.

Writing about Bulgaria, Kitschelt et al. concluded that "we can say that in Bulgaria the 'left' implies socio-economic protectionism and anti-liberalism, authoritarian and collectivist politics, nationalism and Bulgarian majority ethnic particularism." (1999, 240). The conclusion could easily be applied to the Serbian findings *if* the left is defined in terms of party preferences but not left-right ideological identification. The latter variable was correlated basically with the regime attitude and socialist economy primary factors and rather weakly with traditionalism and clericalism. The findings actually confirm the hypothesis about the curvilinear relationship between left-right dimension and nationalism in Serbia, as it can be seen in the graphs of ideological differences between political parties presented in the section with discriminant analysis. The relationship shows a kind of "J" shape in 1990 where the left is somewhat more nationalist than center and less than the extreme right, and changes into a more "U" shape curve in 2002 (compare Data source: ZA Study 2901, 1990).

Figure 4, Data source: ZA Study 2911, 1996.

Figure 6, and Figure 8).

In this context, it may be useful to briefly discuss Eysenck's extremism theory about authoritarianism and left-right ideology, namely that the extremists on this dimension are more authoritarian than the moderates (Eysenck 1954; Eysenck and Wilson 1978; Greenberg and Jonas 2003; Shils 1954). According to the results, there is no support for this model in the 1990 findings, since only the left-wing voters (SPS) obtained higher authoritarianism scores. The findings from 1996 provide some support: the Radicals became more authoritarian than the center, though about average comparing to the entire population. Finally, in the 2002 survey, both ends of the left-right spectrum proved to be more authoritarian than the center, thus providing support for the extremism theory. The conclusion, however, depends on the interpretation of what 'left' and 'right' mean in the Serbian political context. If ideological self-identification is taken into account, then SPS and SRS voters are on the opposite ends of the political spectrum. If party sympathies or the past record of coalition building is considered, the two parties are very close to each other. In regression analyses with party proximity as the dependent variables, the right-wing identification was associated with lower authoritarianism, since Radical sympathizers (as opposed to voters) lean towards leftist ideological identification. Regardless of these ambiguities, it is clear that lower authoritarianism was generally associated with parties promoting democratic political change.

### ***General Dimensions of Political Attitudes***

The second-order factor analysis is utilized to reduce the constructed attitudinal dimensions onto a smaller number of more general ideological orientations and to examine the responsible sources of attitude constraint on this level of generalization. For attitudes organized at this level of generality, it is more appropriate to label them as ideological dimensions, while the primary factors are better termed attitudinal dimensions.

The four-factor solution proved the most interpretable, thus retaining one more factor than the Scree test suggested and one factor less than the Guttman-Kaiser criterion suggested. Despite the relative weight of the first principal component, at least half of the initial scales had loadings below .40. Thus, the one-dimensional model was considered inapplicable. One of the major conclusions of this research is, therefore, that political attitudes in Serbia cannot be fully reduced to a single general ideological dimension.

#### **Socialist conservatism**

The first extracted and obliquely rotated second-order factor is bi-polar, with both positive (e.g., nationalism, militarism, traditionalism, socialist economy) and negative loadings (e.g., international integration, opposition to the regime). The factor is interpreted as socialist conservatism and corresponds to the authoritarianism versus (democratic) political reform division, very close to what Moreno hypothesized for transitional cases (Moreno 1999). One side of the dimension is well represented by the substantive content (e.g., nationalism) but the other side is defined more by the rejection of these attitudes than in clear substantive preferences, apart of the positive view of international integration and the desire for the regime change. The presumed democratic orientation is visible in the opposition to nationalist, militarist and other attitudes on the pro-regime side. In this regard, this ideological divide resembles early transitional divides in other cases of post-communist transitions where the regime party(ies) is opposed by broad 'umbrella' movements or fora, rather than by ideologically coherent forces and ideological options (cf. Berglund, Ekman, and Aarebrot 2004). This testifies to the decade long delay in political transition in Serbia.

Bi-polarity of the first second-order factor counters Kerlinger's (1984) model of independent and unipolar ideological dimensions at the top of the attitude structure. He hints about the role of political extremism in cases when bi-polarity is obtained, but in the present case it seems more to be the role of the heightened political polarization or conflict. In Serbia, and, perhaps in transitional cases more generally, politics tend to be much more polarized and conflictual (as predicted by Mair 1997), than in more stable democracies.

The socialist conservatism factor is strongly related with the included criterial variables, especially authoritarianism and the prejudice scales. Interestingly, it correlates with *both* SDO subscales *positively*. Thus, support for the authoritarian regime and anti-reform orientation in Serbia is at the same time egalitarian and supportive of group-based dominance. This reflects the heritage of the communist regime, which was both prescriptively egalitarian and relied on the dominance of a particular ideological group (the party). Initial applications of the SDO scale in the post-communist context revealed a similar 'anomaly' (e.g., Enyedi and Todosijević 2003). Perhaps egalitarianism concerns the in-group relationships and group-based dominance concerns the relationship with out-groups (cf. Duckitt et al. 2002).

This interpretation is corroborated by the fact that the socialist conservatism factor correlates with the left wing ideological identification. Socio-demographic correlates of this factor are not surprising: less educated, less well-off, and older respondents tend to be skeptical about the democratic political reforms. The hypothesis about the reluctance of the so-called 'losers of transition' to embrace the new regime thus received support in these findings (cf. Kitschelt et al. 1999; Berglund, Ekman, and Aarebrot 2004). Finally, the socialist conservatism factor strongly correlated with political party preferences. In particular, it strongly correlates with parties representing the opposed sides in the real-life political conflict over the regime change, again supporting Moreno's (1999) claims.

The first general factor is also rather close to the combination of authoritarian and economic-populist attitudes, obtained in Bulgaria by Markowski (1997). The negative pole of the Serbian factor, however, cannot be described, as in his case, as containing pro-market attitudes, since economic neo-liberalism does not load on this factor. It also cannot be clearly characterized as being libertarian,



because although traditionalism loads on this factor, other attitudes such as environmentalism, feminism, clericalism, punitiveness, are not associated with it. A closer look at Markowski's findings actually reveals a considerable commonality. Namely, he had only fifteen items in total, defining four factors, where the libertarian side of the first factor was represented by basically two items "for liberal individualism" and "for environmental protection". Another potentially relevant item ("moral restraints on mass media") loaded a different (third) factor. A pro-market orientation aspect of the first factor was represented negatively, by the item "against market opinion", while "support for fast privatization" also loaded the third factor (rural smallholders' liberalism) (Markowski 1997, 251, Table A5). Thus, it seems that Markowski gave a somewhat broader interpretation to the factors than their item content would allow. In general, it seems that the rejection of authoritarianism does not necessarily entail libertarian orientation, and the rejection of socialist economy does not imply wholehearted endorsement of economic neo-liberalism.

### Right-wing conservatism

The *first* second-order factor could be interpreted as the 'left-wing conservatism' or psychological conservatism because the content of this ideological dimension deviates from the standard conception of conservatism. Enyedi and Todosijević (2003) obtained a rather similar 'socialist conservatism' factor in Hungary. However, the second general factor is closer to the typical social conservatism factors obtained across political contexts (Wilson 1973a; Kerlinger 1984). It is defined partly by the same primary factors as the previous second-order factor, namely nationalism, traditionalism, and, to a lesser extent, by militarism. Unique for this factor are, however, high loadings of clericalism, punitiveness, collectivism and, to a lesser degree, liberalism. Presence of collectivism might seem surprising but we should recall that items defining this scale were initially intended to indicate classical conservatism and traditionalism. What really differentiates the two second-order factors is that the first factor is clearly associated with leftist orientation, given the high loading of the socialist economy factor, while the second factor with high loading of clericalism is much closer to traditional right-wing conservative ideology. An important difference is also that the second factor does not have the negative pole, thus making it similar to Kerlinger's (1984) conception of conservatism. In general,

most of the scholars dealing with attitude structure would not have problems in identifying this factor as a classical social conservatism dimension. It corresponds to Wilson's conservatism factor (1973a), Eysenck's R factor (1954), Kerlinger's (1984) unipolar conservatism factor, or Middendorp's attitudinal conservatism (1991a).

The right-wing conservatism factor has, in many respects, similar correlates as the socialist conservatism factor. The important differences are that conservatism factor correlates with religiosity and that this factor is not actualized in terms of the left-right political semantics. Consequently, the primary source of constraint would be socialization in religious tradition, yet a psychological basis of standard conservatism also plays a role (Wilson 1973a), though less than in the case of the socialist conservatism factor.

The socialist and right wing conservatives have a similar social profile (economically worse off, less educated, and older) – a profile of likely losers of transition. The message seems to be that those for whom the transition has been less than successful tend to feel nostalgic for the old system (the socialist conservatives), or endorse more traditionalist-religious views on politics (the right-wing conservatives). Similarly as in Hungary (Enyedi and Todosijević 2003), the differentiation between the obtained two conservatisms seems to be based more of symbolic identifications (with the communist past or religious membership), rather than on different economic interests. As a result, both dimensions have the same socio-economic structural roots (lower status), but still represent two basically unrelated ideological orientations. In the West, conservatism is more specific for the higher social strata, and includes the cults of the free market and self-reliance (although the connection between attitudes and status is also “low to moderate”, Ekehammar, Nilsson, and Sidanius 1989).

The Conservatism factor differentiates Koštunica's DSS, thus confirming the image of the party as being more traditionalist and socially conservative. The political opposition along this dimension in Serbia has yet to develop well. However, if the majority of actors become interested in dissociating conservatism from the socialist nostalgia, its political relevance may easily increase.

### Social order and hierarchy orientation

The highest loadings on the third factor belong to the two liberalism factors, followed by elitism and work ethic. Punitiveness, traditionalism, collectivism and nationalism are also significant variables, though to a smaller degree. It seems that a certain implication of the desirability or necessity of social inequalities is common for the highest loading attitudes. The liberalism scale implies inequality as a part of human nature, while economic liberalism justifies economic inequalities as supposedly reflecting economic laws. The elitism factor has similar implications – a view of the world as hierarchically organized with those more capable and deserving on top. The work ethic factor expresses negative view of those who do not work hard enough. Punitiveness fits this interpretation also well. Loadings of nationalism and traditionalism could also be incorporated in this interpretation. Hence, the factor is interpreted as orientation towards social order and hierarchy. This interpretation is corroborated by the fact that it correlates with group based dominance subscale of the SDO.

While this factor seems close to general liberalism (the European kind, i.e., the version associated with the right-wing politics), in addition to its individualistic component it also contains elements of collectivism. Perhaps it reflects a preference for strict social order and rules rather than openness for laissez-faire competition. Hence, the factor is associated with both the socialist and right-wing conservatism second-order factors. This interpretation is also supported by this factor's association with preferences for DSS and SPS. They seem to be parties most closely associated with the 'law and order' attitude. DS and DOS parties would imply challenge to order by their liberal orientation while radicals are challenging order from their radical-populist stance.

What is unusual about this constellation of attitudes is that it is associated with underprivileged economic background (lower education, income, and older age). One speculative explanation of this association, not unlike Lipset's (1959) explanation of working-class authoritarianism, would be that the underprivileged insist on order and hierarchy as a defense against what might appear to them as an anarchic and chaotic situation in a transitional society, a situation that leaves them clearly on the losing side. According to this interpretation, this factor would be far from liberal ideology, especially from economic liberalism which tends to both favor and be favored by the strata in favorable market

positions. Hence, this factor would appear as a consequence of the interaction of socio-structural and psychological sources of attitude constraint.

In many respects this factor is very close to the protestant ethic dimension described by various authors (e.g., Furnham 1990; Katz and Hass 1988). According to Verkuyten and Brug the protestant ethic ideology “is a hierarchy-enhancing ideology because it provides moral and intellectual justification for differences in status hierarchy and continued inequality among social groups” (2004, 650). The third factor, thus, could be seen as a functional equivalent to the protestant ethic dimension described in the western context. In the case of Serbia, it cannot be explained by reference to protestant cultural heritage, of course, but, rather, by a more universal socio-psychological foundation, such as authoritarianism.<sup>108</sup> The fact that this factor is correlated with the second factor (i.e., right-wing conservatism) corroborates their common roots, since the protestant ethic is generally thought of as a component of conservatism in the west. Thus, classical conservatism appears separated into one component associated with religiosity and traditionalism (factor 2) and another component based on (European) liberalism and ideology of self-reliance (factor 3). If DSS, the only party with distinctly higher scores on both of these dimensions, retains its conservative course and adopts economic self-reliance rhetoric, these two dimensions might further converge in the future.

### Post-materialism

The fourth factor was defined by basically two attitudes - environmentalism and feminism, with an additional lower loading of international integration. Hence, the factor can be interpreted as a post-materialist orientation, since it expresses a favorable view of the two ideologies central to the 'new politics'. It is weakly associated with the other second-order factors, criterion variables (e.g., egalitarianism) and party preferences (e.g., preference for DOS/DS). Political conflicts in Serbia are clearly not about post-materialist issues, unless belonging to a nation is included in the pantheon of post-materialist values.

The fact that Serbian political attitudes cannot be put onto a single overarching ideological dimension should not be taken as particularly unusual finding. In fact, the positive evidence of the existence of such a dimension is rare. As shown in the review of social-psychological literature, even Wilson's (1973a) conservatism factor is conceived as consisting of four rather independent sub-dimensions, while comparative research reveals a weak support for the strict unidimensionality hypothesis (Walkey, Katz, and Green 1990). The present findings might be seen as showing dissociation of different components of general conservatism. The first two factors already contain conservatism in their labels. Social hierarchy and post-materialism could also be conceived as components of general conservatism. Such findings are not unique. For example, Durrheim and Foster (1995) obtained four separate factors (inequality, religious conservatism, political and economic conservatism, and punitiveness) for South Africa, using a shorter and semantically narrower scale.

#### Sources of constraint on the higher level of generality

Implications of the obtained findings for understanding the sources of attitude integration at the higher level of generality are multiple. It is clear that the socialist conservatism factor is strongly associated with both the criterial variables and party preferences. Hence, this dimension seems to be constrained equally by the social structure, socio-psychological predispositions, and by political conflicts. In other words, we can observe several sources of constraint at work in this factor. Thus, the strength and persistence of the regime divide in the Serbian public and politics could be understood as a political division that coincides with specific socio-psychological predispositions among the electorate, which in turn has firm roots in the social structure. The political division appears to be an expression of different world-views.

Structure of the socialist conservatism factor clearly demonstrates the role of the contemporaneous political processes and political tradition as sources of attitude constraint. In western democracies, for example, nationalism is often opposed to preference for socialist measures in the economy.

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<sup>108</sup> In fact, Adorno et al.'s *The Authoritarian Personality* could be seen as a psychoanalytical complement to Weber's *The Protestant Ethics*.

Additionally, these two attitudes are unrelated or opposed in most post-communist cases. Socialists and nationalists in Hungary, for example, are clearly on the opposite sides of the political spectrum (Enyedi 2003). Thus, the specific Serbian political-historical context is evident here and could be interpreted in the sense of the heritage of patrimonial communism. According to Kitschelt et al., "Only in countries emerging from patrimonial communism with extensive clientelist networks and an absence of vigorous "bourgeois" nationalism before the advent of communism, such as Bulgaria, can post-communist parties successfully associate their appeal to themes of national autonomy and ethnocultural particularism." (1999, 239).

The remaining three second-order ideological factors appear less constrained by the political processes since their correlations with party preferences are either small or insignificant. Yet, their psychological existence seems to be 'real' enough and explainable in terms of psychological predispositions and socio-demographic background variables. This applies more to the second and third factors since the post-materialism factor is equally unrelated with both party preferences and criterial variables.

The second factor is more social and cultural in nature. It does not explicitly address political issues, but is rather based on socio-cultural themes (traditionalism, clericalism). It is, therefore, nearly identical with the conservatism factors obtained in studies explicitly dealing with social rather than political attitudes (Wilson 1973a). It seems that DSS has been in the process of actualizing the classical conservatism dimension.

The social hierarchy factor seems to be more psychological in nature, reflecting psychological disposition towards hierarchical social relationships. It is weakly associated with the background variables and is not related with the left-right identification. The post-materialist orientation appears to be closer to the pure attitude or opinion dimension since it proved difficult to establish its social and psychological correlates. This, of course contradicts the classical formulation of the post-materialist value orientation (Inglehart 1977), where it is seen as at least strongly associated with age. Again, the social and political context seems to be relevant for the obtained findings, but the role of more general values seems to be the clearest in structuring this factor. DOS and DS voters appear to

be somewhat more inclined towards post-materialist values. This would suggest the possibility for these parties/blocs to appeal to voters based on this ideological dimension in the future. Yet, given the weak structural and dispositional roots of this dimension, it is not clear that post-materialism could provide a firmer ground for stable political allegiances.

The first two factors are modestly positively correlated, thus demonstrating that there is some affinity between the left-wing and right-wing conservatism in Serbia. This reflects psychological affinity (both have very similar dispositional and background correlates), but also the alignment of the actual political forces. These two factors are also associated with the third factor. The common ground for the three factors could be sought for along the lines of the psychological theories of conservatism (e.g., Wilson 1973a). The findings are generally in accordance with one of the major hypotheses of the current research, namely that on a higher level of generality there should be more evidence of the constraining role of general (post-materialist in this case) values, psychological functionality, and salient political divisions and conflicts, much more than the logical constraint.

The obtained findings do not provide straightforward answers concerning Eysenck's (1954, 1975) hypothesis about different (psychological and socialization) roots of the major ideological dimensions. The crux of the problem is in the impossibility to separate socialization and personality effects by the applied methodology. In fact, the very conception of authoritarianism as a world-view rejects the strict division between personality and socialization. In Serbia, authoritarianism predicts both socialist and right-wing conservatisms (and the social hierarchy factor as well), thus suggesting their psychological foundation. However, authoritarianism also mediates the influence of social structure and, therefore, reflects broader socialization influences. In light of this reasoning, future research should try to differentiate between personality and socialization influences earlier in the causal chain, that is, among the factors that influence development of authoritarian world-view.

One of the major puzzles about post-communist political attitudes concerns the place of capitalist, inegalitarian attitudes vis-à-vis the other attitudes and political preferences. According to Kitschelt's model, pro-market orientations should be affiliated with cultural progressivism in the post-communist world. The present evidence is mixed in this regard. The structure of the first second-order factor is in

accordance with Kitschelt's hypothesis. Preference for socialist or protectionist economy is associated with cultural traditionalism and attitudes such as nationalism and militarism. These attitudes are opposed to the international integration factor – a factor which includes support for the opening of the market for international companies (i.e. elements of economic liberalism). Association of this general factor with authoritarianism, left-wing identification, and lower socio-economic status clearly resembles the coalescence of leftism and authoritarianism from the Kitschelt's early model (1992, 1995a).

The broader picture, however, is considerably more complex than the model. The right-wing conservatism factor is not at all socially libertarian; in fact, it is quite the contrary – it is unrelated with views of the economy. Thus, this factor is, in its structure and correlates, the same as conservatism in countries without a communist heritage.

The third second-order factor joins liberalism and economic liberalism in a dimension that is clearly based on competitiveness, hierarchy, and in-egalitarianism. But, at the same, time it is unrelated to the socialist views of economy, although it is slightly traditionalist on social issues. It also tends to be authoritarian, but it is not related with left-right identification nor with party preferences. Finally, the last general factor contains post-materialist attitudes, which are supposed to go along with other libertarian attitudes and preferences. Yet, this factor is independent of traditionalism, authoritarianism, left-right identification, and party preferences. It is not even associated with socio-economic status. Thus, while there is some tendency of ideological orientation to conform to Kitschelt's model, it involves only very specific attitudes, namely rejection of the socialist economy, leftist ideological identification, and cultural traditionalism associated with lower SES and age. More explicit economic neo-liberalism, more general liberal orientation, and post-materialist issues are basically unrelated with this dimension.

Perhaps, the dimension that conforms to Kitschelt's model owes much more to the salience of regime change and summary preference for the old regime's ideological baggage, than to the socio-structural specificities of the post-communist context as hypothesized by Kitschelt. That is, Kitschelt et al.'s model based on comparative research (1999) is closer to the present findings than Kitschelt's earlier



model (1992, 1995). Yet, despite the many similarities between the present findings and Bulgarian mass survey findings in Kitschelt et al. (1999), there are also fundamental differences. Namely, nothing like Kitschelt et al.'s first factor 'socio-economic protectionism versus market liberalism' or their second dimension of 'authoritarianism versus libertarianism' was obtained presently.

The inclusion of the rather broad set of criterial variables enabled the examination of different roots of constraint in these factors. It was discovered that despite their relative orthogonality, they share fundamental similarities. Most of the criterial variables have very similar relationships with the first three ideological factors, though the coefficients vary somewhat in degree. Major differentiating variables are, somewhat unexpectedly, left-right ideological identification which differentiates the socialist conservatism factor. The SDO subscales proved useful in clarifying the meaning of the social hierarchy factor. Thus, on the one hand, political attitudes in Serbia evade reduction onto a single overarching ideological dimension. Yet, on the other hand, the obtained relatively independent ideological dimensions tend to have very similar correlates. This is evidence of the weakness of the causes supposedly responsible for ideological or attitudinal integration at the highest level of the attitude hierarchy. In particular, there seems to be no clear evidence that basic or general values might be responsible for attitude integration at the highest level of generality, such as for example Rokeach's freedom and equality value quadrant.

The general findings about the sources of attitude organization have important implications for both cognitivistic and idiographic views of interattitudinal consistency (Conover and Feldman 1984; Converse 1964; Lavine, Thomsen and Gonzales 1997). It is clear that focus on exclusively cognitive connections between attitudes is bound to miss other sources of constraint, such as psychological functionality. Likewise, cognitive connections or "implicational relations" (Lavine, Thomsen and Gonzales 1997) are not necessarily terminal explanations. In other words, the question remains why some attitudes are seen as implicationally related. To answer questions like this, one would need to invoke political traditions, political actors, or ideological thinking – the factors addressed in the present research. In addition, findings that are interpreted as supporting "shared consequences model" of attitude integration (Lavine, Thomsen and Gonzales 1997) would also support the interpretation

that perception of shared consequences can be attributed to psychological functionality or ideological reasoning. Concerning the idiographic view of attitude consistency, arguing that “attitudes are organized within the cognitive systems of individuals on the basis of relatively idiosyncratic factors in addition to or instead of normative ideological considerations” (Lavine, Thomsen and Gonzales 1997, 736; see also Conover and Feldman 1984), the present findings show: attitudes are meaningfully structured on the level of population, is possible to examine sources of attitude constraint at the population-level; and it is possible to construct powerful explanatory models of individual differences in the individual’s endorsement of different ideological dimensions.

It is worth briefly discussing what dimensions were *not* obtained. First, neither positively defined liberalism nor libertarianism was among the isolated factors, nor was there much evidence of the economic liberalism as an independent more general ideological dimension in Serbia. In fact, no ideological dimension that could be unambiguously interpreted as expressing interests of socio-economic strata was found.<sup>109</sup> This observation is important given the emphasis on these dimensions in some of the hypothetical models of ideological opposition in the post-communist context (e.g., Kitschelt 1992, 1994; Kitschelt et al. 1999; Whitefield 2002).<sup>110</sup>

### ***Causal Model of Political Preferences with General Ideological Dimensions***

The constructed multivariate causal model with the second-order general ideological factors is able to explain a substantive portion of variance in preferences for most of the major parties in Serbia. It

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<sup>109</sup> It does not have to be economic liberalism, of course. It could, for example, be populist economic dimension (cf. Derks 2004).

<sup>110</sup> This is even more interesting given the fact that the public generally says that economic standard is the most salient/important issue of the day. For example, in 1990, some 41% of all respondents selected “Living standard and economic development” as the most important issue of the day – a far larger percentage than in case of any other issue (environmental issue came second, with some 16%). Similar situation was in 1995, when 38.2% chose these issues as the most important. In 2002, two thirds of all respondents chose economic problems as the most important issue, while the second most often selected issue was unemployment (14.5%). Source: author’s calculation on the basis of ZA studies ZA2903, ZA2910, and ZA 3893. These findings also contradict Moreno’s (1999) argument that issues that are the most salient should form the most competitive ideological dimensions.

applies especially to those parties at the extremes of the main political divide, that is, SPS and SRS vs. DOS and DS. The model works less well in the case of parties more or less off that main division – DSS and, at the time, SPO. The main finding is that, despite the many significant zero-order coefficients, only very few variables have significant *direct* influence on party preferences. Contrary to the sociological model of political preferences, the background variables basically did *not* have any direct influence on party preferences in Serbia in 2002.

The simplistic social-psychological model, which would argue that dispositional or mediating variables are directly relevant, has not received much stronger support. In fact, only the left-right ideological self-placement proved to be directly relevant. Controlling for the socialist conservatism factor, those identified with the left had more positive attitude towards SPS, while those identified with right are more positive towards DSS and, somewhat less consistently, towards DOS and SPO. Thus, ‘the regime’ division was based also on a broader ideological identification with left and right. In a similar model used in 1996, authoritarianism was a significant direct predictor of party preference (Todosijević 2004a). In 2002, and despite the salience of the so-called democratic-authoritarian division in the Serbian politics (Antonić 1998), authoritarianism was insignificant as a direct predictor. The same is true for the SDO factors. It seems that authoritarianism and other social-psychological dispositions, such as SDO, only become relevant when articulated through a particular salient political ideology or ideological orientation.

Among the four second-order ideological factors, three are virtually irrelevant for party preferences, apart of the direct path from the right-wing conservatism factor to the positive attitude towards DSS. This coefficient is in accordance with the image of DSS. It shows that the party has been attracting voters inclined towards right-wing conservatism.

Among the general ideological dimensions, the most important is that of socialist conservatism. It predicts preferences for both ‘the regime’ parties (SPS and SRS) and for parties of the ‘democratic opposition’, in different directions, of course. This single ideological factor captures virtually the entire direct influence on party preferences. In some cases (DS and SRS), this is the *only* significant

coefficient in the multivariate model. This ideological dimension was, without a doubt, at the core of the main political division in Serbia at the time.

The socialist conservatism factor has a relatively smaller weight in explaining preferences for DSS. This reflects the positioning of the party elite that was deliberately moved towards the center of the regime divide and, at the same time, apart from the main divide.<sup>111</sup> This strategy enabled the party to also attract those voters who were relatively less outspoken antagonists of the ‘regime’, and those former ‘regime’ supporters for whom the outright crossing of the huge ‘regime divide’ would be a too great leap both in political and psychological terms. Yet, while this strategy was successful at the time of the regime change, the subsequent electoral tests showed that the party was not able to retain many of its supporters, especially after 2002. Support for the SPO remained unexplained by the present model. This is the consequence of two factors: its marginal position in the political battle at the time and the party’s clearly charismatic appeal.

The model of political divisions in Serbia has substantial explanatory power, but it is also remarkably simple. The socialist conservatism factor deeply divides the two opposed political camps. Only two additional qualifications are needed: DSS was somewhat outside of this division and left-right ideological identification plays some role that is not entirely captured by socialist conservatism. Thus, the evidence reveals the single major bipolar division, with traces of the emerging, though still weak, additional dimension based on traditional conservatism and politicized by DSS.

The model explains some of the second-order ideological factors better than the other (37% of variance in the socialist conservatism compared to 5% in case of post-materialism). It is clear that the measurement issues play a role in the results. The first extracted factor is better defined and a more reliable measure than factors extracted later in the analysis. From the substantive point of view, it is important that factors that are relevant for explanation of party preferences are explained by the model rather well.

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<sup>111</sup> In the 2004 presidential elections, DSS presidential candidate Dragan Maršićanin, supported by DSS, G17 Plus, SPO, NS, campaigned under the slogan “Into the center, Serbia”.

At this stage, authoritarianism appeared as the most relevant variable with direct influence on the ideological dimensions, especially on the socialist and right-wing conservatism factors. Although left-right ideological identification had direct effect on party preferences, it is a much weaker predictor of ideological dimensions. In fact, it is really only relevant for socialist conservatism. Socio-demographic variables again showed a small direct effect. Religiosity is predictive of conservatism, while education is predictive of socialist conservatism. Thus, it can be concluded that in the second step of the causal model building, a particular dispositional variable, namely authoritarianism, appeared as the crucial variable. The findings provided a very modest support for the view that lower SES predisposes people toward resistance to regime change *per se*.

In the third step of the causal model building, it proved difficult to explain much variance in the left-right identification: only age and religiosity exhibited modest significant effects. Authoritarianism was much easier to explain. Age and education had rather strong effects, while income had a somewhat smaller effect. These conform to a wide range of other findings (e.g., Altemeyer 1988; Enyedi, Erős and Fábíán 1997; Schuman, Bobo and Krysan 1992). SDO factors remained largely unexplained. The obviously weak part of the model is that three out of four mediating or dispositional variables are not particularly well explained by the demographic variables. A more positive aspect is that the most crucial mediating variable, that is, authoritarianism, is strongly related with the basic socio-demographic indicators and functions as the mediator in the hypothesized causal chain.

Looking at the complete causal model, the obtained findings indicate that the major causal path goes from the socio-demographic variables, especially age and education, through mediating variables, in the first place authoritarianism, and then through more general ideological orientations, especially socialist conservatism, towards the party preferences. The model is surprisingly simple given the number of included variables and the number of possible relationships between them. The explanation is that it reflects the simplicity of the major political division in Serbia at the time of the survey. The idea of the fundamental divide between the two opposed political blocs was consistently cultivated throughout the 1990s and reached its peak in 2000 (cf. Antić 1998). Parties in opposition at the time referred to this as the divide between a 'democratic bloc' of parties and the so-called 'regime

parties' bloc. Parties in government at the same time referred to the same phenomena as a division between 'pawns of the west' and 'patriotic' parties.

The constructed model does not merely document this division – that would be hardly a particularly challenging task. The model actually *explains* the socio-psychological bases of this political alignment. It shows that the division was almost exclusively based on specific attitudinal-ideological orientation, namely on the attitude towards the regime, which includes lower-order dimensions such as nationalism, militarism, and rejection of international integration. The key ideological orientation i.e., the socialist conservatism is in turn based on specific socio-psychological dispositions, in the first place authoritarianism. Individuals with the authoritarian world-view were strongly inclined to endorse 'pro-regime' attitudes and to prefer the corresponding political parties. On the other side, authoritarianism appears to be a consequence of specific social conditions that impede development of broader social perspectives. This refers primarily to older age and lower education. Thus, the evidence shows that the major Serbian political divide can be seen as a consequence of the deep cleavage of world-views.

### ***Causal Model with the Primary Dimensions of Political Attitudes***

The second-order factors are complex constructs. The socialist conservatism factor, for example, includes not only the positive or negative attitude towards 'the regime', but also includes primary factors such as nationalism, militarism, regime attitude, negative attitude towards international integration, traditionalism, and positive view of the socialist economy. Hence, it is not a surprise that their components are not uniformly related with the explanatory and dependent variables in the model. The real question was which of the primary factors were *not* related with the dependent variable in the same way as their 'parent' factors.

The endeavor was well worth undertaking. Three primary attitudinal factors proved basically sufficient for the explanation of party preferences: the regime attitude, nationalism, and international integration primary factors. They are significant direct predictors in all four cases, with the exception that the last factor was insignificant in the case of SPS. Sympathizers of SPS and the Radical Party

tend to support 'the regime' and to hold nationalistic views. Radicals were also skeptical about Serbia's benefits of international integration. DS and DOS supporters are on the opposite side of these dimensions, i.e., they favor the regime change and Serbia's international integration and reject nationalism.

Preference for DSS is partly in accordance with preferences for the other 'democratic parties', such as in their preference for Serbia's international integration. In other cases, DSS supporters share their attitudes with SPS and SRS supporters, namely they tend to be somewhat nationalistic and not so negative about the Milošević regime.

There are several other significant relationships unique for specific parties, but they are generally of low magnitude. Thus, for example, support for SRS is related with the traditionalism and economic liberalism factors (in both cases negatively), while support for DSS is associated with opposition to environmentalism. The latter association suggests that this party attracts voters with materialist value orientation in Inglehart's meaning of the term.

In the case of preference for SPS, the regime attitude proved to be an especially strong predictor, while the coefficient for nationalism was considerably weaker. Hence, the support for the socialist party was very strongly rooted in the affirmative attitude towards 'the regime', and, to a *smaller* extent, in nationalism. In addition to the left-wing identification, support for the socialists was predicted also by authoritarianism. More detailed analysis showed that authoritarianism was directly contributing to the SPS support, in addition to its indirect influence through ideological orientations.

Particularly interesting findings concern those primary attitudes that loaded on the second-order socialist conservatism factor but remained irrelevant for SPS support: the socialist economy factor, international integration factor, traditionalism, and militarism. Thus, it seems that the support for the SPS is stripped of much of its potential ideological content. The socialist voters are not particularly favorable towards a socialist economy, militarism, or traditionalism, nor much against international integration. In other words, to predict one's support for the SPS, it is basically sufficient to know ones

degree of nationalism and attitude towards 'the regime'. Not surprisingly, the political order of the 1990s was identified with the reign of the Socialist Party.

Moreover, an interesting finding here is the negative association between traditionalism and support for the Radicals (although the zero-order association was positive and significant). When the relationship is examined controlling for a wide set of variables, its direction reverses. That is, Radicals appear as non-traditionalists. More detailed analysis showed that the control for the primary factor of nationalism is responsible for the reversal of this relationship. Hence, the often extravagant, indeed radical, rhetoric of the party leaders makes the party less attractive to the traditionalist voters who are more moderate on the nationalist dimension. It remains for further research to establish whether this result is a robust one since it might have important consequences for understanding the nationalist attitudes and support for the extreme nationalist parties.

The proportion of explained variance in the primary attitudinal factors varies greatly. What is important is that the model performs well with the most important attitudinal dimensions – nationalism, international integration, and the regime attitude. The crucial explanatory variables are clearly authoritarianism, education, and, to a certain degree, age. These findings corroborate the important role of the socio-psychological dispositional variables for explaining the primary ideological factors. Authoritarianism appeared as the major predictor of almost all ideological factors, but especially of those associated with party preferences.

Left-right ideological identification is relevant, especially for ideological factors that explicitly refer to the former socialist and/or Milošević's regime (the regime attitude factors, and the socialist economy factor). It is usually hypothesized that the left-right dimension should predict socio-economic issues (Kitschelt et al. 1999). The present evidence partly confirms the expectation: left-wing identifiers tend to be more in favor of a socialist economy. Yet, the coefficient for economic liberalism remained insignificant. As shown, left-right identification differentiates SPS voters. Serbian voters are still relatively unfamiliar with left-right semantics, and parties rarely use it for their self-description. The clearest exception was party JUL, where left-wing identification was explicit. Thus, the leftist identification of the SPS voters comes partly from its own ideological baggage and partly



through association with JUL. On the other side, none of the other parties has really attempted to explicitly identify with the right-wing. Even the Radicals explicitly identify themselves as Serbian nationalists much more often than as rightists.

The effects of the remaining independent variables are generally specific for particular ideological attitudes. Thus, for example, variables indicating religiosity are very important for predicting clericalism, as well as the work ethic factor. Income, age, and education are also relevant for a number of first-order ideological factors. SDO factors have considerably narrower influence compared to authoritarianism, but the obtained significant relationships are theoretically meaningful. The elitism factor is associated with the SDO group dominance factor, while SDO egalitarianism factor is linked with socialist economy and collectivism factors. It is interesting that the SDO factors are relevant in several politically dormant ideological factors (i.e., factors that are not directly related with party preferences). Perhaps these dimensions offer potential for political mobilization and development of relatively stable alignments.

When the causal model with the primary ideological factor is compared with the one based on second-order factors, it is clear that the socio-economic variables have influence on specific ideological orientations rather than on general second-order factors. Hence, it seems that the general dimensions are shaped or constrained more by political divisions, while socio-demographic milieu engenders rather specific attitudes. As a result, general ideological dimensions appear unrelated to the background variables. To the extent that political divisions shape the convergence of specific attitudes into more general orientations, it is possible that the building elements of those broader orientations have different relationships with socio-structural factors. This point has very important implications for the causal models of ideological orientations, especially for the interpretation of the sociological roots of political attitudes and beliefs. The point is close to Lipset's (1959) argument about the 'leftism' of lower classes in economic matters and their conservatism in social views (see also Derks 2004). Thus, if ideological views are measured at the most general level (e.g., an overarching left-right dimension) the existing relationships at lower levels may remain obscured.

Authoritarianism, by and large, mediates the influence of the background variables, especially age and education (cf. Altemeyer 1996).<sup>112</sup> From a theoretical point of view, the most interesting result is that social structure does not directly transfer into party preferences. The influence of background variables, according to the Serbian evidence, works via more general world-views. As Gabennesch (1972) argued, authoritarianism is a psychological reflection of particular social conditions marked by material and – especially – educational deprivation. The role of what here is termed ‘mediating variables’ is particularly strong in contexts where social structure is still not crystallized and where it is not easy to establish clear connections between particular economic interests, political actors, and policies. This suggests that the concept of disposition as “stable, individual level traits” (Zaller 1992, 22) is meaningfully defined in the present research, and that the heuristic value of such a construct is clear.

On the political level, the main cleavage can, to a certain extent, be interpreted as the conflict between the general principles of authoritarian or democratic rule, in agreement with Moreno’s (1999) predictions for transitional cases (see also Antonić 1998). This is despite the fact that attitudinal items explicitly dealing with democratic views either loaded on minor attitudinal factors which are basically irrelevant for party preferences<sup>113</sup>, or failed to converge with any of the extracted factors<sup>114</sup>.

The basic ideological markers of the opposing political camps are closely related dimensions of nationalism, regime attitude, and international integration. Examination of the item content, especially of the nationalism factor, shows that they clearly imply a degree of anti-democratic orientation, at least directed towards the out-groups if not towards the national in-group. The character of the actual parties at the opposed sides of the main political divide, and especially their policies, also corroborate the interpretation of this division in line with Moreno (1999) and Antonić (1998).

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<sup>112</sup> Authoritarianism, however, does not mediate the influence of religiosity, although this link seems to be well established in other political contexts (cf. Canetti-Nisim 2004).

<sup>113</sup> For example, the item “The country should be lead by the capable; the average should follow the lead”.

<sup>114</sup> An example is the item “There are some who should not be entitled the right to vote”.

Nonetheless, this division is not the only one evident in the obtained findings. First, the parties are not simply divided in the same two blocs according to the aforementioned three primary factors. The attitude towards international integration divides parties into an authoritarian and a democratic bloc (that is a pro-Western, and isolationist or pro-Russian). However, the division based on nationalism and the regime attitude does not completely coincide with the authoritarian-democratic division. Namely, DSS supporters appear in-between the two opposed blocs. In fact, scores on the nationalism factors are equally predictive of DSS support as of the support for the Radicals and Socialists. The results with the second-order factors suggest that the second division among the Serbian parties is close to the classical conservatism. Although this might be an indication of the problematic commitment of the DSS to the democratic rules, more likely and more optimistically, it suggests that nationalism in Serbia does not necessarily have to be undemocratically based.

Gijsberts and Nieuwbeerta (2000) concluded that in former communist countries, attitudes tend to be consistent with social background, but not with voting behavior. The present conclusion would be that, if the world-views are taken into account and attitudes (ideological orientations) are measured more comprehensively, the connection background-attitudes-voting becomes rather consistent. One important caveat is that the economic left-right dimension actually does not have the central place in the picture.

### ***Diachronic View on Political Divisions***

In many accounts of post-communist politics (Markowski 1997; Evans and Whitefield 1993) and of the Serbian case in particular (e.g., Sekelj 2000a; Goati 2002), nationalist and socialist orientations are given a very prominent role. Discriminant analyses were intended to provide a diachronic perspective on the role of these two orientations in differentiating the main political parties. Although in 2002 the socialist views of economy did not predict party preferences directly, this attitude, together with nationalism, participated in defining the major second-order ideological dimension, which is politically central (represented by the socialist conservatism factor). Still, the situation could have been different in earlier periods. Nationalism, especially in Serbia, is often seen as the central political

issue (Sekelj 2000a) or sometimes as the *only* issue that matters (Anzulovic 1999). Yet, its role has not necessarily been uniform over the years.

In this part of the analysis, dimensions of competition were examined in three periods: 1990, 1996, and 2002. The theoretical task was two-fold: (1) to examine whether the main political divisions could be interpreted in the sense of the cleavage of world-views, and (2) to examine the changing relationship between socialism and nationalism ideological dimensions. Causal modeling showed that ideological dimensions indeed can be interpreted as expressions of world-views, but the situation with dimensions of competition could be different.

The principal hypothesis, that authoritarianism should facilitate acceptance of socialist and nationalist attitudes, is based on the conception of the reified authoritarian world-view as implying the resistance to change, preference for order, obedience to rules and established authorities, negative attitude towards outgroups and foreign influences (Altemeyer 1988). Furthermore, it was expected that variables facilitating development of the reified view of the social world, such as older age, low education, should be accompanied by a higher level of authoritarianism (Gabennesch 1972).

Thus, the general expectation was that the discriminating variables should include structural variables predictive of authoritarianism, then authoritarianism itself, and ideological orientations expressing the authoritarian world-view (i.e., preference for the old socialist regime and ideas, and nationalism). Such dimensions should discriminate parties of democratic orientation from those endorsing socialist and extreme nationalist ideology. The second hypothesis argued that at the very beginning of competitive politics nationalism was less authoritarian than in later periods, since the established authorities were challenged from the nationalist perspective and especially because of radically different political style pursued by the then nationalist leaders and parties.

In all three periods, the discriminating variables are capable of strongly differentiating Serbian political parties. The first function in all three periods differentiated a single “big” party from the others. For instance, in 1990, on the one side of the socialism dimension was SPS, while the remaining parties spread along the function with the furthest being voters for Šešelj. In 1996, SPS

voters were opposed by a cluster of all the remaining parties, including the SRS. This was the opposition along the 'authoritarian socialism' dimension.<sup>115</sup> In 2002, the biggest group in the sample was DOS/DS voters. The first function, which incorporated socialist/authoritarian and nationalist attitudes, differentiated DOS/DS voters from the other parties, beginning with DSS voters holding approximately the average position, and SRS, SSJ, and SPS voters on the high end.

The main dimension of competition changed content from being purely about the socialist system to containing increasingly authoritarian and nationalist elements. The more the dimension contained nationalist elements, the closer the socialists and radicals were. The second dimension was relatively strong in 1990 and 1996. In both cases, they could clearly be interpreted as the nationalism dimension, with clear elements of authoritarianism and lower SES. In both years, the opposite ends were occupied by SRS voters at the nationalist end and DS/DSS voters among the non-nationalists. SPO voters, meanwhile, changed their position from the nationalist pole in 1990 to the modestly anti-nationalist side in 1996. In 2002, this dimension lost its connection with authoritarianism but became strongly associated with the right-wing identification and religiosity. Thus, as it became less politically relevant, it became closer to the right-wing nationalism of the 'usual' kind. Given the strong element of right-wing identification in this dimension, it is not surprising that it differentiated DSS and SRS voters from the socialist voters.

The more the major competitive dimension became complex in ideological content, the more uni-dimensional competition was. Thus, while in the western context left-right semantics aggregates positions on different issues, here different issues gravitate towards the authoritarian-democratic regime opposition, supporting Kitschelt et al.'s (1999, chapter 8) discussion of the 'anomaly' of the Bulgarian case where voters showed unexpectedly high level of attitude constraint.

As aforementioned, scholars dealing with political system features proposed that proportional systems favor multiple competitive dimensions (e.g., Karp and Banducci 2002). The present findings do not

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<sup>115</sup> It is worth mentioning that socialist orientation was *opposed* to the F scale in Middendorp (1991a), but that socialism and liberalism were also the opposed attitudes.

support this claim, given the Serbia's proportional electoral system and tendency towards unidimensional *competition*. It seems that Serbian parties have been competing by presenting themselves as better representatives on this dimension, rather than trying to politicize different dimensions.

The comparison of findings for the three periods revealed certain continuities, as well as changes in the relationship between authoritarianism and the two key ideological dimensions. Authoritarianism, together with the relevant structural variables, was consistently related with the strongest discriminant functions. Thus, the main political divides included different world-views, in addition to ideological and structural layers. Political divides structured in this way maybe do not qualify for the label of political cleavages, but they certainly do not lack width and depth.

When nationalist and socialist orientations were opposed, as proven by the first discriminant function in 1990, authoritarianism was related with the socialist orientation and negatively associated with nationalism, in accordance with the second hypothesis about the role of conventionalism. At the time, nationalism was too unconventional of an ideology to be related with authoritarianism. Vuk Drašković's extraordinary appearance and 'epic' rhetoric certainly were shocking to the more conventional public. To the extent that nationalism was pitted against the liberal opposition, as documented by the second discriminant function in 1990, authoritarianism accompanied nationalist attitudes.

In 1996, nationalism and pro-socialist orientation loaded orthogonal dimensions and authoritarianism was related with both dimensions. In 2002, nationalism and socialism converged into a common discriminant dimension together with authoritarianism. There, however, remained a trace of a right-wing nationalist orientation, without significant loading of authoritarianism, since it was contrasted not with the liberal opposition but with the few remaining socialist supporters. It suggests that nationalism of the DSS supporters is more traditionalist, conservative, and clerical, but not particularly authoritarian. Hence, authoritarianism participated in discriminating the main Serbian political actors in accordance with the main hypothesis: it converged with nationalism and with the pro-socialist orientation.

The second aspect of the main hypothesis demands that authoritarianism be rooted in specific social conditions. The findings strongly support this hypothesis. In all cases, high loadings of authoritarianism on a particular discriminant function were followed by significant loadings of variables such as older age and lower education. Education seems especially relevant in this regard (cf. Schuman, Bobo and Krysan 1992). Authoritarianism had significant projections on five out of six discriminant functions and, in all cases, education loaded significantly and in the opposite direction. This corroborates Gabennesch's ideas about the social roots of the authoritarian world-view.

Concerning the evidenced changes over time, the particular trajectory of the relationship between nationalist and socialist ideological dimensions deserves particular attention. In 1990, they were opposed - they correlated with the first function in the opposite directions. In 1996, they loaded on different orthogonal functions, where non-authoritarian democratic opposition was facing two authoritarian opponents - the nationalists and socialists. In 2002, the socialist and nationalist orientations finally converged into a single discriminant function, together with their common denominator, authoritarianism.<sup>116</sup> It is a rather unique feature of the Serbian delayed post-communist transition that nationalism and socialism converged so strongly into a single political dimension. This combination was understandable after years of SPS and SRS collaboration, and their joint opposition to the DOS government in 2002. These findings demonstrate the relationship between nationalist and socialist ideological orientations as elements of competitive political dimensions.

The so-called 'red-brown' coalition of SPS and SRS that developed by the end of 1990s was certainly reflected in mass attitudes by the coalescence of the nationalism and socialism dimensions. But, this is not something that has 'always' characterized the Serbian voters, as many writers on Serbia suppose. It is a result of a painstaking political process, initiated and guided by political actors. Yet, its mass acceptance was enabled by moving of the socialists in the nationalist direction and by the increasing economic populism of the radicals. The affinity between the two dimensions is based on their

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<sup>116</sup> Recall that from being virtually independent in 1990 and 1996, they became strongly correlated dimensions in 2002.

potential to appeal to the authoritarian tendencies on the individual level, while on the other side, the specific Serbian historic-cultural context allowed effective political mobilization on that ideological ground.

Šešelj and Drašković were the first to try a project of anti-communist nationalism in early 1990s. The project, however, if did not fail certainly was not successful enough to bring any of them to power. Thus, while Drašković forgot his previous extreme nationalism, Šešelj forgot his anti-communism. Koštunica may be thought of as having launched a similar project of non-socialist nationalism but it remains to be seen how successful it can be in electoral terms.

The correspondence of the ideological oppositions on the mass level and ideological conflicts on the level of party elites as outlined in the qualitative analysis, raises the question as to what extent the observed changes can be accounted for simply by agency (i.e., strategic maneuvers of party elites engaged in the power struggle). The presented findings cannot provide a complete answer to this dilemma but it is certain that these explanations are not an alternative to each other. Without negating the influence of party elites, it seems clear that there is more stability in the structure of the obtained discriminant functions than strictly in association of these dimensions with particular parties. For example, when SPO abandoned the extreme nationalist rhetoric, it lost some voters who opted for parties more in line with their socio-psychological profile. It seems that common socio-psychological ground made particular maneuvers more or less appealing to the specific sections of the electorate. Hence the apparent ease with which Serbian voters shift from the left (support for SPS) to the right (support for the Radicals).

The pervasive influence of age, revealed in both discriminant and regression analyses, suggests the relevance of the socialization experiences, just as in Inglehart's theory of value change. The difference is that the present model, in fact, operationalizes the dispositional variable that transfers the socialization experiences into the present, while in Inglehart's research program the accessed level in the need hierarchy remained hypothetical, while the presumed effect - the materialist or post-materialist value orientation - is the only construct really operationalized.



The present findings pose a challenge to speculate about the explanation of the prolonged weakness of the non-authoritarian democratic bloc in Serbia. According to Kitschelt's (1992) model, the strength of the libertarian-pro-market camp is dependent on the economic development since resource endowment is crucial for future market competition.<sup>117</sup> Indeed, the loadings of structural variables, such as age and education, show that potential "losers of transition" have been more ready to vote for the Radicals and the Socialists.

Several years later, Kitschelt et al. (1999) viewed the matter in a broader perspective. In their words, "Heritage of patrimonial communism is not favorable for the growth of market-liberal forces. The typically strong semi-reformed communists face the often disunited heterogeneous opposition, so the regime divide tends to persist as a major political division. Other potentially salient issues, such as ethnic divisions and socio-cultural authoritarianism tend to covary with this divide, towards "the super-dimension of left-authoritarian versus right-libertarian politics" (Kitschelt et al. 1999, 86). In a sense, the results obtained in Serbia are more in line with this expectation than what Kitschelt et al. (1999) obtained in Bulgaria. Yet, it seems that their generalized conclusions occasionally hide as much as they reveal about the post-communist condition.

Most importantly, the meaning of the terms chosen to describe ideological dimensions is always consequential and potentially controversial. For example, the meaning of "left" in Kitschelt et al.'s "left-authoritarian" label is very specific and different from what 'left' might mean not only in the West but as their own results show also in countries such as Hungary or the Czech Republic. 'Left' in Serbia and Bulgaria is very close to the preference for the regime vs. opposition (i.e., close to party identification and the regime division) and does not contain much other ideological content. 'Authoritarian' in their research is also very close to the preference for the socialist regime and therefore nearly synonymous with 'left', but it also includes 'socialist conservatism'. 'Right' means nationalism much more than libertarianism (this is not limited to the post-patrimonial cases). If there

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<sup>117</sup> Similar reasoning is expressed also in Kitschelt 1995a, Kitschelt, Dimitrov and Kanev 1995, and Kitschelt et al. 1999.

is some evidence of libertarianism associated with the right, it is in the rejection of the left-authoritarian side. Most attitudes that explicitly refer to market economy and social libertarianism are quite independent of each other, especially in the present results. It is certainly a peculiar definition of libertarianism if it does not correlate with attitudes such as clericalism, as is the case here, or in Bulgaria (Markowski 1997). In general, neither presently, nor in Markowski's (1997) Bulgarian results, does the rejection of authoritarianism necessarily entail libertarian orientation. Likewise, neither the rejection of socialist economy means wholehearted endorsement of economic neo-liberalism. In this sense, one can certainly speak of the lack of more general ideological constraints, though the pattern fits Kerlinger's model of independent unipolar dimensions.

However, it seems that neither Serbia's relative economic backwardness nor the more general heritage of the patrimonial communism can fully account for the Serbian results. It is difficult to overemphasize the importance of the then contemporary political processes and the feeling of threat they induced. The dissolution of the socialist Yugoslavia and secession of the other Yugoslav republics forced the national issue to the foreground. Nevertheless, this process was certainly helped by the ability of the leaders of the authoritarian bloc to appeal to specific socio-psychological features of the electorate and secure stubborn support despite obvious economic and other hardships. At the same time, it also shows the inability of the more democratically oriented leaders and parties to adjust their rhetoric to the sensibility of larger segments of the electorate.

The relevance of psychology-based world-views is clearly seen in crisis situations. During the 1990s, all social strata suffered, yet the popularity of the SPS remained high. Only when the zigzags of the party elite and the military defeat undermined the image of the SPS as credible and effective representatives of any orientation did the voters start to desert. The implication being that leaders can secure stubborn popular support even in the face of economic hardships, as long as they manage to appeal to the psychological tendencies or world-views of significant portions of the public. They can do that as long as they are not seriously challenged in that regard. The rhetoric of the so-called 'democratic opposition' has often been packaged in an elitist framework, making it very hard for masses not only to identify with them but also to even pay attention to the policies they promised to

pursue. The derogatory tone in which they often spoke of their political opponents, and even of voters on the other side of the divide, certainly made it difficult for voters to find sufficient reasons to abandon their initial positions.

### ***Cleavage Politics: The Serbian Lessons***

Theoretically, a particularly important question is to what extent the political divisions outlined in the previous sections could be conceived in terms of the cleavage theory. At the initial stage of political pluralism in Serbia, the communist heirs faced anti-communist nationalists. The situation was therefore similar to most of the other countries in the region, but the anti-communist side was too weak and disunited to win the first pluralist elections in Serbia. The early conflict between SPS and SPO testifies to the presence of this cleavage. In subsequent elections, SPO continued insisting on the anti-communist rhetoric but with evidently limited public response.<sup>118</sup> Thus, this cleavage did not prove strong enough to mobilize voters for the initial regime change.

The ethnic cleavage comes closest to the Rokkan's cleavage concept, including clear group boundaries, institutional encapsulation, and distinct group identity. Its importance in Serbia has been clear from the beginning. Even if Kosovo is disregarded, since it is a case of secession, ethnic divisions still play a significant role in Serbian politics. Parties of national minorities do exist in Serbia; they have had representatives in the Serbian parliament, and control virtually all votes in their subgroups (cf. Todosijević 2002). On the local level, the minority parties are in control of self-governments in regions where they are concentrated. In Serbian and Federal parliaments they have typically been in coalition with parties of the democratic bloc. Beyond that, their role in structuring the national party system is modest, since the two most relevant minorities (i.e. Magyars and Muslims

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<sup>118</sup> After all, most of the anti-communist politicians and MPs were members of the Communist Party, including the SPO leader Vuk Drašković, and many of them held important offices.

of Sandžak) are numerically relatively small and none of the major Serbian parties obtains any significant proportion of votes from minorities (Goati 1996, 131).<sup>119</sup>

This issue, however, extends into several other manifestations of the centre-periphery cleavage such as the issue of state centralization. The Socialists and the Radicals are on the one side of this issue, favoring state centralization, while minority parties and regionalist parties, especially from Vojvodina, have been strongly in favor of decentralization and more extensive territorial autonomies. The other major parties are in-between these extremes. Regionalist parties managed to receive some electoral support in their own right, not only through broader opposition coalitions.<sup>120</sup> Regional differences are observable in general patterns of voting as well.<sup>121</sup> Throughout the 1990s, the socialists were more popular in central and southern Serbia than in Vojvodina. This line of division coincides to a certain extent with the rural-urban division and with the ethnic composition of the population.<sup>122</sup> In regions populated by Serbs who experienced more open ethnic conflicts, such as regions bordering on Kosovo, or Srem in Vojvodina, the extreme nationalist candidate, Vojislav Šešelj, received the strongest support.

The definition and measurement of the socio-economic cleavage is always a complex task in the post-communist context. In Serbia, this divide is not manifested in the classical shape as the conflict

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<sup>119</sup> The minority support is, however, very important in presidential elections, especially under conditions of low turnout, which has been the rule in Serbia in the 2000s.

<sup>120</sup> For example, coalition *Vojvodina* had two representatives in the Federal parliament after the 1996 elections and four representatives after the Serbian parliamentary elections in 1997.

<sup>121</sup> Due to methodological limitations, regional differences were not analyzed. This remains an area for future research.

<sup>122</sup> In regions where national minorities are concentrated, the DS candidate Miroljub Labus won a majority of the votes in the first round of the presidential elections on 29 September 2002. For example, in Kanjiža where Hungarians are an absolute majority, Labus won more than 80% of the votes, while his national result was about 27% (*Subotičke Novine*, No. 40, 4 October 2002).

between capital and labor.<sup>123</sup> It is manifest on the ideological level, such as attitudes towards privatization or protectionism. It is clear that at the elite level Socialists and the Radicals favor protectionist policies, while the democratic opposition has been for economic reform and privatization. Under the Socialist government, the state played a very extensive redistributive role, as most of the large firms were under direct state control. The economy was probably more centralized than during the times of socialist self-management.<sup>124</sup> If the Radicals disagreed, it was because they demanded more egalitarian and less corrupt redistribution. On the level of rhetoric, however, the economic issue has been mainly framed as a valence issue – who is better able to provide the expected economic benefits for the society. Yet, on the mass level, the economic liberalism apparently remained irrelevant for political preferences in 2002. Clarification of economic interests associated with different social strata and their transfer into political divisions remains, of course, as a possibility.

Throughout the 1990s, the deepest division on the party scene in Serbia has been that between authoritarianism and democracy, often represented by the parties involved as the struggle between the good and evil. This cleavage replaced the original and apparently not too deep pro- versus anti-communist division. Although the authoritarianism-democracy cleavage has a long history in Serbian politics (Antonić 1998), the presented evidence showed that it is based more on values and worldviews than on conflicting interests of different social categories. Even to the degree that the major structural variables work, they do not work because of organizational encapsulation or closure of relevant social groups. Thus, in the context of ‘flattened societies’ (Wessels and Klingemann 1994), the formation of politically relevant groups may be based more on values and worldviews than on social categories, even though there is a strong connection between them. Social structure exhibits

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<sup>123</sup> AntoniĆ (1998) calculated the so called Alford index of class voting in Serbia for data from 1996 and found that it was extremely low (approximately 1), suggesting that workers did not give disproportional support to parties of the ‘Left Coalition’.

<sup>124</sup> SPS stopped privatization by law in 1996 (Antonić 2000, 608–9). It was estimated that approximately 85% of basic capital remained under state ownership (Goati 1996, 19).

its influence through particular worldviews rather than explicitly through ideologies expressing group interests.

Multivariate analyses of party preferences showed that preference for authoritarian political options was tied to personal authoritarianism. Authoritarianism as a personality or attitudinal dimension has frequently been used for explaining anti-democratic political preferences (e.g. Adorno et al. 1950; Altemeyer 1988; Canetti-Nisim 2004). Already the first studies of multipartism in Serbia showed significant differences in the degree of authoritarianism between supporters of different parties (e.g. Mihailović 1991). Authoritarianism presently conceived as a general worldview (Gabennesch 1972) proved to be a very influential variable. The divide between the authoritarian and democratic blocs was, thus, not only political and ideological, but also psychological and cultural. Political immobilism in Serbia during the 1990s can at least partly be explained by the depth of this division and by the impossibility – both for voters and politicians – to cross the border between the two positions. The strength of the division, or the extreme political polarization, was reinforced by the fact that it mostly coincided with a number of basic socio-structural categories such as age and education, and with most of the important specific ideological dimensions, such as nationalism or the attitude towards the international actors. In 2002, the model explaining party support was very simple: the same predictors were valid for authoritarian and liberal-democratic parties; only the signs of the coefficients were different.

Following Mair's (1997) speculation about the post-communist condition it was expected to obtain evidence of ideological instability, strong polarization along the main ideological dimension, and weak and unstable connection between party preferences and ideological orientations. The actual evidence revealed a number of changes between 1990 and 2002, but they do not seem like 'fluctuations' but rather as slow changes in a particular direction: the alignment of nationalist and socialist views and at the same time the separation of nationalism in 2002 between DSS and SPS-SRS. The expectation of strong polarization along the main ideological dimension is certainly confirmed. The third Mair's hypothesis was not supported. In fact, the connection between party preferences and ideological orientations is very strong, especially for the first second-order factor and

some of its first-order attitudinal components. The connection is, however, weaker for the other ideological dimensions.

Finally, it is worth mentioning the cleavages that appear not to be relevant in Serbia. This applies to the rural-urban aspect of the economic cleavage, for example. Although there have existed several parties that tried to appeal to agrarian interests, they remained basically irrelevant as political actors on their own. This does not mean that there are no urban-rural differences in voting patterns. It was found in a number of studies that peasants/farmers disproportionately supported the SPS (Antonić 1998; Mihailović 2000). After all, the democratic opposition was, for the first time, victorious in the largest urban centers in the local elections of 1996. This only means that no influential party builds its support on a successful appeal to agrarian interests. Similarly, the state-church, or religious-secular cleavage, has not played any significant role in party politics in Serbia, unlike its role in Western Europe (Knutsen 1988).

#### Parties and cleavages in historical perspective

An important question is to what extent there is a historical continuity of cleavages in Serbia, either in terms of the connection between contemporary and historical political parties, or in terms of relevant issue dimensions. There is, of course, continuity between the communists prior to the Second World War and contemporary SPS, but the difference between the small, often illegal revolutionary party and its distant offspring in the 1990s, is huge. The connection is historical and symbolic rather than institutional or even ideological.

The Democratic and Radical parties also have predecessors in earlier periods of pluralist politics in Serbia. However, none of them have exploited the connection, although the Radicals occasionally stressed their ideological affinity with the Radical Party of Nikola Pašić.<sup>125</sup> Despite the lack of the institutional continuity, the DS and the SRS are both surprisingly close to their historical namesakes. The old Radical Party – while playing an important democratizing role in Serbia – was nationalist and

populist, just as its modern successor (cf. Stokes 1990). The Democratic Party was liberal, elitist, and urban also before the Second World War.

Continuity of cleavages is more interesting than institutional continuity. First of all, state and nation have been on the agenda in Serbia for nearly two centuries. In brief periods of democratic rule, the issue has been politicized in a way reminiscent to the 1990s. The conflict between the authoritarian and democratic blocs is by no means new to the 1990s; it was equally dominant and salient in the 1920s (Antonić 1998). The social forces mobilized by the opposing camps also testify to a high degree of continuity. The authoritarian parties of the inter-war era could rely on support from the ruling political elite, the capitalist elite connected with the state through concessions and other privileges, the military elite, parts of the administrative and academic elites, and lower social strata with negative attitudes towards marketization such as smallholders, unqualified workers and the upper-age brackets (Antonić 1998).

Ethnic cleavages have characterized Serbia since it became a multinational state (i.e. after the Balkan Wars, and even more since the First World War). National minorities gained parliamentary representation in the 1920s just as in the 1990s. But there are also some structural differences between the two time periods worth highlighting. Most notably, in the 1920s, all major parties had to rely on peasant votes, since peasants constituted a vast majority (around 90%) of the population. There were very few large landowners – only some four per cent of land was in estates of 100 hectares or more.<sup>126</sup> Therefore, the situation was more favorable for populist politics than for the development of strong agrarian cleavage.

In the 1990s, the social structure was more differentiated and, in a way, more favorable to the liberal-democratic bloc (a high level of education, a larger service sector, and a relatively small agricultural

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<sup>125</sup> Šešelji's Radicals are only one of many parties with 'Radical' in their name to claim ties with Pašić's Radical Party, but the other parties are generally very small.

<sup>126</sup> Quoted in AntoniĆ 1998; 71.9% of the land was in possessions smaller than 5 hectares (Grbić 1991).



sector).<sup>127</sup> In the 1920s, the working class was a rather insignificant social force and in the 1990s, workers were employed by the state more often than by private owners. In spite of the growing number of industrial workers, the classical capital/labor, left-right cleavage does not dominate the political party system. The question remains whether this is because the time is not yet ripe, or, perhaps, the time is past.

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<sup>127</sup> However, Serbia (with Montenegro) still has a substantial rural population (48% of the population in 2000), larger than in 'Visegrad Four', or even in the 'Balkan six' countries (average for Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Romania) (IMF Country Report No. 02/103, May 2002).

## Conclusion

### About the structure and constraints

Political attitudes among the general public have often been portrayed as incoherent and disorganized. The situation is supposed to be still worse in the post-communist context due to various aspects of the 'triple transition'. These considerations, however, apply to the more general levels of attitude integration. At the more basic level, attitudes are supposed to converge due to their semantic similarity or logical constraints in Converse's terminology. However, the lack of convergence of primary factors into a small number of general dimensions would not be surprising, especially in cases that belong to the patrimonial communism group (cf. Kitschelt et al. 1999).

The main conclusion is that the Serbian public passed Middendorp's test of "thinking ideologically", since the political attitudes definitely show "a degree of interrelatedness - along one or a few dimensions - which can be meaningfully interpreted" (Middendorp 1991a, 60-61). The hypothesis about the multidimensionality and the hierarchical structure of political attitudes in Serbia, such as postulated in Eysenck's (1975) Wilson's (1973a) or Middendorp's (1991a) models, is supported. Political attitudes at the most general level vary along four relatively independent dimensions: socialist conservatism, right-wing conservatism, social order and hierarchy orientation, and post-materialist orientation. The socialist conservatism dimension is defined by six primary attitudes: nationalism, militarism, socialist economy, rejection of the international integration, affirmative attitude towards the Milošević regime, and traditionalism. Primary attitudes that define right-wing conservatism include the clericalism factor, collectivism, traditionalism, punitiveness, and nationalism. The social order and hierarchy general ideological dimension includes primary attitudes such as the economic liberalism, liberalism, work ethic, elitism, and punitiveness. The post-materialist ideological dimension is based on environmentalist and pro-feminist attitudes.

The results of the initial factor analysis and attitudinal mini-scales construction clearly demonstrate the role of semantic similarity or 'logical constraint' (Converse 1964). Virtually all the primary factors contained semantically close items. Particularly clear examples include the following: feminism,

clericalism, international integration, and environmentalism. However, the primary factors showed the work of other sources of constraint as well. This refers primarily to the constraint coming from societal and political traditions, and from contemporaneous political divisions, but also from psychological functionality. Thus, for example, the convergence of the militarist, nationalist, and attitudes about the Milošević regime into a single primary factor is attributable to the contemporaneous political processes.

The initial hypothesis that second-order factor analysis will not converge into a small number of general dimensions is only partly confirmed. The evidence demonstrates a rather strong constraint at this level, especially in structuring the first second-order factor. A relatively large number of logically unrelated primary attitudes converged into a well-integrated higher-order ideological dimension of socialist conservatism. On the one hand, socialist conservatism is ‘functionally similar’ to the conservatism from Wilson’s (1973a) studies, in the sense that it can be interpreted as having psychological roots in the fear of uncertainty. On the other hand, it very closely corresponds to ideological differences between the two main opposed political camps in Serbia over the past 15 years. Moreover, the division is not just between different issue positions and political preferences. It also concerns different political regimes and rules of the political game. The content of this dimension is close to the authoritarianism-democracy division (Moreno 1999) and related transitional cleavages (cf. Berglund, Ekman, and Aarebrot 2004). This finding corresponds to the unexpectedly high constraint on the mass level obtained in Bulgaria by Kitschelt et al. (1999). In their case, the finding was a deviation from their theoretical expectations, interpreted with reference to the salience of the regime change issue. Yet, the interesting question is whether such findings, now obtained in another similar case, are better seen as theoretical deviations or should rather be incorporated into the theoretical framework. One area to explore is to search for the explanation of what makes regime change more or less salient. It would probably require still more subtle differentiations of the communist regimes according to the degree of legitimacy they enjoyed among the public. Regime change can remain salient for a long time only if a substantial proportion of the population is not wholeheartedly attracted to the ‘democratization project’.

Nevertheless, the hypothesis that “the salience of the regime change issue acts as a center of gravity for many other more or less related issues” (Kitschelt et al. 1999) is supported. Additionally, the more specific hypothesis that the regime change and the national issue are at the core of the social and political conflicts in Serbia and accordingly shape the mass ideology is also supported. It was hypothesized that nationalism should have a very important role in structuring political attitudes and political divisions due to the specific events in recent Serbian history, but also following Evans and Whitefield’s (1993) reasoning about ethnically divided societies. Although nationalist attitudes are well organized basically wherever they are analyzed (e.g., Thurstone 1934; Marjoribanks and Josefowitz 1975; Kosterman and Feschbach 1989) the present findings confirmed the specific hypothesis that nationalist attitude is a bipolar dimension and, politically, highly divisive.

The hypothesis about ideological coloring of the regime divide is also confirmed (following Moreno and Kitschelt et al. 1999). In addition, discriminant analyses showed the decreasing political role of the attitude towards socialism from 1990 to 2002. At the same time, the evidence showed the convergence of nationalism and socialism over time – the convergence enabled by specific historical background (cf. Kitschelt et al.’s 1999 arguments based on the Bulgarian case). The findings show that the convergence was led by political parties, but it was based on the appeal to the socio-psychological predispositions underlying both orientations. Serbia had relatively weak nationalist-clerical anti-communist opposition in 1990, so the support for the socialist ideology was not only *politically* conservative but also expressive of psychological conservatism. Hence, the somewhat unusual combination of socialist views with traditionalist orientation and other components of classical conservatism became possible (though economic liberalism is clearly not a part of this combination).

The existence of other general ideological dimensions is evident as well, though they should be interpreted as ideological syndromes rather than intellectually consistent ideological doctrines (see Derks 2004). Nonetheless, they point to additional sources of attitude constraints. The right-wing conservatism factor points towards the role of socialization (religiosity) and of the additional

dimensions of political competition (traditionalist DSS against more secular and cosmopolitan views of the other 'democratic' parties).

In 2002, positions of the opposed political camps were clear and crystallized along the socialist and right-wing conservatism factors. The remaining two general ideological factors, the social hierarchy and post-materialism factors, lack the political relevance, thus confirming one of the initial hypotheses, namely that not all ideological dimensions are politicized. These two factors seem to represent the evidence of psychological and, perhaps, value constraints on the higher level of generality, when causes that would integrate more general but logically diverse attitudes are weak. The general conclusion is that politically relevant attitudinal dimensions are better integrated than those that remained outside of the main political division. Thus, any across the board generalization about whether attitudes are constrained or not is bound to be misleading.

#### About the causal model

While political attitudes in Serbia cannot be fully reduced to a single ideological dimension, political competition is much more uni-dimensional. Separate ideological dimensions correlate in a similar way with party preferences, showing concurrence of several distinct attitudinal dimensions with the single major political division.

Among the higher-order ideological dimensions, the socialist conservatism factor is, by far, the major predictor of preferences for virtually all included political parties. However, not all of its first-order attitudinal components are equally relevant. The socialist economy, traditionalism, and militarism factors lost virtually all of their predictive power when their relationship with the party support was controlled for the other primary ideological factors and background variables.

As a result, the ideological and attitudinal differentiation of party supporters appears extraordinarily simple. The primary ideological dimensions that matter are nationalism, international integration and the regime attitude. The pattern is further simplified by the fact that these factors are relevant virtually for all major Serbian parties. Moreover, coefficients for the 'regime parties' tend to go in the same direction, while coefficients for the 'democratic bloc' parties go in the opposite direction. The

exception here is DSS. Its supporters are similar to the supporters of the 'democratic parties' on the international integration dimension, but are more like the constituencies of the 'regime parties' on the dimension of nationalism.

Another important conclusion is that once the key ideological dimensions are taken into account, the social-psychological and socio-demographic background variables exhibit very little direct effect on party preferences. Hence, Kitschelt's et al.'s conclusion that "With regard to social structure, the message is always that it has no direct impact on party preference, but works indirectly through issue opinions and left-right self-placements " (1999, 278; see also Thomassen 2004) could be applied to the Serbian case. Note, however, that my study specified the underlying causal mechanism in a more detailed way and gave a smaller role to left-right identification.

On the more theoretical level, the question is what explanatory model of the post-communist political preferences is best supported by the present findings. Partial analyses of the same data could be easily used to support different models – whether based on sociological or psychological causal factors, or based on political actors. Thus, for example, zero-order correlations, or multivariate models with socio-demographic variables, would clearly support the simple sociological model. It would not be difficult to construct a model where the potential 'winners of transition' support regime change and democracy, something close to Kitschelt's models (1995a; Kitschelt et al. 1999). Yet, as typical for sociological models, the gap between 'background' and the political behavior in question would remain unaccounted for and probably explained away by various presumed rather than explicated mechanisms.

The present data also support socio-psychological explanation. Much of the variance, in fact, can be explained by authoritarianism alone, so the decisive influence could be attributed to personality factors (cf. Mihailović 1991; Šiber 1991; Kuzmanović 1995). The link between personality and political behavior would still remain unexplained, as well as the fact that 'personality' varies with socio-economic background.

Similarly, an explanation based on ideological commitments would certainly be empirically confirmed. However, without placing ideological commitments in the more comprehensive causal framework, any such explanation would be incomplete. As Hitlin and Piliavin argue, “we do not choose value commitments for ourselves” (2004, 364). The present findings clearly show that the complete model is not only theoretically more meaningful, but also, in purely statistical terms, outperforms the separate sociological, socio-psychological, and attitudinal models.

The present model gives a more complete picture, in which one can see the role of different partial explanations, without overemphasizing any of them, and with explicated links between different explanatory levels. Thus, socio-economic background appears the most relevant in shaping particular broad world-views, as captured by the present operationalization of authoritarianism. There is little direct effect of the background variables onto ideological orientations and political preferences. Yet, their effect on ideological orientations is such that it is more visible when the focus is on narrower, more specific attitudinal dimensions, than on more general ideological orientations. Socio-psychological dispositions do not shape political preferences directly. Their effect disappears if one controls for ideological or attitudinal orientations. An authoritarian world-view predisposes one for accepting and expressing specific attitudes, such as nationalism, traditionalism, and attachment to the familiar political regime. Attitudinal and ideological orientations lead directly to political or party preferences. Political attitudes appear not as the explanation, *per se*, but as a part of the complex causal chain. Speaking about values, but their reasoning is equally applicable to attitudes, Hitlin and Piliavin rightly argue that “behavioral explanations are unconvincing when the process that generates values is unknown” (2004, 360).

Often, analysts are focused on the examination of the behavior of political actors (i.e., political parties and leaders) and on speculation about their presumed interests and intentions as motives of their action (e.g., Anzulovic 1999; Cohen 2002; Stevanović 2004). The qualitative review of Serbian politics presented here accounts for the processes among the political actors as they are generally perceived. The limit of the exclusive focus on elite politics is obvious once the question about the connection with mass politics is posed. A solution, as exemplified in the present research, might be in

both designing and interpreting quantitative survey data with reference to the social and political context.

### The politics of world-views

One of the main hypotheses in this dissertation argues that the basis for political divisions in Serbia has neither been simply ideological in nature nor simply based on social structure. Elaborating on Gabennesch (1972), it is argued that socio-structural position shapes particular world-views, represented here by a specific dispositional construct, namely authoritarianism. The world-views then find their expression in specific ideological orientations, and, consequently, in corresponding political preferences.

An important finding for the present explanatory scheme is that social-structure consistently covaries with a more general world-view. As Gabennesch (1972) argued, authoritarianism is a psychological reflection of particular social conditions, marked by material and - especially - educational deprivation. At the same time, authoritarianism is a construct that is clearly linked with individual psychology (Adorno et al. 1950, 759; Butler 2000; Heaven and Bucci 2001; Schlachter and Duckitt 2002). Essential for the conception of authoritarianism as a world-view is that it has very broad consequences, including ideological orientations. In the present research, it correlated with virtually all primary attitudinal factors – this certainly corroborates its interpretation as a dispositional variable because its effects are broad. Authoritarianism is, of course, not the only politically relevant disposition, though in the present model it proved much more influential than social dominance orientation.

Multivariate analysis of party preferences in 1990, 1996, and 2002 showed that preference for authoritarian *political* options was tied to authoritarianism as an individual difference variable. The divide between the authoritarian and democratic blocs was not only political and ideological, but also psychological and cultural. Political immobilism in Serbia during the 1990s can, at least partly, be explained by the depth of this division and by the impossibility to cross the border between the two sides.



The political effect of individual authoritarianism depends on specific circumstances. The political role of such individual-dispositional variables is particularly strong in contexts where it is not easy to establish clear connections between particular economic interests, political actors, and policies. In the context of “flattened societies” (Wessels and Klingemann 1994), the formation of politically relevant groups may be based more on values and world-views than on social categories, although there is a strong connection between them. Moreover, particular social and political conditions may determine the ‘attraction’ between dispositions and political ideologies. One of the factors that modifies the political role of socio-psychological dispositions is the extent in which the external factors favor concentration of authoritarianism-relevant political options into a single political dimension. Serbia appears as an especially interesting case in this regard. Conventionalism of the authoritarians favored their pro-socialist orientation, while an authoritarian emphasis on in-group vs. out-group divisions soon brought them to the nationalist side. Thus, the real-life social and political processes favored homogenization of authoritarianism both politically and on an intra-individual level. In most other post-communist cases, nationalists and former communists were on different sides of the political divide. In Hungary, for example, authoritarianism has been characteristic of both the former communists (older age, lower education) and the re-emerged traditionalist, clerical and nationalist conservatives but these two camps were in deep conflict with each other (Enyedi 2003; Enyedi, Erős and Fábrián 1997).<sup>128</sup> In fact, the picture in Serbia was similar in 1990, when radicals and socialists were seen as being on the opposite side of the dimension. Yet, while cooperation of the left and right in Hungary is almost inconceivable, in Serbia, it has been the political reality.

Given the fact that age and education, the most distant and causally basic variables, are not easily changeable, it implies that change of preferences with such roots is bound to be slow and, most likely, based on generational replacement. Yet, *political* change may be sudden, under specific conditions such as the appearance of a party or leader that responds to such preferences but with different

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<sup>128</sup> In Romania, authoritarianism appeared associated with pro-communist attitudes and economic views, but with preferences not for parties of the “socialist left” but for the “Fascist right” (Krauss 2002, 1261).

political commitments (e.g., DSS and Koštunica in 2000), or “external shocks to the system” such as the NATO aggression against Serbia in 1999. Thus, Koštunica’s victory in the 2000 elections, founded on his ability to attract former SPS and SRS voters with authoritarian dispositions, might be seen as political ‘taming’ of authoritarianism. Presuming his commitment to democratic principles, the change may be interpreted as the channeling of authoritarian psychological tendencies into a democratic framework. This shows the political relevance of pre-political dispositions like authoritarianism. They have predictive power but they are not strictly deterministic—the same ‘raw material’ allows for both hopeless and hopeful political configurations. Thus, the basic constellation of ideological preferences and predispositions might remain constant, while party preferences may be reshuffled and redistributed among the political actors. One of the attractive features of the concept of the world-view is that it is able to explain the inertia of the basic constellation of political preferences and associated political divisions, the inertia often noticed in cases of even the most radical political transformations.

The evidence presented here shows that a certain portion of the variance in voting behavior can be explained with reference to basic socio-economic categories. Supporters of different parties tend to come from somewhat different socio-economic and socio-cultural groups and hold different political attitudes. In accordance with the cleavage model, the most important political divisions have clear historical background. The question is, then, to what extent can the divisions be captured by the cleavage model?

The cleavage concept can definitely be applied to ethnic oppositions. Borders between voters of different ethnic origins have proved remarkably impermeable. National minorities possess distinct identities; they are institutionally encapsulated, and overwhelmingly support ‘their own’ single party. Identity politics clearly matters (cf. Whitefield 2002). But the overall picture suggests that party politics is not necessarily determined by conflicts between organized groups having distinct socio-structural profiles and elaborate identities. The major structural variables are clearly relevant, but, on the individual level, their influence is relatively small and tends to disappear in multivariate models. However, even to the degree that these variables work, they do not work because of organizational

encapsulation or closure of relevant social groups. Age and education are particularly strongly related to party preferences, but these groups are not “groups for themselves”, and in general they “lack that kind of social closure and/or temporal stability which are necessary preconditions for the functioning of the freezing effect” (Tóka 1998, 599). Moreover, the parties are rarely explicit in their appeal to specific social categories. The SPS and the SRS have had the most specific appeal to ‘ordinary people’ while the elitism of parties such as DS and the GSS, has been more implicit than open and direct.

The relatively weak socio-structural roots of the Serbian parties are explainable from the point of view of all the three key factors that matter in the cleavage theory: parties, society, and voters. Serbian political parties are often described as clientelist networks led by charismatic or would-be charismatic leaders (e.g. Sekelj 2000a, 69; Antić 2002), rather than mass parties with extensive membership and developed infrastructure through which they can establish the connection with targeted social groups. The objective social situation has its role too. Weak social differentiation is often quoted as an important factor in hindering cleavage politics across the region (Wessels and Klingemann 1994). Serbia is an exception only in the sense that it was not flattened by the communist regime; rather, it was a flat, or egalitarian society, consisting basically of small peasants, since gaining independence in the 19th century. More than anything else, Serbian society had experiences that forced the social cleavages to the background: dissolution of the former country, conflicts with secessionist republics and provinces (Kosovo), conflicts with the international community (UN sanctions, NATO attack). In the causal model, attitudes, or ideological orientations proved important as a proximal causal factor determining political preferences. The two most influential orientations are clearly reflections of the most traumatic contemporaneous processes. When borders of the national community are disputed, and after years of conflicting relations with the international community, it is not surprising that nationalism-related attitudes and attitudes towards international integration play a major role in dividing the political camps.

Political actualization of potential social cleavages, especially the development of active group-solidarity, presupposes organizational work by political entrepreneurs. Instead of this lengthy and

uncertain path, political actors may find it more profitable to appeal to and reinforce distinct attitudinal characteristics and negative stereotypes among political adversaries, using easily accessible mass media. Boundaries established in this way do not have to be less deep or less consequential in terms of coalition building, than boundaries based on socio-economic groups. Relatively stable political orientations, thus, can be rooted in political attitudes, or ideologies. As Tóka concludes, “pure structural voting, on the basis of social class, religion, or place of residence, seldom makes a contribution to the stabilization of critical alignments [...] Value preferences seem to provide for the relatively more solid, stable basis for enduring partisan attachments” (Tóka 1998, 607).<sup>129</sup>

This emphasis on attitudinal and psychological elements in the reconstruction of group-formation does not eliminate socio-demographic background characteristics. Psychological dispositions are formed in interactions with an individual’s social position and, therefore, the connection between the social structure and political behavior should be conceived as mediated by broad orientations or world-views, such as authoritarianism. Since the dispositional variables are, by definition, supposed to have broad influence, they could be helpful in predicting orientations of particular segments of the population in situations when particular issues become politicized, or predicting re-orientations in case of major changes in the party system. Thus, it could have been predicted that in the case of the decline of SPS, their supporters would be attracted to conservative-traditionalist parties

### ***The Bigger Picture***

Socialism and communism appeared on the historic scenes as progressive ideologies, on the wave of the enlightenment belief in human progress and perfectibility. At the end of the XXth century, these ideologies that once were looking entirely to the future appeared as largely backward-looking and conservative, if not reactionary, at least in polities where they were the ruling official ideologies for

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<sup>129</sup> Thomassen (2004), for example, reached a similar conclusion, namely that voting in Europe can be better explained with ideological dimensions than with just structural variables.

decades.<sup>130</sup> The emergence of a kind of socialist conservatism, in the sense of the opposition to the imminent social and political change, would be a natural consequence of ceasing being the ruling system. More interesting is the fact that psychological conservatism associated with the opposition to the regime change in former communist countries (e.g., Enyedi and Todosijević 2001, 2003) is very close to psychological bases of classical conservatism as observed in Western countries (e.g., Wilson 1973; Jost et al. 2003).

This parallelism points towards the underlying mechanisms and corresponding theoretical models that might be applicable across different political contexts. Authoritarianism as a world-view would, thus, be not only the bridge that connects individual socialization experiences with political attitudes and preferences, but also the construct that can provide common ground for comparing apparently different processes in different contexts. Politics may be about conflicting interests, but it is certainly also about competition of different world-views. Application of this model to cases other than the Serbian one would certainly be beneficial for comparative research.

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<sup>130</sup> Though, as Vincent argues (1992), the socialist regimes of the Eastern Europe were rather ‘caricatures of socialism’.

## APPENDIX: Variable Specifications

### *Appendix 0 Political Attitude Scale, 2002 Survey*

Items	Hypothetical ideological facet
1. It is harmful for the economy if the government tries to reduce income differences between rich and poor.	Economic liberalism
2. Every individual has to take care of him/herself and it is no state business to worry about individual welfare.	Economic liberalism/individualism
3. The state ought to be involved in economy as little as possible.	Economic liberalism
4. The state does not have a right to tax the rich more than the less well-off citizens.	Economic liberalism/hierarchy
5. For workers it is better to be employed in state-owned firms, than in private of privatized ones.	Socialist economy
6. The transfer of state-owned companies to private hands will help very much in solving the economic problems of our country.	Socialist economy
7. Unprofitable factories and mines should be closed down immediately even if this leads to unemployment.	Socialist economy
8. The state should provide job to everybody who wants to work.	Socialist economy
9. Trade unions should have more say in government business.	Socialist economy
10. We should welcome the appearance of international companies, banks and other firms in Yugoslavia.	International integration
11. Yugoslavia should rely on its own forces to develop economically, without foreign capital or credits.	International integration
12. Education should be accessible to everyone, therefore it should be free.	Socialism/egalitarianism
13. It is always better to stick to the old that is working than to experiment with something new.	(Philosophical) conservatism
14. Law and authority is what holds the society not to turn into chaos and anarchy.	(Philosophical) conservatism
15. There are some who should not be entitled the right to vote.	Hierarchy/elitism
16. The problem of crime cannot be solved without harsher punishments for criminals.	Punitiveness
17. Death penalty is the best punishment for the worst criminals.	Punitiveness
18. Television should support the nation's traditions	Traditionalism
19. Sexual relationships between people of the same sex are always wrong.	Traditionalism
20. Sex relations except in marriage are always wrong.	Traditionalism
21. There are certain life-styles the state (law) should not allow (e.g., marijuana smoke, religious sects, homosexual relations, etc.).	Traditionalism/punitiveness
22. Important is freedom of the individual, not economic equality.	(Philosophical) liberalism
23. Economic inequalities are a natural outcome of differences in abilities.	(Philosophical) liberalism
24. There are situations in which the individual should sacrifice his/her own interests and wishes for the benefit a community, such as for example the nation or the family.	Traditionalism/conservatism
25. Duties are more important than rights.	(Philosophical) conservatism
26. It is in the human nature to help each other.	(Philosophical conservatism)
27. There are more important problems the state should care about than it is environmental pollution.	Environmentalism
28. The state should influence the decrease of the city traffic order to decrease air pollution.	Environmentalism
29. I would accept paying additional tax for environmental protection.	Environmentalism
30. It is more important to preserve and improve nature than to achieve economic development.	Environmentalism
31. Sexual discrimination is not a serious problem in contemporary Yugoslavia.	Feminism

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32. Women should politically organize in order to fight against sexual discrimination.	Feminism
33. Everybody is better off if the man works and the woman takes care of the household and the family.	Feminism
34. Strong army is the only guarantee of our security.	Militarism
35. More money from the budget shall be devoted to modernizing our army.	Militarism
36. It is a great honor to serve in our army.	Militarism
37. We can be proud of great courage and heroism of our army shown in the heroic fight against NATO aggression.	Militarism
38. Yugoslavia's future is joining the EU.	International integration
39. Milošević's regime is mainly to be blamed for the NATO attack on Yugoslavia.	Regime/nationalism
40. Serbia's natural allies are Slavic nations, like Russia or Bielorrussia.	Regime/nationalism
41. Western world is ready to accept and help democratic Serbia and Yugoslavia.	International integration
42. <i>(Item not used in the analyses.)</i>	
43. It would be better if Serbia and Montenegro would separate.	Nationalism
44. Life is lived only once, so one has to take as much pleasure out of it as possible.	Hedonism
45. The country should be lead by the capable; the average should follow the lead	Elitism
46. Laziness is one of the greatest human sins.	Work ethic
47. If only people would work and save more, the poverty would disappear from our society.	Work ethic
48. In general, full economic security is harmful; most men wouldn't work if they didn't need money for eating and living.	Conservatism/work ethic
49. It is better no to work anything than to do some boring or poorly paid job.	Work ethic
50. In life, it is important to rise above other, ordinary people.	Elitism/hierarchy
51. No formal schooling can make up for the lack of domestic education.	Elitism
52. Great art is not meant for the common folk.	Elitism
53. Serbs should be proud of their people.	Nationalism
54. No nation has such a glorious and at the same time tragic history as Serbia.	Nationalism
55. Our country should follow its own way, not caring about the expectations of the West.	Nationalism
56. It is true that Albanians in Kosovo were victims of the persecution by the Serbian state.	Nationalism
57. There are few nations that contributed to the world's culture and science as ours.	Nationalism
58. Nationalism endangers the development of our country.	Nationalism
59. It is more important that a politician be a strong patriot than that he/she be an expert.	Nationalism
60. Our country should seek a peaceful reunification of those parts of the neighboring countries that are inhabited by ethnic Serbs with Serbia.	Nationalism
61. Schools should pay more attention to the patriotic education of young people	Nationalism
62. The Serbian people are victim of an international conspiracy.	Nationalism
63. The Serbian people often suffered because it was too good towards the others.	Nationalism
64. Communism caused great damage to the Serbian people.	Regime change
65. The role of the Church should be increased in managing the country's matters.	Clericalism
66. Religious teaching should be compulsory in all elementary and secondary schools.	Clericalism
67. Religion, that is Christian faith should lead us in our life.	Clericalism
68. Karađorđević dynasty should return to their throne in Serbia.	Nationalism/clericalism/ monarchism
69. It was better when Milošević and SPS led the country.	Regime
70. Since the fall of Milošević regime, people can influence the fate of the country better.	Regime
71. It was the best in Tito's time.	Regime

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*Note:* Items are answered on 5-point scale, from 1 - disagree completely, to 5 - completely agree.

## Appendix B Criterial Variables

### SDO scale and two SDO subscales

Items	Loading – 1st PC	SDO Egalitarianism	SDO Group-based dominance
<b>Egalitarianism sub-scale</b>			
1. Some groups of people are simply inferior to other groups.	-.38	-.01	.61
2. In order to get what we need, it is sometimes necessary to use force against other groups.	-.47	-.05	.72
3. This country would be better off if we cared less about how equal all people are.	-.54	-.18	.68
4. It's OK if some groups have more of a chance in life than others.	-.53	-.29	.53
5. To get ahead in life, it is sometimes necessary to step on others.	-.48	-.09	.68
<b>Group-Based Dominance subscale</b>			
6. We should strive to make incomes as equal as possible.	.27	.59	.25
7. We should do what we can do to equalize conditions for different groups.	.52	.75	.02
8. All humans should be treated equally.	.69	.72	-.29
9. No one group should dominate society.	.56	.58	-.23
1. We would have fewer problems if we treated people more equally.	.71	.76	-.27

Note: 1st Principal Component (PC) of the entire scale explains 28% of the scale variance; two Oblimin factors explain 47.2% of the scale variance.



## Prejudice scales

### **Anti-Gypsy prejudice scale**

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Item	Loading
1. The problems of the gypsies would be solved if finally they started to work.	.42
2. The country should support that Gypsies could learn at school in their native language if they wanted to. <i>(item reversed for reliability analysis)</i>	-.54
3. One can only approve that there are places of entertainment where Gypsies are not allowed to enter.	.70
4. The increase in the number of the Gypsy population is a threat to the public security.	.84
5. The inclination to commit crimes is inborn in the Gypsies.	.77

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Note: 1st PC explains 45.2% of scale variance.  $\alpha=.67$

### **Anti-Jewish prejudice scale**

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Item	Loading
1. Jews are never satisfied and keep on criticizing.	.83
2. Jews usually exclude non Jews from their company.	.78
3. Jews are smarter than the average.	.47
4. Jews try to make advantages even from their own persecution.	.84
5. Intellectuals of Jewish origin keep the media and culture under their influence.	.80

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Note: 1st PC explains 57.5% of scale variance.  $\alpha=.82$

**Appendix C Eigenvalues and Variance Explained After the First-Order Factor Analysis**

Component	Initial Eigenvalues	% of Variance	Cumulative %	Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings <sup>a</sup>
1.00	10.56	15.76	15.76	7.92
2.00	4.45	6.63	22.39	4.53
3.00	2.63	3.92	26.31	3.34
4.00	2.34	3.49	29.80	2.26
5.00	1.99	2.96	32.77	3.51
6.00	1.85	2.76	35.52	1.86
7.00	1.76	2.63	38.15	1.95
8.00	1.62	2.42	40.57	3.24
9.00	1.53	2.29	42.86	3.61
10.00	1.40	2.10	44.95	2.92
11.00	1.36	2.03	46.98	2.61
12.00	1.31	1.95	48.93	2.75
13.00	1.21	1.81	50.74	1.79
14.00	1.18	1.76	52.50	2.53
15.00	1.14	1.70	54.20	1.59

Notes: Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization.

<sup>a</sup> When components are correlated, sums of squared loadings cannot be added to obtain a total variance.

Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy KMO=.86.

Bartlett's Test of Sphericity  $p < .0001$ .

## Appendix D Variables Used in Discriminant Analyses

### Scales in 1990 survey (ZA Study 2903)

Theoretical construct	No. of items	Alpha	Items
Authoritarianism	10	.89	V50 Obedience and respect for authority are the most important dispositions that children should learn. V51 This country needs a brave and tireless leader that people can trust... V52 Much of our lives is controlled by secret conspiracies V53 Most of our problems would be solved if we could somehow get rid of immoral, dishonest and stupid people. V54 Successful groups have to have an energetic and just leader... V55 What youth needs the most is strict discipline... V56 Individuals can be distinguished as belonging to two different groups, composed of strong and weak ones. V57 Homosexuals are no better than criminals... V58 All wars and social problems could be ended some day by an earthquake or a flood that would destroy the whole world. V59 In every society there must be a political authority that people can entirely trust and whose decisions they will carry out without question.
Socialist egalitarianism	5	.57	V45 People will always treat social property as no one's property. (reversed) V46 All weekend cottages should be nationalized and given to those without homes. V47 Social ownership of means of production prevents economic crime. V48 A just society cannot be achieved if there is private ownership. V49 Individual accumulation of wealth should be prevented even if it results from work.
Nationalism	3	N/A	V22 The best for Serbia is to become an independent sovereign state (3 <sup>rd</sup> of 3 options) V23 Borders of Serbia should be changed in case of dissolution of Yugoslavia (2 <sup>nd</sup> of 3 options) V24 Kosovo: taking a more severe course (2 <sup>nd</sup> of 3 options)

Note: All scales constructed as first principal component of the included items, except for Nationalism score which summarizes nationalist answer options to the three included items.

Scales in 1996 survey (ZA Study 2911)

Theoretical construct	No. of items	Alpha	Items
Authoritarianism	8	.90	The purpose of the police is to control opponents... Government should control universities Citizens who misbehaved abroad should be deprived of a passport Children and youth should not be allowed to express disobedience Without a leader every nation is like a man without a head Young people need strict discipline Citizens should behave according to instructions from above... We should follow our leaders
Nationalism	8	.85	Different nationalities can live together in one state National minorities should be given all the rights.. Serbs should have priority in getting a job Every nationality should preserve its ethnic purity... Openness toward the world brings harm We should be careful in dealing with other nationalities... Mixed marriages are doomed to failure It is essential for every nation to be open
Socialist regime support	4	.74	V38 We should return to communist rule.  V71 Household's situation was better in the period of socialism. V74 Economy in the period of socialism was better V77 Political system in the period of socialism was better

*Note:* All scales constructed as the first principal component of the included items.

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