

Governing Fragmented Societies:  
State-Building and Political Integration in  
Chechnya and Ingushetia (1991-2009)

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*I confirm that the thesis contains no materials accepted for any other degrees in any other institutions*

*This thesis contains no materials previously written and/or published by another person, unless otherwise noted*

## Abstract

My dissertation analyzes state-building and political integration in the two North Caucasian Republics of Ingushetia and Chechnya.

The study is to a large extent designed as a reaction to the mainstream claim that the degree of national consolidation and stability of these North Caucasian regimes are primarily a result of clan politics, i.e. political process where the main actors are pre-existing kin-based identity organizations. The task of this research was thus to assess the relative role of informal social structures in projects aimed at establishing and consolidating indigenous political units in the North Caucasus and to identify the principal internal reasons for the outcomes of these projects.

On the basis of long-term participant observation, interviews with experts, analysis of historical data and modern political processes this thesis argues that clans (*teips*) have ceased to be patterns of political integration of any prominence in Ingushetia and Chechnya. As a result of demographic growth and social change brought about by colonization, Soviet modernization and frequent forced and voluntary resettlements, they lost their organizational structure and are incapable to mobilize members for action.

Five case studies show that although certain traditional institutions and practices still play an important role in the society, state-building is determined by struggle for power between socially heterogeneous groups that are driven by ideologies, programs, economic or military interests, and can be based on strong or weak ties. Five structural factors influence elite formation and state-building in the region: descent, kinship, territory, religion and ideology. The prominence of each of them is dependent on elite choices and the particular demands of the state-building project. Governments differ in how homogeneous they are, and how strong are the ties binding their members together. I conclude that the lack of checks and balances and a risk-prone environment increase the relevance of strong ties. I also show that the role of kinship in structuring the elite and the determining the strength of ties within governments do not covary, despite the expectations to the contrary.

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90% of the credit for this work goes to my mom. Her love and care kept me going.

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## **List of Acronyms**

ChIASSR Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic

NO ASSR North Ossetian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic

MVD Ministry of Internal Affairs

FSB Federal Security Service

FSK Federal Counter-Intelligence Service

USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

RSFSR Russian Soviet Socialist Republic

UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

RI Republic Ingushetia

ChRI Chechen Republic Ichkeria

NGO Non-government organization

GONGO Government-operated Non-governmental organization

HRC Human rights Center

SB /*Sluzhba Bezopasnosti*/ – Security Service (of Akhmad Kadyrov)



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## Introduction

The Northern Caucasus has won its fame as the most tumultuous region in the Russian Federation. The political and economic changes which emanated in the late 1980s had extremely disruptive effects on the region and the last two decades came forth as a distraught period of instability, conflict and war. Chechnya was among several other subjects of the Federation which challenged the state integrity in the early 1990's, yet it came to be the only republic in Russia where a separatist movement ended in a full-blown war in 1994. Ingushetia, as many national regions of the USSR, was caught in an intense nationalist struggle for its own republican statehood, but it also slipped towards ferocious armed conflict with North Ossetia, the only armed ethnic conflict in post-Soviet Russia thus far.

Both republics suffered from high costs of economic transition, political difficulties associated with the collapse of the central authority, the necessity to construct new political institutions, deal with the new identities and past grievances, maintain functioning economies, infrastructure and law-enforcement. After the end of armed conflict in the Prigorodny Region in 1992, the precarious political stability, slight economic recovery and remarkable regime consolidation were achieved in the Ingush Republic in 1994-2001; while in Chechnya state-building failed, and a second round of full-blown destructive military confrontation with Russia was provoked by Chechen militants, who invaded the neighboring Russian Republic of Dagestan in August 1999.

Most observers explain the failures and modest successes of Chechnya and Ingushetia by the adversarial vs. accommodative patterns of their relations with the Russian Federal Center. A case in point is the conflict in Chechnya, which is predominantly analyzed as a continuous struggle of the Chechens and Russians over power and land. Fragmentation and the social complexity of the Chechen and Ingush societies, their late and uneven modernization are also included among the factors that destabilize politics in the two republics and impede effective state-building. The survival of primordial structures, such as teips (clans) is thought to have been accountable for

government failures and impotent policy-making in the region<sup>1</sup>. The argument that clan structures play a pivotal role in the political process and that any effective policy-making should take into account the clan factor has become mainstream.

Although such explanations sound convincing, little or no research has been offered so far on what these primordial social structures are, whether they have transformed over time, how they function and interact with the state and which other formal/informal patterns of social interaction have played an important if not a conclusive role in the post-Soviet state-building in Ingushetia and Chechnya.

This Ph.D. thesis has two goals: 1) to assess the relative role of kin-based, religious, ideological, territorial and political structures in projects aimed at establishing and consolidating indigenous political units in Ingushetia and Chechnya, and to 2) identify the principal internal reasons for the failure and/or relative success of these projects. The attempts to create unified, effective, well-ordered polities in Chechnya and Ingushetia will be examined vis-a-vis a complex web of social interactions, practices and the multi-patterned dynamics of social integration within the political units.

The research is based on a set of explanatory case studies that aimed to provide theoretical propositions about the interaction of informal patterns of social integration and state-building in the Northern Caucasus. The simplified theoretical model of the research design consists of the following elements: informal and formal patterns of political integration and state-building projects aimed at creating new unified polities. The interaction among these elements are expected to shape the consolidation of the new political regimes, the efficiency of elites, the role of weak and strong ties in the governments, and the degree of stability and state capacity in the analyzed regions.

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<sup>1</sup> Naimark N. 2001. *Fires of Hatred: Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth Century Europe*. Cambridge MA  
 Tishkov V. 2004. *Life in a War-Torn Society*, University of California Press. Lieven A (1998) *Chechnya: Tombstone of Russian Power* New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, Reno W. "Mafia Troubles, Warlord Crises" in Beissinger and Young, eds. *Beyond state crisis?* Kathleen Collins 1996. *Clan Politics and Regime Transition in Central Asia*. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge. Edwards Schatz 2004. *Modern Clan Politics. The Power of „Blood“ in Kazakhstan and Beyond*. University of Washington Press

## Research Question and Argument

The study is largely designed as a reaction to the growing body of literature on clan politics in post-Soviet Central Asia and its application to the North Caucasus, which claims that the degree of national consolidation and stability of these regimes are primarily a function of the interplay between the state-building projects and the pre-existing primordial patterns of political integration, i.e. clans.

My research question is to explain whether and how informal patterns of social integration interact with state-building and influence elite formation; which are the factors that shape such interaction, and whether and how state-building outcomes are determined by it.

I contrast two models of state-building. One is based on trust networks and socially heterogeneous groups driven by modern ideologies, programs and/or economic and political interests. The other one regards as protagonists the pre-existing organic social groups based on primordial bonds of real or fictive kinship.

My initial hypothesis was streamlined in accordance with the clan politics claim. I hypothesized that polity-building in Chechnya and Ingushetia was determined by interactions with clans. However, as a result of extended fieldwork, interviews with experts, analysis of historical data and of modern political processes this hypothesis has been refuted. The thesis argues that as a result of demographic growth and social change brought about by colonization, Soviet modernization, and forced resettlements clans (teips) have ceased to be patterns of political integration of any prominence. I further claim that informal patterns of integration still play a role in the society, and provide detailed bottom-up analysis of five patterns of social integration that are prominent in Chechen and Ingush societies: descent, kinship, religion, territory, and ideology. I explain the current functions of customary law and blood-feud and analyze how the socio-legal environment they create constrains the political choices of actors. I proceed by a top-down analysis of five state-building projects in Ingushetia and Chechnya, and conclude that none

of them was shaped by pre-existing patterns of integration, like clans. Each of the five regimes was driven by a heterogeneous agency integrated on the basis ideology, program, economic, political and military interest. Thus, the thesis clarifies and sorts out much of the confusion related to the interplay of informal institutions and practices and their interactions with the state.

## **Methodology**

My primary methods for the study of patterns of political integration, informal institutions and practices and their interaction with the state were ethnographic observation and interviews.

A few weeks in the field were enough to establish that learning about clans from interviews and surveys was a rather difficult task. Issues related to kinship and family were considered the domain of private affairs which were not eagerly discussed. Moreover, some local intellectuals and the representatives of the political elite were reluctant to discuss the political relevance of teips with outsiders seeing their very interest in this issue as an indicator of the scholar's colonial mindset. Less educated respondents, typically, had very little understanding or experience of being interviewed about political matters for academic purposes, were suspicious of the interviewer, which made them, on the average, a bad information source.

To deal with this challenge I decided to use the ethnographic method of participant observation. I settled in the region, took up positions at a local NGO in Ingushetia and became a lecturer at the history department of the Chechen State University with a local salary and lifestyle. I shared flats with refugees in Nazran or stayed with Chechen families in Grozny, commuted by public transport (remarkable milieu for political debates), did shopping at local markets and hair-cuts at local saloons. Everywhere I talked to people. My job at the human rights group Memorial involved working with victims of rights abuse in Chechnya, Ingushetia and the Prigorodny Region of North Ossetia and required a lot of travel, sometimes to very distant high mountain settlements. Moreover, it allowed me to observe certain families, villages, individuals in

different situations over extended periods of time. I have spent five years in the region and some of my knowledge of “how things work” is reflected in this dissertation.

My methodological choice in studying the role of teip and kinship in Chechen and Ingush societies was the following. In compliance with the Schneiderian principle, for four years I observed, without asking many questions. Having acquired certain knowledge of the societies, analyzed kinship terms and mapped kinship systems, I started my interviews.

First, I selected 20 Teips/ lineages (10 Chechen, 10 Ingush) analysis from different areas of Ingushetia and Chechnya for in-depth. I interviewed several members of each teip, from different settlements, of different age and when possible, gender. I asked them to tell the story of their teip, to show me their family trees, to explain how and under which circumstances they descended on the plain, how they settled in a particular village, tell their family histories, the story of their families in deportation, return, life after exile and describe their interactions with other teip members and kin members and with the village of origin, possible blood-feud episodes. An average interview lasted about two hours, the longest took seven hours.

Second, I studied several settlements (Achaluki, Gamurzievo, Kantyshevo, Ekazhevo in Ingushetia; Samashki, Gekhi-Chu, Shatoy, Zamaj-Yurt, Zumsoy in Chechnya) and tried to map clanship and kinship relations there and see the role of traditional institutions at the local level. I then talked with the representatives of different teips in each village to trace their story of the settlement and relationships within the village.

Third, personal networks used for acquiring access to jobs and scarce social goods were analyzed. For this purpose interviews with professionally active Chechens and Ingush have been carried out.

Overall I carried out over 100 in-depth interviews with politicians, experts, scholars, NGO workers, lawyers, former combatants, students of Islamic universities, journalists, Sufi and fundamentalist religious leaders, and Elders.

I also repeatedly had a chance to discuss certain kinship-related issues with groups. These were often spontaneous conversations at tea or during lunch break or in a car during long trips around Ingushetia or Chechnya. Such talks were particularly inspiring because the interlocutors argued and contributed arguments to each other, brainstormed for examples, trying to explain certain issues to me. This was better than if I did focus groups, since with these individuals I had a relationship of trust and they were ready to give me important insider's views. I think it helped a lot that I started my structured fieldwork after many years on the ground. I could ask informed questions, which helped the respondents to open up.

Following the ethnographic method developed by Valerij Tishkov, an influential Russian ethnologist, the head of the Institute of Anthropology and Ethnology of the Russian Academy of Sciences, I quote longer bits of interviews with my respondents to give them voice when they give relevant answers to the researched questions.

I also used historical research as evidence that the process of teip-dissolution was detected by ethnographers already in the 18-19<sup>th</sup> centuries, when the primordial institutions significantly transformed as a result of colonial wars, forced and voluntary resettlements that they entailed, state-building efforts of Imam Shamil and integration in the Russian Empire. Although the main focus of the thesis is the immediate past, a large part of the dissertation is dedicated to prior historical analysis with the aims: to check the degree of historical tenacity of primordial institutions; to refute the argumentation of primordialists on their own ground; to indicate the plausibility of certain theories concerning the nature of the political processes and the identity of the real decision makers.

The analysis of the state-building projects and elite profiles mainly relies on academic literature, newspaper publications, statistical data, and memoirs. I consulted a broad array of documents and statistics produced by governments, parliaments, courts and NGOs as well as did monitoring of the republican periodicals. The analysis of Ingush elites was done on the basis of monitoring of all issues of the newspapers *Serdalo* and *Ingushetia* in the years of 1992-2001 available in the



libraries of St Petersburg and Moscow, and mapping was carried out by comparing lists of teips, lineages and places of residence, when necessary verified with representatives of these teips. I am grateful to Ingush ethnographer Dr. Makka Albogachieva of the department of Caucasus at the Museum of Anthropology and Ethnography of the Russian Academy of Sciences in St Petersburg and Ingush historian Dr. Nurdin Kodzoev of the Ingush Research Institute for Humanitarian Sciences for reading and correcting this part of the study.

My approach in this thesis is to tackle the problem by bringing together different disciplinary literatures that are relevant for advancing my argument but are almost never brought together in a sustained discussion of the topic. I am confident that each discipline independently will not be able to adequately address the research questions. I use history, anthropology, ethnography, law and political science to explain the state-building and political integration in Ingushetia and Chechnya in 1991-2009.

The empirical chapter of this research has a subsection which deals in more details with the methodological challenges of the conducted fieldwork.

### Dissertation Outline

The dissertation has eight chapters. Chapter 1 presents the theoretical framework for studying state-building and social integration and reviews the main concepts and terms of the thesis. My analytical framework draws on classical and contemporary literature on state-building, theories of modernization, democratization and consolidation but argues that since this body of literature is focused on formal institutions and Western models of development, it is insufficient for the analysis of late-coming, unevenly modernized and fragmented societies. I discuss relevant anthropological studies on kinship, trust networks, risk, strong and weak ties and the post-Soviet informal political practices and the Russian „economy of favors“. My conceptual framework is closest to the „state- in- society“ approach developed by Joel Migdal, which looks at the state as

one of society's organization, but it argues against clan politics literature, developed within this approach.

Chapter 2 discusses political order and political integration in Ingushetia and Chechnya in pre-Soviet times. It focuses on the key developments such as the Caucasian war, state-building efforts by Imam Shamil, attempts of the Russian Empire to enforce the state on the Chechen and Ingush communities and analyzes the way the primordial and informal structures got eroded (teips) or established (Sufi brotherhoods) in response to colonization and these state-building efforts. Chapter 3 analyzes the sweeping social change brought about by the Soviet modernization programs, which contributed to further erosion of primordial structures; and Soviet repression- from Stalinist exile to post-deportation limits on settlement, employment and practice on faith, which preserved certain informal institutions and practices. It also deals with the three types of memories which Chechens and Ingush share regarding their past within the Russian state, which have had a profound impact on the political processes in 1991-2001.

Chapter 4 summarizes the results of my ethnographic study of patterns of social and political integration in Ingushetia and Chechnya, analyzes the current function of informal institutions and practices, evaluates their relevance in the political process. I argue that teips have ceased to be social organizations, their decision-making mechanisms and channels of communication have lost efficiency, their social functions are limited to the sphere of ritual and settlement of family disputes. However, they do survive as containers of identity of some relevance, especially for ethnocentric men. I argue that four other patterns of integration are not less, but even more important - kinship, descent, territory, religion, and ideology. Together with personal networks of acquaintances, colleagues and friends these five social pillars constitute an individual's "inner circle", which she uses when necessary for getting employment or acquiring social goods. The same five patterns of social integration can be considered as factors that influence elite formation. The prominence of each of the factors in a given elite is determined by the choices of the governmental elite and by the demands of specific state-building projects.

Chapters 5-8 present case studies of Chechen and Ingush state-building projects pursued since 1991. Chapter 5 analyzes the nationalist project in Chechnya of 1991-1994, Chapter 6 deals with the Islamist state-building efforts in Chechnya between 1997 and 1999, Chapter 7 focuses on democratic state-building in Ingushetia in 1992-2001.

The case studies are built up as follows. First I describe the socio-political processes (movements and conflicts) which gave birth to the specific polity-building projects and/or determined their initial conditions. These sections are important for providing context within which the state-building projects unwrap, for characterizing the agency involved and constraints or possibilities available to the particular government.

The second bloc analyzes the state building projects themselves, with the focus on the newly created institutions and on the elite efforts at achieving consolidation. The principal areas investigated are the following: economy, education and health care, law enforcement, armed forces, legal system, infrastructure. By analyzing the state-building efforts I scrutinize problems and challenges involved, evaluate successes and failures as well as factors which determined the outcomes. In all of the three cases I conclude that clan structures have no role in shaping the outcomes.

The third part reviews the principal challenges to the regime (both the formal opposition and the informal groups), discusses issues of disagreement or the crises faced by the governments and analyzes their responses to these crises. Each case study contains a section assessing the role of informal actors, the interaction between formal politics and informal patterns of political integration, institutions and practices.

Chapter 8 analyzes Chechnya and Ingushetia under the predatory regime of Murat Zyazikov and the sultanistic regime of the Kadyrovs.

The case studies illustrate that pre-existing patterns of social integration (clans, tariqas, and wirts) do not play any significant role in the process of state-building in WajnaKh societies. The political process is shaped by agency, integrated on the basis of ideology, program, religion or

economic and military interests. Moreover, the strength of ties in the elites does not covary with kinship despite the expectations to the contrary. The case studies show that institutional constraints and political contexts shape the relevance of strong ties in the governmental elites.

## 1. Governing Fragmented Societies: Late State-Building and Social Integration

In this chapter I outline social science approaches to the problem of late state-building and its interaction with informal patterns of social integration. I contrast two models of state-building. One is based on trust networks and socially heterogeneous interest groups driven by modern ideologies and/or economic and political interests. The other one regards the pre-existing organic social groups based on primordial bonds of real or fictive kinship as the protagonists of state-building. I claim that although descent and kinship are important patterns of social integration in the Chechen and Ingush societies, they do not form the basis for political integration. In other words the first model is superior to the second in helping us to understand political processes in the region. I start the chapter by formulating the analytical problems tackled in the conducted research, and by introducing the principal concepts and definitions of the dissertation. I proceed by reviewing the main bodies of literature this thesis draws on, argues with or contributes to.

In formulating my conceptual framework I generally follow the „state in society“ approach developed by Joel Migdal, which looks at the state as one of society's organization. My research argues against the clan politics literature on Central Asia and the Caucasus by questioning its basic tenet that kinship is the main pattern of political integration in the region. I incorporate insights from the anthropological literature regarding the methodology of researching kinship, nature and structure of kinship ties, their biological and fictive aspects, boundaries and filiations between descent and kinship groups, links between descent and territory. I further review relevant arguments in classical and contemporary literature on state-building, theories of modernization, democratization and consolidation which deal with the problems of state-building in the framework of modernization, installing democratic institutions and achieving regime

consolidation. I discuss the important contributions offered by this stream of research but argue that it is too focused on formal institutions and Western models of development, and it is therefore insufficient for the analysis of non-Western, late-coming, unevenly modernized fragmented societies. I conclude by discussing relevant studies on trust networks, risk, strong and weak ties and the post-Soviet informal political practices and the Russian „economy of favors“.

### 1.1. Late State-building and Social Integration: Analytical Problems and Concepts

“The state is undeniably a messy concept” was the encouraging statement opening Michael Mann’s voluminous study on *States, War and Capitalism* (Mann 1988). Although thousands of pages have been written on the state, experts still can hardly agree on what it is. They do agree on what it is not: ‘The state is not an eternal and unchanging element in human affairs. For most part of its history, humanity got by...without a state’ (Pierson 1996: 35). Societies had had power structures well before states developed.

These political power structures were designated according to traditional rules and were obeyed due to the sacredness of their status (Weber 1995: 42). The rule of gerontocracy (power of elders, understood literally as the eldest in years and most familiar with the traditions) and primary patriarchy (a rule of a particular individual in an extended family or kin group) are good examples of political power which came prior to that of state (Weber 1995: 43). The authority of these structures was backed up by legal codes: a rich variety of social control, social pressure, customary law and judicial procedure (Merry 1992:131).

The power structures and legal codes of pre-modern societies were never cohesive. According to Migdal, “through most of human history, territories have hosted a diversity of rules of the game - one set for this tribe and another for a neighboring tribe, one for this region and another for

that... Social control has not been of a piece, but it has frequently been highly fragmented through a territory". (Migdal 1988: 275).

The power structures of stateless societies came to be threatened with the emergence of the traditional state, which aimed to submerge them under its own compulsive control, but the pre-modern state's penetration was low, the degree of local autonomy high; the state was rather, according to Abrams, a 'unified symbol of an actual disunity' than a general factor of cohesion (Abrams 1988). This was especially true with respect to the multinational empires, where traditional power structures of conquered or annexed peoples and territories were left relatively intact.

It was only the modern state organization which achieved a high degree of efficiency and penetration into the society. It added routine, formalized, rationalized institutions which outreached the entire territories of the state (Weber 1978:54-56). The states gradually expanded their power: regular taxation, a monopoly over mobilization, permanent bureaucratic administration, a monopoly over violence, law-making and law-enforcement (Mann 1995:325). To fulfill those functions the modern state tried to submerge all competing power centers and establish monopoly over making of rules.

In no way was the process of crystallizing the modern state power smooth. Historically, emerging states were sprawling organizations within societies that coexisted with many other formal and informal organizations of social power, from kin groups to tribes and religious organizations (Migdal 1987:396). The state elites sought predominance over these organizations, and fought fierce struggles for monopoly over making and implementing binding rules (Migdal 1987:397). Modern European states with their deep penetration and high degree of authority over social groups were the results of a long process of integration of various social segments into a cohesive political unit (Weber 1978:54-56). State-building was a dialectical process: brief periods of sweeping change were followed by longer periods of adjustment and absorption, when accommodations to these changes could take place (Khoury and Kostiner 1990: 17).

In the present study I understand *state-building* as the process of creating effective government, which involves the monopoly over authoritative binding rule making, rule enforcement and violence within the territory claimed by the state. Concerning the *modern state* I adopt Michael Mann's definition as developed in his *States, War and Capitalism*:

“ (1) A differentiated set of institutions and personnel embodying (2) centrality in the sense that political relations radiate outwards from a center to cover (3) a territorially demarcated area over which it exercises (4) a monopoly of authoritative binding rule-making, backed up by a monopoly of the means of violence” (Mann 1992:4).

Following this definition when speaking of the modern state, I will mean a political unit which is: 1) territorially centralized 2) possesses monopoly over decision-making (i.e. it enjoys recognition of being a final and absolute authority in the political community, with a proviso that no final and absolute authority exists elsewhere (Hinsley 1986:26) ) 3) has the monopoly over the means of violence insofar as the citizens believe that the state is the only agent with a legitimate right to use force for maintaining its order and 4) is the central location of institutions which are multiple and functionally differentiated.

But state does not equal *modern state*. Late coming states often do not meet one or several of the above mentioned criteria, since they operate in *fragmented societies*, which can be defined as weakly homogenized and loosely integrated societies, with strong informal patterns of social integration which follow their own binding rules and do not recognize the state's monopoly over justice and violence. Following Migdal, I understand the modern state to be the culmination of a process transcending these localized patterns of social integration in societies, which had previously made the rules (Migdal 1994: 12).

This thesis relies heavily on the concept of *pattern of social integration*, by which I mean a set of identities, practices and power structures which dominate the behavior of certain social groups and create special social subsystems within society. A pattern of social integration requires an institutionalized power structure and a common identification on behalf of its social group. I

argue that different patterns of integration co-exist in the three following ways: *compartmentalization*, *competition* and *symbiosis*. *Compartmentalization* results in a closed subsystem which is following its pattern-specific logic, *competition* implies the rivalry between various integrative logics at stake. *Symbiosis* is a peaceful blender of various patterns (eg. customary law, Muslim law and secular law co-existed in the North Caucasian Republics in Soviet times).

Patterns of social integration can be more or less institutionalized. Based on the knowledge of the local context and the findings of my fieldwork I claim that five patterns of integration are the most prominent in Ingushetia and Chechnya: descent (patrilineal lineage or segment of lineage), kinship, territory, religion, ideology. I define ideology in the broadest sense: agreement on politically relevant ideas (about nation, family, economic policy, independence etc). Since these republics were at crossroads after the collapse of the Soviet Union it is not surprising that such differences, particularly concerning independence and the nature of the new regime, polarized people at many levels. This thesis does not research friendship as a pattern of social integration, which is a prominent category, but since it does not have its own logic (you can be friend with someone for a myriad of different reasons), moreover friendship has nothing to do with the socio-political structure of society - as opposed to those identified above. In my final model, however, I account for friendship and other patterns of integration, grouping them under the category of 'other'.

It is usually thought that in politics non-state patterns of social integration clash with the state integrative logic. It is especially true, as Geertz argues, for the patterns of political integration based on primordial ties. 'One is bound to one's kinsman, one's neighbor, one's fellow believer, *ipso facto*, as the result not merely of personal affection, practical necessity, common interest, or incurred obligation, but at least in great part by virtue of some unaccountable absolute import attributed to the very tie itself' (Geertz 1987:31). The primordial political patterns of integration are of the same order as state power, they consider themselves as 'possible self-sustaining,



maximal social units, as candidates for nationhood' (Geertz 1994:32). Informal institutions can indeed obstruct the functioning of formal institutions and create problems, but they can also enhance the effectiveness of state-institutions by providing solutions to problems which cannot be remedied within the formal framework. At other times informal institutions can reinforce or even substitute the formal institutions which they appear to undermine (Helmke and Levitsky 2004:728).

According to Migdal, interrelations of state and social organizations can produce four ideal-types of results: (1) total transformation of patterns of social integration by the state; (2) accommodation of patterns of social integration by the state; (3) incorporation of existing social forces by state; (4) Incorporation of the state by social forces (Migdal 1988:25).

Most subtle and unexpected patterns of political change result from the accommodation between states and other powerful organizations in society (Migdal 1988: 31). Incorporation of local components of the state may affect the state's overall coherence- the ability to relocate resources, establish legitimacy and achieve integrated domination (Migdal 1988: 25).

In this project I deal with the cases of late state-building in fragmented societies, which are considered to be marked by the existence of strong non-state patterns of social integration, with their own self-government logic and authoritative binding rule making, established mechanisms of adjudication and rule enforcement. I will look into how the state and social organizations accommodated, blended, marginalized, crashed or captured each other and how this has affected the process of political unification.

I use the term 'state' in its sociological meaning, as one of the social organizations within a given society. I speak of *state-building*, notwithstanding the fact that at least in Ingushetia the state-building project after 1991 was carried out within the framework of the Russian federal state. In this way it becomes possible to analyze the building of effective governments in

societies that in the early 1990s created fundamentally new polities, based on new Constitutions, new identities, new institutions, and legitimizing procedures.

Decentralization in Yeltsin's Russia was unprecedented, and following the famous Yeltsin's encouragement, "swallow as much sovereignty as you can" the national republics enjoyed substantial autonomy. Chechnya was de facto independent and pursued its state-building project without the involvement of the federal authorities. Moreover, the political elites and societies in Ingushetia and Chechnya widely perceived the post-communist time as the period of building „statehood“ (*gosudarstvennost'*). Thus, in the present study the polysemy of the term *state* is reduced to its purely sociological meaning. Other meanings, especially those common to the theory of international relations, are not considered.

## 1.2. State-Building: State-Centered Perspectives

*“For by art is created that great LEVIATHAN called a COMMONWEALTH, or STATE ...is but an artificial man, though of greater stature and strength than the natural, for whose protection and defence it was intended; and in which the sovereignty is an artificial soul.. the magistrates and other officers of judicature and execution, artificial joints; reward and punishment (by which fastened to the seat of the sovereignty, every joint and member is moved to perform his duty) are the nerves, ... pacts and covenants, by which the parts of this body politic were at first made, set together, and united, resemble that fiat, or the Let us make man, pronounced by God in the Creation”. Thomas Hobbes, The Leviathan*

Since 1660 and until recently philosophy and social science tended to treat the state as a holistic, autonomous structure, which exists above societies and is distinct from them. The founding fathers of social science – Durkheim, Marx and Weber linked the emergence of the modern state to high diversification of labor, industrialization and capitalism which resulted in unprecedented centralization of modern societies.

Durkheim argues that the state has an autonomous role of providing moral guidance to society, and as society develops the significance of the state's functions expand. Durkheim's theory of

historical evolution of humanity from mechanical solidarity of primitive societies to organic solidarity of modern societies is a process determined by the structure of the division of labor. In pre-industrial societies, social organization is highly undifferentiated, characterized by similarity of functions, collective sentiments, common consciousness saturated with religious ideas and sanctioned by law, which is repressive and diffuse, imposed not through specialized institutions of justice but by the entire society (Durkheim 1964 37-39, 56, 76).

The division of labor and social differentiation results in a society with high level of interdependence, where solidarity through social similarity is replaced by solidarity through difference and the strengthening of social bonds. This society however, has to be regulated and organic solidarity upheld by a strong moral authority of the state which imposes itself on its different members. To become states, therefore, primitive societies must undergo tremendous change, reconstruct and reconceptualize their social relations (Durkheim 1964).

For Marx the modern state is a class state, governed by the egoism of private property, and the interests of the bourgeoisie. However, the state is always more than the agent of one class, through the emancipation of private property from the community, the state has become a separate entity, beside and outside civil society and is identified with the realm of alienation founded on the contradiction between general and particular interests. In *The German Ideology* Marx describes the historical evolution of the modern state in terms of the mode of production and increasingly specialized division of work which result in the emergence of the separate spheres of administration (Marx and Engels (1933) 1964).

Capitalism destroys the personal ties of pre-industrial modes of domination, leaving only naked self-interest as the bond between individuals. In his analysis of Bonapartism Marx attempted to show that the state was not a simple reflection of social forces, but rather an example of the separation of the state from society, where the state seems “to have made itself completely independent” of all classes and soars “high above society.” (Marx 1852)

Both Marx and Durkheim considered their analysis of modern societies and states to be of quite general significance and they predicted that the social dynamics within later modernized societies would be similar to those observed in Western European countries.

Max Weber's fundamental contribution to the theory of state is the concept of rational-legal bureaucracy, which is the result of centralizing trends in modern industrial society. In modern societies the administration of mass structures is radically different from personalized administration in small associations. The highly specialized division of labor in modern capitalist or socialist economies must inevitably lead to greater bureaucratization from above - technically superior administration, larger-scale planning and resource management.

Modern state officials are personally free and are functionally constrained by their impersonal bureaucratic obligations. Legal rational bureaucracy eliminates all personal, irrational and emotional elements from administration. The state and bureaucracy are increasingly autonomous of civil society and play a crucial role in molding its institutions (Weber 1954, 1964). At the same time Weber dedicated significant attention to the sociological determinants of politics: the role of religion, patterns of leadership and legitimacy in modern states (Weber 1930, 1951).

Continuing the Durkheimian line of inquiry into the problems of social evolution, modernization theories of 1960s/70s analyzed the perspectives for traditional societies to follow the advanced industrialized countries of the West in achieving of the economic prosperity and social progress. According to scholars working within this paradigm, modernization involved major social reconstruction - traditional societies had to drop their archaic customs and agrarian lifestyle and turn towards technology, education, and open systems of government.

Walt Rostow proposed a five-step model of economic growth and social development, which traditional societies have to go through before reaching the age of developed capitalism and mass consumption (Rostow 1960: 4-16). A traditional society has limited production functions, is based on pre-Newtonian science and technology, and on pre-Newtonian attitudes towards the physical world. Sometimes productive innovations could be introduced in a traditional economy,

but in such societies a ceiling exists on the level of each individual development, since modern science and technology are not systematically applied. During the stage of “preconditions for take-off”, the level of education goes up, a class of businessmen and manufacturers develops. During “take-off” the sector-led growth moves the economy toward “drive to maturity” when economy diversifies, economic sectors level off, standards of living go up until society reaches the period of contemporary comfort, which Rostow calls “the age of high mass consumption” (Rostow 1960:4-16). Rostow’s influential model is linear and conceived as generic, applying to all modernizing societies, albeit for each of them each stage would last a different period of time.

Alex Inkels and David Smith in their seminal sociological study *“Becoming Modern”* try to investigate which conditions were conducive to modernization at the level of individual consciousness. Having interviewed 6,000 men in the modernizing countries of Israel, Chile, Bangladesh, India, Argentina and Nigeria, Inkels and Smith found out that education appears to be the most prominent factor shaping a person’s modernity along with work in large-scale enterprises, such as factories. Surprisingly urbanization was not conducive to individual modernism, neither was the quality of education, but rather the number of years that individuals spent at school (Inkels and Smith 1974). David McClelland likewise researched the individual aspects of modernization, arguing in his *“Achieving Society”* that economic growth and decline should be explained by internalized values of achievement, success, spirit of invention and innovation (McClelland 1967).

For Daniel Lerner modernization is equal to Westernization, even though the elites of newly modernizing societies often reject such an association. Urbanization, industrialization, literacy and prominence of media, along with changed behavioral patterns- physical mobility, voluntary participation, empathy, which stipulates an “inner mechanism which enables newly mobile persons to operate efficiently in a changing world,” are necessary for the passing of the traditional society. Lerner acknowledges, however, that sometimes “the societies- in-a hurry” do not follow the Western path of development. For instance, they may install a voting mechanism

and seemingly democratic institutions, which are in fact nothing more than a fad, not corresponding to the internal needs of a participant society (Lerner 1958).

The modernization theory analyzes social transformations from the pre-modern, pre-Newtonian world to the modern urban, socially mobile, secular and democratically governed societies. It provides useful insights into how urbanization, literacy, mobility, diversification of labor transform lifestyles and communal ethoes. In this thesis I will follow the main premise of modernization theorists that social institutions transform with the advent of modern economy, cities and education. At the same time, I subscribe to the harsh criticism which modernization scholarship was subjected to regarding its single, universalistic, West-centric concept of modernity. It failed to seriously address the problems of catch-up modernization, uneven transformation of economy and technology (which can modernize quickly) on the one hand, and social institutions, practices and identities (which tend to transform at a slower pace), on the other. Thus, the late-modernizing societies can develop modern economic sectors and use the most advanced technology, but preserve more traditional family structures and certain primordial institutions, such as blood feud, for example. Intellectual premises of modernization theory were attacked for taking Europe as the norm; such a normative point of view was perceived as denying other societies and cultures the right to have their own ways. Said's classics *Orientalism* not only offered a sensitive analysis of modernization from the point of "societies –in - a hurry", it gave impetus to post-colonial studies which aimed at analyzing and decolonizing the cultural and intellectual heritage of formerly colonized societies (Said 1978).

In the 1960s and 1970s research was focused on the search for the prerequisites and the necessary conditions for the emergence of the stable democracy. Some scholars emphasized socio-economic preconditions, such as GDP per capita, urbanization and literacy (Dahl 1971, Huntington 1984, Karl 1986) others underscored the importance of civic political culture, democratic beliefs and attitudes (Almond and Verba 1963) or analyzed the crucial importance of

social structure, mechanisms of conflict resolution for democracy (Lijphart 1969, Dahrendorf 1967, 1988) and degrees of inequality (Dahl 1971, Stephens 1987).

The new wave of democratization since 1972 when in two decades the number of countries with democratic government increased from 44 to 107 inspired a tremendous body of research which aimed to explain dynamics, modes and paths of transition from authoritarianism, develop criteria for measuring functioning democracy and scrutinize the conditions conducive for the consolidation of sustainable democratic regimes.

The transition literature dropped the single uniform perspective on democracy and aimed at exploring different ways, in which societies, even the poorer and less modernized ones, could build democratic governance. “Among various countries that have made the transition there may be many roads to democracy... the genesis of democracy need not be temporarily uniform: different factors may become crucial during successive phases... the genesis of democracy need not be socially uniform: even in the same place and time the attitudes that promote it may not be the same for politicians and common citizens”, claimed Dankward Rustow (Rustow 1970: 346).

Most of the transition literature focused on the role of political elites in sustaining democracies. Samuel Huntington claimed that democratic regimes instituted by mass protest actions had seldom lasted, while Juan Linz emphasized the role of leadership in successful democratization and the commitment of elites to democratic principles and their capacities to convince their societies of the value of democratic procedures (Huntington 1984, Linz 1990). Alfred Stepan conceptualized the major modes of re-democratization (Stepan 1986). Robert Dahl and Juan Linz emphasized the fundamental weight of elite pacts in the period of transition (Linz 1978, Dahl 1971). The theory of elite-led transformations left the possibility open for societies with weak civic traditions to achieve sustainable democratization. Thus, according to Doh Shin, “democracy is no longer treated as a particularly rare and delicate plant that cannot be

transplanted in alien soil; it is treated as a product that can be manufactured wherever there is democratic craftsmanship and the proper zeitgeist” (Shin 1994:141).

Dankward Rustow underscored the importance of prior sense of community, “preferably... quietly taken for granted that is above mere opinion and mere agreement” for the success of democracy”. “The hardest struggles in a democracy are those against the birth defects of the political community” (Rustow 1970: 363). Doh Chull Shin drew attention to the fact that the factor of uncertainty increases risk and facilitates emergence of trust networks during transitions (Shin 1994).

Many of the insights provided by transition theorists are useful for explaining the particularities of Chechen and Ingush post-communist change. Thus, in both republics the role of leadership in regime transformation was very prominent. In Chechnya the lack on agreement on what shape should the political community take (separatist/ Islamist/ national-part of the Russian state) and the overall high political uncertainty were major birth defects of the republican statehood. However, the tendency of transition literature to understate the impact of social agency, the over-emphasis on elite interactions and official institutions, its assumption of the autonomy of political factors and the autonomy of politics with respect to social structure, make this body of research insufficient for studying transitions in less modernized societies with prominent informal social institutions.

During the 1990s transition theories were replaced by the literature on democratic consolidation. Juan Linz defined “a consolidated democracy” as “one in which none of the major political actors, parties or organized interests, forces or institutions consider that there is any alternative to the democratic process to gain power, and that no political institutions or groups has a claim to veto the action of democratically elected decision-makers” (Linz 1990:158). The proliferation of research on democratic consolidation is surprising compared to the scarcity of literature on the failure of democracies and on the consolidation of authoritarian regimes. As had been rightly



noted by Collins “democratization literature has generated few studies of the relationship between informal organizations and regime type and durability” (Collins 2006: 12).

All the theories reviewed in this section provide valuable knowledge on state-building, social change and the problems of democratization. However, most of them shared the perception of state and government as holistic, overemphasized the role of formal institutions and processes, analyzed modernization and democratization as linear and single-directed, and generally did not engage in detailed analysis of social dynamics at micro and meso-levels. Joel Migdal’s state-in-society approach aimed to overcome such biases.

#### 1.2.1. Finding Balance: The “State-in-Society Approach”

Scholars of late state formations in the developing countries as well as students of the Middle Eastern countries were no longer satisfied with the notion of the state as a single monolithic entity that exercises the ultimate monopoly of power in a given territory and looked for models which would provide a more adequate framework for the analysis of state, and society relations (Khury and Kostiner 1991, Migdal 1988, Migdal 1994, Migdal, Kohl and Shue: 2004). The “state-in society perspective” developed by Joel Migdal and like-minded scholars Atul Kohli and Vivien Shue, aimed at a middle-level theory of state and society, provided new directions in comparative politics. According to this approach states are parts of societies, they may help mold, but they are also continuously molded by, the societies in which they are embedded (Migdal 1994:2).

Migdal depicts society as a *mélange* of social organizations, where the groups exercising control in it may be heterogeneous both in their form and the rules they apply, and the distribution of social control may be among them rather than concentrated largely in the state (Migdal 1988: 28). In this *mélange* the state has been one organization among many (Migdal 1988:29).

Moreover, for Migdal states are themselves complex entities, therefore, they must be “disaggregated”. “The overall role of the state in society hinges on the numerous junctures

between its diffuse arts and other social organizations... It is necessary to disaggregate the state, paying special attention to its parts ...to recognize the blurred and moving boundaries between states and societies, and to view states and societies as mutually transforming” (Migdal 1994:3). The state is not a fixed ideological entity. Rather, it embodies an on-going dynamic, a changing set of goals as it engages other social groups (Migdal 1994: 12).

Each organization or social force is an identity group, but also a structure providing life opportunities to an individual - “social control rests on the organizational ability to deliver key components for individual’s strategies of survival” (Migdal 1988: 27). At the same time, joining social forces presupposes a combination of rational strategies and emotional attachments. “In stitching together strategies for survival, people use myths or symbols to help explain their place and prospects in an otherwise bewildering world (Migdal 1988: 27). The allocation of values, however, is not centralized. Numerous systems of justice operate simultaneously (Migdal 1988: 39). In cases when social organizations are in conflict, and each proposes a different vision of good society, individuals must choose among competing components in making their strategies of survival; “these are difficult choices when people also face the possibility of competing sanctions. The state becomes part of such an environment of conflict” (Migdal 1988: 29). The struggles over domination happen through alliances, coalitions, and conflicts in multiple arenas, involving various components of the state and other social forces. (Migdal 1994:17). In the midst of struggles and accommodations, the boundary between the state and other parts of society may continually shift, as powerful social forces appropriate parts of the state or the components of the state co-opt influential social figures (Migdal 1994: 26). One of the case studies in this thesis exemplifies such a set up.

According to Migdal, social control is the currency over which organizations in an environment of conflict fight. In his theory a state can achieve ideal-type patterns of reaction from social groups: *Compliance*, i.e. gaining conformance to its demands by the population, which often comes with the use of the most basic sanctions and force. The ability to control police and the

dispersal of a broad scope of other resources and services also determines the degree to which the state can demand compliance. *Participation* when the leaders of state organization gain strength by organizing the population for specialized tasks in the institutional components of the state organization. *Legitimization* – acceptance, even approbation of the state’s rules of the game, its social control, as true and right (Migdal 1988:33).

Migdal’s understanding of social dynamics within fragmented societies is Hobbesian. Intense competition of elites with various social forces and the weakness of leaders in the face of continued fragmentation of social control has led them to a range of strategies (Migdal calls them “the politics of survival”), aimed at preventing other organizations within society and within the state to develop into strong competitors. These methods include softer policies like unmeritocratic appointments as well as torture, death squads, etc. Social organizations are likewise forced to use elements of such politics. A society with fragmented social control, according to Migdal, leads to the politics of survival (Migdal 1988: 257).

“State in society approach” aims to explain state capacity and the roles of various social forces in shaping politics in low income countries (Migdal, Kohli and Shue 2004: 309). My cases, although post-colonial and ranking low in the economic development, were still moderately industrialized, highly literate and did not have a major problem of poverty. My claim is that in these cases the idea of the “autonomy of the state” has been internalized by the population, which makes the boundaries of the state quite stable and state-society distinction not as fluctuating as in the Migdal’s model. Moreover, when an informal agency tries to capture or infiltrate institutions it is usually aware that it is transgressing on the state’s territory. I also claim that in such a context persisting social organizations prefer peaceful accommodation, while newly emerging *ad hoc* created political units tend to engage in “survival politics”.

### 1.2.2. Neo-Primordialism: “Clan Politics” Approach and the Factor of Kinship

Among the attempts to situate the state within the web of social organizations a prominent place is occupied by the literature on clan politics, which has emerged in the last decade. This approach is mostly developed within regional studies of Central Asia, the most outstanding contributions being Kathleen Collins' „Clan Politics and Regime Transition in Central Asia“ and a book by Edwards Schatz „Modern Clan Politics. The Power of „Blood“ in Kazakhstan and Beyond“ (Collins 1996, Schatz 2004).

The central thesis of Kathleen Collins' thorough comparative study of post-communist Central Asia is that clans played the crucial role in the process of regime transition, transformation and state-building and “were the dominant social actors and political players” of political development (Collins 2006:3, 7). She defines clan as “an informal organization comprising a network of individuals linked by kin and fictive kin identities” (Collins 2006:17). In Collins' theory clans as organizations predated the modern state (Collins 2006: 43) and persisted from pre-modern times (Collins 2006:44) due to their adaptivity and capacity to resist repressive modern states (Collins 2006:67).

In both pre-modern and modern times in Central Asia “clans, tribes and localist networks have generally defined their groups according to kinship identity ties, even though actual blood ties do not always exist, more important than the objective reality of kinship is the subjective sense of identity and the use of norms of kinship – such as in-group reciprocity and loyalty- to bind the group and protect its members” (Collins 2006:17). This bond forms “strong ties” based on tight, predominantly ascriptive relationships and norms; which makes clans boundaries, although not fixed and unchanging, difficult to permeate (Collins 2006: 23). Thus, according to the proposed theory clans are organic, tightly knit kin-based organizations, which persist from pre-modern times and pre-exist any given political regime.

Collins explains how, in her view, clans survived into the twentieth century. According to her, clan members are formally not registered or catalogued by the state, for this reason most state officials have difficulty in identifying or locating the membership and boundaries of clans. Since

their institutions and practices are also informal, the state cannot easily punish or control them. Moreover, late state-building and colonialism are conducive to preservation of clan structures. Such, according to Collins, was the case of Central Asia, where the Russian colonial governance was indirect, limited and weak, and allowed the local population to continue arranging their daily affairs in their own ways (Collins 2006:64). Subsequently, Soviet leaders were more interested in collecting revenues from Central Asia than fully implementing Soviet reforms and modernizing policies. Clans had infiltrated the rural economic system during the 1920s and 1930s, but were kept in check at the upper echelons of power during the Stalinist era. (Collins 2006:104). However, after Stalin's death clans became salient and were informally entrenched in the power structures under Brezhnev", which encouraged the stability of cadre (Collins 2006: 65).

Finally, after the collapse of the USSR clan politics flourished in the conditions of weakened state and political and economic uncertainty. Collins gives a comprehensive, very detailed account of how in each of her case studies elites established informal rules of the game, based on patronage, asset stripping, and "crowding out" of formal institutions through clan-based mobilization, finally resulting in inefficient unconsolidated unstable governments (Collins 2006, 51- 52).

"Clan Politics and Regime Transition in Central Asia" is an important contribution to the body of research on informal politics. Collins rightly points that the studies on the role of society in democratization and transition typically focus on formal social organizations, such as class, labor, parties, but that the role of informal actors is just as crucial (Collins 2006:10). She proposes a vigorously new approach, which "puts clans at the center of the theory of political development" (Collins 2006:7).

In chapter 2 Collins provides her conceptualization of clan, i.e. analysis of clan structure, socio-economic rationale, nature of trust between clan members, internal clan norms, and attempts to make neat terminological distinctions between the notions of "clans", "tribes", "regionalism,"

“clientelism”, and “corruption”. The clan is conceptualized on the basis of findings of sociological, political science and economic literature and studies conducted by other authors in contexts as different as Korea, Japan, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, or late Medieval Genoa and presented as general knowledge on clans. “Clan-based society” is treated by Collins as a generic sociological category, which seems to mistake an empirical claim for an analytical one. Empirically, the existence of clans is not questioned, Collins inquires into “why do clans persist”, not “do they persist”, while the evidence of clans’ omnipresence is exemplified by several episodes of collective behavior, such as rural Elders voting for 20-30 people in parliamentary elections and the weakness of parties as compared to strength of single-mandate candidates in Central Asian parliaments.

When it comes to the analysis of actual political processes in Central Asia the terminology becomes blurred. Collins speaks of “Samarkand clan” or “more narrow Tashkent clan” (Collins: 2006:123) or “Fergana Valley Elites”, which “undercut power of the Jizzak oblast” (Collins: 2006:121). We learn about clans from Chui, Talas, Naryn, and Issyk-Kul regions in Kyrgyzia, or “distribution of power and resources in favor of Leninabad region” in Tajikistan, or deal with “Akaev or Sarugulov clans”, “Ajtmatorov networks” or the rise of Karimov “Family” (Collins: 2006). Thus, clans are “families”, “cliques”, “networks”, ‘oblasts’ and “regions”, which Collins sees as a “variation on the theme”, a claim which is confusing if one wants to scrutinize clan as a social phenomenon. Collins explains that “clan constitutes the identity and social universe of its members”, that it has an intrinsic meaning, and legitimacy and cannot merely change its social constituency (Collins 2006:29, 58). Clan is a hierarchical structure, “any particular clan network includes both elites and non-elites or masses” (Collins 2006: 29). If this is so, it is hard to imagine the two million city of Tashkent to belong to one hierarchical clan organization and share an intrinsic affective identity to it.

Collins admits that clans include representatives of a shared locality, village or regional network, and school and business colleagues, but she integrates them into her theory by including them

into a network of fictive kinship (Collins 2006: 26). It remains unclear how pre-modern kinship communities (92 nomadic Uzbek clans, Ong, Sol, Qipchak and other Kyrgyz clans) transformed over time into current political networks. Any organic social organization with a long history would have stable mechanisms of decision-making and elite recruitment. How did a historical “clan” turn into a “Sarugulov” clan, why did Karimov become a leader, but not the oldest or the wisest of his clan’s Elders and how was he selected; what is the link between a Karimov or a Sarugulov clan with their respective historical clans and is there such a link; does the “Karimov” clan represent any larger community or is it just a major personal network of close relatives, friends, and trusted people who constitute his political and economic “inner circle”? Arguing that the Soviet regime allowed for kin-based nepotism and corruption is not sufficient if one wants to explain the persistence of pre-modern structures into modernity. Moreover, rich kinship does not equal to clanship, a claim that my research aims to exemplify.

My research claims that studying informal politics should be very case-specific. Knowledge of informal politics in different social and political settings should be very critically tested before applied to any other specific social reality. Knowledge of clan structure, socio-economic rationale, nature of trust between members, and internal clan norms in Korea or Medieval Genoa cannot be easily generalized to Central Asia, and knowledge of Central Asia does not automatically apply to Chechnya, which Collins perceives as a vivid illustration of how “interclan tensions may lead to group mobilization and violence”, probably just because kinship is a visible social factor in Chechen society (Collins 2006:41). Without careful anthropological scrutiny of “clans”, without research of descent and kinship patterns in a given community, without analysis of connections between macro- and micro-levels (elites and communities) of informal politics one cannot convincingly argue the persistence of pre-modern structures into the present day political reality.

Edward Schatz’s “Modern Clan Politics. The Power of “Blood” in Kazakhstan and Beyond” defines clans as pre-existing kinship identities, where precise genealogical knowledge is

understood to define membership (Schatz 2004: 26). Schatz picks up Collins' argument that clans managed to persist and avoid oftentimes brutal methods of modernization due to their inherent quality- concealable nature. Stalin eliminated the traditional basis for clan organization, but he replaced it with a novel mechanism: the shortage economy. Soviet scarcity allowed underground networks to access goods and this way reproduce themselves (Schatz 2004:22). "Clan networks were valuable because they were elusive: they could be hidden from the agents of the Soviet surveillance" and this way they survived (Schatz 2004, xxv).

Schatz admits that by the 1990s, however, clan politics was no longer about relatively coherent groups that made demands on everyday behavior and political expression, rather it was about flexible kin-based networks that were a resource for individuals in their political and economic affairs. (Schatz 2004: 45). Clearly, networks of individuals exist in every polity and "the Soviet state promoted tight-knit access networks- whether in Estonia or Moldova or Russia" (Schatz 2004: 48). But in the ex-Soviet South, claims Schatz, "where pre-existing kin-identity divisions provided a ready cultural connection, the result was to shore up sub-ethnic network of access. In Central Asia and in the Caucasus, networks coalesced around genuine kin connections, since sub-ethnic background was considered axiomatic" (Schatz 2004: 61).

Schatz's work, more solidly grounded in ethnographic research compared to Collins's, seems to provide a more fine-tuned picture of social processes in Kazakh urban and rural communities. His analysis shows that subethnic ties vary- they may be rooted not only in kin relations, but also in attachment to a physical place, an ethnic group or Islam (Schatz 2004: 26, 149) Schatz does not scrutinize these other attachments in depth, working from the original assumption that kinship is the dominant sub-ethnic category in society and in politics. Neither does he treat seriously ideological divides. Schatz' theory has no answer to the question of how much "clan politics" is a result of bottom-up promotion of elites from pre-existing kin-structures, or a creation of political elites, who use kinship as one of the resources to sustain powerful, tightly knit inner circles, based on interdependence and trust, and aimed to make these elites strong



players in high risk- environment of authoritarian polities, governed through illegal political and economic practices. Schatz observation that Russians in Kazakhstan, when accessing power start to behave a lot like the “Fourth Umbrella Clan”, is indicative that non-transparent, authoritarian, semi-legal style of government, rather than pre-existing identities is conducive to the emergence of “political clans”.

In some places Schatz’s argument seems to contradict itself. He conceptualizes clan politics as a breed of identity politics, in his view clan cleavages persist because they are the emotional building blocks of identity (Schatz 2004: 12). He emphasizes repeatedly that descent-both fictive and real - is the central operative principle of sub-ethnic clan identity (Schatz 2004: 26). At the same time he argues that the Soviet state deprived clan groupings of their cultural content and “clans were no longer the corporately defined kin groups that dealt with a wide array of cultural, social and political matters. In the post-Soviet period, individuals used kin-networks often without imagining clan as a coherent group” (Schatz 2004: 97). How can a clan play an identity game if it is deprived of cultural essence and is not imagining itself as a group? There is a conceptual tension between Schatz’ argument about concealability as a crucial characteristic of a political clan and his classifying of “clan politics” as a breed of identity politics, by which we usually understand the contrary – a vocal political process aimed at public affirmation, recognition, and acceptance of a minority identity.

My thesis stems from the assumption that the prominence of kin affiliations at the micro-level is not sufficient to proclaim clan-based politics at the macro-level. It will try to tackle the problem of the role of kinship in top-down and bottom up elite formation, treat seriously other sub-ethnic identities (Sufi brotherhoods, Salafi trends, localism, regionalism) and ideology, and scrutinize their impact on state-building and elite formation.

Schatz claims that his theory applies to most of the post-Soviet South and exemplifies his thesis with Chechnya, where “sub-ethnic teips became enshrined in Moscow’s decision to launch a bloody invasion in 1994; some groups were most closely allied with Russia and others more

staunch supporters of independence” (Schatz 2004: xvi). My thesis provides firm evidence against such a generalization.

Scholars of clan politics also work on Chechnya. Thus, an article by Maria Sultan was published in 2003 in the *Central Asian Survey*. In this article Sultan came up with policy proposals aimed to resolve the governability problem in Chechnya. According to Sultan, Chechen society is “tribal and egalitarian in nature”, “divided into nine Tukhums (tribes), subdivided into Teips (or clans), then village-level units and then into individual households”. Moreover, according to her, Chechen society is acephalous (‘without a head’), which means “bordering on anarchic, given the emphasis on equality” and has come “very close to the archetype of democracy, given that it is councils of elders that are the only decision-making authority with any legitimacy in society”. *Mekhk Khel* [*Council of Elders – E.S.*], argues Sultan, is “the main decision-making mechanism, entrusted with the power to adjudicate disputes, to decide on matters of war and peace (Sultan 2003: 437–457).

Sultan sees the essence of the problem that the Russian state has with Chechnya in that “at a deeper societal level, Chechnya, and especially mountain Chechnya, is a case of a traditional (though modernizing) tribal society in conflict with the alien modern nation-state, which for decades has been trying to incorporate tribal areas into itself, thereby flouting the social and legal codes of tribal societies and hence wittingly or unwittingly seeking to undermine the very foundations of society among the tribal peoples”. Sultan stresses this point because she finds that there exists “the fundamental incompatibility between the modern nation-state and a tribal social structure” (Sultan 2003: 437–457).

Based on the outlined above, Sultan suggests to divide Chechnya into lowland and mountainous areas, hoping that the lowlands can accept some kind of union with Russia, and to organize a “Tribal Area” in mountainous Chechnya. This area should be governed by a “Political Agent” who will enforce law via community councils, and through their rulings bring the perpetrators to accountability. “Should the perpetrator be absent, his property can be confiscated; should this

fail, the Political Agent can hold the individual *Teip* responsible for the actions of its member, and force the payment of a ... stipulated fine for the offence. There can then be an entire series of actions in case of refusal, involving blockade of a certain *Teip*, etc. (Sultan 2003: 437–457).

Sultan's research is an example of scholarship, which in the 21<sup>st</sup> century puts forward policy proposals, based on a selective reading of the history of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. This thesis will fully refute all the above outlined claims.

A clan-tribal approach to Chechnya is also adopted by other quite distinguished authors, such as Anatol Lieven who defined the Chechen society as a clan-based “ordered anarchy” (Lieven 1998:331). The ‘ordered anarchy’, wrote Lieven is “whereby a society which appears to be utterly chaotic and riven by internal feud in fact obeys extremely strict rules and restraints in its behavior, and most importantly, in its capacity to mobilize against a common enemy” (Lieven 1998:331). Valeriy Tishkov also found the clan factor relevant in the Chechen society's slipping to war (Tishkov 2004). Clan literature on Chechnya is not as theoretically elaborated as that on Central Asia. That is why in what follows, my conceptual argument will be mostly targeted against the theory of Collins and Schatz. Following Khoury and Kostiner, I will argue that what we observe in contemporary kinship-rich countries are new forms of informal relations which are rarely based on kinship ties alone but rather are a mix of various patterns of social integration, including kinship, religion and political interests (Khoury and Kostiner 1991:18).

The state-in-society approach is a useful methodological framework for analyzing fragmented, kinship-rich, unevenly modernized societies. Clan politics literature offers a vigorously new framework in political science, by claiming that a lot of what we see as formal institutions actually belongs to the sphere of informal politics. This thesis shares the original position of Migdal that the state is one of societies' organizations and combines with the belief of clan politics authors that kinship matters as a political factor in the North Caucasus. The empirical part of this research will evaluate the relative autonomy of state structures, and stability of state-society divisions as they are perceived by the populations under study. Chapters 2-4 will

scrutinize social change in the North Caucasus prior to state-building efforts and following Migdal will claim that “massive societal dislocation, which severely weakens social control” and local strongmen coupled with impressive modernization and literacy created conditions for building effective democratic government (Migdal 1988: 269).

The North Caucasus represents a different social reality if compared to the low-income, low-literacy, agrarian societies of the Third World, which Migdal’s theory aimed at explaining. This research will try to combine the informal politics factor with the analysis of formal political processes, paying sufficient attention to organic ties of kinship as well as to other social integrative patterns formed on the basis of political ideology, territory and religion.

### 1.3. Kinship in Anthropological Theory

Kinship is a traditional object of analysis in social anthropology, which managed to become central to this discipline. For most of the history of anthropological thought, kinship has been seen as a social structure characteristic of any society, larger structures based on kinship exist in many parts of the world, which are usually called descent groups and are conceived as long-chains of parent-to-child ties stretching back for generations (Parkin and Stone 2004). In this section I review the main debates in anthropological theory of descent and kinship, which are relevant to this thesis.

The first influential kinship theory was outlined in Henry Maine’s “*Ancient Law*” published in 1861. Maine based his theory of patriarchal order on the analysis of Greek and Roman authors and cases of Roman jurisprudence. According to him, at the origins of human societies were individual families, held together by the authority of the eldest male patriarch. In the process of evolution, when the Patriarch died, his children and families stayed together. Extended families organized along a unilineal principle eventually formed the first primitive polities. The unilateral kinship corporations ensured continuity and thus became subjects of primitive jurisprudence. It was only later that the communities integrated on the basis of kinship

transformed into societies bound by territorial attachment (Maine 1861). In Maine's view the development of human societies was from families through large descent groups to states. Simultaneously, as the polities grew, the family was getting smaller and less patrilineal (Maine 1861).

Another founding father of anthropology of kinship was Lewis Morgan, whose "*Systems of Consanguinity and Affinity in Human Family*" published in 1870 and "*Ancient society*" which came out in 1877 have probably been the most passionately criticized research in the discipline, yet this work still remains the cornerstone of kinship studies. An American lawyer, Morgan was interested in the Iroquois and represented their interests in land rights disputes. He continued his research in Asia and among other tribes of North American Indians. Eventually he discovered that kinship terminology was similar among Iroquois and in quite a number of other tribes and had a generational principle of distinction, whereby all males of each generation had one term, while all females of each generation had another term.

Morgan tried to explain this system of kinship with a theory of primitive promiscuity which, in his view, was the primordial social order of human societies. Primitive societies were divided into hordes with no form of marriage or restriction on sexual intercourse. In such situations children could be identified with their mothers with some certainty, while their father's identities remained obscure in most of cases. Contrary to Maine, in Morgan's view the evolution of humanity was from communal marriage through polygamy/ polygyny to nuclear families. Primitive promiscuity has not been recorded anywhere in written history, but Morgan deduced it on the basis of his conviction that terms of kinship should reflect biological relationships (Morgan (1861)1997). For this he was strongly criticized by his followers and accused of imposing his own European notion of kinship (as biological tie) on societies that he researched. Morgan's contemporary McLennan argued that his classificatory systems of kinship were nothing more than a code of ceremonial addresses, salutations and courtesies (McLennan:

1876/1998), while Alfred Kroeber in 1909 considered them to be determined by language and “reflecting psychology, not sociology” (Kroeber 1909:84).

Morgan’s extravagant vision of human evolution, speculative findings and “glaring fallacies in reasoning”, but most of all his invention of a misleading and unappealing model of primitive “communism in women and property” (Fortes 1969: 5) made his work almost obliterated within the discipline until another prominent anthropologist Fortes brought him back to academic life (Fortes 1969). Fortes argues that what is nowadays called structural theory in the study of kinship and social organization originates not in the historical, but in the conceptual sense from Morgan. Morgan was the first to view kinship as a system and underscored the necessity to understand this system in relation to action. In his “Ancient society” Morgan introduced a distinction which later became central to the anthropology of kinship i.e. that between “kinship” and “descent”, between ‘domestic’ and ‘political’ uses of kinship. Morgan wrote that the family can not be a basic unit of social organization, because families are made up of spouses of both sexes, and if ties through both sexes are recognized, then kinship cannot provide basis for the establishment of exclusive groups (in: Harris 1990: 14, 15). For exclusive groups to emerge they have to be based on the principle of unilineal descent. The unilineal system of group formation is seen as a cultural distortion of a natural state of affairs, which presupposes bilateral families. Moreover, if human species are endogamous, clans are exogamous. Groups of descent are thus cultural distortions and social organizations, which have a political and economic character, but nonetheless are defined in kinship terms (in: Harris 1990: 14, 15).

Morgan’s approach to the study of kinship inspired a methodological debate, which has relevance to the present research. Anthropology like no other discipline relies heavily on participant observation and ethnography, both of which pose a methodological problem of the researcher’s bias. It was an American scholar, Franz Boas, who vigorously advocated participant observation, but also introduced the argument of cultural relativity into the anthropological debate. An anthropologist researching a society different from his own runs the

danger of imposing his own culturally determined perspectives on the society which he studies. Boas argued that one has to understand a social or cultural phenomenon in terms and concepts accepted in a given culture rather than try to fit them into existing Western categories. In his late research of the Kwakiutl clans he argued even against translating the indigenous term “*numaym*” as “clan,” and claimed that *numaym* was a certain set of privileges, for which there is no corresponding term in English (Boas 1970). Boas’ cultural relativism argument later resulted in a division of anthropological categories into “*emic*” (indigenous concepts and categories) and “*etic*” (external concepts and categories used by the anthropologists to compare societies) (Stone 2004: 244).

Malinowski developed Morgan’s idea that the family is always the domestic institution *par excellence*, while the clan is never domestic, and claimed that bonds of clanship develop much later as an extension of the primary family sentiment (Kuper 2004). Malinowski considered the family to be based on kinship, to have the bilateral nature and to consist of the totality of a person’s kin relations in all directions, while descent was seen as unilineal, political and connecting an individual with his senior and younger relatives in a direct line. Rivers associated a clan with a specific territory, but considered that territorial tie was one bond which kept the members of a clan together, but the belief in common decent rather than habitation of a common territory was more prominent (Rivers 2004: 22-23). In Britain the clan model was gradually replaced by the lineage model, which was defined as a segmentary political organization, corporate, exogamous, localized descent group (Middleton, Tait 1958). Radcliffe-Brown in his “Patrilineal and Matrilineal Succession” argued that clan or lineage was an organization which transcended an individual, and thus formed the basis of the social system, which required continuity by basing itself on stable corporate groups transcending their individual members (Radcliffe-Brown 1935, 1952).

Fortes considered kinship bilateral and arising out of a private and reproductive sphere, while descent being concerned with allocation of individuals to corporate groups whose significance is

jural and political. (Fortes 1969:10). But for Fortes the distinction between kinship and descent is not between separate spheres or different relationships, but between two aspects of a relationship. Both the family and the descent group have a politico-jural and kin aspects, since lineage reproduces itself through the family, and perpetuation and segmentation of the lineage happens as a result of cleavages between family members or generations. Kinship relations were between individuals, “clan relations” - between groups (Fortes 1953:33). For Fortes bilateral kinship relations were important for binding together the major groups by filiation through marriage. Fortes uses the term “complementary filiation” to refer to the recognition of ties through whom descent is not traced. This way Fortes follows Durkheimian logic, his descent groups are Durkheim’s segments of a primitive social system linked through mechanical solidarity based on likeness, and integrated within and between segments on the basis of kinship (Harris 1990: 25). In such a society the clans, which were essentially similar could occasionally die out without impairing the society as a whole (Parkin and Stone 2004: 11).

An important debate on the issue of the nature of social integration and stability in clan-based societies took place between Fortes and Levi-Strauss. The latter claimed in his seminal book *Elementary structures of Kinship* (1969) that the ultimate origin of social solidarity was not filiation, but exchange. In Levi-Strauss view the incest taboo, which exists in most societies encourages individuals to look for mates outside their kin group. The underlying demand for continued circulation of women keeps various clans peacefully related. This produces a society, which consists of a number of exclusive groups which exchange mates, and it is about the only reason why such decent groups need each other. Thus the most primitive form of social solidarity is that of exchange, which is being understood in terms of reciprocity (Levi-Strauss 1969). Alliance interpretation of social integration preserves the distinctness of the boundary between descent groups, while the descent theory blurs it (Harris 1990: 25). My research findings lean closer to Fortes interpretation of social integration between kinship groups through “complimentary filiation”.



The relation between territory and descent is another debated issue in social anthropology. In the functionalist model the principle of descent was functionally united with territory. The segmentary lineage system was a system of values which linked tribal segments and provided the idiom in which their relations could be expressed and directed (Evans-Pritchard 1940 212). Fortes considered lineage and locality to be independently variable and their interaction depended on circumstances of the individual social structure. According to him, local ties were secondary and did not provide structural bonds by themselves (Fortes 1953: 36 in Kuper: 2004: 89). Leach, on the contrary, considered territory to be reality, while descent to be fiction. In his view, both descent and kinship were idioms, manipulated by individuals for their private ends. Communities are not defined by descent, but by territory from which individuals derive their livelihoods (Leach 1962: 300 in Kuper 2004:90).

A big shift in anthropology of kinship was initiated by David Schneider, an American anthropologist, who stretched the relativist argument to the utmost and claimed that kinship was non-existent as a category that can be compared. Schneider started by arguing that anthropology of kinship was engaged in studying genealogy, which was based on a biological perception of kin. This, according to Schneider, was a Eurocentric view, and did not correspond to the way many societies viewed how their relations were linked to procreation (for example, Yapese did not have a concept of fatherhood and thought that children were made by ghosts). Moreover, a lot of kinship was social (adoptions, fictive kinship). Kinship was a product of anthropologists' efforts, and the way it was constructed by scholars it "does not correspond to any society known to man" (Schneider 1968:50).

In the early 1970s Schneider carried out a research of American attitudes towards kinship and the meanings of kinship, the terminology and symbols that Americans associated with kin relations. Schneider's main finding was that the Americans had no specific concept of kinship and that they shared what was previously understood as specific features of kinship with nationhood and religion. In Schneider's view to be taken as a valid analytical category kinship had to be

conceptualized as biological at the *emic* level, moreover, it had to have a specific set of characteristics not shared with any other domain of human affairs. Schneider's solution was to make a shift from analyzing kinship as a social organization to taking it purely as a cultural phenomenon and instead of starting to analyze societies by reconstructing genealogies and interpreting kin terms, to start by asking how any specific society understands and organizes itself around the fact of biological relatedness. Moreover, in order to claim that a kinship system exists one has to differentiate it from other universals - economics, politics, and ritual. Only then can we claim that a separate domain of kinship exists, which becomes a contingent matter (Schneider 1968).

Schneider's critique was devastating to the discipline and inspired revision and even deconstruction of the main concepts and categories employed by the anthropology of kinship. Some authors, like Janet Carsten and her co-authors in an edited volume "Cultures of Relatedness. New Approaches to the Study of Kinship", dropped the very term 'kinship', and introduced the concept of 'relatedness', which was used "in opposition to or alongside, 'kinship' in order to signal an openness to the indigenous idioms of being related rather than reliance on pre-given definitions or previous versions" (Carsten 2000: 4:). Students of kinship focused more on its emotional and gender aspects, its creative potential, as well as the process of "becoming connected", which involved food-sharing, affection, nurture and substance sharing in the local micro-environments (Lambert 2000, Yanagisako, Collier 2004, Fienup-Riordan 1983).

The Schneiderian theory that regards kinship as a purely cultural phenomenon does not make the pre-existing social anthropology of kinship irrelevant. However, following Harris, his message is that the methods of social anthropology are fundamentally misconceived in their attempts to establish general categories of analysis in anthropology (Harris 1990: 45). This lesson drawn from Schneider is relevant for my research: during most of my fieldwork (for about 4 years) I did not question people about the *etic* categories of kinship, like "clan" or "lineage" or "family". Rather, I observed *how* kinship relations were organized in society and *how* these structures

related to the overall system of social relations. Having mapped these relationships, as they are organized at the *emic* level, I then tried to conceptualize them at the *etic* level. This is the main difference between my approach and that of clan literature authors like Collins and Schatz quoted in the previous section. In chapters 5-7 I do not start with the role of clans in my analysis of political processes. I start by scrutinizing the state-building efforts and by singling out the main political actors and social forces participant in the political processes. I go on sorting out the principles of organization and mechanisms of integration of those actors as well as their social composition, the prominence of kinship and descent groups in their social make-up. I then establish the overlap between the political and the social patterns of integration in these societies. Other important debates in social anthropology, which are relevant for my study, are related to the debate on to which degree kinship is biological or social or even ‘fictive’ in certain ways. A famous discussion on this matter took place between Needham and Gellner, in which I find Gellner’s argument more persuasive and relevant for my analysis, and therefore discuss it below at some length.

According to Needham: “biology is one matter and descent is quite another, of a different order”. For him the defining character of descent systems is social. He gives the example of adoptions or leviratic marriage<sup>2</sup> to prove how social kinship does not correspond to biological (Needham 1960: 97). Gellner argues that Needham’s understanding of kinship is erroneous, that both adoption and “leviratic marriage” imitate biological kinship relations, and the “very possibility of classifying off-spring as adoptive, depends on the observer’s knowledge of the disparity between the social and the physical relationship and it is this disparity which gives the term its meaning (Gellner 1987:165).

For Gellner the physical and social kinship systematically overlap and to deny that is to deprive kinship theory of any explanatory power: “to say that (merely) social kinship and (merely) social birth and the connection with the physical kinship or birth were merely contingent and sociologically irrelevant” means to say “that simpler societies have some kind of structure or

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<sup>2</sup> When brother marries his brother’s widow and raises his children

relationships, and that a man's social position is determined by something..." (Gellner 1987: 165).

Gellner acknowledges that social kinship systems are not identical with the reality of physical kinship, and it is important not to equate kinship beliefs with kinship reality, being aware that there are frequent situations, when "genealogies became untrue or after the fourth generation men will name correctly their grandfather and perhaps his father, but beyond that relatives are simply "arranged" so as to express, symbolize sub-groups existing in the tribe now» (Gellner 1987:169). At the same time, in his view the reason why "clan" is being discussed as a kinship structure is not because clansmen subscribe to the myth of common ancestry (although they do), but because the relationship of belonging to a clan satisfies the initially set up criterion for classifying a social relationship under the rubric of kinship structure (Gellner 1987: 169). Clan is a concept essentially related to other concepts – they might be "sub-clan" or "lineage" or "extended family" which in turn do denote groups for whom some social reality ....does have a reasonable and systematic congruence with some kinship affinity (Gellner 1987:168).

In short, in Gellner's view social kinship relationships are superimposed on social structures, which are molded exclusively by the pattern of mating, since human biology is universal and does not vary sufficiently. It is the social recognition of physical kinship, the kinds of physical relationships utilized for group-membership recruitment that vary from society to society and they should be researched and explained (Gellner 1987:176).

My fieldwork in Ingushetia and Chechnya supports Gellner's position that the biological aspect of kinship is taken very seriously in these societies. In my context the Gellnerian proposition that in kinship relations "fictive" patterns (mainly adoptions) imitate biological kinship, follow the same logic and thus do not distort the overall structure. My research proves that the notion of fictive kinship in Chechen and Ingush societies cannot be stretched too far: unlike Collins, whose notion of fictive kinship in Central Asian societies includes neighbors and friends, my respondents were always very clear of who was a relative and who was not, who belonged to the

kinship group and who - to a more broadly defined inner circle. These were treated differently and the relationship with them involved a different set of rights and obligations. This is an important finding which refutes the claim of the clan politics argument that neighbors and friends should not be analytically differentiated from kinship and are a variation on the theme.

Descent in Chechnya and Ingushetia is generally conceptualized in kinship terms; however, clans have become too big and fragmented to be truly believed to be biological. Teips have indeed become social, and they use kinship as an idiom, rather than as a set of rights, obligations and duties. This, in my view, is another proof of the clan's disintegration as a social structure: the core idea of biological relatedness has been lost, the social function of the structure has become irrelevant, and what remains is just a vague clan identity, which is fading away. Lineages, are indeed, more tightly knit and do share the sentiment of biological relatedness. They, rather than teips are the remaining splinters of the once powerful Wajnakh clanship. As has been rightly pinpointed by Harris, genealogical distance has a fading effect, the relationship becomes weaker, the possibility of evasion of kinship duties - stronger. In more distant relationships, while kinship ties are equally ascribed, they can be paradoxically chosen on the basis of personal liking (Harris 1990:62). This often transforms them into a relationship of a different kind.

The notion of kinship has a distinctive normative content, which is the moral character of kinship, a morality, which cannot be reduced to self-interest (Harris 1990: 42). Pitt-Rivers and Meyer Fortes classified kinship as a relation of amicability which is warranted by a biological idiom of identity of substance (Pitt-Rivers in Harris 1990: 43, Fortes 1965). But in Harris' view, kinship relations, more than any other imply a set of obligations and duties. To perform a duty is not necessarily an act of amity or altruism. Moreover, as empirical evidence shows, kinship in many cases involves rivalry and conflict. Kinship obligations are unspecified in nature, which provides opportunity for negotiation and bargaining, rather, kinship pre-supposes a kind of relation, which excludes egoistic calculation (Harris 1990:60). Most authors note that kinship is based on a high degree of trust, and the longer the period of exchange, the longer the trust.

Kinship relationships involve exchange, but not equivalent to exchange. They are concerned with advantage, but not the calculation of advantage (Harris 1990: 61)

Peter Schweitzer and his co-authors of an edited volume “*Dividends of Kinship. Meanings and uses of social relatedness*” are more straightforward than Harris in exploring the instrumental value of kinship in particular instances, mostly in economy, throughout the volume frequently resorting to market metaphors in the analysis of their case-studies. Schweitzer likens his understanding of kinship as ‘dividend’ to Bourdieu’s usage of cultural, social, symbolic ‘capital’. For him economic benefits are among the most visible dividends of kinship, but kinship cannot be reduced to rational choice of pure pursuit of economic interests, but are “part of a much larger package, that also includes emotions, mental health, group cohesion, etc (Schweitzer 2000:16). This understanding of the dual nature of kinship as an ascriptive, affective bond and as a resource, is relevant for my empirical research.

To sum up, this thesis borrows from the anthropological debates on the concept of kinship: 1) the distinction between ‘kinship’ and ‘descent’; 2) the distinction between *emic* and *etic* visions of social structures; 3) the Schneiderian methodology of not imposing *emic* visions on the researched societies and of starting the research of kinship from the scratch, from analyzing *how* kinship relations were organized in the given context and *how* these structures related to the overall system of social relations. It will also use Fortes notion of complimentary filiation as well as benefit from Schweitzer’s understanding of kinship not only as an affective tie, but as a social resource.

#### 1.4. Trust Networks and the „Economy of Favors“

Both classic and contemporary research emphasizes the fundamental importance of trust in social relations. The roots of trust and its institutionalization is found from a child’s birth within the family and kinship settings to the broader society. Several aspects of structuring the institutional order tend to exacerbate the problems of breaking up and reorganization of trust. The flow of resources can be structured along „market“ or institutional interrelations and

exchange or through what is called generalized exchange, which is based on certain rules of reciprocity. In all societies the generalized exchange is at least to some degree upheld by more informal, yet very pervasive networks of solidatory relations or trust (Eisendstadt 1997: 37).

Economists claim that trust networks are particularly relevant in the situations of risk, where uncertain enforcement of contracts or high information costs are not uncommon, they provide cheap security to an economic actor (Landa 1994: 101). Usually it is assumed that such groups are kin-based, and solidarity exists prior to entering economic or public relations. My thesis will supplement and confront this point by analyzing the historical and anthropological material to confirm that, indeed, informal networks are prominent in many aspects of social life, including politics, however, they are 1) not descent /kinship based, although they oftentimes use kinship as a prominent mechanism of recruitment 2) not organic and preexisting any particular trust groups, but usually ad hoc created and building up trust in action .

I will support my claims by the framework provided by Charles Tilly's theory of trust networks outlined in his *Trust and Rule* published in 2005 and Granovetter's framework of strong and weak ties.

According to Tilly, networks reach into every corner of social life. They include communication, mutual recognition, shared participation in some activity, flows of goods or services... and other forms of consequential interaction and include any set of similar connections among three or more social sites. (Tilly 2005:5,7).

Tilly defines trust in terms of risk. For him, trust networks consist of "ramified interpersonal connections, consisting mainly of strong ties, within which people set valued, consequential, long-term resources and enterprises at risk to the malfeasance, mistakes or failures of others" (Tilly 2005: 12). Trust networks place a major value on common enterprise, *inter alia* protection of personal secrets, high risk politics, they build controls over malfeasance and safeguards against consequences of mistakes and failures into their routine operation, and involve in noncontentious politics more regularly and usually more consequentially than in contentious

politics (Tilly 2005: 6). Tilly claims that groups not linked by kinship, but by religion, political commitment or trade can acquire and maintain very strong kinlike solidarity. Moreover, trust does not necessarily have to be pre-existent but develops over time (Tilly 2005: 9).

Tilly finds two ways how trust networks integrate with the state – indirectly, „when the trust networks extend into politically engaged actors that in turn bargain with each other and with governments over the allocation of politically mediated costs and benefits“ and directly, when trust networks extend into the government itself (Tilly 2005:7). When leaders become indispensable to the operation and reproduction of trust networks and guarantee the means of maintaining them, government rule becomes more stable. Conversely, increasing alternatives of the ruler’s intervention and decreasing reliability of that intervention promote instability (Tilly 2005: 50).

Borrowing from Charles Tilly’s concept of trust network as a risk management strategy this thesis will argue that trust networks do not have to necessarily be based on strong common identity, but that political and economic interests in a high risk environment produces similarly tight networks of access, mutual economic dependence, and risk-sharing. Such relationships I will call „strong ties“.

The notions of “strong” and “weak” ties have been explored in sociology since the 1960s. The most comprehensive theory of strong and weak ties was developed by Mark Granovetter, who defined the strength of a tie as a (linear) combination of the amount of time, the emotional intensity, the intimacy (mutual confiding), and the reciprocal services which characterize the tie (Granovetter 1973: 1361). The strength of a tie could be roughly established on an intuitive basis, and Granovetter distinguishes between strong, weak, or absent (or negligible) ties which can be multi- or uni-dimensional. Previously Kapferer suggested that a strong tie is characterized by "multiplexity," that is, multiple contents in a relationship (Kapferer 1969, p. 213). Granovetter and Simmel argued that although this may be true in some circumstances, ties with one content may be strong as well (Granovetter 1973: 1361, Simmel 1950: 317-29). But the



strong tie is positive and symmetric. This insight is relevant for the present study, which will claim that corrupt and oppressive regimes develop very strong, one-dimensional ties primarily based on mutual economic interest. Thus, controlling for the strength of ties is important for improving the quality of governance.

For Granovetter strong ties include relatives and close friends. Weak ties are acquaintances of various kinds. The importance of weak ties is growing with the evolution of social systems, especially with the division of labor since increasing specialization and interdependence result in a wide variety of specialized role relationships in which one knows only a small segment of the other's personality. Various studies conclude that the level of education, income and mobility have an impact on the significance of one's weak ties, which, in Granovetter's theory have a prominent function of serving as bridges of one's inner circle to various types of other social circles (Lin et al. 1981, Lomnitz 1977, Granovetter 1973).

In this thesis I will adopt Granovetter's distinction between strong and weak ties and use it for the analysis of the formation of the governments and political elites. In my research I deprive the notion of "strong ties" of Granovetter's emotional intensity and positive affection, and emphasize Tilly's interdependence and trust. I thus define strong ties in politics as an interrelation of trust which involves 1) informality and intimacy (mutual confounding in risks), 2) reciprocal services and 3) strong interdependence, when people set valued, consequential enterprises at risk to the malfeasance, mistakes or failures of others. Weak ties are loose connections, which are predominantly formal, procedural and do not involve strong interdependence or mutual confounding in risks.

The functioning of informal networks of trust is best described by Alena Ledeneva in her two books on the Russian informal economy and politics. „Nelzya, no mozžno“ (prohibited but possible), a Russian phrase, which in Ledeneva's view summarised the principles of function of the Soviet economy and distribution of public goods – „an all embracing restrictions and the

labyrinth of possibilities around them“ (Ledeneva 1998: 1). *Blat*, which Ledeneva claims is a very culture specific phenomenon, indicates a set of personal connections which can be mobilized in acquiring desired commodities outside the official system. Blat networks emerged in Soviet times as a response to the structural constraints of the Soviet system, but smoothly traveled into the post-Soviet era transforming into networks of trust, a new institution of „svoi ludi“ (people of the circle).

Blat is a term which has no exact translation into English, it can mean many different things in different contexts, which are hard to reduce to a common ground:

*...blat is an acquaintance or friend through whom you can obtain some goods or services in short supply, cheaper or better quality. Also blat is a reciprocal relationship, which people call „Ty-mne, ya-tebe“ (You help me, I help you). Blat is about using informal contacts, based on mutual sympathy and trust, that is using friends, acquaintances, occasional contacts. Blat also takes place when one arranges a good job for another, or where, on otherwise equal conditions, the one who is known or recommended gets chosen. Sometimes blat means influence and protection, all kinds of ‚umbrellas‘ (kryshi), using big names – so called „I am from Ivan Ivanovich“ – introductions (Ledeneva 1998: 34).*

Thus, blat is a form of non-monetary exchange, a barter based on personal relationships. The object of blat is not a direct exchange, but an exchange of favors over a prolonged period of time provided at the public's expense. Moreover, blat exchange is often mediated by a rhetoric of friendship, of mutual support of friendly care (Ledeneva 1998: 37). In Ledeneva's view, blat was the „reverse side“ of an overcontrolling Soviet state, a response to the structural constraints of the Soviet system of distribution and shortage and most of blat practices withered away, when the shortage economy was replaced with the shortage of money (Ledeneva 1998: 3). Many elements of blat are gone, but the principles of its functioning, the ways people acquire scarce resources or services or evade law for their benefit remain.

In her next book „How Russia Really Works. The Informal Practices that Shaped post-Soviet Politics and Business“ Ledeneva analyses the informal practices of post-Soviet times, such as *krugovaya poruka* (joint responsibility), a variety of scheming business and law enforcement, including double bookkeeping, bribery, intricate privatization schemes, and corporate

governance. These post-Soviet practices are more exclusive than the wide-spread practice of *blat* and are limited to closed circles of professional elites and individuals who understand one another (Ledeneva 2006: 4).

In Post-Soviet Russia, claims Ledeneva quoting data by INDEM, the sum of 2.8 billion \$ per year is paid in bribes by private citizens, only 10% of which is „household corruption“, while business corruption constitutes 90% of bribes spent for export licencing, quotas, tax transfers, privatization deals and servicing debts to the federal budget (Ledeneva 2006:2). Informal practices exist in every society, but predominate in environments, where „formal rules and informal norms are not synchronized and where rules of the game are consequently incoherent, where laws are applied unevenly and arbitrarily, where executive power dominates prosecutors, police, and often courts. The stability is preserved by means of an informal order, guaranteed by mutual control exercised within informal networks or the ties of *krugovaya poruka* – a key term in explaining how Russian politics work (Ledeneva 2006: 90).

*Krugovaya poruka* presupposes mutual responsibility for a common undertaking, when an individual is part of a bigger system, of an inner circle, where he is encouraged to seek protection and repay favors in a long-term relationship of mutual dependency and where governance is „by flexible ethical standards rather than by strict rule of law“ (Ledeneva 2006:113). „Corporatism“ - another term of Post-Soviet political-economic reality is used to denote two things, first „whom an opportunity will be given to“ and second „trust aimed at reducing the complexity of an unstable and high-risk environment“ (Ledeneva 2006: 211).

The informal networks, networks of interests and networks of control, ensuring trust and reducing risks are in fact indispensable in post-Soviet Russia. So they are in post-Soviet Ingushetia and Chechnya (Ledeneva 2006: 211).

The analytical concepts of trust network, *krugovaya poruka*, corporatism, *blat* and access networks proposed by Tilly and Ledeneva will help explain the social mechanisms of political networking within the process of state-building in Wajnak societies. Based on my knowledge of

the local context, I hypothesize that four internal constraints may have an impact on the nature of ties within the government: 1) the system of checks and balances, which is conducive to controlling for nepotism, 2) organized opposition, which serves as a watchdog against governments, misuse of arbitrary appointments and 3) the environment of risk, both the risk of physical elimination or the risk of prosecution for committed economic crimes are conducive to tightening and strengthening the elites' inner circle. I will test this hypothesis in the subsequent chapters.

## Conclusion

This chapter outlined social science approaches to the problem of late state-building and its interaction with informal patterns of social integration, and positioned my thesis in the classic and current literature, debates and methodological frameworks. After reviewing state-centric studies of state-building, classical and contemporary literature on modernization, democratization and consolidation, I argued that despite many valuable insights this body of literature cannot explain state-building in non-western, late-coming, fragmented polities.

I focused on the „state-in-society“ approach by Joel Migdal, which views the state as one of the social organizations, but argued that clan politics literature on Central Asia and the Caucasus that developed as part of this approach misplaces its focus when studying political integration in the region as based on clans. I analyzed the main debates in anthropology of kinship studies on informal politics that are relevant for my thesis, utilized Tilly's theory of trust networks, borrowed definitions from Granovetter's theory of strong and weak ties and from Ledeneva's framework for the analysis of the Russian „economy of favors“.

## **2. Political Order, Informal Institutions and Social Integration before Colonization and in the Russian Empire**

Informal institutions are often characterized as highly resistant to change, and possessing strong survival ability. Yet informal institutions and patterns of social integration do change—and often quite quickly (Helmke, Levitsky: 2003: 732). State policies can often give a strong impetus to change of informal actors and patterns of social integration, while they, in their turn, affect government policies. The following chapter will provide the historical context to the thesis: summarize scholarly knowledge on traditional political and legal institutions and social structures of Chechens and Ingush and the process of transformation of the informal social institutions of the Teip and *wird* in Ingush and Chechen societies prior to the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917.

The first part deals with political order and structures of the Chechen and Ingush societies before the Caucasian War of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. I will scrutinize the issues related to the specificities of Nakh feudalism, which on the one hand, helped the local communities to secure themselves from local aggressors and the colonial superpowers, but on the other, allowed Wajnakhs to preserve their largely egalitarian political structure. The part will also demonstrate that feudalization, loose as it was, has facilitated societal changes within and between Wajnakh teips, while economic differentiation created asymmetries of power.

The second part deals with the Caucasian War (1818-1864), which produced a major social change: the destruction of traditional economic systems, multiple resettlements, mass extermination of male population, spread of Sufi Islam, which had a strong impact on the public order and social institutions of the Wainakhs. In this part I will analyze Shamil's Imamate. The Imamate represented the first attempt to submerge competing traditional institutions and erase distinctions between various patterns of social integration, replace traditional law by Islamic law,

build a superstructure on top of the traditional Wajnakh structure and this way to push traditional institutions into the domain of local issues, limited to village communities.

By bringing historical sources, the chapter argues against the claim of the unchangeable nature of Wajnakh social institutions and shows that clans (teip) had decomposed already by the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. It also shows that Imam Shamil managed to impose a state structure that was rather autonomous from society and thus to draw the frontier between the state and society. The chapter also demonstrates how state structures had gradually marginalized primordial structures by pushing them outside the political system and in this way reconfigured their functions.

## 2. 1. Political Order and Social Institutions Prior to the Caucasian War (- 1817)

Proto- Chechen and Ingush tribes have inhabited the North Caucasus at least since the 1<sup>st</sup> centuries B.C (Krupnov 1960, 1971, Vinogradov and Chokaev 1966, Akhmadov 2001, Martirosian 1933, Desheriev 2006). The oriole of their settlement was immediately adjacent to the Main Caucasian Ridge, which kept the tribes isolated. At the same time, two major passageways, connecting the Great steppe with Transcaucasia and the Middle East lie in close proximity to the Wajnakh lands. Peoples and tribes who moved through these passageways brought with them new cultural impulses-novel forms of political and social organisation, more advanced crafts, weapons, items of daily household and luxury (Krupnov 1960: 45). Due to this, archaeologists claim, being at the periphery of great civilizations, the North Caucasian mountaineers had a good knowledge of technology, weapons and various forms of government. In the 1262-late 1390s North Caucasus was the area of Mongol intestine wars and significant Mongol troops were concentrated in the area of the Daryal Gorge. As a way of protection, the Nakh population migrated high into the mountains and this way remained relatively untouched by the Mongol invasions. (Akhmadov 2001: 227). In 1395 the Nakhs suffered a major defeat from the legendary Timur, whose hoards went into the mountains and eliminated hundreds of Nakh villages, burnt pastures, destroyed churches and pagan heathens, killed and turned the

population into slavery (Akhmadov 2001:234). Some Chechen historians claim that the teips emerged at that time. The Chechen tribes destroyed by Timur, fragmented into smaller social units and dispersed in the mountains, temporarily breaking apart in order to come back together again in better times. “The people had to save their lives and it had to instinctively develop mechanisms of self-preservation in such conditions”, explained Magomed Muzaev, a Chechen historian and currently the director of the State Department of Archives of the Government of the Chechen Republic (Muzaev, interview 2008).

As a result of Timur’s invasion the plains were deserted and after his departure the *Kabartay*, a semi-nomadic Turkic-speaking Circassian people, settled there. Chechens migrated back on the plain since the 16<sup>th</sup> century, while Ingush made their way from the mountains in the late 17<sup>th</sup> century overcoming strong resistance of the Kabardines (Akhmadov:2001: Kodzoev: 202:148).

After the conquest of the Astrakhan Khanate in 1556 the Russian Empire received access to the Caucasus, in the second half of the 16<sup>th</sup> century communities of Russian Cossacks emerged on the banks of Terek river (Shnirelman 2000:264). With the strengthening of the Ottoman Empire in the early 16<sup>th</sup> century, its allies and vassals – the Crimean khans – also strove to annex the North Caucasian societies. In 1519 the Safavids conquered Georgia and in between 1524-1574 they tried to advance to the North Caucasus, Southern Nakhs were involved in these wars on the Georgian side. Thus, since the 16<sup>th</sup> century North Caucasus became the object of simultaneous influence by three regional powers - the Ottoman Empire, the Safavit Empire and Russia. Each tried to strengthen its positions in the region, and had its supporters and vassals among local communities.

In the 18<sup>th</sup> century lowland Chechnya was increasingly becoming oriented towards Russia (Akhmadov 2001:328). The Ingush historian Kodzoev noted the same trend among Ingush. In 1758 the first delegation of nine Ingush Elders gave an oath of allegiance to Russia in the town of Kyzlyar. By 1771 most of Ingush societies gave oath of allegiance to Russia (Kodzoev: 2002:

153). Joining Russia accelerated Ingush descend to the plains. By the end of 18<sup>th</sup> century trade and economic relations with Russian towns encouraged pro-Russian orientation of Nakhs societies and was conducive to the beginning of the process of their integration into the Russian state.

In 1781 there was another wave of swearing allegiances to the Russian state by Chechen societies, which in the Soviet times was represented as the act of "voluntary incorporation into Russia" by the peoples of Checheno-Ingushetia. "This [voluntary incorporation- E.S. ] of course had nothing to do with the historical truth", claims a Chechen historian Yavus Akhmadov (Akhmadov 2001:332). According to a number of regional scholars, the first peaceful period of the Russian colonization of the Caucasus was successful: and in the 17-18<sup>th</sup> centuries many North Caucasian lowland and mountain societies sought political alliances and protection from Russia, especially against the powerful *Kabartoy* (Gakaev 1999:10; Kodzoev 2002:153; Tsutsiev 1998: 20-22, Akhmadov 2001:). However, in their view, this cannot be considered voluntary joining the Russian state. Regardless of numerous agreements and oaths of loyalty, in the expression of the Ingush scholar Kodzoev, "such agreements were concluded for extracting immediate benefits and soon after the objectives were reached, they were forgotten about... Until the end of the Caucasian war they [ the North Caucasian peoples] were out of the sphere of influence of the Russian administration" (Kodzoev 2002: 153). The Russian scholar Shnirlman confirms that "Declarations of citizenship were perceived as protectorate and alliances, which could at any moment be broken, and then restored in a few years again. Moreover, such declarations could be made simultaneously to representatives of two competing powers (Shnirlman 2007:269)". The mountaineers viewed themselves as allies of Russia, not its subjects, while Russia presented agreements concluded with a handful of teips as the accession of the entire people.

After defeating the Ottomans in 1774, Russia intensified its colonization efforts: built fortifications, formed thirty six new Cossack settlements, distributed lands to the Russian nobles.



As a result Wajnakh pastures were expropriated, their trade and movement restricted, they were cut off their natural resources (salt deposits). In response to these advancements, Mansur Usurma, a son of a shepherd a self-proclaimed *Sheikh* declared *gazavat* (a holy war) against semi – pagan Muslims and the infidels (Dunlop: 1998:10). He strove to wipe out customary law- the adat, feudal dependency, tradition of blood feud, and enforce Muslim law- *the sharia*.

By 1785 Mansur managed to assemble a force of 12,000 men. Numerous Russian troops were sent to suppress the rebellion and six years later Mansur was defeated and sentenced to live in imprisonment (Dunlop: 1998:11, 13). In 1807 and 1810 Wajnakh communities had to confirm their declarations of loyalty again (Shnirelman: 2007: 270).

### 2.1.2. Debates on Nakh Feudalism

In the 16-18<sup>th</sup> centuries the political organisation of Nakh societies varied. The 16<sup>th</sup> century written sources already distinguish several Nakh “societies” (teips or groups of teips)<sup>3</sup>. Some were in more or less formal dependency on neighbouring polities or on other regional power centres, i.e. Kabardine, Circassian, West Dagestani princes. Others remained independent (Vahusht Bagrationi in Martirosian 1933, Ajtberov and Akhmadov 1982, Zubov 1835:32<sup>4</sup>, Isaeva 1980:40). In the 1640s powerful indigenous Nakh feudal polities emerged, such as the polity of Chechen princes Turlovs and the principedom of Braguny as well as the strong Ingush teips Targim, Khamkho and Egi who formed a tribal union “*glalgaj*” and controlled the strategic basin of the Assa river (Akhmadov 2001, Umarov 1980). They sprang their political and economic power to most of Ingush tribes and gave their feudal self-name “*glalgaj*” to the entire Ingush people (Umarov 1980, Skitsky 1959, Martirosian 1933).

The nature of feudal dependency in Nakh and generally Caucasian societies was different from classical feudalism. There were no personally dependent serfs, but in the 17-18<sup>th</sup> centuries Nakhs

<sup>3</sup> Nakh-Mokh, Michich, Chamberloy, Shatoy, Myalkhi, Majsty, Nashkhoj, Chianti, Merzhoj, Akki, Glalga1, Dzejrakh

<sup>4</sup> The Picture of the Caucasian land, belonging to Russia and lands adjacent to it in historical, strategic, ethnographic and trade relations. St Petersburg 1835 p.32.

often invited princes to govern their communities and ensure protection, oftentimes from the powerful *Kabartay*. The first author who described the specific features of “mountain feudalism” was a Russian traveller I. Herber, who in 1728 wrote about Kabartay: “The owners...divided themselves among several small fiefdoms... But it is not possible to call those who live in such fiefdoms [their] subjects, more frequently they are called comrades, since they live freely with the prince in company and leave this prince and join others, if he quarrels with one of them. Also without advise and consent of those who live with him... he can do nothing , however, princes and their comrades do not leave each other in time of need and stand together” (in Kosven and Khashaeva 1958: 68). Any member of the community could raise an issue of community relevance for public deliberation. Decisions were taken either during ‘*yurtan gulam*’[юьртан гулам] – public gathering of all men in a village, or by the Councils of Elders.

Ethnographer Golenischev-Kutuzov described such gatherings in the following manner: “people were called to these Chechen gatherings haphazardly: somebody of the residents, who decided to talk about an important issue, would climb the roof of the mosque and call from there the people...Idle men would run to his voice, soon the entire male population of the village would follow, this way a community gathering would soon emerge in the square in front of the mosque. When the proposition, made by the initiator of the meeting was not worth of attention, the crowd would soon leave without indignation (in Leontovich 1883: V.2:83)

Princes, who governed Nakh societies performed the function of contracted protectors or foremen (Laudaev 1872, Bronevsky 1823, Akhmadov 2001). They were responsible for military campaigns, relations with other communities, the economic well-being of the society. If the leader performed badly or quarrelled with someone or abused power or if the geopolitical situation called for new allies, the leader could be replaced or expelled and feudal loyalties shifted.

In the 18<sup>th</sup> century occurred what contemporary Chechen historians call “democratization of the society”, when the feudal lords were expelled from Ingushetia and Chechnya (Laudaev 1872,

Martirosian 1933, Akhmadov 2001, Bliev and Degoev 1994, Isaeva 1977, Dettmering: 2005). A similar process of expulsion of feudal lords was registered among the Shapsugs, a people residing at the Black Sea around the same time (Khazarov 1992:125 in Dettmering 2005: 475).

Scholars have different interpretations of this de-feudalization process in Wajnakhs societies. Some authors claim that princes were expelled because when trying to establish authority they attempted to limit the personal freedom of the Chechens (Akhmadov 2001). Others, like Said Akhmet Isaev, emphasized the assertive advance of the Russian Empire as the decisive factor: the princes were no more able to fulfil their main function of protectors and had to leave (Isaev: 1999). Laudaev claimed that the princes left because the Chechens did not comply with their orders, relatives defended perpetrators of law, and princes who had no mechanism to make Chechens obey (Laudaev 1872). In any case “Chechen” princes disappear from sources “well before the dawn of the 19<sup>th</sup> century” (Dettmering 2005: 475).

Understanding the social order of the Wajnakhs and degree of the feudalization of Nakh communities is important for the analysis of their social institutions, such as teips and the problem of social integration. Deep feudalization would have transformed the egalitarian structure of the teip, the rule of Elders and the sacricity of customary law- the *adat*. But in fact, to some degree feudalisation reinforced teip identity since, as some scholars claim, feudalization went along family lines particularly in Ingushetia.

Khristianovich quotes a story of the Ingush Salgiev teip, which is suggestive: “Fifteen generations ago ...the clan of the Salgievs moved out of the *Tsorinsky society* as a result of density and occupied... the territory of the current community Salgi. When they needed to construct a tower to protect their land, they rented out - sold part of the territory to the clan “*Gu*”. Despite the fact that the latter bought their land, the Salgi clan considered *Gu* to be their lej, i.e. vassals” (Khristianovich in Martirosian 1933: 30). Early 20<sup>th</sup> century historian Ivanenkov wrote that in Chechnya the right of property was based on the “first-come-first take” principle, which existed since ancient times (Ivanenkov 1910:16, 48). Those who had developed and cultivated

virgin land held personal and hereditary rights to it (Zelkina 2000: 22). Having occupied or cultivated land, a teip could rent out or sell part of it to other teips, and consider them their dependents.

Differentiation occurred not only between teips. Magomed Mamakaev, the most influential Soviet scholar of the teip, claims that already in the 16-17th centuries teip ceased to be that “wonderful organization where everyone was equal and disputes were resolved by the collective of people, whom it affected” (Mamakaev: 1973:7). As a Soviet historian, Mamakaev explained the WajnaKh teip by the Marxist sociology of the tribe. The main means of production of the tribe - land - was owned collectively. As agriculture developed collective property impeded production and land was now owned by extended families. The tribe fragmented into extended families and family communities, which in their turn gradually disintegrated into individual families. This way the tribal community was replaced by the village community, where arable land was owned privately, while the forests, and the pastures remained collective property (quoted in Martirosian 1933:26).


According to Mamakaev, this process was complete in Chechnya in the 17<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> century. Although the expansionism of feudalizing families encountered strong resistance from the rest of the mountaineers, “their historical development happened steadily along the lines of increasing of feudal property at the expense of community lands” (Mamakaev:1973: 7). The scholars Kusheva and Usmanov noted two parallel processes unfolding inside WajnaKh communities at that time - the strengthening of the rich teips against the weak ones and social differentiation inside the teip, i.e. the emergence of teip elites (Kusheva and Usmanov 1978: 110).

In 1931 the Soviet researcher M. Kosven proposed a theory of *patronimia*, which he later developed and turned into quite an influential Soviet methodology for the analysis of North Caucasian kinship structures. Kosven defined *patronimia* as a group of families, which emerged as a result of segmentation of family community and which to some degree retained their economic, public and ideological unity (Kosven: 1964:1). Patronymia emerged in tribal

conditions but it survived subsequent formations, and with the development of society it underwent deep transformations, from the archaic tribal form to the state of disintegration and, finally, to the “remnant” condition (Kosven: 1964:2).

Patronymia grows and divides, thus giving birth to a complicated structure of small and large patronymias, which resemble concentric circles or groupings (Kosven: 1964:2). Patronymia disintegrates since its history is a process of gradual and inevitable development of private property, while retaining some degree of collectivism. (Kosven 1964:5). The ideological dimension of patronymia was maintained by the participation of all its members in celebrations and important family events - weddings, births, funerals which kept the identity strong (Kosven 1964:7). Kosven considered Chechen and Ingush teips to be an example of patronymia (Kosven: 1961:38, 45).


Figure 2.1. Chechen teip structure, 19<sup>th</sup> century (M. Kosven’s theory)



Mamakaev disagreed with Kosven’s definition, saying that the Chechen teip has never been perceived as a relatively small group. According to him, patronymia is still a rather small group of closely related kin, while the teip is a complex and numerous structure, consisting of branches named *gaar*, which unlike the teip always knew the name of its real forefather. The *gaar*, in its turn, was divided into still smaller groups- *nek’*. The *nek’* is divided into several *tsa*. The *tsa* into several *dozal* (Mamakaev 1973: 12). Dozal was a nuclear family. New branches open only along

male kinship lines. Mamakaev thought that Chechen “gaar” could be defined as Kosven’s patronymia in the 17<sup>th</sup> century.

Figure 2.2. Chechen teip structure, 19<sup>th</sup> century (M. Mamakaev’s theory)



Robakidze, who studies the Chechens and Ingush using Kosven’s methodology, explained that in the process of growth the patronimia and its territorial unity were decomposing, with other types of ties binding its members decomposing as well. Thus, a patronimia of the first order, produced a patronimia of the second order. This way concentric circles were created, characterized by decreasing intensity of kinship as the number of relatives multiplied (Robakidze 1968:3). In his view, *dozal* (nuclear family) in the process of segmentation created patronymia of the 1<sup>st</sup> circle- *nek'* and second circle -*gaar*. Gaars made up the *teip*, - *a group of people united by real or imaginary kinship* (Robakidze 1968:4).

In his essay “The Chechen Tribe” the 19<sup>th</sup> century the Chechen ethnographer Laudaev explained the division of the teip into *gaars* and *neks* by the demographic expansion of families. “In ancient times when the clans were not numerous, they were not divided into parts and had one name and constituted something like one family, but as the number of family members grew they divided into “*gaars*” and “*neks*”, i.e. branches and lineages. When the members of families multiplied to such an extent that it was difficult for them to live on the land of their forefathers, they looked for other places, and started dividing and became unknown to each other (Laudaev:1872). In Laudaev’s view the weakening of kin ties was the result of natural population growth.

According to Kosven, the patronimia could have also transformed as a result of mixed residence with other patronimias. In the archaic past the patronimia occupied a separate settlement, subsequently it could spread to several related villages, and finally patronymias created neighborhoods in large complex settlements (Kosven 1968: 3). In settlements where several patronymias lived together – “neighbor’s community” would emerge (*sosedskaya obshina*) and the main principle of integration becomes territorial (Kosven 1968:9).

According to Laudaev, having expelled the princes and occupied the plains (in the 16<sup>th</sup> -17<sup>th</sup> centuries- *E.L.*) the Chechens established big settlements, where several teips lived together. The first big Ingush multi-teip settlements emerged in the 18<sup>th</sup> century (Kodzoev 2002:148). These settlements encouraged the territorial principle of integration.

Soviet social theory, heavily economically deterministic in its orientation, explains some elements of the loosening of the teip ties. From the sources so far quoted it is clear that even before the beginning of the colonial wars, which caused major social change, the teip represented a complicated social structure, the members were of which united in complex structures of kinship, some of which were real while others imaginary. The teip underwent a processes of feudalization, expanded in numbers, it resettled and branched over territories, mixed in big villages with other teips, this way losing its initial structure. Mamakaev concluded that although

the teip was disintegrating since the 16<sup>th</sup> century, its unity was maintained by the lack of statehood and by conflicts with the neighbors. (Mamakaev 1973: 22).

### 2.1.3. Proto-national political institutions and law: Mekhk-Khel, Tukhum and Adat

In his essay on Chechnya and the Chechens Alexander Berge reported: “in the old times, say the Ichkerian Elders, when the Chechen people was not yet numerous and lived in the mountains... all disputes were resolved by the elders; the elders at that time were clever, they lived long and knew many things and always resolved disputes fairly, according to their wisdom, without guidance or any law.” (Berge 1858:72, 73). But by the end of the 16-17 centuries was the period of distemper and intestine wars between Chechen teips, when the authority of Elders was not respected. The decisions of the Elders, having no executive authority to enforce them, were not always implemented and were sometimes arbitrarily neglected (Berge 1858: 73). Strong families denied the competence of the Elders, so these decisions were just for the weak families (Laudaev: 1872).

Accordingly, Chechen legends that seniors tell until today, in the midst of distemper a Congress convened in the mountainous area of Nashkh and at this Congress agreements were reached which regulated the internal relations between the Chechen teips. Since then the *Mekhk-Khel* (the Council of the Land) was convened regularly and among other things elected military leaders, who at times of war received almost unlimited military power. The *Mekhk-Khel* had judiciary, legislative and executive authority. “The Council of the land discussed customs and laws of the various provinces which depending on their economic and legal utility were generalized and later spread in the rest of the country” (Mamakaev 1973:44).

Mamakaev claims that the Mekhk-Khel was elected according to a pyramid system from representatives of various teips and settlements. However, several of the seniors whom I interviewed remembered that their grandparents told them that the *Mekhk-Khel* was elected both on the teip and the territorial basis:



*My grandma was over a hundred, when she died in 1984, and she said that 12 people were selected from Ingushetia to the Mekhk Khel. First each teip in a given village selected its best representative. Then among those teip representatives the best was selected from the village, and then from among the villages a candidate was chosen to represent the region. No accidental people turned up there. These were the best of the best and the most respected. Idris Chapanov, Achaluki village, Ingushetia*

Apart from the *Mekhk-Khel* two thirds of the teips were united into nine *tukhums* – military–political units<sup>5</sup>. The remaining one third of the Chechen teips each formed their own *tukhum*<sup>6</sup> (Mamakaev 1973). Teips referred to as Ingush formed five more *tukhums*, the most numerous was *Ghalgaj* (Zelkina 2000: 17). *Tukhum* was a territorial organization, ruled by a group of Elders – representatives of all teips, aimed to solve common issues of security and economic exchange, to resolve disputes among teips on the basis of customary law- the *adat* (Mamakaev 1973: 16).

Chechen justice was partly based the Islamic law- *the sharia*. The two systems of law were often competing: “adat spread and strengthened each time when the Sharia was in decline, and on the contrary adat was abolished each time when the Sharia found zealous proponents and followers” (Berge 1859: 74).

## 2.2. Political Order, Social Change and Social Institutions during and after the Caucasian War

In 1801 Eastern Georgia was annexed to Russia which resulted in a situation when, according to the frequently quoted metaphor by Karl Marx “the legs of gigantic empire were cut off its body”. Russia needed to subjugate the North Caucasus, and St Petersburg went for a hard-line approach. This section will analyze the impact of the Caucasian War (1818-1864), which produced a major social change in Nakh societies: the destruction of traditional economic systems, multiple resettlements, mass extermination of the male population, the spread of Sufi Islam, which had a strong impact on public order and social institutions of Vainakhs. In 1840-1868 the first attempt to build a regular Islamic state was successfully undertaken by Imam Shamil. This natural

<sup>5</sup> Akkiy, Melkhiy, Nohchimakhoy, Terloy, Chantiy, Cheberloy, Shaory and Shoatoy, while the Ortskhoy (or Qarabulaq) occupied a midway position between the Chechen and the Ingush and was regarded as a separate group

<sup>6</sup> Zurzuqoy, Maistoy, Peshkhoy, Sadoy etc.

experiment was abrupt by the Russian conquest, but played an important role in reshaping the traditional social institutions.

### 2.2.1. The Beginning of the Caucasian War

The beginning of the Caucasian war was linked with the name of Alexej Yermolov (1777 - 1861), a notorious Russian general who characterized the Chechens as ‘a bold and dangerous people’ who required a special approach.<sup>7</sup> Yermolov’s special approach became the first tactic of anti-guerrilla war in Russian history, which in order to eliminate combatants targeted the population supporting them (Zubov 1836: 1). In May 1818 he sent the Russian Tsar Nicholas I a detailed plan of a military campaign, which stipulated “military economic siege” by the establishment of lines of Russian military forts along the lower part of Sunzha river and the construction of Cossack settlements between the line and the Terek river, forcing Chechen communities from their fertile lands back into the mountains and (Gammer: 1998:58, Bliev, Degoev: 1994). “Having lost their land suitable for cultivation and pastures... Chechens will be squeezed in the gorges of... mountains” and “without tillage and pastures where their cattle is spending winters in the period of severe colds, they will have nothing to do but to reconcile themselves with the rule of Russia” – wrote Yermolov (in Zubov 1836:4, Gammer 1998: 58).

In 1817-1819 Yermolov built a line of Cossack settlements occupying fifty kilometer territory, and a number of military redoubts, including Nazran in Ingushetia and the fortress Groznaya in the center of Chechnya (Bliev and Degoev: 1994: 174).

Each autumn Yermolov destroyed fields of maize exactly when the crops were harvesting. This was intended to starve the population into submission (Baddeley 1908). He pursued a policy of collective punishment: if the Russian commandment established that an individual Chechen took part in an attack on Russian soldiers or Cossacks, his village had to hand ‘the bandit’ and his family over to the Russian authorities. If they refused to do so, the village was levelled to the

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<sup>7</sup> Yermolov’s report to Emperor Alexander I, as quoted by J. Dunlop, *Russia Confronts Chechnya* (Cambridge, 1998), p. 15.

ground (Dunlop 1998: 16). In Yermolov's own description: "Protesting villages were ravaged and burnt, orchards and vineyards were eradicated to root... we investigate whether the people resisted [guerillas –E.S.] and whether among them there were people killed in the battle or whether they allowed the swindlers to pass without resistance, in the latter case the entire village was exterminated, wives and children slaughtered" (in Bliev and Degoev 1994:152). Eventually the Chechens stopped defending their villages, when the troops approached their homes and together with women, children and cattle moved to the forests (Gammer 1998: 65, Bliev and Degoev 1994:178). Ingush societies were considered more "peaceful" and were not directly involved in the war. Nonetheless, unrests and uprisings took place in Ingushetia, too, and the policy towards them was similar to what was done in Chechnya.

Yermolov's policies caused large-scale social change in the life of the Chechen and Ingush mountaineers which had an unprecedented impact on their political order and social institutions. "The siege of some mountaineer communities, expropriation of land from the others, expulsion from the pastures in pre-mountains destroyed the traditional forms of goods exchange... the residents of the mountains could not provide for all their needs and largely depended on these economic ties and the existing production systems" (Gammer 1998:71). The perpetual emergency situation and the frequent resettlements disrupted the normal functioning of traditional institutions - free gatherings for discussion of village affairs- *yurtan gulam* and *adat* trials on the one hand; and strengthened the prominence of supra-teip institutions on the other - tukhum Councils, *Mekhk-Khel*, which before Shamil's arrival in 1840 had to be assembled frequently due to the rapidly changing circumstances. The emergencies and forced migration strengthened kin solidarity.

By 1839 it looked like the mountaineer resistance was suppressed<sup>8</sup>. The Russian administration in the Caucasus appointed police officers to villages, mainly from loyal locals, collected taxes

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<sup>8</sup> in September 1839 Shamil suffered a major defeat at Akhulgo (Dagestap), where he had to surrender his older son Dzhamalaltdin to general Grabbe as a hostage. After that Shamil's prospects in Dagestan looked rather bleak.

and duties (Gammer 1998:163). However, abuse of power by the state representatives was frequent, and Chechen resentment was growing.

In 1840 the Chechens rose up and invited Shamil, a famous military leader from Dagestan, to lead it.. Shamil was “perhaps the most outstanding political and military leader ever to emerge in the North Caucasus Region” (Dunlop 1998:24). “Unlike previous leaders, he not only defied the Russians but held the resistance together for almost three decades of unbroken warfare against the army which had defeated Napoleon»(Smith 1998:45). Shamil was a tough leader, he offered the mountaineers a stern life, strict rules of the Islamic law and a constant war against the invader, regardless of cost (Smith 1998:46). In Chechnya Shamil strove to wipe out the customary law *-adat*, to erase clan distinctions. His primary goal as an imam was to enforce the *sharia* rule. He “used Islam and personal ruthlessness, to reach across the deep tribal divides and create an alliance of Moslem highlanders» (Smith 1998:45).

The military strategy of Shamil was to constrain the adversary on his territory, which he knew well, to wear the adversarial troops out by long marches in the mountains and then to attack. Shamil used the tactic of resettlements and “burnt land”. In 1840s he started what Gammer called a “demographic war”: organized mass resettlement of people from the areas bordering the Russian-controlled regions to the lands under his control and burnt the territory in between. This produced a circle of burnt land, which created significant obstacles for the maneuvers of the Russian army (Gammer: 1998). Thus, both sides of the conflict caused forced migration to the population. In a report to the Chief of Staff of the headquarters of the Caucasus Army Corps Dmitry Milutin, Orbeliani stated that „In the whole of Chchenya there is no village, no household left which would not be several times resettled from one place to another“ (Orbeliani in Martirosian 1933:68).

In the place of Wajnakh villages new Cossack settlements – *stanitsy* - were built: five of them were established on the territory of Chechen settlements<sup>9</sup> (Gritsenko 1971:14). The entire central part of Ingushetia was forcefully resettled in 1859-1861; instead thirteen Cossack settlements with 200 families each were founded. The Ingush communities were thus locked between the mountains and the Cossacks, artificially divided into lowland and mountain populations, which destroyed the existing mutually reinforcing lowland and mountain economic systems (Tsutsiev 1998: 29). The Ingush were also isolated from the Chechen, which further accelerated the divergent paths of development and the distancing of these two ethnically akin societies.

After the major Nazran uprising of 1858 in a policy of “enlargement of settlements” was carried out in Ingushetia, whereby small Ingush villages were destroyed and their residents resettled in larger villages (at least 300 households each), which was aimed at better monitoring the population. Police was stationed in the settlements and roads leading to the territory under the control of Shamil were destroyed (Gammer 1998: 253, Martirosian 1933:68).

*The traditional system of settlement and economy were crashed after the 1858 Nazran uprising. In fact, this is when the teip system had been broken. Before that we lived in individual households, were engaged in agriculture and maintained traditional self-rule, and in the process of settlements enlargement we were all merged together. Demography also played a role: teips were growing, parts of them branching out, becoming distant and finally inter-marrying, Nurdin Kodzoev, Ingush historian*

### 2.2.2. Shamil's Imamate

On the lands under his control Shamil established a theocratic state – the Imamate (1840-1859).

The head of the State was the Imam; he was the commander in arms, chief executive and legislative power (Martirosian 1933:63, Gammer 1998: 306). The imamate was divided into provinces (*naibstvo*)<sup>10</sup>, each of which was governed by a *naib* – a deputy of Shamil. Naibs had executive and military power. They collected taxes, implemented decisions of *sharia* courts, monitored compliance with Shamil's orders and recommendations, prevented internal conflicts and blood feuds (Gammer 1998:306, Bliev and Degoev 1994:384). The naib was responsible for

<sup>9</sup> Ermolovskaya, Groznenskaya, Samashkinskaya, Petropavlovskaya, Zakan-Yurtovskaya

<sup>10</sup> Initially Chechnya and Dagestan were divided into 17 *naibstva*, subsequently they were 32.

military training and commanded his people in times of war. He usually had 100-300 warriors-*murids*. On top of it each *naibstvo* had 500 local village horseman *murtazeks* (Berge 1859: 86). The historians Bliev and Degoev claim that Shamil used *murtazeks* for executions and extra-judicial killings, which made them personally dependent on the Imam for protection against vendettas (Bliev and Degoev 1998: 407). *Naibstvo* was divided into sub-regions, with a *mazum* in charge of each region (Berge 1859: 87). A *mazum* usually commanded a hundred of warriors. He monitored the Elders of the villages. In the end of 1840s a position of *mudir* was introduced. The *Mudir* was standing above several (3-5) *naibs*, reported on them to Shamil and commanded them in the battlefield (Bliev, Degoev 1994:385). He also performed the functions of *naib* in his place of residence (Gammer 1998:308).

The religious authority in every *naibstvo* was mufti and several *qadis*. The qadi was responsible for the maintenance of the mosque, he was leading the prayers, including *the hutba* -Friday cermon - resolved disputes and observed that the congregation lived in accordance with laws of *sharia* (Gammer 1998: 308). The mufti was the highest religious authority in a given *naibstvo*. He appointed *quadis*, monitored their activity and decisions (Gammer: 1998:308). In sub-regions the disputes were resolved by mullahs (Berge 1859:87). The mufti eradicated digressions from the sharia either himself or with the help of the *naib* (Gammer 1998:308).

For monitoring the naibs and mudirs and for collecting parallel information, Shamil set up an institution of *mukhtasibs*, *i.e.* inspectors for implementation of sharia. Sometimes Imam carried out inspections of naibs himself (Gammer 1998: 307).

In the 1840s a regular army of the Imamate was created. The population had to provide the army with one armed horseman- *murtazeks*- from each ten houses. Murtazeks were village militias who patrolled the neighborhoods, participated in military actions and were under the command of *mazuns* (Berge 1859:87). The army of murtazeks was numbering around 3,000 and was evenly spread throughout the country (Berge 1859:87).

In 1842 was established a Pivv Council - the *Divan* consisting of the most trusted associates of Shamil, whom he called for when most important decisions had to be taken (Gammer 1998: 306).

Shamil collected taxes, fees and confiscated property of executed criminals. Much effort was invested in imposing the *sharia*. The sharia was supposed to replace local adat, which Shamil abolished and issued a set of laws related to war and interpretation of certain sharia norms, known as *Nizams*, where he replaced mutilating punishments for crimes to fees and threatening punishments. (Berge 1859: 85, 87).

Shamil's state was despotic but his authority was limited by norms of sharia, moreover, being a Sufi he was accountable to his spiritual leader (*murshid*) - Jamaladin al-Ghazi-ghuzikumuqi.

By the end of Shamil's rule Chechens felt burdened by his despotic order and were disappointed with him (Berge 1859:89). The state founded by Shamil was dictatorial, and the stronger the pressure of the Russian troops the tighter was its grip. On August 25, 1859 Shamil's and his followers were besieged by the Imperial troops in the Dagestani village of Gunib, the situation was hopeless and Shamil surrendered to the Russian authorities. Eventually he accepted Russian citizenship, was granted the title of a Russian noble, and died in 1871 in Medina.

Shamil's state caused a true revolution in the social structures of mountain societies. Fragmented tribes and peoples were united by a centralized state, with common legal norms, a complex apparatus of government, a unified military-financial organization and to some extent a regular defense of the country. This was the first statehood ever experienced by Chechens, and introduced the model of the Islamic state, which would ever since be present as one of the statehood, which part of the population would strive for. Ingushetia was not part of the Imamate and does not have such a pattern in its recent history.

### 2.2.3. Political Structures and Informal Patterns of social integration during the Caucasian War and Shamil's Imamate

The Caucasian war produced a dramatic social change which had an impact on Nakh social institutions. According to Mamakaev, teip was still the main political unit in the 19th century. He counted 135 tight strictly exogamous groups, which shared 23 main characteristics, the same ones that Morgan found studying an Iroquois tribe, such as, inter alia, a common ancestor, a common tower, common ownership of land and family cemetery (Mamakaev 1973:33).

Mamakaev's model was challenged by scholars on many points: the first, authors managed to successfully prove that the teip was not anymore exogamous by that time; moreover, sometimes neither was the gaar (lineage). Second, historians showed that by the 19<sup>th</sup> century the collective property rights were within the gaar, not within the teip (Dettmering 2005, Gantemirova 1981:8-10, Kaloev 1960:345-374, Isaev: 1999). Moreover, during the Caucasian war teip was further dispersed among various settlements. Settlements became increasingly mixed, allegedly even in the mountains, which destroyed the monolithic political structure of the teip (Dettmering 2005: 474). According to Martirosian, the process of intra-Teip differentiation continued, along economic and ideological lines. Both the Russian command and Shamil "bought" the loyalty of local elites. Those who supported them received lands, salaries, presents, war trophies and other economic benefits. The Caucasian war produced an ideological divide within teips. Some were supportive of Shamil's stern Muslim order and the *sharia*; others were on the side of Chechen traditions, the *adat* and individual independence (Martirosian 1933).


The Imamate of Shamil was the first state structure which tried to submerge traditional WajnaKh institutions, enforce a different legal order (*the sharia*) and build a government superstructure over WajnaKh societies, which was different from their own loose system of self-government by local communities and teips, coordinated by a supranational organ (*Mekhk-Khel*), which met on an irregular basis.



*Mekhk-Khel* continued to function in Chechnya in the early years of the Caucasian war before the uprising was headed by Shamil. In different documents we find traces of Chechen leaders asking for the consent of the *Mekhk-Khel* to start or continue the war with Russia (Musrailov 1998). According to Chechen historian Magomed Muzaev, during Shamil’s reign the *Mekhk-Khel* was pushed underground. Subsequently it co-existed with the Russian administration as a parallel authority. Islamization during the Caucasian war turned it also into a religious institution; the leaders of the *Mekhk-Khel* were the famous mullahs and Sheikhs. The “*Mekhk-Khel* was an institution which

Figure 2.3. State and Society during Imamate of Shamil (1840-1858)

*VE-village Elders, q- qadi, tp-teip*



an autonomous state structure and incorporating or pushing other social institutions, namely the teips and the adat into the domain of local and private affairs. This process is reflected in figure 2.3.

*Already by the time of Shamil, the teip ceased being a social organism in the society, it lost its social functions and obligations. Many factors contributed to it, including the spread of Islam and the contradictions within teips and within society. Shamil had finally broken the backbone of the teip order. His Islamic leaders were people who had no status in the teip-based society. They were nothing, who became everything, and they transformed the system of social relations. Then Russia arrived, and it again demolished what had been constructed by Islam. Magomed-Emin-Khasiev, Chechen ethnologist*

### 2.3. The Russian State and Wajnakh Social institutions after the Caucasian War

As most multinational empires, Russia left social structures of conquered or annexed peoples and territories relatively intact being “content to subjugate them ... establishing indirect rule, and to pursue these people’s assimilation by means of long- term administrative adaptation and migration’ (Simon 1991: 3). Compared to radical social restructuring of the Soviet period, Imperial state interference in community life was limited, indeed. However, several decades before the Bolshevik revolution significant change to Wajnakh public order and social institution was brought about primarily due to the “land famine”.

#### 2.3.1 Land reform. Institutionalization of “dym” as a fiscal and economic unit. The Russian administration

After the war the Russian administration carried out a redistribution of land, which resulted in a dramatic “land famine” in the Nakh peasant communities. Trying to “to create” a local nobility, the Russian government distributed lands to respected and loyal families (Mamakaev 1973:59). Already in the 19<sup>th</sup> century there were a number of local landowners with over 500 dessiatins of land each<sup>11</sup>. In addition to the Cossack settlement founded earlier, this chopped off most the best fertile land in Ingushetia and Chechnya (Gritsenko 1971:14, 19)<sup>12</sup>.

<sup>11</sup> dessiatina ( = approx. 2 3/4 acres, 10 925,4 meter<sup>2</sup>)

<sup>12</sup> In 1845 Troitskaya, Sleptsovskaya , in 1846 Mikhailovskaya stanitsy. Instead of villages- Gadzhinren-Yurt, Magomed-Khite, Akh-Borze, Aki-Yurt, Angust, Ildir-gala, Alkhaste there appeared stanitsy Assinskaya,

In 1863-68 the government carried out a land distribution reform. A special Estate-Land Commission (*Soslovno-Pozemelnaya Komissiya*) divided land according to “dyms” –or households, which were defined as an extended nuclear family, living as one household- usually comprised of the head of the family (father) and sons who lived with their wives and children as separate families together with him. This arrangement was actually negotiated with the community leaders, who thought that it would be easier to deal with the head of the extended family, rather than with individuals. Land was allocated to each dym, which was supposed to divide it among its members (Gritsenko 1971) Soon, however, the community leaders realized their mistake: as the families grew, the individual slots of lands decreased dramatically. In the 1860s a “dym” consisted of 5-8 people, in 1880 the number of people who had to share it increased at least by 30%. As a result of the population growth the distribution of arable land in 1873 was as follows (in *dessiatins* per person): Cossacks- 21. 3; Ossetians – 5. 3; Ingush 4. 3, mountainous Ingush – 1. 6 (in Kodzoev 2002:171) Chechens - 1.2 (in Mamakaev 1973: 59).

The land reform and fiscal policies elevated and economically institutionalized nuclear extended family – individual household or “dym” which was now the main economic and fiscal unit. This accelerated the fragmentation of *gaar* and *nek* into individual 2-3 generation households (father-sons with wives and children).

### 2.3.2. Enforcement of Russian institutions and law. Involvement in new sectors of economy

After the war for a short time village foremen were elected but soon they were appointed by the Russian administration. In 1852 a “Chechen Court” [*Mekhkme-Chachani*] was established in Grozny. It consisted of a qadi, who resolved disputes according to Islamic law- the sharia, and three Elders, who knew customary law – *the adat* and carried out justice according to it. The Court was presided over by a Russian officer (Berge 1859: 80). *The adat* dealt with crimes such as theft, arson, bodily injuries, insult of women. The sharia was applied in cases of murder,

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Voznesenskaya, Sunzhenskaya, Tarskaya, Karabulakskaya. In 1850-60 new stanitsy- Ermolovskaya, Samashkinskaya, Petropavlovskaya, Zakan-Yurtovskaya were built (Gritsenko 1971:14).

division of property, divorce (Berge 1859: 81). However, Berge noted that since 1858 after the new Regulations on Government of the Caucasian Army were issued, the application of the *sharia* was minimized to the issues of faith and consciousness (Berge 1859:82).

The land reform and the “land famine” caused change in employment patterns of the Chechens and Ingush. To cope with the land deficit the mountaineers had to rent land and pastures from Cossacks or to look for jobs in the vineyards of Kyzlyar, or the oil refineries in Grozny, which were opened in 1893<sup>13</sup>, or to offer themselves as construction workers or craftsmen in other bigger settlements on the plain. With the discovery of oil, Grozny turned into a major industrial center – oil extraction, processing industries as well as mechanical engineering and transport enterprises were mushrooming with the inflow of Russian and foreign capital. European, particularly British oil companies bought shares in Grozny oil business and invested in technologically advanced production. Most of the at factory workers were Russians, but gradually Chechens joined the profession, first as unskilled but increasingly as skilled labor. In 1914 Chechen entrepreneurs<sup>14</sup> founded the “Staroyurtovskaya Neft” Oil Company, which was a modern and efficiently run joint stock enterprise (Kolosov 1964:45).

Employment outside the community opened up isolated Chechen and Ingush societies, made them learn languages, acquire skills, and at least temporarily get out of the habitual social structures. The social organization of the community where many male members were employed in seasonal jobs elsewhere transformed gender roles, women started to play a more prominent role in managing individual households.

### 2.3.3. New Pattern of Social Integration: Tariqas and Virds

Teip was not the only pattern of social integration, which shaped the political order and social institutions of 19<sup>th</sup> century Wajnakhs. Tariqas and virds – Sufi Muslim brotherhoods- spread to

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<sup>13</sup> in “Starye Promysla”

<sup>14</sup> Bashirov, Baduev, Batukaev, Mirzoev, Shaptukaev

North East Caucasus during and after the Caucasian war and they became a conspicuous political and social factor in Chechen and Ingush societies.

*Tariqa* - is a mystical way to God which a Sufi Muslim believer (*murid*) makes under the leadership of his spiritual teacher (*murshid*), with whom he should be in a constant spiritual connection (Akaev 2004:10). The leader of the *tariqa* - Sheikh usually appointed a successor during his life, who got an official permission (*idzhaza*) for continuing the *tariqa* or for founding his own sub-order (Akaev 2004:11). There exist 12 main Sufi *tariqas* in the Islamic world<sup>15</sup>, two of which- are represented in the North Caucasus.

Sheik Mansur, who led the first major uprising against Russia in the 18th century, is thought to be the first leader of Naqshbandi *tariqa* in Chechnya. Subsequently Naqshbandi *tariqa* was spread by Imam Shamil.

*Qadyriya (the zikrists)* spread in North Caucasus by Chechen Sheikh Kunta-Khadzi Kishiev. He started preaching in the 1850s when the great Caucasian War was coming to its end. Kishiev called for peace, humility, social justice, non-resistance to evil by violence, which appealed to the mountaineers exhausted by war. Kunta-Khadzi proposed an ideological program of survival in dignity- a teaching of passive resistance to authorities through spiritual preservation:

*“If they tell you to go to the church, do so: churches are only buildings and in our souls we are Muslims. If they make you wear crosses, wear them, as they are only pieces of iron, and in your soul you remain Muslim. But! If your women are used or abused, if you are forced to forget your language, culture and custom, rise and fight to death, till the last man!” (in Kodzoev 2002: 167).*

This program resonated deeply among mountaineers exhausted by protracted war, in the 1860s, Chechens en-masse abandoned Naqshbandiya and joined the new *tariqa*. In late 1850s the Ingush converted to Islam. Kunta-Khadzi was very successful among Ingush societies, which was a clear reaction to colonial expansion and protracted war. The Ingush like to emphasize that Imam Shamil was unable to convert them to Islam “with his sword”, while Kunta- Khadzi was successful “with his word”.

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<sup>15</sup> *Rifaija, jasawija, shaziliya, sukhravardiya, chishtiya, kubraviya, badavija, maulavija, bektashija, khalvatiya, naqshbandiya.* Akaev 2004: 10

In the 1860s the zikrists formed a religious structure on top of which was the Imam and two sheikhs (religious authority), who commanded *naibs*, *vekils* and *murids* (executive authority), from the latter the village foremen were elected (Akaev: 1994). “Soon all Chechnya, Nazran and a great part of upper mountain societies were covered with this clandestine teaching as with a tight net” (Ippolitov 1836:37 in Akaev: 1994). Zikrism was getting politicized, and largely reproduced the organizational structure of Shamil’s Imamate, which suggests that Shamil’s institutions had taken root in Nakh societies. Tariqas and virids cut across teips and became powerful patterns of social integration, very relevant to the political processes of the 19<sup>th</sup> century.

## Conclusion

This chapter reviewed the main findings of ethnographers and historians on informal institutions and patterns of social integration in Ingushetia and Chechnya up to the Bolshevik Revolution. It sketched out the function of the traditional Wajnakhs institutions of teip, *tukhum*, *Mekhk-Khel* and customary law (*the adat*) before the creation of Shamil’s Imamate, scrutinized the issues related to the specificities of Nakh feudalism, which helped the local communities to defend themselves against the local aggressors and the colonial powers, and at the same time allowed the Wajnakhs to largely preserve the egalitarian principle of their political organization. The chapter argued that loose as it was, the mountaineer feudalism facilitated economic and political inequality within and between Wajnakhs teips, which in the Ingush case was even reflected in the norms of *adat*.

It furthermore analyzed the impact of the Caucasian War (1817-1864) on the political order and social structures of society. Destruction of traditional economic systems, multiple relocations, mass extermination of the male population, and the spread of Sufi Islam had a strong impact on the public order and social institutions. I further analyzed the government structures of Shamil’s Imamate in Chechnya (1840-1859), which was the first attempt to submerge competing traditional institutions, replace traditional law by Islamic law, and build a superstructure on top

of the traditional Wajnakh structure and this way to push traditional institutions into the domain of local issues, limited to village communities.

Between the Caucasian War and the Bolshevik revolution the local communities started the integration process into the Russian political and social system, relative stability which came as a result of the end of war and economic development caused by the inflow of the Russian and foreign investment transformed a small layer of the traditional mountaineer economy and allowed for some local businessmen to develop modern trade, as well as industrial and agricultural enterprises. At the same time, the majority of the population was confined to closed rural agricultural and cattle-breeding areas.

In the 18<sup>th</sup> century the teip as a social organization was weakened due to population growth, dispersal of teips between lowland settlements and the mountains, social differentiation and ideological cleavages; historians argue that political power belonged to the *gaar*, rather than teip. In the 19<sup>th</sup> century the *gaar* disintegrated into individual 2-3 generation households, which became the unit which held the economic power. The land reform and the new taxation system made individual household or “dym” the main actor of the economy and fiscal unit. Political power belonged to the Russian administration, which pushed traditional Chechen and Ingush institutions and law from an increasing number of public spheres.

Despite the fact that the Wajnakh institutions of law and self-government were gradually marginalized, they still retained some official status. *The adat* quickly re-established its positions after the years of Shamil’s persecution. *The Mekhk-Khel* had to go underground and became the organ coordinating resistance. In Ingushetia the policy of enlarged settlements broke the traditional life-style and self-government, by putting different teips together in one settlement it introduced a new logic of integration in local communities. The emergence of new patterns of social integration- tariqas, virds, and large settlements - divided teips and made the structure of Wajnakh societies more complex.





### 3. State-Building, Informal Institutions and Social Integration in the Soviet State (1921-1991)

This chapter aims to explore the effect of Soviet state-building, modernization programs, repression and forced and voluntary relocations (deportation, return, restriction on settlement, labor migration) on the social integration and informal institutions of Chechens and Ingush. It starts by analyzing the early Soviet modernization programs and their achievements, collectivization and the following wave of repression of the late 1920s and the 1930s. I further provide an analysis of social change caused by the forced deportation of 1944 and argue that the deportation fully undermined the territorial basis of Chechen kinship, further weakened the *teip*, but strengthened kinship solidarity, national identity, *adat* and the institution of Elders. I conclude by analyzing the social change in Wajnakh society upon return from the exile, until the 1980s.

#### 3.1. Early Bolshevik State and the Social Change (1922-1940)

In January 1921 the People's Commissar for Nationalities Affairs Stalin proposed in the name of the Bolshevik government to the North Caucasian Muslims to establish a new Mountain Republic (in Dunlop 1998:42). The Congress demanded to create a legal system based on the *sharia* and the *adat* without the interference of the central government in the affairs of mountaineer and the return of the lands expropriated during Imperial rule. Stalin accepted both conditions, and the Congress formally acknowledged Soviet rule and joined the Soviet state (Avtorkhanov 2005).

The Bolsheviks were the first Russian government which set themselves to build a modern statehood in the North Caucasus: to penetrate deep into the social structure, even in the domain of family life, and to integrate various social segments into a cohesive political unit. In their early years, the Bolsheviks made an impressive progress through modernization and development. Subsequent tough measures — forced collectivization, *dekulakization*, anti-Islamic campaigns, and the repression of the Muslim clergy - undermined some of those efforts, and strengthened traditional mechanisms of self-government.

In the 1920s-30s the Soviet government developed public healthcare, mechanized agriculture, and a formal secular education system based on the national languages. The Wajnakhs benefited from the program of *korenizatsiya*<sup>16</sup> launched in 1923 and was aimed at the promotion of national languages, national elites and at the employment of representatives of the non-Russian nationalities<sup>17</sup>.

The scale of affirmative action towards minorities in the early years of the Soviet Union was unprecedented. Both Chechens and Ingush were on the list of the country's 97 "culturally backward nationalities", and were offered a number of class-based and gender-based affirmative action programs, and as a result large numbers of Wajnakh citizens were eligible for some sort of preferential treatment.

The main obstacle for *korenizatsiya* efforts in Checheno-Ingushetia was the very low level of literacy of the population, which was a minimum prerequisite to promote locals for managerial and leadership positions. According to Martin, in 1926, the literacy rate among Ingush was 9.1%, while of Chechens – 2.9%, compared to 45% literacy among Russians and 78.1% among Estonians. During the first five-year plan tens of thousands of mountaineers were put through short-term courses to train them for positions like that of accountants (Martin 2001: 171).

According to Simon, in the sphere of education 'the pace was unprecedented in comparison with other countries. Soviet accomplishments in this area dwarf the efforts of many southern European countries, let alone those of the Third World Countries (Simon 1991:266). The mechanization of labor required higher educational background. This encouraged Muslims to send their children to school. The use of native tongues in the classrooms had a pronounced effect on the development of the schooling system. Since primary schools were made almost entirely native language, the teachers had to be non-Russian. In 1939 the level of leadership *korenizatsiya* in Checheno-Ingushetia was higher than in the Ukraine or Belorussia. Wide

<sup>16</sup> Lit. Rootinization, indigenization.

<sup>17</sup> The best analysis of the logic and essence of this policy is offered by Terry Martin's seminal book "The Affirmative Action Empire".

educational opportunities produced the first layer of Soviet intelligentsia, who having benefited from the regime started to develop loyalties and attachments to it.

Tables 3-5 show the social-professional structure in Checheno-Ingushetia.

Table 3.1. Social structure of Chechen-Ingush Republic, 1939 (*korenizatsiya* rates in parenthesis)

Republic	Titular nationals as % of total employee population	Titular national as % of all Employees in Sector					
		Leadership	Technical	Medical	Cultural-education	Artistic	Communication
Chechen-Ingushetia	63,4	46.6 (73.5)	7.4 (11.7)	10.5 (16.6)	53.0 (83.6)	24.7 (39.0)	12.9 (20.3)

Source: Calculated from *Vsesoyuznaya perepis' naseleniya 1939 goda*, in

*Martin 2001: 382*

Table 3.2. *Korenizatsiya* of leadership positions, 1939 (*korenizatsiya* rates in parenthesis)

Republic	Titular nationals as % of total employee population	Leadership	Republican
Chechen-Ingushetia	63,4	46,6 (73.5)	23.4 (36,9)

Calculated from *Vsesoyuznaya perepis' naseleniya*. In *Martin 2001: 383*

According to a Russian historian, Pavel Polian, the unrest following the collapse of the Russian Empire resulted in 5-6 times decrease in the oil production. By 1920 the Bolsheviks managed to raise the production to the pre-revolutionary level, and in 1922 18,000 workers were employed in the oil industry, which was quite a large concentration of proletariat in agrarian Chechnya (Polian: 2003). In 1928 the North Caucasian region initiated a 5 year plan to recruit a thousand mountaineers per year to factories in Rostov and other major North Caucasian cities (Martin 2001:152).

*Korenization* stipulated efforts at changing the legal consciousness of the people: local judges were educated and employed in the new Soviet courts; special educational programs were set up at the workplace in order to acquaint the locals with the new legal system and codes (Babich 2000:36). The project was not very successful and the Soviet courts enjoyed little legitimacy

since in Wajnakh understanding, they stipulated strict penalties for minor offences, while not punishing murderers sufficiently enough. Consequently, the minor offences were hardly ever reported and blood feuds were carried out regardless of the Soviet courts. Wajnakh societies continued to live in a plurality of legal systems: now the Soviet laws, the adat, and the sharia.

The political sovereignty of the North Caucasian mountaineers within the Soviet State was short-lived: between 1921 and 1924 Moscow divided the Mountain republic into smaller units: in October 1922 and in July 1924 respectively the Chechen and the Ingush Autonomous Oblast' (Regions) were formed. They were merged in December 1936 and into a united Chechen- Ingush Autonomous Republic. The Ingush lost their capital- the right bank of Vladikavkaz, which was left to North Ossetia.

The real Soviet offensive started in 1929 with collectivization. The policy of dekulakization targeted not only wealthy peasants, but often middle class rural families and even hired laborers who expressed anti-kolkhoz opinions. Dekulakization was often used as a pretext to get even with personal enemies or rivals or target religious leaders. Local authorities had to regularly report on the results of dekulakization, therefore in order "to produce statistics" families were selected randomly and deported to Siberia.

Forced collectivization, expropriation of property, arrests and deportations, accompanied by closing of mosques, produced mass protests in Ingushetia and Chechnya (Polian 2003).

Eventually kolkhoz policies adapted to the Chechen and Ingush reality. The authorities turned a blind eye to the fact that the Chechens organized collective farms which were "not simply small, but dwarfy" - almost family based (Polian 2003). Thus, in one (big) village, Shali, 87 kolkhozes were registered, "which at best was a parody on collectivization" (Polian 2003). By the end of the 1930s Checheno–Ingushetia had 412 collective farms. The Chechens and Ingush sabotaged kolkhoz formalities; the production output was very low. Many enterprises practiced various upward distortions, fraud and falsification of documents. According to Polian, in 1939 about 10% of all grain areas were written off as destroyed by hail, pests and diseases. In fact, as the

revision commission established, the grain was lost as a result of neglect and weeds. The collective farmers paid little attention to public cattle, while horses confiscated from private households remained in fact at their previous domicile address – in the stables of their previous owners (Polian: 2003).

In the 1930s dekulakization was supplemented with combat against “bourgeois nationalism” as a result of which the whole stratum of the local intelligentsia was exiled or eliminated.

An anti-religious campaign was launched since 1925 and was particularly severe in Ingushetia. In another wave of repression in 1937 almost 300 religious leaders in Chechen-Ingushetia were arrested, which was almost everyone who could read the Koran (Akaev 1994). Anti-Soviet uprisings continued until 1941. According to Pavel Polian, 12 major uprisings took place in Chechnya in 1921-1941, each of which numbered 500-5,000 armed participants (Polian 2003).

To conclude, early Soviet policies involved assertive affirmative action programs, which resulted in impressive development of the Chechen and Ingush social-professional structure, increased the level of literacy and education, changed employment patterns, and promoted the emancipation of women. Moreover, korenizatsiya created a demand for teachers, journalists, writers, historians, as well as for bureaucrats; Chechens and Ingush gravitated to those spheres and established their networks. The rural, family-based economy continued to reshape, new patterns of social integration emerged– industrial teams, professional unions, communist party and komsomol membership - which co-existed with traditional identifications and acquired increasing significance.

Collectivization further destroyed the economic basis of Chechen and Ingush extended families. Even the nuclear family household could no longer be the main source of income due to limits on private economic production. Family members had to sell their labor to the kolkhoz or join industrial enterprises. This development diversified family employment patterns and accelerated the erosion of strong extended family units embedded in common economy. At the same time the

strong extended family structures of the Wajnakhs were not easy to dissolve. Moreover, they managed to adapt the new kolkhoz regime to their habitual ways of economic activity.

The 1937-1941 mass repressions against religious leaders and national intellectuals were aimed at destroying all alternative (religious and nationalist) power centers in Ingushetia and Chechnya. The elimination of the educated stratum undermined the achievements of *korenizatsiya* and impeded the subsequent cultural and professional development of Chechen and Ingush societies. Importantly, repression was not targeted at leaders of kinship structures, which proves that the Bolsheviks did not see kinship structures as institutions of real power, but rather as units of bourgeois economic activity.

### 3.2. Wajnakh society and social institutions during the deportation (1944-1957)

In 1944 the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic of Checheno-Ingushetia was abolished, the entire population was charged with ‘cooperation with Nazi occupants’ and was deported to Central Asia mostly to Kazakhstan and to Kirgizia, but also Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. The ‘deportation’ took place in the midst of the winter; many people died on the way of diseases, cold and hunger. Many more perished upon arrival. According to Russian ethnologist Valeriy Tishkov, the Chechens lost over 1/3 of their population (Tishkov 2001:82).

My respondents recalled how the deportees were placed on American studebaker trucks, each truck collected people from one neighborhood or small village and brought them to train stations, where they were jammed into train cars “so that there would not be enough space to stretch one’s legs”. Recently declassified archival documents confirm that on the average 240 people were transported in each train car (Kozlov and Kozlova: 2004). Sometimes a train car would be formed of people from the same convoy, which meant - of co-villagers or residents of the same neighborhood. These deportees had greater chances to find themselves in the same areas of Kazakhstan or Kyrgizia, and subsequently to re-unite.

Having analyzed over 50 interviews about exile, I came to the conclusion that deportation inflicted considerably greater suffering and losses on residents of the mountain villages, which were inaccessible to automobiles, and thus their residents had to walk on foot to the regional centers, from where they were picked up by cars (usually 15-25 kilometers). Those who had to walk were not allowed to take more luggage than they could carry in their hands, and since often families had many small children to carry, they could take only basics. As a result more mountaineers died of hunger on the way and upon arrival. The very ill and elderly mountain dwellers, who could not walk were shot dead. In a high mountainous village of Khaibakh (Galanchozhsky region of Chechnya) 705 people were burnt alive in the kolkhoz stables: these were elderly, women and children from the surrounding villages who could not walk on their own.

*On the day of deportation all men were told to come to the village administration. And women were ordered to pack. My daughter was 4 years old and she was laying in fever. When we were ready to go my husband said, leave her at home, we will come back tonight. We went, and then I turned back and saw tears running down her eyes. I rushed back and took her along, tied her to my back with a woolen shawl. All day they kept us outside in the snow, the girl did not make a single sound, she was so happy that we took her with us. That day they kept us in the village and did not let us take almost anything. Next day they made us walk to Yalkharoy /regional center – E.S. / on foot. Many ill elderly were left behind. Two brothers Sajdaev, Israil and Mikail, were carrying their elderly mother on their backs. Then the soldiers shot her dead in front of them. From Yakhoroj we had to walk on foot to Alkun in Ingushetia, and from there they picked us up by cars and brought to Grozny railway station. No food was given to us on the trains, only what we could take with us. Several days later my daughter died. People were hiding dead children, because if the soldiers noticed corpses, they threw them out of the window. My brother Yakub performed the rite, pronounced a prayer, we wrapped her in cloth.. At a train stop in Kyzlyar he asked a local shepherd for a spade and buried my daughter... Khabisat Khasbulatova, 1910, village of K'orgi, Galanchozh district of Chechnya*

In Kazakhstan, the trains stopped at each station, 3-4 families were called out, and the train continued. At the stations deportees were met by the locals in carts yoked in oxen or cows and taken to small villages. Members of the same teip, *gaar* and *nek* found themselves dispersed around in the vast territory of Central Asia. Moreover, lots of nuclear families became separated, since people were deported from where they were on the night of deportation and many were caught on that night at relatives' or parents' homes (staying overnight at relatives is still a habitual practice). I documented numerous stories of people who spent weeks and months wandering from village to village in Kazakhstan trying to find their nuclear kin despite the strict

penalties stipulated for unsanctioned leaving of the allocated place of exile. Some movement was possible until 1946, after that it was fully restricted. The regime of “special settlement” was enforced by a system of *komendaturas* (commandment’s officers) manned by NKVD staff. Every ten days each exiled Chechen and Ingush older than 10 years old had to register at his *komendatura*. Leaving the allocated place of exile could result in long prison terms.

*Our teip was scattered 1-2 families all around Kazakhstan. In the village where my family lived, there was not a single Ingush, to say nothing about Aushevs. It took us a long time to find out where our relatives lived. People were writing letters, asking each other, in 3-5 years many relatives found their kin through correspondence, but could not visit them until Stalin’s death. This was done on purpose, to prevent communication.* Mussa Aushev, Director of House of Folk Art, Ingushetia

At the same time Chechen and Ingush settlement during deportation was more compact than of other deported peoples, the overwhelming majority were located in Northern Kazakhstan (over 400,000) and in Kyrgyz republic, thus according to a Russian scholar, Kuznetsova “ separation of families ...in deportation of Chechens and Ingush did not have such catastrophic consequences compared to other peoples, it did not have an impact on their linguistic situation and ethnic self-consciousness “ (Kuznetsova 2005).

The first two-three years of deportation were a genocidal experience. Those who managed to take money, corn or dried meat from home, survived longer, others were dying of starvation and diseases. According to the official statistics of the Department of Special Settlements of the NKVD of the USSR, during the 1 year and 8 months after the deportation the number of Chechens and Ingush diminished by 90, 560 people. Between 1944-1948 144,704 Chechens and Ingush died. Thus, the highest percent of mortality was during the first 1,5 years of the deportation- around 15% (in Kuznetsova 2005).

In about three - four years life became easier, people started to plant vegetable gardens, some got jobs and managed to support their families, affluent kolkhozes distributed cows to the deportees, entrepreneurial and hard-working Vajnaks tried to find a place in the existing labor market, used every opportunity to make money or otherwise find resources for their households. High responsibility to their relatives and shrewd survival strategies had brought results; those who survived the first 3-4 years, usually lived:

*We were settled in a German village near the town of Kustanaj in Kazakhstan. In the spring I collected potato peels and we planted these peels. The peels gave such a crop, much better than*



*that of the Germans who planted full potatoes! The chair of the local kolkhoz held us as an example: "You see", he said "they cultivated land by hand, planted peels and got such a crop!" Subsequent years there was famine in Chelyabinsk and people came from there and bought potatoes from us. For this money we bought a cow, two sheep and clothes. Adam, Goragorsk, Chechen Republic.*

After Stalin's death, restrictions on movement were fully abolished and many extended families consolidated or moved to urban centers.

*Our family was scattered around the entire steppe. [After 1953] we tried to move closer to each other, someone would find a job and others would then join him, move closer. Osman Khadziev, deported from Khadziev Khutor, Prigorodny Region of North Ossetia, currently resident of Malgobek, Ingushetia*

Many of my respondents said that they moved to their matrilineal relatives, or in-laws. Previously Wajnakhs rarely resided with their matrilineal kin, but in deportation conditionality was dropped and kinship, rather than descent was the basis of solidarity. Alikhan Dozariev, the director of the Ingush museum- memorial to deportation, thinks that this reshuffling increased national solidarity and erased teip and family frontiers:

*In deportation many people lost their families, they had to survive with other families. And when a person lives with another family, he becomes part of them. Grief united people; they had to share what they had with those who were surviving next to them, without dividing them into kin and non-kin. Everyone was a brother. Ingush national consciousness had very much strengthened in that period. Alikhan Dozariev. Ingush Memorial-museum to deportation, director.*

After 1955 the Wajnakhs were distributed passports and young people could get into universities. Hard working and entrepreneurial, by the end of the years in exile many Wajnakhs became well-off.

*By the end of the deportation we lived marvelously. My older brother worked in an automobile shop, another brother was a driver, and third brother was also a driver. I studied at school. In 1957 we moved to Alma-Aty. I continued my studies. We lived better than now. Life had taught us to find ways. We are a very entrepreneurial and hardworking people. Many families became affluent. Bersnak Gandarov, lawyer from Karabulak, Ingushetia*

On July 16, 1956 after the Supreme Soviet of the USSR adopted the Decree "On abolishing limitations for special settlement of Chechens, Ingush, Karachay and their family members", the

Wajnakhs started mass resettlement to the North Caucasus and by 1961 the overwhelming majority of them had returned.

During the years of exile Chechen and Ingush managed to maintain their culture, language, informal social structure and a spirit of opposition and silent resistance to the regime. In the emergency conditions, national and family solidarity increased, traditional institutions of self-government strengthened, customary law; etiquette, traditions and rituals were preserved. These institutions shaped a social space parallel to the official, which the authoritarian state was unable to penetrate. The institution of Seniors, which in pre-deportation times had already been almost symbolic and limited to the domain of ritual, regained during the years of exile, especially during first genocidal years of 1944-1946 its real spiritual force and pursued a conscious mission of preserving traditions and national identity. It was in exile that Wajnakh Seniors enforced strict endogamy which is still largely observed until now. At the same time in Kazakhstan young people assimilated faster and not always followed the traditional ways:

*During the first years we did not do sakh<sup>18</sup>. If a person died, and others had enough energy to bury him, this was already considered good. Then when life became better we started to perform all our rituals according to rules. There were around 200 Chechens in the place where we lived, so we observed everything.... But young people were under strong influence of the environment. Some started smoking and drinking. Said-Ali, deported from Khal-Kiloj, Chechnya, born in 1911.*

Not surprisingly during the first years of deportation, the special services reported an unprecedented increase of Wajnakh religiosity. In the end of 1946 the Ministry of Internal Affairs “revealed” among the special settlers from the Caucasus – 1003 mullahs and other religious authorities. This was twice as many as members of the Communist party, of which there were 593 (Kozlov and Kozlova 2004). According to the historian Kozlov “the religious life was bustling and the authorities could not understand what was happening within the community” (Kozlov and Kozlova 2004).

In 1950s in the Akmolinsk region of Kazakhstan, a group of zikrists, headed by Vis-Khadzi Zangiev founded a new vird- so called *beloshapochniki* (white hats). Vis-Khadzi reformed some

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<sup>18</sup> religious sacrifice, usually meat and other food.

of the Wajnakh customs and rituals, thus he established a fixed and low price of bride money, which was burdensome to some of the families in exile.

Kuznetsova concludes that the thirteen years of deportation furthered “the ethnocultural strategy of the Chechens and Ingush - the inclination to self-isolation and resistance to any minor pressure of the authorities... National self-consciousness of the Chechens and Ingush was traumatized by the stigma of “nation of traitors ” and although none of the Chechens or Ingush believed in the fairness of such accusations, “public opinion” in Kazakhstan and subsequently upon return to the ChIASSR, was conducive to depressive moods and insularity” (Kuznetsova:2005:).

I would argue that deportation taught the Chechens not to resist every minor pressure of the state, to adapt or find ways around, counter-act totalitarian pressure by strengthening and enlarging their distinct social space and alternative ideology. This space was carefully safeguarded by the seniors, by the religious leaders, and simply, by the adults.

Undoubtedly, deportation greatly impeded the economic and cultural development of the Chechens and Ingush. While other Soviet nations were writing their histories, developing literatures, industry and science, the Wajnakhs fought for survival, struggled to make their way to a local factory, to establish themselves there, to bring relatives over, so that all could stay close and warm. At the same time, in the end of the day, scholars’ evaluate differently the social progress of the Wajnakhs societies during the thirteen years in exile. Some conclude that the social-professional structure of the Chechens and Ingush was frozen, restricted to agriculture and unskilled manual labor and partly degraded, due to the lack of conditions for professional growth of national intelligentsia (Kuznetsova 2005). Others, like the historian Kozlov emphasized the opening up of Chechen and Ingush societies, as a result of education in a multiethnic environment and the integration of mainly young people into a different cultural milieu. „It was there that the process of influence of the Russian, or better say Soviet, culture on the deported peoples began. Young people started to go to movies. Young men started to date Russian girls...

youth started to learn many things which went beyond the framework of the customs and traditions of their people, a window to the big world was open to them“ (Kozlov and Kozlova 2004).

The deportation fully undermined the territorial basis of Chechen kinship: the teip villages, kin-based neighborhoods, traditional mechanisms of maintaining contact by attending funerals and weddings. It had finalized the processes launched during collectivization – which destroyed the traditional Wajnakh economy of self-employment, the family-based agricultural and cattle-breeding households, and made most Wajnakhs state-employed. Nonetheless, by the end of the deportation the Wajnakhs managed to consolidate their families (usually extended families up to second cousins) revive religious brotherhoods, and establish regular Islamic practice. Moreover, leaders of virds continued to play a prominent role. The process of creation of new virds continued, which is exemplified by the emergence of new vird of Vis-Khadzi Zangiev, part of Qadyriya tariqa.

### 3.3. Wajnakh society and social institutions upon return (1957-1991)

On 16 July 1956, the Presidium of Supreme Soviet of the USSR issued a decree “On abolishing limitations for special settlements of Chechens, Ingush, Karachay and members of their families”<sup>19</sup>. On January 9, 1957 the Decree № 721/4 of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR restored the Chechen-Ingush Republic with the aim to “create necessary conditions for national development of the Chechen and Ingush peoples.”<sup>20</sup> The Prigorodny Region, which used to be part of Ingushetia, remained in North Ossetia. As a way of compensation, Naursky, Nadterechny and Shelkovskoy regions which had previously belonged to Stavropol kraj were annexed to Chechen-Ingushetia.

<sup>19</sup> [http://lawrussia.ru/texts/legal\\_586/doc586a391x878.htm](http://lawrussia.ru/texts/legal_586/doc586a391x878.htm)

<sup>20</sup> <http://www.bestpravo.ru/ussr/data04/tex16157.htm>

To organize the repatriation an Orgkomitet (*Organization Committee*) was created, which was supposed to return Wajnakhs in an organized manner. However, thousands of Chechens and Ingush headed back to the Caucasus in an uncontrolled fashion. In a month after the decree 11,000 people had already resettled to the former Chechen-Ingushetia (Kuznetsova 2005).

In the subsequent three years the spontaneous return of Chechens and Ingush swept all plans and established timeframes. By early 1958 201, 746 people arrived instead of the planned 100,000. (Kuznetsova: 2005). They had to be accommodated in a republic which already had 540, 000 inhabitants resettled there following the deportation of Wajnakhs. In 1957, the police tried to stop this flood of repatriation and detain those who returned without the permission of the Orgkomitet, but without success (Kozlov and Kozlova 2004).

Upon return home, the Wajnakhs found their houses occupied by others. There was a scarcity of jobs, the capacity of the social infrastructure (schools, kindergartens, hospitals) was limited. The return to high mountain villages of the Itum-Kalinsky, Sharoysky, Galanchozhsky, Chamberloysky and Shatoysky regions of Chechnya was forbidden and strictly persecuted. All the returnees had to squeeze into the existing social texture of the lowland rural areas. The percentage of indigenous urban residents remained low until the 1980s.

Table 3.3. Ethnic composition of urban and rural population 1959, 1970 (thousands of people)<sup>21</sup>

	Urban population		Rural population	
	1959	1970	1959	1970
Total in CHIASSR	293.7	444.1	416.7	620.4
Including Chechens	22.3	90.8	221.6	418.1
Ingush	4.2	35.6	44.0	78.1
Russians	227.7	269.9	120.7	97.0
Ukrainians	9.1	9.7	4.6	2.9
Armenians	11.8	13.7	1.4	0.9
Peoples of Dagestan	2.4	3.7	14.6	15.9
Tatars	3.9	4.3	-	-
Jews	5.0	4.9	-	-
Ossetians	1.2	1.4	1.9	1.2

<sup>21</sup> Grebenshikov P. (ed) 1977. *Checheno-Ingush ASSR 1917-1977. Collection of Statistics*. Chechen-Ingush Publishing house. Grozny

Other nationalities and peoples	6.1	10.1	7.91	6.3
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The measures for the repatriation of the Chechens and Ingush included providing them with loans for building houses and buying cattle. However, according to scholar Kuznetsova, only 5% of the returnees actually benefited from these loans. In 1957 only 1/5 of the returnees enjoyed housing. The rest lived in industrial premises or dugouts (Kuznetsova 2005). Some tried to reclaim their former houses by force; or to exert psychological pressure on new settlers to leave. Some bought them.

The problems of employment were structural. The labor market in Chechen-Ingushetia was incapable of taking in so many new arrivals. Most positions had already been filled by the non-Wajnakhs population. Moreover, the economy of the region had become more advanced while the Wajnakhs were in exile. Oil, chemical and mechanical engineering industries required new skills which Wajnakhs did not possess and had few opportunities to acquire. According to Valeriy Tishkov, the republican economy was ethnically divided. The ‘Russian sector’ controlled the oil industry, heavy machinery, infrastructure and services, while the ‘national [Chechen and Ingush] sector’ was concentrated in agriculture and trade. ‘National cadres’ did not have equal access to the more prestigious and better paid jobs in the industry (Tishkov 2001: 116). Even in the late 1980s the largest industrial enterprises in Chechnya, such as Grozneft and Orgsintez, which employed more than 50,000 people each, offered only a few hundred positions to Chechens and Ingush (Tishkov 2001: 116). In Kuznetsova’s opinion, the concentration of Chechens and Ingush in the light and food industries and in agriculture was the result of an intentional policy (Kuznetsova: 2005). Unemployment forced over 30, 000 Wajnakhs workers to annually leave the republic for seasonal jobs in Russia<sup>22</sup>.

<sup>22</sup> Report of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the USSR of January 8, 1987 “On the results of checking of implementation of statements by TsK KPSS “On major drawbacks in the work of North-Ossetian Obkom of the Communist Party in ideological-political, international education of working masses” in North Ossetia and Chechen-Ingushetia. Soyuz nerushimikh. Nezavisimaya gazeta. 29 April 2001.

Still starting in the mid-1970s, the Wajnakhs slowly but steadily integrated into all the sectors of the modern economy of the republic, which was among the most industrialized in the RSFSR<sup>23</sup>. Wajnakhs benefited from the modern social infrastructure of schools, hospitals and institutions of culture. In 1977 the Republic had two higher educational establishments – the Grozny Oil Institute, which was of country-wide significance, and the Chechen-Ingush Pedagogical Institute - 12 specialized secondary educational establishments, and 566 schools (Grebenshikov 1977). In 1967, 14 scientific research institutes functioned in Grozny, 8 were newspapers published in the Chechen and 2 in the Ingush languages (Grebenshikov 1967:152,155)<sup>24</sup>. Increasingly greater numbers of students received college and university education.

In 1967 out of 10.000 people there were:

In USSR- 166 students

In the Russian Soviet Socialist Republic-185 students

In Chechen-Ingush Republic – 125 students

The numbers were lower than the average in the USSR, but according to the same source; the numbers for Romania in 1967 were 100 students per 10.000 and in Pakistan - 18 students for 10,000.<sup>25</sup> However, the official statistics on Chechen-Ingushetia does not reflect the educational progress of the Wajnakhs.

Usually the official collections of statistical data on Chechen –Ingushetia in the 1970-1980s did not publish data on the national aspects of education and the economic progress. However, in the collection of statistics “Checheno-Ingushskaya ASSR in 50 years” of 1967 we find the following tables, which suggest that despite being the most numerous ethnic groups in the republic<sup>26</sup>, the Wajnakhs were heavily underrepresented in the educational institutions compared to Russians:

Table 3.4. National composition of students of middle special educational establishments 1959-1967<sup>27</sup>

<sup>23</sup> In 1971 81,4% of the republican gross economic output was industrial, 52% was oil industry, the rest was distributed between energy sector, mechanical engineering, chemical and other industries.

<sup>24</sup> Grebenshikov P. 1967. *Chechen-Ingush ASSR in 50 years*. Chechen-Ingush publishing house. Grozny. Table: Number of females among students of vocational and higher educational establishments.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid.

<sup>26</sup> According to 1970 census, Chechens made up 47,8% of the republican population (508,900), Ingush 10,7 % (113,700), Russians – 34,5 (366,900) in Grebenshikov P (ed) 1977 *Checheno-Ingushskaya ASSR in 60 years of Soviet Power. A statistical volume*. Checheno-Ingush publishing house, Grozny 1977

<sup>27</sup> Grebenshikov P. 1967. *Chechen-Ingush ASSR in 50 years*. Chechen-Ingush publishing house. Grozny. p.146

	Total number of students		Among them female students	
	1959-1960	1966-1967	1959-1960	1966-1967
Total number of students	4976	13013	1941	6942
Including				
Russians	3285	8671	1489	5349
Chechens	889	2453	139	708
Ingush	215	499	40	104

Table 3.5. National composition of students of higher educational establishments<sup>28</sup>

	Total number of students		Among them female students	
	1959-1960	1966-1967	1959-1960	1966-1967
Total number of students	5555	12788	2339	6555
Including				
Russians	4002	8455	1954	5202
Chechens	483	1815	80	462
Ingush	196	517	60	214

This situation was the result of the lower educational level of Wajnakh secondary school graduates, constrained economic situation of Wajnakh families, who could not afford to send a young person to higher schools and had to have him employed, and the general lower value that Wajnakhs attributed to higher education. Many male youth and even teenagers joined their older relatives in seasonal works, mainly as construction workers in Russia, the Ukraine and Kazakhstan.

*I remember as we got older, on the 1<sup>st</sup> of September, the beginning of school year, many Wajnakh guys in our class would be missing. They got into school only by the end of October or so. Their parents took them for seasonal jobs, which were over in late autumn.* Shamil, 1968, Grozny

The impact of “*otkhodnichestvo*” (lit. leaving for seasonal works) on Wajnakh societies needs a special research. I will name a few factors only: first, a male dominated society where 30, 000 men every year left their families and spent several months in different social and ethnic environment continued being increasingly less male-dominated. Women took charge of the households. Second, *otkhodnichestvo* was conducive to Wajnakh integration and feeling of being part of a big country. Some of these men had civic marriages with children in Russia. Many lived

<sup>28</sup> Ibid. p.147



“a Russian” lifestyle when away from their communities. However, their integration was very limited, constrained to the sphere of private construction-building and did not involve full-fledged participation in the life of the host communities, which could have happened in the case of regular employment. Third, the opportunity to earn significantly better during seasonal employment prevented the Wajnakhs from sending young men to higher schools and vocational training institutions, i.e. impeded the professional sophistication of many Chechens and Ingush. The containment of Wajnakhs to rural areas and traditional sectors of the economy, which impeded the development of social-professional structures of the Chechen and Ingush societies, was a factor contributing to the tenacity of Wajnakh informal social structures.

The branches of Islamic brotherhoods –the wirts - and religious leaders continued to play a prominent role in the society. According to Kuznetsova, there were around 500 mullahs in Checheno - Ingushetia in the 1970s. Customary and Islamic law penetrated the Soviet law-enforcement and the judicial systems. Cases of blood feud were oftentimes closed with the consent of both sides. Marriages were registered according to the *sharia* norms. After divorce children typically stayed with the father, contrary to the Soviet Family Code and in compliance with *sharia*. However, the multiplicity of legal institutions gave individuals a chance of manoeuvre. Thus, a divorced woman, if determined to have the children with her, had the Soviet court on her side, and she actually got the opportunity to fight for her rights, if she was ready to confront her own social reality. The same related to the abduction of brides: families who felt offended and wanted to punish the perpetrators had the option to turn to the Soviet court, which threatened the unlucky “bridegroom” with 10 years in jail. Both of these developments were conducive to further emancipation of women.

Most of my respondents from Grozny claimed that in the 1980s teip and vird identification was not important at all. Many of them knew almost nothing about their teips and did not know teip

affiliations of other Wajnakhs around them. In the multinational environment it was important that they were “Wajnakhs”, then “Chechens” and “Ingush”, further divisions were not relevant.

The return from exile was another shake up for the remains of the disintegration of teip. Structurally the teips and lineages were yet once again territorially fragmented. Mountain villages – the teip heirlooms - were closed for residence, houses and cemeteries were destroyed, regular rituals linked to teip cemeteries and teip villages were impossible. Moreover, even the nucleus of the teip structure, - the inhabitants of teip village - were now scattered all around Checheno-Ingushetia. Impossibility to practice rituals in the teip village of origin and thus maintain regular contacts dramatically reduced the organizational capacity and unity of the teip. At the level of identity- the return from exile caught the Wajnakhs in an intense ethnic strife with members of other nationalities in the republic. Disputes over property, competition for land and scarce employment often acquired ethnic overtones. This resulted in the strengthening of Chechen and Ingush national identities against other ethnic groups, enhanced internal group cohesion, thus reducing the significance of internal sub-national divisions. Teip identity, however, continued to matter to some degree in match-making for marriages.

In the residential areas of Grozny extended families lived in a dispersed fashion, especially in neighborhoods of blocks of flats. In rural Wajnakh populated areas, consolidated kin-based neighborhoods were more frequent. Despite the collectivization of agriculture, in the conditions of high unemployment family households (cattle, gardens, and vegetable gardens) remained an important basis of family economy. Family households were usually nuclear families, but sometimes included adult brothers or cousins living next to each other.

Despite the dramatic dispersal of Wajnakh family structures during exile and upon return, high birth rates, predominantly rural lifestyle and the tradition to attend family ceremonies (funerals and weddings) in large numbers which was revived after the return from exile, helped maintain strong and wide kinship ties. At the same time, the Soviet modernization, industrialization and social change produced new patterns of social integration. Educational opportunities, upward

mobility for workers and peasants, urbanization further strengthened new integrative patterns (e.g. student groups, party membership, Komsomol, workers collectives, professional unions etc) and new modern allegiances with the modern state (e.g. Soviet citizenship). The intelligentsia, national *nomenklatura* and workers were new strata created by the Soviet State which operated in a more individualistic fashion. However, titular nationalities were underrepresented in government positions. According to Kozlov, in 1979 and 1989 out of each 1000 adult Chechens only 2 persons were in governing positions (Kozlov 1999: 134,141). For this reason Chechen networks did not establish themselves strongly at the republican government and administration.

### 3.4. Collective Memory as a Political Resource

*“All beginnings contain an element of recollection. This is particularly so when a social group makes a concerted effort to begin with a wholly new start”. Paul Connerton “How societies remember”*

The next chapters will analyze Chechens and Ingush statehood projects launched in early 1990s. New political identities, new social movements as well as unprecedented political mobilization of the late 1980s were focused on and strongly embedded in the collective social memories. Before analyzing post-Soviet developments, I will briefly discuss relevant issues related to collective memories, which the national leaders were heavily drawing on in the 1990s.

When asked about motivation to support the separatist cause in Chechnya or the national movement in Ingushetia, almost all respondents provided historical justifications:

*For me all started from school. I knew since my childhood what had been done to our people. I have searched through all school textbooks and there was no mention of Chechens. There were wild tribes, indigenous peoples, but no Chechens. We had a history teacher, Nadezhda Nikolaevna, I asked her in class why there were stories of different peoples... but nothing about us, a whole national republic? I caught her angry glance and got no response. Her husband was a local policeman, a few days later he came up to my father and said “Your son is asking too many questions. He does not need it.” But I needed it. I knew my grandfather was deported and died as a kulak, because they had two flour mills here in the village. His three brothers were shot dead.*

*My father was nine when he was deported to Kazakhstan with his grandmother. She died of hunger a month later. My father was raised in orphanages. I had always known that I would fight when the time comes. I was a ready-made revolutionary.* Ruslan, former Chechen fighter

Ruslan joined the combatants when he was seventeen, fought in both wars and is now racketeering in one of the Southern Russian towns. Issa Kodzoev, an Ingush intellectual, writer and the leader of Ingush national movement “Nijskho” explained how the struggle for Ingush national statehood started for him in similar terms:

*It started when we were students at the Pedagogical Institute. It's all because we were deported and we wanted to know the truth. In 1944 my family numbered eleven people. I buried everyone in the deportation, and returned home alone.. After my arrest, in 1962, in court I said that I would fight the Soviet power till the end of my life...*

The phenomenon of social or collective memories has been a topic of prolific theoretical and empirical research since Maurice Halbwachs's famous introduction of the topic into social science theory in 1940s (Halbwachs (1926) 1950). Following Durkheim's belief that the function of remembering is to promote a commitment to the group by emphasizing its values and aspirations, Halbwach brought the thesis further by claiming that every group develops a memory of its own past that highlights its unique identity, and that collective memory is in fact a manifestation of this identity. According to him, memory is a crucial condition of social order, solidarity and political action; moreover, it is reorganized and restructured, when the society remembers together (Halbwach: (1926) 1950).

Scholars of “the presentist” memory approach showed that nationalist movements create a master narrative that highlights society's common past and legitimizes their aspiration for a shared destiny (Luke 1996, Collini 1999 in Misztal 2003:56, 61). Nations who lived through genocidal experiences, and were deprived of parts of their history, develop popular counter- memories that are particularly stable with regard to their certain core elements. Political leaders usually build on

these memories, on “what goes without saying”, i.e. something that is so well known in a given community that it is taken for granted (Connerton 1994:18).

During my five years among the Ingush and Chechens I heard hundreds of family histories and participated in dozens of occasions when people collectively remembered their past. This happened at the workplace, in the evenings during tea with neighbors, in the villages where we stayed overnight. Once a group of people got together informally, story telling about the past would often be a way of spending the time. If a senior happened to be in the house, and he or she would happen to be a story-telling type, everyone would get around them, occupy cosy positions, someone would ask a question: “Vashi (Uncle)<sup>29</sup>, how did we live in the past?” and the story would float.

I distinguish three types of social memories, which the Chechens and Ingush share about the experience of Russian/ Soviet statehood before 1990 - ‘*memories of grievance*’, ‘*memories of success*’, and ‘*memories of multiculturalism and inter-ethnic solidarity*’. Depending on the circumstances and personal perspectives one cluster of memories or another is being actualised, shaping the political outlook.

‘Memories of grievance’ are very prominent in both Chechen and Ingush self-identification and deportation remains *the* central building block of this type of memories. Collective memories preserve detailed stories of the day of deportation, the way to exile, the first years of struggle for survival, and lost dear ones. The label of ‘enemy of the people’ was very painfully perceived, especially by those, whose relatives fought on the fronts during the Second World War, of which there were thousands. Such was the senior Islaj, born in 1922, a resident of the town of Sernovodsk in Chechnya, who went through the whole Second World War, from Kiev to Stalingrad, and was wounded during the notorious Stalingrad battle:

*The Stalingrad battle was the worst thing I’ve seen. Not only people, each dog in Stalingrad should have been awarded the Hero of the Soviet Union. I defended my Motherland, spilt my blood and my family was deported as “the enemy of the people”. My father, four brothers and two sisters died in deportation. Only my mother and I returned..*

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<sup>29</sup> A respectful address to older man

State-sponsored oblivion intensified the trauma. There was no mention of deportation in the official press or history books. The acts of heroism by Chechens and Ingush during the war were silenced and when a Chechen writer Khalid Oshaev, discovered many Wajnakhs names among the perished during the heroic defence of the Brest Litovsk fortress and tried to publish a book about it, its publication was banned and the script was stolen from the editor's writing desk (Shnirelman 2007: 276).

*I worked in LITO – the republican department of literary censorship. We were censoring periodicals and books in Russian and in the national languages. Until 1980s you could not use the words “deportation” or “exile” in the official press. The instruction said “forbidden until special permission”* Ilina Sajdullaeva, literary editor, Grozny

Apart from the deportation and the Caucasian war, the Chechens and Ingush have a strong block of recollections about collectivisation and the repression of the mullahs, the discrimination upon return from exile, disrespect of the native language and culture.

*At the entrance to the university there were huge letters: “Rich and powerful Russian language”.. I was close to my students and they told me about incidents of chauvinism on behalf of the Russians-speakers.. I remember at the history department there was a public lecture by Professor Katsin on “One language of Communism”. His main point was that under communism there would be only one language- Russian. Students asked him: and what about our national poets and intellectuals? “These are rotten intellectuals” – he responded. Khussejn Betelgereev, Chechen poet, bard-singer, philologist*

Symbols of colonial domination increasingly irritated the youth who in the 1980s repeatedly attempted to blow up the monument to notorious general of the Caucasian War Alexey Yermolov or poured red paint (Shnirelman 2007: 278).

Obviously memories of grievances affected people differently. In some families, grievances were much discussed and even cultivated, there were strong negative sentiments towards the state and Russians as its representatives. Others tried not to focus much on negative information:

*In my family the parents tried not to load the children with this information, as it could have been an obstacle to our normal life in the society. They followed the principle “you’ll find out yourself as you grow”.* Timur, Ingush from Grozny, born in 1972.

Other families would share their family stories with the children:

*As a child I spent most of my time with my grandfather. He told me a lot about the deportation, about two cousins who died there of disease. Since childhood I was ready to fight for independence, I knew it did not start yesterday or today. Salambek, Chechen fighter, Grozny*

The ‘memories of success’ mostly referred to the periods of regime liberalization: in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century, after the Bolshevik revolution and before Lenin’s death, and in the last decades of the Soviet rule. After annexation, Chechens and Ingush participated in almost all of Russia’s wars. The fact that they were awarded the highest decorations and were praised by the Russian Emperors remains part of ethnic memory.

*We have a common fate with Russia, we very actively participated in all the wars on the Russian side, in the Russian-Turkish wars, in the Russian-Japanese war of 1904-1905, in the First and the Second World wars, in the Civil war on the side of Bolsheviks. We were the basis of Soviet power in the Caucasus. We are accused of not fighting during the Second World war, but only at the battle of Brest fortress 400 Chechens were killed. Over a thousand people were nominated for Heroes of Russia and only 380 subsequently received decorations. Khussain Akhmadov, Chair of the Chechen Parliament 1991-1993.*

Many remembered educational opportunities with great affection, especially opportunities for young women:

*After returning from Kazakhstan my parents received a plot of land in a village and we settled there. For me this was the place of happy childhood, where children of different nationalities- Russians, Chechens, Ukrainians studied together. I loved literature and the Russian language wielded very deeply in me. Our village library was great, I used to sit there till late, so that my mother would get worried and come to pick me up. The teachers were mostly Russians and very good, they encouraged our interest in learning. I was quickly growing intellectually. Lipkhan Bazaeva, born in 1945, leader of Women’s Peace Movement 1994-1996, head of the Woman’s Center “Women’s Dignity”, Grozny, Chechnya*

Workers remembered upward mobility and the possibility of free movement during last three decades of the USSR:

*I am not a great patriot of Russia, but it is my country. I am a miner; I have worked all over the country-in Karaganda, Norilsk, and Vorkuta. I have become a cosmopolitan person. I have read a lot and loved theatre and music. I am a great fan of the Russian literature...I do not want to live under Turkey or any other country; I am brought up on this culture... Azamat Nalgiev, Member of Ingush People’s Assembly, the 1<sup>st</sup> call Assembly*

Memories of multiculturalism and solidarity. Contrary to a widespread perception, there is no widely diffused innate hatred of Chechens to Russians among the population. The overwhelming

majority of Chechens and Ingush I met spoke of the Russian people favourably, and remembered the multicultural communist times with nostalgia.

Strong positive memories about inter-ethnic solidarity are focused on the times of deportation, and then on late 1980s. Many of the interviewers recalled that during the first years in exile Russians were helping Wajnakh families to survive:

*Russians planted vegetable gardens and they always had tinned vegetables, pickles or potatoes preserved for the winter. They gave us those and old clothes for the kids. Russians in authority were always softer than locals and eager to help.* Marika, born in 1936, resident of Alkhan-Kala, Chechnya

Another prominent cluster of memories relates to multicultural neighbourhoods in the 1970-1980s, and non-Wajnakh teachers, who invested a lot of effort in educating non-Russian kids:

*We were lucky with teachers. Our school was next to the KGB building. So our teachers were Russians- wives of KGB officers. It's amazing. They were usually coming for one year but they invested so much effort, trying to teach us!* Akhmet, Nazran, Ingushetia

Chechen combatant Ruslan, whom I quoted at the very beginning, told me the following about his favourite school teacher, who was a Russian:

*My favorite teacher was Marta Timofeevna. She taught Russian language and literature. She had a heart of gold. She was shot dead in April 1995. I will never forget her...* Ruslan, a former Chechen combatant

Especially warm memories of multicultural life had the residents of Grozny:

*Life was much more interesting back then. In this street lived five Chechen families, four houses of Ingush. Across the street was a very nice Armenian couple. Here, next to us lived a Russian man with his wife. We all celebrated each other's holidays. Ramadan, your Orthodox Easter. Everyone tried to cook the best of their cuisine and invite the neighbours. Everyone really tried to show the best of their culture. I remember that I always liked Orthodox Easter. We painted eggs, too. It was fun.* Zina, 1965, Grozny.

*Grozny had its own culture, and youth was of a special kind. My friend Tima Islamov was a fan of "The Beatles" and if he saw another Beatles fan – he would not care about his nationality. We were playing hide-and-seek around the Drama Theatre. We courted girls. Fighting for a girl was a normal thing. No one cared which nationality you were, you had to be a cool guy.* Tamirlan Akiev, 1972, Grozny.



Thus, by the 1980s Chechen and Ingush social memory was deeply projected into the history of past grievances. At the same time the Soviet State brought positive experiences of modernisation, social change, interethnic solidarity and multiculturalism, which were preserved in the public consciousness as very dear memories. On the one hand, in the early 1990s the Russian federal elite had to deal with frustrated and traumatized nations, but on the other ‘memories of multicultural existence’ and the ‘memories of success’ left enough room for responsible policy-makers to strengthen Wajnakh common identity with the new Russia, to find compromise and avoid wars.

### Conclusion

This chapter analyzed the effects of the Soviet state-building, modernization, repression and forced and voluntary relocations on the social integration and informal institutions of the Chechens and Ingush. I started by analyzing the achievements of early Soviet modernization programs, which accelerated the integration of Wajnakhs into the Soviet state, but were subsequently undermined by collectivization and the repressions of late 1920s and 1930s. Collectivization destroyed the economic power of extended families, and deportation of 1944 further undermined the territorial basis of the *teip*, weakened kinship ties, but strengthened national solidarity, *adat* and the institution of Elders. Return from the deportation resulted in a new wave of forced relocations, linked to restriction on settlement in certain areas of Chechnya and in the Prigorodny Region.

By 1990 the Chechen and Ingush societies had a large sector of population both socially and economically organised in a rural community-based manner. These societies also had a considerable strata of people living in urban areas and operating in a modern, secularised Soviet lifestyle. The *teip* disintegrated both as a social organization and as an identity. Extended and large nuclear families mattered most. Islamic brotherhoods- the *wirds* – also played an important role in the social life of society. Religious leaders were strong informal centres of political power.

Generally, three decades after the return from deportation were probably the most peaceful period of Wajnakhs history, which despite many problems, allowed both nations to significantly develop their economic and cultural potential. Despite serious missteps the state tried, indeed, to integrate the Wajnakhs into industry and agriculture within the areas of containment. Regardless of obstacles by late 1980s Wajnakhs managed to integrate with various degrees of significance to all spheres of the economy, education and culture, and their relations with other ethnic groups became more balanced. Patterns of employment changed dramatically- during the Soviet period the majority of working people were employed by the state. New professional and interest groups, together with thousands of pensioners, multiple child parents, state-employed workers got used to the state providing salaries, living spaces, welfare benefits, free medical care, education, children's holidays, infrastructure of culture, leisure and sport. Having benefited from the state they developed attachments to it.

The Russian state was most embedded in North Caucasian realities during the last two decades of the USSR. More balanced relations between ethnic groups naturally increased the prominence of the Russian language and culture. Education, employment, mobility, urbanisation and some intermarriage helped to open up closed communities and implement Russian institutions and law which were relied upon more frequently, especially in the case of disputes between representatives of different nationalities, though these still co-existed with customary practices.

As history shows, the social and economic integration of the complex and unevenly modernized Wajnakhs societies was highest during periods of regime liberalization in the Russian state, when combined with relative state effectiveness. However, each time the pendulum of Russian history reeled from short, bright periods of thaw to prolonged periods of authoritarianism, Wajnakhs conflict with the Russian state intensified and wounds opened up.

## 4. Social Integration in Ingushetia and Chechnya

### (A fieldwork report)

This chapter aims to analyze the main patterns of social integration in contemporary Ingushetia and Chechnya. It is based on over a hundred interviews and five years long participant observation in the region (2003-2008), as well as additional field trips in 2008-2009. This chapter analyzes what clans are at the current stage of social development. It undermines existing theories that misunderstand local dynamics and miss the links between the macro and micro levels of social and political integration.

The chapter demonstrates that clans are not the only social structure which shape social integration in Wajnak societies, and that they are not even among the most important ones. By undertaking a detailed anthropological analysis of the current state of the *teip*, i.e. historical patrilineal descent group, I conclude that the mechanisms for maintaining cohesion of the Wajnak clan (except for small teips in Ingushetia) are lost. The *teip* is a loose identity, to which different people attach differing significances. The role of the *teip* lineages and segments is limited to rare cases of blood feud, when members of teips “express solidarity” and financially support the offended family, and to participation in each others weddings and funerals. Daily routines of Chechen and Ingush individuals are to a great extent shaped by *close kin* (patrilineal, matrilineal and affiliated through marriages) and religious structures – *murid* groups, virds or fundamentalist networks. During the recent years religious structures have become increasingly prominent in the life of Wajnak communities. Imams and religious authorities have replaced village Councils of Elders in all villages where I did my fieldwork. Regional and town/village identities are also prominent. Neighbors and co-villagers are often considered almost as important as relatives, although, a strict borderline is drawn between biological kinship and other types of ascriptive ties. This chapter contributes to the literature on clans by providing a detailed

analysis of the Ingush and Chechen teips, but also by refuting widespread stereotypes about Wajnak societies as clan- and kin-dominated communities.

#### 4.1. Fieldwork methodology and challenges

After several weeks in the field I noticed that people around me often used the word teip, but seemed to attribute different meanings to it: in daily conversations they could use the word “teip” (historical clan), when they actually referred to ‘gaar’ (lineage of that clan), to *nek*’ (segment of lineage) or even ‘*tsijnakh*’ (immediate close kinsmen). The Ingush historian Nurdin Kodzoev confirmed this observation: “*Nowadays many people call their familia [lineage- E.S.] their teip and only sometimes they remember that they actually belong to a larger teip*”. Many interviewees when speaking of teip in their daily affairs actually meant some smaller group of relatives. They did not know exactly how to call it and used different terms:

*We do have teips...But inside the teips there is something like a clan. A clan is smaller than a teip. Each teip will have different clans. This clan is very closely integrated. These are up to third cousins, may be further.* Muhammad Gazdiev, Ingush historian, member of national movement

*My teip- the Mutsolgovs is too big. It is impossible to know all the heads of the families. They originate from different settlements- Nasyr-Kort, Surkhakhi, and belong to different Muslim tariqa... But teip is also close relatives, brothers, cousins...* Magomed Mutsolgov, leader of Ingush NGO “Mashr”

Later I realized that this confusion in terms misleads researchers and the respondents alike. In real life the distinctions might not at all be that important, but for the purpose of an academic study it is vital to differentiate kinship terms properly, in order to avoid erroneous conclusions about the social functions of various identities and groups.

Here is a suggestive fragment of an interview:

- *I have responsibility for my teip members. For example, when the war started in 1999, I left with my family for Dagestan. My nephews aged 18 and 19 had no parents or closer kin, so I took them with me. Somebody had to take them, otherwise I would later be blamed that I saved myself and left them behind.*
- *But they were your close kin, your nephews. Did you have responsibility for your closest relatives, or for all teip members?*
- *Of course, my own kin.* Khusein, Dzhalka, Chechnya

Similar confusion sometimes happens with the term ‘Khel’/’Council” or “Court”/. The word *Khel* can be used for denoting:

- the historical Council of the Land (Mekhk-Khel);
- village Councils of Elders, local government (Yurt-Khel)
- people’s Court (Khel), a group of seniors who get together for a specific occasion to adjudicate a dispute.

Often when I asked “Do you have a Council of Elders in your village” (meaning Yurt-Khel), I would get an answer “yes” and a person would start telling me about people’s courts (Khel) instead. If a researcher does not clarify what is the meaning attributed to the specific word by the local speakers and is not aware of the multiple usages, she can be easily misled.

Another source of confusion concerned the deterioration of tradition. Most of my respondents were proud of their traditional institutions, positively evaluated their functions and regretted that they were losing a stand in the society. I noticed that during interviews when asked questions about traditional institutions people would often talk about ‘how things ought to be’, not how they really are. In order to understand how a teip or some of its aspects really work now I had to ask more specific questions.

In other times respondents would first reproduce internalized stereotypical explanations about their societies, and only when asked additional questions, would they give clearer – and often less romantic - descriptions of a phenomenon. Here are two typical reactions to the questions about the role of traditional institutions:

*Q: Did Elders play a role in the Chechen revolution of 1991?*

*A: Of course! But the word of an Elder did not mean anything at the rallies. Everyone was subjected to one slogan [of independence – E.S. ]. Even if a most respected Elder of a teip would deliver a speech against independence, he would be smashed in a second. Khussein, Dzhalka*

*Q: Does the teip still have a disciplinary capacity?*

*A: Of course!*

*Q: But why was there such a skyrocketing criminality before and between the wars?*

*A: Who would listen to the teip then? Ruslan, Itum-Kale*

Some respondents have clearly overestimated their own influence, or that of their teip. For example, one elderly respondent reported that he forbade his people to take up arms, so no one went to fight in this war. Having finished the interview with this senior I had a short chat with

his sons, and it turned out that one of his nephews had joined the combatants just a few months before that, and others had fought earlier.

Thus, I learnt not to take all evidence at face value, to double-checked data, to ask specific questions and often to summarize the argument of my respondent to him in order to make sure that I understood it correctly. With local scholars and participants in the political process I tried to discuss and brainstorm together, or I shared my findings with them and asked to confirm or refute my hypothesis.

Some of my respondents were reluctant or afraid to speak about the role of clans and kin in the recent political processes. But most of the people I have talked to had spoken with great sincerity for which I am very grateful to them.

#### 4.2. Descent Groups in Ingushetia and Chechnya

As is the case with any social identity, different people attach different significances to the teip. Some of my respondents said that the teip mattered:

*Chechen social structure is teip-based, everybody should know this. Whoever does not know this, does not understand anything.* Israil Murtazov, teacher of history, Sernovodsk agricultural college, Chechnya

*Teip has its territorial, ethnocultural particularities. Now many Chechens consider that without teip structure you can loose your identity, you can fall under the influence of others and can be offended or humiliated by other members of society. The teip is a microcosm. It's a blood-kinship tie, a linguistic, psychological union, a union of souls and in this world people live.* Khussain Akhmadov, Chair of the Chechen parliament, 1992-1993, Advisor to the Mufti of the Chechen Republic

*For me any Kodzoeva is a sister, I am obliged to protect her.* Issa Kodzoev, leader of the Ingush national movement Nijskho, Kantyshevo, Ingushetia

*The teip is something which concerns me directly. If my relatives call me, I will be there and I will help with what I can. I will listen to advice of a senior and will direct younger.* Rashid Zakriev, driver, 45, Grozny

Others asserted that the teip is gone:

*Clans have disappeared. Only a formal identity remains as an attribute of traditionalism. Youth is not even taking this identity seriously anymore. Teips which are in conflict can now intermarry. Chaps will just abduct a bride and that's it, hostile teips become relatives.* Yakub Patiev, Ingush ethnologist.

*Now youth are interested in history, because they are all educated. But they are not interested in the history of their teip. I think, gradually the teip will completely disappear, because everyone has already understood that the teip does not matter. The main thing is that we are Chechens.* Narkom Dadashev, Senior of the teip Bilttoy, Nozhay-Yurt district of Chechnya

*“For me a teip is just one’s geographic area of origin”.* Usam Baysaev, journalist, Chechnya

*The teip has disintegrated as a result of social processes, because now a person does not depend on the teip as before.* Nurdin Kodzoev, Ingush historian

This section will investigate what the teip is in the current stage of history of the Ingush and Chechen societies.

Among the questions people frequently ask when they first meet is: “*хънегI вu хъо*” (lit. Whose are you? ) or “*малгIа меуна вu хъо?*” (*Which teip are you?*). Learning about somebody’s teip in Chechnya provides a person with local intelligence about one’s place of origin and possibly present habitation of parts of their family, and helps search for common acquaintances, which is good for establishing trustful communications.

The primary meaning of the word *teip* is a kinship organization of common descent, or clan. Teip is an Arabic word, borrowed by the Chechen language. According to Chechen ethnologists Garsaev, Chokaev, and Khizriev, there are 135-164 teips in contemporary Chechnya (Garsaev Vakha, interview, June 2009). Most teips consist of patrilineal lineages (*gaars*), subdivided into branches (*neki*) consisting of nuclear families (*dozal*). This section will deal with patrilineal descent groups (teips, lineages, and territorial fragments or ‘segments’) in Chechen and Ingush societies and try to evaluate their current social status and function.

A teip originates from one geographic area (usually one or several villages) and sometimes has a linguistic dialect of its own. Some teips have reached very significant numbers, for example Ingush teip “*ozdoy*” allegedly numbers over 69,000 members; the Chechen teip “*benoj*” amounts to 15% of the Chechen population. The teips have myths of common decent, a historical motherland and their “architectural heirlooms” – battle towers in the mountains<sup>30</sup>.

<sup>30</sup> Towers are traditional vainakh military-architectural constructions, which families used for protection from enemies and for family residence.

Currently most Chechens bear surnames, coined from the Muslim names of their fathers/grandfathers. Members of one Chechen teip can have hundreds of different surnames. Members of *nek'* (sub-lineage of gar) will usually have several different surnames. That is why analyzing kinship profiles of Chechen politicians by surnames is impossible.

All Chechens are thought to be off-spring of a legendary hero, Turpal Nokhcho, who lived in the mountainous area of Nashkho, which was later called Ichkeria. All indigenous Chechen teips originate from the Nashkho region, the cradle of the Chechen nation. The *Mekhk-Khel*, the Council of land, was gathering in Nashkho, and the ancient Chechen capital city Motsar is thought to have been located there. According to legends, there was a huge ancient copper in Motsar, which was decorated with plates with the names of all indigenous Chechen teips. Meat was boiled in this copper during the *Mekhk-Khel* gatherings which anyone could enjoy. The copper was thought to symbolize the unity of the Chechen clans.

Seniors say that this copper was for the first time destroyed by Imam Shamil who tried to eradicate the teip identity of the Chechens. Finally, they say, the copper, the stamp and documents of the *Mekhk-Khel* were destroyed by the Soviet soldiers after the deportation of Chechens. In Dudaev's time, just before the war, a replica of this copper was cast at the *Krasny molot* plant in Grozny and ceremonially placed in the village of Starye Atagi during the celebration of the Independence Day on September 6, 1994.

The origins of individual Chechen teips are often traced to some legendary figures, often Arab missionaries who arrived to the Caucasus, and had their sons resettled around Chechnya. Often several teips may consider each other related, since they believe to have originated from siblings.

*Generations of my forefathers lived in Rigahoy, I am the 10<sup>th</sup> off-spring. The forefathers say that our origin is Arabic. At the beginning of Islamization a religious leader, Ibn Abbas, came from Samarkand. He arrived to Derbent [Dagestan-E.S.] by the Caspian Sea. From there he went to the Dagestani village of Zhal and from there founded our village. Ibn-Abbaz had twelve sons and he sent them all to spread the word of Islam. Adam, senior from the Rigkhoy teip, Resident of Goragorsk, Chechnya*

*Our first forefather's name was Beshto. He lived in Georgia with his sons- the older Zumso, the middle - Tumso and the younger - Chianti. He left Georgia and settled in the mountains of*



*Nashkho. They lived there for a long time and when the sons buried their father they went to the mountains of Zumsoj. At that time no single person lived there. Tumso founded the village of Tumsoj-yurt, Chianti- Chianti-yurt and the oldest son went to the very top of the mountain and founded our village Zumsoj. We are now three brotherly teips-zumso, tumso and chianti. Abdul-Rashid, senior of Zumsoy teip, Chechnya*

Some teips have alternative stories of their origin linked to a common craft and even trace the etymology of their teip-name to a common economic activity. Thus, the name of the Zumsoy teip is also thought to come from the word “zum”, basket, because people of the Zumsoy were once skilful basket weavers. A senior of the village of Rigahoy reported that his teip was producing sables and other weapon, “we originated as a village of craftsmen”. At the same time, both teips have their myth of a common ancestor (stories quoted above). Possibly, the legend about a common ancestor emerged later to streamline the teip’s history with similar stories of other teips. Local scholars agree that a Chechen teip is a social identity based on a myth of kinship, but in essence it is either a kin-territorial unit, or a social-economic entity:

*Previously, it was believed that a teip is simply kin. It’s a great misperception. The Chechen teip has lived through great shocks and it has reconfigured. Some teips were more of a social-economic phenomenon, they developed from craft guilds. Other teips originated from nek’, gaar-lineage and are divided into families. There are also new teips, which emerged from incoming populations - a Kabardine teip-cherkzi, a Cossack teip-gunoj, djukti- the teip of mountain Jews. Magomed Muzaev, Chechen historian, Head of the State Department for Archive of the Chechen Republic*

*Teip is a community of neighbors, which is constructed in terms of kinship. When the institution of teip emerged, it was necessary to consecrate it. This is how the sacralization of the teip as an organ of kinship took place. Without an ideology, it would not be possible to create such an institution. Said-Magomed Khasiev, Chechen ethnologist, editor of journal Vestnik Lam, head of the Chechen Republican Ethnographic Center (Center of Folk Art)*

In Khasiev’s view the teip as an institution emerged in response to the processes of feudalization, to avoid the establishment of feudal relations between individuals in Chechen society.

Individuals, families and whole lineages could be integrated into the teip, even in quite recent history. For example, the Khadziev family from the village of Zumsoy is considered to be a most respected and prominent family among the zums- teip, due to the teip’s Elder mullah Mukhadi Khadzhiev, who was a well-known *alim* respected for his wisdom and outstanding personal qualities. Mukhadi died at the age of 105 in 2007 and I had the privilege of talking to him about

the history of the Zums (of which he was an invaluable source) on quite a number of different occasions, being his daughter's friend and staying in their house.

After five years of being friends with the family, when I started analyzing Zumsoj lineages, I discovered that the Khadzhievs were not indigenous to the Zumsoj. Muhadi's 4th forefather was from the village of Shatoy, which he fled in the 19<sup>th</sup> century because of a blood feud and found refuge in Zums. "Four of our forefathers are buried in Zumsoy, so we are Zums", explained his daughter. No one of my Zums respondents seemed to care that the Khadzhievs were not the off-spring of their legendary ancestor Zumso.

However, Muhadi's daughter later told me the following story:

*Just before the war one of the Zums people blamed my brother that "he was not even zumso". My brother was so offended, that he decided to get all young men together and tell them that at least four of his forefathers have died in Zumsoj, and if they did not consider him a zumso they should tell that straight in his eyes. But the war started and he left this world with this pain.*  
Rovzan Khadzhieva, Zumsoy, Chechnya

Thus, even if clan members know that they are not biological relatives, the myth of common origin is still somewhat important. If a family has been integrated at a late point in history and teip members remember this, in certain situations (usually of conflict or tension) they may be reminded of their "alien" origin. This means that descent is still somewhat associated with the kinship idiom, particularly in the villages of origin.

I have heard similar stories in Ingushetia about entire lineages, which have been incorporated into a teip:

- You know how many aliens we have in our *familia*! In the past we would incorporate entire lineages, slaughter a bull or a sheep and consider them brothers. This way they merged with us, and some of them are not the best people! Magomed Sali-Kotiev (teip Barkinkhoj)
- We also have such people in our *familia*, they were not respected where they came from and not respected here. Albert Khantygov (teip Merzhoy)

The Ingush teips originate from the Ingush mountain areas. The Ingush believe that their common forefather was the legendary hero *Ga*.

The Ingush teips are often referred to as ‘*familiya*’ (lit. surname), because many members of Ingush teips have the same surnames. Sometimes, lineages would spring out from the teip, which will take their own surname and establish a new *familia* within a teip but these count by tens, not hundreds (like in Chechnya) and usually have not Muslim, but Ingush linguistic roots. Lineages of Ingush teips are also called ‘*familiyas*’. Thus, some “*familiyas*” are teips and they have sub-lineages, while others are just lineages. For example, the “*ozdoy*” teip comprises 21 subteips and 47 ‘*familiyas*’. And at the same time the *Ozdоеvs* are themselves a ‘*familiya*’.

A family can decide to start a new lineage for various reasons, often to distinguish themselves from the big teip. Thus, Abukar Gudiev, a member of the Ozdoy teip told me that his father changed his family name in the 1920s when he was sent to St Petersburg to study at the financial-economic school. He already had a career as a Bolshevik, intermingled with famous revolutionaries and wanted to differentiate himself from the rest of Ozdoy teip. He took his father’s name Gudi, and coined a new family name of Gudiev (part of Odzoev clan).

Some families reported that they changed name in Soviet times to secure their off-springs from persecution for repressed relatives. One Chechen respondent said he had recently established his own *nek*’ (segment of lineage) in response to his kinsmen vanity.

*“We started to have arguments over who was of the noblest origin. They thought that they should be the face of our gaar [lineage E.S. ]. So I said: If you guys are so noble, why would we interfere in your affairs, we will have our own nek’. They all got so nervous, why would I want to fragment the gaar! And I did it on purpose to tame their ambitions”.* Khussein, Dzhalka, Chechnya.

The Ingush teip is usually exogamous, while its Chechen counterpart is not. Members of *galay* teip told me that they now prefer to intramarry within their teip, but into a different lineage, or with teips from the same region. I was told the story of their family dispute over the choice of a husband for one of their girls. The girl, who went to the university in Grozny wanted to marry her capital-based classmate and had her mother’s support, while her patrilineal aunts preferred her to be married to a man from their village, from their teip or one of the neighboring teips. “It’s

easier to build kinship relations if we are from the same area, we do things in the same manner, all rituals and daily routines are the same”. The Chechen teips seem to have been exogamous for quite a while: 99 year-old Khabisat Khasbulatova, from the village of Yandi-Kotar told me that she and her husband both belonged to the *galaj* teip but different lineages and her parents were also both *galaj* (*korchkhoz* lineage), and she said it was normal already then to intramarry. Quite a few Chechens I know have both parents of the same teip origin, this is also the case with some Ingush from big teips, but in this case the parents are of different *familias* (lineages).

Both the Chechens and Ingush share the belief that a “common gene” remains in the blood only until the seventh generation. After seven generations young people can intermarry. That is why it is very important for a Wajnakh man to know his seven male forefathers. Many of the Chechen and Ingush teip members can trace their teip genealogies 16-17 forefathers back, thus, clearly they can marry their teip members. This is seen as another factor in teip disintegration, a ‘clan is not a clan when they marry inside it’. Idris Abadiyev, a businessman-activist of one of the largest Ingush teips, the Evloevs, told me that he sponsored a Congresses of his teip exactly in order for people inside his teip not to intramarry, because this led to the disintegration of the teip.

Sometimes the same Ingush ‘familiya’[here surname] can appear in more than one teip (eg. Tochiev, Sampiev, Keligov), but this is quite rare. In the Ingush case, knowing the place of origin one can pinpoint the teip belonging with almost full certainty. Thus, analyzing clanship profiles of Ingush politicians is easy.

Chechen teip genealogies are non-existent, because their teips have reached such enormous numbers that making genealogies is virtually impossible. However, some lineages (gaars) keep their family trees. Seniors of the teip *keloy* gathered in the village of Chiri-Yurt to show me the genealogical tree of their lineage - “Bogur-gaar”. The tree was compiled before the Bolshevik Revolution in the Arabic language, and constituted over a dozen of pages with various segments of gaar coming to one forefather Bogur from their mountain village of Khal-Keloy.

Since Ingush teips are much smaller compared to Chechen (except for several major ones, like the Ozdоеvs or Evloєvs, which have approached the size of the Chechen teips), many Ingush lineages have by now reconstructed their genealogies, which are much more confidently linked to a common ancestor. According to my observations, usually, there would be one (sometimes several) individuals in a *familiya*, who take a special interest in its history and invest time in collecting documents, data, reconstructing lineages and popularizing them among other members. Usually when I started researching a certain *familiya*, I would be immediately referred by its members to such a history fiend, who would then give me quite a professional account of the *familiya*'s past, would have a good collection of documents and a family tree. The rest of the *familiya* members would usually know some basics: several myths or legends or anecdotes linked to their teip, their common forefather, the location of their battle tower in the mountains, and seven patrilineal forefathers. Many older respondents would have the list of ancestors written down and they would carry them in their purse.

Interest in clan genealogies revived after the collapse of the USSR, as part of the rediscovering of roots and by now many lineages display quite impressive achievements in rebuilding and reconstructing their histories. The big Ingush teip of the Malsagovs have published a thick colorful book about the history of their *teip* and its outstanding people. This encouraged others to start working on similar books. Thus, a history fiend from the Uzhakov teip, told me that he was working on the "Encyclopedia of the Uzhakhov family", while an activist from Ozdоеv teip said that he did archival work in St Petersburg and Rostov-on-Don and is preparing a book on Ozdоеvs. According to Elder Mussa Aushev, a special memorial stone board was set up in their cemetery with the genealogy of the teip engraved on it, so now anyone could come and learn of their roots. Conversely, Magomed Gazdiev, a successful professional in his mid-thirties who reconstructed the tree of the Gazdievs' and collected rare documents and photographs related to his teip, said that he was not interested in writing a book. "This is just my hobby, what is there so special about *teip* to write a book about it? I am just curious about my family history".

Ingush and Chechen teips are divided not only into lineages (gar/vyar) and sub-lineages (nek'), but also territorially between different settlements as a result of voluntary and forced relocations. I call territory-based fragments of descent groups- territorial 'teip segments' and will treat them in more detail in the subsequent section.

To conclude, Chechen and Ingush teips were once classical descent groups with characteristic idea of patrilineality and common descent mythology. Nowadays the kinship idiom is still somewhat important for their integrity, but members of a teip realize that their blood relatedness is constructed. Chechen teips are very large units who have their histories blurred and obscured in the ancient past and some of them have abandoned the kinship idea altogether. "We are not relatives" – told me members of the *galay* teip, "we originate from one area". Chechen lineages and sub-lineages are smaller, usually having clearer genealogy and more neatly approximating the idea of biological kinship. Ingush teips with several exceptions are much smaller than Chechen ones and have more confident kin-based genealogy, Ingush lineages are pretty congruent with biological kinship patterns.

Thus, my research shows that, as Gellner predicted, the relationship of belonging to a clan satisfies the initially set up criterion for classifying a social relationship under the rubric of kinship structure, because clan is a concept essentially related to other concepts, like "lineage" which in turn has a systematic congruence with some kinship affinity (Gellner 1987:168). Large size adds a higher degree of social construction to a kinship unit, but still one cannot become a teip member just if they want to do so. Even those who have been part of a clan for over a century can be reminded of their alien origin and this runs counter to Collins' idea that a clan, "which persists from primordial times" can incorporate classmates and friends. At least this is definitely not the case in Ingushetia and Chechnya.

#### 4.2.1. Is the Teip a Social Organization? Looking at Mechanisms for Maintaining the Teip's Unity

This section looks at the teip as a social organization and aims to establish whether the mechanisms which used to maintain teip unity in the past are still working nowadays. On the basis of interviews and analysis of historical sources, I identified five mechanisms, which used to maintain unity of a Wajnakh teip, such as (1) *common residence*, (2) *common ownership of land/property*, (3) *common defense / justice*, (4) *rule of Elders*, (5) *religious rituals (funerals, weddings, mold, and sakh)*.

I will look at all five and see what remains today to maintain the unity of a Chechen/Ingush clan.

### 1. Common residence

As I have shown in chapters 2-4 the big teip has not only fragmented into lineages (gaars) and sub-lineages (nek'i), but also became dispersed between the mountains and the plain and among several settlements. People resettled on the plain, usually to the pre-mountainous and lowland areas adjacent to their mountain areas of origin. They preferred to resettle to places, where their relatives had already lived or which were connected with the hills economically. Segments of teips resettled at different times, starting in the 16-17century and continue to resettle today. Usually one settlement on the plain could not accommodate the entire group of relatives which moved. This way teips fragmented into several territorial segments.

*It was not easy to descend to the plain, because in the 18 century this land belonged to the Kabardoy. There was slave trade, so anyone insufficiently protected could be abducted and sold to slavery. But eventually the Aushevs settled on the plain and founded their own village of Surkhakhi. Now 500 families of Aushevs live there. We all are off-spring of one son of Aush – Chirko. The off-spring of other sons of Aush settled in other villages. Eventually we were fragmented among the villages of Ekazhevo, Sleptsovsk, Karabulak, and Achaluki. After the deportation, in 1957 we tried to get back together to our native village of Surkhakhi. Not everybody got in, and now many different teips also settled there. Mussa Aushev, director of house of Folk Art, Elder of Aushev teip*

Some lineages fragmented as a result of blood feud:

*Three- four generations ago we used to live in a place called Dlinnaya Dolina in the Prigorodny Region. Then we had blood feud there. A brother of my grand-grandfather was then a teenager,*

*a shepherd, and at night when thieves attacked his herd he fired and accidentally killed a man. Because of the blood feud our entire familia had to leave that place. We divided among four villages: Mochkhoy, Kantyshevo, Plievo and Barsuki. We still reside mainly in these four.*  
Mohmad-Sali Kotiev, senior of Kotiev familia (Barkinkhoev teip)

The process of descent to the plain continues. During the last Russo-Chechen war over a dozen of mountain villages have been fully or partially abandoned. Usually when fleeing from the village of origin, the mountaineers try to settle compactly, in places where their family members already live. This is thought to be a way of social support before one gets established in a new place, also if there are many close people residing together they feel more protected and have more weight in this locality.

Thus today, both Chechen and Ingush teips are fragmented into numerous lineages (*gaar*) and sub-lineages (*nek'*) but also between settlements (territorial segments). They are dispersed all around the territory, but each teip may have 4-10 villages where they live in quite significant numbers. Representatives of some big teips (eg. Chech.-*benoj*, *alleroj*, *biltoj*, Ingush- *ozdoj*, *jovloj*) reside in almost every settlement. In Ingushetia territorial segments are stronger than in Chechnya, members of teip X residing in the same village of Y call themselves X's Y. (Surkhakhi's *Aushev's*, Barsuki's *Kotievs*, Achkhoy's *akki* etc). In the table below I demonstrate the fragmentation of the 20 teips/lineages studied according to settlements. The list of settlements is not exhaustive, but includes the ones with significant concentration of kin-groups. Members of all teips reside in Grozny, member of 40-50 teips reside in the Chechen towns of Urus-Martan, Argun and Gudermes. The same applies to the towns of Nazran, Karabulak, Malgobek and Magas in Ingushetia and to many large villages. Urban centers are not included in the table.

Table 4.1. Territorial Segments of Chechen and Ingush Lineages and Teips

Teip, region of origin	Settlements
Biltoy (Nozhaj-Yurt Region of Chechnya)	Mountains: Bel'ty, Khochi-Are, Rogun-Kozha, Nozhaj-yurt, Aki-Mokh, Balansu, Zamaj-yurt, Churchi-Irzu Plain: Novie Bilty, Argun, all villages of Gudermes / Kurachaloy districts
Zumso (Itum-Kali Region of Chechnya)	Mountains: Zums



	Plain: Samashki, Roshni-chu, Prigorodnoye, Gikalo, Alkhan-Yurt, Alkhazurovo
Pamyatoy (Shatoy district of Chechnya)	Mountains: Pamyatoy, Bekum-Kali, Vyardi, Gushkert Plain: Starye Atagi, Goyty, Urus-Martan, stanitsa Ermolovskaya
Bosoy (Chaberloy district of Chechnya)	Mountains: closed for settlement Plain: Samaski, Starye Atagi
Keloy (Shatoy district of Chechnya)	Mountains: Keloy (Khal-keloy) Plain: Duba-Yurt, Chiri-Yurt, Gikalo, Goyty
Galay (Galanchozh district of Chechnya)	Mountains: closed for settlement Plain: Yandi-Kotar, Roshni-chu, Achkhoy-Martan
Nashkhoy (Galanchozh district of Chechnya)	Mountains: closed for settlement Plain: Samashki, Gekhu-Chu, Roshni-Chu, Alkhan-Kala, Valerik, Shalazhi, Achkhoy-Martan
Rigkhoy (Vedeno Region of Chechnya)	Mountains: Rigkhoy Plain: Goragorsk, Zakan-Yurt, Alkhan-Kala, stanitsa Petropavlovskaya, stanitsa Ermolovskaya
Key (Galanchozh district of Chechnya)	Mountains: closed for settlement Plain: Samashki, Achkoy-Martan, Nadterechny
Khakhkhoy (Shatoy district of Chechnya)	Mountains: Shatoy Plain: Starye Atagi, Khambi-Irzi, Gekhi, Baba-yurt (Dagestan)
Ozdoevy (tower settlement Targhim, mountainous Ingushetia)	All Ingush settlements
Evloevy (tower settlement Nij, mountainous Ingushetia)	Major concentration in Nasyr-Kort, Ekazhevo, Ali-Yurt + Dolakovo, Gamurzievo, Altievo, Nasyr-Kort + all Ingush settlements (except for v. Barsuki)
Aushevy (tower settlement Egikal, mountainous Ingushetia)	Mountains: closed for settlement Plain: Karabulak, Ali-Yurt, Achaluki, Surkhakhi, Ekazhevo, Kantyshevo, Sleptsovsk,
Chapanovy/lineage of Gorbakov teip (tower settlement Targhim, mountainous Ingushetia)	Mountains: closed for settlement Plain: Achaluki, Majski, Nazran, Karabulak
Gazdievy (tower settlement Egikal, mountainous Ingushetia)	Mountains: closed for settlement Plain: Nazran, Chermen (Prigorodny Region)
Kotiev / lineage of Barkinkhoevy teip (tower settlement Ozdig, mountainous Ingushetia)	Mountains: closed for settlement Plain: Kantyshevo, Plievo, Barsuki,
Kodzoevy	Mountains: closed for settlement Plain: Plievo, Tarskoye (Prigorodny Region), Kantyshevo, Yandyrka, Nasyr-Kort
Merzhoevy	Barsuki, Nazran, Altievo, Gamurzievo, Sagopshi, Achaluki, Akhi-Yurt, Ekazhevo, Galashki (Ingushetia), Bamut, Achkoy-Martan (Chechnya),
Khadzievy	Srednee Dachnoye (Prigorodny Region), Karabulak, Nazran
Uzhakhovy (Egikal, mountainous Ingushetia)	Chermen (Prigorodny Region), Barsuki, Plievo, stanitsa Troitskaya

Thus, territorial unity, common habitation and lineage do not characterize contemporary teips or lineages.

## 2. Common ownership of land/property

When travelling in the mountains I often heard the phrase “every plot of land here is someone’s”. Although the Russian state does not recognize teip’s ownership of land, it is generally believed that certain teips “own” certain territories in the mountains. In Chechnya in Dudaev’s times many disputes broke out over teip territories. However, if we look closer at such disputes, we will see that their participants were residents of the immediately affected areas:

*We have a land dispute with the neighboring village of Meskhety, our youth are fighting with each other, provoking each other. Before 1933 we lived a bit further from here, but because of landslides, the authorities decided to resettle us here. Originally this was the land of Meskhety, the alleroy teip. And our land was given to them for pastures etc. They think that the land on which we live now is better and it belongs to them. In 1993 we had a massive fight over it, village against village. Thanks God, without fatalities. This was pure luck. Ruslan Tsokuev, head of administration of the village of Zamaj-yurt (Biltoj teip, Nozhaj-yurt district of Chechnya).*

In Ingushetia I have heard many times that the town of Nazran could not be the republic’s capital, because there “all the land is owned by someone”, so there is no place for administrative buildings. When I questioned further I have learned that these slots belong to particular extended families.

Entire *familias* “own” their historical mountainous areas with battle towers, which have been closed for settlement since 1944 and are now part of the frontier sanitary zone with Georgia and in addition a nature reserve<sup>31</sup>. My Ingush respondents said that they never heard of teip-to teip disputes over land, although certain families could argue over the division of common pastures of lands or hey fields in a village.

Inside one teip, the territory is divided and “owned” by individual extended families. Thus, in 2008 the Chechen authorities started the reconstruction of the abandoned village of Zumsoy and promised to build 10 houses for returning families, a school, the buildings of administration and ambulance. Previously, Zumsoy consisted of a number of individual farms scattered around a vast area, 2-3 kilometers from each other. The condition of the republican authorities was to

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<sup>31</sup> In Aushev times, it was possible to resettle one or two families in each “tower complex”, but the area does not have the infrastructure for mass residence of people.

build all houses close together in the center of the village and create a compact settlement. The negotiations came to a stalemate: the residents of Zumsoy refused to take such houses (offered for free by the state), on the grounds that the land on which they would be built belonged to some other family. *“Why would I move into a house, which does not belong to me? One day the owners will come and claim this land from me. I want my own house on my family land”*, explained one of the villagers. This familial right to land is not recognized by the state.

Thus, contemporary Chechen and Ingush teips’ ownership of land is purely symbolic, and when disputes emerge, they do so usually among territorial segments of teips of immediately affected settlements. Inside the teip in the mountains the land is also divided between individual extended families and these distinctions are respected. The only property commonly owned by the teip are architectural heirlooms- their family battle towers. But even they are now considered state-protected cultural monuments, so *familias* cannot even repair their roofs without permission from the Ministry of Culture and without the involvement of professional architects.

### 3. Common defense

*Before the deportation we lived in the mountains. At that time, there was mutual respect between people. The teip at that time would not abandon its men in trouble. There were many thieves they could steal cattle, property, even people. A strong teip protected its members.* Said-Magomed Elsanov, Senior of teip Bosoj, Samashki, Chechnya

Many of my respondents regretted that the teip is not offering protection to its members as it used to do before.

*Ingush were respected when we had a teip-based society. The teip protected each person, down to the smallest boy. And now we do not have teips. If there were teips, would the authorities have dared to violently disperse demonstrations? The teips would have long ago torn this Zyazikov<sup>32</sup> into pieces.* Batarbek Akiev, head of the collective farm “Dolakovo”, Ingushetia

Almost all my respondents emphasized that blood feud and defense in the face of humiliation fall in the domain of the descent groups and remain about the only working mechanism for their mobilization. In Ingushetia, the whole familia (lineage) or teip (if it’s a small or an average one) may mobilize in case of blood feud:

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<sup>32</sup> President of Ingushetia in 2002-2008.

*“The whole familia will raise, but the mortal hit should be inflicted by the immediate relative. Usually all the work is done by youth in the teip, and the last shot is done by those, who were offended.”* Nurdin Kodzoev, Ingush historian

In Chechnya, it is not the teip, but the lineage (gar) or more often the sub-lineage (nek'), which support the blood feud:

*It's a big misperception that blood feud is teip-based. Take our teip 'alleroy'; it is one of the largest Chechen teips, and then take 'benoj', another large teip. We can put forward 30-40 thousand mature fighters, so do they. It's a civil war if we announced blood feud on each other!* Said Magomed Khasiev, Chechen ethnologist

What the descent group does, it “expresses solidarity” to the offended family (its members stop talking and intermarrying with representatives of the enemy teip (lineage), leave public events demonstratively if their enemies show up there, or even start fighting with them once they see them in the street). It supports revenge financially, with connections to sort things out with authorities once vendetta has been fulfilled etc. Killing or humiliation of a teip/ lineage member is still considered to be an offense, which injures dignity of the entire group. Adequate response is important for preempting attacks in the future: *“If you let it go once in respect of Kodzoev, then everybody will think that one can behave freely with Kodzoevs. We have several times responded very well, so now nobody wants to deal with us”*(Kodzoev, interview 2009).

All my respondents spoke of blood feud as the heaviest burden any family can imagine (for either side of the conflict). That is why in almost 99% of cases unintended murder (eg. in a car accident, inattentive handling of weapon) is being forgiven after “*maslat*”, a special ceremony of reconciliation. However, intentional murder is seldom forgiven.

In Soviet times vendetta, but even more so reconciliation of blood enemies were an inexhaustible source of corruption for the police. *“Sometimes a person was killed in a car accident. In such a case usually families settle the issue peacefully. Of course, after the settlement no one would go file a complaint to the police. So, sometimes you could have a car accident with 5 corpses and no one punished. In the Soviet times the investigative authorities took bribes to close the case. They would be darting about these families, trying to sniff out whether they have reconciled. And once they did- here would police immediately appear to get their juicy bribe”* Mussa Aushev, senior of Aushev teip.

Members of descent group would help arrange things with the authorities and collect money to pay bribes.

Today, as my respondents claim, if blood feud is proportional, the authorities do not intervene:

*Recently there was a case, when one of the President's guards hit a Kozdov. The Kodzoevs responded, then the others started shooting and shot this Kodzov dead. Kodzoevs in return killed this officer of the President's guard... The President came up to the site, one of the guys explained what had happened, and how it was, that the killed one was guilty, so no one interfered, the President left and let the families settle the issue. Nurdin Kodzov, Ingush historian*

Usually, risk of punitive actions on behalf of the state is not an obstacle for performing blood feud. In Soviet times, oftentimes if a murderer was arrested the victim's family would not testify against him to avoid his imprisonment, which would for years postpone the possibility of revenge.

Blood feud and humiliation between 'common' Wajnakhs are usually settled in compliance with the traditional mechanisms. In the overwhelming majority of cases, the lineage/teip is unable or unwilling to protect its member against arbitrary state violence or violence committed by a state agent of Wajnakh nationality. However, I documented one case in Ingushetia, when a segment of an Ingush teip was able to defend its members against state security agencies and another case, also in Ingushetia, when the teip was able to mobilize and investigate an abduction by federal security servicemen, albeit too late, the person had already been killed.

On September 18, 2007 two cousins Aushev, both Magomed, were abducted at the outskirts of Grozny: when they were getting in a cab coming from Grozny railway station to Ingushetia, unidentified armed men in masks forced them out of the taxi, into their car and drove away. The taxi driver quickly informed the father of one of the cousins- Maksharip Aushev - an affluent Ingush businessman, who immediately took about 25 men of his relatives and in a convoy of 6 cars rushed in full speed to Grozny. Maksharip paid his way at every checkpoint and traced the route along which the two young men were taken. The following morning the Aushevs from the village of Surkhakhi organized a protest rally, blocked the main thoroughfare and the railroad in Nazran demanding to release the young men. Soon relatives of other abducted people, youngsters and sympathizers joined the protesters, who remained there for two days. The police tried to disperse them, but the protesters remained still, the policemen refused to shoot into the crowd. The protesters prepared tents and coppers for boiling meat, and announced that they would stay until the young men were returned to their families. At 3 a.m. Maksharip Aushev received a phone call and was told to pick up his chaps in the Shatoy police district in Chechnya (faraway mountain area). Later it turned out that the young men were tortured for several hours and then taken for execution, when their abductors received a phone call with an order to release them.

This incident was a prominent example of familial solidarity, which was supported by other like-minded Ingush. I asked relatives of other abducted Ingush men (around 180 were abducted since

2002), why the Aushevs managed to intervene so successfully? Most of them explained that this was because 1) the Aushevs were an influential teip, but most importantly, the authorities were afraid that Ruslan Aushev (still the very popular ex-President of Ingushetia) might come to the republic from Moscow and lead the protest which would then transform into a mass civic movement 2) Maksharip Aushev himself was a very energetic and affluent man, he managed to mobilize relatives and friends.

There was another episode when the members of the (large) Ozdov teip managed to carry out an independent investigation of the abduction, but they were not as successful as the Aushevs, the abducted person had already been killed.

Parents of other abducted young men in Ingushetia told me that their teip members did not offer them any real support or protection of that kind. On the basis of these two episodes of action and of almost two hundred episodes of non-action, I can conclude that two elements are conducive to the consolidation of teip when confronted with the state: 1) the size and assertiveness of teip and 2) the presence of an influential leader who can mobilize kinsmen around him.

Most of my respondents, especially in Ingushetia, emphasized that in cases of blood feud teips only “provide background”, “express solidarity”, but the actual murder is carried out by the closest kin. Even in the unique case of the recent mobilization of the Aushev teip in Ingushetia, just a small part of the teip was mobilized, supported by the like-minded Ingush. The Aushev teip numbers around 9,000 people, but only some several hundred took part in the protest rally altogether (including many non-relative supporters).

In Chechnya many instances of intra-teip blood-feuds exist, mainly as a result of the recent wars. Such instances have also been registered in Ingushetia, where, for example, Magomed Evloev, the owner of oppositional Ingush news-portal [ingushetia.ru](http://ingushetia.ru) was assassinated on August 31 2008, after an illegal arrest by a security serviceman who belonged to his teip, having even the same name - Evloev.

To conclude, blood-feud and retaliation in case of humiliation is the strongest (and as many say, the only) mechanism which can mobilize a descent group in Ingushetia and Chechnya today. In Chechnya the lineage or segment of lineage, in Ingushetia the teip (if a small one) or lineage will offer moral and financial support for the retaliation, but the retaliation itself is the responsibility of the closest kin. I will briefly come back to this phenomenon in the section dedicated to kinship and explain how it works within the extended family.

#### 4. Rule of the Elders

Respect of seniors is widely pronounced and displayed in both Chechen and Ingush societies. When an aged person comes into the room, everyone gets up and gives him/her the best place, does not sit down until he invites them to (and sometimes not even then), does not interrupt him when he speaks. Elders are present at public events, religious rituals, and political ceremonies. All politicians seek symbolic support of “the Elders”.

In the past the Wajnakhs were ruled by Councils of Elders of villages, selected from every teip. Adjudication was as well performed by the Elders too. Mekhk-Khel or the Council of the Land were comprised of the respected Elders from teips or regions.

Today, the word ‘stareyshina’ (Elder) is rarely used, more often is the term “starik” (Senior, Old Man) is in circulation. All of my respondents noted the declining role of the seniors, however, each of them evaluated the reasons and the degree of this decline differently.

The most typical explanations have been:  
 “Very few seniors remained. All of our seniors have died during these turbulent years”;  
 “This is a bad generation of seniors. They were spoilt by the deportation. They are hungry or have deportation syndrome”;  
 “All the best seniors are sitting at home because this is not the right moment to speak up; those who are conspicuous in politics are trash”.

Each of these explanations has a grain of truth in it. Indeed, during the recent years of conflict and war the life expectancy went down, many elderly people died or became ill:

*We have respect to the elderly, but we don't have the elderly. In our teip all our elderly are either very ill or dead and I have to perform all the senior's functions. And very often when I come to talk to other families they don't even have my peer to represent them! I have to deal with*

*the youngsters!* Mussa Aushev, Director of the House of Folk Art, senior of the Aushev teip (78 years old)

As will be discussed in the subsequent chapters, in Dudaev's times and during the 1992 Ingush-Ossetian conflict many politically active seniors discredited themselves. In the more recent years we have seen how the same seniors praise each new coming president. It is commonly believed that they are being paid for this or somehow encouraged otherwise. The fact that the Elders can be corrupt is commonly believed to be the consequence of deportation. 'They have seen famine, so they are now hungry for material goods', many of my respondents explained. There was an implication to such statements that the next generation of seniors would be better. The fact that the elderly are praising the authorities is also thought to be the result of the deportation syndrome: 'They are fearful; they have lived through genocide'.

I have heard from many respondents that 'the real Elders' are 'sitting at home', and they do not want to turn up in public, because 1) "the time is not right" 2) they do not want to be seen in company with the corrupt ones.

To the questions "when will the time be right", I would get the response "when really important questions are solved, like the fate of the nation or territorial issues".

*"You cannot see respected Elders in public now. They are all at home. Those whom you see on TV are trash, who will sell their motherland for a ruble"* were the words of an Ingush scholar who expressed a rather wide-spread opinion. *"There is a difference between an Elder and an aged man. He might have had a frivolous life and now he has aged and he has grown a long beard and he wants to be an Elder"*? was another common opinion put in a rather straightforward fashion.

In short, the evaluation of seniors in society has become merit-based.

After years in the field my understanding of the declining role of seniors is different from those quoted above by my respondents. I see them losing their social functions mainly because society changes.

First, according to all my respondents, neither Chechen nor Ingush villages have Councils of Elders anymore. Sometimes administrations may invite and consult respected seniors in a given village, but this is a) initiated from above and b) has an ad hoc basis. I will discuss it in more



detail in section 4.5.2 of this chapter. Thus, seniors' self-government does not function at the village level anymore.

Second, at the country level, the Mekhk-Khel (Council of Land) did not function in Soviet times. In Dudaev's time in Chechnya and in 2007 in Ingushetia attempts were made to revive the Mekhk-Khels. These attempts failed and discredited the idea. The story of the Mekhk Khel under Dudaev will be analyzed in some detail in chapter 6. As to the Ingush Mekhk-Khel, it was organized as part of a powerful protest movement aimed to replace President Zyazikov in 2007. Among other things, the opposition created a 'Mekhk-Khel', 'elected' representatives of teips and appointed a 21 year old (!) man, Akhmed Kotiev, as its chair. In two years the Mekh-Khel met several times and then leaders of the opposition pompously announced that they 'discovered' that Kotiev was "an FSB agent". Clearly this Mekhk-Khel was quite a ridiculous attempt to use the old symbol for a modern political purpose. This attempt failed, two thirds of the republic had no idea that it even existed and those who were presented as "elected representatives of teips" were simply supporters of the opposition from various teips.

Third, the Elders loose their religious authority. The "People's Islam of the forefathers" is not very popular with the youth who are now seriously interested in religion and have young learned scholars to turn to when it comes to religious issues. Most of the village imams are either middle aged or young. The role of village imams has grown significantly. This matter will be tackled in more detail in section 4.5. of this chapter.

At the same time, seniors do preserve a very prominent function in rituals and in disputes, in what is called People's Courts (*Khels*). Seniors still enjoy a good deal of respect; nobody will be rude or aggressive towards an elderly person. That is why they can sort out conflict situations- bride abductions, blood feud and other disputes. If someone wants to get married, they ask their seniors to go to the family of the bride-to-be and make the proposal. The seniors of the bride-to-be receive them and give their response.

In case of a dispute, a person can choose his own judge. Usually this is a respected senior person, known for his command of *adat* and *sharia*, with immaculate reputation. If one of the sides is against a particular senior he would not be invited. This improvised court which takes place in somebody's home is called *Khel*. It is created *ad hoc* and functions for adjudication of this particular dispute. A person can also choose, whether he wants the dispute be settled by the *adat* (customary law) or the *sharia* (Islamic law), although the two have become very closely merged. My respondents noted that recently more people tend to prefer to resort to the *sharia* for resolving disputes, although the procedural part of adjudication usually follows the *adat*.

In 1990s some teips in Ingushetia elected their teip Councils of Elders. These councils consisted of respected elderly men, who were supposed to represent the teip in case of conflicts or at major funerals or other events. According to Osman Aushev, the Chair of such a teip Council of Elders, and Abukar Gudiev, a chair of another, usually the actual work is being done by young assistants, who coordinate and organize things in a given village or within a given lineage under supervision by the seniors. Such councils usually comprise seniors from each of the settlement where representatives of this teip live in large numbers and representatives of various lineages (familias) within this teip. Such representatives are not always the oldest, but usually the most respected in a given community. The councils do not meet unless something happens (bride abduction, murder, major funeral) when they are needed.

The forth factor which contributed to the deterioration of the role of seniors is market economy and modern political processes. I noticed that today ritual life is regulated by seniors, but in the actual life of the community younger energetic leaders, often with due education, money and connections are needed. Idris Abadiyev, a successful Ingush businessman, who invested a lot in the revival of his Evloev teip, said that he was elected member of the Council of Elders, being just 40 years old. According to Idris, the chair was elected because he was a *mullah* and an old man, but all the actual things were done by younger members. Mohamad-Sali Kotiev, a senior from Ingushetia, said that the same was true of their lineage – they had an Elder, but younger

men did everything in his name, having coordinated it with him. Akhmet, in his early 50s, an energetic investigator of the Republican Prosecutors office in Chechnya, seemed to be the key coordinating person in the Bogur gaar (lineage) of the Keloy teip in Chechnya.

The Ingush historian Nurdin Kodzoev confirmed this observation: *“In the past the Elders had respect, when trouble came they all united and made decisions and took responsibility for them. But now each teip is led by young people. And elders stay at home. Forty-fifty year old people are the actual decision makers in their families in Ingushetia”*.

Thus, the institution of Elders has deteriorated and seniors retain their function in rituals, sorting outs and symbolic legitimization of certain public politics. Having said this, I should re-emphasize, that respect of age remains high in both societies under study.

### 5. Religious rituals (funerals, weddings, *mold*)

Life-cycle ceremonies, especially weddings and funerals, are attended by huge numbers of people in Ingushetia and Chechnya. To express condolences at funerals is a must for all relatives, neighbors, friends, colleagues of the deceased and his/her family members. Usually, according to Muslim tradition, a deceased should be buried on the same day before sunset. Subsequently for three days in the house of the deceased a mourning is taking place, with people coming and going, expressing condolences to the family. The ritual differs according to vird, some families feed their guests others do not, some have groups of *murids* performing *zikr*, and others do not. But nonetheless, as Salavat Gaev of the Chechen village of Gekhi-chu put it “when somebody dies in this village we leave all our work and are there for three days with them to support”. The closest kin and neighbors stay for three days, more distant relatives and people from other settlements usually visit once. Oftentimes, groups of close relatives get together 20-50 people and in one convoy of cars arrive to the funeral together and depart together.

*“We do not go to funerals or weddings one by one, we get all together, 30-50 people. Everybody knows that the Aushevs from Surkhakhi of this and this family arrived. I attend funerals of all Aushevs... To certain important funerals or weddings all the Aushevs come. Recently Bashir Aushev, the Secretary of the republican Security Council, was killed, so all the Aushevs attended*

*the funeral. But this was a special case*". Mussa Aushev, director of the House of Folk Art, Elder of Aushev Teip.

Mussa Aushev is among the oldest and most respected members of his teip, this is why he is invited to attend all the weddings and funerals. Mussa knows all the older people in his teip, who participate in ceremonies. Since teips and lineages are big, funerals or weddings happen almost every week, and this is the main public space where seniors of a teip meet and it is also a mechanism for maintaining teip/lineage cohesion in Ingushetia.

In Chechnya teips are much bigger so people tend to attend weddings and funerals only of representatives of their lineage or those with whom they maintain kinship relations. However, some respected elderly are invited to ceremonies of other teip lineages and other teips. Funerals and weddings involve financial contributions which is another way of social support to the family. These contributions come back to the person, once something happens in his/her family.

Attendance and involvement in funerals/weddings is age- and gender-specific. Usually all the seniors of the family should express their respect in good and bad events on behalf of their kin. Middle aged people do not have to attend in all cases; one or two siblings from a family can come on behalf of all. Young peoples' attendance and involvement in ceremonies of distant kin is even less mandatory. In many families women do not attend funerals, in some they do, but they sit separately from the men and express condolences to the women of that family. As a result, according to my respondents, the seniors know all (in Ingushetia) or many (in Chechnya) of the seniors in their teip/lineage, middle-aged people know each other much worse and usually only those of their lineage, and young people often do not know each other.

However, within the segment of lineage, all adult members attend all weddings and funerals.

*"Not a single Sunday passes without a wedding of one of our village's Chapanovs. We do not need to organize any congresses or councils, all political questions are resolved at funerals or weddings! If someone gets married, the day or two before it we get together there, and then the wedding itself, and then almost everyday, we, the Achaluki Chapanovs, somehow bump into each other. I know all the Chapanov elderly, I do not know all people of my age, and the youngsters-they grow like mushrooms you cannot remember them all"*. Vakha Chapanov, Achaluki village, Ingushetia, 38 years old. Chapanov is a lineage of the Gorbakov teip

Weddings and funerals are not the only events which are attended by representatives of descent groups. Sometimes members of a lineage meet at religious rituals, like *mold* and *sakh* – sacrifices with readings of the Koran. Thus, funerals/weddings and religious rituals, are important platforms in which members of lineages, sub-lineages or territorial segments can meet, and where important seniors of entire teips can get together.

I conclude that in Chechnya the teips are not social organizations, they have desintegrated and do not retain mechanisms of maintaining cohesion. Lineages, sub-lineages and territorial segments of lineages perform the function of descent groups, which is limited to mutual attending of ritual ceremonies (weddings, funerals, and mold) and support in cases of blood feud or humiliation. Other mechanisms, which used to maintain teip unity in the past, such as common residence, common ownership of land/property, and the rule of Elders, have ceased to exist. Teips do not reside together anymore; many have lost their villages of origin and are fragmented not only along lineages/segments but among settlements. Each teip can have 5-10 villages where its members are concentrated in significant numbers. Teip ownership of land and cultural heirlooms has become more symbolic than real. The Elders have long ago lost their political function in society and are contained to the domain of the ritual. Even the Councils of teip Elders set up as part of the retro fashion on teips were in fact run by middle aged activists rather than the Elders. Blood feud has essentially migrated into the domain of the extended family, the teips expresses solidarity and supports financially, but the actual killing is done or commissioned by the immediate kin of the victim. Moreover, there are many cases of intra-teip vendettas.

Chechen teips have completely deteriorated, while in Ingushetia some small or average teips retain some degree of cohesion, which is also limited to ritual and blood feuds. Ingush lineages (*familias*) are more tightly knit units and can be considered social organizations.

#### 4.3. Kinship

##### 4.3.1. Categories of Kinship and Relations between them

When speaking about teips, many of my respondents emphasized that although teip matters to some degree, the actual routine life is linked with one's close kin. Wajnakhs are very kinship-rich societies. Close relatives are called *tsijna nakh* – («цлийна нах» - Chechen, «цле нах»/«цлентара нах» - Ingush) – lit. people of the same hearth, house. «*Tsijnanakh*» includes patrilineal relatives: *shichoy*- (шичой) - cousins, *myakhchoy* (мяхчой) – second cousins, *vovtkhar (m)/yovkhatar (f)* (вовтхар/йовхатар), third cousins. The word *yovhatar* stems from the word 'warmth', which indicates that this relationship still contains some degree of closeness. For fourth cousins there is no special term, although they can sometimes be included in *tsijnanakh*. After them all kinsmen are called *gergarlo* – i.e. relatives. Chechens have another important kin-term- "*yukyokushverg*" (Юкъйокъкъушверг)- 'dividing'. This is a relative, which is a dividing line between kin and non-kin. Beyond *yukyokushverg* people can marry and there is no blood feud responsibility for each other.

There is a distinction between kin terms on the mother's and father's line, thus relatives on the mother's line are called "*nenahoy*" (ненахой), on the father's side – "*dekho*" (дехой). Kinship on the mother's and father's side is distinguished by prefixes. The prefix "*ne*" will be added to kin terms on the mother's side (*nenavash*- uncle on the mother's side, *netsi*- aunt on mother's side, *nenana*, *nenada*- grandmother and grandfather on mother's side) and the prefix "*de*" to kin terms on the father's side (*devash* - uncle on the father's side, *detsi*- aunt on the father's side, *deda*- grandfather on father's side, *denana*- grandmother on father's side).

The *de* and *ne* prefixes are used only when one wants to specify the type of kinship. When one directly addresses his grandfather, he would seldom say "*nenada*", but would simply say 'dada'. The same with grandmothers on both sides, they will be addressed simply as "nana" or "baba", similarly with uncles on both sides. Thus, kinship terms in Wajnakh societies suggest that the closest relatives among ones' kin are until the third cousins, that relatives on the mother's and the father's side are distinguished linguistically, however, when a person interacts with his kin,

he does not differentiate between matrilineal and patrilineal relatives, kinship is perceived as cognatic.

Relatives through marriages are called *zakhhalsh* (*зaxанu*). The wife's relatives are called *usttsa* (*ycmyла*). The ethnical code presupposes a special treatment of each of these categories of relatives. In Ingushetia these rules are still very strictly observed. Relatives on the female side are very important and one has to express more respect to them, than to one's patrilineal kin. For example, Ingush have very strict rules of how people should be placed in a room or at a table during family gatherings. The more respected people, should be placed further from the doors in more comfortable positions. Then everybody occupies places according to their age and kin status. *Nenkhoy*, *zakhlysh*, *usttsa* - relatives on mother's, female sibling's spouses' and wife's side are placed "higher" than patrilineal relatives.

A woman, once married becomes part of her husband's family, but she remains under the protection of her relatives. In Ingushetia the husband does not keep physical contact with his parents-in-law, he is obliged to avoid seeing them, does not park his car near their house and he visits the house of his wife's relatives only when her parents are not in (which signifies that he recognizes shame for sexual contact with their daughter). The husband does maintain close relations with his wife's siblings and other kin. Once a person gets married, the family expands by a large number of persons and his obligations increase; with each sibling getting married a nuclear family significantly enriches its kin.

Thus, the Ingush and Chechens are connected with many teips and lineages through various kin-ties – matrilineal, through marriage, marriage of siblings, one's own marriage. Oftentimes especially in Ingushetia, relations with relatives on the female side are very close, and even more significant to a person than his own lineage relations.

In the previous chapter I quoted Fortes, who claimed that kinship relations were between individuals, while "clan relations" - between groups (Fortes: 1953:33). Fortes emphasized the importance of bilateral kinship relations for binding together the major groups by filiation

through marriage. Fortes uses the term “complementary filiation” to refer to the recognition of ties through whom descent is not traced. In the daily routine of Wajnakh societies complimentary filiation though marriage is as prominent as patrilineal relations.

#### 4.3.2. Kinship Relations and Kin Solidarity

The actual life of an individual in a Wajnakh society is placed within the tight network of multi-vector kinship relations. As everywhere, it depends on a person, how intense are his/her kin ties, but on the average, Wajnakh family life is much more intense than that of a Russian family. Sheer numbers of relatives make this happen. An average extended family would include 3 generations vertically and relatives in the three degrees horizontally (up to third cousins). Given high birthrates in the region all this kin amounts to a large group of relatives.

*“We are a big family, I have ten brothers and four sisters, all of them are married with children, I have 35-40 nephews and nieces, I need to see them at least once a week. So I hardly have time running around, remembering everybody’s birthdays and other important occasions”*, Alikhan, Gamurzievo, Ingushetia

Alikhan’s family is quite exceptionally big, but many of my local colleagues have 5-7 siblings which keeps them busy just within the immediate family. According to my observations, cousins, uncles and aunts on both patrilineal and matrilineal sides are very close relatives and play an important role in the life on an individual.

Family solidarity is very strong. If a child is sent to study outside the republic, then usually with a close relative. Other close relatives are likely to follow:

*At the age of 16 I finished school and went to Irkutsk to visit my cousin for vacation. Some years before that my cousin went there to work on the construction of the BAM<sup>33</sup>, got married to a Russian, graduated from a Pedagogical university and stayed there. When I arrived my cousin said- why should you go home? Ask dad to send us your school certificate, you will take exams to the University here. The documents came late and I could not take exams to the University, so I entered a vocational college. Later my aunt, two of my sisters and my brother joined me in Irkutsk. One sister finished Pedagogical university, another- the College of trade. Our older brother came to Irkutsk in order to find a job and support all of us while we were studying. We bought a flat and all lived there for several years. Then we returned to Ingushetia. Akhmet Barakhoev, resident of Nazran, Ingushetia*

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<sup>33</sup> Bajkal-Amur railroad



In times of trouble family solidarity was as strong with the female side relatives as with patrilineal kin. I heard numerous stories when in deportation families were helped by relatives on the female side, who got settled in big cities and assisted them in moving. During the recent wars in Chechnya many families found refuge with their *nenkhoy* (mother's relatives).

However, the most intense family relations lie within relatives up to second cousins:

*For me my family is first of all my children. Then my brothers and sisters. If trouble comes, who will help? This is my immediate solidarity group. Then come cousins and second cousins, these are also very close relatives. In our household four generations live together- cousins and second cousins (these are kids of cousins). We all live as one family household.* Khazdimurat Kostoev, a leader of the Ingush national movement "Nijskho", Ekazhevo village, Ingushetia.

Close kin take the leading role in all rituals related to life-cycle events, especially funerals, they help to organize weddings, contribute with money and food, women cook and clean up after such events. The end of the Ramadan holiday is another mechanism of maintaining close kin solidarity. For Ramadan for three days all men have to visit their neighbors and relatives on all sides (starting with kin affiliated through marriages), wish them a happy holiday and if time permits to have a meal with them. On Ramadan all tables in each house are laid and people receive guests, who come in and out in huge crowds. First, one has to visit elderly and ill on that day, so seniors receive much attention, even if they live in distant villages. Both for Ramadan and Kurban-Bajram- two main Muslim holidays, close kin men go to cemeteries to pray together.

#### 4.3.3 Co-habitation: Kinship enclaves

Many of my respondents said that in order to maintain close relations relatives should live close-by. In Ingushetia many settlements still represent a patchwork of kinship enclaves, which are usually segments of '*familiyas*', i.e. patrilineal kin. As I have shown in table 4.1. every *familiya* has one or several territorial centers, where they settled originally when descending from the mountains and from where they branched out to other places. Since Ingush families are growing

fast, familial centers cannot accommodate all the new families, so a son would leave his parents and buy land elsewhere. His brothers are likely to join him. Soon a small kinship enclave will emerge in a new place. *“Our Mezhoevs live in the village of Barsuki, but there was not enough place for everyone there, so we started buying land at Gvardejskaya street in Nazran. We already have 10 houses here in Nazran”*, explained one of my respondents. One or several lineages in a *familia* can be found in a specific village.

These kinship enclaves are more often patrilineal, and usually are made up of *tsijnanakh* (extended family). This is explained by a commonly shared belief, that one should live close to one's *dekhoy* (patrilineal kin) because in case of conflicts or problems they are the ones to offer assistance.

*I don't have brothers, but my cousins on my mother's side live in Dolakovo. They tell me, why don't we buy you a land slot here with us? I don't go for it. Imagine, I settle in Dolakovo and one day I have a conflict with somebody. Immediately people around will say: this is this Merzhoev, who came here and settled with his mother's kin. And now he is making trouble. They will already look down at me that I am not with my father's relatives. My mother's cousins would of course interfere on my side, just to show the people around that they are not leaving there relative alone. But if a more serious problem occurs, they will say-hey, you understand, you have your own kin, they should help you. I will then have to turn to my father's relatives and ask for support. And they will tell me: why on earth did you settle with your mother's relatives!? You should have come to live here with us, and then in case anything happened, we would have always been nearby...* Magomed, resident of Nazran

Invisible borders between kinship enclaves, especially the ones considered patrilineal, are observed and respected. It is next to impossible for a stranger to buy land in such enclaves. Wajnakhs have their own traditional rules of property rights. If a piece of land is considered to belong to some family it will remain as such, even if the authorities take it and give to somebody else or build a kindergarten on this territory. Once authorities change, this family will reclaim the land and it will have to be returned by the new owners. An individual family living inside a kinship enclave, especially in case of the 'village of origin' cannot sell their land as they please. If they want to sell their land and house, they have to offer it first to their brothers/cousins/relatives, and they will most likely buy it for a price they can pay. If no one of the relatives wants to buy this piece of land, the family has to offer it to non-kin neighbors (if

any present there). Only then can they sell it to an outsider. Because of these nuances, Ingush are very careful, when buying land.

The organic kinship enclaves will protect their territory. If someone comes and tries to create problems there (initiate a dispute or a fight), he would be quickly ousted. *“If he tried to sort things out on a neutral territory- this is another matter. But “coming to us” and “making a hassle here”, would be taken as disrespect of this family. Every guy down to the last idiot will jump out and protect the familial honor.”* – explained Albert from Nazran.

Such rules apply only to land in rural and particularly familial settlements in Ingushetia. Buying a house in cities or in new settlements or outside organic family units does not entail any obligations to kinsmen. The main thing is not to encroach on patriarchal nests, which are, indeed, tight social organisms.

Some kinship enclaves especially in patriarchal nests try to maintain discipline and order inside the kinship community.

*How much can familia discipline its members? It depends on the men in that family. We are about 50 households of my fifth forefather Toach. We all live in a compact manner. We do have an influence and today we can proudly say that we have no single drunkard or drug addict or extremist or otherwise sinful people. Everybody is working, cultivating land. Our past helps us today, we try not to stain the good memory of our forefathers,* Mussa Aushev, director of House of Folk Art, Surkhakhi village, Ingushetia

In Chechnya in many settlements there are many representatives of one teip. However, Chechen settlements are more mixed compared to Ingush ones. In many bigger villages representatives of 30-40 different teips might reside, and they do not live in a compact fashion, but in constellations of kin groups, occupying one/two streets next to each other. In Chechnya maintaining close kinship with further than third cousins is rare, even in the villages of origin:

*These days we become distant from each other very quickly. With our cousins we have close kinship, but our children will know that they have such relatives, myakhchoy /second cousins/ but they would not know each other anymore. Now time flies very fast, everybody is scattered around, as a result of the deportation and the recent wars. I know many stories when young people started dating each other and then found out that they were relatives. They had to break-up.* Rovzan Khadzhieva, 38, Zumsoy, Chechnya

The last two wars have dispersed extended and nuclear families even further:

*What has this war done?! One of my daughters is in Moscow, another- in Belorussia, the third is in Baku, another son and a daughter are in Istanbul, my nephews are in New York, Canada and*

*Iceland! My family has fallen apart!* bitterly exclaimed a senior from a mountainous village of in Shatoy district of Chechnya.

*As a result of wars kin ties were broken. Everyone fled wherever they could. Wherever they had relatives, acquaintances, where the roads were open for traffic. Everyone got dispersed- tents, refugee camps, little communication..* Khussain Akhmadov, Chair of Chechen parliament 1992-1993

#### 4.3.4. Kinship and Blood Feud

I have dealt with blood feud in the section on teip, where I identified the role of the descent group in helping extended families to revenge their dear ones. Previously blood feud was the function of the entire teip. Today, blood feud still falls strictly in the domain of patrilineal relatives, but as has been mentioned in the previous section, the teip/lineage “supports” families in performing the blood feud only, but the responsibility to kill lies on the immediate blood relatives.

*Brothers, cousins will revenge. It hardly ever comes to second cousins. In exceptional cases, vovtkhar [third cousins – E.S.] can revenge, because the prestige of the teip is always on the agenda.* Vakha Garsaev, Chechen ethnologist

If for some reason close kin cannot perform the blood feud at a certain point in time, it will not be taken up by more distant relatives, but will be transferred to the next generations of immediate kin of the killed:

*“I will revenge for my brother. If I don’t- our sons will when they grow. If they don’t – our grandchildren will. I am not forgiving the blood of my brother”-* said Zurab Tetchoev, whose brother was abducted and disappeared in Ingushetia.

If children of the killed person are still small, relatives can sometimes wait with the decision to announce blood feud or not, until the kids are in the position to make a decision, because it is thought that they have the primary right to do so. Thus, if impossible to perform right away, vendetta responsibility travels not horizontally (from immediate to more distant members of the descent group), but rather vertically, down to the direct offspring. This signifies that the last functioning mechanism of descent group cohesion is deteriorating and travelling into the domain of the extended family.

This section has summarized the results of my research which show that kinship on the patrilineal, matrilineal sides and through marriage constitutes a vital structure of Chechen and

Ingush societies: daily routines, support in good and bad events (wedding and funerals), strong social solidarity and mutual responsibility, blood feud and social security fall in the domain of extended families. Where kin groups live in a compact fashion, they represent very tight and organic units. In the towns, the intensity of kinship relations is much weaker.

#### 4.4. Territory

Historically most of the Chechen teips used to be united into 9 *tukhums* – military-territorial units. Tukhum is a Turkic word, borrowed by the Chechen language. Tukhums are non-existent at the moment, but their former contours coincide with cultural, regional, linguistic variations among Chechens. Thus, *Akki* is a tukhum of Chechens primarily residing in Dagestan and culturally closer to Dagestan. The *Ortkhoy* and *melkhi* tukhums are geographically close to Ingushetia and speak a transitional dialect between Chechen and Ingush. In Soviet times, some of them had written down in their passports as the Chechens, while others – as Ingush. *The Nokhchimakhoy* tukhum is considered to be the nucleus of the Chechen nation, the embodiment of “Chechenness” and comprises 30 teips residing beyond the Argun river. Nadterechny, Naursky and Shelkovskoy regions are traditionally leaning towards Russia.

Village affiliation is rather strong, particularly in Chechnya, where villages are less fragmented into kin enclaves. Wajnakhs towns, especially the half million big Grozny as any urban centers are socially different from rural areas.

But even Vainakh towns are divided into smaller sectors, micro-districts - *kuyans*, comprised of several streets or small residential areas. The residents of a *kuyan* usually know each other by name, and maintain intense neighborly relations. “A good neighbor is closer than a relative”, states a Wajnakhs proverb. Indeed, neighborly solidarity is very strong, mutual help in household, maintaining infrastructure, water/gas/electricity supply, child care, cooking for holidays or funerals are important, especially since some of the above mentioned services are poorly provided by the state and catering agencies are non-existent.

Earlier I analyzed an incident of teip solidarity in Ingushetia, when in response to illegal actions of state agents, kin group managed to organize serious resistance. In Chechnya, such protests were a routine practice in 2000-2003 but were organized on the village-basis as a response to actions of military servicemen, who en masse abducted young men, many of whom subsequently disappeared. Co-villagers would block roads and demand the release of young men. Many young people were saved due to these efforts. Never did such protests take up kinship contours in Chechnya. In Chechnya during the aerial attacks, neighbors the entire residential blocks spent weeks together in cellars.

There is a widespread belief that certain Chechen towns and villages took independent positions vis-a-vis the turbulent political events of the 1990s. Thus, the town of Urus-Martan and the Nadterechny region were thought to be in oppositional to the separatist regime of Jokhar Dudaev before the first war, while the same Urus-Martan is thought to have been the center of fundamentalism in Maskhadov's times. The subsequent chapters will scrutinize these political processes in settlements and explain their special, or allegedly special, political standing. Here I will take a note that regionalism and territorial affiliation are certainly relevant in Chechnya.

Historically the Ingush teips united into five-six 'societies'. However, historical 'societies' have no social or political relevance in contemporary Ingushetia. The Ingush have culturally and politically relevant distinctions between those Ingush who used to live Grozny (*groznenskie ingushi*), those from the Prigorodny Region of North Ossetia (*prigorodnye ingushi*) and the indigenous Ingush, often called Nazran Ingush. All the three groups of the Ingush are currently residing in Ingushetia, the first two groups arrived there as refugees, fleeing the Chechen wars and the Ingush-Ossetian conflict and are considered to be more "advanced": educated, urban, but also Russified, uprooted, lacking understanding of "Ingushness". Vices and problems of modern Ingush society, such as low morality are often blamed on these in-coming Ingush. Indeed, on the average having higher cultural capital, the Grozny and Prigorodny Ingush took jobs and had more successful careers than their local co-ethnics, which caused resentment, especially among

the indigenous cultural elite. The first two Ingush Presidents were from Grozny, the incumbent president Yunus-Bek Evkurov is a Prigorodny Ingush. This fact incites tremendous dissatisfaction of the Ingush nationalist elite, who look forward to finally having a ‘real Ingush’, who “knows the Ingush ways” to rule the republic.

#### 4.5. Religion

In what follows I will analyze the role of religion as a pattern of integration and religious institutions in contemporary Ingushetia and Chechnya. Since the mid 1990s religion occupies an increasingly prominent place in the social life of Chechen and Ingush societies.

##### 4.5.1. Tariqas and virds

As has been noted in the previous chapters, Soviet anti- religious campaigns were not very successful among the Wajnakhs, and especially seniors continued to pray, fast, get together in *murid* groups for the performance of *zikr*. Two Sufi tariqas are represented in the republics of Ingushetia and Chechnya, the Qadyriya and the Naqshbandiya, with the followers of the Qadiri tariqa making up roughly 80% of all Wajnakh believers, 10% - of the Naqshbandiya and the other 10% belong to other very small virds.

The largest Qadyriya vird is Kunta-Khadzi, the followers of Kunta-Khadzi Kishiev, who introduced Qadyri *tariqa* into Chechnya after the Caucasian War. The Kunta-Khadzi vird has sub-virds, which sprang from it at a later point; the last one, the vird of Vis-Khadzi was founded in Kazakhstan. The Naqshbandi tariqa also has a number of sub-virds, including some very small ones. There are 32 virds in Ingushetia and Chechnya, most of which are Naqshbandi; The Qadiri tariqa is less fragmented.

In the Russian academic literature there is a widespread opinion, that the followers of Qadyri Kunta Khadzi vird in Chechnya are mostly mountaineers and that they are traditionally more anti-Russian, while lowland people are mostly Naqshbandi and they are pro-Russian. “...The religious factor played an important role in the fate of the current regime in Chechnya. Although it has never been pronounced openly, in fact it happened that the mountaineers (Qadyri tariqa)

supported Dudaev, while the residents of lowland regions and intelligentsia (the majority of them- Naqshbandi tariqa) moved to the opposition” (Kulchik 1994).

My interviews with experts and fieldwork in the villages did not support this claim.

*“Virds are not divided according to geographical areas. Even in many families there are vird divisions. Moreover, there is no connection between vird and politics. The separatist idea was an ideology which cross-cut religious and regional divisions.”* Khussain Akhmadov, Chair of Chechen Parliament in 1992-1994, currently advisor to Mufti of Chechnya.

My fieldwork in villages confirms that there are numerous Naqshbandi followers in the mountains, especially in the region which fought in the Caucasian War on the side of Imam Shamil and adopted his vird at that time. They usually preserve the original vird of their forefathers.

The differences between the *tariqa* and *virds* are slight, and are mostly linked to performance of *zikr* - ritual dance and ceremonies during funerals. Oftentimes, in one family a wife could be of one vird and her husband of another. Fatima Bekova, who is a Qadiri Kunta-Khadzi follower, and her husband is a Naqshbandi, explained the difference between the two in the following way:

*“We [Qadiri Kunta-Khadzi vird- E.S.] will spend our last kopejk to make a dignified funeral. We spend a lot of rituals. When we buried our mother, we spent all our savings. For three days we serve lavish food and we give people little packages with food to eat for the soul of our deceased. We make it very tasty, from the bottom of our heart, because this is done for our deceased loved one. For three days our men perform zikr. And my husband’s vird [Naqshbandi - E.S.], they do not eat during funerals and do not do zikr. Their funerals are very quiet and inexpensive. On the seventh day they make a modest dinner and only the closest relatives come. Everyone brings what they can to contribute... I have no problem with us being different with my husband. I told him when I die, I want them to bury me according to their tariqa, since I do not want my family to spend much on my funeral.”* Fatima Bekova, Nazran, Ingushetia

Despite insignificant differences in substance, vird-based integration and fragmentation are quite relevant in Ingushetia and Chechnya. The most tightly integrated is Batal-Khadzi *vird*, Qadiri tariqa, the followers of Sheikh Batal-Khadzi Belkharoev (1821-1914). This vird does not recognize teip divisions, they marry only inside the vird, have a monetary fund, which supports its members, and control some important economic objects in Ingushetia (the central market in Nazran, gasoline stations, the former plant Elektropribor). There are lots of myths and prejudices



about this group in the Ingush community, linked with their allegedly criminal nature and masterful skills of lobbying their political interests. There is a full consensus that the Batal-Khadzi vird is the most politically organized and disciplined vird of all.

The second most integrated *vird* is Naqshbandi vird of followers of Sheikh Deni Arsanov (1851-1917). This vird occupies prominent positions both in Ingushetia and in Chechnya, and it is thought that any political leader in both republics should count with the opinion of this vird's leaders. The solidarity of its vird members is also rather strong.

The least integrated is the most numerous vird of Kunta-Khadzi Kishiev followers. They constitute about 80% of the Chechen and Ingush population, and are pretty evenly spread among most of teips.

The religious fragmentation displays itself in the fact that in many settlements there are separate mosques of followers of different virds, in the existence of prejudices and stereotypes about virds with pejorative nicknames attached to each. Forums at Wajnakh internet portals are full of squabbles between different *vird* members.

#### 4.5.2. Murid Groups and Local Religious Authorities

In Chechen and Ingush villages believers form murid groups, which meet for the performance of religious rituals. Village murid groups are cells of larger religious structures (virds), which are part of still larger tariqas. The solidarity of village *murid* groups is strong, according to many.

*"My house was destroyed during this war. A tank shell fell on the roof. I was injured and spent about a month in the local hospital. At that time my whole family was in Ingushetia in a refugee camp. So the murids got together, bought construction materials and made a new roof. This way the remains of the house were saved, and later we were able to rebuild it, said Maskhud Musakhadziev, Samashki village, Chechnya*

Each settlement has a central mosque, and in big settlements there will be several other smaller mosques, one in each neighborhood. The central mosque is visited on Fridays, while other prayers are performed in the mosque nearby. In Ingushetia, a segment of familia may have their own mosque. Thus, in the village of Achaluki there are 7 mosques, six for each major *familias*

living there (Chapanovs, Bekovs, Gagievs (2 mosques), Shadizovs and Aushevs) and one central mosque. There is one Imam in the village (Chapanov) and he is responsible for leading the prayers in the central mosque.

Each village also elects a *tamada*, who is responsible for organizing religious rituals. In bigger settlements the *tamada* has assistants called *turks*, one for each neighborhood. Thus, in the Chechen village of Gekhi-chu there is one Imam, one *tamada* and 6 *turks*, one for each neighborhood. In case something happens (eg. a funeral); the *turks* inform everybody or call for help. The *tamada* organizes the rituals and coordinates the necessary support for the family. The work of all religious authorities in a village is voluntary.

The Imam, *tamada* and *turk* have taken up the responsibilities of the old councils of Elders: *“Now we do not have Councils of Elders. If anything happens, we turn to respected people: mullah or turk, they come and solve problems,”* said Salavat Gaev, a senior from Gekhi-chu. There is no Council of Elders in the big village of Samashki: *“Now we have an Imam, everybody listens to him. We decided not to elect the council”,* - explained Maskhud Musakhadziev. Many of the community problems are solved after Friday prayers in mosques. The head of administration of the village of Zamaj-Yurt in Chechnya said that there are few seniors remaining in the village, that is why the Imam took up most of their functions.

*We do not have a Council of Elders, but if I need to discuss issues with the community I can do it in the mosque on Friday, during Ruzban. I gather people outside the mosque (in the mosque you are not allowed to solve worldly problems) and raise the question. Usually almost everybody comes to Friday prayers. So I discuss things with everybody. And later I can formalize it on paper as a ‘meeting with residents’. The Councils of Elders have transformed into this..”.* Ruslan Tsokuev, head of administration of village of Zamaj-yurt.

Maskhud Musakhadziev has been a *tamada* of the village of Samashki for 22 years. As a *tamada* he was involved in many negotiations with the military during the wars and with the civic administration on behalf of the population. The head of the village administration often asked him to talk to the residents, when sensitive issues had to be solved:

*“In the beginning of this war the military servicemen based nearby demanded that we handed in one gun, because allegedly someone from our village did not handle it in. The head of administration called me and said: “Talk to people, ask them to collect money, we need to buy*

*this gun and give it to them, otherwise they won't leave our village in peace. They will listen to you". I said: "We will raise money now, will buy a gun and in two months another regiment comes here and they will again demand that we hand in weapons. He said may be the situation will change for the better. Indeed, that was a dangerous time. So, I sent my murids to collect money street by street. I told my murids to make a precise list of each contribution with signatures. I still have this list here. Then I brought the money to the head of administration and made him write a receipt that he got it. I insisted that we make a footage of how we hand this gun in and get an official statement from the military that they received it. I did it in case the military men changed and the next ones also wanted to make business on us."* Musukhadziev Makhud, Samashki, Chechnya

Thus, in the conditions of non-elective local governments, the religious authorities in the villages take up some of their function and act as the people's representatives in dealings with administrations and the military. *Ruzban* (Friday prayer) is used for solving issues of public relevance. The Imams and their assistants have replaced teip-based Councils of Elders in every village where I did fieldwork. Quite a few of my respondents said that vird affiliation is as important or even more important for them than their teip.

#### 4.5.3. Fundamentalists

Murid groups are not the only patterns of religious integration in Wajnakh societies. Since the mid 1990s new fundamentalist movements started to spread in the North Caucasus, which went into open uncompromised opposition against the traditional virds. Fundamentalists called for "return to the origins of Islam", and spoke against elements of paganism in the Sufi tariqas. The fundamentalists strongly opposed adoration of saints and pilgrimage to their tombs, which according to them contradicted the main principle of Islam- *tawhid* (Oneness of God). They consider *zikr* an innovation, they called for the simplification of expensive religious rituals (funerals, weddings), the strict observance of all the duties, which the sharia stipulated. They are against teip, vird and national distinctions as fragmenting the Muslim umma.

Virds are based indeed on the adoration of their leaders, who are attributed supernatural capacities (to fly to Mekka in five minutes and get back, to come out of a chimney as smoke, to disappear, to stop an airplane in the air so that the pilots can fix it, etc).

According to experts, many young people have been moving away from the traditional virds. “Young people do not believe in these fairy tales anymore. The virds have strengthened in deportation, when people needed to believe in miracles, but now we have a 100% literate population. Youth are moving away from them”, said an Ingush ethnologist.

However, fundamentalism is persecuted by the authorities in the North Caucasus, especially in Chechnya, and people who openly deny the *tariqas* can become victims of arbitrary detention, murder or disappearance. Some young people nonetheless risk persecution and gather in separate places to follow their own fundamentalist breed of Islam. These are usually quite aggressively opposed to the *tariqas*. In Ingushetia there is a bit more space for freedom of religion, although the security services have lists of fundamentalists from every district and monitor them and regularly invite them for “talks” or arrest them. These are tightly integrated, almost underground communities usually of young people, for whom fundamentalist Islam is a protest subculture. Young people who belong to this trend in Islam tend to join combatants more often than the *tariqa* followers.

Still others, try to stay in between, not to join the fundamentalist networks and not to participate in traditional *tariqa* rituals (*zikr*, *mold*) and prefer to perform prayers at home.

Thus, religion is a very important factor of both integration and fragmentation within the Chechen and Ingush communities, which are divided into two *tariqas* and fundamentalists. The *tariqas* are in their turn fragmented into 32 virds, some of which (eg. Batl-Khadzi Vird and Deni Arsanov K’ala Vird) are very tightly integrated. The religious authorities play an increasingly important role in the villages often substituting or complementing local government. *Murid* groups are a prominent source of solidarity. So are fundamentalist networks.

#### 4.6. Mechanisms of recruitment to office and getting access to social goods

In the previous sections I have analyzed stable social structures in Chechen and Ingush societies or what has remained of some of them. As part of my fieldwork I carried out over 40 interviews with professionally and politically active members of the Chechen and the Ingush societies. Each

of these respondents I asked questions of about the dominant mechanisms of recruitment to office. Most respondents replied that the predominant channels of recruitment were through 1) relatives 2) neighbors 3) personal networks of (friends, *vird* members, acquaintances from mosques/praying group, class-mates, former co-workers, ideological comrades). Respondents attributed different weight to each of these categories, depending on their personal outlook, level of education, urban/rural residence, occupation.

#### 4.6.1. Kinship and descent

Among the primary channels of acquiring access to jobs/ social goods are still relatives on either side or through marriage (more rarely members of *familia* in Ingushetia). Most of the respondents either actually found their jobs through relatives or thought this was the way to look for employment.

Many respondents thought that helping relatives to find employment was morally tolerable and practically efficient. “The Chechens have this understanding that if you have strengthened your position in life, you should help your relatives”, said one of my respondents of a high political profile.

*If it had not been for family solidarity, many would have died. If a teip member becomes the head of an enterprise, soon his relatives will appear there, up to a night watchman. A relative will not sell you, betray your interests, and if he steals, well, it is better if one of your guys steals than a stranger.* Israil Murtazov, teacher of history, Sernovodsk agricultural college, Chechnya.

Other more urbanized and educated respondents who have made successful careers claimed that their contacts with relatives are very limited.

*In my personal network relatives occupy less than one percent. I used to turn to my brothers and cousins in the past. Now I don't, even if I need money. I rather turn to friends. I have one friend of the same familia, but it's not because he is a relative, it because he is a writer and we are close spiritually. I have my own circle. I will only turn to relatives when I need to perform wedding rituals for my children's marriages,* Nurdin Kodzoev, Ingush historian

Some of the respondents noted that in the late years of socialism, when unemployment was high but less dramatic, family channels of office recruitment were not as prominent. When economic crisis became very acute, family solidarity increased, together with kin-based nepotism. In

addition, in the conditions of highly militarized and criminalized business and politics, many families thought it to be more secure if relatives “went into” the jobs together. This was especially true for the governmental positions and law enforcement in Chechnya:

*“To secure our family, we had to send one brother to work for the government. Soon we realized that it was difficult for him to be there alone, so the second brother had to join him”, - Zura, aged 53, explained their family choice.*

In Chechnya in the conditions of sharp cleavages and warfare, securing employment in one of the government or pro-government agencies has for many families been a strategy aimed to ensuring the protection of their extended family. Thus, kinship is not only an affective tie but a resource used for strengthening families, risk reduction and securing employment.

#### 4.6.2. Neighbors/ Zemlyaks

Together with families, all respondents mentioned neighbors, members of local communities and other territorial ties as an important part of their social network, which could help access jobs. This was particularly relevant in respect to Chechnya under Kadyrov, who surrounded himself by his co-villagers from Khosi-Yurt. Jokes about nepotism of the current regime are numerous: “In Khosi-Yurt every shepherd has become a minister”.

Neighbors and co-villagers, regional connections constitute a prominent part of a person’s social capital.

#### 4.6.3. Religion

Another stratum of members of social networks named by the respondents as important (mostly in Ingushetia) was *the vird*, or Islamic brotherhood, acquaintances through the mosque or praying group (especially relevant for fundamentalists). As has been noted earlier, the most tightly integrated virds, which express solidarity in employment and lobbying their political interests are the Qadyri Batl-Khadzi Vird and the Naqshbandi Vird of Deni Arsanov.

Fundamentalists represent a marginalized closed network based on strong mutual-help and solidarity. Since it is very difficult for a fundamentalist to get employed in state agencies or

government controlled institutions, they often work at construction sites helping each other to get access to employment.

#### 4.6.4. Professional networks, ideological networks and others

But the most important role in the personal networks of professionally active individuals have been professional contacts, colleagues from the previous or current workplace and other contacts, such as friends and acquaintances. Many respondents maintained close relations with their secondary school mates and university friends. If people studied outside the republic at higher schools, this friendship often lasted for the entire lifetime, because it was tempered in many risky adventures. People maintained close contacts with their ideological comrades (nomenklatura, members of national movements from the late 1980s), Chechen separatists (those who still cherish the idea) also maintain a loose, hardly visible network.

#### Conclusion

This chapter analyzed the main patterns of social integration in contemporary Ingushetia and Chechnya, based on many interviews and a five year long participant observation in the region. The detailed analysis of informal social structures in this chapter aims to provide a link between the macro (elite) and micro (community) - levels of analysis of social and political integration by carefully scrutinizing these structures, their functions, how they are being maintained, the essence of identity behind them and mechanisms of identity reproduction.

I conclude that the teip (clan) ceased to exist as a social structure in contemporary WajnaKh societies, mechanisms for maintaining cohesion of the WajnaKh teip are lost (except for small teips in Ingushetia), the teip remains a loose identity, to which different people attach different significance (it tends to be stronger with ethnocentric men and traditionalists). Descent groups have disintegrated into lineages and territorial segments of teips and lineages, which also have a

very limited social role, mainly contained to the performance of rituals and to “express solidarity” in rare cases of blood feud.

Daily routines of Chechen and Ingush individuals are to a greater extent shaped by *close kin* (patrilineal, matrilineal and affiliated through marriages). The Wajnakhs are very kinship rich societies, the sheer numbers of close relatives due to high birthrates make kinship networks prominent in an individual’s life. Even blood feud, an institution which traditionally bound together the clans, has now travelled into the domain of the immediate kinship, or *tsijnanakh*, i.e. people of the same house. Wajnakh kinship has a strong biological connection. If a person was integrated in a family (through adoption or otherwise), this will be always remembered and emphasized in particular circumstances. My fieldwork confirms the Gellnerian position that albeit acknowledging a certain degree of fiction, kinship is closely linked to biology. This goes against the theoretical proposition of clan literature that kin, territorial and friendship ties are a variation on the theme that can be classified under the rubric of ‘kinship’. At least the Wajnakhs differentiate very strongly between kin and non-kin; each category involving a different set of rights and obligations.


Religious structures have become increasingly prominent in the life of Wajnakh communities, *murid* groups, virds or fundamentalist networks are important patterns of social integration, many claim more important than descent groups. Imams and religious authorities have replaced village Councils of Elders in all villages where I did my fieldwork. In the conditions of non-elected local government religious authorities were an important link which connected appointed administrators with the population.

Regional and town/village/neighborhood identities are also prominent, moreover, neighbors and co-villagers are commonly considered almost as important. When kin groups settle in a compact manner, neighborhoods become very strongly integrated organic communities.



Part of my empirical research was uncovering mechanisms of access to jobs and social goods, for which interviews were carried out with professionals and politicians. Several mechanisms were identified by the respondents as most prominent:

1. Mechanisms of recruitment to office



descent (being the weakest), kinship, religion, territory, ideology, friendship/professional networks (being as important). I include friendship and professional networks under the category of 'other', and do not research friendship as a pattern of social integration, which is a prominent category, but it does not have its own logic (you can be friends with someone for various reasons). Moreover friendship has nothing to do with the socio-political structure of society - as opposed to other patterns of integration identified above. Thus, this chapter has proven that kin structures are prominent, but in no way dominant in shaping the social processes in Ingushetia and Chechnya.

## 5. Nationalist State-Building Project in Chechnya 1991-1994

This chapter will analyze the 1991-1994 nationalist state-building project in Chechnya, the main forces and factors shaping political process, the social make-up of the political agency, the government policies aimed at building the state and the reasons of their failure or success. It will explore the role of teips, kinship and other patterns of social integration in state-building and public life in the given period.

The analysis of this chapter shows that the political process in 1991-1994 was secular, ideologically and economically driven, the challengers of the regime were represented by civic organizations and movements, that had no links to traditional structures, informal patterns of social integration or religious groups.

I start by describing the socio-political context which preceded the regime change, namely the emergence of mass political protest which transformed into a separatist movement, and resulted in a National Revolution. This section is important for understanding the political agency, state-building dilemmas and challenges. The second section will analyze the state building project itself, with a focus on the function of the newly created institutions and the state's capacity to deliver social goods. The principal areas to be investigated are: budget and tax collection, industry, education and healthcare, law enforcement, armed forces, judicial system, infrastructure and welfare. While analyzing the state-building I will scrutinize the driving forces behind it, the agency involved and show that the role of the teips/traditional institutions in the political process was nil. The third bloc will discuss the political crisis between the executive and legislative branches of power, which virtually paralyzed the Chechen political system by 1993 and the outcomes of this crisis. It will show that the crisis had nothing to do with the struggle between descent groups and had no kinship element to it. It will also discuss how the system of checks and balances coupled with strong opposition controlled for nepotism in the Chechen government. The

fourth section will analyze interaction of the state and informal patterns of social integration, the attempts to revive and politicize the teips and the traditional institution of the Mekhk-Khel in Chechnya in 1991-1994. Finally, I will deal with the phenomenon of regional political opposition to the separatist project of Dudaev and the challenge of armed groups based in these oppositionary regions. I will argue that patterns of social integration, pre-existing Dudaev regime (descent groups, tariqas, virds) were accommodative or supportive of the government, while the challengers were organized along ideology and regional affiliation.

### 5.1. Socio-Political Processes Preceding State-Building: Nationalist Movement and National Revolution

Protest politics in Checheno-Ingushetia started - as in many regions of the USSR – from ecological movements. Environmental protests against the construction of a biochemical factory in the town of Gudermes were overtaken by nationalist slogans. The Peoples' Front of Chechen-Ingush Republic was formed, which was the avant-guard of the opposition until 1990. In 1988-1990 a number of other “informal” organizations emerged which organized public discussions on national history and some of them (eg. the organization “Bart” - Unity) went further and demanded to transform the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous union Republic into a full Union Republic of the USSR (Gakaev 1999).

The appointment of Doku Zavgayev in June 1989 as the first Secretary of the Republican Communist Party was widely perceived as the victory of the democratic movement. It was the first time in the history of the Soviet regime in Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic that a Russian communist functioneer Semenov, proposed by the Central Committee of the Communist Party was outvoted, and an ethnic Chechen took the lead of the republican party. This event was widely celebrated by the Chechens, animals were sacrificed to his success. (Gakaev 1999, Tishkov 2001)

Zavgayev' rule brought a significant liberalization of the regime. Being a moderate nationalist he finally allowed the sensitive issues of Chechen history into the official press. It caused an unprecedented rise in the awareness of past grievances and an intensification of the shared sense of historical injustice.

Protest sentiments were gaining force and in February-March 1990 seven regional party bosses and a number of other party officials were replaced under the pressure of the People's Front. What started as the anti-corruption and anti-communist protests was quick to developed first in the direction of nationalism and then of separatism. In May 1990 the Wajnakh Democratic party was founded which set as its main goal "the creation of an independent democratic state". In the summer of 1990 the Wajnakh Democratic party together with a number of leading Chechen intellectuals initiated the Chechen National Congress, where a Soviet air force major general in Estonia and an ethnic Chechen, Dzhokhar Dudaev, made a passionate speech and impressed all delegates with his strength of character and decisiveness (Dunlop 1998:93). On December 1 1990, Dudaev, then still serving in Tartu, was elected a chairman of the *ispolkom* [executive committee] of the Congress.

On June 30, 1990 three alternative drafts of the Chechen Declaration of Independence were published in "Groznsky rabochij", which suggested three versions for Chechen independence: the first, proposed by the republic's Supreme Soviet declared Checheno – Ingushetia an independent state within the Russian Federation and the Soviet Union, the second, proposed by the Wajnakh Democratic Party – a sovereign Wajnakh Republic, the third-by the Chechen National Congress – an Independent Chechen Republic of Ichkeria (Groznskii Rabochii 30 June 1990).

The emergence of modern nationalism with formal political programs, transformed the Chechens from an ethnos, an ethnocentric community focused on the past, into a modern political nation, projected into the future. As events unfolded towards separatism the national ideologues further politicized the 'memories of grievance' and employed the security argument to garner support

for the idea of full independence from Russia. Social protesters, most of whom were born in exile and were unemployed in their national republic supported the claim that Russia had historically inflicted a great deal of suffering on Chechnya and that in order to prevent a repeated ethnocide it had to establish its own nation-state. On November, 26, 1990 the Supreme Soviet of the Republic Declared *The Independent State of the Checheno – Ingush Republic*. In reaction, the National Congress of the Chechen People declared the *Independent Chechen Republic Nokhchi-cho* (Groznskii Rabochii, 30 June 1990).

The turning point was the failure of the *putsch* against Gorbachev in Moscow, on 22 August 1991. Doku Zavgaev failed to take a firm stance against the *putsch*, and by this discredited the moderate republican nationalists. Thousands of people gathered downtown Grozny and demanded the resignation of the republican government.

On 6 September the protesters stormed the building of the republican administration, Zavgaev had to resign, and Dzhokhar Dudaev, now the leader of the National Congress, was declared the President of the sovereign Chechen Republic. This event came to be known either as the ‘Chechen National Revolution’ or as ‘Dudaev’s *coup d’état*’.

*When the putsch was carried out the republican authorities were disoriented. They supported the putchists and the people learnt about it. The National Congress to the contrary knew what to do. They spoke against the putsch and supported Gorbachev and took a lead in the protest. The demonstration was massive- at least 100,000 people standing by the Palace of Culture. And this human mass was ruled by Dudaev, they did not recognize anyone except him. Khussain Akhmadov, Chair of Temporary Supreme Council, 1991 (Provisional government), Deputy Chair of the Executive Committee of the National Congress of the Chechen People (OKChN).*

On October 27, 1991 parliamentary and presidential elections took place in which most Russians and Ingush did not participate and there were numerous other “irregularities”, but the Chechens voted and according to the official Chechen statistics Dzhokhar Dudaev received 85% of the Chechen votes (Dunlop 1998, Tishkov 2001, Gakaev 1999).

Thus, in 1991 the tide of social protest in Checheno - Ingushetia brought at its crest the nationalist slogan of political independence of the Chechens, i.e. the demand of congruence of the Chechen national and political units. In Gellner’s definition the Chechens became a modern

nation. The amorphic pre-modern national feeling was now in Oakshott's expression "abridged" and presented as a simplified platform for collective deeds. The past granted the future of the Chechen nation with a set of conditioned reflexes which were not deterministic but crucial in shaping the possible range of further trajectories and behavioral patterns. Following Anthony Smith, one could argue that the Chechen modern political nation incorporated many features of its pre-modern ethnies and it owes a lot to its general mode of ethnicity (Smith 1986:18). This mode of ethnicity was shaped by the three types of memories analyzed in the previous chapter, which alongside with memories of grievances, contained a very prominent element of memories of success, development and positive coexistence of nations.

It is for these reasons that separatism did not establish itself fully until the breakout of the war. A significant part of the national movement considered that Chechnya should have a national polity with an extensive autonomy within the Russian federal state or in a union with Russia. Among these were many intellectuals, academics, members of the *ex-nomenklatura*, part of the economic class and students.

*My family was against full independence and so were most of the intellectuals [intelligentsia]. Many of us received our degrees in Russia. We maintained academic links. We were against radical nationalism and xenophobia the way it flourished under Dudaev. Tamara, 41, Pedagogical Institute lecturer, Grozny*

*I have never supported independence. I thought you can not build sovereignty on pure enthusiasm. [I thought] that we had no economic, social, political preconditions for a functioning independent state. Zura, 31, journalist, Grozny.*

The supporters of Dudaev, however, considered these intellectuals assimilated, alienated from the Chechen society and not representative of its interests:

*In 1976 my family returned to Chechnya from Kazakhstan. Religion was under pressure; language was under pressure, no programs on TV in the native language, the 1<sup>st</sup> Secretary [of the Communist Party- E.S.] was Russian, the second-Ingush. No work for the indigenous population. The Ingush occupied all the lucrative positions. Russians had specialists' jobs. And Chechens had to sweat on seasonal jobs outside the republic. The elite could not put two Chechen words together and were following only their mercenary interests... When Dzhokhar came, it all changed. It was a blissful time. I can't remember him without tears. He was a star, an ideal, a meteor, which visited the earth and burnt down. Such people are born once in a thousand years. He was a romantic, a pure, conscientious soul. For romantic people he was everything. There's a saying that revolutions are made by romantics, but their achievements are instrumentalized by*

*scum. That's exactly about us. I elected Dzhokhar that day, and since then I have never casted my vote for anyone.* X, 1953 Gikalo village, Chechnya

*For me Dzhokhar was an ideal. The first time when I heard him at a rally, when I listened to elders, about the suffering they had to undergo, I understood that he was right. He wanted freedom. He did not want it repeated - the 19<sup>th</sup> century, the 20<sup>th</sup> century, 1944- just one big pogrom of the Chechen people, Khozh, a former Chechen combatant*

Dzhokhar Dudaev, the public support he enjoyed notwithstanding, was aware of the ideological differences about the future of the Chechen national polity among his co-ethnics. He also realized that Chechnya was a multi-ethnic republic, and that his separatist project did not appeal to Russians, Ingush and other minorities. This is probably the main reason why no referendum on the status of the Chechen republic had ever taken place.

## 5.2. State-Building Policies (1991-1994)

In his classic *States, War and Capitalism* Michael Mann defined the state as containing four major elements: “(1) A *differentiated* set of institutions and personnel embodying (2) centrality in the sense that political relations radiate outwards from a center to cover (3) a *territorially demarcated area* over which it exercises (4) a monopoly of *authoritative binding rule-making*, backed up by a monopoly of the means of violence» (Mann 1992:4). Unlike many previous writers who tended to directly or indirectly equate the state with the military power (Eisenstagt 1969, Weber 1968, Rustov 1982), Mann emphasized that the emergence of state and its maintenance are determined by two ‘types’ or two ‘meanings’ of state power. Those are the *despotic* and the *infrastructural* powers of the state. Although in modern times, the despotic power of the state is still present (in the form of a wide range of actions that a state can undertake without “the routine, institutionalized negotiation with civil society), the infrastructural power is becoming increasingly more efficient (Mann 1992:5). The infrastructural power, according to Mann, is “the capacity of the state to penetrate the civil society” (by subsistence: employment, welfare; means of communication, information maintenance), and “implement logistically

political decisions throughout the realm” (Mann 1992:6, 7). The dependence of the state on its infrastructural power is enormous in modern times (Mann 1992:6).

In 1991 all the ingredients of Michael Mann’s state power were absent in Chechnya. This was a republic lacking a tradition of modern secular statehood, its own infrastructure, or even a historic experience of its own ‘despotic’ power (Imam Shamil initiated his state from Dagestan). It had no precisely demarcated area over which it extended its power. Until 1992 it was even unclear whether Ingushetia still belonged to the state. There was no monopoly on physical violence or on binding rule making. On the other hand, in 1991 Chechnya still had the infrastructure of the Soviet Union: people were mostly employed in the state sector, the welfare system was rather comprehensive, the education and medical care were provided for by the state, the state owned the railroads, maintained sewage systems and elevators, subsidies for children.

Establishing institutions went smooth: in 1991-92 all due Ministries, State departments and Security services were founded. All state property owned by the Russian Federation and the Soviet Union were nationalized. The 1992 Constitution guaranteed all citizens of the Chechen republic equal human, social, cultural and environmental rights<sup>34</sup>. Islam was announced the state religion, while freedom of conscience to others was guaranteed<sup>35</sup>. The languages of state institutions and judicial system were Chechen and Russian.<sup>36</sup> Men and women were acknowledged as equal before the law and in the family.

According to the 1992 Constitution the Chechen Republic was a parliamentary state. The Chechen parliament had very wide powers, including that of approving all the Ministers of the cabinet, the appointment of the Chair of the Constitutional Court, the Chair of Supreme Court, the Prosecutor General, the Chairs of the Investigation Committee and the National Defense Service, of the National bank, the sanitary-epidemiological and the ecological services, all the

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<sup>34</sup> Consitution of the Chechen Republic Chapter 2. Art 17-60

<sup>35</sup> Ibid, Unit 1 article 4

<sup>36</sup> Ibid.



Ambassadors, of declaring war and emergency situations, approving the budget and initiating the impeachment of the President and of referendums.<sup>37</sup>

The President of the Chechen Republic was the chief executive and the commander-in chief of the armed forces. Any citizen not older than 65 years old, could be elected the chief executive by direct anonymous vote.<sup>38</sup> The President could veto laws passed by the Parliament, but the Parliament could outvote the veto by 2/3 of votes. Local government was to be elected and be independent of the central government system<sup>39</sup>. The Soviet judiciary system at the Republican, city and regional levels was to be preserved.<sup>40</sup> An Ethnic Council was set up to represent the minorities in the Republic.

*There was no mention of traditional institutions and very little emphasis on religion in that first Constitution. All MPs had the Constitutions of the United States and of European countries on our desks. We produced many descent laws. We were oriented towards a European democratic model.* Khussain Akhmadov, Chair of the Chechen Parliament 1992-1993.

#### 5.2.1 Budget and Tax collection

Economically the beginning of Dudaev's rule was promising. After on January 29 1991 the Russian Federation imposed an economic siege on Chechnya by, Dzhokhar Dudaev ordered to stop all payments into the budget of the Russian Federation and transfer them into the budget of the Chechen Republic<sup>41</sup>. All the revenues of the oil industry stayed in the republic, and on top of that Chechnya continued to receive financial transfers from the state budget, 9 billion rubles in 1992 only (Tishkov 1996:21). In 1992 the budget was 50% local taxes, 50% from the budget of the Russian Federation.

According to the "Information letter on control and check-up activity of the State Tax Police of the Chechen Republic", tax collection was quite efficient in 1992. The document states that in 1992, 6.9 bln. rubles were transferred to the budget and non-budget funds of the Republic, the police checked 10 659 out of all 40 701 taxpayers, a 10% increase since 1991 despite the fact

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<sup>37</sup> Ibid. Art.62-65

<sup>38</sup> Ibid. Art.70

<sup>39</sup> Ibid. Art.73

<sup>40</sup> Ibid. Art.100

<sup>41</sup> Order of the President of the Chechen Republic of January 29 1992

that three Ingush regions stopped paying taxes into the budget of the Republic. One thousand twenty two officials were fined for violating tax regulations<sup>42</sup>.

*People did pay taxes, the inspectors were visiting businesses, collected all dues. I do not know what subsequently happened with this tax money, but it was collected. You should keep in mind that in those three years most of the industry stopped functioning and it stopped paying taxes. Individual businesses paid. The tax service itself got funds from the Russian federal center and we received salaries until 1994. But the senior staff was changing each month. The main criterion was: what have you done for the revolution? In 1994 they created a separate department for markets, and appointed a new director. Our secretary showed me his employment record (trudovaya knizka). It said "shepherd", then "senior shepherd", then "senior state tax inspector". But he was an active supporter of the revolution. Imran, Tax service inspector, Grozny*

There is no hard data on tax evasion, however. Obviously, a large sector of moonlite economy was outside the legal framework or tax police reach. The documents from the parliamentary archive testify that President Dudaev was trying to follow a flexible tax policy, to react to constrained economic conditions. For example, from January 1, 1992 he abolished the 5% sales tax and the 25% tax on "goods on high demand"<sup>43</sup>

### 5.2.2. Industry and Unemployment

During 1992- 94 a drastic decline in Chechnya's industrial and agricultural production took place (Dunlop 1998:126). According to the Goskomstat of Russia [official bureau of statistics], the industrial decline in the Chechen and Ingush Republics was 32 % in 1992 (on an average of 18.8% in all of Russia), 61.4 % in 1993 (16.2 in Russia). The production of food products per person declined by 46% in Chechnya (in Russia 18%), unemployment rose by 16 % and in 1993 the number of temporarily laid off workers was over 16, 000 (Tishkov 1996:23). According to the Russian economists Emil Pain and Arkadii Popov, there was a nearly 60% decline in oil industry. In 1992, which, in their opinion, was directly connected with the mass outflow of the Russo-phone populace who had previously been the key qualified cadres of this industry (in Dunlop 1998:126).

<sup>42</sup> Information letter by Head of Tax Police Alerkhanov V. to the Chair of Parliament of the Chechen Republic Soslambekov Yu, May 5, 1993.

<sup>43</sup> Decree of the President of the Chechen Republic "On abolishing 5% sales tax on the territory of the Chechen Republic and 25% taxes from sale of goods of high demand " of December 16, 1991

In January 1992 when Russia liberalized prices on consumer goods, Dudaev kept control on key goods. Until July 1993 he insisted that bread cost remains the symbolic price of one ruble. This had catastrophic consequences for the Chechen economy, which remained in the ruble zone, as small traders were buying goods in Chechnya and reselling them outside the republic (Gall and de Wall 1997:126).

### 5.2.3. Law Enforcement and Security Services

Taming lawlessness and criminality was an issue of vital concern to the Chechen authorities. At the time when the Chechen official economy suffered a drastic collapse, the shadow economy was thriving. At least 300 million dollars in profits from oil went to the Chechen government in this period, but never showed up in the state budget. Some estimates put the figure as high as one billion dollars (Lieven 1998:75).

To tame the illegal export of oil and its products from Chechnya, Dudaev issued a decree, which obliged enterprises and organizations to dispatch strategic goods by railway only after they were checked by customs service and had due permission<sup>44</sup>. The organizations were bound to provide monthly reports to the Cabinet of Ministers of the Chechen Republic and the custom's service of the republic on agreements concluded, deadlines and amounts of the dispatched goods.

Partly as a result of this decree contradictions emerged in the summer of 1992 within the Presidential team, between the Vice-Premier, Yaragi Mamodaev, who was now supposed to oversee oil transactions on the one hand and the Minister of Internal Affairs, Sultan Albakov, on the other. The conflict was to a large extent over the control of oil industry and the sales of petroleum products. The "presidential" group took over; Mamodaev lost his ministerial post, while Dudaev ordered to report all oil transactions directly to him<sup>45</sup>.

<sup>44</sup> Decree of the President of the Chechen Republic "On ordering the transfer of the strategic goods beyond the Chechen Republic by railroad" of January 4, 1992

<sup>45</sup> [http://www.chechnya.ru/view\\_all.php?part=hist&offset=17](http://www.chechnya.ru/view_all.php?part=hist&offset=17)

Oil transactions remained intransparent and the problem of theft of “strategic goods” was not efficiently solved. On October 19, 1992 in Resolution # 389 of the Cabinet of Ministers of the Chechen Republic, the situation in the sphere of safeguarding products of oil and chemical industry and main oil pipelines was characterized as “critical.”<sup>46</sup> During the subsequent crisis in May 1993, the Constitutional Court of the Chechen Republic passed a resolution on compliance of actions and decisions of high officials of the state with the Constitution of the Chechen Republic. In this statement the Constitutional Court ruled:

*“...the material losses of the state from unreasonable and at times questionable sales of oil and oil products reach dozens of billions of rubles. By decision of government in the conditions of hard material circumstances of the population oil products were supplied according to questionable contracts, for which material valuables or payments have not been received until now. Moreover, oil products were supplied for understated prices abroad, where bank accounts in foreign currencies have been opened, which senior officials conceal from the public.”*<sup>47</sup>

Oil was not the only branch of the shadow economy. In 1992 Chechen criminal groups skillfully exploited the ambiguous status of Chechnya to make the republic a center for the notorious bank frauds. By forging the so called *avizo* promissory notes of the Russian banking system, they were able to get spurious documents in one part of the ex- Soviet Union and cash them in another part of the country for huge amounts of money; “...some Chechen *avizovshchiki* brought home literally lorry-loads of rubles» (Gall and de Waal 1997:131). The Central Bank of Russia managed to stop this practice in the summer of 1992 only. As many observers have noted, few obstacles were created on the way of these criminal transactions from Russia. Moreover, according to Sergei Arutounov, an expert of the Institute of Ethnology in Moscow “certain Russian corrupted civil and army circles and ‘mafiosi businessmen’ zealously exploited the de facto free economic zone, which had been formed in Chechnya” (in Dunlop: 1998:132).

<sup>46</sup> October 19 1992, Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of the Chechen Republic # 389 “On appointing Atabaev M. The 1<sup>st</sup> deputy minister of defense of the Chechen Republic”, signed by Ya. Mamodaev.

<sup>47</sup> Zakluchenie Konstitutsionnogo suda Chechenskoj Respubliki “O sootvetstvii Konstitutsii Chechenskoj Respubliki dejstvuj i reshenij visshih dolnostnih lits gosudarstva po ohrabe Konstitutsionnogo stroja, prav i svobod Respubliki”, (Resolution of the Constitutional Court of the Chechen Republic “On compliance to the Constitution of the Chechen republic of actions and decisions by high officials of the state, aimed at protection of the Constitutional order, rights and freedoms of the Republic”) May 18 1993

Criminality was not only at the level of organized crime, but also minor illegal economic activity, illegal capture of previously state-owned property, industrial equipment, transport, taking over enterprises and using them for one's own good. On January 8, 1992 in his Decree, President Dzhokhar Dudaev tried to return to the state the illegally captured administrative buildings and premises but the Decree was not efficiently enforced.<sup>48</sup>

The situation of lawlessness was increased by the mismanagement of prisons, generous amnesties, and the escape of prisoners from the Preliminary detainment facility (SIZO) in Grozny and from the Naursky prison-colony<sup>49</sup>. According to the statistics quoted by the Constitutional Court of the Chechen Republic "The number of registered crimes in 1992 was 9,984, which was a 68% growth compared to 1991. The total number of serious crimes increased by 94,6% (2,341 compared to 1,203) and the number of murders by 80,6% (242 against 134), rapes by 37% (63 against 46), theft of state property by 234,3% (2,434 against 727), burglary and robberies by 275,4% (214 compared to 57)<sup>50</sup>".

Chechens were reluctant to resort to violence against Chechens, which made it difficult to cope with particularly daring criminals and escaping prisoners. The enforcement of discipline and order on Chechens by Chechens turned out objectively very difficult, given the blood feud tradition. Realizing this problem, Dzhokhar Dudaev issued decree # 140 on November 1 1992 "On the use of weapon", which allowed "the personnel of the Ministry of Defense, the Service of National Defense, military servicemen and other persons who guard state objects and public order to use weapons against perpetrators, if it is otherwise impossible to stop their illegal actions". Naturally no decree could abolish blood feud.

#### 5.2.4. The Judicial System

In the Chechen Republic of 1991-1994 the functions of the Ministry of Justice were performed by the National Committee for Legal Reform at the President of the Republic. Starting on

<sup>48</sup> Decree of Dzhokhar Dudaev "On the illegal capture of administrative buildings and premises" of January 8 1992

<sup>49</sup> Prisoners escaped from SIZO of Grozny twice, in 1991 and in January 1993. In 1991 625 prisoners escaped from the Naursky colony.

<sup>50</sup> Resolution of the Constitutional Court, May 18, 1993 p.3

January 13 1992, according to a Presidential Decree “On the financing of the National Committee for Legal Reform, the agencies and institutions under its jurisdiction, at the people’s courts of the Chechen Republic”, the state stopped financing courts, notary agencies, and civilian registration services. The National Committee for Legal Reform was supposed to receive the payments levied by courts, notary agencies and civilian registry offices as well as fees for additional services and use them for the maintenance of the institutions under its jurisdiction and for the salaries of their employees. Since the collection of levies was inefficient, the courts appeared to be severely underfunded.

The lack of funding and control seriously shattered the judicial system. There were numerous attempts by affected individuals and organizations to influence judicial decisions using money, connections or pressure. However, this pressure was not government sponsored but grass root. In his decree of January 8, 1992. President Dudaev acknowledged that “there are numerous cases of citizens and officials evading subpoenas to judiciary and investigative agencies, resisting or creating obstacles to the implementation of court decisions and verdicts”. He thus ordered to strictly punish in accordance with the law those who “prevented courts... from carrying out their duties”. The decree remained on paper. According to Resolution of the Constitutional Court of the Chechen Republic, in 1992 1,204 cases were transferred to the courts, which constituted 12% of all crimes registered that year, mostly on insignificant offenses. Only 327 people had been sentenced to prison terms<sup>51</sup>.

At the top level of the judiciary system informal interventions were less frequent, while the Constitutional Court tried to remain impartial between the government and the opposition until it was dissolved in 1993. In short, the most efficient part of the judicial system was the one which was most visible and subject to checks and balances, the more particularistic ones were the local courts.

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<sup>51</sup> Ibid. p.4

### 5.2.6. The Military

Among the successes of Dudaev's state-building efforts was the creation of the Armed Forces of the Chechen Republic. In the period of 1991-1992 the Chechen government managed to appropriate or buy, normally from Russian military officials an immensely large number of weapons, including military airplanes, helicopters, tanks, armed troops carriers, automatic weapons and handguns<sup>52</sup>. Twice a year the Chechen Military Commissariat drafted young men to mandatory military service, the President created a unified system of state mobilization system of defense. Many observers who knew Dudaev, insist that he was not personally corrupt, and that the dollars which came from the oil transactions were spent on arms for national defense (Dunlop 1998, Gall and de Waal 1997, Tishkov 1996).

### 5.2.7. Education and Healthcare

The educational system and healthcare remained dramatically underfunded; teachers and doctors did not receive salaries for months, in some schools the parents collected money to pay the teachers their wages. On the positive side, a series of decrees of the President were able to prevent illegal privatization of property which belonged to the institutions of education, healthcare and culture<sup>53</sup>. The economic blockade had a serious impact on pharmaceutical supply to the hospitals. In order to cope with the shortage the government purchased the necessary equipment from Turkey<sup>54</sup>.

### 5.2.8. Infrastructure and welfare

The social infrastructure of settlements was shattered, utility payments were not fully collected and projects of improvement of infrastructure were frozen. The head of the city administration of Gudermes Dukhvakha Abdurakhmanov, filed an appeal to the Parliament, in which he stated that "due to a large debt in payments, the electricity has been swithed off in the city from 8 a.m.

<sup>52</sup> *Rossiiia and Chechnya. Dokumenti svidetel'stvuyut.* (Russia and Chechnya. Documents witness) 1997 RAU Universitet. Moscow p 44

<sup>53</sup> Decrees of the President of the Chechen Republic on state protection of institutions of culture and art (9.12.91), institutions of people's education (16.12.91) and healthcare system (23.12.91)

<sup>54</sup> Paperwork on relevant contracts can be found in the archive of the Chechen Republic.

to 8 p.m. every day; and the construction of projects concerning water and gas supply, and the sewage system have been frozen<sup>55</sup>.

The President issued regularly orders to pay allowances to pensioners<sup>56</sup> or indexate the income of the population due to high inflation rates or to increase the salaries of state-employees working in education, culture and healthcare. Eleven categories of citizens among them citizens diagnosed with tuberculosis, cancer, single mothers, families with many children, were entitled to receive residential premises from the state owned residential fund.

But in fact pensions and salaries were seldom paid, the welfare system of the republic was virtually destroyed, and thus the dissatisfaction with the regime increased. The Constitutional Court of the Chechen Republic stated in its resolution of May 18 1994 “Since the establishment of the independent Chechen state no efficient measures have been taken to help the economy out of the crisis; and to assist education, culture, healthcare, agriculture and the underprivileged groups of the population collapsing under the burden of the galloping poverty.<sup>57</sup>”

Dudaev, notorious for extravagant public statements, did from time to time accuse the seniors, who were in opposition to him that they had been “bought by the Russian pensions” and that in “a normal society children should be the social welfare of their parents”. He advised people to “knit socks or collect cones in the forest”. When confronted with the problems in the education system he would said that “it’s sufficient for girls to have a three year education”. “We gave you freedom” he used to say – “Now you should make your living by yourself!”, -. My respondents who knew Dudaev well claim that he did not really mean it. He was simply unable to cope with the rapidly collapsing state.

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<sup>55</sup> Appeal of head of town hall of Gudermes to Chair of Parliament Akhmadov Kh., to Chair of Cabinet of Ministers Mamodaev, Minister of Finances Abubakarov of 2.05.93

<sup>56</sup> Order of President of the Chechen Republic of November 8 1992 “On compensation payments to pensioners”

<sup>57</sup> Resolution of Constitutional Court of May 18, 2003 p.2



### 5.3. Political Crisis: The Parliament vs. the President

This section analyzes the political crisis between the executive and legislative powers, which unfolded in Chechnya in 1993, and resulted in a sharp institutional cleavage and in the dissolution of the Parliament, the Constitutional Court and the establishment of authoritarian presidential rule by Dzhokhar Dudaev. Understanding the nature of the political process, the character of the political agency, and the mechanisms of conflict resolution is crucial for grasping the essence of the state-building dynamics in Chechnya of 1991-1994, and of the role of informal political actors.

Cooperation between the President and the Parliament of the Chechen Republic was fruitful for the first three-four months of independence. Soon, however, contradictions increased, which finally resulted in an acute political crisis. This which virtually paralyzed the state institutions.

The Chechen parliament consisted of 41 deputies, with an age average of 35. Only one of the MPs had no higher education, and only one was an ethnic Russian (Akhmadov, interview 2008). The Russian MP- Gleb Bunin - was the Chair of the parliamentary committee for healthcare. He supported independence.

The contradictions between the Executive and Legislative powers were primarily ideological, although there was a dimension of power struggle to it, too. The parliament was ideologically heterogeneous. Twelve of the MPs were committed supporters of President Dudaev and independence, nine MPs were moderates, supporting the parliament's Chair Akhmadov. The rest were located in between the two polars. Both power centers fought for this middle ground. The points of disagreement were numerous.

According to then Chair of the Chechen Parliament, Khussain Akhmadov, the main difference between the President and the Parliament was the very interpretation of the notion of sovereignty.

*There were two concepts of state sovereignty: the first was Dudaev's – an independent state, which could have a common economic, defense and currency space with Russia. But in my understanding sovereignty was not absolute. It was always limited by something. We should have*

*less sovereignty because we have a historical connection with Russia and we are located within Russia. We also had to get compensations from Russia for seven deportations and exiles. The Chechens are a small people and our sovereignty could well enough be realized on 1/6 of the world's territory*<sup>58</sup>. Khussain Akhmadov, Chair of the Chechen Parliament, 1991-1993

The difference in interpreting the notion of sovereignty resulted in divergent positions regarding politics of symbolic significance, economics, and negotiations with Russia. Thus, Akhmadov and his associates in the Parliament insisted on keeping a mutual budget with Russia and on remaining in the ruble zone, while the President and his supporters were working towards introducing a Chechen currency and keeping an separate budget. The President wanted to rename Chechnya Ichkeria, to which the Parliament strongly opposed:

*Once Dzhokhar told me: "Bek, lets give our country some beautiful name.. For example "Ichkeria"... " I said "why the hell sould we do that? The Chechens call their country Nokhchi-Cho, the world knows us by the name of "Chechens". He thought that by changing the name we would be out of the legal framework of Russia. Bektimar Mezhidov, Vice-speaker of the Chechen Parliament 1991-1993*

However, the most important apple of discord between the majority in the Parliament and the President were negotiations with Russia. Disagreements on the negotiating process reached their peak, on November 14, 1992, when the Russian official representatives Ramazan Abdulatipov and Sergey Shakhraj were supposed to arrive in Grozny, but Dudaev refused to receive them.

*Dudaev was against Shakhraj, and called him an enemy of the Wajnakh people because of the Ingush events*<sup>59</sup> *and Shakraj's anti-Chechen statements. He refused to meet him, sent four lorries of guardsmen, put an APC in front of the Parliament, targeted a "Shilka" gun at Khussain's office, and demanded to hand Shakhraj in to the government". Ilina Sadulaeva, Parliament's analytical department staffer, 1992-1993*

*I called Moscow and asked whether it was possible to do without Shakhraj, but Shakhraj was already on the way... We nonetheless carried on the negotiations. The head of the Investigating Committee organized lunch, we organized security guards- my relatives, relatives of members of Parliament, some Moscow-based businessmen helped, because the Ministry of National Defense did not provide any security..." Khussain Akhmadov, Chair of Parliament 1991-1993*

<sup>58</sup> USSR occupied 1/6 of the world's territory

<sup>59</sup> Sergey Shakhraj is thought to be responsible for the Russian intervention during the Ingush-Ossetian armed conflict, when the Russian army took the side of the Ossetians and participated in the ethnic cleansing of the Ingush.

Appointing Sergey Shakhraj, a nationalist Cossack, who indulged in public anti-Wajnakh statements, the head of negotiating group was a provocation on behalf of Moscow. Still most parliamentarians thought the President had over-reacted. The following time, in the end of January, Shakhraj was not in the commission anymore, yet the agreement which was thoroughly worked out and almost signed by the delegation headed by Vice-Speaker of Parliament Bektimar Mezhidov, was not signed because of Dudaev's disruptive actions:

*We arrived at Moscow airport and were brought to the VIP-hall. The tables were laid with cocktails. Then under escort we went to the White house, Mr. Ryabov was chairing the meeting. We discussed the agreement between Russia and Chechnya on common and separate credentials. I emphasized that this was not about our political status, but about economic cooperation. In any case, it was decided that we spend 3 days working on the agreement and then we come back. We were taken to dachas of party bosses. I was placed in a separate palace, beautiful girls were taking care of us ...*

*Three days later we met again at the table. We had come to agreed on most of the points. And what do you think? Mr. Ryabov pulls a telegram out of his pocket, which says "I delegitimize the credentials of the Chechen delegation. President Dzhokhar Dudaev". Can you imagine? Dudaev himself hugged me before leaving and said "May Allah help you, Bek!" And when we left he started screaming that the parliament wanted to unilaterally sign an agreement with Russia! But we knew, if we don't sign some kind of an agreement with Russia, there would be no independence! ... So Ryabov said: "What are we to negotiate? First reach an agreement among yourselves". Our delegation included the Minister of Finances, the Minister of Education, the Minister of Oil and Chemical Industry, MPs, senior bankers. It was a very representative delegation. We could have continued. The Russians could have signed it with us, but they were not interested in the agreement anymore. This was the last meeting at such a senior level" ... Bektimar Mezhidov, MP of Chechen Parliament, head Chechen delegation during the last Russo-Chechen negotiations.*

Along the ideological differences, it was the power struggle that contributed to the political crisis. President Dudaev was inclined to create a strong presidential regime, while the Parliament, and especially its politically ambitious chair Khussain Akhmadov, zealously insisted on preserving the system of checks and balances.

*The confrontation was the result of the fact that except for twelve deputies, there were no more supporters of Dudaev in the Parliament. From the very beginning he strove for absolute power, abusing the fact that the people associated freedom and independence with him. But I knew that he was doing nothing to build an independent state. Instead of strengthening the government system he was destroying it" Bektimar Mezhidov, Vice-speaker of the Chechen Parliament*

The main battlefield between the Parliament and the President were control over institutions and key ministerial appointments. Thus, in May 1992 Yaragi Mamodaev was appointed the First Vice-Prime minister of the Chechen Government. Dudaev appointed him without the approval of the parliament. For this reason the Parliament considered him illegitimate. Dudaev and Mamodaev tried to reduce the power of the Parliament over the nomination of Ministers to the Cabinet by creating state committees. These were aimed to duplicate ministerial functions, but had no word “Ministry” in the name. This allowed Dudaev to appoint their chairs without the approval of the parliament. Thus, the Ministry of Justice was replaced by the Committee for National Reform. A Committee for Management of National Economy (KoUNKh) and a Cabinet for Entrepreneurs were created parallel to the Ministry of the Economy etc. These were headed by people loyal to Dudaev. “The chair of KoUNKh was a person, spiritually close to him, and also *lamro* [mountaineer – E.S], explained Akhmadov. These institutions were the topic of protracted disputes between the parliament and the President.

Dudaev dismantled the Soviet system of local and regional government and appointed his representatives, the so called prefects, in each of the regions. This contradicted article 73 of the Constitution of the Chechen Republic, which stated that the regional and district councils had to be elected.

Naturally, each power center tried to push their people into the local governments:

*Dudaev introduced a system of prefects and started appointing people. We were against it. He appointed them anyway. We ruled that he had no right to do so, but he anyway did, without notifying us... In the spring of 1992 we finally had the local government elections. In Gudermes my relative Dukhvakha Abdurakhmanov<sup>60</sup> was elected with my backing. He promised to support me in the struggle against Dudaev.* Khussain Akhmadov, Chair of Chechen Parliament, 1992-1993

In late 1992 the conflict between the executive and the legislative powers in Chechnya became so acute that the state moved towards diarchy. The cleavage plainly obstructed the functioning of the institutions, which had divided into pro-legislative and pro-executive, and were in fact sabotaging each other’s decisions and activities. The parliament and the President were playing

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<sup>60</sup> Dukhvakha Abdurakhmanov- currently the Chair of Chechen parliament

ping-pong with legislation, the Parliament would pass laws resolutions and the President would veto them. The President would issue decrees and the Parliament would not approve them. The table below illustrates how institutions divided into pro-legislative/pro- executive during the 1992-1993 political crisis in Chechnya.

Table 5.1. The ideological division of institutions during the 1992-1993 political crisis in Chechnya

Pro-legislative	Pro-executive
The Prosecutor's Office	All the Ministries (including the Ministry of Internal Affairs)
The Investigating Committee	The General Staff
The National Security Service	The Prosecutor General (El'za Sheripova)
The Tax Police	The Committee for Legal Reform
The National bank	The Committee for the Management of the National Economy (KoUNKh)
Grozny City Mayor Office and City Hall	
Gudermes city mayor's office	

The Constitutional Court and the OKChN (*National Congress of the Chechen People*), the organization, that brought Dudaev to power, and of which Akhmadov used to be the deputy chair, remained after the Chechen Revolution a child out- of -wedlock, since its members were not invited into the government, remained in the middle ground. At the high of the crisis, Ilyas Satuev, the OKChN's Executive Committee Chair, negotiated between the parties a compromise, while the Constitutional Court tried to stay impartial. Fifteen years after the analyzed above events, Khussain Akhmadov regreted that OKChN, as a political force, was not used in the state-building. "It could have been transformed into a respectful moderate political party, which could help stabilize the political process", he said.

The consequences of the struggle between the power centers were more than the mere lack of coordination. Sometimes this came to open sabotage of each others efforts in combating criminality. In the archive I found an appeal of the Chair of the Investigating Committee of the Chechen Republic, S.M. Khasanov, to the Chair of the Chechen parliament, Yu. Soslambekov, of May 7, 1993:

*From the moment the Investigating Committee was created, various power structures of the Chechen Republic, including the law enforcement agencies, have created obstacles to Committee's performance of its duties ....the leadership of the investigating committee has*

*credible evidence that a number of persons who have been arrested by the investigative authorities and were placed in the preliminary detention facility of the Ministry of Internal Affairs have been released. The lack of control on behalf of the Prosecutor's office is conducive to this situation. There have been cases when officers on duty at the city police departments have released perpetrators ignoring arrest warrants, by doing so they complicate the criminal situation and prevent realization of the principle of inevitability of punishment<sup>61</sup>".*

Another document is an appeal of the Deputy chair of the National Security Service (SNB)

Khasimikov S.A. to the Chair of Parliament, Akhmadov Khussain:

*"The personnel of the SNB of the Chechen Republic detained 18 tankers of oil products at the railway station of Gudermes... We have requested the due cargo documents for checking the legality and expediency of the above mentioned contract. These were not provided to us on the grounds of an oral order of Albakov A.G. [Minister of Internal Affairs- E.S.] not to provide or issue any documents to the personnel of the SNB. Various obstacles have been created in the investigation into this fact. I ask you to intervene and carry out a parliamentary investigation into this affair."*

The root of the contradiction is clear: the SNB and the Investigating Committee were parliamentary institutions, while the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Prosecutor's Office were pro-Presidential. On November 18, 1992 the President tried to abolish the Investigating Committee of the Chechen Republic "following its poor efficiency"<sup>62</sup>, a decision which was overridden by the Parliament. The Parliament, in its turn, fired the Prosecutor General of the Chechen Republic, El'za Sheripova, a devout supporter of Dudaev and of independence, for whom the President fought till the end of the crisis.

*As a result of this crisis, we ended up with many centers of power. We had several institutions performing the function of Cabinet of Ministers – the one approved by the parliament, KoUNKh, Cabinet of Entrepreneurs, on top of it Mamodaev as deputy Prime Minister, whom we did not recognize – Khussain Akhmadov, Chair of Parliament, 1992-1993*

However, on May 18, 1993 the Constitutional Court ruled that the Parliament had its fair share of responsibility for spiraling criminality:

*Exhibiting institutional ambitions, fully denying the practice of developing common measures for combating crime, the Prosecutor General Asabaev, the Chair of the Investigating Committee S. Khasanov, the Minister of Security S. Albakov, have not had an impact on the criminal situation, which was deteriorating day by day, have not analyzed its origins and roots, have not performed*

<sup>61</sup> Appeal of Chair of the Investigating Committee of the Chechen Republic S.M. Khasanov to the Chair of Parliament of the Chechen Republic Yu. Soslambekov, May 7 1993.

<sup>62</sup> Decree of the President of the Chechen Republic, of November 18 1992 # 128 "On suspending the activity of Investigating Committee of the Chechen Republic".

*decisively in combating officials, who allowed lawlessness and arbitrariness.... No one is being held accountable for economic crimes, negligence, abuse of official credentials, or bribes. The above mentioned crimes, which primarily erode statehood and the moral basis of society, which destroy the economy have not at all been dealt with by the law enforcement agencies.”<sup>63</sup>*

The Court added that “the responsibility of the Parliament, as represented by its first deputy Chair Bektimar Mezhidov, was to exercise control over the law enforcement agencies, but in fact it connived with the ineffectiveness of the latter”. “Thus, in 1992 B. Mezhidov received over 30 official notifications on the grave violations of the law by the Prosecutor’s Office, the Investigating Committee, and the Ministry of Security. But he did not bring the materials on the illegal actions the officials of the law enforcement agencies to the attention of the Parliament, thus creating obstacles for the making the perpetrators accountable, did not undertake preventive measures for maintaining public order”. Clearly, both power centers disrupted the work of each other.

After the Russian-Chechen negotiations virtually failed, the Parliament ruled on February 16, 1993 to carry out a referendum on the form of government in Chechnya (Presidential or Parliamentary) and the status of the Chechen Republic<sup>64</sup>. The President vetoed the Resolution. The Constitutional Court scrutinized the case and overturned the veto of President Dudaev because the Parliament had the Constitutional right to call referenda, but also ruled that the Resolution of the Parliament contradicted the Constitution in the part where it aimed to question the status and the form of government of the Chechen Republic at a referendum, “because these have already been fixed in the Constitution of the Chechen Republic”.<sup>65</sup>.

In April the opposition started a protest rally in the Theatre Square in the center of Grozny, which demanded Dudaev’s resignation, and a referendum on the political status of Chechnya and new elections. According to Valery Tishkov, the opposition included moderate members of the Chechen National Congress and the movement “Dajmokh”, the Movement of the Democratic reforms, the movement “Marsho”, the group “Civic Agreement”, and the Association of Intelligentsia (Tishkov 2001:216).

<sup>63</sup> Resolution of the Constitutional Court, May 18 p.3-4

<sup>64</sup> Resolution of Parliament of the Chechen Republic # 266 “On carrying out all-nation voting (referendum) on March 27, 1993 Grozny”, 16 February 1993

<sup>65</sup> Resolution of the Constitutional Court of the Chechen Republic “On the case on checking the compliance of the Decree of the President of the Chechen Republic of February 24, 1993 # 14 “On Vetoing the Resolution of Parliament of the Chechen Republic of February 16 1992 “On carrying out all-nation votion (referendum) on March 27 1993”, March 11, 1993 Grozny

In response Dudaev called f his supporters to the Square of Freedom in the center of Grozny asking to endorse him, independence, new elections of the Parliament and of the Grozny city council. Thousands of people flooded both squares. The rallies were declared perpetual until their demands were satisfied. The center of Grozny turned into a military camp- troops were brought in, tanks, APCs, military field kitchens were set up.<sup>66</sup>

By April 1993, not only the institutions, but civil society and the media took sides in the crisis:

Table 5.2. The ideological division of the society during the political crisis in Chechnya of 1993.

Pro-legislative	Pro-executive
<i>Central Institutions</i>	
The Prosecutor's Office	All Ministries (including Ministry of Internal Affairs)
The Investigating Committee	General Staff Headquarters
The National Security Service	Prosecutor General
The Tax Police	Committee for Legal Reform
The National bank	Committee of Management of National Economy (KoUNKh)
<i>Local Government</i>	
The Grozny City Hall	All other regional governments
The Gudermes city mayor	
The Urus-Martan Temporary Council	
The Nadterechny Regional Administration	
<i>Civil Society Groups</i>	
The Coordinating Committee for Re-establishing of a Constitutional Order in the Chechen-Ingush Republics (Association of NGOs)	Mekhk-Khel
Parts of the OKChN	Parts of the OkChN
<i>Media (newspapers)</i>	
Golos Chechenskoy Respubliki	Ichkeria
	Svoboda
<i>Masses</i>	
Theatre Square	Square of Freedom

On April 17, at the rally of his supporters President Dudaev read decrees, by which he dissolved the Parliament, appointed Zelimkhan Yandarbiev, a tough-liner separatist, a Vice-president, returned his associate El'za Sheripova to her position of Prosecutor General, dissolved the Cabinet of Ministers, announced curfew in Grozny, that is he established a direct presidential rule. Armed supporters of the President took control of the buildings of the Parliament, the Prosecutor's Office of the Chechen Republic, and the television.

<sup>66</sup> Ibid.p.5



*On April 17, Dudaev announced in the square about the dispersal of the Parliament. In the evening he signed the decree. The protesters started to flood into the parliament. They tried to bully or hit someone. But each MP had his crew, a crowd of relatives, they attended parliament with their MPs, were standing in the lobby.. So they somehow prevented clashes. ” Khussain Akhmadov, Chair of Parliament, 1991-1993*

The parliament naturally considered this decree illegal and continued its session. Twelve pro-Dudaev MPs left the parliament to prevent the rest from having a quorum and thus not to be able to adopt anti-Dudaev measures. Instead two other deputies elected on reserve were brought into the Parliament and the quorum was calculated according with the existing number. The Constitutional Court ruled that found this was illegal. The parliament decided to hold a referendum<sup>67</sup> on June 5, 1993 and formed a “transitional government of people’s trust” chaired by Yaragi Mamogaev, a former Vice-Premier at the Dudaev Cabinet, whom the President fired, allegedly because of disagreements on economic policy and oil exports. In the streets the atmosphere was getting dramatically tense, threatening to spill into large-scale violence.

The first fatalities were inflicted by the opposition. On May 25, 1993 four men were killed in the Theatre Square: among them a nephew of the President, Shamil Dudaev. In response, on June 4 Dudaev’s forces stormed the Grozny city Hall and Grozny Police dispersed the demonstration at the Theatre Square and dissolved the Chechen Constitutional Court.

*After Dudaev shot at the Parliament and the city hall, we all went home. People were telling me: let us fight with Dzhokhar. But I did not want it. I did not come there to fight for power, I came there to pass laws and build the state. This is the story of how the first and the last parliament of the Chechen Republic ceased to exist” Bektimar Mezhidov, Vice-speaker of Chechen parliament*

After the parliament was dispersed the republic was renamed Ichkeria. Dudaev established an authoritarian rule, closed the opposition newspaper “Golos Chechenskoj Respubliki”, and crashed all centers of civic opposition. Criminal cases were instigated against opposition MPs, and some of them (including Bektimar Mezhidov) were arrested.

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<sup>67</sup> The questions for the referendum were the following:

1. Do we need the institution of Presidency?
2. Do you trust the President of the Chechen Republic Dzh. Dudaev?
3. Do you trust the Parliament of the Chechen Republic? (*Resolution of Parliament of the Chechen Republic # 308 “On the date and questions brought for the all-nation’s voting (referendum)” April 22, 1993).*

As the account of the events indicates, the nature of the crisis was political-ideological and reflected the differences in approach to the notion of Chechen sovereignty, to the future of the Chechen state and to key domestic and international policies, like state budget, local government and negotiations with Russia. The crisis had a power struggle dimension. Many disagreements were the result of the President's attempts to get more credentials, especially over appointments and the parliament not being prepared to let Dudaev strengthen presidential rule.

Procedurally, the political process in Chechnya of 1992-1994 was democratic and quite legalistic, despite many attempts to slip off this track. The arguments of both sides were usually based on references to Constitution and in cases of acute disagreement, each side resorted to the Constitutional court, which tried to stay impartial. Even after the parliament was dissolved by Dudaev and its building was taken over by his gunmen, the remaining deputies were mindful of the issues of their legitimacy. The very fact that a quorum was still an issue after the parliament was dissolved is suggestive that both sides to the conflict accepted the rules of the game and tried to remain within the framework of the Constitution and law.

Until April 1993 the political process itself was secular and highly ideological. The ideological divide split the institutions and once the conflict spilled into the streets, the main agency there were civic organizations, political movements and NGOs none of which were based on traditional, kinship, clanship, religious or territorial ties. It was a modern political process with no collective actors entrenched in pre-existing identities. The absence of political actors embedded in affective ties was a result of the significant autonomy of the state institutions and political processes from society. Dudaev's state was a state-above- the society, with elites playing a major role in the transition, as predicted by the democratization authors, rather than Migdal's state-in-society.

Dudaev's choice to end the crisis by force was not an easy one. The cleavage between the executive and the legislative was so acute that paralyzed the political system. Moreover, once the conflict spilled into the streets, it threatened with major civil violence. Dudaev did not want to

risk the fate of independence by holding the referendum, fearing that his state-building project could be outvoted by the masses, who were frustrated by the lack of pensions and salaries, who feared Russia and the collapse of the state, all of which he probably considered temporary difficulties. Dudaev was well aware that part of his political society maintained strong links and connections with Russia and had differing visions of the Chechen future. His problem was what Dankward Rustow called “the birth defects of the political community”. The Chechens undoubtedly had a Rustowian “strong prior sense of community”, but they did not agree on the political future of this community. Ideological differences and a failing state put an end to the young Chechen “democracy”. By stepping outside the framework of law, Dudaev pushed the political process into the domain of informal politics and subsequently of armed opposition.

#### 5.4. State Building and Informal Social Institutions in Chechnya 1991-1994

The following section will analyze the role of informal patterns of social integration in the state-building project in Chechnya of 1991-1994. It will look at the role of teips and descent groups, kinship, religion, regional affiliation, and personal networks on elite-formation and evaluate their role in the political process.

##### 5.4.1. Teips and Descent groups

*“With Dudaev started a fashion on teips. This was something like a retro-fashion, revival of origins, mentality, we started to remember the old sufferings, the teip structure was romanticized”* – Lipkhan Bazaeva, leader of the Women’s anti-war movement, 1994-1995

The years 1991-1994 were the period of an intense revival of teip identity, which was viewed as a symbol of “Chechenness”, unfairly suppressed during the centuries of colonial rule. The

revival of teips and neo-traditional institutions was encouraged by the Chechen government and Dzhokhar Dudaev paid much symbolic support to the Councils of Elders.

On November 22, 1991 the first teip congress [*s'ezd teipa*] was held in Chechen-Ingushetia that gave an impulse to a wave of teip gatherings, held either in the villages of origin or in settlements on the plain, where large communities of teip members resided. The main objectives of such congresses were to meet up, to get to know each other, to promote teip identity, solidarity and discipline. The teip congresses raised the issues of restoring teip borders and district frontiers, of increasing teip solidarity and morale, of combating crime, and of promoting teip representatives to power. Many teips tried to establish “teip banks”, but after several instances when the raised funds were appropriated by some not very decent members, the idea of teip banks turned unpopular. Teip Congresses adopted resolutions which would appear in the regional press but more often were distributed as leaflets.

Teip congresses were usually initiated by middle aged, politically active people, who, as many of my respondents claimed, strove to use teips as a resource to boost their political careers.

*These were politicized elements in power or striving for power, who wanted to exploit teip support. The Elders had nothing to do with these congresses, the organizers tried to win their backing, which was sometimes successful, at other times not*”, claimed a member of the Chechen political establishment at the time.

A Chechen ethnologist, Vakha Garsaev, emphasized two logics behind the idea to call the teip congresses: on the one hand, for politically ambitious people to make a stake on teip support and, on the other hand, for teip members to encourage solidarity in the conditions of increasing lawlessness, when the police could not fulfill its function of protecting the population from murders and burglaries.

Almost all seniors I interviewed had a very reserved, negative or sometimes aggressively negative attitude to teip congresses, some of them reproduced conspiracy theories of various kinds to explain this phenomenon.

*There was a teip Congress of the pamyatoy teip. They wanted to have it here, on the school school, which is located on our teip territory. I forbid them to hold it here. I told them that this was a special political trick, aimed to divide us. This was a way to disintegration; KGB did it through teip agents all around Chechnya and Ingushetia to encourage disputes over teip*

*borders, to divide, to clash. Dudaev was part of this KGB project. Yaragi Bagataev, village of Vyardi, Shatoy district, senior of teip pamyatoy*

Not all teips held Congresses. Some made a decision not to:

*We did not have a Congress. At least I have not been at any and haven't heard of it. It was unnecessary. We had to unite, but instead they started to have their teip meetings. Our activists also told me – let us call a nashkhoy congress. I was against it. Older people did not approve of it. ” Salavat Gaev, Gekhi-chu village, Urus-Martan district, senior of teip nashkhoy, khkajbakh gaar*

*We had a congress. There was one guy Giriskhanov, a captain in the traffic police. He spoke up, said we should not believe Dudaev, that he was an agent of Moscow. Then some started to praise Dudaev, others to criticize. Nothing good came out of it... Narkom Dadashev, Khochu-ara village, Nozhaj-yurt district, senior of teip biltoy*

National intellectuals and many seniors were aware of the danger of disintegration, which these congresses had:

*This was a totally crazy idea. Our teip seniors, especially Abuzar Ajdamirov [famous writer-E.S.] spoke against it. But our activists nonetheless insisted that we carried it out. But everyone who came to that Congress was told that first of all we were Chechens and only then- teip members. “Those who do not understand this have nothing to do here” was the opening announcement. Said-Magomed Khasiev, Chechen ethnologist, teip alleroy*

Congresses to some extent succeed to strengthen teip identity, which had some quite unexpected initiatives as a consequence.

*One day our guys came to me and said: benoy have created a regiment, 300 armed men. Shamil Beno [a politician- E.S.] distributed them weapons. Why cannot we create such a group? I said: “No way, otherwise we will become completely divided”. Later it turned out that there was no benoy regiment, but it was a dangerous gossip and a dangerous tendency.” Chechen politician, teip ejtkhaloy, Kurchaloy district of Chechnya*

In 1993 there was an initiative to hold a Congress of all teips. A steering committee was set up, but the Congress never convened. The role of the teip idiom in politics increased after Dudaev dissolved the Parliament and opposition to his regime was growing. Dudaev tried to instrumentalize traditional structures in order to maintain support for independence.

According to Anatol Lieven, a journalist who worked in Chechnya at the time, instead of working with political forces Dudaev started gathering hand-picked national councils, congresses mainly made up of village and teip elders ‘to maintain the façade of democracy and consultation’ (Lieven 1998:343). Khussein Betelgireev, a university professor, poet, and bard-

singer explained that Dudaev tried to revive the old disciplining function of the teip and use it for controlling the opponents of independence:

*Dudaev tried to influence the opponents of independence through their teips. He said that everyone should know, who these people were, which teip they came from, their relatives should bring them to their senses". Khussein Betelgireev (interview 2008)*

However, this proved impossible, since the disciplining function of the teip was lost. My respondents who attended teip congresses noted that ideological divisions, political and economic interests were stronger than teip affiliation, and it turned impossible to achieve any political unity:

*"It seems easy to divide people by teip affiliation, but I witnessed how it worked during the protest rallies here. Some benoy people were in the one square with Dudaev, others- with me at the Theatre Square. Benoy even fought each other in Urus-Martan. They decided to have an unarmed fight between themselves. Same with the belgatoy people. Nadterechny Chechens were all against Dudaev, but they all had relatives in the mountains many of whom supported him". Magomed Muzaev, Director of Department for National Archive of the Chechen Republic.*

*In the early 1990s the process of the revival of teips was initiated from above. There was a demand for new ideas, but nobody tried to predict how these ideas would behave in reality. The idea of teip congresses was quickly picked up. We carried out our Congress as well, spoke about how we were so great and the best of all. We made an attempt to organize ourselves politically, but it turned out impossible to agree on any political position. People were so different, everybody had such different interests and views, society had become completely different... Ruslan Tsokuev, head of administration of the village of Zamaj-Yurt, Nozhaj-Yurt District of Chechnya, teip bilty*

Thus, the political mobilization of teips failed. The only sphere where teip (or rather lineage) solidarity worked in 1992-1994 was that of individual cases linked to security or more precisely revenge for offences:

*I know of several cases during Dudaev's time, when teip solidarity transformed into the action. At that time bands appeared, 30-40 armed people each, who robbed civilians. Citizens were defenseless in the face of such groups. One such group was commissioned to kill Viktor Kan-Kalik, the Rector of the University. Kan-Kalik did a lot for our university, and for the republic, he introduced new technologies, new educational methods, the attitude to him was very positive. He was not a revolutionary, but he was a creative person who did his professional work. Some careerists and nationalists were jealous because he, a Jew, became Rector of the Chechen University. Someone wanted his position, it also entailed money - access to bribes. So armed men in masks arrived, they surrounded him as he exited the University. A professor of physics,*

*Abdul-Khalid Bisriev, quickly realized what was happening and tried to shield Kan-Kalik with his body. They shot Bisriev dead. Kan-Kalik was abducted and later was found dead. After this happened the teip of Bisriev got together, collected money and swore to find these people and kill them. At that time blood feud was the only protection. Magomed Muzaev, Director of Department of Archives of the Chechen Government*

The other case, which Magomed Muzaev could remember was also linked with attacks by armed groups.

*One of the relatives of Said-Akhmed Isaev, a doctor habitus of science, was robbed. He was an elderly man. They caught him, humiliated and beat him, and kept him in the cellar. Miraculously he survived. He turned to Dudaev's Ministry of Internal Affairs. There was no help. Then he turned to his relatives. They called the teip people. The teip acted very serridly – they got together, some of them turned out to be former police officers, they investigated, found these guys, surrounded the village, found the perpetrator who humiliated the old man. He was crawling, apologizing, begging for forgiveness for the sake of his ill mother. So they beat him up, took his pants off and threw him in the feet of that old man. Magomed Muzaev, Director of Department of Archives of the Chechen Government*

In compliance with the findings of my fieldwork outlined in Chapter 4, teip (more precisely lineage) solidarity in action worked only in cases of blood feud and humiliation. Political mobilization of teips failed, although teip congresses and public discussions made people more aware of their roots. Khozh, a former Chechen combatant recalled: *“Until the 1990s I did not even know which teip I belonged to. When they started discussing it all after the Revolution, I went to my seniors and demanded that they told me about our teip”*.

Political revival of teip identity failed for several reasons. First, during the Soviet period teip identity was very strongly suppressed. A growing number of educated people as well as seniors had a negative attitude to teip identity and considered that the revival of teips fragmented the nation. Second, as has been discussed in chapter 4, the teip as a social organization had desintegrated and divided into numerous large lineages, territorial segments, which were more relevant than the entire teip. The institution of Elders had lost its power, too. Remarkably, the Chechen Constitution had age limitation - for the President and MPs not to be over 65, which clearly meant the rejection of any form of gerontocratic government. Third, the Chechen national project of 1991-1994 was aimed at a European model of statehood, and declared modern

democratic values. And finally, until 1993 a tough system of checks and balances existed, which prevented teip – or – kin - based nepotism. The Chechen parliament was popularly elected, freely deliberating and represented different teips, regions, sub-identities, and the MPs were careful not to let Dudaev or Akhmadov to adopt personalistic approaches and select ministers on the basis of criteria other than merit.

#### 5.4.2. Neo-traditionalism: the Mekhk-Khel and Seniors in Politics

Newly created neo-traditional institutions like the *Mekhk-Khel* (Council of Land) were strongly supportive of independence. The Republican *Mekhk Khel* was founded in the Square of Freedom during the Revolution of 1991. It was chaired by a very active senior Said-Magomed Adizov, who decided to set up an organization of Elders, and gave it the historical name - *Mekhk-Khel*. The *Mekhk-Khel* tried to include representatives of many teips. During rallies Adizov asked people to propose candidates from their teips (which means a certain rare category of separatist, rally-attending seniors was selected). The *Mekhk-Khel* was very active politically. They organized meetings, and discussions in regions, and villages, and regularly held their Congresses in Grozny, which were widely covered by the media. Among the major political issues they settled, were the negotiations on the territorial dispute with the Ingush in 1993.

Dudaev attended the meetings of the *Mekhk-Khel* paying them ostentatious public respect.

Eventually the Mekhk-Khel started to increasingly demand more authority:

*“Mekhk-Khel received legitimacy at a public rally during the putsch. Its chair Adizov was a very resolute, brave, quick and talkative Elder. He took over the Mekhk-Khel and tried to dictate his conditions. For example, they wanted Baron Kindarov to be appointed a Minister of Health. Baron was a doctor, who organized tents and medical support for protest rallies during the revolution. So Adizov was shouting everywhere that only Kindarov should be the Minister of health. One day Adizov with a bunch of elders broke into the parliament and demanded that we approved Kindarov. Adizov threatened: the „Mekhk-Khel ousted Imam Shamil, it will also oust you!“ My deputy, Bek Mezhidov told him in Chechen to get lost. We basically threw him out of the parliament. Khussain Akhmadov, Chair of the Chechen Parliament 1991-1993*

*There were several impostors in this Mekhk-Khel. I ousted them out of the Parliament. I said “Please, leave, the parliamentarians have to work”. And their senior said “What a bitchy talk?”*



*I sent him to hell and helped them out. And there were no political consequences for me because of that Bektimar Mezhidov, Vice-speaker of Chechen Parliament, 1991-1993*

The famous Chechen respect for the Elders turned out to be seriously watered down once certain Elders tried to turn into real political force. They were immediately treated as any other political rival:

*Adizov tried to revive the Chechen traditions in his own interests. It was very difficult to stop this old man. He crashed all authorities except for Dudaev. Dudaev was the hero of the nation. He was a martyr, who took off his general's epaulets, put his career on the alter of independence. Adizov organized Congresses, demanded to limit the credentials of the parliament, he demanded my resignation, they gathered protests under my windows. I did not like that man and behaved accordingly when they tried to interfere” Khussain Akhmadov, Chair of the Chechen Parliament 1991-1993*

The respect was further deteriorating as the *Mekhk-Khel* started to increasingly intervene in daily routines of villages and organizations. The Elders engaged in checking warehouses, businesses, interfered in professional disputes.

The pro-government newspaper “Ichkeria”, which was independent until 1993, published several materials, very critical of the Mekhk-Khel. “The Mekhk-Khel is an organ sacred to every Chechen since ancient times. Its tasks are the issues of war and peace, support of national traditions, reconciliation of clans and blood-feud, but in no way the checking of warehouses and supplies bases, intervention in the work of the traffic police, resignation and appointment of people,” The article further reported how the Mekhk-Khel’s deputy chair, Khussein Bisultanov, who worked at a Grozny tinned food factory “by ways of intrigues and squabbles managed to achieve the resignation of a respected workshop supervisor and took his position”. Then he engaged in a conflict with the director of the factory, who demanded him to produce decent work. The workers took the side of the factory director and Bisultanov was asked to retire due to his age. The Mekhk-Khel intervened, demanded the resignation of the factory director, returning Bisultanov back and transferring one of the warehouses to him as a private enterprise, while Bisultanov himself tried to change the date of birth in his passport by making a fake court decision.

Having learnt about the Mekhk-Khel rulings the workers unanimously expressed their negative attitude to Bisultanov, who “during communist times was a party member, praised the authorities”, and was suspected of reporting to the KGB. The employees of ten workshops signed a protest letter and went on a two day strike. “After this scandal”, concluded the article “Even an infant will understand that such actions of the respected Elders will not bring agreement and peace to our much suffered land” (Ichkeria May, 24:1992).

In another instance, Ichkeria reports the situation in the Pervomajskaya village, where Elders in a similar fashion intervened in the activity of a local kolkhoz director, and when he refused to comply, started a smearing campaign against him and threatened his father. Finally they initiated a general meeting of the village, which ended up in a physical fight (Ichkeria, July 28, 1992).

“Ichkeria” of 6 August 1992 is fully dropping political correctness: “Something strange has happened to a significant part of our Elders. There is an impression that they got obsessed with something. Day and night they sneak around offices of those in authority. They look for ways to get some kind of position, wherever they can...You see, “during the revolution” they were standing in rallies and caught a cold and sneezed and for this now they need to be rewarded, and if not- they would organize self-styled “Mekhk-Khels” and “Islamic centers” and...from there would start preaching truth to the nation, using for this radio and television (for some reason without any restriction)” (Khizraev 1992).

By 1994 the Mekhk-Khel discredited itself as an institution to such an extent that it got a pejorative nick name – (*Manure of Land*, pun on Chechen word *Mekhk*, which means both ‘council’ and ‘manure or shit’). The aggressively nationalistic rhetoric of the Mekhk-Khel made this institution associated with provoking warfare.

Its chair, Said-Magomed Adizov was reportedly shot dead by his teip member a notorious criminal Alavdi several months after the first Chechen war, when he allegedly tried to flee to Turkey. Reportedly Alavdi came and publically accused the Elder of provoking the war: “Due to your ideology we started fighting. We did not want to fight, and now you want to escape!”. In response, Adizov hit him with his crutch. Then Alavdi shot both Adizov and his brother.

This grotesque institution and largely the personality of Said-Magomed Adizov discredited the idea of the Elders' involvement in politics with many Chechens. Even Dudaev took them more as a symbolic, decorative institution, which could be used for legitimizing his policies and national independence. Anatol Lieven reported an occasion when the Elders criticized Dudaev, to which he replied:

*I called you to serve the nation, not to split it. You are here because of me. If you serve the nation, you can stay and help me. If not, you can go home...didn't ask you here to tell me what to do..” (Quoted in Lieven: 1998:343).*

Neo-traditionalism in Chechen politics failed in 1991-1994, once the Elders took up additional functions to ritual and family dispute settlement. The famous respect to them evaporated and they were treated as any other political force. Since 1994, for 15 years no serious attempts or interest to revive the institution of *Mekhk-Khel* in Chechnya have been noted.

As the two previous sections have shown, despite the attempts to revive and politicize the teips, they did not play any significant role in the state-building project of 1991-1994. Moreover, these attempts failed (political unification turned out impossible) and discredited in the eyes of the majority of the population the very idea of the political prominence of such institutions. Dzhokhar Dudaev, who in general supported neo-traditionalism in politics, did not attempt to integrate traditional structures into the political system. Rather he sought their symbolic support and legitimization. He did so increasingly as the regime was losing its social support and the state institutions were failing.

#### 5.4.3. Kinship

Dudaev had no close relatives in his government. My respondents could remember that one of his relatives was heading the Assay chamber - a commission for testing the purity of gold and diamonds. Dudaev (who arrived from Estonia) lived in the house of his older half-brother (by another wife of his father), named Bekmurza. Bekmurza and his son did have some influence on Dudaev and there were relatives in his security guard. The wife of Bekmurza was appointed the financial inspector of Grozny market, which was a non-political, but rather lucrative position.

Dudaev's immediate family did not benefit from his high political standing. The Parliament's Chair Akhmadov remembered how Dudaev's brother Baskhan asked the parliament to use a car from the former garage of the Communist party, which was announced the property of the Parliament. "I signed a paper and Baskhan got a car" (Akhmadov, interview 2008). Besira, the older sister of Dzhokhar Dudaev, told me in an interview that Dzhokhar's immediate family did not approve of his political career:

*The family was unhappy when Dzhokhar headed the national movement. When he was accepted to the Higher Aviation school - we were happy, when he became a general- we were so proud, we thought now life would be great he had a good salary, a good position, but when he got into politics our mother and I were crying and the brothers tried to talk him out of it... As if he would listen to us! He had no time for us anymore.*

At the same time Besira said that during the two wars 36 men of Dudaev's extended family were killed, which suggests that many of them subsequently joined Dzhokhar in fighting and continued fighting for independence after his death.

According to the parliament's chair Akhmadov, members of the parliament mobilized kinship support on various occasions: when it was necessary to organize security for the Russian delegation which President Dudaev refused to receive, when the parliament was dissolved and Dudaev tried to take over the building of parliament. Ilina Sadulaeva, a staffer of the analytical department of the Parliament recalled that during the crisis of 1993, parliamentarians were coming to the sessions accompanied by groups of relatives, who were standing in the lobby and waiting for them. This was partly done for the sake of protection and partly as a way of social activity for young unemployed men who hang around as groupies of their important relatives. Akhmadov admitted that he helped his relative Dukhvakha Abdurakhmanov to win the elections to Gudermes City Mayor's office, because he promised him support against Dudaev, which Dukhvakha, indeed, provided.

Informal practices based on kinship displayed themselves more prominently at a lower level. In the archive of the Parliament of the Chechen Republic, I found an appeal of the employees of the

Grozny Central milk kitchen addressed to the Parliament<sup>68</sup>: The signators of the letter complained that, using the moment when the director of the Central children's milk kitchen, an ethnic Russian Kabanina L.L. was absent, a nurse Makaeva M. decided to take her place, using the support of her uncle Malsagov Akhmed, a member of the Chechen Parliament "having no due education, or support of the collective" /working staff- E.S./ A complaint was fabricated against Kabanina, and later it turned out during the staff meeting that no one actually filed any complaints..." Nonetheless, MP Malsagov "announced that a Russian would not be the director of the milk kitchen and instead of her would work exactly his niece Makaeva M". "In spite of all the efforts of Makaeva and her uncle Malsagov our collective will fight till the end for justice...How can we trust the Parliament of the Chechen Republic if it has a place for such people as Malsagov?<sup>69</sup>"- said the appeal.

This story is characteristic of the situation with ethnic relations in the republic of the period, when economic struggle often acquired ethnic overtones. The unprotected Russian-speaking population was most vulnerable in the conditions of lawlessness and disorder. This episode is also exemplary of how a nurse used her close kinship to an MP for patronage to get a promotion.

#### 5.4.4. Territory

One can frequently in the literature on Chechnya of 1991-1994 find an argument that the support for the President or the opposition had regional aspects. A widely shared opinion is that Dudaev was supported by the mountaineers, while his opposition - by the lowland Chechens (Gakaev 1999, Tishkov 2001). Experts explain this phenomenon by claiming that more traditional, less educated and mostly unemployed mountaineers supported more radical solutions. There is some truth in this argument. Indeed, many of my respondents noted that while their relatives on the plain were more critical of Dudaev, their mountaineer relatives were supportive of him. The

<sup>68</sup> In the USSR- special dairy products shop where for breastfed babies could be bought

<sup>69</sup> Appeal of collective of Central Childrens Milk Kitchen of Grozny to city major of Grozny Bislan Gantemirov, Chair of the Chechen parliament Khusain Akhmadov. Parliament of the Chechenn Republic. Registration number 02-8921, 27 October 1992

counter argument is that tens of thousands of Chechens on the plain also supported Dudaev. The cleavage between the opposition and the parliament boiled down in the end to the issue of complete independence vs. signing an agreement with Russia. People in the lowland settlements were much more dependent on the Mannian infrastructural power of the state – for them a failed state meant not only lost income, but also the lack of electricity, gas, sewage, transport, water supply - everything which more urbanized population is strongly dependent on. Chechen lowland villages are usually very big, often numbering ten thousand people and more. In fact they are small towns, which were strongly affected by the failed state, skyrocketing criminality, and the shortage in food supplies. The mountaineers, who had always lived in their smaller, still mostly self-sustaining communities, sometimes with no electricity, and usually without gas, did not feel the failure of the state that strongly. Their dependence on the state infrastructural power was minimal and they kept criminals out of their villages themselves. What they did feel, however, was that the regime was now Chechen, that it was respectful of their traditions and religion and even placed them sometimes above the lowland lifestyle. They also could feel at home in Grozny and may be even buy apartments there. Thus, for them the developments were rather positive, and they were prepared to endure difficulties on the way to independence.

The explanation of mountaineer somewhat greater support for secession can be found not so much in a traditional vs. a more modern mentality, but in ideological cleavages rooted in specific historical experiences and memories. The mountain villages were always the natural base for armed resistance and *abreks* (bandits of honor), who had lived in the hills. For this reason the mountaineers were always stronger affected by the repressive measures of the state. Collective memories in smaller communities were better sustained than in larger ones with a mixed populations. On the average the deportation for residents of mountain villages inflicted much greater suffering than to the plain dwellers, due to the simple fact that they had to walk long distances to regional centers before they were picked up by trucks to the train stations. For this reason they were allowed to take very little luggage and food supplies with them. Very ill and

elderly relatives, who could not walk were shot dead, which was usually not the case on the plain. At the same time, I observed that the mountaineers, although more of a political nationalist orientation, are by far less poisoned by modern xenophobia compared to the residents of the urban centers. A Chechen ethnologist Said-Magomed Khasiev agrees that the argument that the mountaineers were more supportive of separatism is not correct. According to him, “it all depended on person’s ideological orientation and economic position, not his mountain/ lowland origin” (Khasiev, interview, 2009).

Another common belief about this period is that certain regions supported the opposition. Clearly this was the case with the Nadterechny region, which from the very beginning refused to recognize Dudaev’s regime, and later with the Urus-Martanovsky region. My respondents among the former Chechen combatants said that in the Urus-Martanovsky district many villages did not let fighters in during the first war, and refused to help them with food and medical supplies.

The phenomenon of regional opposition to Dzhokhar Dudaev is often explained by the fact that two powerful opposition leaders Bislan Gantemirov (from the Urus-Martan region) and Umar Avturkhanov (from Nadterechny the region) managed to garner support of their clans and co-villagers in protest to separatist Grozny (Lieven 1998, Smeets and Wesselink 1995). Section 6.5. will deal more specifically with the issues of regional opposition and will offer some alternative explanations, based on my fieldwork.

#### 5.4.5. Religion

Islam did not enjoy prominence in the 1991-1994 national state-building project in Chechnya, although voices were raised in favor of an Islamic state already at that time. Dudaev’s vision of Chechen satatehood was secular and nationalist. Moreover Dudaev was tough in keeping the Islamists at a significant distance.

Some scholars claim that the separatist project was widely supported by Qadyri tariqa, namely the Kunta-Khadzi vird followers- the *zikrists*, but opposed by Naqshbandiya. The *Zikrists*, who

constitute about 80% of Chechen believers, are thought to have been more oppressed by the Soviet regime than the followers of the Naqshbandiya (Kulchik 1994, Muzaev, interview 2008). My respondents frequently expressed an opinion that “the Soviet state was trying to provoke tensions between the two main movements in Islam by unevenly promoting the Naqshbandi tariqa”. Regarding alleged support of Dudaev by the Kunta Khadzi Vird followers, this seems to be more of a myth than a reality. The high representation of the *zikrists* in the national movement simply follows from the fact that this was the most numerous vird (80% of the population), and therefore also the most conspicuous, when performing their zikr in the squares. At the same time there are some reasons to believe that Dudaev was aware of the speculations regarding his alliance with *zikrists*, and was careful to have representatives of the Naqshbandiya in his government. The example is Andarbek Yandarov, the first Chechen doctor habitus of philosophy, who wrote a book on Sufism in Chechnya and was appointed Minister of education, despite the fact that he had been the second secretary of the Chechen-Ingush Republican Communist party. Dudaev avoided promoting former party *apparatchiks*, but Yandarov was the grandson of a prominent Naqshbandi Sheikh, Solsa-khadzi from Urus-Martan, which probably determined the choice.

Adam Dukhaev, the editor of the regional newspaper “Terkijst” in the oppositional Nadterechny region of Chechnya, said that the vird factor did not play a role in the political orientation of the regions’ population, and although historically most of the Nadterechny Sheikhs were Naqshbandi, the region’s believers were evenly divided between the Naqshbadi and Qadiri tariqas (50-50) and their support of political leaders was not shaped by vird identity. Khussain Akhmadov, the chair of the Chechen Parliament, who is currently the advisor to the Mufti of Chechnya, also claimed that support of separatism cut across descent, kinship and vird ties.

In the given period, all pre-existing patterns of social integration (descent, kinship, religion, territory) co-existed peacefully at the social level and were acknowledged as identities by the political regime, unless they were politicized ( the Urus-Martan and Nadterechny regions) and



turned into political opponents. Following Migdal's classification of state-society relations, Dudaev's policy towards informal patterns of social integration can be characterized as accommodative, but keeping them outside the political system (Migdal 1988).

#### 5.4.6. Political elite formation: ideology, personal networks

*In some of the key positions were people loyal to Dudaev. In 1992 Albakov became Minister of defense. He was Dudaev's close person. Dudaev asked me to approve him in Parliament. I did, although it was difficult, MPs had learnt that he was a Dudaev protégé, they immediately accused me of lobbying for his interests. Albakov almost cost me the position of chairman, the MPs initiated my impeachment... So, I helped Dudaev with Albakov and he helped me to appoint my co-villager Ediev, Minister of Transport. He was a professor at the Institute of Automobile transport, a big scholar. I could not have pushed his approval through parliament, so I asked Dudaev to appoint him by decree. We had such compromises, of course. Khussain Akhmadov, Chair of Chechen Parliament 1992-1993*

Later, during the crisis of 1993, Ediev as a member of Dudaev's government fully supported the President, in Akhmadov's expression "once he became part of his government, he was fully dependent on Dudaev and strictly subordinated to him. He was no more my man, he was part of his team, fully loyal to him, as were all of his ministers" (Akhmadov, interview, 2008).

'Dudaev's people' were usually his ideological supporters, 'people who were close to him spiritually' or those who helped him to come to power. Yaragi Mamodaev, the first Chair of Dudaev's government, was known for helping Dudaev financially in the early years of his political career. El'za Sheripova, the Prosecutor General was Dudaev's close associate since the times of the revolution and the OKChN. Many of his ideological comrades were in the judicial system. Dudaev did not allow kinship relations in the government, neither did the parliament. In the first two years of independence, mainly active supporters of the revolution have been promoted. However, gradually, especially as the post-revolution euphoria was going down, and when the regime moved towards authoritarianism, kinship ties started making their ways into the political establishment. Members of Dudaev's government tried to bring people loyal to them into the administration. "Certain person holding an insignificant position of a unit manager, who

had access to economic resources and be linked through personal ties to a minister, could actually have a major influence on a political institution” – claimed one of the government members.

#### 5.4.7. Personal networks and “joint responsibility”

Dudaev’s political elite was not based on kin, descent, territory, region or religious affiliations. It was mostly ideologically driven. However, personal networks comprised of kinship, neighbors, friends, acquaintances, were prominent at the medium and lower-level of decision-making. Disorder and lawlessness were to a large extent the results of a generally shared value that reporting illegal activity to the authorities was not proper behavior. Unless they were directly affected, people usually turned a blind eye to how their acquaintances and former colleagues used public goods for private purposes.

The Russian term “*krugovaya poruka*”, used by Ledeneva to explain the post-Soviet economy, which means mutual or joint responsibility and covering up, expresses this phenomenon quite precisely. The results of the Parliamentary investigation into the situation in the Vedensky region of Chechnya is a good example of the analysis of this phenomenon. Below I quote archival materials related to three episodes from one region, illustrative of the mutual cover up by co-villagers, neighbors, acquaintances and co-workers.

*Episode 1:* “In the beginning of the summer of the current year, the residents of the villages of Makazhoj and Tsa-Vedeno decided in the village councils to reorganize their kolkhoz and to transfer the kolkhoz lands to the jurisdiction of the local government. In this situation, in order to preserve the pedigree buffaloes of the kolkhoz, the Ministry of Agriculture and Nutrition instructed the kolkhoz to sell the state-owned buffaloes to another state-run kolkhoz “Predgorny” for a mutually acceptable price. “Counter to this instruction, the board of the kolkhoz sold the buffaloes to someone else. residents of Kharachoy took the remaining cattle to their private households. Moreover, the members of the kolkhoz divided the kolkhoz vehicles (cars, tractors)

among themselves. No measures have been thus far taken by the law enforcement agencies or the Ministry of agriculture”<sup>70</sup>.

This first episode can still be classified as a somewhat justifiable decision to divide the common property of a former kolkhoz, especially since everyone knew how violently these kolkhozes were created in the first place. The second episode involved obvious damage to common good, and inflicted significant harm.

*Episode 2.* The sovkhos “Plodopitomnicheskij” is located between the villages of Vedenno and Oktyabrskoje. In 1991 the Council of Ministers of the Chechen Republic allocated 43 hectares of land for additional houses and gardens for families. However, on top of it several residents of the village of Kharachoy and of other settlements illegally captured 8, 5 hectares of land from the sovkhos. These persons cut 1,089 trees from sovkhos orchards, broke 189 reinforced concrete posts, damaged 8,100 meters of pole-hedge wire. The total damage amounted to 165,431 rubles”. The prosecutor’s office of the Vedensky region instigated a criminal case, which was transferred for investigation to Vedensky security unit, which two months later suspended the case, “without having interrogated or interviewed a single person, without carrying out any investigative measures”. This decision was overturned by the regional prosecutor, who sent the case back. However, the local investigator again had not taken any further actions. As a result of this the “illegal self capture of lands has taken a massive character, and cases of violent conflicts over land disputes occurred.” In order to tame these processes, the prosecutor’s office of the region sent 13 cases to the regional court with no response from it<sup>71</sup>.

This episode is an example of mutual cover up based on *zemlyachestvo* (regional solidarity). Since the perpetrators’ illegal activities did not harm any particular family or anyone else’s personal interest, local authorities saw no immediate benefit in dealing with them in accordance with law.

The third episode is an example of mutual cover up based on professional solidarity:

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<sup>70</sup> Report of the Parliamentary Commission for investigation of the situation in Vedensky region of Chechnya. March 1993

<sup>71</sup> Ibid.

*Episode 3.* In the end of March 1992 the family of the district inspector of the Vedensky regional security unit, Idrisov, illegally moved into a state-owned flat, which previously belonged to the KGB. The regional Prosecutor sanctioned an administrative eviction of the Idrisov family on May 9 1992, and the same day it was transferred to the regional court for implementation by the local security unit. For five months the decision of the Prosecutor was not enforced. Then the regional Prosecutor filed a presentation to the Minister of Security of the Chechen Republic, demanding to take measures. No measures were taken. The Illegal capture of a flat by a member of the security unit and lack of adequate reaction to it encouraged other residents to capture flats and state-owned premises. Thirteen such cases were instigated into illegal capture of property by the Prosecutor.

In this case the local security servicemen did not want to oust one of their colleagues from an illegally captured flat, the Ministry of Security was not interested to take measures against an inspector in its department, leaving the regional Prosecutor totally impotent.

Generally, according to the report of the parliamentary commission, Veden regional law-enforcement agencies instigated 36 criminal cases in 1992, only three of them reached the court. “Impunity rules in the region, where offenses are taking a mass character.”- stated the report. The whole Veden region was the embodiment of “*krugovaya poruka*” based on neighborhood, regional and professional ties<sup>72</sup>.

Despite the fact that the top political elite was not formed on the basis of particularistic ties, the regional and local-level governance was tolerant to informal and illegal practices, mutual cover up and non-reporting of illegal actions by neighbors, co-villagers, kinsmen, friends, members of personal networks and corporate groups of professionals. These practices certainly had existed in Soviet times, but after independence they proliferated. Clearly, the new Chechen state was unable and did not attempt to create anything approximating a Weberian rational bureaucracy, or an effective impartial judiciary.

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<sup>72</sup> Ibid.

### 5.5. Challengers to the Regime: Regions in Opposition

In 1993 after the dispersal of parliament, Moscow started to help covertly the opposition with money and arms supplies (Lieven 1998:79, Orlov and Cherkasov:1998). There is a wide-spread opinion that several pro-federal politicians took up arms, consolidated power in their native regions and went against Dzhokhar Dudaev with Russian support. These were Umar Avturkhanov from the Nadterechny district, and Beslan Gantamirov, the former chair of the City Hall of Grozny, who quarreled with Dudaev over oil and allegedly garnered support in his native town of Urus-Martan. They were joined by Ruslan Labazanov, a hardened criminal, who had a personal grudge against Dudaev. Labazanov set up a criminal gang of 40-50 people and acted freely in the town of Argun.

On December 16, 1993 these three leaders set up the Temporary Council of the Chechen Republic with Umar Avturkhanov as its chair, and they declared Chechnya as part of the Russian Federation. In June 1994 they called for a “Congress of the People of Chechnya” in the village of Znameskoye, the administrative center of Nadterechny region. The Congress voted no confidence to Dudaev and acknowledged the Temporary Council as the “highest organ of government” for the transitional period. The Temporary Council received over 150 mln. rubles for the “stabilization of the situation” from Moscow (Orlov and Cherkasov 1998).

The fact that the anti-Dudaev armed opposition was region-based is usually linked with the personalities of Gantamirov and Avturkhanov and often perceived as another proof of clan-based politics in Chechnya. Anatol Lieven, for example, claimed in 1998 “The money and backing that came from Moscow allowed pro-federal field commander Umar Avturkanov to consolidate power in his native Naursky region [*mistake-Nadterechny region-E.S.*] by paying wages and salaries to its inhabitants” (Lieven 1998:80). My fieldwork in these two regions produced a slightly different vision of the nature of regional opposition to Dudaev.

I carried out interviews with eight residents of Urus-Martan, the second largest town of Chechnya, who were politically active in 1991-1994. They provided their vision of the “special

position” of Urus-Martan during the times of Dudaev and Maskhadov, all on the condition of anonymity.

According to my respondents, Urus-Martan had been in opposition to Dudaev long before Bislan Gantamirov arrived there. Urus-Martan was always been a town with high level of education and had its own active elite – *intelligentsia*. It also was a town with superfluous labor force. A large part of its residents worked on seasonal jobs in Russia or moved to Russia, which made them more integrated with Russia, and ‘knowledgeable of how people lived elsewhere, and how the state works’. The planning of the town is very urban, unlike Grozny, where some districts resemble villages with people living in private houses, keeping cattle and large vegetable gardens. In Urus Martan there was not enough land for each family household, so people had small gardens and mainly lived on a salary, which made them very dependent on the state.

During the early years of perestroika several civic organizations were founded in Urus-Martan, which supported democratic reforms. A strong and well organized civic movement emerged, and the town became the first one in the USSR (!), to get rid of a communist mayor and have him replaced by a democracy-oriented leader. After the Revolution of 1991, Urus-Martan first supported independence, but soon became disillusioned:

*The changes did not bypass Urus-Martan. People enthusiastically elected the President. Many hopes and expectations were linked with Dudaev. The educated part of Chechen society, a large part of which lived in Urus-Martan demanded some kind of democracy. But was just a declaration of democracy. In fact louts, who perched on power were dictating their rules to the others and started to seize with their tentacles everything that could be appropriated. XX, staffer of local administration of Urus-Martan*

*Because Urus-Martanians were educated and travelled a lot, we knew what the state should be like, how authority should function. We expected that the Chechen authorities would implement some minimal policies: pay pensions, welfare payments, create employment opportunities. Dudaev inherited enormous property and economy. For example, in Urus-Martan, the Michurina state farm was a millionaire; tens of thousands of livestock we had in this region, good crops of grain, functioning enterprises, and very hardworking people. Having all this, Dudaev was incapable of organizing basic things, it was clear that they simply did not know how to govern. Everything that we owned was gradually plundered, huge agricultural enterprises fell into decay, factories and plants were closing don. And when people asked Dudaev to please pay the pensions, he would say on TV- collect cones and knit socks. People started to understand that nothing proper can be done with such authorities. XXX, lawyer, Urus-Martan*

Since the times of perestroika, Urus-Martan had already been a well organized elite and a charismatic leader - Yusup Elmurzaev, a history teacher and later an inspector of regional department of education. Already in 1992 Elmurzaev and his colleagues created the Temporary Council and declared that Urus-Martan was not subordinated to Dzhokhar Dudaev. The Urus-Martanians created their own guard and protected the city. "Urus-Martan has always supported the Russian official authorities. Yusup Elmurzaev was a supporter of the evolutionary development of Chechnya and Russia. He said: "we will do our best that neither Russian nor Dudaev's troops enter this city," recalled a journalist of the local newspaper.

It was only in late 1993 that the opposition city mayor of Grozny Bislan Gantamirov joined the breakaway city with his own paramilitary groups. In late August 1994 Dudaev's forces tried to take the city. *"Our guys were keeping guard at a checkpoint, when Dudaev's gunmen arrived and shot them dead point blank. The first clash was on September 1, Urus-Martanians cleaned the city from the alien gunmen. On October 19<sup>th</sup> in the morning started a full scale attack with armored vehicles. They suffered great losses and had to retreat. They then took the corpses of their dead back to Grozny which aroused indignation of people. Later Dudaev himself acknowledged that if Urus-Martanians had one tank, they would have taken over the capital. Dudaev's position was very shattered at that time."* XXXX, Deputy Head of the local administration

All of the respondents claimed that Gantamirov (the Chair of City Hall of Grozny), played no role in the "special" position of Urus-Martan. *"Gantamirov survived thanks to Urus-Martan and when his military base was attacked, he for some reason happened to be elsewhere. Our leader here was Yusup Elmurzaev and the Temporary Council of Urus-Martan district, which included local respected people. There were many very good young men, who supported Yusup and would do everything he would say. As to Gantamirov, we evaluate very negatively his actions and do not accept him as an authority-* said a local journalist who seemed to express everybody's opinion.

A very similar situation I found in the Nadterechny region of Chechnya, which is located on the right bank of the Terek river and was the first one to declare its compliance with the Dudaev regime. Local activists elected their own regional administration and together with the religious authorities persuaded the population to recognize the Russian authorities. The Nadterechny Chechens regularly and on time received their pensions, salaries and subsidies from Russia unlike in the rest of Chechnya.

As pointed out above, the Nadterechny region had historically been strongly oriented towards Russia. *“Nadterechny Chechens have always been different, they are far away from Grozny, more Russified, in addition they got some good financial inflow for their opposition to Dudaev”*.

Khussain Akhmadov, chair of Chechen parliament 1992-1993

The editor of the Nadterechny regional newspaper “Terkjist” Adam Dukhaev explained in an interview: *The majority of our population was pro-Russian, but about 10% were pro-Dudaev. One village in the region was fully Dudaev’s. It was not linked with kin ties, but ideologically they wanted to be with their people. Dudaev’s television was full of anti-Nadterechny propaganda, Nadterechny Chechens were called traitors, who went against their own people”, so this village had retained their own opinion”*. (Dukhaev, interview 2009)

According to Adam Dukhaev, since the 19<sup>th</sup> century Nadterechny Chechens have been loyal to Russia. The Russian general Yermolov in the 19<sup>th</sup> century wrote that the Nadterechny Chechens, in order to preserve their fertile land, would be forced to serve in the Russian army against the rebellious mountaineers. During the 19<sup>th</sup> century Caucasian war, the Imperial army drafted one man from each ten households to fight against Imam Shamil. Many of them became prominent officers. The police has also been manned by Nadterechny Chechens since then.

The fact that Doku Zavgaev, the first Chechen Secretary of the Communist party elected in 1990, was from Nadterechny contributed to the special position of the region, but not much. Doku Zavgaev did not recruit many of his Nadterechny people into the government- said a member of the regional administration. More important, in his opinion, was the fact that three of Zavgaev brothers, who were all influential people during the late years of the USSR, channeled the Russian support to Nadterechny. Doku’s brother, Akhmed Zavgaev, was the head of the regional government. Umar Avturkhanov was the mayor of the region. Umar Avturkhanov was from the same village as the Zavgaev brothers and received financial support from Russia through them.

The alliance of Nadterechny and Urus-Martan districts was, indeed, a result of elite coalition.

*Bislan Gantamirov, the chair of the city hall of Grozny, born in Urus-Martan region, quarreled with Dudaev and moved to live in the Nadterechny region. He made a coalition with Umar*



*Atvurkhanov and then established ties with his regional oppositionists, and the two regional elites allied within the republican Temporary Council,” explained a member of administration.*

On August, 11 1994 Yeltsin was interviewed on television and on the subject of Chechnya he stated that intervention by force was “impermissible and must not take place” but then added with a sly smile: “However, the situation in Chechnya is now changing. The role of the opposition to Dudaev is increasing. So I would not say that we are not having any influence at all» (Dunlop: 1998 197). Dudaev instantly reacted saying that Yeltsin’s declaration proved that he personally directed the “unprecedented provocation” of Avturkanov’s opposition. Dudaev interpreted it as ‘Russian aggression’, and declared holy war - *gazavat* and passed a decree of military mobilization within the republic. (Dunlop 1998:197) Two weeks later the Russian deputy premier Sergey Shakhraj stated that the possibility of a political dialogue with Dzhokhar Dudaev has been exhausted. In the end of November the decision was taken to adopt the use of force to resolve the conflict.

On November 26, 1994 the forces of the armed opposition headed by Umar Avturkhanov and Bislan Gantamirov together with federal servicemen tried to storm Grozny. Unobstructed their tanks entered the capital, reached its center, where they were destroyed by the Chechen forces with grenade-launchers. About 30 crew members were killed, and about the same number captured. Since November 27, the Russian TV channels showed these captives, who admitted that they were Russian military servicemen contracted by the FSK (Federal Service for counter-intelligence). On November 28, Pavel Grachev, officially denied that these were his military servicemen. On the following day Dudaev declared that the captives would be executed, if the Russian side did not acknowledge that these were her soldiers. The same day the Security Council of Russia adopted decided on the military operation (Orlov and Cherkesov: 32). On December 11, 1994 Russian troops entered Chechnya and the first Chechen war broke out.

*“Dudaev wanted to meet Yeltsin. For some reason I believe that if he met Yeltsin, he would have signed that agreement which we had prepared. But he wanted parity. If this meeting took place, there would have been no war, -”* claimed Bektimar Mezhidov, Vice-speaker of Chechen parliament

*The opposition with their debacle of 26<sup>th</sup> November did a great favor to Dudaev. When people learnt that these were contracted soldiers who stormed Grozny together with Chechens, the effect was reverse. Dudaev's government was in a deep crisis. If it had not been for the 26<sup>th</sup>, I give 100% that he would have been replaced by the internal opposition, without any violence. The war could have been avoided. XX, member of local administration Urus-Martan*

*Dudaev declared freedom and independence, something that people were waiting for generation after generation, our forefathers were fighting for it with arms. We were waiting for such a man, such a development, to start living in peace, to put an end to wars and extermination and subjugation. I am an old man, I don't understand many things, I don't know why it did not work out for him. But I regret that it did not work out. Said- Ali, Chechen peasant, born in 1911*

## Conclusion

In 1991-1994 the Chechen political elites, who came to power as a result of a national revolution, attempted to build a modern secular nation-state. The analysis of this chapter shows that the political process in the given period was secular, and ideologically and economically driven. Until 1993 the political actors tried to keep their commitment to stay within the framework of the law and a minimal definition of democratic procedure, with independent legislative and executive powers, a fairly impartial Constitutional Court, and a functioning system of checks and balances. By 1993 Chechen the political system was paralyzed by an acute political crisis, which was the outcome of intense struggle between political actors who sought to implement their different visions of the good Chechen statehood (separatist vs. sovereign in alliance with Russia), based on their different memories of existence under the *ancien regime* and different ideological orientations. The cleavage cut very deep, dividing state institutions, civil society groups, the media, producing a deep ideological divide in society and threatens with major violence when the power centers mobilized their supporters into the streets. The challengers of the regime were represented by civic organizations and movements, which had no links to traditional structures, informal patterns of social integration or religious groups.

Two regions with traditionally pro-Russian orientation (Nadterechny, and Urus-Martanovsky) gradually announced their non-compliance with the government in Grozny. The Temporary Council of the Chechen Republic, an organ created by leaders of opposition with support of

Russia, was based in these regions. The oppositionist groups were not embedded in teip, religious, or kinship identities or organizations, they were ideologically and politically driven. Regional identities played an important role, but more important was the general pro-Russian and anti-Dudaev consolidation. Moreover, my fieldwork showed that regional opposition was not linked to the personalities of Avturkhanov and Gantamirov, and their specific ties to the locals, but was determined by historical and social conditions which made these regions associated towards Russia and the presence of organized civic groups and local leadership, which consolidated this ideological opposition.

Thus, the analysis of this chapter refutes the clan politics argument, which claims that in Chechnya inter-clan tensions lead to group mobilization and violence (Collins 2006:41) or that the “subethnic *teips* became enshrined in Moscow’s decision to launch a bloody invasion in 1994, some groups were most closely allied with Russia and others were more staunch supporters of independence“after the collapse of USSR (Schatz 2005: xvi). The clan politics literature is lacking in understanding of what teip/clan really was at the moment. It misunderstands the nature of the political process in Chechnya of 1991-1994, underestimates the role of ideology, political and economic interests, and regional identities which were decisive in political outcomes.

The principal problem of Chechen state-building was what Dankward Rustow called “the birth defects of the political community” - the profound lack of agreement on the political future of the nation. The other crucial challenge was the lack of knowledge, experience, and sometimes will, to build a modern state in earnest, as well as a lack of capacity to govern and to deliver social goods to society. The failures of the state to keep the industry and employment running, to fill the republican budget, provide education and healthcare, to enforce the law, combat crime, and ensure a functioning judicial system, to maintain the residential infrastructure, to pay welfare, and salaries – all these factors were crucial in determining people’s attitudes to the regime, not their teip or clan affiliation.

Despite President Dudaev's support of neo-traditionalism in politics, of the revival of the teips and Councils of Elders, he did not attempt to incorporate them into the political system or let them play any significant role in the political process. Using Migdal's categories of ideal-type societal reactions to the state, quoted in Chapter 1, Dudaev was looking for *legitimization* of his regime by informal actors, which is the weakest pattern in Migdal's classification (Migdal 1988:33). The revival of the teips passed as an element of retro-fashion. Except for a handful of cases, which were usually linked to a murder or a humiliation of its members and the ineffective of the state security services in punishing the perpetrators, teips (or more exactly lineages) were unable to mobilize for any significant action. The political unification of teips proved impossible. Neo-traditionalism in politics was equally unsuccessful. The Elders who went into politics were treated as any other political actors, with no special respect and their role was limited to that of politically engaged civic organizations, not institutions. The Elder's attempts to interfere in professional matters and political issues stumbled on firm resistance on behalf of both society and the state institutions. Moreover, the performance of some of the elders seems to have discredited the idea of reviving traditionalism in politics.

The analysis in this section has shown that at the top level of the political elite, kinship, neighborhood, and territorial relations did not play any prominent role. The state was largely autonomous from the social structures and in the situation of comparatively low-risk environment (no immediate security risks for the President, no risks linked with high personal corruption or other illegal actions). Dudaev did not need a strong-tied organic group around him. A strong parliament, the system of checks and balances, were crucial in preventing nepotism and affective ties in the government.

However, nepotism and illegal informal practices flourished at the regional level, especially mutual covering up of illegal economic activity. These practices were based on an entire array of territorial, kinship, friendship, professional, religious identities and ties. The 1991-1994 case shows that Chechens turned out to be inefficient in *disciplining other Chechens* if the action lay

outside the framework of traditional law. Blood feud tradition made Chechen security forces impotent in the face of daring criminals. In regional communities where everyone knew everyone, the investigating authorities, the prosecution and the courts were reluctant to enforce discipline on their co-villagers or acquaintances who, illegally seized former state property, or were involved in questionable economic activities. In the sphere of economic crimes, mechanism of mutual cover-up were by far stronger than the commitment to the newly born nation-state. This was probably a result of post-colonial thinking: after so many years of state police functions having been performed by alien state structures society was not prepared to take them up itself, especially after acquiring independence. On the other hand similar processes of lawlessness and *krugovaya poruka* described in this chapter were characteristic of the metropolis itself at that time.

President Dudaev's state-building project failed and the lack of consolidation is too obvious to be discussed. The prominence of various patterns of social integration in Dudaev's elite is summarized in the following table:

Table 5.3. Prominence of patterns of integration in elite formation in Chechnya 1991-1994

	Chechnya (1991-1994)
Descent group	insignificant
Kinship	insignificant
Territory	-
Religion	insignificant
Ideology	prominent

Such a low prominence of strong ties based on ascriptive identities should be explained by the nature of the political process, which was ideology-driven, by internal constraints on the government, such as checks and balances (assertive parliament, quite independent judiciary) and organized opposition, and low risks of physical elimination of leaders or of prosecution for large-scale illegal economic activity. Internal constraints on the government can be evaluated as follows:

Table 5.4. Internal constraints on the Chechen government (1991-1994)

where 1 - negligible; 2- weak , 3 – significant, 4- prominent 5- very prominent

Government	Checks and balances	Opposition within the system	Risk (of physical elimination)	Risk (prosecution for illegal economic activity)
Chechnya (1991-1994)	4	5	2	2

The percentage of strong ties in Dudaev's government was low. Informal patterns of integration behaved differently towards the government. Table 5.5. shows that structures pre-existing the Dudaev regime preferred to be accommodative or supportive, while the challengers of the regime were embedded in ideology or regional identities rather than in ascriptive networks:

Table 5.5. Informal actors' behavior toward the government (Chechnya 1991-1994)

Accommodating	Challenging
descent (teips)	region-based opposition
religion (tariqa, virds)	ideological opposition

This can be explained by the fact that “traditional” Wajnakh institutions are usually consensus-oriented, when dealing with a Chechen agency, moreover, being the bearers of memories of grievances they were more supportive of the Chechen state. However, most importantly they were not organized politically, unlike groups driven by ideology or regional oppositional sentiment.

## 6. The Islamist State-Building Project in Chechnya (1997-1999)

This chapter will analyze the 1997-1999 political processes in Chechnya, when after the end of the first Russian-Chechen war of 1994-1996 the Chechen elites undertook a second attempt at independent polity-building.

I start by describing the socio-political context which brought about the regime change, shaped the initial socio-political circumstances and elite choices in the analyzed period. The second section will analyze the state building project itself with a focus on the function of the newly created institutions, the President's efforts to ensure elite consolidation, the principal challengers to the regime: both the formal opposition and the informal groups. I will then look at the state's infrastructural power- the capacity to deliver social goods. While analyzing the government's attempts at maintaining the economy, replenishing the budget and collecting taxes, supporting education and healthcare, law enforcement, armed forces and the judicial system I will discuss challenges faced by the government, and analyze its responses to the crises. I will show that the main challengers of the regime were armed criminal groups and paramilitaries and that the role of teips and lineages was nil, kinship in politics was hardly visible and even virds and tariqas started to raise their voices only by the end of the analyzed period. I will conclude by an assessment of the reasons for the failure of the state-building project through the prism of the interaction between formal politics and informal institutions and practices.

### 6.1. Socio-political processes shaping state-building in Chechnya (1997-1999)

The 1997-1999 state-building project in Chechnya was shaped by the social and political changes brought about by the 1994-1996 Russo-Chechen war. The first Russo-Chechen war was successful for the Chechen separatists and concluded in Khasavyurt Peace Accords signed on 31

August 1996 by Aslan Maskhadov<sup>73</sup> and General Alexander Lebed.<sup>74</sup> The document stipulated the end of the military conflict, withdrawal of the Russian troops, commitment not to use force against each other and resolve disputed issues on the basis of international law (*Nezavisimaya Gazeta* 3 September 1996). The settlement of the political status of the Chechen Republic was postponed until the end of 2001.

At the ceremony after signing the Accords, Vladimir Lukin, a member of the Russian delegation, then MP of the Russian State Duma and currently the Ombudsman of Russia dropped a phrase, which is still remembered by many and which had strong implications for the Chechen state-building trajectory of 1996-1999: “In five years Russia will be stronger and we’ll see what happens then.” During the electoral campaign, Shamil Basaev repeatedly quoted this phrase and insisted that the status of Chechnya should be resolved before 2001 (Tishkov 1998:64). The unresolved status was used by the main field commanders as a pretext not to demobilize their groups.

Maskhadov’s state-building was unwrapping within a society, which had just lived through a most destructive asymmetric war. According to the annual report of the Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 80% of the republican economy was destroyed, along with the social infrastructure- 121, 760 houses and flats, all central republican medical clinics, over 400 educational institutions were bombed out fully or partly (Tishkov 1998:73). Impoverishment, routine encounter with human death, almost 500,000 refugees, free access to arms, revenge, psychological trauma, break up of morality and ‘paramilitarization’ of the male population were just a few of the social consequences of the war. The Russian government recognized the damages and the Khasav’yut Accords were accompanied by a package of economic agreements, in which Russia took up the responsibility to finance the reconstruction, pay pensions and salaries.

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<sup>73</sup> on behalf of President of Chechen Republic Ichkeria, Zelimkhan Yandarbiev

<sup>74</sup> on behalf of the President of the Russian Federation, Boris Yeltsin



The Russian military invasion affected the political orientations of the population, but also brought significant social change – profound Islamization and the emergence of new patterns of social integration- paramilitary groups. The war naturally and drastically weakened at part of the Chechen identification, which was positively correlated with Russia. The fact of the invasion, and indiscriminate violence reduced the pre-war achievements of the pro-Russian opposition to almost nil, confirmed old fears, intensified ‘memories of grievance’, and discredited the idea of the Russian statehood. The war also accelerated the re-Islamization of society. It started in 1994 as an anti-colonial war, with ‘national liberation’ being the major motif of the rank-and-file. By 1997 Islamization was very prominent, all of the Chechen politicians resorted to Muslim discourse in their public statements. Clearly, religion becomes important among societies at war: in the conditions of random violence and death, there was a turn to faith among the population. In the background of the general Islamic revival new religious trends emerged - fundamentalism or Salafism, or Wahhabism- which proved very efficient in military organization and discipline. International Jihadists who arrived to Chechnya in some numbers in 1995 were the bearers of this ideology and invested much effort to diffuse it among post-Soviet field commanders and rank- and- file.

Paramilitary groups strengthened gradually. All former combatants I have interviewed described the first two weeks of the war as chaos. There were too many volunteers who were actually more of a disrupting than a military force, there was no central command, groups formed on their own, spontaneously and often randomly.

*It was difficult even to join this nightmare. For two weeks I could not find a group. The majority of volunteers were forming groups on the basis of previous acquaintances, friendships, and I had no acquaintances, I had just arrived from Kazakhstan. Khozh, former combatant*

However, unified command was established quickly the armed forces were divided into fronts and then into sectors. Despite yje unified command, autonomy of military units was significant. Made up of volunteers who could come and leave, dispersed around vast territory and fragmented by

isles of territory under control of the federal troops, commanders of small units were rather free in their daily planning. Internal cohesion in groups was strong.

Groups were formed on the basis of village affiliation, previous acquaintance or just randomly. Often their social and regional composition was heterogeneous. The commanders were usually people with some prior military experience and older than the others, but not necessarily the oldest:

*In our group the commander was 49 years old, he was a school teacher of military education. We had other teachers with us, as they are called – intelligentsia. I was 32. The oldest was 56, the youngest – 18. I Two of us were from Groznensky (Selsky) region, 3 guys were from Grozny, one guy was Adyg<sup>75</sup>, the rest were from Nadterechny and Naursky regions, totally 21-22 people. All except for one served in the army... Khozh, former combatant*

None of the former combatants whom I have interviewed mentioned that their group was based on kin or vird affiliation, moreover, many told me about their cousins and other relatives fighting in other groups elsewhere, and they did not seem to be interested to be closer to them. They did mention, however, that they preferred to be in a group with someone they knew, preferably co-villagers or people from the same residential neighborhood:

*I wanted to be with my guys, from my village, because I knew 100% that they would not abandon me if I was injured or killed. Zelim, former Chechen combatant*

As the war progressed the composition of groups could be in flux. After the war many of the groups were dissolved, and most of fighters returned to peaceful life. However, some groups remained, and gradually turned into paramilitaries with stronger territorial component and personal loyalty to the leader.

During the war popular support to combatants was enormous.

*The people's militia had to be fed, so women baked bread, sewed uniforms, and unloadings. The injured were taken care of. When a unit entered a village, the injured were immediately taken homes – it was perceived as an honor to take care of them. The rear was working. The entire nation supported us. We were fighting for a pure idea, for independence. And you cannot defeat a nation, when it has an idea. When one side has patriotism and the other side- vodka, it's clear who wins such a war. In the first war truth was on our side and we won with the support of the All-Mighty and the nation. Ruslan, former combatant*

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<sup>75</sup> (Circassian), an indigenous Muslim nation of the North Caucasus

In the post-war euphoria ex-combatants were treated as national heroes, and quite a few of them developed a superiority complex and felt that they were entitled to their share of power.

## 6.2. Elections and attempts at initial elite consolidation

Chechnya started its second state-building project after independence with presidential and parliamentary elections of January 27, 1997 carried out on the basis of the 1992 Chechen Constitution, the institutional design and principles of governance remained the same.

Over 20 candidates ran for presidency. No pro-Russian or non-separatist candidates were allowed to run. The actual rivals were three: Zelimkhan Yandarbiev, who took the Presidential position after Dzhokhar Dudaev was killed by the federal security forces in April 1996<sup>76</sup>, positioned himself as a supporter of Islamic values and was radically anti-Russian. Aslan Makhadov, a former colonel of the Soviet Army, was the chief of Staff of the Chechen Forces during the war and signed the Khasavyurt Accords on behalf of Chechnya. He was for a secular democratic state, advocated normalization of relations with Russia, and was in favor of attracting support and investment from the West. Shamil Basayev, a celebrated field commander, and terrorist was the obvious leader of the radicals. Basayev became famous in Chechnya already in November 1991, when in response to Yeltsin's imposition of a State of emergency in Chechnya he hijacked a Russian passenger plane to Turkey. He was rebuked for this deed by the Ichkerian government and put on the wanted list by the Russian law enforcement agencies. In June 1995, when his group seized a hospital in the town of Budenovsk, in the Stavropol *krai*, Basayev demanded that Moscow start peace talks with Dzhokhar Dudaev. After several unsuccessful attempts to storm the hospital, the Russian government announced a cease-fire in Chechnya. Basayev released the hostages and returned home as a national hero (Aliev and Zhadaev: 2005).

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<sup>76</sup> On April 21 1996, the signal of his satellite telephone was taken bearing of in the area of the village of Gekhi-chu. Two Russian Su-25 planes with radio-guided rockets attacked Dudaev, one of the rockets killed him at the moment when he was talking with an MP of the Russian State Duma, Konstantin Borovoj.

Aslan Maskhadov was the most ‘pro-Moscow’ candidate, for this reason the tough-liners did not trust him.

*The Kremlin had obviously put its stakes on Maskhadov, because of that I did not trust him.*  
Shirvani, 46, Grozny

Most interviewed respondents from among former combatants and radical separatist shared this view. Many respondents remembered the 1997 elections, which followed the Khasav Yurt agreement as a very special civic experience:

*I have cast my vote only once in my lifetime. It was that day. So many people were voting! There were queues at the polling stations. People were dancing. Everyone felt: the war was over, now we would start a new, better life’.* Tamara, 41, Grozny

The OSCE recognized the results of the elections. Maskhadov received 59% of votes, leaving all other candidates far behind. Second was Shamil Basaev, with 23. 5%. According to analysts of the Chechen newspaper “Chechenskoje obschestvo, “most people voted for Maskhadov because Basaev frightened them by his aggressive military biography, while Maskhadov was the symbol of reasonable and secular authority (Aliev and Zhadaev 2005). Moreover, Maskhadov signed the Khasavyurt agreement with Russia and many voters were looking forward to him resolving the remaining disputes with Moscow. The executive president Zelimkhan Yandarbiev got only 10%. Thus, according to the Russian scholars Malashenko and Trenin, the 1997 elections demonstrated that “most Chechens wanted to avoid a new confrontation with Russian and favored dialogue”, as well as that over 30% of the population favored the radicals. “These 30% of the electorate...soon became the core fighting force of the anti-Maskhadov opposition” (Malashenko and Trenin 2004:30)

Turn out for parliamentary vote was low, the elections to the legislative assembly took place in two rounds<sup>77</sup>, and even then only 32 MPs out of 63 constituencies received a due number of votes, so that the Central Electoral Committee of the Chechen Republic Ichkeria had to review

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<sup>77</sup> The second one was organized on February 15 1997

its decision and confirm the mandates of MPs in another 11 constituencies, thus creating a parliament of 43 seats.

Maskhadov swore in as the new President on February 12, 1997. According to the Constitution of the Chechen Republic he was also the head of the Cabinet of Ministers, the commander in-chief and the Chair of the Supreme Council with the President of the Chechen Republic.

Maskhadov's choice of ministers clearly shows his priority to accommodate interests, avoid fragmentation within the separatist elite and share power with former field commanders. Thus, all of Maskhadov's main political rivals were invited into the government – Shamil Basaev and Movladi Udygov became the first Vice-Premiers of the government<sup>78</sup>. Other two prominent commanders were appointed vice-prime ministers - for construction (Ruslan Gelaev), and social issues (Islam Khalimov). Maskhadov put field commanders or former members of Dudaev's government in charge of Ministries and governmental departments, Supreme Presidential Council, Security Council and the Presidential administration (Muzaev 1997).

At the same time Maskhadov realized the importance of experienced cadres, therefore he also invited former pro-Russian managers, which his more radical colleagues perceived as “rehabilitation of communists”. The Ministries of Energy, Labour and Social Issues, Road construction, residential property as well as the Departments of State Property, at the National Bank were headed by representatives of the «old» bureaucracy (Muzaev 1997). Thus, the political elite in 1997 were selected on the basis of personal achievement, primarily in the military effort or in their adherence to the idea of independent Chechen statehood. No teip, vird, or kin affiliations played a role.

The main fraction in the parliament were the MPs of the pro-Maskhadov party of national independence (over 20 MPs), second was the fraction of the Union of political forces “Islamic order” – 7 MPs (Lukin 2007). Both the Chair of Parliament and his deputy were former field commanders. The Chair of the parliament Alikhadzhiev was elected with the support of

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<sup>78</sup> Basaev responsible for industry and Udygov for information, press, and negotiations with Russia

Makhadov's allies (39 votes out of 42). Thus, Makhadov's position in the legislative assembly was strong and the parliament supported him on most issues throughout 1997-1999.

Maskhadov gave enough real power to all his former comrades, which should have satisfied everyone and cemented the political regime. One can speculate whether this was the right choice -staffing the institutions with former combatants, who usually had no due education, experience or knowledge of government was clearly risky. One can also wonder whether Maskhadov had a choice not to include them. Probably for Maskhadov, it was the only rational choice to keep them all under the auspices of his government than to have them outside the political system.

### 6.3. Regime challengers: formal opposition, informal groups

Despite Maskhadov's efforts, tensions between field commanders were increasingly hard to conceal. The first one to openly challenge the regime was one of his rivals in the presidential campaign -Salman Raduev, a former prefect of the second largest town of Gudermes, then the commander of the presidential guard "Presidential Berets" in 1993-1996, who married Dudaev's niece. On January 9, 1996 he repeated a terrorist act committed by Shamil Basaev- attacked a military base and airport in the Dagestani town of Kyzlyar and when retreating took hold of a local hospital, demanding a safe corridor to Chechnya. After Dzhokhar's death, Raduev considered himself to be a logical successor to his relative, he renamed his group - the "Army of General Dudaev", rejected the results of the elections, refused to accept the legitimacy of Maskhadov and went into open confrontation with him. Raduev had well armed military bases in the town of Gudermes and in Staropromyslovsky district of Grozny.

The real political challenger to Maskhadov was not Raduev, however, who was popularly perceived as a rascal, but the charismatic radical Shamil Basaev, who lost elections to Maskhadov and received his defeat very painfully. Basaev, however, was strategic enough not to oppose Maskhadov immediately after the elections.

The third challenger was Zelimkhan Yandarbiev, the executive President after Dudaev's murder, who was also very much looking forward to dropping the word "executive" from

his title. After the elections, Yandarbiev took a break and went on a several months long trip to the Muslim countries (probably to raise funds).

Other Chechen commanders allied with one actor or another, but many kept their own armed groups, despite Maskhadov's attempts to dissolve them after the war. Basaev's and Raduev's forces were major military formations, well trained and experienced in audacious military operations. Both groups together could militarily compete with the state armed forces. Maskhadov himself, did not have a personal paramilitary group, was relying on state security structures and a small number of faithful personal guards.

Apart from paramilitary groups the above mentioned political challengers set up formal political organizations to represent their interests in the public sphere. "Public-political movements" were established which functioned as one-leader political parties, and had their own printed organs-newspapers.

In 1997 Shamil Basaev, founded a radical separatist party- "Marshonan Toba" – The way to freedom. In June 1998 following his failure as Prime-Minister Basaev organized a permanent "Congress of the Peoples of Chechnya and Dagestan" with himself as its chair (Malashenko, Trenin 2004:34). Salman Raduev- created a military-patriotic organization "Soldiers of Freedom" and later- "the Caucasian house" (Muzaev 1997). The former executive President of Chechnya Zelimkhan Yandarbiev was elected the emir of the Organization for Islamic Unity of the Caucasus in June 1998. The President also formed a public movement "Chechen Islamic state", which supported him as the head of the state and called for additional credentials for the executive (Muzaev 1997)

The newspapers "Kavkazskaya konfederatsiya" [Caucasian Confederation] (Yandarbiev), Marshanan Az (Raduev, Basaev), "Put Dzokhara" [Way of Dzhokhar] (Raduev), "Put Islama" [Way of Islam] and "Islamskaya natsiya" [Islamic Nation] (Udugov), "Velikij Dzikhad" [The Great Dzikhad] (Gelaev), were in opposition to Maskhadov.

Official newspapers Ichkeria (the organ of Chechen government), and Zashitnik Otechestva [Defender of Fatherland] (organ of Ministry of Defense) supported Maskhadov, as well as the independent newspapers “Groznsky rabochij” [Worker from Grozny], and “Golos Chechenskoj Respubliki. [Voice of Chechen-Ingushetia]. Publications in these newspapers will be quoted in the upcoming section.

Thus, all Chechen challengers were in official (formal) political opposition to Maskhadov, but their real strength was in their informal paramilitary capacities.

The ideological divisions between Maskhadov’s supporters and his opponents were the attitude to Islam, foreign and domestic policy. Domestically, all opposition leaders were pushing for an Islamic state and for enforcing Islamic mores. If Maskhadov was investing much hope in privatization as a mechanism for the revival of Chechen economy, the opposition was very cautious and argued that there was a high probability for it to be carried out in the interests of specific groups, not the entire population. At the same time the opposition leaders did everything to pursue an “informal privatization” or the naked capture of state property by criminal groups. Maskhadov was focused on combating organized crime domestically, while the opposition called to combat spies and “collaborators of the occupation regime”. The opposition was very sensitive to any criticism of the *sharia* judges.

In foreign policy, the opposition blamed Maskhadov for an inadequate reaction to ‘the cynical and insulting campaign against the Chechen state organized by Russia’, and demanded to settle the remaining issues with Russia as soon as possible in favor of a full independence of Chechnya. The opposition demanded to introduce Chechen passports, customs at the borders with Russia, Chechen registration plates for vehicles. Maskhadov’s challengers were unhappy about the lack of the government’s reaction to the world geopolitical processes. They called for interference in Dagestani political processes on the side of the Islamist leaders, and for a more outspoken anti-Western position in international affairs.



There were two groups of “aliens” in addition to these “indigenous” challengers who were hosted by the Chechen radicals and played a prominent role in the state-building project of 1997-1999. These were the fundamentalist Islamic leaders – the international Jihadist Khattab, who supported financially, logistically and militarily the spread of fundamentalism in Chechnya, and the Dagestani Muslim scholar Bahhaudin Muhammad (Kebedov), who provided the ideological support and training to the fundamentalists and inspired the transformation of Chechnya into an Islamic state. Both men had their own armed groups.

Khattab, a Saudi citizen, fought USSR in Afghanistan, then joined the Islamists in conflict in the Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. In December 1994, he learnt about Chechnya from a CNN reportage and already in January 1995 arrived in Grozny with a group of Arab supporters. Khattab brought with him the structure, skills and most importantly the financial support of international Jihadists. He organized stable financial inflows of weapons, ammunition, training and supplies. As a professional guerrilla, with a masterful command of all types of infantry arms, land mining, mine clearing and mountain warfare, he trained future combatants. In 1995-1996 Khattab carried out a number of successful military operations,<sup>79</sup> which impressed Chechen field commanders, but according to my respondents among former combatants, Dudaev, who was a consistent opponent of Islamism “kept him quiet”. However, when the Russian security services killed Dudaev on April 21, 1996 his deputy Zelimkhan Yandarbiev, had already been under a strong influence of the fundamentalists. In 1996 Yandarbiev introduced *sharia* courts in Chechnya and gave the Islamists political prominence.

Shamil Basaev as a military strategist also realized the organizational benefits of the fundamentalist structures and the efficiency of their mechanisms for generating support among the youth. He became close to Khattab who channeled financial support to his group. In 1996 Khattab

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<sup>79</sup> most infamous one being the April 1996 operation near the village of Yarysh-Mardy, where in 3 hours he destroyed a military convoy of federal the 245 motor-rifle regiment, killing 95 federal servicemen, injuring 54, and destroying all the military vehicles. The operation was cunningly planned: federal convoy comprised of heavy armored military vehicles was caught on a narrow mountainous road, with steep mountains on the one side and abyss on the other. Chechen fighters led by Khattab attacked the head and the tail of the convoy, set on fire the vehicles on both ends, killed the commander in the first minutes of the operation, and then destroyed the rest in between, who were unable to move, being blocked by burning vehicles on both sides.

married a Dargin woman from an Islamist enclave of Dagestan and settled in Basaev's native village of Vedenov.

In 1996 with the help of Basaev, the foreign Jihadists Khattab and Abu Fatqh founded the training Center "Kavkaz" in the former *pioneer* camps near the village of Serzen-Yurt, in the Shali region of Chechnya. In almost three years the centre was attended by thousands of young people from the region. The teachers and instructors in the camp were mostly foreigners, according to my respondents; they were accompanied by Dagestani translators from Arabic. Each camp had a specialized program offering ideological training by studying of Koran, training in explosives and terrorist actions in the rear of the enemy, training in heavy artillery weapons, methods of guerrilla war. The training cycle took six month. The camp could reportedly take in from 1,000 to 2,000 people at a time. Thus, due to Khattab thousands of young people got access to a rather sophisticated and advanced ideological and military training in international Jihad, most of them became bearers of the fundamentalist ideology and some, indeed, turned terrorists.

Different people attended the camp –from rather secular intellectuals, who joined out of curiosity or perhaps to learn something new about Islam, to radicals who joined with a clear agenda to become fighters. But most of the trainees attendees were idle, bored youngsters, for whom it was an adventure of a "zarnitsa"<sup>80</sup> type, a free of charge vacation. Going to training was a sign of manliness and raised a young man's status among his peers. One of my Ingush colleagues, a totally secular intellectual, said that at the time he planned to go as well, but to be enrolled he had to quit smoking that is why he reconsidered it. Another respondent said that he went to learn about Islam, and after the camp he was very much looking forward to war. The existence of Center "Kavkaz" played a prominent role in the strengthening of fundamentalist Islam in the North Caucasus and engaged in military-political struggle many of those who were otherwise disinterested in politics.

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<sup>80</sup> A sport – and –military game in the USSR. It was an imitation of military action, similar to military training. These games were part of military education at schools.

Below are two interviews with the attendees of the camp, one of whom fought in both wars, the other, a former communist party member, became a strongly “anti-Wahhabi” deputy chief editor of a regional newspaper “Gumsi”:

*I was in the training camp of Khattab. There were up to 1,000 guys at the time... Everything was free of charge.*

*There were Bashkirs, Uzbeks, Tatars, Tajiks, Ingush, Kabardines, Ossetians, Afghans, and Englishmen there. There was also one black guy, a professional runner. He only knew English and Arabic, he came to fight. There was one guy from Bosnia, without legs, these were some real fighters there; they were wanted by all security services in the world. We were divided in Jamaats- there were Ingush, Kabardine Jamaats, the two latter were very united... After training in the first camp, the best were selected and transferred to the military camp. Guys from Russia were taught mining, explosives and the like... This was real military training, these people knew that there would be another war, they were preparing... They showed us videos of Kashmir, Palestine. I was shocked. Although now I think it was brainwashing... And there was no power in Chechnya, which could approach this camp and bark at them.*

*All the taxi drivers knew the way to the camp. We were passing checkpoints and the military servicemen knew where we were going. It was impossible not to know about this camp. But it was dangerous to touch us. Zelim, former combatant*

*After the first war we were in Serzhen-Yurt. We thought this was the place where people worshiped God. The first week some Jordanian was lecturing. Gradually I started to feel tension; I saw people's eyes turning bloodshot. I thought this was some kind of hypnosis, they often repeated words – war, blood, murder. Then I told my friend- “something is wrong with this place” and we left. Khavas Akbiev, deputy chief-editor, newspaper “Gums.”*

Fundamentalist influences came not only from Khattab and the Arab Jihadists he brought with him, but also from Dagestan. In the 1990s the Dagestani fundamentalist scholar Bahhaudin Muhammad founded a madrasah at the border of Dagestan and Chechnya which was attended by around 700 students, both Dagestanis and Chechens (Akaev 2006). In 1997, when the authorities of Dagestan managed to crash many of the fundamentalist centers on its territory, Bahhaudin Muhammad and his supporters with the families performed *hijra* (migration) to Chechnya where they were allowed to settle in the formerly pro-Russian opposition town of Urus-Martan (Akaev 2006). Bahhaudin trained judges for the Chechen sharia court.

Both Khattab and Bahhaudin Muhammad interfered in Chechen politics from behind the scenes. Knowing the ambitions of Chechen leaders, they never voiced any personal interest in gaining political power. However, they consistently and forcefully pushed for an Islamic state, for more aggressive behavior towards Russia and the West, for all- Caucasian and international Jihad.

Both leaders regularly gave interviews to Chechen newspapers, most frequently to the pro-fundamentalist newspapers “Islamskij poryadok” or “Al-Kaf” (the latter was sponsored by Khattab). In various interviews Khattab reiterated that his main life credo was Jihad, which was an obligation of every Muslim, he reiterated that he did not believe in the end of war in the Caucasus and called to prepare for another war (IGPI 1998-1999).

Bahhaudin Muhammad and Khattab launched an offensive on Sufism in Chechnya. There was no law other than the sharia and the Koran was the Constitution. Nationalism was their foe. These latter theses were hard to accept by the majority of the population. Maskhadov and his supporters tried to curb the anti-nationalist claims of Islamists. Thus, Maskhadov’s close ally Lecha Khultygov, the Director of the National Security Service, announced in January 1998 that the propaganda of the “wahhabists” directly contradicted the national traditions of Chechens, he condemned the enforcement of an “Arab lifestyle” and feared that “the replacement of national tradition by the Islamic ones” will eliminate the distinct Chechen nation (Muzaev 06.1998). Maskhadov in the midst of his latest political crisis declared that “Chechnya is for the Chechens. We do not need...Arab advisors” (in Muzaev 06.1998).

The military formation of fundamentalists called “Jamaat” was a very well trained and organized combat-ready group. Some hostages taken for ransom were found on their bases. Dagestani policemen released from captivity in Urus-Martan claimed that the fundamentalists dug trenches and were preparing for the attack of the Presidential troops. My respondents from Serzhen’ Yurt claimed that they lived in constant fear of armed clashes between Khattab and Maskhadov.

All the Chechen challengers of the Maskhadov administration resorted to Islamist rhetoric, but they were allied to fundamentalists, rather than converts. Demanding more Islam in the state was instrumental to a number of political ends. In the conditions of the post-war chaos calling for religious purity and strict adherence to Islam was a handy moral position, which allowed boosting one’s own stand and discrediting one’s rivals. Thus, Salman Raduev in an interview to the analytical magazine “Ogonek” in 1997 blamed Maskhadov for fighting for power, while he

claimed that he fought for Islam. “I am a man of deep religious convictions, I do not drink or smoke“ (Belovetsky 1997). According to Ogonek, all funds from the Global Islamic forum came through him. Maskhadov officially appealed to the Muslim countries not to finance Raduev (Belovetsky 1997).

Zelimkhan Yandarbiev also openly acknowledged the instrumental value of financial support from the Islamic funds. In an interview to the *Vremya Novostey* in December 2001, Yandarbiev said: “Islamic fundamentalism is not dangerous. It is partnership, international relations. You do not consider it a problem if Western investors tour Russia, do you? One cannot divide help into help from Wahhabists and help from others” (Yandarbiev 2001).

The last journalist to interview Shamil Basaev before he was assassinated in 2006 was the Radio Free Europe reporter Andrej Babitsky. In an interview to the Russian Newsweek Babitsky said that he was surprised that Basaev had not transformed into a complete Wahhabite and he claimed that for him religious motifs were secondary – he fought a national liberation war (Babitsky 2005)

However, for young people who followed these opposition leaders, who went through the training camps of Khattab, Islamism was already in earnest. It was part of their life, which many of them sacrificed during the Second war, brought about the failure of the 1997-1999 state building project.

#### 6.4. State-building policies 1997-1999

##### 6.4.1. Economy

The main problems of the republican economy in 1997-1999 was the dramatic decay in the oil industry and the lack of cash. In 1997 the gross domestic product amounted to 2 bln rubles (instead of the expected 5 bln) and in 1998 - to 1. 6 bln (instead of the expected 7 bln) (Groznsky rabochij 10-16 June 1999). As a result Chechnya under-produced goods for 8,4 bln

rubles, which had a negative impact on financing its state sector, the education, the healthcare, the infrastructure, security, the law-enforcement agencies and the military.

Most economic activity was concentrated in small private businesses – food stands, small cafes, shops, gasoline stations, selling crude oil products at the roadsides. Many of the field commanders turned their groups into military-economic units, which engaged in larger-scale illegal economic activity, including illegal oil extraction and hostage-taking for ransom. The radical opposition to Maskhadov was against the official privatization of property, claiming that it would benefit just part of society at the expense of the majority. At the same time with their consent and involvement, de facto privatization of state property by criminal groups resulted in squander of national treasures of the Chechen republic.

The following sections will analyze the efforts of the Chechen government to manage the economy in 1997-1999.

#### 6.4.2. Budget and tax collection

In the economic program of Maskhadov's administration, the oil industry was strategized as the main source for replenishing the state budget. The second profit generating budget line was taxes from legal entities (Ichkeria: 1998, № 13 June-July). The government did not expect much from individual tax payers and by 1998 stopped collecting taxes from individuals. In compliance with the Khasavyurt Accords, the state budget of Ichkeria was also filled with the financial inflows from Russia. Moscow was taking part of the responsibility for the state-employed sector and pensioners, and had to finance reconstruction projects. Moreover, Russia paid Chechnya for the transportation of oil along the Chechen part of the Baku-Novorossiysk pipeline to cover the costs of maintenance and ensure the security of the pipe.

Nonetheless, soon after the peace treaty Russia imposed an unofficial economic siege on Chechnya. Moscow paid its part irregularly, partially and with delays. In late 1998 the Russian transfers deducted the Chechen debt for electricity supplies.

The problems with internal sources for replenishing the state budget were linked with the deep crisis in oil industry, the decay in the other spheres of economic production, and tax evasion.

Since 1997 the Chechen oil industry gradually transformed from a profit –generating sector to a damage-inflicting one (IGPI 10/1997). The Chechen government had to spend on the maintenance of the pipes and equipment, put out fires caused by criminals who illegally extracted oil neglecting safety measures, invested enormous effort in securing the pipes, but the profits from the industry were shrinking month by the month.

The general economic decay put most of the enterprises at the edge of bankruptcy; the industry and businesses were simply unable to pay taxes. The burden of post-war reconstruction of premises and equipment, the necessity to ensure security significantly raised the costs of production. A large number of tax exemptions generously adopted by the Chechen parliament, which were often applied not only to those eligible, also significantly decreased the state capacity to collect dues. In the post-war economy, when everyone was short of cash, many enterprises practiced barter deals, profits often were paid in kind, and financial transaction were carried out in cash bypassing bank accounts. The President and Parliament tried to enforce the governmental “Resolution on Incassation” of July 24, 1997 with little success (Ichkeria: 1998, 18 January). In fact, the government, which was unable to support the industry, had to tolerate barter.

The tax police checked only those enterprises which were registered. However, most of the Chechen economic activity was a “shadow” one. Hundreds of enterprises and private businesses were not registered with the tax department, including some major firms. Muzaev quotes the results of check ups carried out in October 1997, which revealed 54 major construction firms, carrying out reconstruction of state objects being unregistered with tax service of the Chechen Republic. Armed groups who controlled businesses and enterprises also prevented tax collection (Muzaev 10/1997).

Since mid 1998 oil revenues reached the republican budget in very small amounts. Representatives of Russia and Ichkeria negotiated a 2 bln ruble Russian contribution to the Chechen budget in 1999. However, the Russian State Duma approved only 240,000, while the Federative Assembly ruled to stop all financial transfers to Chechnya (Ichkeria 1999, March-April).

#### 6.4.3. Industry

As quoted above, 80% of the republican economy was destroyed during the war (Tishkov 1998). Industrial enterprises were mostly closed. Several factories survived but changed their specialization. Most successful were furniture factories which used their industrial capacities for 10-15% (Tishkov 1998:65). The former major factory “Elektropribor” which before the war produced electrographic equipment converted to producing forms for baking bread and cap lids for jars and clothes-pegs (Tishkov 1998:439). The Grozny radio-technical factory “Sintar” converted to producing plastic boxes for storage, baskets for preserving vegetables and metal items. The workers received their salaries in the produce of the factory (IGPI 06/1998).

In the first three months of 1998 the industrial output decreased dramatically by 60% compared to the same time period in 1997 as a result of the lack of funds for reconstruction and the lack of raw materials. But already in June 1998 the Grozny factory of iron-concrete products was relaunched at a new concrete factory, which was opened in the village of Novy Sharoy. A flour mill and sugar factories and a large battery farm were reconstructed in 1998. Over 3,000 additional work places were created as a result of the re-launching these factories (IGPI 1998:06). The reconstruction of the cement factory in Chiri-Yurt was financed by the Russian government. In 1999 17 out of 44 major industrial enterprises were functioning, but their output constituted 5-8% of the pre-war production (Tishkov 2001:439).

President Maskhadov had great hope in the privatization of the industry, which to his mind was the only realistic mechanism to revive the Chechen economy. The state was unable to support



the enterprises in restoring their pre-war capacities. Thus, private owners had to come in. Discussions over privatization started in the summer of 1997 and became among main source of contention between Maskhadov's supporters and the radical opposition, and although the first privatization projects were announced in the summer of 1998, the official privatization process never started in earnest.

Since the oil industry seemed the easiest way to generate revenue, Maskhadov's government held it as a high priority and invested systematic efforts to enforce order in the processing, realization and transportation of oil.

War inflicted damages to oil pipes in Chechnya of estimated 340 bln rubles. The largest processing factories in the capital Grozny were bombed out. Oil was mainly extracted from fountain wells, because the pumping equipment was out of order- marauders stole the electric equipment and cables during the war.

Since 1996 the main damage to the transportation of oil was inflicted by illegal in-cuts in the pipeline for stealing oil and oil products. Between February and August 1997, over 130 such cuts were registered with over 30,000 tons of oil stolen (Groznsky Rabochij, 28 October 1997). Oil products were stolen directly from the pipes or from the oil processing factories. The security companies were accomplices in these thefts.

Private gasoline stations and stands for selling illegally extracted petroleum products mushroomed. The authorities repeatedly banned such trade, but in vain. Illegal gasoline suppliers sold fuel cheaper than registered gasoline stations. In the first six months of 1998 the state-owned gasoline stations sales dropped tenfold compared to the same period in 1997. (IGPI 06/1998).

In December 1998 the oil processing enterprises stopped functioning due to the mass theft of oil. Five to six new in-cuts into the oil pipeline occurred each day. Thus, a 2, 850 meter long pipeline from the oil base #2 to the Lenin oil processing factory had over 300 in-cuts. The pipeline was

divided into sectors, controlled by armed groups; just a small portion of oil actually reached the processing factories. In April 1999 the managers of the Chechen oil industry asked the government to introduce a military regime in the oil industry (Muzaev: 04/1999). Since July 1999 Chechen consumers felt shortage in fuel in the gasoline stations. By then most of the gasoline stations had been importing their fuel from outside the republic, since Chechnya was no more able to satisfy domestic fuel demand (Groznsky rabochij 28 July-3 August 1999). Since June 1999 transportation of Azeri oil via Chechnya was stopped, too.

#### 6.4.4. Agriculture

The most stable economic sector in 1997-1999 was private farming. The association of private farmers of the Chechen Republic Ichkeria numbered 1,445 registered farms, and the share of private farming in the agricultural output of Chechnya was steadily growing. In 1997 the state agricultural enterprises in Chechnya numbered 59 state farms, however, the state-owned cattle was consumed during the war, the buildings of state farms were dismantled by the local residents and used as construction materials. The cycle of land cultivation was not observed in the majority of farms, state agricultural enterprises were supplied with fertilizers and pesticides by 35-40%, the chemical weeding was carried out by 40%, and the enterprises lacked in fuel, agricultural machinery and qualified staff. As a result of lack of spares in 6 state farms only 58 out of 119 tractors, 35 trucks out of 83, and 16 combines out of 23 were functioning (Ichkeria June-July 1998).

The government agricultural policy was to annually create republican coordinating centers aimed at assisting private and state agricultural enterprises. The headquarters “Crop-98”, “Crop-99” coordinated efforts aimed at providing farmers with seeds, fuels, spares for tractors, using the existing limited funds, barter options, securing humanitarian assistance. Heads of the local administrations were concerned that agricultural machinery was increasingly out of order or stolen and land had to be cultivated “the forefather’s ways” – with oxen yoked in plough. As a

result of the lack of machinery and labor force fields remained uncultivated. Cattle-breeding, a traditional industry of the mountains experienced difficult times – almost all veterinary doctors left the mountain villages, which caused loss of cattle because of the disease (Groznsky rabochij, # 20, Grozny 1999, May 27-June 2).

#### 6.4.5. Education and healthcare

According to the Annual Report of the Institute of Ethnology of the Russian Academy of Sciences, all central republican medical clinics, over 20 municipal hospitals and polyclinics, 83 educational institutions (university buildings, schools, kindergartens, vocational schools) were destroyed completely, 321 partly, 157,000 people injured and mutilated as a result of bombing (Tishkov 1998).

Lack of funds in the state budget affected most seriously the educational system. The government was unable to rebuild schools, thus in many villages children studied in refugee wagons. The UNHCR had large scale reconstruction programs, to restore schools and medical facilities in the villages, including in the mountains. In 1997 alone, the UNHCR spent 2mln USD for reconstruction in Chechnya (Groznsky rabochij January 4-11, 1998), but they could not manage more than 20 villages.

Salaries to 13, 665 Chechen teachers were not paid for months unless transfers arrived from Moscow. The Chechen government tried to compensate teachers as much as they could. Thus, in October 1997 the teachers received part of their salary in sugar produced by the now partly functioning sugar factory (IGPI 10/1997). The teachers planned to organize protest rallies in October 1998, however, postponed their action because of the acute political crisis in the republic, when some of the field commanders demanded Maskhadov's resignation. According to Tishkov, the teachers did not want to appear as supporters of the radical military groups (Tishkov 1998).

The state educational policy in 1997-1999 was mainly focused on the Islamization of the education process, minimizing the school curriculum, and reducing the number of educational establishments. Thus, in January 1998 a number of subjects were temporarily excluded from the school curriculum for the sake of economy, such as musical education, drawing, sketching, physical training, and a number of other subjects. New mandatory subjects were introduced by the Ministry of Education - Arabic, introduction to Islam, Chechen ethics, introduction to sharia and civil law. Islamic subjects were taught from elementary school, where tuition was to be carried out in the Chechen language. The government developed an Islamic dress code for school children and was working towards separating female and male students.

In July 1998 the government decided to close the Chechen Pedagogical Institute as duplicating the Chechen State University and to transfer its material values and staff to the University. At the university 5 departments and 36 sub-departments (kafedras) were closed and staff reduced by 1443 people. About 30% of vocational schools were reduced by a decision of the government (IGPI 06/1998). According to my respondents employed in education at that time, about 1/3 of teachers had higher education. Education suffered from brain drain inflicted by the mass outflow of qualified personnel. Thus the strategic task was to replace the missing people with the newly educated ones. Professors at the Pedagogical Institute tried to explain this to the Chechen Government; nevertheless, the policy to cut on education expenditure was implemented.

Mountain villages suffered most. Teachers moved into the plain seeking alternative employment. Heating systems at schools were out of order, which made classes in the fall and the winter almost impossible to study in. Lack of income in families left children without warm clothes and textbooks. Each class (20-30 students) had to share 2-3 copies of the textbooks. In Vedeno region all of the 32 schools were closed as a result of lack of funds for heating and paying salaries for the teachers. In other schools of the republic classes took place once or twice a week and lessons were reduced to 20-30 minutes (Groznsky rabochij 3-9 December, 1998). Eventually parents started to collect money to pay teachers themselves. By May 1999 secondary

education became fee-paying, with a strict government provision that no child could be excluded from educational process if his parents were unable to pay (Muzaev 06/1999).

While the secular educational system was in deep crisis, the authorities supported the creation of religious educational institutions: the Islamic institute in Kurchaloy educated 400 students. Branches of the institute were open in 8 other settlements of Chechnya. The Grozny Islamic center established courses for children aged 10-13, where they could study Arabic, learn to read and translate the Koran. These educational opportunities were free of charge (Golos Chechenskoj Respubliki June 28 1998).

The 1994-1996 war had a tremendous detrimental impact on the health of the state of health of the population and the republican healthcare. After the war, some of the hospitals were seized by military groups. Thus, the republican tuberculosis hospital was occupied by *Sharia* battalion, while the T.B. prophylactic centre was unable to satisfy the needs of the population on its own. In 1998 TB cases doubled compared to 1994, and mortality from TB- tripled (IGPI 01/ 1998).

Central maternity house in Grozny was hit by bombs and required reconstruction.

In the years 1997-1998 Chechnya experienced a post-war baby boom. Due to the lack of funds, 50% of newly born children left maternity houses without vaccinations in 1996-1997 (IGPI 07/1998). In 1998 the Ministry of Healthcare adopted a special state program “Children of Chechnya” aimed at the medical and psychological rehabilitation of children. The program, however, had no financial support to implement it.

Failing state had immediate impact on the health of the citizens, particularly in the urban centres. The decay of state services, and the deteriorating sanitary conditions resulted in the dramatic growth of acute intestine infections, which in 1997 increased by 43% compared to 1996. Experts attributed this development to the lack of equipment for purifying and chlorination of water, the pollution of water and soils by numerous illegal oil processing enterprises, the unsatisfactory conditions of the sewage system, and the uncontrolled sales of food (IGPI: 06/1998). The government tried to control the pharmaceutical supplies in the republic. The Ministry of Sharia

State Security, and the Prosecutor's office controlled the legality and licensing of all medications sold in the Chechen republic (Kavkazskaya Khronika July 1998). No major problems caused by the quality of pharmaceuticals occurred in 1997-1999.

By 1999 the immense pollution caused by illegal oil extraction and processing resulted in the increase of respiratory diseases, which made up 77% of all illnesses in the republic. (Groznsky rabochij July 28-August 3 1999). The expectancy of cancer rose from 30 to 40% in 1995-1998 (Muzaev: 07/1998).

The healthcare system was practically destroyed in the mountain villages. Most of village ambulances were closed by mid 1998, and midwives and veterinary doctors quit their jobs. (Groznsky rabochij October 28 1997).

No clear government healthcare policy could be traced from the available sources, except for the high priority which the government gave to the treatment former combatants. The Ministry of Health allocated funds and used their connections to send groups of former fighters to Arab countries and Azerbaijan for treatment and the prosthesis. "Support", a special State foundation for participants of the Russo-Chechen war, was set up to solve the health and employment problems of veterans, including the creation of collective farms for former fighters (IGPI 10/1997). In the situation of high unemployment, the government found it important that field commanders helped their subordinates find employment and return to peaceful life (IGPI 10/1997). In other words the government delegated some of its functions to the field commanders, who felt economically responsible for their rank-and-file during peacetime. According to Tamara Elbuzdukaeva, former head of history department at Chechen State University, combatants were enrolled to the university without exams and created serious disciplinary problems in the educational process (interview 2005).

#### 6.4.6. The armed forces

The official armed forces of the republic included the National Guard, the Anti-Terrorist center, and the military units of the Ministry of defense, all of which were subordinated directly to the

President of the Chechen Republic. There were also units of the Ministry of State Sharia defense (the sharia guard, the Islamic regiment), the national security service, and the state frontier-customs troops (Tishkov 1998). The armed forces of the Chechen Republic Ichkeria included 53 generals, one general per 300 officers (Muzaev, 12/1998).

In March-June 1997 Maskhadov tried to reorganize the command and the structure of the armed forces. On March 13, he founded the National guard, numbering 2000 people which was supposed to be the only regular armed unit (Muzaev 1997). In May 1997 Maskhadov abolished the headquarters of the wartime fronts, which functioned during the war, organized a system of military bases of the Chechen armed forces and adopted the Statute of Armed forces (Muzaev 1997). In November 1997 the parliament adopted the Law “On weapons”, aimed at controlling the dissemination of guns. Nonetheless, a huge market of arms functioned in the center of Grozny. The demilitarization of the population had never happened. In fact, the field commanders ignored Maskhadov’s reorganization efforts and orders to the demilitarize groups. The groups remained and were transformed into personal guard of field commanders, local police, or private security firms (Muzaev 1997)

#### 6.4.7. Law-enforcement and capacity to maintain order

Criminality was the main problem of the Chechen state in 1997-1999. According to the official statistics, crime went up to 60-70 crimes per week, including 1-8 murders. In the first 6 months of 1998 130 murders, 66 abductions for ransom and 137 burglaries were committed in Chechnya (Tishkov 2001: 67). Theft of oil, and illegal capture of property paralyzed the industry to such an extent that the oil rich republic started to import fuel for domestic needs and state-farms were not able to fill the tanks of their tractors. Hostage-taking and killings of hostages inflicted irreparable damage to the Chechen cause. Fraud with residential property, and killings of non-Chechens in order to capture their flats, created another exodus of the non-Chechen population from the republic.

All the political forces recognized the need to curb criminality was crucial to the very existence of the Chechen state. However, the sources of this social evil were perceived differently by the supporters of President Maskhadov and the radical opposition. Maskhadov's team recognized that crime was a domestic problem of the Chechen state and regarded the illegal armed groups and criminal gangs to be a main disrupting force for Chechen statehood, while the opposition regarded flourishing crime to be a result of espionage and collaboration by part of the population with Russia. They put high priority on purging the republic from spies and collaborators, pushed for the adoption of law on lustration and demanded to strengthen counter-intelligence work. The first Director of the National Security Service (*Sluzhba natsionalnoj bezopasnosti* - SNB), an agency responsible for combat of high profile organized crime, field commander Abu Movsaev was a close friend and ally of Shamil Basaev, and adhered to the latter view. His agency was manned by ex-combatants, many of whom had dubious and even criminal past. They covered or sometimes participated in illegal activities.

In July 1997, Movsaev had to resign and was replaced by Maskhadov's close supporter, Lecha Khultygov, a general of war, and a tough line combatant on crime, among the strongest figures of Maskhadov's inner circle. Khultygov was the first to declare war on crime and call ex-combatants involved in illegal activities- enemies of the Chechen nation and state. Khultygov purged the SNB of criminal elements and introduced public executions of criminals (IGPI 06/1998). Another of the Maskhadov's close associates and tough liner on domestic crime headed the Anti-terrorist center.

President Maskhadov personally supervised law-enforcement activities, which developed in three main tracks: combat on oil theft, combat on hostage-taking, and combat on the trafficking and production of drugs.

A special commission within the law- enforcement agencies of Ichkeria was set up aimed to combat the theft of oil. The Chechen government deployed regular armed forces, the special battalion of the Department for the Security of the State and units of police to confront illegal oil



dealers. Several times in 1998-1999 Maskhadov called for former-combatant reservists to support his efforts in taming the criminal gangs.

The state policy on combat of crime involved routine measures along with special “campaigns” – raids on criminal formations which usually mobilized almost all of the republican security services.

A first round in a series of campaigns named “The Shield of Legal Order” was launched in late May 1997. The next one was carried out already in June in response to the abduction of Russian journalists – three correspondents of NTV channel and two reporters of the TV Company “VID”. Joint units of the security forces checked all vehicles in the main thoroughfares of Grozny, and searched all vacant buildings and basements, while special groups carried out checks in villages, including those high in the mountains. The journalists had not been found, but the security services released six other hostages, taken for ransom, detained three people wanted for murders and arrested several suspects in burglary and thefts (Zapodinskaya 1997 ).

Maskhadov administration was well aware that the criminal groups were linked with the main regime challengers - radical opposition groups. Small gangs had patrons among major field commanders and their larger armed formations. Thus, each round of “Shield of Order” was accompanied with attempts to dissolve major political-military armed groups. The first of such raids against organized crime coincided with Maskhadov’s decree on dissolving the “Army of Dzhokhar Dudaev” led by Raduev and another armed group regiment of special assignment troops - “Borz” (Wolf) headed by colonel Bakaev. The Prosecutor’s Office instigated a number of criminal cases against former combatants in connection with abductions and illegal violence (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, June 17 1997).

In December 1998 Chechnya was shattered by the most insolent and notorious crime of 1997-1999 the murder of four engineers of the British company “Granger Telecom”. Three Englishmen and a New Zealander arrived to Chechnya to install telecommunication equipment on the invitation of the Chechen government and were abducted on October 3. In early

December 1998 their cut off heads were found, and the Russian security services received a VHS tape, where the captured foreigners “confessed” to being British spies. This brutal crime had a wide international resonance, and was qualified by the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan as “nightmarish and inhuman” (Kommersant 12 May 2001 ). The murder of the engineers was a dramatic blow to the Chechen cause and the credibility of the incumbent government.

The results of the “Shield of Legal Order” in December 1998 were more than impressive- 596 people were detained, including 78 wanted criminals, several hostages had been released. (Groznsky rabochij 3-9 December, 24-30, December 1998).

The Chechen law-enforcement agencies were confronted with organized crime, involving large and well armed groups with significant resources. Thus, in June 1998 the Prosecutor General of the Chechen Republic Ichkeria instigated a criminal case into the illegal capture of oil wells belonging to “Grozneft” by an illegal armed group of around 200 people (IGPI 06/1998). These groups were prepared to defend their economic interests by arms, while Maskhadov was still cautious of spilling Chechen blood. As a result, his law-enforcement agencies were inefficient when confronted with aggressive armed criminals. For example in August 1998 the special battalion of the Department for the Security of the State supported by police units suffered a major defeat when it failed to gain control over two oil wells illegally captured by fundamentalist armed groups. (Golos Chechenskoj Respubliki 18, 20 August 1998). The security services limited their activity to issuing warnings and trying to regain strategic objects through negotiations with criminals.

The anti-terrorist center and the regional units of the State Sharia Security confronted the organized drug business and carried out raids to discover plantations of poppy and hemp in the Chechen mountainous and pre-mountainous areas. Hectares of narcotic fields were regularly discovered and destroyed in the forests of Chechnya (IGPI: 06/1998).

Objectively speaking, the results of the efforts of the law-enforcement agencies were quite impressive, but still insufficient to tame the crime. Security services were paralyzed by the

inability to resort to violence. By 1999 the situation started to change, and reports on armed clashes between criminal groups and police forces regularly appeared in the republican press<sup>81</sup>.

By mid 1999 Makhadov's team managed to consolidate the national and regional forces to combat crime. All the commanders of the security and law-enforcement agencies were mobilized and lived in the barracks. In the framework of another anti-criminal operation in June dozens of hostages were released.

In 1999 the Presidential administration actively involved local governments in operations against armed groups. Thus, in June 1999 Maskhadov created a Regional *Sharia* committee #1, which united officials of eastern Chechnya (4 regions), formed loyal to him sharia units in the settlements, appointed local mullahs and imams from among the non-fundamentalists (IGPI 06/1999). Similar coordinating bodies were emerging in other regions of the republic.

Some of the achievements of law-enforcement are exemplified by the statistics. According to the Prosecutor General of the Chechen Republic, in 1997 3,558 crimes were committed in Chechnya, out 3083- in 1998. In 1998 the Prosecutors office opened 3824 criminal cases, which were 825 cases less than in 1997. Some 55, 8% of the crimes were investigated in 1998, compared to 41, 8 in 1997. However, only 20, 1 % of the murders were investigated in 1998. Investigating hostage taking was even less successful (Groznsky rabochij April 1-7 1999).

#### 6.4.8. The Judicial system

In 1997-1999 Chechen judicial system was based on the Islamic law. The transition to Islamic jurisdiction happened upon the decision of the ruling elite, without the consent of the population.

The main problem of the Sharia judicial system was the low qualification of judges, which was not surprising since the republic had to almost at once staff courts at three levels with new cadres, without previous training or time for transition. Short –term courses for judges were set

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<sup>81</sup> For example, in April 1999, in an armed clash at the Anisimov Oil Processing factory, two people were killed, several more injured and 9 policemen disappeared without trace (Parlament, 1999, №2. April 12).

up, where the Dagestani fundamentalist leader Bahhaudin Muhammad trained usually young people with no background in law. Until June 1 1999 sharia courts used the criminal codes of various Muslim countries, including the Sudanese Criminal Code (Akaev, interview 2008). On June 1 the Parliament passed the Criminal Code of Ichkeria. (Muzaev 06/1999).

#### 6.5. The Political Crisis and the Government's response

The attribute “weak” is the most commonly used to characterize Maskhadov as a politician by experts, combatants and the population. I have hardly ever met Chechens (outside the incumbent government) who had very strong negative or positive feelings towards Maskhadov, but most of them characterized him as “weak.”

Maskhadov had a good reputation and was respected by various combatant groups, but unlike Dudaev, who was a recognized, unquestionable leader, he was one of many outstanding field commanders during the war and the others had a difficulty to accept his authority:

*Maskhadov as a president and as a person was a far cry from Dudaev. You know how Dudaev talked to the guys like Basaev and Gelaev? He scolded them: “You don’t fulfill the tasks! I don’t see any movement, you are giving up positions!” They all respected him, because he was clever, because he knew better. He had taught them everything they knew [in combat science - E.S.]. He was the authority to all of them. Salambek, former combatant*

*Maskhadov was a good person, but very weak. His main mistake was to become President. When the war was over, they should have united and elected one candidate [from among field commanders- E.S.], but Basaev decided to divide the people. He thought he was the national hero. I think Basaev resented that he was not elected. Khozh, former combatant*

When evaluating the success and failure of the Chechen state-building project of 1997-1999, it is important to bear in mind both the legacy of the previous conflict and the priorities set by the ruling elites. The state-building project of 1997-1999 was preceded by a very destructive war, which at the same time was victorious and produced a number of ‘national heroes’, each of whom felt that he had to be rewarded by getting a chunk of state power. The political status of the quasi-independent Chechen state was not settled. Moreover, no country had recognized its independence, so military mobilization was tolerated.

The main goal of Maskhadov's government repeatedly verbalized by him and members of his inner circle was to avoid internal schism and civil war. Maskhadov was confronted with armed groups, which captured the society and used Islam as an instrument of political struggle and fund raising. Keeping the example of Tajikistan and Afghanistan in his mind, Maskhadov was well aware that while these groups, rather than the entire society were shaping the political future of his country, a civil war between them would tear apart the entire nation, since then blood feud would come into play. Having the support of the majority of the society, Maskhadov did not make use of this support until the very end, when he felt that society's patience toward the Islamists and the criminals reached its limits. Until then he preferred to deal with his armed challengers on his own, without involving large groups of people. Maskhadov also understood that a civil war in Chechnya would be used by Russia as a pretext for the invasion. He was thus not prepared to take the responsibility for starting either the first civil war among the Chechens, or the Second Russo-Chechen war.

Thus, Maskhadov's strategy was to keep even a sham agreement between the field commanders primarily by means of concessions. He gave informal groups access to power, and by February 1999 satisfied all their political demands, including the transformation of Chechnya into an Islamic state. At the same time, he made a few tough offensives on the radical opposition –every armed challenge by the radicals was dealt with militarily, which was usually followed by political concessions, the restoration of the consensus and when the opposition felt politically defeated, he would quickly implement important state-building reforms, which they opposed - the re-organization of the army, the purging of the security services from criminals, introducing educational qualifications for policemen and judges, returning legislative credentials to the parliament, rehabilitation of Sufi tariqas.

Thus, as a politician Maskhadov was quite successful. By mid 1999 the radical opposition realized that they had not much left to gain in Chechnya and accepted his moral authority. He beat them

politically, but did not expect they would turn their eyes elsewhere and in the end attack Dagestan. As a statesman and military person Maskhadov certainly failed, being unable to create a unified social space where laws would apply, authorities be respected a working economy and state order would be in place. In what follows I analyze the main stages of the political crisis in Chechnya, which resulted in the final collapse of the Chechen state caused by the break-out of a new round of military confrontation with Russia.

As mentioned above, the radical opposition led by Salman Raduev, the commander of the paramilitary “Army of Dzhokhar Dudaev” started to challenge Maskhadov right after the elections. Raduev criticized Maskhadov for his compromises with Moscow, for including old communists in the government and for the insufficient Islamization of public life. He carried out numerous demonstrations, parades and rallies where he criticized the incumbent government, and threatened “to take action”.

In June 1997 Raduev was joined by other field commanders, who attacked Maskhadov for the “rehabilitation of collaborationists”. Radical field commanders (Basaev, Gelaev and Movsaev) left Maskhadov’s government. Just four months after the government formation, the elite consolidation was broken. At this stage the schism was ideological and limited to public criticism.

Pressure on Maskhadov continued till the end of the year and in late December 1997 he made his first serious concession to the radicals- he appointed Basaev the Prime-Minister of Chechnya, and transferred most of the executive powers to him. Basaev promised to tame crime and solve social problems. However, already by June 1998 his government failed.

The main result of Basaev’s activity as a prime-minister was the prominent advancement of Islamists values in Chechnya. By 1998 the fundamentalists started to aggressively establish Islamic norms and laws in towns and villages. Crime did not concern them, they were focused on mores:

*I had a cafe, where my wife and my relative worked. After the first war, they ran up to my office and shouted that bearded guys broke into the cafe with guns. I rushed there. They did not find*

*any alcohol. But they screamed: Who is this woman? What kind of relation do you have to her? I said- this is my wife, and this is my relative. Why are these women working here? Women are not supposed to work in places where men go to. We give you two days; unless you solve the problem we will burn your cafe.* Khavas Akbiev, deputy chief editor of newspaper “Gums”, Gudermes, Chechnya

During Basaev’s leadership, especially in the spring of 1998 the problem of hostage-taking for ransom became extremely acute. Some hostages were found in fundamentalist centers.

Moreover, the fundamentalists found quotes in Koran, which justified hostage taking of infidels for ransom.

In March Maskhadov’s Anti-terrorist Center tried to attack the fundamentalist base in Urus-Martan, but failed to either destroy the base or release hostages. In the end of May, as the situation in neighboring Dagestan was deteriorating and radicals increasingly called for military intervention on behalf of the Islamist brothers, Maskhadov took another firm stance against intervention. Moreover, two fundamentalist security Ministers had to leave his government. The supporters of the fired ministers got together and made a raid on Maskhadov’s native village of Alleroy. They harassed a few women and shot a man from Maskhadov’s teip. Government forces chased the fundamentalists and clashed with them in the town of Gudermes. Almost two thousand people participated in the fight, among them Chechens, Avars and even Arabs. The oral agreement was not to use guns, to avoid blood feud consequences. “During several hours of the most brutal fighting only one shot could be heard – Maskhadov’s guard was injured, who knocked Wahhabists off like sheaves” (Vlast 30 June1998). This was the first violent clash between groups, until this point unarmed, but massive in the number of its participants. This was a signal to the President: armed clashes were close.

After the Gudermes fight in protest against Maskhadov’s assertive measures “against the comrades in the resistance” Basaev filed his resignation. Just before that he was severely criticized in the parliament for failing as the head of the government (Muzaev 2004). This was Maskhadov’s political victory- his main challenger who had been given as much power as he wanted (accept for the Presidential status), had failed and this way lost credibility to criticize the

President especially for dealing with social problems and crime, which was the latter's most vulnerable point. After the Gudermes clash Maskhadov's forces established control over all state objects in Grozny (Muzaev 2004). Temporal peace was restored.

Following his failure as the Prime-Minister and with his heroic image rapidly fading away, Basaev became increasingly involved in Salafi political projects. In June 1998 he organized a permanent "Congress of the Peoples of Chechnya and Dagestan" with himself as its chair. The idea behind the Congress was to revive the Islamic Imamate of Imam Shamil in Dagestan and Chechnya (Malashenko and Trenin 2004:34). Clearly, Basaev's aim was to hijack the state from his rival, by creating a new political entity- union of Chechnya and Dagestan with him as a new Imam Shamil. The peak of the crisis came in mid July. On July 14-15 1998 the National guard tried to disarm fundamentalist groups in the town of Gudermes. In an ensuing clash several dozens of people were killed, and many more injured. It turned out that fighters of two governmental units – the Sharia guard and the Islamic Regiment fought on the side of the Islamists, which indicated that the fundamentalists seized a significant part of the armed forces (IGPI 07/1998). Two days later Maskhadov made his first tough public statements against the Wahhabists. He mobilized his supporters among the reservists ex-combatants and demanded that the leaders of the fundamentalists leave the republic within 24 hours. He also dissolved the Sharia Guard and the Islamic Regiment. On July 23 there was an unsuccessful attempt on Maskhadov's life, which was attributed to Islamic radicals. The Prosecutors' office summoned the leaders of the opposition for interrogation in connection with this case. The opposition (including Basaev) fearing public disgrace announced its support of Maskhadov.

In the fall Maskhadov made new concessions to opposition and agreed to adopt "The Law on Lustration" and set up honor courts for its implementation. Another political principle of Maskhadov's government was sacrificed in the name of sham consolidation.

On December 8, 1998 as the world saw the horrifying pictures of the cut heads of the four British engineers; Maskhadov mobilized again the reservists and carried out another anti-criminal



campaign. The opposition responded by terror and made attempts on the lives of several of Maskhadov's allies. Field commanders Basaev, Raduev and Israpilov appealed to the Chechen Parliament and the Sharia court demanding that Maskhadov be impeached (Malashenko and Trenin 2004:33).

Chechnya became a polyarchy. The population, including former combatants was bitterly disillusioned and frustrated:

*When the first war was over, the people, whom we, the rank-and-file, made heroes- they all received state positions. They received them according to their merit... but started to act in their own interest. The idea, for which the people had suffered, in which it had invested so much effort, was betrayed.* Ruslan, former combatant

On February, 3 1999 Maskhadov decided to overtake the slogans of the radical opposition and announced the introduction of "full sharia rule" in Chechnya and set up a special governmental commission to develop the new project of the Sharia Constitution of the Chechen Republic Ichkeria. In the Sharia state the parliament had to lose its legislative power and to act as controlling institution, while the higher legislative organ was to be the Islamic Council- *the Shura* – made up of prominent field commanders and Islamic scholars (IGPI 2/1999).

The opposition was taken by surprise and totally disarmed. Maskhadov had satisfied all their demands. Basaev immediately declared his full support of the president. However, the Khattab-sponsored fundamentalist newspaper "Al-Kaf" announced that the creation of the Shura and Islamic rule was a hypocritical political maneuver aimed to blunt the Muslim's vigilance. A few days later Basaev and his supporters made a statement that they would not join Maskhadov's Shura, and created their own Shura with Basaev as its Emir (Chair) (IGPI 2/1999).

The Parliament which had previously been very supportive of Maskhadov announced the introduction of sharia rule unconstitutional, and violating the basis of the Chechen state, it created a commission to impeach the President for violating the Constitution and his attempt to dissolve the highest legislative institution (Groznsky rabochij 25 February –3 March 1999). The parliamentarians refused to give up their legislative credentials.

As a result of this final concession to the opposition, Maskhadov both won and lost. On the one hand, he managed to show the population the real face of his challengers- it was not Islam they were fighting for, but power. On the other hand he abolished the basis of statehood which was also the basis of his legitimacy - the 1992 Chechen Constitution, the institution of direct popular vote, and secular executive power. Moreover, he further alienated his supporters- especially the Parliament which had been loyal to him throughout 1997-1998.

Nonetheless, Maskhadov still enjoyed significant support, and those who supported him understood the maneuver, and wanted him to go further in ousting the radicals. On March 15 a large rally of Maskhadov's supporters gathered in the centre of Grozny, which reportedly numbered up to 50, 000 people (IGPI: 03/1999). On March 21 and April 10 there were unsuccessful attempts on Maskhadov's life, which mobilized his supporters even further.

By April Maskhadov made two vital steps which strengthened his power. He managed to reach consensus with the parliament by returning it the legislative powers and assigning them to make cosmetic changes to the Constitution by adding quotes from the Koran and the Hadith, and he carried out a major reorganization of the security services. In addition Maskhadov started to increasingly mobilize public support. His slogans of getting rid of shameful crime and Arab advisors who destroyed the Chechen nation were resonating deeper and deeper (IGPI 03/1999). In many villages militias and public councils loyal to the President were set up, which aimed at keeping out those who contradicted the Chechen traditions, incited distemper, divided Muslims and challenged the President (Groznsky Rabochij 1-7 April 1999).

By April the activity of the opposition was finally neutralized. Even Zelimkhan Yandarbiev, the most radical ideological challenger of Maskhadov called for a compromise with the President (IGPI: April 1999).

Thus, by the summer of 1999 Maskhadov controlled most of the security services in the republic and silenced formal opposition via accommodation and achievement. He improved the quality of the security forces and the judiciary purging them, which was translated to a modest success in

taming crime. He was unable to dissolve the informal opposition combat-ready groups, to revive the economy or at least the oil industry, which would have given him resources to sustain the state sector, the infrastructure and the courts. Maskhadov as a politician won. Maskhadov as a state-builder failed.

When all demands of the opposition were finally satisfied and yet they did not achieve their main goal, namely the supreme power in the state, Basaev, Khattab and the Dagestani Islamists attacked the Tsumadinsky and Novolaksky regions of the neighboring Republic of Dagestan in August 1999 to support their “Muslim brothers” in the fight against infidels. In response, Russia started the second war in Chechnya.

All the combatants I interviewed strongly disapproved of Shamil Basaev’s excursion into Dagestan.

*This was such a terrible mistake to go to Dagestan! They gave such a tramp card to Russia! Later Shamil tried to explain himself, saying that they [Russia- E.S.] anyway planned it and they would have anyway invaded, but he was given 16-17 mln dollars to get ready for war. So in order not to loose this money he went. But I always thought, Shamil, you had to understand, that it is one thing if they attacked first and another thing if we did it! How could we expect any support to our cause after that? But he cared less. Honestly, I have never wished death to any Chechen, but when I learnt that he was killed I felt malicious joy and revenge. This man pushed our nation to the abyss. And I voted for him in 1997...* Ruslan, former combatant

*We were not able to preserve our patriotism, our victory. We defeated the Russian soldier and went home. But instead of creating and multiplying we started to destroy. That is why the second war was Allah’s punishment.* Salambek, former combatant

## 6.6. State-building and informal institutions and practices in 1997-1999

The failure of the 1997-1999 state-building projects should be attributed to the incapacity of the Chechen government led by Maskhadov to subdue the opposition and paramilitary groups, who challenged the regime, and turned the political process into a perpetual struggle for power. Criminal groups, linked with or part of these paramilitary groups squandered the state property and paralyzed the republican oil industry- the main budget forming sector of the economy. The inability to fill the budget almost destroyed the already shattered education system and healthcare,

the infrastructure, and transport. The infrastructural power of the state reduced to almost nil. Unlike the 1991-1994 state-building project, when the mountaineers did not feel the state failure as much as the residents of the plains, during the 1997-1999 the mountaineers suffered most – schools and medical institutions were closed, and land cultivation returned to the “forefather’s ways.” The *Sharia* became about the only product the state was able to deliver.

#### 6.6.1. Paramilitary groups

Paramilitary groups strongly linked or even merged with criminality was a new pattern of social integration previously unknown in Chechnya. Most of the paramilitary groups positioned themselves as formal political forces (political parties), had their printing organs (newspapers), but in essence remained armed groups. The social make up of the paramilitary groups was heterogeneous; the nature of cleavage between them was power struggle, framed as an ideological divide.

The core of many groups were former combat comrades, but gradually groups became based on personal connections, friends, relatives, co-villagers. In peacetime, their main activity was political-economic, and when it came to resource distribution, the social composition of groups changed towards more ascriptive ties.

#### 6.6.2. Religion and ideology

The emergence and vigorous dissemination of the new religious trend- fundamentalism or Salafism created a deep schism between Sufi and fundamentalist leaders, which remains very acute until now. The Islamists who dominated the public space in 1997-1999, opposed the traditional Chechen virds. Therefore the political role of the tariqas was next to nil almost until the breakout of the Second war. Only in late 1998, when the anti-fundamentalist opposition started to strengthen, did the vird leaders who felt threatened by fundamentalist attacks on their way of religious practice join. Akhmad-Khadzi-Kadyrov, the Sufi mufti of Chechnya was the most

outspoken opponent of Wahhabism since 1998. He called the fundamentalists “the enemies of Islam” and demanded their deportation from Chechnya. There were several unsuccessful attempts on the life of the mufti, which did not stop him from defending his religious convictions. Maskhadov worked with Kadyrov, but they had not become close allies. Maskhadov’s close relative told me in an interview, that the President personally did not trust Kadyrov and they were never close.

The Islamists tried to erase not only virid divisions, but also nationalism. Political nationalism, the driving force of Dudaev’s revolution, the state-building of 1994-1996 and the first Chechen war was hijacked by Islamist slogans. Maskhadov was a national Islamist, and secular nationalists did not dare to expose themselves in public space. However, the Islamists failed to eradicate national identification even among the trainees in their camp, where ethnically -based (Ingush and Kabardine) Jamaats existed. Paramilitary groups, which challenged the regime by framing their demands in Muslim discourse, were successful in the Islamization of the State, of the public sphere and of the youth.

#### 6.6.3. Regional opposition

In 1997-1999 the city of Urus-Martan again had a “special” position, but this time it was not pro-Russian, but pro-Islamist. According to my respondents, several factors were conducive to this development: 1) “The betrayal of Urus-Martan by Russia” 2) Maskhadov’s desire to control anti-separatist Urus-Martan by allowing Islamist leaders and military bases there. 3) The prosecution of the pro-Russian elites after the withdrawal of the Russian troops.

*During the war Urus-Martan maintained neutrality. Neither federal forces nor Dudaev troops entered the city because we had our own guards and defended the city. At the same time, both sides in the war perceived Urus-Martan as a safe haven, injured fighters and federal servicemen were brought here and given medical aid in the hospital. After the withdrawal of the Russian troops, Urus-Martan was taken over by Maskhadov troops. In 1996 our leader, Yusup Elmurzaev, was killed. After Urus-Martan lost its leader, people were disoriented. They were tired of combat and left alone against this armed armada. A law on lustration was passed. Everyone who worked in pro-Russian institutions was fired, including the cleaning ladies. Former oppositionists were arrested, thrown in cellars, beaten, and subjected to torture. In*

*order to protect themselves, many joined the Islamists* XX, member of local administration, Urus-Martan

My respondents remembered that the Islamist groups established themselves gradually, almost unnoticeably, but by 1997 they firmly controlled Urus-Martan. It was not possible to resist their power:

*There was a local family the Akhmadovs. They were nine brothers one of whom fought in Afghanistan and then in Abkhazia with Basaev. They joined the Islamists and invited them into the city. The Islamists set up their bases in administrative buildings, at a boarding school. Maskhadov supported their resettlement in order to control Urus-Martan from rising against the regime. The Islamists from all over the region moved here. They had money, they bought houses, they were from Dagestan, from the Arab countries. They married local girls. Then these veils, black dresses for women started ... At some point there were checkpoints at the entrances to schools, checking the dress-code... Conflicts within families occurred around the schisms between the Wahhabists and supporters of traditional Sufi Islam. Families were falling apart. People would stop talking to each other, brothers and cousins, for example. There were so many fights over this and even cases of murder. A son killed his father for not accepting Wahhabism.* XXX, journalist of a local newspaper, Urus-Martan

My respondents noted that the Islamists mostly stayed at their bases, while the population continued living their own ways, taking some basic precautions on the surface.

*We had a wedding of my nephew, a regular wedding with alcohol and all that. One of our neighbors came in and noticed that some people were drinking. When he was leaving, he said: I am going to report it to the sharia police. I said: "Go ahead, just try to do that. I'll see how you will come back and live here among us". He left, but never reported.* XXX, journalist of a local newspaper, Urus-Martan

Thus, religious cleavages divided the political elites, neighbors and even individual families. At the same time, Chechen communities, used to living under politically repressive regimes, accommodated on the surface and preserved their usual lifestyle underneath. The clearest example was the Urus-Martan region, which had a "special position" again in 1997-1999, due to the choice of its politically active members to host the Islamists.

#### 6.6.4. Teip, seniors, kinship

In February 1999, a famous Chechen businessman and public figure, Khoz-Akmed Nukhaev put forward a declaration "On the basis of organizing state institutions in Chechnya", in which he proposed to organize them on the basis of the teip system, with the highest authority being Mekhk –Khel (Council of Land), the Head of the state- the popularly elected Mekhk-Da (Father

of Land), a Supreme legislative council (Lor Is) comprised of representatives of the nine Tukhums (unions of teips). Nukhaev considered that a government system based on national institutions would guarantee the state sovereignty of the Chechen people and ensure national consolidation of the society (Groznsky Rabochij 23 January –3 February 1999).

The idea of creating institutions based on traditional structures resonated with some nationalists, particularly the nationalist party “Nokhchi” (Chechens). According to the party’s leader Pashaev “in the teip everyone is responsible not only for himself, but also for the teip, and the teip is responsible for each of its members”. Teip-based government according to Pashaev, would tame criminality, and enhance the responsibility of political leaders (IGPI 04/1999). The party “Nokhchi” was about the only political force which actually reacted to the proposal, otherwise not discussed by any political institution or group. The party itself was rather marginal, and today many of my politically active respondents of that time could not even remember that this party existed or what was it about.

According to Timur Muzaev, the idea to design a teip-based system of government was an attempt to find alternatives to sharia rule and the “Arabization” of Chechnya (IGPI 04/1999). This project however, was limited to a discussion within certain traditionalist nationalist circles and was not treated seriously by major political forces, institutions or the parliament, which suggests that the idea sounded utopian and unfeasible to the key actors in the political process. The main fault of this project was that it was based on a wrong assumption- that the teip was still responsible for its members and that each individual member was accountable to his teip. If this were the case, such a tremendous criminality would not have developed in Chechnya in the first place.

The remnants of the Dudaev-time teip self-organization displayed itself once, when a delegation of representatives of teips visited Maskhadov and offered him support. A Chechen ethnologist, Said-Magomed Khasiev, recalled:

*After his election a delegation of representatives of teips, people thinking about the fate of the state, both senior and young came to Maskhadov and said: all these brigade generals, their*

*headquarters should be liquidated, everyone should take ladders and axes and work. "If you cannot stop them, we will" – they said. "These are my combat comrades, my friends, we were fighting together, I cannot do it" was his response. He did not clean up the political system, this was his main mistake.* Said-Magomed Khasiev, Chechen ethnologist

The role of Elders in the state-building project of 1997-1999 was almost negligible. They were not visible in the public space, not organized in any way or paid any special respect. Even at the level of local government, the elder's role had dramatically decreased. This development was convincingly explained by Ilyas from the mountain village of Shatoy:

*When the young people are with arms in their hands, they do not ask Elders for advice. Leaders from among youth started to distinguish themselves and they took control over villages.* Ilyas, 35, Shatoy

Blood feud played a very prominent role in the political processes of 1997-1999. Maskhadov's notorious "weakness" was a result of his caution not to start series of blood feuds in Chechnya, including acquiring personal blood foes. The inefficiency of the Chechen security services and troops in combat against oil thieves and hostage-takers was also a result of vendetta considerations. The Gudermes fight of May 1998 was a spectacular example of the mechanism of blood feud at work: up to two thousand people, most of whom possessed guns, engaged in a most brutal clash putting their weapon aside. By 1999 armed clashes between the government forces and criminals started to occur routinely, which can be seen as the beginning of the process of erosion of the institution of blood-feud in the name of the indigenous state.

#### 6.6.5. Political elite formation: kinship and personal networks

Maskhadov's cadre policy likewise to that of Dudaev was not teip- or kinship- centered, but based on ideological /programmatic values (Islamic nationalists) or other political considerations (eg. The necessity to accommodate the opposition). The only member of Maskhadov's inner circle, who was his relative, was his second nephew Turpal-Ali Atgeriev, the Minister of Defense; there were also relatives in his personal guard. The Minister of agriculture was from the *alleroi* teip. Given the fact that *alleroi* is one of the two largest teips in Chechnya, they were not overrepresented.

*He did have the support of the alleroi people. But if he listened to the respected people from the teip, there would not have been such an anarchy. He ignored all recommendations, had not*



*followed a single reasonable advice given to him. For Maskhadov the teip had no relevance whatsoever. He was outside the teip framework.* Said Magomed Khasiev, Chechen ethnologist, senior of Alleroy teip

Maskhadov was from an alleroy family from the village of Zebel-yurt in the pro-Russian Nadterechny region. His wife was also a Nadterechny Chechen. When Russia retreated after the first war, the Nadterechny Chechens recognized the Maskhadov government and many supported Maskhadov both as the most moderate of all field commanders, and as their *zemlyak* (person from the same area).

*Maskhadov was supported in the region. However, he did not invite the Nadterechny Chechens into the government, he was afraid of being accused of favoritism, and of being called a traitor for helping Nadterechny Chechens, known for their pro-Russian position. That is why Basaev in fact overthrew him and betrayed, because he did not have close people around.* Adam Dukhaev, editor of the regional paper Terkjist, Nadterechny region of Chechnya

The perpetual opposition to Maskhadov on behalf of his challengers created a peculiar system of checks and balances, which prevented regional and kinship nepotism. Moreover, as my respondents claim, Maskhadov, a product of the Soviet military system, was outside the traditional framework of kinship, descent, locality or Islamic virds.

## Conclusion

This chapter analyzed the 1997-1999 Islamist state-building project in Chechnya. I claimed that the political process in the given period was shaped by the socio-political context which led to the emergence of the new regime: the destructive but victorious war, the emergence of strong field commanders with their paramilitary groups which many refused to dissolve, the militarization of the male population, profound re-Islamization of society, and the emergence of “new” fundamentalist trends in Islam which due to their financial and military capacities and the persuasiveness of their doctrine were gaining prominence among the population.

The analysis of the state building project showed how Islam became the main contested issue among the political forces in the republic, with the opposition demanding more profound

Islamization, more radical position in the negotiations with Russia and more outspoken stand on Islamist causes worldwide. In fact, under the slogans of deeper Islamization, the challengers of the regime aimed at weakening Maskhadov, at gaining more power, and keeping their paramilitary groups and having impunity in economic and other crimes.

The Chechen state under Maskhadov lost further the Mannian infrastructural power. Armed criminal groups illegally got control over oil wells, made in-cuts into oil pipes and virtually paralyzed the oil industry, the main budget forming branch of the economy. Only a handful of industrial enterprises recovered from the war. The state's capacity to deliver social goods was extremely limited, and the Chechen systems of education and healthcare were working on enthusiasm or financial contributions from students and patients. Maskhadov tried to settle perpetual political crises by accommodation, further concessions to the Islamists and rare offensives against his challengers. Despite the very flammable situation, Maskhadov managed to avoid internal conflict, to purge the state security services of criminal elements, to raise the educational level of *sharia* courts, to start having modest success in combating organized crime, and in the end, to win a political victory over his challengers, who discredited themselves as impotent politicians, got all their political demands satisfied, but continued unconstructive opposition to the regime. In the end, peace was disrupted by Basaev's invasion of Dagestan, which put an end to the Chechen quasi independence.

The main pattern of political integration in 1997-1999 as the armed paramilitary groups and the main cleavage between them was religious-ideological (National vs. Fundamentalist Islamism), this shaped the republican political process. The political elite was formed on the basis of individual performance during the war, adherence to Islam, ideological position and paramilitary strength. The role of *teips* and *virds* was almost nil in the state-building, marginalized by Islamist ideology of the unity of the Islamic *umma*. The Chechen politicians did not seek participation or legitimization on behalf of *teips* or seniors, and ignored them as potential actors. *Vird* affiliation became somewhat important as anti-Wahhabi sentiments were growing, but never reached the

level of actual mobilization. Kinship played some role, which was insignificant compared to the above mentioned factors. Kinship was prominent in personal guards of politicians and gradually in paramilitary groups, which were first manned by former combatant comrades, but eventually started to have more prominent territorial, kinship, the neighborhood elements.

As interviews quoted in this chapter illustrate, when a teip member or a representative of a region occupied the chief executive position, he tended to get some support of his teip members and the region. This partly explains the fact of Nadterechny region (Maskhadov's birth place) not taking a "special" position in 1997-1999, although the regional opposition of Urus-Martan (albeit of quite a different coloring) continued in the period under study. Although Maskhadov received some support from his Nadterechny area, he did not invite many Nadterechny people into the government. Being permanently attacked by the opposition he was cautious not to give reasons to accuse him of kin-based or region-based nepotism.

Table 6.1. Internal constraints on the Chechen government 1997-1999

where 1 - negligible; 2- weak , 3 – significant, 4- prominent 5- very prominent

Government	Checks and balances	Opposition within the system	Risk (of physical elimination)	Risk (prosecution for illegal economic activity)
Chechnya 1997-1999	2	5	3	1

Table 6.2. Prominence of patterns of integration in elite formation Chechnya 1997-1999

where 1-insignificant; 2- some presence, 3 – significant, 4- prominent 5- very prominent

	Chechnya (1997-1999)
Descent group	insignificant
Kinship	insignificant
Territory (region)	some presence
Religion	prominent
Ideology	prominent

Similarly to the 1991-1994 period, the main challengers of the regime were not pre-existing but the newly emerged patterns of integration – paramilitary groups and regional opposition, also dominated by paramilitaries.

Table 6.3. Informal actors' behavior toward the government (Chechnya 1997-1999)

Accommodating/ non-interfering	Challenging/Disrupting
descent (teips)	paramilitary groups
Sufi brotherhoods	region-based opposition
	ideological-religious opposition

The case of 1997-1999 Chechnya further refutes the clan politics argument, which claims that state-building and political process in Wajnakh societies are shaped by the clans. It shows how much clan politics literature underestimates the role of ideology and religion, as well as other patterns of social integration, such as paramilitary groups. Applying Migdal's classification of state-society relations, the 1997-1999 interaction between formal and informal actors closely approximated the "incorporation of the state by social forces" pattern (Migdal 1988:25). The root of Maskhadov's state failure was again a result of competing concepts of statehood. Rustowian "birth defects of the political community" have not been overcome. Chechnya of 1997-1999 was split between the supporters of an Islamic state and a nation state with significant prominence of religion.

## 7. The Democratic State –Building Project in Ingushetia: 1992-2001

This chapter will analyze the 1992-2001 state-building project in Ingushetia. I start by describing the socio-political context preceding the regime change, i.e. the Ingush national movement and the Ingush-Ossetian armed conflict of 1992. Dramatic defeat in the conflict and ethnic cleansing discredited the leaders of the national movements, and united the nation in mourning, which was conducive to unprecedented regime consolidation and support which Aushev enjoyed at least during his first term in office. The second section will analyze the creation of the republican institutions and initial attempts at elite consolidation. Unlike Maskhadov who was accommodative of his rivals or Dudaev who promoted nationalists, Aushev marginalized the members of the national movements and promoted non-nationalist consolidation of the Ingush. He avoided politicizing the memories of grievances, and promoted ethnic inclusion and a sense of belonging to the Russian Federation. The third section will analyze the state building project with a focus on the government's efforts to build a functioning republican polity. By scrutinizing the government policies to support the economy, enforce the law and give an impulse to the newly born republican system of education and healthcare, this chapter illustrates how in conditions very similar to Chechnya, the Ingush government managed to maintain order, avoid war and prevent the economy and social services from total collapse, and furthermore to give the republic a strong development impulse. The fourth bloc will analyze the government's efforts to deal with the consequences of the Ingush-Ossetian conflict and the Chechen wars, the two issues which came to be the main source of political disagreement in Ingush society of 1992-2002, but did not transform into open confrontation or even cleavage.

The last part will analyze the interaction between formal politics and informal institutions and practices in 1992-2001 and argue that a strong movement to revive Ingush teips and involve them in politics failed. The teips were unable, or unwilling to develop a common position during the presidential elections. Neither were they capable of solving any of the serious social problems which they tried to tackle. Retrofashion on teips improved the coordination within lineages related

to rituals, and raised awareness of teip history and traditions among its members. Aushev had a significant number of relatives and members of descent groups in his government. Nonetheless, this did not result in an intransparent or corrupt government.

#### 7.1. Socio-political processes shaping state-building in Ingushetia: National Movement and Foundation of the Ingush Republic

The Ingush national movement fledged during the first years of *perestroyka*. Its driving force were the Ingush intellectuals and professionals who advocated for the return of Prigorodny Region, which used to belong to Ingushetia before 1944 and remained part of Ossetia after the deportation.

Already in October 1988 a delegation of Ingush representatives filed an appeal to the leadership of the Communist party of the USSR and the Soviet government signed by 8, 000 Ingush which called for the return of Ingush territories in Prigorodny Region of North Ossetia. In April 1989, another delegation handed A. Voss, the first deputy Chair of the Supreme Soviet of USSR a petition with the request to restore the national autonomy of the Ingush signed by 51,000 people (Patiev 2007: 200, 202).

On September 9-10, 1989 a Congress of the Ingush People was held in Grozny which had the return of the lands and restoration of the Ingush Autonomy as its main issues on its agenda. The Congress elected the Organization Committee for Restoration of the State autonomy of Ingushetia chaired by the school teacher, poet and dissident, Issa Kodzoev. Two months later Kodzoev was replaced by a doctor hab. of law, Beksultan Sejnaroiev. This soon produced a schism in the national movement and two organizations emerged: the People's Council of Ingushetia, led by Sejnaroiev was comprised of the intellectual elite, mainly residents of Grozny or Vladikavkaz, academics, economists, writers, and lawyers, most of whom were communist party members; and the party "Nijskho" led by Issa Kodzoev was based in Ingushetia and had the support of the rural Ingush.

The two rivaling groups did not have major ideological contradictions. Both advocated for the Ingush autonomy within the Russian Federation, which would include the Prigorodny region and part of Vladikavkaz. But “Nijskho” was more radical and engaged in protest rallies combining a purely nationalist agenda with anti-communist slogans and attempts to get rid of corrupt party nomenklatura. In January-February 1990 Nijskho together with people’s deputies of the regional Soviets gathered multi-thousand protest demonstrations in the Ingush towns and managed to replace the regional party bosses with democratically oriented Ingush (Patiev 2007:209). Many of my politically active respondents were of the opinion that the rivalry between the two groups resulted in the radicalization of the national movement, and eventually contributed to spiraling confrontation with the Ossetians.

*There were situations when one rally would gather in Nazran and their counter-rally would gather in Ekazhevo. One rally would claim that the others were KGB and the other would do the same. The People’s Council was not able to admit that it would be difficult to regain the region. Bogatyrev [one of its leaders- E.S.] would say: “No Russian soldier will shoot at you. Yeltsin is sitting in Moscow and waiting for us to take the region”. They incited people to action. Yakub Patiev, Ingush ethnologist, former MP of the Supreme Council of South Ossetia.*

On March 23-24 1991 Boris Yeltsin visited Ingushetia. He was the first Moscow leader of such a high level to visit Nazran or to publicly recognize the injustices committed against the Ingush and to promise support. He started his speech with the traditional “Salam- alejkum!”<sup>82</sup> – which won the hearts of the nation. During the Presidential elections of June 12, 1991 the Ingush cast 94, 7 % of their votes for Boris Yeltsin, the highest result in Russia (Gutseriev 1997:196). A year and a half later, however, after Yelstin sent tanks to cleanse the Ingush from the Prigorodny region, his words “As-salaam-alejkum, Ingushi” would be remembered with bitter irony and come to be the expression of the Ingush “betrayed nation” complex.

Before the Presidential elections on April 26, 1991 the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR adopted the law “On the Rehabilitation of the Repressed Peoples”, the 3 and 6<sup>th</sup> articles of which stipulated the rights of the repressed peoples to “territorial rehabilitation”<sup>83</sup>. At the time leaders of human rights groups like “Memorial” warned against “territorial rehabilitation”, which in their

<sup>82</sup> <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tNzXhufbqnI&NR=1>

<sup>83</sup> <http://pravo.roskultura.ru/law/zakonrsfsr/26/04/1991/1/text/383.html>

view could provoke armed conflicts, however, their voices were drowned in the “historical justice” rhetoric.

After the August putsch of 1991 and the Chechen National Revolution, Ingush deputies of the regional councils adopted the Declaration on “Establishing of the Ingush Republic, part of the RSFSR unified with the historical territory of the Ingush people and the capital in the right bank part of Vladikavkaz” (Ingushskaya gosudarstvennost. Normativno-pravovie akty 1997:46).

On November 30, 1991 97, 4% of the voters cast their votes in favor of creating the Ingush republic as part of the Russian Federation (Khamchiev 2002). On June 4, 1992 the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation adopted the law “On Establishing of the Ingush Republic, part of the Russian Federation”.

The restoration of the national statehood is still perceived by most Ingush as the main achievement of the post-Soviet transition.

*“I can’t even describe how happy I was, when the republic was created. Overwhelmed with joy I could not find a place for myself; I could not sit down for a minute. Even if we are brothers with the Chechens, each brother wants to live in his own house. During the Soviet times, all factories and plants were built in Chechnya, nothing was built here...”* – Osman Khadziev, 1933, peasant, resident of Malgobek

After the republic was established, the Russian federal center sent its representatives to help set up government institutions in Ingushetia. However, the specially created Coordination Committee decided that the elections to the Supreme Soviet of Ingushetia would not take place until the issue of the borders with Ossetia was settled. Thus, by the time when the situation in the Prigorodny region started to get out of control, Ingushetia had functioned without institutions of government for over a year.

Since spring 1991 clashes between Ingush and Ossetians in the Prigorodny Region occurred with a threatening regularity. People’s militias emerged on both sides. The full-scale armed conflict broke out at the night of October 30/31 from armed clashes in two villages. As the news of the clashes and new Ingush casualties reached Ingushetia, hundreds of Ingush men headed to the Prigorodny Region to help “defend their co-ethnics”. At about the same time a few hundred men



from South Ossetia were already approaching the Prigorodny Region to support their ethnic brothers. By 9:30 ten large villages were caught in full warfare. Both sides used machine guns, grenade launchers, anti-aircraft guns and sniper's rifles.

In the afternoon of October 31 the federal governmental delegation arrived from Moscow to Vladikavkaz. On November 1, the official position of Moscow delegation was announced by General-Colonel Filatov on the Ossetian TV:

*Today at 12: 45 the first plane with airborne troops, equipment and ammunition arrived, which will be located on the territory of Ossetia. Russia has not forgotten its faithful sons, the Ossetians, who served it with faith and honesty for many years. Already today... the airborne troops together with the interior forces of RF and the Interior forces of North Ossetia will start military action against the aggressors...and every hour this resistance and pressure on the aggressors will grow...I want to warn all the rest, who find themselves in the zone of military action... I think it will not take us long to cleanse here all those who wants to or actually disrupts the peaceful labor of Ossetia...I want to warn them that they should leave this territory and not disturb those peoples, who live here, on this territory, and who have lived here before in peace and agreement for many years..." (Quoted in Zdravomyslov: 1998: 65)*

The following day several regiments of the Russian troops were brought to the region, which first drew the warring parties apart and then sided with the Ossetian interior forces and South Ossetian paramilitaries and forced 40-60, 000 Ingush civilians out of the Prigorodny Region of North Ossetia and its capital Vladikavkaz. Almost 3,000 Ingush houses were intentionally destroyed (Zdravomyslov 1998:65).

The Ingush forced migrants found refuge in neighboring Ingushetia and in Grozny. Their return has been an extremely complicated political issue, which remains unresolved until now. The Ingush-Ossetian conflict dramatically intensified the Ingush "memories of grievances" and has been perceived by the Ingush population as 'genocide of the Ingush people' committed by the Ossetians together with the federal troops. At the same time, part of the population and the elite is prepared to acknowledge that there was a fair share of Ingush responsibility for the 1992 tragedy:

*Many people say that it was a provocation on the Ossetian side with the aim of ethnic cleansing. I think that the conditions were such that they naturally developed towards conflict. The Ingush lobbied the law [on Rehabilitation of the repressed peoples- E.S. ]. They just wanted to have this law, and did not care about the mechanism of its implementation. Only some people understood that it would not be easy to return the region. The national leaders thought that once the law was adopted, we would redraw the border and here's the solution. They had no understanding that human beings are not a mechanical aggregate, that there are different characters, forces at*

work. Mukhtar Buzurtanov, MP of the People's Assembly of the Republic of Ingushetia 2003-2008, former deputy – Minister of Internal Affairs of Ingushetia.

Not surprisingly, the Ingush-Ossetian conflict resulted in the consolidation of Ingush society, strengthened the sense of ethnic belonging which was conducive to building a unified polity.

## 7.2. Creating Institutions, initial consolidation

Two days after the breakout of violence Boris Yeltsin introduced the state of emergency on the territory of the North Ossetian SSR and the Ingush Republic<sup>84</sup> and established a temporary federal governmental body – Provisional Administration in Ingushetia and North Ossetia. In the midst of the conflict, Ruslan Aushev, a 38 year old ethnic Ingush general-major of the Soviet Army, awarded the “Hero of USSR” medal for combat actions in Afghanistan, at the time an MP to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR from Primorsky Kraj arrived in the republic. In November he was appointed the head of the Provisional Administration in Ingushetia.

On February 28, 1993 Aushev was elected President of Ingushetia (he was the only candidate to run), having received 99, 94% of votes with the voter turnout being 92.66%<sup>85</sup>.

Due to the emergency conditions, the People's Assembly – the Parliament of the Ingushetia was elected only in February 1994. A special decree of President Aushev allocated three guaranteed places for representatives of the Chechen minority and three places for representatives of the Russian minority<sup>86</sup>. On February 27, 1994 the residents of Ingushetia voted for the Project of the Constitution of the Republic of Ingushetia.

<sup>84</sup> Decree N 1327 of November 2 1992

<sup>85</sup> Ingushskaya gosudarstvennost'. Normativno-pravovie akty sovremennoj istorii. Ofis postoyannogo predstavitelia Respubliki Ingushetiya pri Prezidente Rossijskoj Federatsii (*Ingush statehood. Normative-legal acts of contemporary history. Office of Permanent Representative of Republic Ingushetia to the President of the Russian Federation*). 1997. Moscow-Nazran. p.68.

<sup>86</sup> Decree of the President of the Republic of Ingushetia “On introducing ammendments and supplements to the “Provision on elections of the deputies of the People's Assembly-Parliament of the Ingush Republic” of January 19 1994. Ingush Statehood: normative-provisional acts. 1997: 104 . Subsequently the Federal Center abolished this provision, since guaranteed ethnic representation was not stipulated by the federal electoral law (Ayup Gagiev, MP of Ingush Parliament, 3d calling 2003-2008. Head of group of advisors of the President of Republic Ingushetia 1995–2000, 2000-2002 deputy Minister of Justice of RI).

According to the Constitution, Ingushetia is a presidential republic. Any citizen aged 35-65 who has a command of the two official languages- Ingush and Russian- can be elected a President for five years. The Parliament is elected for four years, and unlike the Chechen parliament at the time, which had broad credentials, including the approval of all the government ministers, the Ingush MPs voted only for the Chair of Government, and the Chairs of the Supreme and the Arbitration Courts of the Republic.<sup>87</sup> There is no special mention of Islam in the Ingush Constitution. Its article 11 states that “return by political means of lands illegally annexed from the Ingush territory and the preservation of the territorial unity of the Republic of Ingushetia is a most important goal of the state”.

Aushev did not invite any members of the Ingush national movement into the government, which they were unable to challenge, being discredited as a result of the armed conflict of 1992:

*“They brought us to the tragedy of 1992. They gave the pretext for Ossetia to get ready for war. They screamed that several thousand horsemen were prepared to take over Vladikavkaz. Which horsemen??!”* Magomed-Sali Aushev, Member of Parliament of the Republic Ingushetia, 3d calling, 2003-2008.

*“The schism among the national leaders provoked internal contradictions among the Ingush. Because of these contradictions we were not able to establish government institutions in time. By the time of the conflict there were no authorities here, no security services. And it was not the fault of the Federal Center but of these national leaders”* Ayup Gagiev, Member of Parliament of the Republic of Ingushetia, 3d calling 2003-2008. Head of group of advisors of the President of Republic Ingushetia 1995–2000, deputy Minister of Justice of RI 2000-2002.

According to Akhmed Malsagov, the Minister of Finances and later chair of the government,

Aushev had an uncompromising position on nationalist leaders:

*He categorically would not allow the leaders of nationalist movements close to the government. He was getting irritated when hearing about them. He considered that they inflicted a tremendous damage to the Ingush people. He never talked to them or made any concessions to them.* Akhmed Malsagov, Chair of Government 1997-2001

Thus, President Aushev did not seek initial elite consolidation, but marginalized the nationalist leaders and rival groups. The Ingush government tried to promote ethnic inclusion, and

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<sup>87</sup> Ingush statehood: normative-legal acts 1997:96

made a different use of the historical memories than the Chechen leadership. Unlike President Dudaev, who used every opportunity to collectively remember, emphasize and emotionally stir up past injustices, President Aushev made due references to past tragedies whenever it was relevant, but placed them in the context of looking for ways to remedy evils and overcome hardships regardless of the difficult past. “Enough of complaining- oh, we are such a much suffered nation. We need to work! Not to permanently look back”... (Aushev 1994).

Having marginalized potential opponents and informal groups, the Ingush President managed to consolidate the population by his firm, resolute, yet moderate style of leadership, independent but cooperative position towards the federal authorities, authentic effort and capacity to find solutions to numerous seemingly insolvable problems. On March 1, 1998, Ruslan Aushev was re-elected for a second term, this time receiving 66.5% of the votes.

### 7.3. State-Building Policies 1992-2001

#### 7.3.1. The Economy

Ingushetia is a rural agricultural republic. After the break-up of Chechen-Ingushetia, Ingushetia inherited less than 10% of the ChIASSR production capacities (Gutseriev 1997: 195). The Republic had underdeveloped industry, social infrastructure and transport, it had no higher educational establishments, no hotels, no railway station, no airport or cinema or stadium, many settlements had no water-pipes, telephone connection or gas. In 1994 90% of the republican budget consisted of financial transfers from the Federal Center, and occupied the last place in the Russian Federation in its income per capita (Gutseriev 1997:195). Ingushetia had the highest birth rates in Russia, a small territory and hence – a high population density, which by 1992 was increased by at least 45,000 internally displaced people (IDPs) from North Ossetia and in 1994 - by over 100,000 from Chechnya (Serdalo 1995). In 1999 during the second military campaign in Chechnya another 300,000 IDPs fled this republic for Ingushetia.

The dramatic decline in industrial production was a common problem of post-Soviet Russia. According to an Ingush economist, Ruslan Malsagov, the deep economic depression in

Ingushetia intensified by its closeness to conflict-zones, great share of the military-industrial sector in the economy, which after the break-up of the Soviet Union remained without state commissions or investment (Malsagov 2007:15). Moreover, even the remaining production capacities were in use for over 15 years and required urgent modernization or replacement (Gutseriev 1997:195).

Although the oil resources of Ingushetia are incomparably smaller than these in Chechnya, in Soviet times oil industry constituted 70% of the republic's production. However, three major wells located at hydrogen sulphide containing oilfield were conserved, another 274 small wells were not functioning. An estimated 14-16 million dollars were required for their reconstruction and modernization, which the republic was naturally lacking (Toriev 2004:4).

In 1995 the Government of the Republic of Ingushetia adopted a program of social-economic development of the Republic for 1996-2006 aimed at economic self-sustainability, the development of the social infrastructure and the raising the standard of living. The priorities in the sphere of economy, which President Aushev reiterated in many of his reports and appeals to the Parliament and Congresses of the Ingush people included: 1) Replenishing the republican budget by raising the profits of local enterprises; 2) The development of oil-chemical industry; 3) strengthening budgetary discipline; 4) The restructuring the agricultural sector 5) developing independent mechanisms of attracting investment (Serdalo 16 April 1998, 8 December 1999).

According to Ingush businessman and scholar, Dr. hab. of economics Mikhail Gutseriev, the implementation of this program required a 1.650 mln. dollar investment, 700 of which were required already in 1996-1998 (Gutseriev 1997:195). Although the financial assistance of the Federal Center was stipulated by various agreements, at that time Moscow was unable to provide for the most urgent needs of Ingushetia (Gutseriev 1997: 196).

In this situation the government of Ingushetia together with the Ingush economists, proposed the federal government to create an experimental offshore economic zone "Ingushetia" and an offshore Center of International for Business "Ingushetia". The Russian President Yelstin and

Prime-Minister Chernomyrdin, who were unable to ensure the financing of the new republic's most basic needs, supported the idea.

The free economic zone "Ingushetia" stipulated a preferential economic and legal regime for enterprises in registration and taxation, aimed at stimulating economic activity (Gutseriev 1998:17). The financial mechanism was the following: the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Ingushetia received a budgetary loan equal to the taxes and mandatory payments to the federal budget by the newly created enterprises registered in the zone from the Ministry of Finances of the Russian Federation, which could be used for the social-economic development of the republic (Ingushetia 30 July 1994). The Ingush offshore zone was initially planned for one year, but was subsequently extended several times until 1997. In the period from July 1, 1994 to April 1996, 3,099 companies were registered in Ingushetia, including 140 foreign firms (Gutseriev 1997: 208).

Of profits accumulated in the free economic zone, 88 objects were constructed in 1995-1997, including a republican hotel, a confectionary factory, a boarding school, 61 modern cottage houses, a publishing house, 6 open cafes and 9 children's entertainment parks (Gutseriev 1997:213). In subsequent years the government managed to build a modern airport, a railway station, a TV station, a hydraulic electro-station, a brick-factory, stadiums, and a military cadet school, water-pipes to the Malgobek region which for decades had suffered of shortages of drinking water, engineering communications, to provide gas to mountain villages (Aushev: 1997<sup>88</sup>, Gutseriev 1998:213). The construction of the new capital Magas was financed by the profits from the off-shore zone.

Similarly to Maskhadov in Chechnya, the main priority of the Ingush government was to revive the oil-chemical and gas extraction industries, hoping that they would become the main budget-forming sector. According to Mustafa Akhriev, the deputy director of the concern «Ingushneftgaskhimprom» already in 1994 some revival of industry could be felt: 20 wells were

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<sup>88</sup> Aushev R. 1997. Speech at the celebrations of 5 years anniversary of creation of the Ingush Republic. <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qVvo-a9p73A&feature=related>

reactivated, and a new well (#98) with a daily production of 50 tons of oil was opened. An oil processing station was bought, which allowed collecting oil and transporting it to other regions. This provided funds to update and purchase equipment, to pay salaries to workers and taxes. The President managed to include Ingush oil enterprises in the federal program for the reconstruction of the destroyed economy of the Chechen Republic (Akhriev 1995). By 1995 the output of the republican industry increased by 9.7%, and oil extraction by 4.2% (Serdalo June 4 1996).

In 1997 Aushev succeeded in bringing foreign investors to the Ingush oil industry. An American oil company Pacific Petroleum signed a contract, aimed at increasing oil extraction (Serdalo October 18, 1997). In his late 1999 report by the Congress of the Ingush People, the President Aushev expressed his dissatisfaction with the development of the oil industry: “the level of oil extraction during the recent years has stabilized at the level that allowed the industry to barely survive. The new wells have not been re-activated, oil-processing enterprises have not been build and cases of major theft have been revealed by the Department for control and revision with the President of Republic Ingushetia” (Aushev 1999). Nonetheless, compared to Chechnya, the Ingush government managed to prevent the total collapse of the republican industry, moreover, achieved a modest revitalization of the oil sector.

### 7.3.2. Budget and Tax Collection

Aushev’s government invested significant efforts to enforce budgetary discipline and raise tax collection. Unlike President Maskhadov in Chechnya, who virtually gave up on collecting taxes from individuals, Aushev tightened policies to control for tax evasion. His decrees ordered commercial banks to strictly follow the Russian tax laws and file monthly reports to the tax police on all taxpayers, and to report the same day all financial transfers exceeding 10 mln. rubles (Ingushetia 27 October 1993). In 1995 Aushev abolished all tax wavers to enterprises, unless they were registered in the off-shore zone (Ingushetia 24 January 1995). In July 1995, President Aushev tightened control over use of cash registers for businesses when carrying out

financial transactions with the population, again to prevent tax evasion (Ingushetia 11 July 1995)<sup>89</sup>. Illegal sale of petroleum products was banned and strictly enforced. The government introduced inter-ministerial joint action plans for increasing budget discipline that the President oversaw personally (Serdalo 1998 #28).

### 7.3.3. Agriculture

In 1992 the Ingush agricultural sector was in a similar condition to the Chechen one – economically ineffective state farms required reform, most of the equipment was outdated, and missed parts and some of it was squandered. Unlike Chechnya, being part of the Russian Federation, Ingushetia benefited from the federal programs, which provided subsidies for state farms to purchase seeds, fuel, and cattle (Serdalo 29 April 1995). At the same time, the Federal center was not able to duly support the regions, and state farmers did not receive salaries for the periods of up to eight months.

The government's plan was to restructure the state farms into agricultural enterprises of various forms of property- joint stock enterprises, individual farms, and state-farms. Aushev was against the privatization of land and thus most of the agricultural enterprises were transformed into joint stock enterprises (Serdalo May 30 1995). The years of 1995-1996 witnessed quite a significant decline in agricultural production, but since 1998 the agricultural sector was slowly and partially recovering.

The Ingush government tried to appoint entrepreneurial successful people to head the state farms, who in their turn looked for ways to encourage the agricultural workers in conditions of an acute shortage in cash:

*In Grozny I was the director of the civic passenger transport enterprise with over 1500 employees. In 1994 we moved to Ingushetia. They asked me to work as the director of sovkhos in my native village of Dolakovo. I had a degree in agriculture, but I never worked in agriculture and never lived in rural areas. But they said – its no problem, you just need to have the right style of management. The squalor was terrible here. The farms had no windows, nor doors; the fields have grown in weeds. I bought cattle in Krasnodar, we fixed the buildings of the farms, and planted the fields. Subsequently we set up a butter-producing workshop, a breeding nursery,*

<sup>89</sup> In Chechnya many businesses do not use cash registers until today



*and vegetable teams. Our fields looked beautiful! I paid good benefits to the workers in natural products - barley, corn.* Batarbek Akiev, head of the collective farm “Dolakovo”

Despite some revitalization of parts of the sector (production of grain increased four times in 1999 compared to 1998), in 1998-2001 the agriculture was still in crisis and provided less than half of the republican needs. Less than 50% of credits and budget loans were returned by the agricultural enterprises, which had a negative impact on the sector and the republican budget. The lack in agricultural machinery, seeds and spares as well as of fertilizers prevented the sector growing. The federal transfers to the sector were very limited, which, in Aushev’s view, was partly due to the incapability of the republican Ministry of Agriculture to lobby in the federal Ministries (Serdalo 8 December 1999).

The results of Aushev governments’ efforts to revive the Ingush economy are evaluated differently by local experts. Some considered the free economic zone a big success which allowed bring the republic back to life:

*“Free economic zone was the core around which everything else emerged. Ingushetia had no economy in 1992. Clear page. This zone gave a contour to the whole economy”* Ayub Gagiev, MP of Ingush National Assembly, 3d Assembly, 2003-2008. Head of group of advisors of the President of the Republic of Ingushetia 1995–2000, deputy Minister of Justice of RI, 2000-2002.

Others, like MP Idris Abadiyev considered it a failure:

*This off-shore zone was not profitable. The objects which they built did not give anything to the citizen or to the budget. For example, the railway station, what does it give to the Ingush people? He [President Aushev- E.S.] spent 10 mln dollars on it. I would have built 50 objects for 10 mln, which would be replenishing the budget. I would have built a cheap railway station for one train with two cars. The costs of construction were inflated at least 10 times. Aushev was not corrupt himself. But his close people did take bribes behind his back.* Idris Abadiyev, Ingush businessman, Member of Ingush Parliament, 2d calling

Critics of Aushev emphasized in interviews that the federal center had the obligation to finance the objects, which were constructed with the help of the profits from the zone, so Aushev should have made them pay rather than let Kremlin use the zone as a bargaining chip in the Ingush-Ossetian negotiations over the status of the Prigorodny Region.

Akhmed Malsagov, Aushev's Minister of Finances and later Chair of Government acknowledged that the zone was instrumentalized by the federal authorities to tame the Ingush territorial claims, but said that the zone played an important role in affirming the Ingush statehood:

*The zone was a distracting factor, for the Ingush not to demand Prigorodny region back. Aushev thought Ingushetia would not survive without the zone. He was always saying: "unless we strengthen ourselves economically we would never return Prigorodny Region". He was right in a way. The zone helped us not as much economically, as psychologically. The people had gained optimism, hope that the republic would develop.* Akhmed Malsagov, Minister of Finances, Chair of Government, Executive President of RI (1997-2001)

Magomed Tatriev, the 1<sup>st</sup> deputy chair of government explained that the Ingush government was determined to find economic resources on its own, because "waiting for the favors of the federal center in the current very complicated economic situation, which is prevailing and will prevail as such in Russia for a long time - is almost a hopeless endeavor... (Serdalo 12 March 1996). In short, unlike Chechnya, where the government was unable to prevent the squalor of the enormous industrial economy, the Ingush government that had incomparably more modest capacities at their disposal managed to find ways to bring resources into the republic, to spend it for the republic's development, which had very visible (although not always functional) results.

#### 7.3.4. Law-enforcement

In Ingushetia, similarly to Chechnya, the problem of criminality was very acute. At the same time, the criminalization of the society did not occur. Combat on crime was the highest priority of the Ingush government and President Aushev personally. His team found efficient ways to combat criminal groups.

In 1992 the Republic of Ingushetia occupied the 63d place in the ratings of the subjects of the Russian Federation, in the effectiveness of combat on crime. In 1993, it already had the third place in the Russia-wide rating, in 1995 it occupied the first place in the number of investigated crimes (77, 6% of crimes were successfully investigated) (Serdalo June 14, 1995). Since 1996 the situation started to deteriorate dramatically, which was linked with the situation in Chechnya:

criminal groups involved in abductions for ransom spread to the neighboring regions. But already in 1997 due to the efforts of the republican law-enforcement agencies the situation improved by 19.4% compared to 1996, and the uncovering of crimes reached 83, 77%. (Serdalo November 4 1997).

When the republic was established, the law-enforcement agencies had to be created from scratch.

*Everything had to be created from scratch. By 1993 the state institutions were virtually destroyed, including the Ministry of Internal Affairs. But we had professional cadres. Without good cadres the President would not be able to do anything,* Mukhtar Buzurtanov, MP of Ingush Parliament 2003-2008, former deputy – Minister of Internal affairs of Ingushetia (1995-1997).

*Ruslan [Aushev- E.S. ] right away started tough measures against crime. Our Ministry of Internal Affairs had to confront both Chechen and Ingush gangs, but they knew that there was a courageous, resolute man behind them. Nobody questioned his decency and courage.* Magomed-Sali Aushev, MP of the National Assembly of Ingushetia, 3 Assembly

The Ingush government used a wide range of measures to strengthen law-enforcement: President Aushev regularly held meetings of the heads of law-enforcement agencies, strongly criticized, controlled and personally coordinated their activities. Villages with the most unfavorable criminal environment were taken under special control. The government regularly introduced curfews in certain settlements. In 1996-1997 the Ministry of Internal affairs regularly, oftentimes monthly held press-conferences in which its leaders reported on the results of their work.

The Ingush government paid great attention to raising the quality of the personnel of the law enforcement agencies. According to the Executive Minister of Internal Affairs Korigov, 200 policemen were dismissed in 1996, because they failed to meet the demands of the job. In 1997 on the order of Aushev, the police carried out a major cleansing of cadre, “getting rid of dirty people and those not meeting the demands of the job”. Over 300 policemen were fired in 1997 (Serdalo April 14 1997). During the first term of President Aushev, three Ministers of Internal Affairs and four Prosecutors were changed.

Since 1996 Ingushetia was confronted with the problem of abductions. Criminal networks functioning in Chechnya found wealthy victims through their accomplices in Ingushetia,

abducted them to Chechnya and demanded ransom. The problem was acquiring a threatening scale. In the first 10 months of 1997, 44 people were abducted, 35 of them released by the Ingush security services (Serdalo November 15, 1997). In the first 6 months of 1998, 26 people were abducted for ransom. Among the main reasons for the inadequate investigations of such crimes, the Minister of Internal Affairs Korigov named bad cooperation with the security services of the neighboring republics (Serdalo July 30 1998). Unlike Chechnya, in Ingushetia most of the cases of abductions were investigated and the hostages released. President Aushev personally worked hard on making it happen. Unlike the Chechen government which was turning a blind eye on criminal gangs acting under the umbrella of the leading field commanders, the Ingush law-enforcement agencies made all the results of their investigations public, and published the names and photographs of the criminals involved in such shameful crimes.

Trying to cope with the rising criminality, Aushev initiated in February 1998 a referendum “On broadening the powers of the state agencies of the Republic of Ingushetia in forming the judicial and law-enforcement institutions<sup>90</sup>”, by which he tried to reduce some of the federal credentials to appoint judges and top officials of the republican security services. The Supreme Court of the Russian Federation ruled against this referendum on November 17, 1998 (Serdalo February, 26 1998). Then President Aushev called for the Congress of the Ingush People, in November 1999, to discuss the deteriorating criminal situation in the republic and advised that the Parliament had a special hearing on “activities of the law-enforcement agencies aimed at insuring the security of the citizens and at combat on abductions” and urged the nation to consolidate against criminality (Serdalo June 15, 1999).

The Ingush law-enforcement agencies were quite efficient in combating corruption and economic crimes. During the first six months of 1995, 61 specialized checks were carried out and over a hundred violations discovered. The results of investigations into economic crimes were publicized in the press including names and the damages inflicted on the economy. Kin or

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<sup>90</sup> O rasshirenii polnomochij organov gosudarstvennoj vlasti Respubliki Ingushetia v formirovanii sudebnyh i pravookhranitelnyh organov

teip relations did not matter: thus, on July 25, 1995 the newspaper “Ingushetia” reported about criminal case instigated against the former head of the enterprise PMK “Nazranovskoye” Kiloiev and the senior mechanic Aushev, who falsified documents and appropriated financial transfers intended for salaries to workers and subsidies for children. Totally they were suspected of appropriating over 317 mln. rubles (Ingushetia 27, July 25 1995). Never after President Aushev, could an immoral action by a person from the same *familia* as the republican leader be publically exposed to such an extent. Making crimes public, openly criticizing officials, naming names, publishing photos and data on the most brazen criminals was a new development in Ingush society, where tradition prescribes to avoid direct confrontation, be diplomatic and respect the honor of the family. Aushev ignored these traditions.

In 1993 President Aushev issued a decree and developed a series of measures for preventing illegal privatization of state property in Ingushetia. Since all income from privatization went for construction of the new capital, the government was tough in monitoring all possible irregularities (Ingushetia January 20, 1994). The President banned registration of any commercial enterprises in conjunction with state institutions of the Republic “to prevent the emergence of conditions conducive to abuse and theft of state funds and material values (Serdalo January 24, 1995). The activization of combat on economic crimes returned significant funds into the republican budget (Serdalo November 4, 1997).

To conclude, the Ingush government under Ruslan Aushev managed to impressively combat crime, quite unprecedentedly for such an unstable time and turbulent region. Criminality was a significant challenge in Ingushetia, just as it was in Chechnya. However, criminalization of society did not occur.

#### 7.3.5. Education and healthcare

In 1992 Ingushetia ranked the last in the Russian Federation in the number of hospital beds *per capita*, it had no specialized clinics nor an emergency ward. Many village ambulances had no

proper premises and lacked basic drugs and staff with higher medical education. The republican maternity house required a major reconstruction (Toriev 2004: 7).

The Ministry of health was established in 1992 and was housed in two vinous refugee wagons in the courtyard of the Nazran district hospital which was renamed the Republican Clinical hospital.

*The situation was very complicated. In the regions there were no qualified cadres, only nurses. In 1992 after the Ingush-Ossetian conflict all the qualified Ingush doctors, who worked in Ossetia fled to Ingushetia and took up jobs and then in 1994 our capacities strengthened after the inflow of refugees from Chechnya, among them were also qualified doctors. Specialized clinics and departments started to open, because now we had specialists.* Khadizhat Musieva, director of Children's Polyclinic at the Republican Clinical Hospital

To resolve the problem of cadres, the Ingush government requested additional place for Ingush students in medical schools in Russia. In 1993 it opened a medical college for nurses in Nazran and in 1997 - a medical department at the Ingush State University.

*At first the quality of education was not too high, but the Dean invited faculty from Grozny, later our local specialists received degrees, defended dissertations. We now have qualified academics at the department.*" Khadizat Musieva, head of the Children's Polyclinic, at the Republican Clinical hospital

President Aushev personally negotiated with the Federal Ministries to get funding and equipment for the republican hospitals. Thus, in June 1998 Aushev managed to persuade the Minister of Health of the Russian Federation, Oleg Rudkovsky that T.B. in Ingushetia was reaching epidemic size and to secure funds for the construction of a T.B. prophylactic center, a bacteriological laboratory, for stationed fluorography equipment and other medical equipment (Serdalo June 9 1998).

Ingush healthcare was under immense stress during both Chechens wars:

*"The inflow of IDPs was enormous. We did not know what to do. The first winter was very difficult. The refugee camps were the responsibility of the Republican hospital. Sometimes each doctor received 50-60 patients a day. International organizations helped a lot, but the doctors were from local institutions, who for several years worked under emergency conditions"* Dr. Magomed Gadaborshev, urologist, Republican clinical hospital

The education system was also strained by conflicts, crisis and outflow of the Russian-speaking population. The republican schools worked in three shifts lacking in over 20, 000 places per year due to natural population growth. The situation dramatically intensified with the inflow of

refugees from both conflict zones (Toriev 2004: 8). The shortage in school places equaled to 63 new schools (Bednov 1995).

International organizations helped to set up schools in refugee camps, but many IDPs lived in the private sector and sent their children to regular schools. The quality of education in Ingushetia was extremely low as a result of overcrowding, and the lack of equipment and text books (Toriev 2004: 8). The republican government allocated funds from the profits of the offshore economic zone to construct a new modern lyceum building, and a Mountaineers Cadet School, which the President envisaged as a boarding school for the future Ingush elite. The Cadet school tried to maintain a multi-ethnic composition of the students, allocating places to students from Dagestan, for Chechens and Cossacks from the republican budget (Serdalo 22 November, 1997).

Ingushetia suffered from an immense shortage of professional cadre: it had 3.5 times fewer specialists with higher education and four times fewer specialists with secondary education than the average in Russia (Ingushetia December 22, 1993). In 1994 the Ingush State University was founded and 423 students were enrolled into five departments (Serdalo June 27, 1995). By 2001 the university was educating students in 17 majors and had a research center of the Ingush literature and language. The university was an important contribution to the capacity-building of the republic. Due to the low income and the increased costs of living, most families were unable to educate their children outside the republic. Moreover, this way more female students got access to higher education:

*The University is very important. Now more people can get educated in their own republic. Due to our mentality many people did not let girls to go away and study. Now the Ingush send girls to school. This is a very important change.* Magomed Mutsolgov, leader of NGO “Mashr”

Along with secular institutions, an Islamic Institute named after Imam Ash-Shafi was opened in the Ingush town of Malgobek, which came to be the first Islamic institution of higher education in Russia. The university was functioned on private donations and had foreign and local tutors. The vice-Rector for academic subjects and subsequently the Rector of the Institute, Issa Tsetchoev, was educated in Algeria and was believed to be of the fundamentalist inclinations.

Many of the students of this university were later arrested or killed by the security services allegedly for participating in armed groups. Like in the case with Khattab's training center "Kavkaz", many young people who went there were initially attracted by the not very competitive enrollment and the prospects to eventually get into the rather lucrative profession of mullah. However, most of them eventually became bearers of the fundamentalist ideology.

*After I served in the army, I went to Saratov and wanted to get into the law school there, but failed in the essay-writing exam. I was preparing myself again for the next year, but the next time I got a "4" [B- E.S.] and again was not enrolled. The next year I was again studying for the exams when everything was decided by fate. My uncle stopped by and said that an Islamic Institute was opened in Malgobek and they decided that I should study there. Before that I did not do namaz, I was drinking with the guys during the military service.*

*And there I learnt that Allah is our President, and Tsar and Protector. Who are the other Presidents? If you have said la-ilahha-il Allah [There is no God but Allah] , then we have no Russian laws anymore. The Koran is our law. The Sharia is the Koran. Everyone has to live according to the laws of the Almighty. Moldi, 1969, Ingushetia*

The Islamic Institute was closed by the Ingush government in 1997. Ruslan Aushev, who fought the Taliban in Afghanistan, did not want to breed fundamentalism on Ingush soil.

#### 7.4. Issues of Political Disagreement: the Ingush-Ossetian conflict, and the Wars in Chechnya

The main issues of political disagreement in Ingushetia of 1992-2001 were the negotiations on the Ingush-Ossetian conflict and the policy towards Chechnya. President Aushev's approach to the resolution of the Ingush-Ossetian conflict was to give absolute priority to the return of the Ingush internally displaced people (IDPs) to their villages in the Prigorodny region over all other conflict- related issues. Already in January 1993 the first protocol was signed by the Presidents of Ingushetia and North Ossetia which had a symbolic function of a 'peace treaty' in which the parties agreed to abide by the Constitution and laws of the Russian Federation, and to start resolving the problems of the forced migrants<sup>91</sup>.

<sup>91</sup> Protokol namerenij. The Protocol on the Intentions (of official delegations of the Ingush Republic and North Ossetian Soviet Socialist Republic). Kislovodsk. January 24 1993. "Severanaja Osetia" January 27 1993



As a result of the Ingush government pressure already in 1993, less than a year after the war, the first IDPs returned to their villages adjacent to the Ingush-Ossetian border. Ossetian armed groups were still active in the Prigorodny district and their disarmament was ineffective. Convoys with returning IDPs were systematically attacked, and returnees killed or wounded. Oftentimes these attacks happened in the presence of federal officials and military units. The Ingush government protested and called for the investigation of each of such episodes of violence; dangers notwithstanding, hundreds of Ingush IDPs returned home in 1993.

On June 24, 1994 the Presidents of North Ossetia, Galazov, and of Ingushetia, Aushev, signed the so-called Beslan Accords in the town of Beslan. Part of the Ingush consider as a betrayal of the Ingush cause. These agreements outlined the logistical details of IDP return, and contained lines which confirmed that both parties agreed to “abide by the laws of the Russian Federation and North Ossetia, and recognize the territorial integrity of the Republic of North Ossetia”, thus explicitly giving up on the Ingush territorial claims. By the end of 1994 over a thousand Ingush IDPs returned to their villages.

President Aushev’s signing of documents which practically repudiated the territorial claims to North Ossetia produced strong dissatisfaction among the nationalists. His policy to never insist on the return of the land, but demand the return of the refugees was for them an unacceptable trade-off. Aushev’s opponents considered the construction of a new capital as another major retreat, namely giving up on the Ingush claims to the right-bank side of Vladikavkaz:

*The greatest crime was the foundation of Magas. The Ingush have their capital- Vladikavkaz. Aushev was sent by Moscow to ensure the territorial claims of Ossetia. Bamatgirej Mankiev, Member of Ingush Parliament 2003-2008, former Deputy of Supreme Soviet of ChIASSR.*

For the same reasons, nationalistically oriented opponents of Aushev were against the off-shore zone “Ingushetia”, treating it as a political carrot offered by the Kremlin in return for concessions on the territorial claims. These disagreements coupled with the still tremendously difficult economic and political situation transformed into 33% reduction of voters’ support to Aushev in the 1997 elections.

Another issue which caused a major political controversy in Ingushetia was the republican policy on Chechnya. President Aushev was extremely critical of the federal government for launching the wars in Chechnya. He opened the border to Chechen IDPs and invested a great effort in assisting them in Ingushetia. For this, the Ingush nationalists accused him of defending the Chechen interests more than the Ingush ones.

Ingushetia was affected by the Chechen war not only as a host to refugees but also directly. In 1995 the Ingush mountain villages of Dattikh and Arshty were repeatedly bombed by federal forces which caused human losses. In October 1995 the civilian airport in Ingushetia was subjected to an aerial attack by seven helicopters of the federal forces. Then paratroopers landed and they as well subjected to fired people waiting for the passenger plane from Moscow (Serdalo 3 October, 1995). Federal units illegally entered the territory of Ingushetia. The Ingush government and parliament protested. Aushev demanded that military prosecutors immediately start investigations into the illegal actions of the 58<sup>th</sup> army, travelled to the attacked settlements and urged the population “not to react to provocations and not to let Ingushetia be dragged into the war” (Serdalo February 27, 1996 , March 6 1996). Moreover, Aushev facilitated negotiations between the Russian government and the Chechen leadership and was the middle man in many of them. President Aushev travelled abroad and met with the Ambassadors of the USA, and the EU countries in Moscow. He also held press-conferences strongly condemning the wars in Chechnya (Serdalo: 28 February 1995). He hosted Russian and international organizations in Ingushetia, who documented war crimes by the federal forces.

Yeltsin tolerated Aushev with difficulty, but once Vladimir Putin replaced him and launched his “strengthening the Russian statehood” project, Aushev resigned before the end of his term (December 28, 2001). The first Ingush President never explained publically his resignation, but most experts agree that he probably understood that he was unable to go on working with the new leaders in Moscow.

Until his voluntary resignation at the end of 2001, Aushev controlled the security services on his territory and succeeded in preventing “the counter-terrorist” operations of the federal forces from spilling over into Ingushetia. Immediately after his resignation mop-up operations a la Chechen scenario (involving grave human rights abuses) started in Ingushetia. At the same time armed groups resisting the federal forces became more active in Ingushetia, attacking the security services and troops. By 2007 Ingushetia fully became a hot spot, and since 2008 – the area of the most intense armed confrontation in the North Caucasus. Aushev’s opponents consider him responsible for these developments. By opening borders to the Chechens, they claim, he created a breeding ground for fundamentalists and radicals in Ingushetia.

Aushev’s challengers were mostly nationalists, who were disappointed with his stand on the Ingush territorial claims and his over-assertive pro-Chechen position. Nonetheless these challengers were not able to, or consciously abstained from standing up against the Aushev administration.

*After his first term, there were people who wanted to overthrow him [Ruslan Aushev- E.S. ]. They came to me and said: “let’s organize actions of civic disobedience”. I said “I am not going against him. The Ingush Republic is a feeble child, it can die if we start fights”. I respected him for not allowing the soldiery to cross over into Ingushetia,” Issa Kodzoev, Ingush poet, writer, leader of national party Nijskho*

There was no open opposition to Aushev in 1992-2001. Neither did he ever use repression against political dissent. The Ingush Parliament had limited powers vis-à-vis President and although the relations between the executive and the legislative got sometimes tense, the parliament was not a strong constraining factor on the President. Thus, the internal system of checks and balances was existent but not very prominent in Ingushetia of 1992-2001.

The first part of this chapter showed that in conditions very similar to Chechnya, an efficient government prevented the Ingush polity from failing. A creative approach and a consistent effort to find ways out of the crises prevented Ingush society from criminalization, gave modest results in revitalizing the economy and an impetus to the development of the Ingush systems of

education and healthcare. The contradictions between Aushev's supporters and opponents were ideological and did not involve pre-existing structures or kin-groups.

## 7.5. State-building and Informal Social Institutions and Practices in Ingushetia (1992-2001)

### 7.5.1. Teips and Familias

Similarly to Chechnya, the national revival in Ingushetia went hand in hand with the revival of fashion on teips. Ingush teips held congresses in the mountains, in their familial towers and castles to enhance teip solidarity and discuss current social and political issues.

*Three years ago our Elders organized a trip to the mountains for all our men. We spent three days in the mountains, cleaning our tower, recollecting stories and legends about our teip. It was much fun. I now know lots of things about my teip. We have a rich history. There are so many of us, I was surprised"* Roustam Yandiev, Vezherij-yurt, aged 24 (Interviewed in June 2003)

Idris Abadiey, a successful Ingush businessman and politician explained why he sponsored teip gatherings:

*In the late 1990s my brother and I organized several times congresses, and invited people to the mountains. We slaughtered cows, and boiled meat. We also brought Chechens, who belong to our teip. Their seniors had tears on their eyes when they learnt about their family roots. In Soviet times only those who were close maintained kin relationships. The rest had already forgotten that they were Evloevs, started to intermarry. We wanted to unite them.* Idris Abadiey, Ingush businessman, MP of the Peoples Assembly-Parliament, 2d calling

Teip congresses resulted in some coordinated actions. Visiting mountainous Ingushetia, where Ingush familial towers and castles are located, one would see that many *familias* have undertaken attempts to restore their family relics. Some wired electricity and planted orchards and had their teip representative (usually one senior per teip) move to live in the towers. In the summer of 2009 I interviewed senior Alikhan Evloev, who moved to the Evloev's tower complex in the place called Pyaling, 14 years ago with his young wife. He lives there all year round, breeds horses, bees and cattle, invites visitors for tea and stories about Pyaling, and cultivates a friendship with the generals of the frontier troops stationed nearby.

A member of the Ozdov teip, Alikhan Dozariev, told me that during the first congress of the Ozdovs in 1995, the teip decided to pave a 5 kilometer road to their most famous tower “*Vovnushki*”, a late medieval castle, which is included in the register of the “Miracles of Russia”. They collected money, and paved the road, but were unable to carry out the restoration works, since this had to be done by the Minister of Culture and involve professional architects. “We also decided to have one representative of each *familia* comprising the Ozdov teip to actually live in the towers, and maintain them”. However, as of the summer of 2009, no members of Ozdov teip permanently resided in mountain Ingushetia.

Most teips have put their cemeteries in order, and raised money among their members to build premises for praying. Thus, the Aushevs built a prayer house and engraved a genealogical tree at the entrance to the cemetery so that everyone could learn of his or her roots. Three members of the Uzhakhov *familia* gave money to build a prayer house “Джамаат-Ц1е” at the teip cemetery in the village of Barsuki. At the same cemetery a young businessman, Ruslan Uzhakov, built a house for reading Koran in memory of Teshal Uzhakhov, an associate of the 19<sup>th</sup> century Sheikh Kunta-Khadzi Kishiev, the founder of Qadiri tariqa in the North Caucasus. Six other teip members rented six hectares of land around the cemetery for 99 years, which used to be the teip lands (this way preventing other people from buying it or settling there).

Many Ingush teips undertook serious efforts to reconstruct the history of their teip, lineages, and genealogies, and put together telephone lists of the teip members. Some teips created their heraldic symbols – for example the teip symbol of Evloev teip is registered in the Russian Heraldic Society (Heraldic matricul, V.3, #434). Teips reconstructed and used in heraldic symbols the petroglyphs (*tamgi*), which were engraved on Ingush towers and castles in the mountains. A group of teips, comprising the *Tsori* society, created a website dedicated to its history, culture and current affairs – [www.tsori.ru](http://www.tsori.ru) (at the moment the site is not functioning).

Most of teip activity was focused on issues of culture and ritual. I have a protocol of a meeting of “The Council of Elders and the initiative group of the Uzhakhov teip” of January 12, 2002.

According to the protocol, 22 representatives were present from 7 settlements. A history fiend of the Uzhakhov teip, a middle-aged activist and former opera singer Magomed Umatgireevich Uzhakhov, delivered a report, in which he summarized the results of thr common efforts and proposed issues for discussion<sup>92</sup>:

- Alcohol consumption by some young and old, which “creates anxieties in the families, in the society and has a damaging effect on their health”. Measures to be discussed: to make them undergo treatment, to excommunicate them from th teip.
- Drug addiction and distribution. Measures to discuss: to make them undergo treatment, to excommunicate, to resettle them to another region of Russia, to put them to jail.
- Resolving land disputes and issues of inheritance. Question for discussion – which law to use [*secular, adat, sharia*- E.S.]
- Unresolved financial disputes. Measures proposed: to facilitate their resolution
- “Urgent issue of timely marriage for youth of both sexes and of the divorced”. Measures proposed: to create a commission
- Assistance to ill members: assistance in care at home, in hospitals, organizing treatment and diagnosis outside the republic
- Regulating issues of blood feud, reconciliation
- Mutual assistance in case of abduction of bride or other family member
- Better coordination of weddings and funerals (how, when and who informs others, who organizes the events, how much time or how many days should different teip members stay at the event and help, how should seniors be dressed, especially at funerals, why the same food is cooked at all events, why no dancing is anymore taking place at weddings, to restore dancing and stipulate in which exceptional cases should dancing be prohibited).
- Looking after the cemeteries. Obliging all teip members to write a *vosket* (a will, composed according to the Muslim tradition).
- Restoring the tower of *Uzhakh* teip
- “...in this very difficult time to be in the avant-guard of all positive state-building processes and changes for the benefit of the Ingush and Russian people as well as of our teip. For this reason to support upward mobility of our brothers and sisters, particularly those who have life experience...and intellectual capacities to government agencies, up to the UN. Or to support any candidate of any teip of the Ingush people who would be useful to the entire Ingush and the Russian people, as well as to our teip of Uzhakhovs”.

This was a rather grand agenda with serious measures proposed, however, according to the protocol, the actual discussion was focused on the creation of a Religious council with the Council of Elders to resolve ritual issues, on the use of teip land rented for 99 years, on mores, and creation of a mutual help fund. None of the issues which would involve enforcement or serious investment were even discussed (eg. excommunication of drug addicts or resolving financial disputes). The elders limited themselves to re-emphasizing the importance of a moral

<sup>92</sup> Council of Elders and the initiative group of Uzhakhov teip. 12/01/2002. Archive of the author

lifestyle and resolving conflicts according to the law. Regarding promotion of teip members to office, on the initiative of the teip activist Magomed Umatgireevich, the Elders sent a letter to the Advisor of the President of the Republic, Kambulat Uzhakhov, asking him to help teip “brothers and sisters” to get employment according to their education or to help those who do not have education to get it. This appeal seemed to remain without consequences. The issues discussed at the Uzhakhov gatherings are typical of such events. Respondents from other teips reported similar agendas at their teip gatherings. So did publications in press, covering Congresses of bigger teip unions, such as, for example, the clan public association “Tsori” (Serdalo 20 December 1997).

Magomed Umatgireevich Uzhakhov, the most active member of the Uzhakhov teip, a history fiend and the initiator of most of the Uzhakhov efforts is disappointed with the participation of his teip members. According to him, most of the initiatives have never been implemented. Raising money for common projects proved very difficult, and people’s interest was dramatically going down after 2-3 events.

*We elected the Council of Elders and the tamada. The train did not go much further than that, even the council fell apart. I made a list of people who were worth of commemorating [mainly heroes of various wars-E.S.], but we could not raise money for that. The book about Uzhakhov teip is still not published, we are lacking in funds. I even created special Uzhakhov postcards, which should be used as invitations to weddings. But they are not catching up. Magomed Uzhakhov, ex-opera singer. Activist of Uzhakh’ familia.*

The interesting part of the story is that the Uzhakhovs, who in all their documents call themselves “a teip”, are actually a lineage (nek’an) of the larger teip of the Gazdievs. The word “nek’an” (lineage, Ing), reminding of their actual belonging to the larger teip can only be found on the heraldic symbol of the Uzhakhovs. My colleague, a member of another *familia*, which in most of the sources is also classified as belonging to the Gazdiev teip and the same is suggested by their genealogy, had a long argument with me that this data was wrong, and they were a separate teip. He was very anxious that in my book I would classify their *familia* as part of the Gazdievs, for this reason I do not specify which familia he belonged to, but re-emphasize the

confusion between teips and lineages, scrutinized in Chapter 4 and the actual relevance of lineages rather than teips, even in Ingushetia.

As the story of the Uzhakhovs demonstrates (and this seems to be a typical story in this respect), a teip has usually several middle-aged activists with a strong teipist ideology, who either romanticize the teip or want to use its support for political purposes. However, most of the other teip members, including the seniors, are usually not interested in enforcing teip discipline over individuals or extended families:

*We had a Council of Elders. The Chair was Sulumbek-Khadzi, a mullah. I told him, we should enforce discipline, but he did not want discipline for some reason. He actually contributed to our disintegration. The Council existed till the elections [2002-E.S.] and then the election split us.*  
Idris Abadiyev, Ingush businessman and politician

In most teips Councils of Elders did not turn into a working institution, they met only rarely on some very special occasions, but otherwise seniors get together to perform their ritual function at weddings and funerals. In short, teip congresses played an important role in the dissemination of knowledge about the teip and the awareness of teip history, and of individual roots. The teip members started visiting more distant relatives for weddings and funerals, rituals became better coordinated, and family cemeteries taken a better care of.

The Uzhakhovs are a medium-sized teip and its representatives told me that they never tried to organize themselves politically, because “*this is ineffective. We can never concur in political opinions. Moreover, this is dangerous for our security*”, Daud Uzhakhov, Altievo.

However, large teips, did attempt to mobilize politically or discussed the possibility of such mobilization, during the Presidential elections of 1998 and 2002. None of the Ingush teips was able to vote in an organized manner. Some abstained from even trying to do so for various reasons. The Barkinkhoev teip decided that taking sides would threaten the position of teip members in society. Taking the side of one candidate would automatically mean positioning all members against the others. Since the elections outcomes are unpredictable this was undesirable.



*Before the 1998 elections of Aushev the seniors of the Barkinkhoev teip got together. I was elected to represent the Kotiev familia. Our Barkinkhoev scholars, professors and doctors of science were talking, expressing their opinions. Afterwards we deliberated and came to a conclusion that everyone should vote the way they wanted, although anyone has the right to express an opinion and share it with the others. One of our seniors, aged 75-80, spoke up and said “All the candidates are dignified, educated people, with their familias, their convictions and we can have nothing against any of them. We should not divide people by familias or categories, we have suffered enough and we should not split the people. That is why everyone should vote for him/herself”... You see if we made a decision to vote in an organized manner, we would have had to declare it publically in front of the nation. And such things would never be forgotten or forgiven, this would be remembered for generations on. It could have an impact on our offsprings, so our seniors said that they forbid to even raise the issue of organized voting in the future. Magomed-Sali Kotiev, teip barkinkhoy*

The two largest Ingush teips – *ozdoj* and *jovloj* had their representatives running for the presidency and they tried to organize disciplined voting, which in both cases failed. Both times, the initiative came from politically active teip members who tried to use teip support as a resource for boosting their positions:

*The second time when there were the elections of Aushev in 1998, there was an attempt to get all the Ozdoevs together. Boris Ozdoev, a judge, was also running for the presidency. So there was an attempt to unite and support Boris. I remember how our seniors argued: Boris is an educated, decent person, he is our relative. But what can Boris give to the entire people? So they made a statement, saying that electing a President is a responsibility. That is why everyone has to decide for himself, because tomorrow everyone will have to be responsible for this decision. They said that electing the President should not depend on the teip. But, honestly, everyone supported Aushev, not Boris. It should not be this way that we elect a family person the President. President is a national position. Alikhan Dozariev, teip ozdoj*

The most dramatic story of deconsolidation was that of the Evloev teip, which, according to its representatives “split completely” in the process of trying to form a common position on the 2002 elections, after Aushev’s voluntary resignation. During these elections, 8 candidates were running, Aushev’s team was represented by Mikhail Gutseriev, the “founding father” and the head of administration of the off-shore zone “Ingushetia”, while the Kremlin put its stake on an FSB general, Murat Zyazikov. This is what Idris Abadiyev, an MP, a candidate to the presidency, and a member of the Evloev teip told me about these elections:

*In 2002 my brother and I were running for the presidency. We had the following tactic- we wanted to first run both of us, because he was better known in Moscow and I had more influence*

*in Ingushetia, and then we planned that in the last moment one of us would withdraw and focus voters on the other. Evloevs is a huge teip, if all Evloevs unite- that's it, no president can be elected, unless supported by them. We had tremendous chances to win. So, what did Gutseriev do? He had the head of his guard - Evloev, a good guy. Then he was in close contact with Vakha Evloev, a champion of Europe in wrestling, and then there was the third Evloev- Evloev Zakri, who several times ran for Parliament. And the fourth was Maskurov; he was Vice-Premier in Aushev's government. Gutseriev encouraged all of them to run! Plus me and my brother, six Evloevs! This way Gutseriev fragmented us. Zakri Evloev right away acknowledged that he was Gutseriev's man. Vakha Evloev later announced on TV that he withdraws in favor of Gutseriev. Maskurov turned out stronger, but even he proved to be a Gutseriev man. This is how we were fragmented. As a result not Gutseriev or a Evloev, but this Zyazikov came to power. Idris Abadiyev, teip Jovloj, candidate to presidency 2000.*

Experts find this incapacity to mobilize the teip quite natural:

*When Ruslan Aushev was running for the second time, there were 8 other candidates. Among them were representatives of big teips- Kostoev Issa, Albogachieva (Lejmoev), Evloevs. They calculated that if the representatives of their teips vote for them, Ruslan won't get more than 50%. Then they would unite in the second round and win. There was also Aushev Mukharbek running against Ruslan, to split the Aushevs. I understood this situation. I was telling them: do not expect your teips to give you many votes. Ruslan is very respected, people are interested not in which position you get, but how the republic is governed. All the candidates from other big teips got 33% in the first round. Ozdoev, who has the largest teip, received about 1000 votes. Albogachiev- 600! Kostoev received 13%, but he was a respected man. They tried to mobilize the teip factor, but they failed. Now time has changed. Now it is the individual family that is in the center of everything, not the teip. The teip can only give you moral support, especially in the cases of blood feud. But for political positions we now choose respected people. Mukhtar Buzurtanov, MP, deputy Minister of Interior 1995-1997*

This section has argued that 1992-2001 was the period of revival of teip identity in Ingushetia.

Many Ingush teips, but especially lineages (*familias*) undertook significant efforts to consolidate, to research and popularize their history, coordinate rituals, increase solidarity and solve certain social problems, like low morality, alcohol consumption and insufficient state capacity to provide care to the needy and ill. Some of the teips tried to consolidate politically and defend their interests through elections of teip members to state institutions. However, the teip turned out incapable not only to develop a common political position, or to agree on a candidate from among its members, but also to have any significant impact on the resolution of social problems. Anything that required commitment, either money or time did not move very far. The teip remained a loose identity, which had a different relevance to different people, depending on their ideology and beliefs. The findings of my fieldwork prove that in Ingushetia, similarly to

Chechnya, lineage had become the main focus of reference when descent groups are concerned. Moreover, in Ingushetia some lineages have forgotten their ties to the larger teip or lost their feeling of attachment. The role of descent groups is limited to ritual, match-making and culture, preservation of some ethnic history and collective memories. The role of seniors is also mostly limited to ritual and some symbolic support of statehood. Teip/lineage consolidation has been usually initiated by middle-aged politically active members or history fiends, with a strong “teipist consciousnesses”.

#### 7.5.2. Religion

Similarly to Chechnya, in 1992-2001 there emerged a new fundamentalist Islamic movement which provoked tensions in the Islamic umma in Ingushetia.

*I was brought up in the Sufi tradition. I appealed to my Sheikh when I tried to take exams to the university. My father carried hair of Deni-Sheikh in his purse. When I was accepted to the Islamic institute I would come back home and tell my father and mother what they told us at school and how we did things wrong. They were so indignant: what are you saying about our Sheikh! This way we were labeled Wahhabists. The religious conflict was superimposed on the Wajnakh hierarchy. The older generation has this attitude: “Who are you, milksop!” It was hard for them to accept us. Moldi, 1969, Ingushetia*

The Islamic Institute received books from Saudi Arabia, brought to Ingushetia by a delegation headed by the Ambassador of Saudi Arabia to the Russian Federation. According to my respondents in Aushev’s government, the President himself was not religious. However, he thought it was necessary to revive Islam, which could play an important role in the upbringing of theyouth. But he was for traditional Islam and in order to resist fundamentalist tendencies introduced Sufi Islam as a subject at schools, and closed the fundamentalist Islamic Institute in Malgobek.

Akhmed Malsagov, a Chair of government remembered how President Aushev ousted an official delegation from Saudi Arabia, which arrived to Ingushetia through the Ministry of Emergency Situations of the Russian Federation:

*A delegation from Saudi Arabia arrived. They said they would build a hospital and the largest mosque in Europe here in Ingushetia. Aushev literally ousted them from the republic. He said:*

*send them away, they are Wahhabists, spies. “I was so embarrassed, I said: “Ruslan, they were sent by the Russian Ministry, they are our guests”, but he would not listen, just shouted”: I don’t want to see them here!” The delegation was very offended and later we had problems with the Russian Foreign Ministry. They said that we had no right to deport an official delegation. This is how much we were afraid of this Wahhabism. Akhmed Malsagov, Minister of Finances, Chair of Government (1997-2001)*

By 1998 the problem of Islamic fundamentalism became of serious concern to the republican authorities, who witnessed the developments in the Chechen republic and clearly identified fundamentalism as a threat. In 1997 in his annual appeal to the nation Ruslan Aushev called Wahhabism “a harmful movement”. In 1998 he issued a decree on regulating the activity of religious educational establishments and supervised the development of a joint action plan of the Spiritual Board (Muftiyat) and the state agencies (Serdalo 8 January, 1998). All the Imams of Ingushetia were to receive salaries from the state budget. Missionaries from other states were advised to leave the republic (Serdalo 5 August 1998). On August 17, 1998 a meeting of the leaders of the Spiritual Boards of the North Caucasian Republics was held in Nazran, which created the Coordinating Center of the Muslims of the North Caucasus with its headquarters in Ingushetia, aimed at resisting Wahhabism (Serdalo 26, 27 August).

Fundamentalism did not get widespread until the beginning of the second Chechen war. Aushev managed to control and marginalize fundamentalist groups and did not give too many reasons for their criticism – the state respected the freedom of conscience, mosques mushroomed, Uraza-Bajram and Kurban Bajram (the two main Muslim festivals) were state holidays in Ingushetia and days off, the sale of alcohol was prohibited during Ramadan, Islam was introduced as a subject at schools, and Aushev legalized polygamy. On top of all of this government was doing its best to somehow deliver social goods to the population, and there were no major violations of human rights, which fundamentalists usually use to garner support. Aushev’s critical position of the federal policy in Chechnya made him a respected figure among Chechen field commanders, who abstained from challenging his regime.

### 7.5.3. Elite formation: Kinship, Personal Networks, Ideology (Program)

One can hear polar opinions on the role of kinship in President Aushev's government. Usually the evaluation of prominence of kinship ties in 1992-2001 depended on a respondent's attitude to Aushev as a politician and his state-building efforts in the Ingush Republic.

His opponents would start to enthusiastically tell the story of how Ingushetia was turned into Aushetia, and all the most important positions were occupied by the President's relatives:

*Under Aushev Ingushetia was turned into Aushetia. All key positions were occupied by the Aushevs. In Karabulak, all city mayors were Aushevs. This happens when a person becomes president, his teip, which is otherwise dormant, would wake up and unite around him. Nurdin Kozdov, Ingush historian*

*Aushev did promote his close relatives. He said "What can I do if the Aushevs are educated, they were studying when others made money at seasonal jobs. But Aushev is a big familia. He often trusted them not as relatives, but as specialists." At the same time, take Gutseriev, he belonged to the Beshtoev familia. Gutserievs are a very small lineage- 10-15 households. But what has he done for them? He is one of the 30 richest men in the country. He could have given a million rubles to every household, buy land slots for everyone in one place and ensure their comfortable life. But he did not do that. Magomed-Sali Kotiev, member of national movement ("Diakeste").*

Idris Abadiyev, the Ingush businessman and politician quoted earlier, who has a very strong "teipist consciousness" and invested much effort and money in organizing the Evloev teip politically, explained with bitterness that although there were Evloevs in the government, they were Aushev team members, rather than Evloev teip members and were not supportive of, or accountable to the teip:

*In Aushev's government there were Evloevs. The Minister of Employment was Evloev, so was deputy minister for social development. But any Evloev who is appointed by them, is not listening to the Evloevs anymore, he becomes their man. Teip representation does not matter, there is president and everybody complies with what he says. This has destroyed Ingush democracy: we have never had presidents or tsars. Idris Abadiyev, Ingush businessman and politician, Evloev teip*

Although some of my respondents, especially those very critical of Aushev emphasized the role of kinship in his government, the majority claimed that informal social institutions of teips or virds were not relevant in the process of Ingush state-building in 1992-2001. The main principle for recruiting people to positions in the government and at state enterprises was adherence to

Aushev's course, i.e. programmatic, meritocratic, in the President's own understanding of the world – the person had to be effective, not corrupt and share the ideology of his team. According to my respondents who were supporters of Aushev, the President did not preferentially treat his relatives; neither did he discriminate against them for being such. Thus, Aushevs were represented in the government structures, if they professionally fit the position, and he fired them or fought with them when they did not:

*There was no clanship in Aushev's time. Of course the way to politics is not open to everyone. A milking lady cannot be a politician. All of Ingushetia is covered with a net of kinship ties. Less than 70,000 people returned from the exile, roughly 30% of them children, 30% younger adults, 30% Elderly. Of these 30,000 younger adults a nation multiplied which now numbers half a million. Thus, most of us are relatives in some way. If a relative is educated, with a potential to growth, why not hire him? But when someone is appointing an idiot because he is a relative, this is clan stupidity. Keeping a vird or teip balance for us is not relevant. We are one nation and teip or vird balancing would get us back to the 19<sup>th</sup> century. The main criterion is professionalism. What if some teips do not have a person who could be a statesman? It's not for everyone. Dagestan has such a system of balance since times immemorial. As a result they have divided into groups and fight with each other for power. Ingush society does not need a teip-vird-based political consolidation. Daud Garakoev, MP to Ingush Peoples Assembly, 3d Assembly. Leader of regional division of "Yabloko" party.*

*Our teips play a great consolidating role. Without them we would not have preserved our culture and traditions. There's nothing wrong with that. It is bad if the teip system is used for political ends. Aushev had no teip-based approach to cadres. A wise leader should not use this structure in politics, but only for preserving traditions and culture. Ayup Gagiev, MP of Ingush Parliament, 3 Assembly 2003-2008. Head of group of advisors of the President of Republic Ingushetia 1995–2000, 2000-2002 deputy Minister of Justice of RI.*

Mukhtar Buzurtanov, who has worked with every government (Aushev, Zyazikov and now Evkurov), thinks that in fact there were not many Aushevs in government and "Aushetia" is a term invented by "malicious gossipers" from the national movements:

*In opposition to Aushev were members of the national movement whom he did not invite to power, never supported them and kept them at a distance. These were evil tongues who called Ingushetia-Aushetia. There were 4-5 Aushevs at prominent positions in the republic, and he fired them just as often when they underperformed. Mukhtar Buzurtanov, deputy Minister of Internal Affairs, (1995-1997), deputy chair of the National Assembly 1999 -*

One of the main political challengers of Aushev during his second term was his teip-member, Mukharbek Aushev, who was an Deputy of the Russian State Duma from Ingushetia. By 1996 the confrontation between the two Aushevs became so prominent that it spilt into the media. In 1998 Mukharbek started to use dirty tricks and suggested that Ruslan Aushev was almost an accomplice to the abductors of people and negotiated with them the exchanges of hostages

(Serdalo December 8, 1998). Magomed-Sali Aushev, an member of the Ingush parliament was one of his critics, and during several episodes of tensions between the parliament and the president, was taking the side of his opponents.

President Aushev very often dismissed ministers, heads of state-departments and governmental agencies. In 1992 he passed a decree forbidding to transfer civil servants, who were dismissed for bad performance or immoral behavior to other equal positions, which used to be a common practice in Soviet times (Ingushetia 15 December 1993). Especially in 1993-1994 the Ministers were often replaced after just several months in office. In 1995-1996 the situation somewhat stabilized, but firing people remained typical of Aushev's style of government. Very often Aushev would fire a minister or medium level official and have central republican newspapers publish a decree stating that the person was dismissed "for inadequate performance" (see eg. Serdalo 25 March 2000). Naturally by the end of his term Aushev had quite a few enemies in the republic. The frequent rotation of cadre was explained by some as Aushev's attempts to break the old style of government and the old networks of nepotism and corruption, but also to get rid of inefficient and unprofessional leaders. Others attributed the frequent reshuffles in the government to the quick temper of the President. The appendix contains a list of government officials of top and medium level (but in charge of an institution/state department or region), compiled from the newspapers Serdalo and Ingushetia, the decrees of President Aushev and articles quoting state officials in 1992-2001. Since some of the issues of both newspapers are missing from the libraries of St Petersburg, Moscow and Nazran, the list may be incomplete, but it contains most of the names with the titles. Some of the officials stayed in office quite briefly, but for the purpose of this study it is important to register the fact that they were recruited in the elite. As has been stated in Chapter 4 the Ingush familias represent lineages or teips. Thus, analyzing family-names (and sometimes villages of origin) one can establish kinship ties of the government officials with some certainty. The results of the analysis confirm that the Aushevs

(both members of teip Aushev and Aushev familia) were somewhat over-represented in the official institutions in Ingushetia in 1992-2001.

Thus, there were seven senior officials of the Aushev familia, nine of the Aushev teip (7 Aushevs + 2 Toldievs) compared to eight representatives of Evloev teip, three representatives of Ozdoev teip (Evloy and Ozdoy are the two largest teips in Ingushetia), seven representatives of large Barkinkhoyev teip and five of Gorokoy teip. All of the other teips had three or less representatives.

Table 7.1. Teip representation in Ingush political elite 1992-2001 (four and more representatives)

Teip	Number of officials
Aushev	9
Jovloy	8
Barkinkhoy	7
Gorokoy	5
Malsag	4
Barakhoy	4
Khulakhoy	4

Akhmed Malsagov, who acknowledged that President Aushev was not deprived of “teipist consciousness”, said that at least three out of seven Aushevs were nonetheless replaced by the President during his two terms in the office.

*There is no clan politics, this is a misperception. In this period, the main criterion for elite recruitment was dedication to Aushev’s vision of Ingush statehood, and support of his policies... There was no clanship, but there was an element of kinship. There were Aushevs in the team, but importantly, if an Aushev would perform badly or behave in an inadequate manner, Ruslan would punish him very strictly. There were many cases like that. For example, Bashir Aushev was the first Minister of Internal Affairs, but he was caught taking a bribe and was fired and punished by Aushev.* Akhmed Malsagov, Minister of Finances, Chair of Government 1997-2002.

Aushev’s team included quite a few non-Ingush (Russians and representatives of other non-Caucasian ethnic groups). For many years the Prime-Minister was an ethnic Russian from Voronezh, Boris Agapov, Aushev’s friend, who also fought in Afghanistan (since 1992 until today Ruslan Aushev Presides over the Society of Afghan war veterans). Several veterans of the Afghan war of various nationalities were Aushev’s team. For example Ruslan Pliev, who used to be the head of government administration and later the chair of parliament and the Minister of Emergency situations (Kovalskaya 1996).



Interestingly, the Russian members of Aushev's team did not differ in rhetoric or way of thinking from their Ingush colleagues. Agapov would refer to Ingush and Ingushetia as "our people", "our republic", would condemn Chechen war and the actions of the federal generals, moreover, he, rather than Ruslan Aushev would speak about the "imperial ambitions" and the "Russian chauvinism" of the federal center (Kovalskaya: 1996). In other words, Russians, were part of Aushev's team, sharing its ideology just as much as the Ingush.

This is how Agapov explained the frequent change of cadre during Aushev's presidency:

Our main criterion for a leader is his professionalism. He has to be a good manager, to be able to organize work well. The important qualities of the leader should be indisputable honesty and patriotism. He has to have clean hands and a clear soul and be devoted to his republic...he should remember that he is working not to promote himself, not for the sake of the material well-being of his family, but for his people and the republic. But if we see that a person is lacking in professionalism, or cannot organize work, or is dishonest, or is not a patriot of his republic, than the President makes the decision to remove such a person from office (Serdalo: 23 July 1996 #30).

In short, the main principle of Aushev's elite formation was programmatic. As we have learnt from the interviews, Ingush and even representatives of other ethnic groups dropped their teip and ethnic identities and became members of Aushev's team. As Idris Abadiyev regretted, the Evloevs, once joining Aushev's government were not accountable to their teip or lineage, but were part of the President's crew. Kinship did matter to some extent, and President Aushev was not deprived of "teipist consciousness", but, according to most of my respondents, even his critics, the President treated Aushevs in power equally.

## Conclusion

This chapter analyzed the 1992-2001 state-building project in Ingushetia, which was an outcome of the Ingush national movement and the Ingush-Ossetian armed conflict of 1992. In this conflict the Ingush had been defeated, which intensified their feeling of insecurity, stirred up memories of grievance and alienation from the Russian state. At the same time, ethnic conflict was conducive to internal consolidation, feeling of solidarity which provided Ingush society with

what Dankward Rustow called “a strong sense of prior community”, that “was taken for granted”; which political science usually takes as an important prerequisite for successful state-building (Rustow 1970:346). Unlike the Chechens, the Ingush did not suffer “birth defects” of the political nation.

Ingushetia’s first President Ruslan Aushev managed to consolidate the post-conflict society by his resolute, yet non-confrontational style of leadership and his ability to defend the interests of the Ingush people in front of the federal center as well as to play an important role in the regional affairs. Remarkably, Aushev’s unprecedented ability to consolidate was not based on nationalism; quite the contrary, his policy was one of ethnic inclusion and marginalization of the nationalists.

The chapter analyzed the efforts of Aushev’s government to build the republican statehood: economy and infrastructure (industry, agriculture, budget security, foreign investments), enforce law, provide education and healthcare. Creativity and consistent efforts to find ways out of a tremendously difficult situation helped the Ingush government to maintain the precarious stability, prevent the republican economy from a total collapse, Ingush society from criminalization, and give an impetus to the development of the Ingush educational system, healthcare and infrastructure. Large-scale construction carried out due to funds available from the profits of the off-shore Zone „Ingushetia“ was conducive to the positive feelings of hope and sense of protection by the Ingush population, who, as even the harshest critics of Aushev admit „have accepted this government as their own“. Despite the criticism related to the effectiveness of the use of profits from the off-shore zone, clearly never before or after Aushev’s presidency has Ingushetia seen so much of public construction and development in one decade. This was a radical difference from Chechnya, which in the same time moved towards total collapse.

The issues of contention and the central political tensions within the Ingush society in 1992-2001 were between Aushev’s vision of Ingushetia- modernizing, multi-ethnic, self-sufficient and open to neighboring nations and nationalists’ vision of statehood – traditionalist, ethnocentric,

isolationist towards neighbors. The main issues of disagreement were ideological - ways of to deal with the consequences of the Ingush-Ossetian armed conflict and the Chechen Wars or economy which although produced discontent on behalf of the part of the population, never transformed into a real cleavage or produced organized opposition.

Finally the chapter analyzed the role of informal actors in the Ingush state-building of 1992-2001. It argued that similarly to Chechnya in the 1990s were the period of retro-fashion on teips and descent groups. Many Ingush teips *familias* reconstructed their genealogies, family histories, restored familial cemeteries, coordinated rituals, and generally “turned to their roots”. Descent groups became somewhat more integrated and better organized in respect of tradition and ritual, however, were unable to find their niche in the modern life of the society, solve any social problems, which they aimed to target like low morality, alcohol consumption and insufficient state capacity to provide care to the needy and ill. The attempts of some teips to consolidate politically and defend their interests through elections failed dramatically. This chapter has shown that the Ingush teip and even familia had disintegrated, they are not political units, and exist at the level of loose identity which had a different relevance to different people, depending on their personal outlook. The Imperial and then Soviet state managed to contain teip to the domains of ritual and tradition, and it remained as such, playing insignificant role even in the life of individual families.

Religion was an important factor of the 1992-2001 Ingush state-building. On the one hand, Aushev’s government supported Islamic revival. On the other hand, the appearance of fundamentalism created tensions in the republic. Aushev managed to control and marginalize fundamentalist groups and did not give many reasons for their criticism.

Religion did not play any role in Aushev elite formation, the main principle for recruitment of cadres was professionalism and ideology – a shared vision of republican statehood. When joining the government, Ingush and representatives of non-Wajnakh ethnic groups dropped their teip and ethnic identities and became members of Aushev’s team. As Idris Abadiyev regretted, his

teipsmen -Evloevs – when members of Aushev’s government were not interested in their teip or lineage, but were part of Aushev’s crew. Kinship did matter, and President Aushev was not deprived of “teipist consciousness”, moreover, Aushevs were overrepresented in key positions at state institutions. At the same time according to most of my respondents, even his critics, Aushevs in power were treated equally strictly if they underperformed. The fact that President Aushev was able to bring so many of members of his familia into the republican elite should be explained by the fact that no system of political checks and balances existed in the republic. According to the Constitution of the Ingush Republic, the parliament had very limited leverage over cadre policy, while the opposition was not organized.

The Ingush government in 1992-2001 set the goal of creating a Weberian rational –legal bureaucracy in Ingushetia. Their success in this endeavor was very modest, but there is a full consensus among all of my respondents that at least among top-level officials there was little corruption and Ledeneva’s mechanisms of mutual covering up and of economy of favors were existent, but marginal.

Using Migdal’s ideal-type classification of interrelations between the state and social organizations, Aushev’s government followed the “accommodation” pattern, towards traditional informal actors, like descent groups and Islamic brotherhoods (Migdal 1988:25). The autonomy of the state with respect to social structure in Aushev’s presidency was significant, and accommodation happened outside the political system. The Ingush government did not seek participation or legitimization of informal actors, as did Dudaev, but allowed them to peacefully coexist and live their own lives. Pre-existing informal patterns of social integration, in turn, had internalized the idea of the “autonomy of the state”, and did not press for greater participation of informal actors in politics. Nationalists being discredited by the Ingush-Ossetian conflict did not dare to challenge Aushev’s regime. Aushev’s policy, in his turn, was to marginalize the ideological opposition, which, however, did not involve persecution or repression.

Table 7.2. Informal actors’ behavior toward the government (Ingushetia 1992-2001)

Accommodating/ non-interfering	Challenging/Disrupting
descent (teips, familias)	
Sufi brotherhoods	
nationalist movements	

Aushev's regime was consolidated, both because it had no organized challengers and because the President enjoyed large support among the population, which was reflected in the results of the elections. The lack of organized opposition and parliament with very limited powers to influence the government appointments, were conducive to nepotism and Aushevs government had a much higher percent of relatives or representatives of kin groups in his elite compared to Chechnya under Dudaev or under Maskhadov.

Table 7.3. below indicates the prominence of the five dominant patterns of integration in the Ingush political elite of 1992-2001. It shows that the most prominent pattern of integration was ideology; descent and kinship had significant presence, the role of religion was marginal and of territory- nil.

Table 7.3. Prominence of patterns of social integration in elite formation in Ingushetia 1992-2002

where 1-insignificant; 2- some presence, 3 – significant, 4- prominent 5- very prominent

	Ingushetia 1992-2001
Descent group	significant
Kinship	significant
Territory	-
Religion	insignificant
Ideology	prominent

Table 7.4. Internal constrains on the Ingush government 1992-2001

where 1 - negligible; 2- weak , 3 – significant, 4- prominent 5- very prominent

Government	Checks and balances	Opposition within the system	Risk (of physical elimination)	Risk (prosecution for illegal economic activity)
Ingushetia 1992-2001	3	1	1	1

“The clan politics” argument does not apply to Ingushetia during the Presidency of Aushev in 1992-2001. The main criteria for elite recruitment were shared values and efficiency, in the conditions of low risk of physical elimination for government leaders or of their prosecution of illegal economic activity, President Aushev could afford not to have a tightly knit political team, based on strong ties. Relatives in his teams were dismissed from office as often as non-kin. The main political division in the process of state-building was ideological (between Aushev’s vision of Ingush-state-building and that of the nationalists); descent groups played no organized role in politics, although serious attempts to use them as a resource had been undertaken by activists of some teips.

Modern secular national consolidation and a feeling of identity protection offered by Aushev’s government are acknowledged even by the critics of Aushev. At the same time the Ingush state-building of 1991-2002 did not result in the institutionalization of the system, but produced a highly personalized paternalistic presidential political regime strongly dependent on the consolidating capacities of President Aushev.

## **8. Personalistic Regimes: Ingushetia under Murat Zyazikov (2002-2008) and Chechnya under Kadyrovs (2003- current)**

Before finalizing the findings, I will briefly sketch out two extreme cases of personalistic regimes in Ingushetia and Chechnya. Both of these regimes are normally referred to as ‘clan-based’ or ‘teip-based’ by many Russian analysts and politicians. These are Ingushetia under President Zyazikov (2002-2008) and Chechnya under the Kadyrovs (2003- current). I do not dedicate separate chapters to these case studies and do not analyze the state-building efforts in these periods, because there was no political autonomy or an authentic, independent political process of any kind in either case. Both leaders were installed by the federal center and kept there by force due to the support of Moscow. Moreover, they were both guaranteed impunity for

crimes committed in office. One of these regimes was egregiously corrupt and the other egregiously violent. Both created highly personalistic polities based on full loyalty to the leader. One (Ingush) was totally inefficient; the other (Chechen) is successful in maintaining order running state services.

#### 8.1. Ingushetia under Murat Zyazikov: 2002-2008

In May 2002 Murat Zyazikov, an FSB general and a protégé of Vladimir Putin, was elected the President of Ingushetia (with numerous violations registered during elections). With Zyazikov's arrival the situation changed dramatically: if President Aushev managed to contain the actions of the federal forces to Chechnya, President Zyazikov was installed to ensure the freedom of action of the federal security services in Ingushetia. Mop-up operations started, which involved grave human rights violations, such as disappearances and summary executions. They were carried out first in Chechen refugee camps, but then increasingly throughout the republic. President Zyazikov did not try to control the security services on his territory and turned a blind eye on mass human rights abuses. In return he was given full freedom and impunity in his political and economic affairs. In June 2005 he was appointed the President of Ingushetia for another five years (by that time regional elections have been abolished in Russia).

Zyazikov's government was unprecedentedly corrupt, dramatically ineffective and violent. In his six years in office Ingushetia turned from a peaceful republic into a full-fledged conflict zone, with an armed insurgency more active than in Chechnya, with a collapsed economy, high poverty, and the worst medical care and education services in the entire North Caucasus. The end of Zyazikov's rule was marked with the emergence of large-scale public protests, which he violently crushed. Despite the massive protests, the scandals linked to abuses against famous rights defenders and journalists and the blatant squander of state property, Zyazikov enjoyed the

full support of President Putin until 2008, when, after a most brazen murder of Magomed Evloev, the leader of the anti-Zyazikov opposition, Zyazikov had to finally be replaced<sup>93</sup>.

Zyazikov was notorious for his fictitious reports to the federal center about the successes in the development of Ingushetia. Thus, in 2007 at the sixth Investment Forum in Sochi, Zyazikov declared to journalists: “In the last three years we have built 3million 233 thousand square meters of residential housing. For a small republic, this is a huge figure”. This figure was, indeed, incredible since the entire residential fund of Ingushetia before Zyazikov was not more than 3 million square meters. Zyazikov claimed to have almost doubled the republican residential fund, while the residents of Ingushetia could hardly find any newly constructed buildings apart from private houses around them (Velikovsky: September 24 2009).

Zyazikov’s report to President Putin which was broadcast on the central TV channels, in which he claimed to have launched 80 industrial enterprises in the republic, produced a furious reaction in Ingushetia, which is too small for people not to notice any of these enterprises (Velikovsky, Russkij Reporter: 24.09.09). During the first two years of Zyazikov’s rule (2002-2003) the gross regional product declined by 25%, unemployment and poverty grew from 30% to 55% and from 50% to 80% respectively. Corruption went up dramatically (Nutwood, Wild West January 30 2009).

After Zyazikov was removed the auditors of the Counting Chamber of the Russian Federation (Счетная палата РФ) carried out a budget inspection of Ingushetia in 2008 and found financial violations amounting to 1,74 billion rubles (13.4% of the budget of the republic). The report listed specific violations. A private firm ООО “Alisa” received 73. 5 million rubles of government funding as payment for the construction of a Tuberculosis

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<sup>93</sup> On August 31, 2008 when flying from Moscow to Ingushetia President Zyazikov happened to be on the same plane with his opponent, the owner of the oppositionist web-site Ingushetia.ru, Magomed Evloev. Zyazikov made a phone call, and when the plane landed, the Minister of Internal Affairs Musa Medov met him at the ladder of the plane. Medov picked up Zyazikov and left, gestures his men to get into the plane. They got on board and took Magomed Evloev away. Thirty minutes later Magomed was dumped at the Republican hospital in Nazran with a bullet in his temple. The insolent murder of the famous opposition was the beginning of Zyazikov’s end. In two months President Medvedev signed the resignation of Murat Zyazikov, which caused hilarious joy in Ingushetia, with people dancing in the streets and security servicemen shooting in the air.



prophylactic centre, which had not been built. The Ministry of Construction of the Republic with other state departments illegally transferred 139 mln rubles in full advance payment for the construction of schools, polyclinics, development of industrial infrastructure in various regions of Ingushetia. The result was that a huge amount of money was accumulated at the bank accounts of private firms. The report noted a number of minor violations, like enormous overspending on “souvenirs” by the Presidential administration. The report also noted that the government of Ingushetia completely failed to implement the special federal programs for the resettlement of families from areas with high landslide risk or to construct a rehabilitation center for handicapped children and an AIDs prophylactic center (Novikova, Dachaeva, Gazeta: May 21 2009). After Zyazikov was removed from his post, the Prosecutor’s Office of the Ingush Republic investigated 22 corruption-related cases against officials.

*Today Zyazikov rules Ingushetia. Who is behind him? His relatives, friends, close people. In my understanding, what Zyazikov presents as his team is in fact his clan, his associates, this is a union of racketeers of the people, who are stealing from their people on the background of complete lawlessness and impunity. At the same time one family cannot take over the republic. There will never be one family clan in power. This is an interest group, united by thief’s interests.* Azamat Nalgiev, Member of the Ingush Parliament of the 1<sup>st</sup> calling.

Kinship element in Zyazikov’s elite was modest, but had a prominent function. Zyazikov’s most entrusted person was his cousin, Rustanbek Zyazikov, who occupied the insignificant position of the head of his personal guard, but became the most powerful man in Ingushetia. All financial deals and agreements were negotiated and carried out by Rustanbek. It is well known that in order to get governmental position one had to pay a bribe, which was arranged through Rustanbek.

Rashid Zyazikov, another cousin of the president was implicated in lobbying business interests of certain firms to getting no-interest credits, budget loans as well as permissions for construction of other objects. The due permissions for using budget funds were usually signed by the Minister of Finances, Aset Ustilgova. For arranging permissions, Rashid Zyazikov allegedly

took 10% personal “*otkat*” (graft). Aset Ustilgova is thought to be one of the key players in financial machinations in the Republic. Her brother was the director of the spirit factory in Karabulak, and according to Ingushetia.org he received budgetary inflows for the purchase of raw materials in inflated rates. According to various sources, Ustilgova personally collected bribes (always emphasizing that most of it “goes to the boss”- i.e. Murat Zyazikov), and carried out tenders for the construction of budget-sponsored objects and other machinations through her deputy minister Alikhan Gandaloev (Ingushetia org. November 12 2008, Commersant: November 14 2008).

Alikhan Dudarov, the head of the Administration of President of Ingushetia and Boris Kamurzoev, Minister of Health (Dudarov’s brother-in-law) were implicated in major theft in the sphere of health. The Minister of Internal Affairs Musa Medov is widely known to be responsible for large scale corruption related to the “emergency situation benefits” to policemen. After the attack on Ingushetia by armed insurgents in June 2004<sup>94</sup>, Ingush policemen started to leave their jobs *en masse*, feeling that the situation developed towards an armed civil conflict. Then the federal center decided to pay Ingush policemen “emergency money”, additions to the salaries which they were supposed to get since 1992 for working in the zone of “emergency situation” (Ingush-Ossetian conflict). Those policemen, who worked for several years, were supposed to get quite significant sums, sometimes sufficient for buying a house. It is widely known in the republic that “emergency money” could be received for 40-50% *otkat* (graft) to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, in addition one had to pay for the court decision to judges who confirmed the fact of employment in police at the time. During my fieldwork I have met several people who have not worked a single day in the police but got this money, having paid due bribes. Machinations with the “emergency money” involved the Ministry of Internal Affairs, courts and lawyers (who served as ‘postmen’ preparing documents and delivering bribes to judges). My acquaintance, Musa, a defense lawyer, put it very frankly “May be this is the only

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<sup>94</sup> when 98 policemen and security servicemen were summarily executed within four and a half hours

chance in my life to make such money, I cannot miss it.” Musa bought a nice luxurious flat in the center of the new Ingush capital Magas after several months of working on “emergency” cases.

The city mayor of Nazran, Magomed Tsetchoev, reportedly sold around 15,000 land slots around Nazran, at the price of 5-6,000 euro each. This land was supposed to be allocated for private housing for free. Several of my acquaintances bought such land slots. In short, each member of Zyazikov’s team was “doing business” in his own office, sharing profits with Murat Zyazikov and helping each other in covering up the machinations, and in other issues, in Ledeneva’s terms, “exchanging favors”. For example, Nazran city mayor Tsetchoev “helped” President Zyazikov to disperse protest rallies in Nazran, while the Minister of Internal Affairs Medov “helped” him to get rid of his opponent, the owner of Ingushetia.ru Magomed Evloev. Zyazikov, in his turn, “helped” to cover them up. All were connected by *krugovaya poruka* - mutual covering up and responsibility for highly risky financial machinations.

The closest circle of Murat Zyazikov – Aset Ustilgova (Minister of Finances), Musa Medov (Minister of Internal Affairs), Ibrahim Malsagov (Prime-Minister), Akhmed Tsetchoev (major of Nazran) were not his relatives and did not belong to his teip/familia/ with him. They were united by common economic interest and relations of trust and mutual dependence based on detailed knowledge of each others financial crimes. Zyazikov’s cousins, Rashid and Rustanbek (both matrilineal cousins), were his only relatives in government. Several other relatives of Zyazikov occupied some less prominent positions, not playing any significant role:

*Zyazikov hired those who paid bribes. First and foremost you needed resources to get into the government. Then he took toadies, those who praised him, also relatives, on his mother’s and wife’s side. His wife is Chakhkieva, one of her sisters, a former school teacher, became the head of the state archive, her brother, a complete dummy, was made the head of the Licensing Committee, her father was an MP. There were not too many relatives, you just spot relatives right away and focus on them in such situations.* Nurdin Kodzoev, Ingush historian

After Zyazikov’s resignation, ingushetia.org news portal published a list of “Zyazikov’s team” members, whom they considered his close circle, and who, in the opinion of the portal, participated in plundering the republic, ensuring impunity and granting much political support to

Murat Zyazikov (see appendix). This list is a wonderful illustration how even in a truly personalistic, “clannish” regime; the overwhelming majority of members of the inner circle were not relatives.

This list of 46 close associates shows that there were only two Zyazikov’s “teip members”<sup>95</sup> in the political elite, five representatives of the largest Evloev teip, and the rest of the teips and lineages were spread quite evenly, although Ozdоеvs, who were as large of a teip as Evloevs, is slightly underrepresented. There are two Russians in the list- Yuri Turygin, the Prosecutor of Ingushetia and Mikhail Zadornov, the Chair of the Supreme Court. Turygin, whom I know personally, was among the most loyal Zyazikov’s supporters and was eagerly covering the grand financial machinations and crimes committed by Zyazikov and others. He was quite shamelessly lying on TV losing all respect in the eyes of the population in order to defend Zyazikov and his team. Once Zyazikov was replaced and the new president Yunus-Bek Evkurov started an anti-corruption campaign, Turygin eagerly joined his efforts of revealing financial fraud of his former comrades.

In short, Zyazikov’s government, which was the most personalistic and ineffective in the recent history of Ingushetia, was a trust group, tied up with common economic interests and high risk associated with large-scale illegal economic activity. This group had a minor kinship element, which was not teip-or-descent based, but included members of President Zyazikov immediate family (matrilineal cousins, since Zyazikov has no brothers), but mostly consisted of large groups of unrelated people. Nonetheless, compared to Aushev’s presidency, when the percentage of teip members was much larger, the strength of ties was incomparably higher in Zyazikov’s period. He never fired a single of his close allies for underperformance (except for mayor of Nazran Tsetchoev who was replaced as a result of a personal conflict with Zyazikov) and the rotation of cadre was very low. The lack of elections, the lack of any system of checks and balances, virtually no political autonomy from the federal center, dependent courts and

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<sup>95</sup> Zyazikov grew up in the family of his mother and bears the name of his matrilineal kin. His actual teip members (Borovs) are not at all represented in the ruling elite

ineffective prosecution in Ingushetia of 2002-2008 created a predatory system, where people who got access to channels of public good redistribution extracted resources for their own benefit and that of their close kin.

Thus, even an extreme case of paternalistic, predatory regime had nothing to do with clan or descent group, which persisted from pre-modernity to modern times. Even kinship was marginal in the making of the tightly integrated elite. The main principle of elite formation was common economic interest, shared risk of illegal economic activity and mutual covering-up.

## 8.2. Chechnya under the Kadyrovs: 2003 – current

The second Chechen war broke out in 1999. By 2003 the federal forces had gained control over most of Chechen territory, this was followed by a policy of Chechenization, whereby the federal troops mostly withdrew to their barracks, and pro-federal Chechen-manned paramilitary groups carried out operations against the combatants. The Chechenization also entailed the creation of republican institutions in a series of staged elections: a referendum for the Constitution of the Chechen Republic, which placed Chechnya within the Russian Federation, and elections of the President and the Parliament of the Chechen Republic.

The largest pro-federal military group, manned by ethnic Chechens was the so-called Security Service (“SB”, Sluzba Bezopasnosti) of Akhmad Kadyrov, commonly known as “*kadyrovtsy*”. Initially created as personal security guard of the Moscow-appointed head of Chechen administration Akhmad Kadyrov, the SB expanded into a powerful paramilitary formation which in the lifetime of Kadyrov-Senior largely remained his private army. In 2000-2004 it was partly legalized as units of the patrol service and extra departmental guard of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation, which created the legal basis for Moscow to finance them and supply them with arms. The group was commanded by Akhmad Kadyrov’s son-Ramzan (born in 1976).

Initially the SB consisted of relatives and co-villagers of Kadyrov and was formed on the basis of personal loyalty. Soon former fighters were “legalized” as part of the group, following an informal amnesty under the guarantees of Kadyrov senior and then junior. Their safety - both from the reprisals of the guerilla fighters and from prosecution by federal authorities - depended on Kadyrov’s personal protectionism.

Along with Kadyrov's relatives, co-villagers and former rebels the Security Service recruited *en masse* young men who had previously not been involved in the conflict. In the conditions of mass unemployment the Security Service was for many of them the only source of stable income. Being employed by the pro-federal security services they became automatically involved in the armed confrontation and thus became personally dependent on Kadyrov's group. After Akhmad Kadyrov was killed in a bomb blast on May 9 2004 at the Dynamo stadium in Grozny, the SB was formally abolished, but Ramzan Kadyrov was appointed vice-prime minister for the security affairs. The de facto existing SB received additional financial support and the possibility to expand. In 2004 the Second regiment of the patrol service PPS-2 named after Akhmad Kadyrov was created consisting of 1,125 men as well as the so-called Oil Regiment numbering 1,5- 2000 men. Both were part of the extra-departmental guard of the republican Ministry of Internal Affairs. They were manned by *kadyrovtsy*, who thus became legalized. In the process of reorganization of the existing structure Ramzan Kadyrov continued to actively recruit new people and set up his military units in an increasing number of towns and villages, gradually overtaking the local police stations. Eventually the former “SB” which numbered according to various estimates 4-12, 000 (the latter is probably an overestimate) of well armed and well trained people was fully legalized as part of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation. In 2004 Ramzan Kadyrov was awarded the “Hero of Russia” medal and in 2007 as soon as he turned 30 and became eligible for presidency, he was appointed by Vladimir Putin the President of Chechnya.

Movladi Baysarov's group "*Gorets*" (Mountaineer) was created at the same time as the SB, and was manned by residents of Pobedinskoje<sup>96</sup> township where Movladi was from. The group numbered 200-400 men. Movladi was a close associate of Kadyrov-Senior. The group did not have any legal status, and except for several field commanders, his fighters were not officially employed by any power agency of the RF. Since they were not part of any legal structure and had no salary from the federal budget, they made their money themselves, i.e. via control of oil revenues on their territory. Baysarov's group participated in military operations against the "terrorists" together with Russian federal servicemen and on their own. After the assassination of Akhmad Kadyrov, Movladi's relations with his son Ramzan became tense, since Ramzan who was much younger than Movladi behaved in an increasingly assertive way. Finally their tensions broke into an open confrontation. In an interview to Ekho-Moskvy radio station Baysarov called Kadyrov-the Younger "a bandit", after which his group was besieged in Pobedinskoje, and Movladi was shot dead by the personnel of the Chechen Special Forces in the center of Moscow on November 18, 2006.

The group of Magomed Kakiev, or the so-called "*Gruppa Zapad*" (Group "West") includes 300-800 men, they control the Staropromyslovsky district of Grozny, the area of Turbina, the Nadterechny district and the adjacent territories. This group is legalized and is part of the Chief Investigating Department (GRU) and the Russian Ministry of the Interior and is fully loyal to Ramzan Kadyrov.

The group "East" (*Gruppa Vostok*) was led by Sulim Yamadaev. It used to control the mountain areas of Chechnya and was part of the Ministry of Defense Troops. The group enjoyed high political standing, Sulim's brother Dzabrail was awarded the Hero of Russia medal (posthumously) and his brother Ruslan became the Deputy of the Russian State Duma. After Ramzan Kadyrov was appointed President tensions emerged between the Yamadaev brothers and him, which broke out into open conflict by spring of 2008. It started as a traffic quarrel over whose cortege should give the road to whom, and ended in an exchange of fire, when two of the

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<sup>96</sup> Also known as "The 15<sup>th</sup> milk farm", a settlement adjacent to Grozny

Yamadaev's officers were killed. Ramzan Kadyrov initiated a major smearing campaign against the Yamadaev brothers, calling them war criminals and demanding a criminal investigation of their activities. Eventually, in September 2008, despite the Yamadaev's group prominent performance during Georgian- South Ossetian conflict on the Russian side, this Ministry of Defense battalion was dissolved without explanations and two days later on September 24, 2008, one the brothers - Ruslan Yamadaev - was shot dead in the centre of Moscow. Yamadaev men partly fled, partly joined Kadyrov forces. Sulim Yamadaev was shot dead by an assassin on March 29, 2009 in Dubai. The municipal police of Dubai demanded extradition of Adam Delimkhahov, a Deputy of the Russian state Duma and a cousin of Ramzan Kadyrov.

Thus, since his father's death in 2004, Ramzan Kadyrov used the resources available to him to make his group the largest, the strongest, and legal and to dissolve all competing groupings with their leaders eliminated. Kadyrov built a sultanistic regime, incorporated or destroyed all alternative centers of power, not only military, but political and public. At the moment Chechnya is a full dictatorship, with all power centers subjected to the president. Many of the important positions are occupied by people of his inner circle: patrilineal/matrilineal relatives, co-villagers, and friends. His closest friend and ally is his cousin, Adam Delimkhanov.

Kadyrov's regime was the result of victory in the war against underground networks. His task was difficult: to defeat the combatants in the hills and to take over power rivals on the pro-federal side. This was a task of extremely high risks, which involved tremendous violence. In Chechnya with its tradition of blood feud, trust in the immediate circle – from the cook and bodyguards to members of government was a matter of survival. It is not surprising, therefore, that he had to surround himself with the most trusted people:

*Kadyrov Senior became the head of the republic. He had to rely on someone. That was a troubled time, many had their minds dim. So he relied on his kin ties.* Vakha Garsaev, Chechen ethnologist



Akhmad Kadyrov relied on his son Ramzan, who adored him as if he were God. The team which Akhmad Kadyrov started to build was then densely packed with relatives and co-villagers, friends, who were too interconnected with kinship and other ties to betray him. Ramzan was responsible for his army. He attracted them with money, weapons, cars, and protection from the “federals”. There was no hint of accommodation, so typical of Maskhadov’s style.

*Maskhadov was not using kinship connections, his co-villages. Ramzan Kadyrov has learnt from his mistakes. He had to suppress groupings. He adopted a style of government opposite to Maskhadov’s. At first he was buying people, knowing their last for money, for power. He was buying clerics and civil servants. He is buying his relatives, too.* Said-Magomed Khasiev, Chechen ethnologist

Ramzan also tied people with blood. Usually when his men caught combatants they would keep them in their secret prison, torture them, kill some of them in front of the others and this way intimidate the rest, and then offer them to change sides and work for Kadyrov. It was a choice between life and death, so most would swap sides. Soon such a new recruit would be sent to the village where he previously fought as the head of Kadyrov’s service with the task to eliminate his remaining comrades. Thus, the new arrival would soon be “tied with blood” to his new group.

Many experts and my contacts among former combatants claim that a large part of Kadyrov’s army represent more of a threat than of protection to him, and the moment he loses the support of the federal center they will eliminate him. In February 2008, two of my colleagues and I had a meeting with Kadyrov at his private residence in Gudermes. The meeting took place at night, and was more of a sorting out between Memorial and the Chechen President, but at the same time Kadyrov seemed to be very sincere about many things discussed. Thus, he repeatedly spoke about the risks to his life, coming both from the fighters and the Russian security services. He recalled an episode when his father was still alive and when he seriously considered giving up such a risky endeavor:

*One day I told my father: Why are we doing it? The Russians hate us. The Chechens think we are traitors. Cannot we get out of it? Then father said: “Have you chickened out? Pick any university, I will buy you a ticket and send you there”. I said “No, I am staying with you”. Since*

*then he considered me not just his son, but his associate.* Ramzan Kadyrov, President of the Chechen Republic (2007- )

He also described how after his father was killed he could not trust anyone and had to always be tough in front of his men and could share his problems only with his dog:

*I had to be strong. I could never show my hesitation or feelings to anyone. I had a dog there at the stables and in the evenings I would go to him and tell him of all my troubles. He was a young healthy dog and in a few months he got ill. I sent him to Moscow, to Rostov, to all the best vets in this country. They could do nothing, they could not diagnose anything. He died because I had poured too much of my grief to him.* Ramzan Kadyrov, President of Chechnya, 2007-

In these conditions of extreme risk and virtually “no one to trust” Kadyrov naturally built a network of the most trusted people:

*If we can talk about clanship at all, than the most vivid clanship is displayed today. Today you can put your relatives, co-villagers in different positions and call it a “team”. In the previous periods you could not do it. There were some elements, attempts of certain people to build certain groups around them, but it had never materialized. May be if we had clanship, we would have built a state. But society was not prepared to voluntarily give rule to some clan.* Khussain Akhmadov, Chair of the Parliament 1992-1993, Advisor to Mufti of Chechnya

*The people around him are not Benoj. These are Khosi-Yurt<sup>97</sup> people, his co-villagers. When a person comes to power he has to rely on someone, he is looking for faithful people. You rely on relatives because you know that they cannot get away from you. Others can run away with money, but relatives are tied up to you, they have nowhere to escape. So he is relying on those with whom he was growing up....*XXL, head of a regional administration, Chechnya

Ramzan Kadyrov did not ask society for permission. He simply established his power by force.

He also tries to deliver and has turned out to be an efficient manager. At the moment the Chechen state functions more efficiently than ever in its recent history. There is a massive reconstruction. Since late 2006 Grozny, which lay in ruins, turned into probably the most posh-looking city of the North Caucasus, with very few traces of the war left. He restores factories, schools, kindergartens. He supports culture, sport, and youth entertainment. He builds mosques, and restores *ziyards* -sacred places of the Chechen virds. The financial inflows into the Chechen republic have been unprecedented in the last three years. However, the financial schemes of reconstruction are completely non-transparent, and corruption is egregious. In the conditions of

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<sup>97</sup> Kadyrov's native village

lack of any elections at any level, lack of any checks and balances of any kind, full impunity combined with a high level of violence against political opponents, a regime emerged that could be hardly more personalized and more based on strong, organic ties (kinship, neighborhood, close friendship).

This thesis has analyzed five regimes. The case studies covered two republics, different periods in recent history, different programs, different ideological orientations and styles of government, and different levels of risks. The first two Chechen regimes were all based on weak ties. Ideology, programmatic consensus, and performance were the most important criteria of recruitment. In the government of Aushev the elite was somewhat more homogeneous, strong ties (especially based on kinship) played a somewhat larger role, but the functional logic of the government has always dominated over the personal relationships within the elite. The frequent turnover in governmental positions assured the openness of the elite. The Zyazikov and Kadyrov governmental elites, on the other end of the spectrum, were close-knit groups, defined by unconditional loyalty to the leader. Yet, the regime of Ramzan Kadyrov is heavily based on ascriptive ties, while in Zyazikov's government the presence of kinship was very insignificant.

## 9. Conclusion

This dissertation has analyzed the state-building and political integration in the two most troublesome Russian regions, Ingushetia and Chechnya, after the collapse of the USSR. The cases of the Ingush and Chechen state-building offered a window into late polity-building processes in unevenly modernized societies: social contexts in which traditional identities and institutions constrain political actors and informal institutions and trust networks play a prominent role in politics.

One of the principle aims of this thesis was to provide a socio-anthropological analysis of informal patterns of social integration and to assess their role in political leadership. The thesis

adopted an interdisciplinary approach drawing on historical, anthropological, sociological, legal and political science data and literature.

My argument was constructed primarily in supplement and opposition to the literature on clan politics in the region. The clan politics writers claim that regime transition and state-building is shaped by and organized around clans - pre-existing informal identity organizations based on kinship (Collins 1996: 24, Schatz 2005, Sultan 2003). In clan based societies, according to Collins, formal institutions and elite decisions have limited power (Collins 1996). Maria Sultan claims that Chechen society is tribal and its integration into a modern Russian nation-state is essentially impossible (Sultan 2003). The eight chapters of this dissertation tried to refute such arguments both from bottom-up (starting from the teips and working towards the political systems) and from top down (analyzing state-building projects in 1999-2001 and the role of teips and other informal actors in the political process). I have also scrutinized elite choices in dealing with the informal actors and showed that the elites of the two republics had multiple options in dealing with the social structures and identities, and those which reacted more adequately to their social setting were more successful.

I started the dissertation by analyzing how socio-political developments - repeated forced and voluntary resettlements, deportations, expropriation of land, destruction of traditional economic systems, and integration into the capitalist and then the Soviet economies – have transformed teips and traditional political structures. The scrutiny of the historical sources has demonstrated that already in the 18<sup>th</sup> century the teips, as social organizations, were weakened due to population growth and migration from the mountains to the lowlands. In the 19<sup>th</sup> century the teips were further dispersed as both Imam Shamil and the Imperial forces resettled large numbers of people. Moreover, the creation of the Imamate produced social differentiation and ideological divisions within teips. The Imamate enforced Islamic government structures and law on Chechen societies, marginalized traditional self-government institutions and contained the Wajnakh traditional structures to the domain of family matters. While in the 18<sup>th</sup> century the

*gaar* (a branch of *teip*) were the principal socio-political units, by the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century even the *gaars* disintegrated further, into what the Russian administration called ‘*dym*s’ (2-3 generations households), which became the main units of economic production. The 1863-68 land reform made the *dym* the main fiscal unit and this way strengthened individual households against the *teip* commune. After the end of the Caucasian War the political power in the region belonged to the Russian administration, which diminished the role of the traditional Chechen and Ingush institutions and customary law in public sphere.

The first state which aimed to penetrate even the family structure, submerge all of the local competing power centers and to establish a monopoly over the making of rules was the Bolshevik state. Early Soviet policies involved assertive affirmative programs that resulted in the impressive development of the Chechen and Ingush social-professional structure. They increased the level of literacy and education, changed employment patterns and promoted the emancipation of women. *Korenizatsiya* created a demand for teachers, journalists, writers, historians, as well as for bureaucrats. The Chechens and the Ingush gravitated to those spheres. The rural, family-based economy changed. New patterns of social integration emerged and acquired increasing significance: workplace teams, studentship, professional unions, communist party and *komsomol* membership.

The institutionalization of ethnicity, and ethnic competition which was a result of mass resettlement of Russian-speaking population into Chechen-Ingushetia during the years of deportation of Wajnakhs (1944-1957) enhanced group cohesion of the Chechen and Ingush communities and weakened the significance of sub-ethnic divisions. Collectivization further destroyed the economic basis of the Chechen and Ingush extended families. Even the nuclear family household could no longer be the main source of income due to the limits on private economic production - family members had to sell their labor to the *kolkhoz* or join industrial enterprises. This development diversified the family employment patterns and accelerated the erosion of strong extended family units embedded in common 2-3 generation economies. At the

same time extended family structures of the Wajnakhs were not easy to eradicate. Moreover some managed to adapt the kolkhoz regime to their habitual ways of family-based economic activity.

The Stalinist deportation of the entire Chechen and Ingush people, their dispersion along vast territories of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzia and the subsequent return from exile, during which settlement to mountain areas and the Prigorodny Region was restricted, were further blows to teip-structures. Therefore, at the end of my historical sections I concluded that according to historical sources and witness accounts, extended families rather than teips were the main units of kinship in Ingushetia and Chechnya by 1991. The specificities of Wajnakh history, which involved frequent resettlements, changed patterns of employment, institutionalization of ethnicity and perpetual inter-ethnic competition made the teip (clan) an irrelevant social institution. It lacked both political and economic power to reproduce and reinforce itself as a relevant socio-political organization. The historical chapters refute the argument of clan politics authors who claim that similarly to Central Asia clans survived in Chechnya and Ingushetia. The Central Asians and the Wajnakhs had, in fact, very different colonial and Soviet histories, different social structures and traditional forms of governance, which make mechanical cross-regional generalizations invalid.

My ethnographic findings – collected between 2003 and 2009 - summarized in chapter 4 confirm the conclusions of the historical chapters. The detailed analysis of informal social structures in this part of the thesis provides a link between the macro and micro levels of social and political integration. Participant observation and interviews identified the role of five patterns of social integration: kinship, descent, territory, religion, and ideology. Coupled with personal networks of acquaintances, colleagues and friends these may be constitutive of a person's "inner circle", which she uses when necessary for getting employment or acquiring social goods. This chapter concluded that the teip is not a relevant social organization of the contemporary Wajnakh societies. The mechanisms for maintaining cohesion of Wajnakh teip are lost. The teip remains a

loose identity, to which different people attach different significance. The daily routines of Chechen and Ingush individuals are to a greater extent shaped by *close kin*, religious groups and regional/village identities.

The case studies in chapters 5-7 analyzed the socio-political processes which gave birth to the specific state-building projects and/or determined their initial conditions. Autonomous statehood, in both republics, was a result of powerful secular nationalist movements. In a later phase in both cases it was contested by Islamist political actors (successfully marginalized by Aushev in Ingushetia in 1997, but overtaking Chechnya in 1998-1999) and by 2002 it was finally taken over by Russia-imposed indigenous politicians. The findings of these chapters further refute the clan politics argument.

The 1991-1994 Chechen case shows clearly that despite attempts to revive and politicize teips and traditional political structures (the Mekhk-Khel), clans failed to play any significant role in the political process and rather passed as elements of retro-fashion. Dudaev was challenged by moderate national intellectuals and state-employed workers who wanted an agreement with Russia and a functioning state. The fragmentation lines in 1991-1994 were highly ideological, the crisis between the legislative and the executive powers in fact *compartmentalized* the state institutions with the Constitutional Court remaining the only (not entirely) neutral mediator between them. The crisis was resolved by the President who *suppressed* the opposition and dissolved the challenging institutions. The latter, fearful of possibility of blood feud, did not resist. The Chechen nationalist state-building project failed because of the government's inability to maintain Mannian infrastructural power: to pay welfare and salaries, to support the industry, education and healthcare, to enforce the law, to ensure a functioning judicial system, and to maintain the residential infrastructure. State incapacity was crucial in determining people's attitudes to the regime, not their teip or clan affiliation. A strong parliament and opposition were crucial in preventing nepotism and the dominance of affective ties in the government. As a result kinship, descent, religious or territorial attachments played a marginal role.

The failure of the 1997-1999 state-building project in Chechnya should be attributed to the incapacity of the Chechen government led by Maskhadov to subdue paramilitary and criminal groups, which challenged his power, squandered state property and paralyzed the republican oil industry - the main sector of the economy. Inability to tame crime reduced the Mannian infrastructural power of the state to almost nil. In this case we observed *compartmentalization* of formal and informal subsystems within the polity (the state, foreign Islamists, local and regional Islamists, and criminal groups), each controlling part of a territory and its resources and each following its own specific logic of behavior. President Maskahdov tried to consolidate the situation by *empowering* and *accomodating* the leaders of the subsystems. This strategy brought temporary peace but eventually failed due to a fatal provocation of one of his challegers which ended in the second Russian invasion of Chechnya. Maskahdov's governmental elite was not socially homogeneous, strong ties played an insignificant role. His elite was formed primarily on the basis of ideological and religious convictions and programmatic beliefs, although in the first period of the case, interestingly enough, the organizing logic was exactly to bring together different factions of Chechen society in form of a grand coalition. The main cleavages between the government and the opposition were ideological-religious and had nothing to do with pre-existing identities, like kinship or teips.

The relative success of the 1992-2001 Ingush state-building was largely due to the ability of the Ingush government to start their project by immediately *marginalizing* the radical nationalist challengers in 1992, and to subsequently keep under control the Islamists and prevent informal groupings from stabilizing as political actors. Creativity and consistent effort to find ways out of a tremendously difficult situation helped the Ingush government to maintain the state's infrastructural power. They prevented the republican economy from a collapse and society from criminalization. Moreover the government managed to give an impetus to the development of the Ingush educational system, healthcare and economy. Although Aushev's government had a significant presence of relatives and members of descent groups, "the clan politics" argument does



not apply to this regime either. The system was meritocratic, the main criteria for elite recruitment were efficiency and programmatic agreement, and kinsmen in power were treated as anybody else and dismissed when underperforming.

Chapter 8 analyzed Chechnya and Ingushetia under the personalistic regimes of Murat Zyazikov (2002-2008) and Akhmad and Ramzan Kadyrovs (2003-), which are usually referred to as clan- or teip based. As opposed to the previous cases these regimes were not engaged in proper state-building: both leaders were installed by the Kremlin and were fully dependent on the federal center, which provided them with financial, administrative and military resources. But these leaders had freedom in forming their elites and to a certain degree in choosing the style of governance. Both regimes produced highly personalistic elites based on strong ties, characterized by immense corruption and violence. The difference between them was that the government of Ramzan Kadyrov was embedded in ascriptive ties of kinship, descent, village affiliation, and Islamic tariqa, while Zyazikov's elite had a very insignificant number of relatives (two cousins) and other ascriptive patterns of informal integration were also irrelevant. Zyazikov's government was a trust group of unrelated people, tied up with common economic interests and knowledge of each other's economic crimes. The analysis of his government suggests that not even the most predatory, personalistic governments need to be based on ascriptive ties of blood or territory. Trust can develop as a function of interdependence and common involvement in risky political projects.

The latter thesis is supported by evidence on corruption cases quoted in chapters 4, 5 and 8, which revealed the mechanisms of *blat*, *krugovaya poruka* (mutual covering) and *corporatism*, similar to the ones described by Alena Ledeva in her influential study on Russia's economy of favours. The perpetrators of these crimes shared a whole array of identities- village, region, kin-based or corporate, confirming Charles Tilly's claim that trust networks do not have to be linked by kinship to maintain strong solidarity (Tilly 2005: 9).


The findings of this research suggest some generalizations:

1. Pre-existing patterns of social integration (clans, tariqas, virds) do not play a significant role in the process of state-building in WajnaKh societies. The political process is shaped by agency, integrated on the basis of ideology, program, religion or economic interest. Chechens and Ingush politics are not clan-based.
2. Various patterns of social integration can gain prominence in state-building and elite formation. The role and prominence of individual factors is the outcome of the socio-political environment, elite choices and the demands of the state-building project.


The figure below illustrates the prominence of five main patterns of integration for all the five case studies:

Figure 9.1. The prominence of five main patterns of integration for all the five case studies


1. Chechnya 1991-1994



2. Chechnya 1997-1999




3. Ingushetia 1992-2001



4. Ingushetia 2002-2009



## 5. Chechnya 2003- current



3. The table below summarizes the nature of the regimes, the nature of ties within the governmental elites and the prominence of kinship in the elite (the qualitative judgments were made on the basis of the analyzed empirical material). This thesis defined strong ties in politics as an interrelation of trust which involves 1) informality and intimacy (mutual confounding in risks), 2) reciprocal services and 3) strong interdependence, when people set valued, consequential enterprises at risk to the malfeasance, mistakes or failures of others. Groups based on strong ties are tight and difficult to permeate. Weak ties are loose connections, which are predominantly formal, procedural and do not involve strong interdependence or mutual confounding in risks.

Table 9.1. The nature of regimes, nature of ties within the governmental elites and the prominence of kinship in the elite

Case study	Regime type	Strength of ties	Prominence of kinship
Chechnya 1991-1994	Nationalist	weak	insignificant
Chechnya 1997-1999	Islamist	weak	insignificant
Ingushetia 1992-2001	Democratic	medium	significant
Ingushetia 2002-2008	Predatory	strong	insignificant
Chechnya 2003- now	Sultanistic	strong	very significant

The analyzed cases suggest that, contrary to the popular perceptions, the strength of ties in the government does not directly covary with the prominence of kinship and the prominence of kinship/descent does not directly correlate with strong personalistic government.

Four internal constraints have an impact on the nature of ties within the government. The table below indicates the prominence of these constraints in the five analyzed cases: where 1 - negligible; 2- weak, 3 – significant, 4- prominent 5- very prominent

Table 9.2. Internal constraints on governments in Chechnya and Ingushetia in 1991- 2009


Government	Checks and balances	Organized opposition	Risk (of physical elimination)	Risk (prosecution for illegal economic activity)
Chechnya 1991-1994	4	5	2	2
Chechnya 1997-1999	2	5	3	1
Ingushetia 1992-2001	3	1	1	1
Ingushetia 2002-2008	1	1	3	5
Chechnya 2003-now	1	1	5	5

In kinship rich societies, the stronger the system of checks and balances or the opposition, the weaker the ties in the government. The table also demonstrates that the stronger the risks of physical elimination or prosecution for large-scale illegal economic activity, the stronger the ties in the government.

4. The model of elite composition and nature of ties within the government is the following: State building has an impact on factors which shape the composition of the elite by dictating certain criteria for their recruitment. Thus, a nationalist project of 1991-1994 Chechnya required marginalization of strongly pro-Russian actors, while Islamist regime would not allow atheists in the government. It also has an impact on the system of checks and balances (via constitutional design and law) and on opposition (sultanistic and predatory states do not leave room for opposition). The factors influencing the nature of ties within government include five patterns of integration analyzed in this thesis (descent, kinship, territory, religion, ideology) together with some other integrative pattern (acquaintances, colleagues, friends and professionals). The

prominence of each factor depends on elite choices and the demands of the state-building project. The nature of ties depends on systemic constraints such as checks and balances and the existence of opposition as well as on the political environment of risk. High risk of physical elimination or prosecution for economic crimes tends to strengthen the ties within the government. Elites in their turn can alter the systemic constraints and reduce or increase risks by their policies.

Figure 9.2. The model of elite composition and nature of ties within government in Wajnakh societies



5. Traditional patterns of integration (descent, tariqas, virds) are more likely to be accommodative/non-interfering/ or supportive of governments compared to patterns of integration based on ideology, territory or religion, which are more likely to be challenging. The table below shows the behavior of informal actors towards the government:

Table 9.3. Informal actors' behavior toward Chechen and Ingush governments (1991-2009)

Accommodating/ interfering/supportive	non-	Challenging
descent (teips) religion (tariqa, virds)		region-based actors ideological groups

This can be explained by the fact that “traditional” Wajnakh institutions are usually consensus-oriented and contained to the area of private and family lives.

Based on the analyzed cases it seems that the key to successful state-building in Ingushetia and Chechnya is for regimes to develop an optimal policy towards such potential informal challengers, improving the quality of governance, effective system of checks and balances, working towards a transparent economy and meritocratic legal-procedural political system with rational bureaucracies. This thesis suggests that in fragmented kinship-rich societies strong parliaments with credentials to control government appointments and plural political process are conducive to reduction of nepotism in the elite.

I find it likely that in the future we may observe new attempts at the revival of the traditional institutions of teips, Councils of Elders or Khels. These attempts will be, however, unsuccessful: the teips as relevant social organizations ceased to exist a long time ago.

The scholarship on allegedly clan-based societies should investigate social and political integration by combining historical, anthropological, sociological and political science approaches. This strategy will allow to consider both macro- and micro- level social dynamics of descent and kinship and to draw meaningful cross-country comparative conclusions. I hope that my thesis has demonstrated the merits of such an approach.

## 10. Bibliography and References

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## 11. Appendices

### Appendix 1. Teip belonging of the Members of Ingush Elite (1992-2001)

Abadiev I.A.- advisor to President on defense and combat on crime (Evloy)  
 Agapov Boris – Vice-President of RI (Russian)  
 Agiev M. Minister of Internal Affairs (Tsidzoy )  
 Akiev B.S. Director of Department for Automobile Transport of RI (Evloy)  
 Akhhilgov Kh.Kh.- Chair of Board of Ringombank (Tsitskiev)  
 Albakov B.A. Head of Ingush Republican Department of Russian Transport Inspection (Barakhroy)  
 Albakov Daud – Chair of Supreme Court of RI (Barakhroy)  
 Albogachiev Kh.A.- Chair of State Committee for statistics (Lejmoy)  
 Amirkhanov Alikhan – Head of Administration of Center for Development of Business of RI (Matiev)  
 Arselgov M. – Head of Migration Service of RI (Beshtoy)  
 Aushev A.Kh.- Chair of Association of Farmers, Deputy Chair of Government  
 Aushev A-Kh.Kh.- director of central department of Central Bank of the Russian Federation in RI  
 Aushev M.B.- Chair of Board of Ingush bank Sberbank RF  
 Aushev Kh.E. – city –major of Karabulak  
 Aushev R. – Minister of Healthcare  
 Aushev B.- Minister of Internal Affairs  
 Aushev B.S. Chair of Arbitration Court  
 Ausheva K. Kh. Head of Department of Retirement Fund of the Russian Federation in RI  
 Bankhaev Ts.A. Minister of Economy of RI (Barkinkhoy)  
 Barakhoev B.A. Advisor to President on Economic Issues  
 Barakhoev B.O.- Head of Department for State Bread Inspection  
 Barkinkhoev A.M. – Head of Ingush Republican Inspection of Federal Mountaineer and Industrial Monitoring of Russia  
 Barkinkhoev B.U. – Committee for Environment and Natural Resources  
 Bazgiev Ya.I. Director of State Tax Inspection (Belkhoroyev )  
 Bogatyrev A.Ya. Chair of state committee for management of state property  
 Gajtukiev – Chair of State Committee for Refugees and forced migrants (Gijnbukhoj, Tsori)  
 Gagiev Ayub- Advisor to President on Legal Issues  
 Gajsanov R. Deputy Minister of Economics  
 Gireev I.Kh. head of Narzan Ministry of Internal Affairs Department  
 Gireev S.A. Minister of Agriculture  
 Gorchkhanov T. – Minister of Healthcare (Tsechoy)  
 Goygov M.Kh.- Chair State Committee for Construction and Architecture (Pogorovy )  
 Goygov Askhab Abdurakhmanovich – deputy chair of government RI, Head of Administration of Government RI (Pogorov)  
 Gutseriev Kh.S.- Minister of Internal Affairs (Beshtoev)  
 Gutseriev M.S.- Head of Administration of the off-shore zone “Ingushetia” (Beshtoev)  
 Darsigov M-B.Z. – 1<sup>st</sup> deputy chair of government, Chair of Government (Polonkhoevy)  
 Darsigov B.B.- Chair of State Construction Department of RI (Polonkoevy)  
 Idigov M.I. 1<sup>st</sup> Deputy Chair of Council of Ministers of IR (Polonkoevy)  
 Didigov T.M. Chair of Council of Ministers (Gorokoy)  
 Dolgiev B. Minister of Agriculture and Food Supplies (Tumgoy)  
 Dzaurov A. Secretary of Security Council RI (Salhoy)  
 Evloev B.A. – Head of Department of Retirement Fund of the RF in RI  
 Evloev Kh.I. General Director of “Ingushgas”  
 Zyazikov R. Manager of Council of Ministers (Barkhanoy)  
 Zangiev A.M. Head of Karabulak Oil Enterprise (Tsoroy )  
 Zurabov M.A. Deputy chair of Council of Ministers of RI (Ozdoj)  
 Zazul V.I.- Head of Administration of Malgobek city (Russian)  
 Ismailov E.E. Chair of State Enterprise for Construction “Ingushstroy” (Evloy)  
 Ismailov Kh.S. Chair of State Commission for Geology and Usage of the Interior of Earth (Evloy)  
 Klimatov I.S. – head of administration of Sunzhensky region (Kokkurkhoy)  
 Kamurzoev B. – Minister of Health (Ozdoj)  
 Kasiev R.Kh. Head of State Department of Incassation of RI (Gorokoy)  
 Keligov M. Deputy Chair of Constitutional Assembly of IR (Gorokoy)

Kodzoev K.B.- Chair of State Committee for Physical Culture, Sport and Tourism of RI  
 Kodzoev Kh.T. Chair of State Committee for Youth, Tourism and Sport  
 Kodzoev M. Head of Nazran Police Station, ROVD  
 Kosov P.S. State Advisor of RI (Russian)  
 Kostoev K.B. – Chair of State Committee for Youth in RI, Minister of Culture  
 Kotiev M. – Minister of Healthcare (Barkinkhoy)  
 Korigov D.A. Minister of Internal Affairs (Belkharoy)  
 Kuksa V.P.- Deputy chair of Government (Russian)  
 Kurkiev I.B. Chair of State Committee RI for Statistics (Gelatoy)  
 Lolokhoev A. Director of Concern “Ingushneftekhimprom”  
 L’yanov U.M. Minister of finances  
 Malsagov A.A. – Rector of Ingush State University  
 Malsagov A.I. Minister of Finances, Chair of Government  
 Malsagov M-E.A. Head of the Department for Postal Service  
 Maskurov R.Sh. – Head of Administration of Malgobek Region, deputy chair of government of RI (Evloy)  
 Matsiev A. Chair of Committee for Labor and Employment (Arapievs)  
 Marziev V.Kh.- Head of Department for Retirement Fund of RF in RI (Khulakhoy)  
 Mavlatov Z.M. Secretary of Security Council of RI (Chechen)  
 Miziev I.M. Director of Directorate for Construction of Magas, 1<sup>st</sup> Deputy Chair of Government RI (Evloy)  
 Murgustov M.S. Minister of Education and Science (Barankhoy)  
 Murgustov M.S. Minister of full and professional education (Barankhoy)  
 Mutaliev T.Kh.- Director of State Archive Service  
 Muzhukhoev M.B. Head of the Department for Hunting Enterprises  
 Murzabekov A.I. Head of Department of Capital Construction Council of Ministers of RI (Bejnhoy)  
 Nakasthoev M.A.- Ministry of Healthcare  
 Nalgiev S.A.- Head of Department for Automobile roads (Kekarkhoy)  
 Nalgiev A.A. Chair of State Committee of RI for melioration and water resources(Khekhoy)  
 Nalgiev M.A. Head of State Tax Inspection (Khekhoy)  
 Ozdov K.Kh. Head of Territorial Migration Service  
 Oskanov A-V.M.- Head of Control-Revision Department with the President of RI (Lejmoy)  
 Oziev M.K. Chief –editor of Serdalo- newspaper of the Ingush government  
 Parizhev V.I.- Director of Mountaineer Cadet Corps in RI (Khortoy)  
 Parov A.Kh. – Minister of Culture RI (Barakhoy)  
 Parov K.M.- Deputy chair of government of RI (Barakhoy)  
 Patiev Ya. Deputy Chair of Government of RI (Loashkhoy)  
 Pliev R. – Head of Administration of the President of RI  
 Pliev Kh.S. – Head of Ingush Customs  
 Pliev A. – Head of Administration of Sunzhensky Region  
 Sultygov Z.Kh. – city mayor of Narzan  
 Sultygov M.A.- Chair of State Committee for Communications  
 Sultugov M. Kh.- Head of State Service for Hydrometeorology and monitoring of environment  
 Saraliev U.M. Chief editor of Serdalo- newspaper of the Ingush government (Lolokhoy)  
 Tatieva L. Minister of Education (Barkhinkhoy)  
 Tatriev Kh. Had of Department of Transport (Garakoy)  
 Tatriev M.B.- deputy chair of government of RI (Garakoy)  
 Tankiev V-G.Kh. Advisor to President of RI (Korohoy)  
 Tangiev M.A. Head of Regional Department of Fund for Social Insurance of RF in RI  
 Timerkhanov Yu.Kh. Minister of Healthcare (Lejmoy)  
 Timurziev M. – Head of Administration of Nazran  
 imurziev I.I.- City Mayor of Karabulak city  
 Temirkhanov S.Kh. Chair of State Committee for Melioration and Water Resources (Lejmoy)  
 Tochiev I.- Head of Administration of Dzejrakhksky Region (Barkhinkhoy)  
 Toldiev M.V.- director of migration service of RI (Aushev)  
 Toldiev B. Chair of Public Council of RI with the President of RI (Aushev)  
 Tsokoev B.A. General Director of AO “Ingushenergo”  
 Uzhakhov K. Minister of Healthcare (Gazdievy)  
 Uzhakhov M.Z.- deputy chair of government RI (Gazdievy)  
 Fateev V.P. 1<sup>st</sup> deputy chair of government of RI (Russian)  
 Khamchiev B.B. chair of government (Barkinkhoy)  
 Khashagulgov B.U. Chair of Interdepartmental anti-terrorist commission of RI (Lejmoj)

Tsetchoev R.I.- head of administration of Sunzhensky district  
 Tsoroev M. Department of Communications and Information (Tsoroy)  
 Tsokiev Kh. Minister of Healthcare and welfare  
 Tsurov Kh.I.- head of administration of Dzejrakh District (Tsoroy)  
 Chaniev Azamat-Girej – Chair of Supreme Court (Polonkoy)  
 Shadyzhev B.S.- head of administration of Nazran Court (Lolakhoy)  
 Shmanyak N.B.- Chair of State Committee for Welfare  
 Chakhkiev M.A. Chief editor of republican newspaper “Ingushetia (Khulakhoy)  
 Chakhkiev G.U. Head of Department of Automobile Roads of RI (Khulakhoy)  
 Chakhkiev Kh. Minister of Culture (Khulakhoy)  
 Esmurziev I.A. – Head of Group for Combat on Corruption with the President of RI (Korokhoy).  
 Yandiev Kh.I. Minister of Justice of RI  
 Yandiev A.-A. Ya. Head of Department of Federal Treasure of RI  
 Yandiev A.A. Manager of Government of RI

## Appendix 2. Teip belonging of the Members of Ingush Elite (2002-2008)

Murat Zyazikov – President of Ingushetia (Barkhanoy)  
 Rashid Zyazikov – Head of Administration of the Government (Barkhanoy)  
 Rustambek Zyazikov – Head of guard of Murat Zyazikov (Barkhanoy)  
 Musa Medov – Minister of Internal Affairs  
 Makhmud Sakalov (khamkhoj)– Chair of Parliament (Khamkhoy)  
 Khava Evloeva- 1<sup>st</sup> deputy Chair of Government (Yovloy)  
 Aset Ustilgova- Minister of Finances  
 Kazbek Kostoev – 1<sup>st</sup> Deputy Chair of Government  
 Alikhan Dudarov – head of administration of President of Ingushetia (Mukhloy)  
 Yusup Kostoev- Committee for Youth issues  
 Salamkhan Evloev – Minister of labor and social development  
 Zelimkhan Evloev - city major of Karabulak  
 Vakha Evloev- Minister of Sport and Tourism  
 Musa Evloev – head of Central Electoral Commission in Ingushetia  
 Zelimkhan Khautiev – head of control-revision department (Shoankhoy)  
 Tamara Khautieva – deputy chair of Parliament (Shoankhoy)  
 Ibrahim Malsagovv – former Chair of Government  
 Magomed Tsetchoev - former major of Nazran  
 Yakh'ya Mamilov – head of administration of Dzejkharh region  
 Magomed Murgustov – Minister of Health  
 Karim-Sultan Kokurkhaev – Ombudsman of Ingushetia (Kokkharkhoy)  
 Isa Merzhoev – Deputy Head of Administration of President  
 Kharun Dzejtov Chair of Government (Lolokhoy)–  
 Bashir Aushev – deputy Chair of Government  
 Khamzat Bekov – Minister of Construction( Bejnkhoj)  
 Mustafa Belkharoev – Minister of agriculture and provisions  
 Magomed Barakhoev- director of Ingush TV  
 Bahaudin Shadyzhev– head of administration of Nazran district (Lolokhoy)



Akhmed Nakastoev - head of administration of Sunzensky district (Kurkiev)  
 Gelani Bogatyrev – Head of Administration of Malgobek district (Egaltsoy)  
 Vakha Merzhoev – city major of Magas (Merzhoy)  
 Bejel Ozdoyev – city major of Nazran  
 Mukhmatkhan Alikhanov– city major of Malgobek (Muzhakhoy)  
 Zunait Musaev– deputy Chair of People’s Assembly (Merzhoev)  
 Isa Tochiev – head of administration of People’s Assembly (Barkinkhoy)  
 Shamsudin Mogushkov, MP (Tsoroy)  
 Ibrahim Mogushkov – head of the Investigating Committee with the Prosecutor’s office of the Russian Federation (Tsoroy)  
 Luba Dudarova – MP (Mukloy)  
 Ismail Tankiev – MP (Korohoy)  
 Askhab Myakiev – MP (Tsoroy)  
 Mariam Amrieva, MP  
 Yuriy Turygin, Prosecutor of Ingushetia (Russian)  
 Mikhail Zadornov- Chair of Supreme Court of Ingushetia (Russian)  
 Isa Gireev- Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs  
 Magomed Gudiev deputy minister of Internal Affairs (Ozdoy)