The Relationship between Democratisation and the Invigoration of Civil Society in Hungary, Poland and Romania

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Beni bağıنتظر eden desteğini

verdikleri için . . .

Beni ben yapan değerleri,
Beni özel kılan sevgiyi,
Abstract:

This is an explanation on how and why the invigoration of civil society is slow in Hungary, Poland and Romania during their democratic consolidation period. To that end, I will examine civil society invigoration by assessing the effect of interest organisations on policy-making at the governmental level, and the internal democracy of civil society organisations. The key claim is that despite previously diverging communist structures in Hungary, Poland and Romania, there is a convergence among these three countries in the aftermath of their transition to democracy as related to the invigoration of civil society. This claim rests on two empirical observations and one theoretical argument: (1) elitism is widely embedded in political and civil spheres; (2) patron-client forms of relationship between the state and the civil society organisations weaken the institutionalisation of policy-making. As a result, there is a gap between the general and specific aspects of institutionalisation of democracy at the levels of both the political system and civil society. The theoretical argument is that the country-specific historical legacies from the communist period have only a secondary impact on the invigoration of civil society in the period of democratic consolidation.
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Abbreviations:

ADER: The Alliance for Economic Development in Romania

ANAA: The National Association of Agricultural Activists

AOAR: The Businessman’s Association of Romania, Romania

ASZSZ: Alliance of Autonomous Trade Unions

AWS: Solidarity Election Coalition

BZSBTN: Bajcsy-Zsilinszky-Endre Brotherly Society

CD: Democratic Convention

CDSR: Democratic Trade Union Confederation of Romania

CNSLR - Frația: National Confederation of Free Trade Unions

COMECON: Council for Mutual Economic Co-operation

CES: Economic and Social Council

ÉSZT: Confederation of Unions of Professionals

ÉT: Interest Reconciliation Council

ETUC: European Trade Union Confederation

ECOSOC: European Union Economic and Social Committee

FIDESZ: The Alliance of Young Democrats

FIDESZ-MPP: FIDESZ-Hungarian Civic Party

FSN: National Salvation Front

FZZ: Federation of Metal Workers’ Trade Union

GDS: Group for Social Dialogue

GT: Economic Council

ICFTU: International Confederation of Free Trade Unions

IPOSZ: Hungarian Association of Craftsmen’s Corporations

KASZ: Union of Commercial Employees

KDSZSZ: Transportation Workers’ Trade Union Federation

KISOSZ: National Federation of Traders and Caterers

KPN: Confederation for an Independent Poland

KOR: Workers’ Defence Committee

KRIR: National Association of Agricultural Chambers

LAÉT: Association of People Living Below the Social Minimum

LIGA: Democratic Confederation of Free Trade Unions

MDF: Hungarian Democratic Forum
MGYOSZ: Confederation of Hungarian Employers and Industrialists
MOSZ: National Federation of Agricultural Co-operators and Producers
MSZMP: Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party
MSZP: Hungarian Socialist Party
MSZOSZ: Hungarian National Trade Union Confederation
NEM: New Economic Mechanism
OÉT: National Council for Reconciliation of Interests
OMT: National Labour Council
OPZZ: All Poland Alliance of Trade Unions
PDS: Social Democratic Party
PDSZ: Democratic Union of Pedagogists
PKPP: Polish Confederation of Private Employers
PRON: The Patriotic Movement for the National Renaissance

PZPR: Polish United Workers’ Party
PCR: Romanian Communist Party

ROPCiO: Movement for the Defence of Human and Civil Rights

SLOMMR: Free Trade Union of the Working People of Romania
SLD: Left Democratic Alliance
SZEF: The Forum for the Co-operation of Trade Unions
SZOT: National Council of Trade Unions
SZDSZ: The Alliance of Free Democrats
SZTDSZ: Welfare Workers’ Trade Union
TTK: Commission of Solidarity
UGIR: The Union of General Industrialists of Romania
UGIR 1903: The Union of General Industrialists of Romania 1903
UGSR: Romanian General Trade Union Confederation

VDSZSZ: Free Trade Unions of Railway Workers
VOSZ: National Association of Entrepreneurs and Employers
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PREFACE

I. The Argument:

This is an explanation on how and why the invigoration of civil society is slow in Hungary, Poland and Romania during their democratic consolidation period. To that end, I will examine civil society invigoration by assessing the effect of interest organisations on policy-making at the governmental level, and the internal democracy of civil society organisations. The key claim is that despite previously diverging communist structures in Hungary, Poland and Romania, there is a convergence among these three countries in the aftermath of their transition to democracy as related to the invigoration of civil society. This claim rests on two empirical observations and one theoretical argument: (1) elitism is widely embedded in political and civil spheres; (2) patron-client forms of relationship between the state and the civil society organisations weaken the institutionalisation of policy-making. As a result, there is a gap between the general and specific aspects of institutionalisation of democracy at the levels of both the political system and civil society. The theoretical argument is that the country-specific historical legacies from the communist period have only a secondary impact on the invigoration of civil society in the period of democratic consolidation.

II. The Argument in Context:

The previously introduced argument about Hungary, Poland and Romania grows out of a conviction that democratisation does not necessarily bring the invigoration of civil society. Keeping in mind the differences in Hungary, Poland and Romania as regards to (1) the types of communist regime; (2) the types of dissidence against the communist
regime; (3) the extent of societal adaptation to the communist regime and (4) the types of
transition to democracy, it is still my intention to show that there is a convergence in
these three countries as regards to first the relations between the civil society and the
state, and second routes of internal decision-making within interest organisations in the
period of democratic consolidation.

Hypothetically, the causes of convergence are as follows: (1) the dominant position of the
state vis-à-vis the civil society regarding policy-making; (2) the missing link between the
leaders and the masses in civil society organisations; (3) the institutionalisation of the
participatory aspects of democracy only in the abstract. In this context I should emphasise
that in terms of examining convergences, this thesis is not looking for uniformities but
rather the repeated trajectories in countries under study. There are six trajectories in the
democratisation period, which would suggest convergence among these three countries. I
shall illustrate these trajectories briefly in the next section.

My thesis does not seek to understate the achievements of democracies in Hungary,
Poland and Romania. Rather, it seeks to examine and understand the participative
qualities of these democracies. I expect participation to take place at two stages: first,
within civil society organisations through the effect of members on the internal decision-
making procedures of organisations, and second at the national policy-making level
through civil society organisations representing their constituencies’ interests in specified
policy areas. Through an assessment of participation at these two stages, my thesis seeks
to illustrate the participative qualities of democracies in the making in Hungary, Poland and Romania.

Therefore, my argument is based on the fundamental hypothesis that if there is a convergence among these three countries during the democratisation period, despite their earlier differences, then we have firm grounds to question the impact of country-specific structural historical legacies in defining the relationship between democratisation and the invigoration of civil society. The thesis first and foremost aims at empirically illustrating this convergence.

**III. Historical Divergences and Expected Points of Convergences:**

The Table Pre.1 gives a brief outline of the country-specific historical legacies.

[Table Pre. 1 about here]

Despite these differences from the previous communist regimes, however, the expected points of convergences hypothetically come about as a result of the following trajectories in the democratisation period:

(1) Elite monopoly on changes: At the start of the period of democratic consolidation, changes were carried out by an avant-garde elite in all three countries without the active participation of citizens at large.

(2) Personalisation of changes: The groundwork of changes during the democratisation period occurred through particular persons (new political elite), who did not delegate the process of change to institutions.
(3) Twofold elite convergence: The new political elite and the elite from the previously
dissident civil society formed one subculture alongside the previously power-holder
political elite and the elite from the previously transmission belt organisations of the
communist party.¹

(4) Politicisation of civil society and elite shift from civil sphere into the political sphere:
This process benefited especially those members of the civil society organisations
with expertise [cultural capital]. They used their civil society leadership/membership
[social capital] in order to secure a political position [political capital] for themselves.

(5) Elite domination in civil society: Links between the members and leaders in civil
society organisations remained missing almost in all cases. There was an appreciation
of member involvement in internal decision-making only in abstract or in rhetoric,
which did not provide members with concrete chances of influencing their
organisations.

(6) Enfeebled institutionalisation of policy-making: Patron-client relations, rather than
institutions, draw the boundaries of policy-making. Despite the trilateral rhetoric,
informal links and political alliances determine interest organisations’ chances of
influencing policy-making. The previously explained elite convergence is the major
reason for this facetious institutionalisation of policy-making. Nonetheless, this
hinders the capacities of the civil society to become a voice for their constituencies.

¹ See Enyedi (1993) for a detailed discussion on the subculture forming capacities of political elites
especially in Hungary.
IV. Methodology: Qualitative Analysis:

Testing the effect of democratisation on the invigoration of civil society comprises the core of my dissertation. My assumption is that, in order for a notable civil society activity to exist, first there should be a state and second, state and civil society should collaborate and complement each other in terms of policy formulation. Hence, a co-operation between the political and civil societies in a balanced and egalitarian manner will provide checks-and-balances against a possible domination of either of them. In my opinion, this balancing would work – if and only if – representative and participatory features of a democratic system could supplement each other.

In order to investigate whether or not collaboration is possible, my thesis will, first, look at the nature of state and civil society relations during the processes of policy-making. The assumption is that an institutionalised policy-making body, which sustains the respective independence of both the state and the civil society, will imply an environment of collaboration. However, if patron-client relations and informalities replace institutionalised policy-making, then we can only talk about patrimonialism. This discussion on state and civil society relations will illustrate the first stage of participation.

Second, this thesis seeks to understand how civil society organisations operate. I employ ‘civil society’ as a general term. I consider dissidence movements prior to transition to democracy as a part of this term as well as interest groups from the aftermath of regime change. During the democratic consolidation period, I look at trade union confederations, trade union federations, employer’s organisations, agricultural producers’ associations
and agricultural trade unions as representatives of civil society. In the introduction chapter, I present a longer discussion of my understanding of civil society. The main assumption is that, civil societies are not formed to privilege certain strata or to tolerate rent-seeking behaviour. Normatively, only non-hierarchical, participatory, internally democratic civil groups can instil virtues of democracy in their members. Attributes such as participative organisational structures and routes of decision-making and membership procedures speak to a great deal about the nature of participation within civil society organisations. Testing the prevalence of these attributes in civil society organisations will give an idea of the second stage of participation (Kamrawa and O’Mora 1998; Riley 1992; D. Rueschemeyer, M. Rueschemeyer, Wittrock 1998).

My dissertation utilises two methods in order to test my fundamental hypothesis. First, I employ a comparative historical method. It is designed to discover and assess the convergences among countries as well as the explanations of political change in three countries specified. The dissertation presents an examination of each case over several decades. The intention, however, is not a presentation of general political history of these countries. Rather, I propose a selective historical treatment of the relations between the political and civil societies in Hungary, Poland and Romania over the communist, transition and democratic consolidation periods.

The second method of enquiry, as regards to the current period of democratic consolidation, is interviews. From March 2001 until August 2001, I carried out a series of interviews with 62 representatives of trade unions, agricultural unions, employers’
organisations, agricultural producers’ associations and agricultural trade unions in Hungary, Poland and Romania. Interviews with these groups were based on formal questionnaires. The questionnaire inquired on both qualitative and quantitative aspects of relevant issues with an almost equal distribution of standardised and open-ended questions. After the questionnaire, informal talks followed with interviewees on various matters related to the position of civil society in the new democracies of East-Central Europe. Based on availability, I gathered further data through a thorough study on internal statutes of interest groups. From the interviews, I sought to learn the following: conditions of internal democracy within the civil society groups, and governmental attitudes in countries towards interest group participation in policy-making.

To facilitate a clearer analysis, I shall elaborate the first three trajectories that I noted in the previous section with the help of the literature while I subject the last three to an empirical test. For the empirical test dealing with the democratic consolidation period, I group my hypotheses into three branches: (1) the autonomy of civil society organisations: the relative confidence of civil society in terms of its own power vis-à-vis the political society and in its ability to collaborate with the political society; (2) forms of policy-making in countries; (3) internal democracy of organisations. Chapter IV presents these hypotheses.
V. Theoretical Framework:

My interpretation of recent political developments in these three East-Central European countries – in an eclectic manner – borrows insights from theories of historical sociology and historical institutionalism. Nevertheless, this thesis does not seek to adopt any of these theories as the main theoretical framework. Indeed, this thesis realises that in social sciences, causes are complex and they rarely operate in isolation. Usually, it is the combined effect of various conditions, their intersection in time and space that produces a certain outcome (Ragin 1987, 25-26).

In brief, my work relies on the methodology of historical sociology in terms of tracing historical trajectories in order to explain post-transition conjunctures. It also considers that state strength is vital for democratisation (D. Rueschemeyer, E. Stephens, and J. Stephens 1992, 65) and the invigoration of civil society. Nevertheless, this dissertation keeps a reserved distance from explaining transition to democracy and processes of democratic consolidation only through the effect of structures on events (Grugel 2002). Legacies can be determinants of present outcomes that stem from the (distant) past, such as inherited endowments of actors with material resources, mentalities and transitions (Elster, Offe, and Preuss 1998, 293), but a unidirectional determinative application of path dependency is not feasible to explain post-transition contexts in full. Instead, this thesis argues that social sciences should look at how different historical legacies are funnelled into the next period. In this respect, the thesis rejects an autonomous treatment of political institutions in determining, ordering and modifying individual motives (March and Olsen 1989, 4), but still pays respect to the historical institutionalist
approach, demonstrating that institutions constrain and refract politics, but are never the sole cause of outcomes (Thelen and Steinmo 1992, 3).

My fundamental belief is that democratic consolidation occurs as a result of a process of institutionalisation of various mechanisms. However, in contrast to the influence of a normative belief on the formative impact of new institutions to shape the traditions, habits, routines, and expectations of citizens (Elster, Offe, and Preuss 1998, 296), the thesis realises that there is a complex mode of interactions among and within the structures, elites and sometimes the public. In East-Central European contexts, this complex mode of interaction historically superseded structures, leaving political institutionalisation in abstract. And this is where this thesis believes that convergences among Hungary, Poland and Romania reside. These convergences can possibly be a result of a region-specific historical legacy. Yet, the main thrust of the thesis is to illustrate that structures are important, however where historical legacies reside is actually patterns of interaction. That is why structures remain abstract.

Explaining a convergence – despite country-specific historical legacies of Hungary, Poland and Romania – is theoretically very challenging. In this attempt, this thesis does not completely disregard country-specific historical legacies. After all, we cannot expect similar forms to be the result of a single set of causes that are identical across countries and historical configurations. We should bear in mind that once the analysis begins, we must expect to find patterns of multiple causation (D. Rueschemeyer. E. Stephens, and J. Stephens 1992, 76). This thesis does not argue that country-specific historical legacies do

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2 I owe this phrase to Professor Peter Solomon, University of Toronto.
not have any impact, but demonstrates that they have only a secondary influence with respect to the relationship between democratisation and the invigoration of civil society in Hungary, Poland and Romania.

VI. The Outline of the Argument:
The introduction chapter presents a review of various explanations of democratisation. After a brief summary of wave theory, modernisation theory, historical sociology and agency-related approach, I introduce my own understanding of democratisation. This chapter also introduces working definitions of civil society, state and participation, which I will utilise for the rest of the thesis. The following theory chapter (Chapter I) discusses the need for participation through civil society in democracies, routes of reaching a balanced relationship between the civil society and the political society in democracies, and the democracy supporting features civil society. The main aim of this chapter is to produce normative arguments as theoretical yardsticks to later examine the institutionalisation of two stages of participation, presented above, in Hungary, Poland and Romania.

The following two chapters (Chapter II and III) explore the types of communist regimes, the extent of societal adaptation to communism, the types of dissidence under communism, and the types of transition to democracy in countries under study. Chapter IV is a comprehensive discussion on the democratisation period regarding the focus of the thesis. Chapter V presents my findings from my fieldwork and discusses the plausibility of my hypotheses. The last chapter provides us with conclusions as to why
the common elements among Hungary, Poland and Romania with regard to the relationship between respective democratisation and the invigoration of civil society were stronger than individually characteristic ones.
PART I:
Laying the Theoretical Framework for a Discussion on the Relationship between Democratisation and the Invigoration of Civil Society
INTRODUCTION

In order to assess the relationship between democratic consolidation and the invigoration of civil society in the countries under study, this thesis seeks answers to three related questions. First, why is participation through civil societies in democracy is necessary to the processes of consolidating democracies? Second, how do we reach a balanced relationship between the state\(^3\) and civil society during the process of policy-making in democracies? Third, what features of civil society organisations support democracy? Answers to these riddles will provide us with a better understanding of the conditions under which democratisation invigorates civil society in new democracies. Moreover, these answers will serve for a better assessment of the forms of civil society emerging in new democracies. Overall, these answers shed light on the position of civil society and the extent of its representative capacities for large constituencies during the process of democratic consolidation in East-Central Europe more than a decade after the regime change.

In the first part of this dissertation I discuss the possible answers to these questions concomitantly with the democratic consolidation approach, which I develop later in this chapter. This part of the dissertation prepares theoretical yardsticks to evaluate the relationship between democratic consolidation and the invigoration of civil society as it applies to the countries under study in the second and third parts of this dissertation. In an attempt to develop my own conceptual approach to democratic consolidation, I start this

\(^3\) Elected officials (government) along with their appointed counterparts (bureaucracy) represent the state in policy-making.
chapter with an assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of different theories of democratic consolidation. These are, namely, the wave theory, the modernisation theory, historical sociology, and agency-related approaches. Lastly, this chapter presents working definitions of ‘civil society’, ‘state’ and ‘participation’ as used in this dissertation. It also provides the reader with my approach to institutions and institutionalisation.

I. Re-thinking Explanations of Democratic Consolidation:

The discussion of actors, background factors and processes of democratic consolidation, as well as features of consolidated democracies, is ongoing. A common tendency in this debate has been to qualify democracy with adjectives, and classify countries accordingly. Terms such as *liberal* democracy, *pseudo* democracy, *hollow* democracy, *delegative* democracy, *realist* democracy, *participatory* democracy, and *electoral* democracy are some of the most common. Even minimalist interpretations of democratisation, however, require some basic terms: individual freedoms, freedom of association, elections, rule of law, and separation of powers are a few. Basic requirements, nevertheless, are only the first steps for extended democratisation. Henceforth, explaining the process of democratic consolidation through narrow definitions of democracy is not acceptable.

It is in this manner that the conceptualisation of democracy in this dissertation contrasts primarily with that of ‘wave theory’. The wave theorists followed a conceptualisation of democracy carved along an elitist tradition, developed by Mosca, Pareto and Schumpeter. This theory adopted an excessively basic understanding of democracy, and in fact came close to seeing democracy simply as regular elections independent of the size of the
electorate, the nature of the party system, or the state of civil liberties (Grugel 2002; Karl 1995, 72-86).

In this respect, Huntington (1991, 7) sees a political system as ‘democratic, to the extent that its most powerful collective decision makers were selected through fair, honest, and periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes’. This explanation, similar to a Schumpeterian understanding of elitist democracy (1943), presents regular elections as the sole and adequate means of participation in a democratic system. Participation in the political system through routes other than elections – according to the wave theorists – would, on one hand, lead to an overload of government⁴; and on the other, threaten the stability of the political system (Huntington, Crozier, and Watanuki 1975). As such, this theory reduces explanation of democratic consolidation to one variable and arguably propagates a ‘fallacy of electoralism’. Moreover, representative democracy in the third wave democracies did not alleviate problematically low governmental accountability and public influence on decision-making (Hirst 1990). The next chapter will elaborate on this topic.

It becomes plausible to argue that the wave theory denies the importance of civil society participation in democratic political systems in order to decrease the threshold for recognising democratic consolidation. As a result, this theory falls short of reflecting on democratic consolidation as a process, instead favours generalisations with less demanding criteria for democratic consolidation. To decrease the ‘intention’ of

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⁴ This premise in reality is quite fundamental to elitist approaches to democracy for a longer discussion see Pateman (1977).
of democratisation to generalise (Bunce, 2000). Thus, this dissertation criticises single-variable explanations of democratic consolidation, especially in their affinity for broad, unbounded generalisations. In this manner, I question the tendency of wave theory to label even hollow, illiberal, poorly institutionalised systems as democracies in order to qualify its generalisations (Diamond 1999). Notwithstanding its ability to envision democratic consolidation beyond national experiences, wave theory does not address the processes of democratic consolidation.

This thesis is also critical of explaining the processes of democratic consolidation as a result of unidimensional historical trajectories. In this context, modernisation theory has gone the furthest in assuming a linear trajectory between development of capitalism and democracy. The fundamental belief behind this assumption is that democratisation manifests itself once structural features are in place (Grugel 2002, 49). For example, Seymour Martin Lipset (1960a) connects stable democracies with the development of certain economic and social background conditions, such as high per capita income, widespread literacy, and prevalent urban residence. Daniel Lerner (1958), Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba (1963) discuss the development of civic attitudes as a prerequisite of the successful working of a democratic system. This approach implies that it is only possible to build effective democracies by fulfilling a whole list of prerequisites, or so-called ‘social correlatives’, of democracy. As such, it would appear as if certain
conditions uniquely determine the outcome of regime termination and transition to democracy; individual action in history would be little more than incidental (Suny 2002). This theory exaggerates the importance of structures and assumes that the behaviour of people is epiphenomenal and ultimately reducible to material or other conditions (Schmitz and Sell 1994, 24 in Grugel 2002, 49).

The agency-oriented explanations of transition⁵, on the other hand, posit that transition is a fluid process, and that the identity and confrontational strategies of a regime’s opponents and incumbents define this process (Munck and Skalnik Leff 1999, 195). In this context, division within the ruling class begins the process of political liberalisation, while strategic interaction between various elites establishes the mode of transition and the kind of regime that ultimately emerges. Hence, elite groups appear to be real actors with autonomous casual power to influence the course of regime change. Transition agents committed to liberal principles push the regime change toward democracy. As such, democrats with power, not the process of transition, produce new democratic regimes (McFaul 2002). In this context, Suny (2002, 13) suggests that negotiated pacts and a balance of power between major actors enhance the probability of reaching a democratic conclusion⁶. Chapter III displays how transition to democracy took place in Poland, Hungary and Romania.

⁵ See Przeworski (1992) and O’Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead (1986) for a detailed discussion.
⁶ The term ‘pact’ in the literature on regime transition refers to a wide set of negotiated compromises among competing elites with long term goals of accommodating conflicts and institutionalising the distribution of power in key aspects of state and society (Shain and Linz 1995, 41).
Agency-centred perspectives would thus seem to suggest that democracy can be created independently of structural context, and that the general population is, at best, a bystander in the creation of new regimes. Pridham (1994, 16) contends that this school of thought has privileged volitional variables, such as political determinants of regime change, and emphasised the importance of political choice and strategy of actors in the transition process. Questioning structural determinants of democracy, however, should not solely credit the work of individual agents in laying the framework for the process of democratic consolidation. As my discussion will show in Chapters II, III and IV, structural factors, such as the type of pre-existing communist regime, types of dissidence, and the extent of societal adaptation to communist regimes, certainly affected preparations for the end of such communist regimes in Hungary, Poland and Romania. Still, we must recognise the importance of various forms of interactions among the structures, elites and the ordinary citizens in all processes of democratic consolidation. However, we should approach these interactions with the realisation that ‘human motives, as distinguished from natural forces, are still hidden . . . from inspection’ (Arendt 2000, 439). Hence, a proper description of the groundwork for democratic transition and of the quality of subsequent democracies must account for the complex interaction between agents and structures in confusing conditions (Schmitter and Karl 1994, 175).

One last approach to review is historical sociology, which methodologically favours ‘legacies’ as key variables (Elster, Offe, and Preuss 1998, 294). It is a more diffuse approach to democratisation than modernisation theory, with a primary interest in
explaining – not predicting – outcomes. It arose in response to the excessively society-based accounts of political change, and offered instead a state-centred view (Evans, D. Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol 1993). Fundamental to this theory is the assumption that democracies do not come into being overnight; nor does democracy happen simply because some people will it into existence (Grugel 2002, 51). State strength, for instance, may enable the state to overpower the pro-democratic forces in the rest of the society. Moreover, many structures and constellations persist, and are influential beyond their original or historical mandates. Hence, previous state structures and regime forms shape later political developments (D. Rueschemeyer, E. Stephens, and J. Stephens 1992, 65, 75).

Although my work benefits crucially from the methodology of historical sociology, in terms of tracing historical trajectories, I refrain from explaining the transition to democracy and processes of democratic consolidation exclusively through the influence of structures. In particular, ‘presentism’, assuming that the motives and perceptions of the past are the same as those of the present, can be deceptive. After all, the process of democratic consolidation is more than a prolongation of the transition from authoritarian rule (Schmitter and Karl 1994, 175). On this basis, I shall introduce my approach to the process of democratic consolidation:
II. Democratic Consolidation as a Process:

My dissertation emphasises democratic consolidation as a process, and introduces citizen participation, through civil society, in policy-making as a sine qua non to increase the quality of democracies under consolidation. I base this argument on my fundamental assumption that in the event that a democracy turns into a sole electoral regime, that regime will have difficulty finding legitimacy at mass levels. Hence, as I argued above, I oppose labelling poorly institutionalised elective democracies, with entrenched elite-oriented legacies and unbalanced state power, as consolidated democracies. Democracy is a way of regulating power relations so as to maximise opportunities for individuals to influence the conditions in which they live, and to participate in and influence debates about the key decisions that affect their society.

A holistic description of democratisation is necessary here. In order to provide such a description, this dissertation elaborates on the intersection of historical sociology approach as well as historical institutionalism recognising that these two theories do not conflict entirely, but rather agree that at successor institutions bear the stamp of their predecessors (Thelen and Steinmo 1992, 16). Structures, in other words, can be vitally important for explaining outcomes. Likewise, my approach to democratic consolidation pays due attention to the interaction of various actors within the structures, and with the

structures. This complex nature of interactions is where, I believe, historical legacies reside. That is why, the transition perspective’s key contribution to the democratisation debate – namely that democratisation is a dynamic process, shaped by human behaviour and choices – is centrally important. Still we cannot deny the fact that the weight of structures, such as patterns of interaction between the state and society, and traditions of organisation and mobilisation, crucially shape the options open to political actors (Grugel 2002, 64-65). Hence it is important to recognise the form and extent of interactions, and the correspondence between social structures and mental structures these interactions may imply (Wacquant 1992, 12), in order to fully grasp the process of democratic consolidation. In line with this argument, the next chapter shows that institutionalisation of participation in two critical stages – within civil society organisations and during policy-making – is fundamental to increasing the participatory quality of regimes.

Democratic quality, in this context, increases to the extent that the goals of the institutions fit with the goals of the actors, in terms of enabling participation ultimately and comprehensively.

Institutions . . . do not primarily refer to large or important associations, but they represent a social order or pattern that has attained a certain state or property. [I]nstitutionalisation, [on the other hand], denotes the process of such attainment. Routine reproductive procedures support and sustain the pattern (Jepperson 1991, 145).

As a result of this institutionalisation, there appears – in Bourdieu’s terms – a *habitus* as

[a] system of lasting and transposable dispositions which, integrating past experiences, functions at every moment as a matrix of perceptions, appreciations, actions and makes possible the achievement of tasks. . . This deep structure is a historically constituted, institutionally grounded and thus socially variable, generative matrix (Wacquant 1992, 18-19).
The effect of the historical context on this idea of institutionalisation will occupy the core of my empirical debate in the chapters to follow.

In this perspective, my approach to institutions and institutionalism is not static and has three crucial aspects: (1) institutions are important to the extent that their procedures may eventually impart an effect on individuals’ behaviours and attitudes; (2) institutions are affected first by the context within which they operate, and second, by the mode of interaction of the actors within and with the institutions; and (3) this institutional effect can permeate into people’s behaviour as long as institutions are ‘legitimate’ and a result of the eventual compatibility of personality with structure. I do not go so far as to claim that institutions mould actors in decisive ways, but I argue that the institutional effect will eventually be transmitted to actors. This effect can come about through the eventual creation of a certain habitus. Overall, my approach to institutions brings together premises from literature on institutionalist, path-dependency and participatory democracy.

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8 This approach, therefore, is incompatible with some literature on constitution-making in East Central Europe, which foresees that, ‘[institutions] organise patterns of socially constructed norms and roles, and they define the prescribed behaviours that those who occupy these roles are expected to pursue’ (Sadurski 2001, 455; see also R. Weber 2001, Szikinger 2001, and Wyrzykowski 2001 in the same volume on constitution making in Romania, Hungary and Poland).

9 In terms of environmental effects on the formal structures of institutions, structural effects may diffuse if and when environments create boundary-spanning exigencies (Meyer and Rowan 1991, 47). DiMaggio and Powell (1991, 77) called this ‘institutional isomorphism’ and went as far as hypothesising that ‘the greater the extent to which organisations in a field transact with agencies of the state, the greater the extent of isomorphism in the field as a whole’.

10 Beginning with Parsons (1960), who early emphasised that the correspondence of the values pursued by the organisation must be congruent with wider societal values if the organisation is to receive legitimation, legitimacy has been largely interpreted as pertaining to societal evaluations of organisational goals (Scott 1991, 169). Another explanation of organisational legitimacy refers to the degree of cultural support for an organisation – the extent to which the array of established cultural accounts provide explanations for its existence (Meyer and Scott 1983, 201 in Scott, 1991).
Finally, my approach borrows an argument – at the very least – from new modernisation theories, and implies that long-term democratic consolidation must encompass a shift in the political culture of the relevant society (Diamond 1999). With respect to carrying out this shift, institutionalist theory considers the creation of social agency or the formative impact of new institutions critical to the success or failure of national cases of transformation (Kopstein 2003). This resembles, for example, the role that civil society organisations should play as a ‘school of democracy’ in the Tocquevillean understanding\(^\text{12}\).

In this respect, this thesis supports the role of institutions towards this political culture shift, while introducing modifications to institutionalism. One should not expect institutional effect to come over night or support that which is incompatible with the political or social context. Continuous interaction between the people and the structures will yield institutional effect. Crucially, these structures and interactions ought to increase individuals’ political efficacy (Pateman 1977, 46). Institutions are not closed social systems. Increasing demands, both outside and inside the institutions, for democracy will inevitably stimulate institutions to respond with greater democracy (Benson 1986). Hence, shift in context and institutional behaviour will become isomorphic\(^\text{13}\) and mutually affecting. Institutions are mirrors of political culture (Rossteutscher 2002). The

\(^{11}\) See Pateman (1977, 45-64).
\(^{12}\) This is a belief in line with the basic assertion of the theorists of participatory democracy, ‘that responsible social and political action depends largely on the sort of institutions within which the individual has, politically, to act’ (Pateman 1977, 29).
\(^{13}\) Isomorphism: ‘An exact correspondence or identity of form and operations between two or more groups or other sets as regards to the number of constituent elements and the relations between them’ (The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 1993 edition, Oxford: Clarendon Press).
features of institutional effect which remain abstract – separated from matter, practice, or particular examples\textsuperscript{14} – are those that are still incompatible with the context.

Overall, my approach regards the process of democratic consolidation as a simultaneity of assorted sequential layers\textsuperscript{15}, paying due attention to the complex interaction between structures, legacies and agents. Hence, I argue that democratic consolidation is a highly contingent and complex process taking place in several spheres of the socio-political organisations of society (Ekiert and Kubik 1998, 548). This dissertation finally asserts that the collective action – of classes or social movements – will be more influential than individual agency in promoting democratisation. Thus, collective and egalitarian participation is the most crucial element of the process of democratic consolidation, and civil society is a crucial facilitator of participation.

III. A Working Definition of ‘Civil Society’:

This dissertation argues that civil society activities are relevant for political systems once they – in Habermas’s words (1992) - become parts of the Systemwelt, elevating from the Lebenswelt. That is, the issues civil society organisations represent are no longer confined to the private lives of the organisations’ members, but are relevant to ongoing problems in the political system. An issue becomes a part of the Systemwelt when it concerns individuals with broader affiliations than family, church, club, or business. Thus, civil society activities potentially involve the individual in decisions about the collective

\textsuperscript{15} In crude terms, once the first layers of democratisation – the minimal requirements – are in place, it is not very difficult to imagine that further democratisation will follow. Freedoms will bring free speech, associations; elections will bring accountability and transparency requirements as well as certain political rights of expression, organisation, and opposition; and last but not the least rule of law will protect citizens.
affairs of a chosen group in ways that leisure-time activities typically do not (Pateman 1977, 55). Civil society organisations devoted to causes of public interests emerge, at this stage, to contribute to the system. They are legally separate from the state, and democratic states are in a position to guarantee civil society actors both personal and collective liberties in the public sphere (Bernhard 1993; Melucci 1993; D. Rueschemeyer 1998; Waltzer 1995).

My understanding of the term ‘civil society’ draws a distinction between political parties and the market on one hand, and civil society groups on the other. As such, I do not accept Putnam’s (1993) general definition of civil society, which includes all societal groups with the means to provide their members with 'social capital'. Rather, I focus only on those groups that articulate their members’ interests in the Systemwelt. I assume that both the transformation into a political organisation and the choice to remain parochial are hazardous to civil society groups (P. Heller 1996, 1057).

Furthermore, my understanding of civil society differs in particular from the liberal understanding of the term. The liberal perspective regards civil society as an essential aid to the state, especially in terms of reducing the state’s total burden, and as a check on state excesses. It envisages the democratic state as a minimal state (Cohen and Arató 1992). Moreover, the liberal understanding of civil society (Diamond 1994) neglects power structures within civil society organisations. In contrast to this approach, I will demonstrate in the next chapter that the optimal relationship between civil society and the

from frivolous detentions and torture. As such, given pertaining rights and liberties, democracy – in the minimalist definition of the term – cannot remain minimalist indefinitely. It is a self-improving process.
state occurs in a context where each is strong, and where they collaborate on equal terms. Likewise, I will identify the features of civil society organisations that significantly support democracies.

IV. A Working Definition of ‘State’:

The state, in democratic regimes, must operate within the ensemble of interwoven organisations, rather than acting as a unitary agent of intervention. States are holistic structures (Cerny 1990, 166): they contain institutions through which social interests are represented in state policy-making (Skocpol 1990, 29), governments and the bureaucracies that depend upon them for authority, and the public officials – elected and appointed to high and low levels – who participate in developing public policy (Nordlinger 1981).

The implementation of rights on the part of the private organisations and of duties on the part of the state occurs in the ‘public sphere’. I regard the state as one of several actors in interactions with various other actors within this public sphere. I discuss this approach at length in the next chapter. By now, it suffices to say that my approach to state does not conflict with that of Max Weber, who argues that the state is a political organisation with specific means and a monopoly over the use of legitimate force (1984, 33). As long as politics denote the attempt to share power or the attempt to influence the distribution of power among groups, a legitimate authority is necessary to prevent anarchy (Nordlinger 1987). Briefly, governmental domination by ‘virtue of legality’ (M. Weber 1996) provides civil society with a space for organised social activities.
This dissertation opposes the libertarian notion that civil society can replace political parties or the state. Strengthening civic organisations, which represent the demand side of the political equation, without providing commensurate assistance to the political organisations that must aggregate the interests of those very groups, ultimately damages the democratic equilibrium (Doherty 2001, 25). Gary (1996) presents cases from Africa where civil society ultimately conquered the state. Similarly, Abel and Stephan (2000, 615) study on civic environmentalism in the United States argues that, ‘the devolution of environmental policy away from the government does not necessarily lead toward a substantially new role for citizenry’. Therefore, just as the absence of civil society will harm the democratic consolidation process, the absence of the state will also be detrimental to the civil sector.

In democratic contexts, therefore, ideal civil society organisations remain in the civil sphere and do not compete with the state for popular loyalty. In turn, the state provides appropriate decision-making by ensuring public consultation and adequate representation of relevant parties in terms of policy-making. Offe (1989) suggests that, as public policies exert a more direct and visible impact on citizens, the citizens in turn try to obtain a more immediate and inclusive control over both the process of policy-making and the political elite. The greater opportunity for actors to develop an effective organisational and

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16 The dissertation, however, recognises that in societies where the political regime is perceived to be illegitimate, civil society organisations can create alternative spheres of power. People may divert their energies into secondary associations to satisfy their basic needs. As such, civil associations may turn into opposition forces against state (Berman 1997a; Hyden 1997).

17 Also see Jones (2000) on Georgia, where the rapid withdrawal of the state from major sectors of economic life undermined the ability of the majority of population to participate in policy-making. For a
political capacity to advance their goals, protect their interests, and preserve their values in the democratic institutional environment, the more secure their commitment will be to that environment (Valenzuela 1992).

V. Working Definition of Participation:

Lastly, my understanding of healthy participation in the democratic system encompasses two stages: citizen participation in civil society decision-making, and civil society participation in governmental policy-making. Only a democratic state can allow an autonomous civil society and only a democratic civil society can sustain a democratic state (Clark 1997; Howlett and Ramesh 1995; Malpas and Wickham 1998). This assumption stands on a long tradition of participatory democracy. It is only within the context of popular, participatory institutions that an active spirit of public interest will develop (J.S. Mill 1910 in Pateman 1977, 28-29). Furthermore, both the state and civil society organisations are equally responsible for cultivating habits of participation.

discussion on Central American countries on this issue, see (Boussard 2000; Fitzsimmons and Anner 1999; Goma and Font 1996).
CHAPTER I

State, Civil Society, Policy-Making and Participation

I.1. Why is Participation through Civil Society in Democracies is Necessary to the Process of Consolidating Democracies?

I.1.a. Accountability:

Democratisation simply means replacing undemocratic forms of governing with democratic forms. Democracy, however, comes about when previously subordinated social groups achieve sufficient access to the state to change the patterns of representation contained within it (D. Rueschemeyer, E. Stephens, and J. Stephens 1992). In the process of democratisation, different degrees and dimensions of democraticness can be distinguished with respect to the issues of equity and equality in various social spheres (O’Donnell 1993, 1361). Democratic consolidation, in turn, requires certain behavioural, attitudinal and constitutional terms. In behavioural conditions, consolidated democracies should impede national, social, economic, political or institutional actors from pursuing their objectives by creating a non-democratic regime. Attitudinally, democratic consolidation depends upon a strong public conviction that democratic procedures and institutions are the most appropriate ways to govern collective life. Support for anti-system alternatives remain quite insignificant or isolated from pro-democratic forces. Constitutionally, consolidated democratic regimes come about when governmental and non-governmental forces alike become habituated to the resolution of conflicts within the bounds of the specific laws, procedures and institutions sanctioned by

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18 In this dissertation, I will employ a distinction between democratisation and democratic consolidation. This distinction is similar to what Ágh, (2001a) and Mainwaring (1992) previously made between early and mature consolidation.
the new democratic process (Linz and Stepan 1996). As such, consolidation of democracy is a complex process, stretching over many decades.

Institutionalisation of this process requires that polities should initially construct representative institutions, with the understanding that the notion of representation implies a form of delegated rule. In its ideal-typical form, parliamentary democracy is a chain of delegation and accountability from the voters to the ultimate policy makers. In this context, representation starts with a multitude of principals (the citizens) and ends with a large number of agents (civil servants) (Strøm 2000, 268). Although elections are the main facet of popular control, under the conditions of inchoate party system, high volatility of votes and parties, poorly defined public policy issues, and sudden policy reversals in new democracies, the influence of elections may diminish (O’Donnell 1999a, 30-31). In these contexts, essential popular control may require, besides elections, the continuous accountability of government: directly to the electorate through the public justification of its policies (Beetham 1994, 29). Increasing accountability to its logical maximum limit would, in a way, also hinder the development of patron-client linkages. This action benefits democratising countries, where patronage may become prevalent in undercutting democratic accountability in the system19.

O’Donnell (1999a, 38) identifies two forms of accountability in consolidated political democracies: vertical and horizontal accountability. In brief, vertical accountability

19 See Berins Collier and Collier (1991); Burton. Gunther, and Higley (1992); D. Collier and R. Collier (1977); Diamandouros (1986); Eckstein (1989); Forewalker (1994); Hamann (1998); Helfand (1999); Manuel (1998); Pereira (1993); Pollack and Matear (1996); O’Donnell (1977); Riethof (1999); Waylen (1993).
supposes that elections provide accountability. Horizontal accountability suggests that the existence of various other state agencies, legally enabled, empowered, and willing to oversee state actors in those agencies provide accountability. Schmitter considers horizontal accountability with respect to civil society and defines horizontal accountability as follows:

the existence of permanently constituted, mutually recognised collective actors at multiple levels of aggregation within a polity that have equivalent capacities to monitor each other’s behaviour and to react to each other’s initiatives. These countervailing powers can be constituted of different mixes of public and private organisations. Their internal composition would be based on the participation of citizenship, that is on the equality of rights and obligations of their respective members (1999, 61).

O’Donnell (1999b, 68), in response, argues that non-state actors exercise vertical accountability beyond that of elections. Thus, he visualises an imminent role for civil society to monitor state activities even under the conditions of vertical accountability. Regardless of civil society control being internal or external to the state apparatus, the discussion above makes it clear that civil society, in normative terms, should contribute to the accountability procedures in democracies, especially consolidating democracies. Therefore, civil society organisations are both eligible and qualified actors to call into account the incumbents of positions in the state and the regime.

I.1.b. Responsiveness:

Participation of the citizenry in the democratic system through civil society can improve democracy in the following ways: (1) by representing the interests of the public in influencing decisions at the governmental level; (2) by transmitting governmental decisions to the public; (3) by helping to implement governmental decisions; and (4) by providing the government with knowledge and information resources otherwise
unavailable. A vigorous, pluralistic civil society strengthens a democratic state by increasing the state’s responsiveness to those it claims to represent. Hence, policy deliberation through civil society organisations creates relationships between the governments and the citizenry (Gibson 2001; Hadjiisky 2001; Howlett and Ramesh 1995, 57).

With respect to the citizenry, civil society activities strengthen social bonds, reduce dangers of anomie, nourish habits of civic engagement, and shape deliberation in democratic public institutions. The more often that actors have the opportunity to develop the organisational and political capacity to advance their goals, protect their interests, and preserve their values in the democratic institutional environment, the more secure their commitment will be to that environment (Valenzuela 1992).

Hence, I reach the first central claim of my dissertation: successful democratic consolidation requires a political system that enables its citizenry to participate in securing the representation of its own individual and collective interests. This condition is as important as the basic representative institutions of democracy. Productive routes of participation via civil society are as important to democratising countries as periodic elections and the regular change of government. Increasing accountability is necessary to counteract conflicts of representation in democratic systems, especially in new democracies, which can be more prone to patronage in comparison to established democracies. Likewise, participation through civil society will make democracies more
responsive and will contribute to forging stronger social bonds between the society and the state.

I.1.c. Possible Hindrances of Participation in New Democracies:

There is an implicit assumption in the democratisation literature that the introduction of democracy invigorates civil society\(^{20}\). The key objective of this dissertation is to show that the emergence of civil society, in the aftermath of democratic transition, is not as straightforward as expected. Possible impediments to the emergence of civil society as a crucial actor in the system are as follows: general mistrust of the civil sector in newly democratising countries, an assumption that political parties are the sole means of representation, and embedded elitism among the ranks of the political and the civil sector. The integrity of civil society is especially threatened when polities are led by a figure who is widely viewed as the liberator and the leader of nation and, therefore, as the builder of the state. Generally, these perilous conditions still prevail in countries in the immediate aftermath of their transition talks (Bozóki and Karácsony 2000; Munck and Skalnik Leff 1999).

\(^{20}\) Minimalist and Maximalist theories of democratic consolidation disagree about the path, values, institutional level, and attitudes in the process of democratisation (Merkel, 1998). Those arguing for a maximalist position advocate a symbiotic relationship between the forces of democracy, (e.g., state, government, civil society). Thus, according to Ash (1996), Bryant (1995) [in the case of Western European democracies], Cohen and Arató (1992), Keane (1993) [in reference to the dissolution of boundaries between state and civil society in Western Europe, and appearance of 'hybrid' institutions during democratisation], Melucci (1993), Putnam (1993) [in the case of state-civil society collaboration for more democratic governance in the North of Italy], Bendix (90-91) [in reference to the need for a democratic state to prevent the sphere of civil society from turning into anarchy], Schmitter (1992) [in reference to state power in constructing 'partial regimes' in Southern European democracies], and Sampson (1996) [in the case of democracy in Denmark to sustaining a prominent civil society] democratic regimes are expected to play a prominent role in the invigoration of civil society.
Low accountability and low responsiveness can also put the invigoration of civil society in peril. And polities under the processes of democratic consolidation can be incapable of solving these problems. As such, there may be discrepancies between the design and enforcement of law and authorities may abuse the legal framework (Schöpflin 1994). Institutions in these polities may fail to ensure respect for institutional procedures. The powers of the executive may profit from low public participation in the system, imperilling horizontal accountability and promoting ‘delegative’ democracy (O’Donnell 1994 and 1999a). Similarly, unaccountable power circles may influence decision-making in ways that undermine state authority\textsuperscript{21} (Mainwaring 1992; Skocpol 1993). Or alternatively, state actions may be consistently shaped and constrained by industrial and financial capital, the commercial middle class and the nascent bourgeoisie (Nordlinger 1987). In Gramscian terms\textsuperscript{22}, therefore, both the state and dominant groups within the state structure are liable to exercise ‘hegemony’ in polities under democratic consolidation.

Hypothetically, a certain number of these obstacles originate from historical legacies of the authoritarian period. In this regard, Part II of this dissertation elaborates on the possible impact of the historical legacies. A crucial historical legacy is old cognitive traditions\textsuperscript{23}. In the light of my discussion on institutions and institutionalism in the

\textsuperscript{21} Possible examples of these states can be seen in Latin American. Chalmers (1977) described such helpless states as ‘politicised state’. In these states, established rules and procedures of policy-making are not buttressed by respected traditions of policy-making and broadly accepted ideology. The likelihood that effective influences will bypass such rules and procedures is great, and states representing this form of government are altered frequently to accommodate new patterns of power. Therefore, the policy-making process is potentially created anew for each decision.

\textsuperscript{22} See Sassoon Showstack (1987) for further discussion.

\textsuperscript{23} This is a ‘vital point of connection where a version of the past is used to ratify the present and indicate directions for the future’ (Williams 1977, 116).
introduction chapter, one could justifiably infer that, so long as the influence of old
cognitive traditions prevail, civil society will be slow to develop. Participation through
civil society, in contrast, can promote a feeling of political efficacy in the citizenry
(Pateman 1977, 103-105). Studies\(^{24}\) showed that the more people are involved in
decision-making, the more they tend to be interested in the fulfillment of their objectives.
This tendency implies that a collective identity arises out of participation, in proportion to
the members’ perception of their importance within a group (Onaran 1971, 167-168).
Such a collective identification may create certain forms of interaction to replace the
communist *habitus*, though the process of this replacement may be gradual.

**I.2. How do we Reach a Balanced Relationship between the State and the Civil Society
During the Process of Policy-Making in Democracies?**

**I.2.a. Juxtaposition of State- and Society-Centred Approaches towards Policy-
Making:**

There is a paradigmatic disagreement between state- and society-centred approaches
towards policy-making. Most state- and society-centred approaches treat the opposite
approach as a ‘black box’ (Fox 1996, 1090). In crude terms, the society-centred or
pluralist literature argues that non-state actors would be effective in so far as non-state
actors curtail state power. Building major networks of organisation and representation at
the expense of the state will distribute a portion of the state responsibility to an active and
empowered civic sector (Berman 1997a; Hyden 1997; Laclau and Zac 1994). This
approach disapproves of state-centred habits of neglecting non-state variables, such as
political parties and interest groups (Almond 1988, 872).

\(^{24}\) See Tannenbaum (1950).
The state-centred approach argues that interest group-oriented pluralism ignores public actors and institutions. This form of pluralism, accordingly, regards governments as ‘cash registers’ that calculate and respond to the mean values of social actors’ preferences and political power (Evans, D. Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol 1993; Krasner 1984). The panacea for strong governmental institutionalisation is, however, autonomous state action (Skocpol 1993, 15). State autonomy is instrumental to the state’s ability to realise its goals, despite the opposition of societal elements. Weak states, on the other hand, have difficulty resisting the demands of powerful social groups. State-centred theories argue that a multiplicity of centres of authority is typical of state weakness, which may presage the ultimate destruction of state authority (Atkinson and W. Coleman 1989, 54). The highest level of state autonomy, in this respect, occurs when the preferences of the state and society diverge, but the state adopts a policy consistent with its own preferences (Nordlinger 1981).

Nevertheless, neither pure state- nor society-centred approaches fully describe the process of policy-making. Along with the state and interest groups assume a major role in policy-making. In many political systems, interest groups are not only accepted facts of political life, but they are also legally and officially involved in the process of making and administering public policy (Peters 1984, 150). Corporatism and neo-corporatism present some modes of close relationship between the state and civil society in policy-making. Clientela and Parentela relationships between state and civil society organisations suggest extreme conditions of proximity between the state and civil society (LaPalombara 1964 in Peters 1984, 157-158). Neo-Marxist approach, on the other hand,
criticises society-based approaches to policy-making. I shall briefly compare the core statements of these perspectives in preparation for my own approach, which emphasises collaboration between the state and civil society in policy-making. I shall demonstrate this approach in the section 1.2.c.

- Corporatism:

As a critique of pluralism, corporatism suggests that the state is prone to surrender its autonomy to numerous groups imposing their demands upon it. Thus, corporatist settlements require a limited number of participants in policy-making. Only a small number of participants could be given licence to represent their particular area of competence, and thereafter be incorporated into state apparatuses (McCollow 1991). Therefore, corporatist policy-making advocates a relationship between a limited number of singular, compulsory, noncompetitive, hierarchically-ordered and functionally-differentiated groups and state (Schmitter 1977).

In this manner of policy-making, corporatism seeks a majoritarian order in search for efficiency. It requires structured relations between the state and civil society, as well as a hierarchical organisational structure for those groups allowed to participate in policy-making. As such, the application of corporatism raises fundamental questions regarding the democratic spirit of policy-making procedures. Thus, my working definition of participation, as I introduced it in the previous chapter, contrasts with corporatism.
In authoritarian types of corporatism, the state controls societal organisations through (1) control of demand-making, (2) control of leadership, and (3) direct state monitoring and intervention in organisational affairs (D. Collier and R. Collier 1977, 494). This type of corporatism was mostly prevalent in authoritarian Latin American and Southern European regimes. In these environments, state penetration of society provided political leaders with many opportunities of patronage. As a result, cultivating the loyalty of factions within every accessible institution and organisation became central to the states’ political survival. Hence, the ‘statisation’ of organisations of civil society and the partial privatisation of state institutions went hand in hand (Chalmers 1977; O’Donnell 1977). Some analysts have also called policy-making under East European communism, a form of corporatism\(^{25}\) (Bialecki and Heyns 1993; Gorniak and Jerschina 1995). I shall review this understanding of corporatism when I discuss communist policy-making in the next section.

The liberal version of corporatism, where there is both greater bargaining between interest groups and less formalised government-interest group interaction than in authoritarian corporatism (Lehmbruch 1982), is possible. However, corporatist decision-making may be implicitly elitist. A fundamental argument of this dissertation is that the democratic tradition ignores distinctions between people and supports the claim ‘that those who can participate in collective decisions are not necessarily the virtuous elite or the rich, but the very same person who may undertake an active private life’ (O’Donnell 1999a, 31). When inequalities accumulating from the distribution of economic and

\(^{25}\) A better name is corporate-bureaucratic, which suggests that no special interest groups are established; rather, the interest groups are part of a state bureaucratic network, with the party apparatus as the centre of
organisational resources, knowledge, and information damage egalitarianism, the policy-making environment can undermine the spirit of democracy. The following neo-Marxist approach evaluates this argument.

-Neo-Marxism:

As the previous discussion demonstrates, providing all civil society groups with the same rights does not guarantee them the same or similar means to influence public policy-making (Marcil-Lacoste 1995, 130; Waltzer 1995). Although members of polyarchies may possess the same rights, some may remain passive citizens due to their lack of appropriate resources (Badie and Birnbaum 1983; Cohen and Arató 1992; Dahl 1982; Dahl 1989, 318; Habermas 1984). Therefore, the pluralism implied by society-centred approaches might provide a misleadingly optimistic picture of the distribution of power. Resources of power have been unequally – though widely – distributed in many societies. Therefore, despite available opportunities for individuals to articulate their demands through interest groups, a group’s real political achievement depends on its resources and credibility.

The neo-Marxist approach, in this respect, assumes that some groups are commonly more privileged than others during policy-making in capitalist pluralist systems. Hence, a group’s ability to organise and to participate in policy-making is related to its socio-economic status. Public affairs are in the hands of two sectors: government and business (Nordlinger 1987, 364; D. Rueschemeyer, M. Rueschemeyer, and Wittrock 1998; Skocpol 1993). The neo-Marxist approach is extreme, however, in its insistence upon corporate intermediation (Grant 1993, 90-91).
extending state autonomy over certain corporate organisations in order to provide for the benefit of disadvantaged groups. Furthermore, it demands active state involvement in maintaining a balance among the civil society groups. However, active state involvement can become problematic when the state persistently favours one group over another. Such inequality would result in a clash between the state and civil society, paving the way for the state’s possible recourse to authoritarian solutions.

Still, the neo-Marxist critiques of pluralism merit consideration. In any given political system, once the state serves only those better represented, the better served set the cast for future structures and developments. Thereafter, agents with oligarchic inclinations may acquire hegemonic influence vis-à-vis the state and those less privileged. This would result in the states’ failure to provide a framework for secure interest representation and fair mediation between competing interests in society. The clientela and parentela form of relationships might be extreme forms of state and civil society co-operation, but this dissertation shows that especially parentela is relevant for Hungary, Poland and Romania.

- Clientela and Parentela Forms of Relationships:

Briefly put, the clientela relationship exists when an interest group, for whatever reason, succeeds in becoming, in the eyes of a given administrative agency, the natural expression and representative of a given social sector which, in turn, constitutes the natural target or reference point for the activity of the administrative agency (LaPalombara 1964, 262).

The implications of this process may be such that, while one group increases its influence on the process of policy-making, the overall influence of pressure groups on public policy
will deteriorate. Influential groups with special access to decision makers may initiate policies that they do not necessarily want to discuss or defend\textsuperscript{26}. Thus, the interest groups will keep negotiations and interactions private and informal, at the expense of public scrutiny and accountability. In this way, there develops a symbiotic form of dependence between the administrative agency and the interest group. The administrative agency needs information and political support from the interest group, whereas the interest group needs access to decision-making and favourable decisions from the administrative agency (Atkinson and W. Coleman 1989, 84; Peters 1984, 157-158).

\textit{Parentela} relationship, on the other hand, is a situation of kinship or close fraternal ties between the government or the dominant party and the interest group. ‘It involves a relatively close and integral relationship between certain associational interest groups, on the one hand, and the politically dominant party, on the other’ (LaPalombara 1964, 306). Hence, a pressure group gains access to policy-making through its relationship with a political party, rather than through its ability to represent a large fraction of society. If the political party is in power, the interest group obtains access to administrative decision-making through the willingness of the party to intercede on its behalf with the bureaucracy, and therefore to manipulate bureaucratic policy-making. The pressure group has an impact on bureaucratic choice, and both the party and the bureaucracy enjoy the benefits of the pressure groups’ specialised knowledge (Peters 1984, 162). Such interest groups, consequently, will have attained a prominent place inside the party organisation. The result is a policy-making process where technical expertise is weak and a

\textsuperscript{26} Cobb, J. K. Ross, and M. H. Ross (1976 in Howlett and Ramesh 1995, 113) called this relationship ‘insider-initiation model’.
professional/bureaucratic ethos has scarcely developed (Atkinson and W. Coleman 1989, 84).


The communist political model is particularly instrumental in describing the influence of historical legacy on the balance of state and civil society in policy-making. Although they were never uniform in all respects, the communist states fully dominated interest groups to the extent that surrendered their identity to the state apparatus. Hence, interest groups were, at best, a means of mass coercion, to multiply state power or to serve as so-called ‘transmission belts’ of state policies. The party and the official trade unions amalgamated with the state to share a monopoly of coercive force (Fellegi 1992, 121-124).

Policy-making followed the credo that,

while interest groups were an indispensable element of socialist democracies as the institutional expression of group interests, they should still adopt the guidance of society (meaning the communist party) as an integrating element (Lakatoš 1965 in Skilling 1965/66, 444).

The party, as a result, absorbed both the state and the society with the help of these ‘transmission belts’. This system structure prevented any societal power from emerging and persisting outside the control of the communist party (Fejtő 1996; Miłosz 1981; Verdery 1996). In this environment, patronage – rather than ideology – was the conduit of authority. (Fontaine 1995; Schöpflin 1979; Tismaneanu 1991). Gorniak and Jerschina describe the socialist corporatist system as follows:
[The] system consisted of certain forms of interest articulations and negotiation between groups and interests organised in terms of a distinctive division of labour within the command economy. Its basic organisational units were socialist corporations, which aggregated the interests of the technocrats (the nomenclatura), labour groups (lower management and workers), union leaders and apparatus, and party leaders within industrial structures. Although the groups did not have equal weight as actors, they did participate in a game within each corporation, which culminated in the articulation of common interests . . . Technocrats and political groups . . . played the role of quasi-representatives. They held mandates of central power and, at the same time, held mandates from other groups within the corporations (1995, 169).

Indeed, the main features of the relationship between the state and the groups, in terms of policy-making, were: (1) the right of the state to define social interests without control from below; (2) the habit of the state to authorise only those organisational-institutional frameworks which originate from the bureaucratic or political elite; and (3) a set of rules and laws which the state had implemented to favour its own versions of policy-making process and public interest. In this formulation, the outcomes of policy-making processes were at the mercy of struggles both within the political elite and between the various branches of the apparatus, which were intertwined with different particularistic interests (Bruszt 1988, 47). The interest groups, as a result, merely served the interests of the government and acted as alternative means for communicating government policies to the workers (Banks 1974, 37).

Such a process of decision-making was analogous to a ‘black box’. In theory, the Politburo and its functional equivalents and lower executive or party levels were responsible for policy-making. However, this process was usually very secretive. Moreover, the party’s version of popular participation in administration took the form of encouraging citizens to monitor each other’s performance, either as individuals or via
mass organisations. The result, however, was one of the best examples of formal elite based pluralism, where officially acknowledged interests only pretended to represent real public interests\textsuperscript{27} (Wesołowski 1991, 80).

This method of policy-making cultivated various elite structures and embedded those with sufficient cultural and political capital into the system (Frenzel-Zagorska 1997; Hankiss 1991; Wesołowski 1991). This method, at the end, forged a strong role for intelligentsia in the system, and increased intelligentsia’s distance from the citizenry. Inevitably, the increasing influence of the intelligentsia contributed to the erosion of the state socialist system (Curry 1995), but it also prevented societal groups from developing themselves into democratic, well-organised, efficient and stable organisations.

How this background affects the current practices of policy-making in Hungary, Poland and Romania remains to be seen in Chapter IV and Chapter V. The next section will consider the relations between the state and civil society in policy-making, which fall within the scope of a collaboration-centred approach. Prior to that, however, Table I. 1 presents a summary of the main assumptions, strengths and weaknesses of the society-centred/pluralist, state-centred, corporatist, neo-Marxist, \textit{clientela, parentela}, and the communist policy-making. The idea behind this table is to show similarities and differences among these approaches and prepare for a debate on my own approach towards an assessment of policy-making.

\textsuperscript{27} Although a study on collective bargaining in the Soviet Union contradicted this statement. See Banks (1975, 37-40). Decision-making under communism in Yugoslavia stands out to be an exception to the

This dissertation does not insist that the state and society conflict in the course of policy-making. Patterns of constructive mutual support between state and societal actors are uncommon, but they challenge one-way approaches to state-society relations. In the remainder of the section I.2, I shall consider methods for achieving a policy-making balance between the state and society, and the problems that new democracies may face in institutionalising such a balance.

A healthy relationship between the state and interest organisations is predominantly contingent upon the confluence of state and interest group objectives. With common objectives, the state and interest groups will develop long-term policies more easily. The most constructive possible relationship between interest groups and the state is collaboration. At the very least, the state can guarantee an environment for arbitration that brings together different interest groups. At most, it can promote an interactive network and partnership, which respects independence of interest groups. Rapid conflict resolution and decision-making would be the result of such a partnership.

In environments of collaboration, state autonomy and the power of social groups increase and decrease proportionally (Evans 1996a). Mutual respect between the state and civil society, acceptance of each others’ autonomy and independence, and a plurality of civil society opinions and positions are all inherent to this environment. This form of generalisation above. See Banks (1974, 40-44) and E. Stephens (1980).
relationship would decompose myths about government based solely on representative features (Hirst 1990 and 1993). Thus, if a democracy needs to be more inclusive, it can become so by fostering a balanced relationship between the state and civil society. Finally, this collaborative environment would sustain continuous interaction between the public, socio-political institutions, and the state – modifying them in certain ways.

It is mistaken to assume that state’s autonomy from society will increase state’s efficacy in policy deliverance. The collaboration argument asserts that this efficacy arises out of the co-operation of the state and civil society organisations during the policy-making processes. Simultaneous state and civil society strength is fundamental to my collaboration argument. Accordingly, I question Putnam’s (1993) treatment of state as an external actor to social relations. A combination of strong state and strong civil society is the basis for responsive, effective democracy, whereas a combination of strong state and weak civil society leads to strong state autonomy, the danger of unresponsiveness and potential for ‘prerogative state power’. In the combination of a weak state and strong civil society, the result is an overwhelming strain on state capacities, and ineffective state response to the demands of constituencies (Bernhard 1993, 326). This dissertation considers whether simultaneous state and civil society strength is in place in countries under study through assessing ‘autonomy’ of civil society28 in Chapter IV and V.

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28 See preface for the definition of this term.
Collaboration suggests *complementarity* with *embeddedness* (Evans 1997, 82; Lam 1996, 1049). Evans’ (1996b, 1123) definition of embeddedness requires the direct involvement of public officials in organising citizen activities. This dissertation, however, does not necessarily support this argument, primarily because the direct involvement of public officials may jeopardise the independence of citizens’ efforts. This conflict is especially possible in those countries where independent interest organisations have been historically absent. In contrast, complementarity supports day-to-day interaction between public officials and civil society. The duty of the state, in this respect, is to assist the citizenry with resources and expertise that would be otherwise unavailable, such as the necessary framework for regular meetings, and then later to maintain a ‘hands-off’ stance with respect to further civil society activities. This hands-off stance will guarantee that synergy, which is a result of embeddedness and complementarity29, does not turn into clientelism (Evans 1996a, 1121, 1126). Such a synergy, more comprehensive than that implied by *clientela*, will work alongside state assistance to help a newly democratising population overcome the preliminary difficulties of representing its interests in an organised manner. Thus, rather than eliminating government agencies, it would be more useful to study how to design government agencies that complement and collaborate with citizens’ efforts in the broader institutional settings of policy-making (Lam 1996, 1040).

Conversely, dialogue with the civil sector may be unproductive where the state-civil society relationship is too cosy. This is the case with *clientela* and *parentela* relationship,

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29 Evans (1996b, 1119) makes a differentiation between two forms of synergy: (1) synergy based on complementary actions by government and citizens and (2) synergy based on ties that cross the public-private divide (embeddedness). Chazan (1994), in return, called this relationship a symbiotic relationship. I
which I discussed above. In excessively comfortable relationships with the state, civil society groups may accept government information and co-ordinating influence too readily. By not questioning state activities, they may fail to consider grassroots perspective (Clark 1997, 47-48, 54-56). As I shall discuss in chapters IV and V, interest groups’ pursuit of their interests through overt alliances with political parties may be a dangerous strategy.

The collaboration argument suggests that it would better for civil society groups to collaborate with policy-making institutions, in which they can negotiate policy concerns with ministers and officials, than it would be to collaborate with political parties (M. Hill 1997, 117). However, sustaining institutional frameworks during the transition to democracy appears to be a difficult task. Despite the emphasis in transition studies on the importance of institution building for successful democratic consolidation (Huntington 1991; Przewroski 1992; Zielonka (eds.) 2001, vol.1), it is usually the case that a considerable gap develops between formal institutions and informal practices in new democracies.

This suggests that informalities and patron-client relations may prevail over established institutional frameworks (Kéri 1994, 92) during the maturation of democracy in transitional political environments. Therefore, while institutions remain little more than abstract, informalities become concrete. As Malová’s (2001, especially 376-377) study on Slovakia illustrates, the predominance of informal rules in the political process has do not see any difference between Evans’ definition of synergy and Chazan’s definition of symbiotic relationship between the state and society.
emerged as a competing structuring principle that shapes the behaviour of the political elite. With respect to the process of policy-making, a worst-case scenario would be a government’s establishment of a tripartite council for the purpose of exerting greater control over the policies and public pronouncements of its social partners (Héthy and Kyloh 1995, 9). In such a case, tripartism would help to preserve the ‘transmission belt’ role that interest groups played prior to the transition to democracy in East-Central Europe. This dissertation argues that both collaboration and institutionalisation of participation are indispensable to the maturation of democracy.

In its attempts to establish a balanced relationship between the state and civil society in terms of policy-making, the collaboration argument differs from previous theories in the following ways:

- It privileges neither the state nor civil society in considerations of strength and autonomy, but looks for ways to strengthen these two simultaneously.
- It does not necessarily believe that state and civil society should operate at the expense of each other, but seeks ways of improving their co-operation.
- It agrees that possible inequalities of resource distribution can only be solved in participative and non-hierarchical environments.
- It looks for comprehensive state and civil society relations without any preferential treatment of one civil organisation vis-à-vis the others.

To conclude this section, one can say that an institution’s power would have to be partially controlled by an external agent (Laclau and Zac 1994, 20). This applies both to state and civil society. In this respect, the second central claim of this dissertation is that
balanced state and civil society action to guarantee egalitarian participation is necessary in democratic societies. This balance will also ensure that neither state nor civil society would be a threat to the other’s existence. In the light of this claim, I shall now consider the second stage of participation: routes of member participation in internal decision-making of organisations.

I.3. What Features of Civil Society Organisations Support Democracy?

The importance that this dissertation attributes to civil society, in terms of both democratic consolidation and policy-making, should not be understood as an idealistic approach to civil society. We cannot take for granted that civil society organisations will be democratic by default. A fundamental assumption is that, while citizen participation in governing provides justifiable grounds for governmental action, deliberative decision-making within the organisations justifies civil society action on the grounds that deliberative process is democratic (Ash 1996; Malpas and Wickham 1998). Still, civil society is at best, politically neutral: neither inherently good nor inherently bad, but rather dependent for its effect on the wider political context (Berman 1997b, 427 in Encarnación 2001, 77). Authoritarian tendencies are also possible within civil society organisations. Respectively, Rossteutscher argues that,

[After all], associations are a microcosm of society at large; in a sufficiently democratic environment their impact generally will be democratic, in an undemocratic society their impact might well be very undemocratic. This is the case because associations do not advocate a certain type of culture but reflect and amplify the dominant cultural traits of their environment: they are not democracy’s avant-garde but political culture’s mirror (2002, 515).
Thus, before presenting my expectations of a participatory civil society, I shall briefly review the historical legacies of Hungary, Poland, and Romania in order to elaborate on context.

I.3.a. Attempts to Extend Participation to the Masses under Communism: A Paradox by Definition?

Only in the second half of the 1970s were there pioneering attempts at instituting increased participation through the formation or invigoration of workers’ councils in Hungary, Romania and Poland\(^{30}\). Not surprisingly, these attempts came after the labour unrest in the early 1970s (Makó and Héthy 1979; Stefanowski 1977 in Bielasiak 1981). These mechanisms of mass participation were implemented to create the guise of increasing popular involvement in socio-economic affairs without significantly altering the regimes’ policy preferences. Yet participation, as the communists saw it, had to be ‘of the right sort’. In this context, while the prevailing attempts of the 1970s stressed the successful adaptation of politics to society, the dominant practice of communist states – in reality – was to adapt society to unchanged paternalistic relations (Bruszt 1988, 45).

This ‘pseudo-participation’ was beneficial to the political authorities in forging new links between the public and the state. As part of an effort to develop socialist democracy, these regimes attempted theoretically, ‘the improvement of already existing patterns of representative democracy, the expansion of direct participation by the people in state administration and the intensification of workers’ participation in economic management’

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\(^{30}\) A report by Triska (1977, 175-176) offers introductory and fragmentary evidence that citizen participation was present in community decisions in Eastern Europe. The report concludes that, ‘the more developed the socialist system, the greater the citizen participation, the more ambitious the aspirations and
(Nemes 1978; Zaherescu 1978; Zawadzki 1977 in Bielasiak 1981, 97). At its best, however, this was ‘purposive socialisation’ in which a particular agency consciously and openly strove to instil particular ideological orientations (Kavanagh 1972 in Holmes 1983, 247). The result was more careful guidance and supervision by the communist authorities to educate workers, as the process appeared impossibly complex to the workers themselves. Likewise, the leadership committed more deeply than it had before to maintaining control over decision-making, even as the opportunities for popular participation were broadening (Nelson 1980). Hence, these attempts to correct inadequate popular participation were only attempts to correct the image of the party, which at best led more intelligentsia workers to represent the proletarian workers at communist party meetings (Bielasiak 1981, 91-92, 103).

Inevitably, a sub-group of intelligentsia and party bureaucracy, with exclusive possession of cultural capital, evolved into a new caste sociale, and used the party as an instrument to consolidate their positions of authority (Konrád and Szelényi 1979). This elite closed its ranks to outsiders (Fehér. A. Heller, and Márkus 1983) and the communist model came to be characterised by hierarchy and subordination (Csanádi 1997). Many party communists enjoyed their privileged position in society, and felt that, by encouraging limited and controllable popular participation, they could pretend to be working towards communism and self-administration without undermining their privilege. As a result, the rhetoric of socialist democracy greatly surpassed the actual implementation of participation opportunities for citizens and workers in their respective neighbourhoods.
and factories (Bielsiak 1981, 104). From the arguments of these regional experts, we can conclude that the participative rhetoric of communism prescribed abstract ideas of participation without any concrete action.
I.3.b. Features of Participatory Civil Society Organisations:

If one confronts the context of communist participatory policies with Michels’ theories on organisations, then one finds that the strategies for institutionalising popular participation in the internal decision-making of their organisations would seem to be futile. However, I would argue that this futility would only be the result of failing to question Michels’ ideas on organisation. The myth that ‘whoever talks of organisations talks of oligarchy’, propagated so successfully by Michels and his followers, have obscured previous discussion on organisational democracy. The prevailing academic orthodoxy on the subject has yet to face substantive and rigorous criticism. As such, the present research on internal democracy of interest organisations is inadequate.

In short, Michels adopts a generally elitist understanding of democracy. Going back to Plato, the elitist approach suggests that the realm of politics is a realm of contingent superior knowledge: people with relevant specialised skills will always be more successful than those without. Likewise, license to make legitimate non-contingent claims to superior political knowledge is reserved for those made by democratically elected representatives during their period in office (Saward 1994, 10, 13). This approach to participation in particular suggests that ‘the incompetence of the masses was almost universal throughout the domains of political life, and this constituted the most solid foundation of power of the leaders’. Hence, according to Michels’ circular logic, the best indicator of a leader’s fitness for leadership is the fact of his or her present state of

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31 In the literature, which I covered within the confines of this thesis, studies on this issue are extremely scarce. Existing studies are either apologetic about the whole lack of participation (Lipset 1960b; Banks 1974; Moe 1980) or else preoccupied with workers’ participation on the shop floor (E. Stephens 1980 on
authority. Furthermore, this line of reasoning suggests that leaders should cultivate the
distance between themselves and their subordinates and constituents (Michels 1962, 111). Expert knowledge, which the leaders acquire in matters inaccessible to the public, gives the leaders a security of tenure, as their principal source of power becomes their indispensability (Michels 1962, 70, 109-111). The masses may grumble occasionally, but the majority is really delighted to find persons who will attend to its affairs (Michels 1962, 88).

Despite Michels’ austere conclusion, that ‘the majority of human beings are predestined to submit to the dominion of a small minority, and must be content to constitute the pedestal of an oligarchy’ (1962, 354), there are two weaknesses inherent to his approach. He agrees that (1) the elite within these organisations elude all possibilities of technical control from the masses and become the masters of the process (1962, 110), and (2) the possibility of establishing democratic institutions will increase in proportion to the cooperation of all persons concerned in the decisions of relevant issues (1962, 113). Surprisingly, the theory of participatory democracy shares these two viewpoints with Michels.

To speak about oligarchic tendencies in organisations as commensurate with virtues of representative democracy in organisations is to imply that representative democracy lacks the necessary devices for the public to check on the administration of organisations. In accordance with my argument on institutions and institutionalisation in the introduction, workers’ participation in Peru, and Pateman 1977) with suggestions towards general participation. I think that there is room for further research regarding this issue; in this respect see Korkut (forthcoming).
this thesis proposes that ‘we do learn to participate by participating and that feelings of political efficacy are more likely to be developed in a participatory environment’ (Pateman 1977, 103, 105). Thus, the institutionalisation of participatory organisations is crucial, because participation schemes develop in close interaction with changes in the distribution of power in civil society, and between civil society and the state. Especially if the leaders of interest organisations appeal to governmental authorities to allow their organisations to actually participate policy-making, and point out the concrete results of their policy participation to the members of these organisations, a high degree of member involvement will become more likely (E. Stephens 1980, 6, 22-23; Grant 1993, 86). Demands for democracy inside organisations, after all, will be stimulated by the workings of democracy on the outside (Benson 1986, 369).

Granted, the mere existence of participatory structures is not enough for permeating participatory habits (Tarrow 1996), historical legacy deeply affects the institutionalisation of these habits. In Chapter V, I shall discuss this premise in the light of the data gathered through my fieldwork in Hungary, Poland and Romania. Overall, the format of organisational structures, the routes of participation for members or local/regional groups, and the social networks and membership protocols within civic groups all reveal a great deal about the groups’ democratic potential.

Democracy expects civil society organisations to develop healthy cross-cutting identities that encourage tolerance and compromise. This expectation imposes considerable responsibilities on civil society organisations. The embracing of democratic values
demonstrates to the public that it is entitled to certain rights and privileges. Collective participation shapes the 'consciousness' of the public as it shapes its interests, its commitments and its political awareness. Thus, bonds of mutual solidarity, rather than vertical bonds of dependency, will develop to produce trust and co-operation. An organisation’s members develop an appreciation of democratic values through socialisation, participation, and the egalitarian distribution of resources (Hyden 1997; Moe 1980; Waltzer 1995). Hence, associational life in general – and habits of associations in particular – foster patterns of civility in actions of citizens in a democratic polity (Putnam 1993).

Some internal features are specific to a participatory civil society. Participatory civil society requires horizontal organisational structures, open routes of participation for their constituencies, all-encompassing membership procedures and policies, a clear representational domain, and pro-democratic rhetoric and structure if it is to sustain an independent course of action. Horizontal decision-making procedures give an equal voice to each member of an organisation while providing the organisation’s leadership with information about members. Only those civil societies that create cross-cutting cleavages and a consciousness of common interests will produce the necessary patterns of healthy democratic governance (Berman 1997a; Moe 1980, 40-41) and play a positive role in democratic consolidation (Schmitter 1992).

Civil society benefits from social networks of weak and hence permeable social boundaries, because such networks do not obstruct co-operation. The importance of the
institutionalisation of participatory civil society lies in the fact that social networks transmit innovative information and values, as well as assist social learning within transitional polities (Berman 1997a; Gibson 2001; Kamrawa and O’Mora 1998; Tarrow 1996). A strong civic community arises from firm civic engagement, widespread political equality, appreciated solidarity, trust, tolerance, well-placed social structures, and co-operation. Such a community can be expected to support democracy (Waldron-Moore 1999).

On the other hand, a civil society undermined by radical individualism, social anomie and greed will fail to build effective avenues of citizen participation (Gibson 1998). Civil societies must not privilege certain strata or to tolerate rent-seeking behaviour (Kamrawa and O’Mora 1998; Riley 1992; D. Rueschemeyer 1998). Uncivil society appears either in the absence of social networks, or in a society of firm, but closed social networks. In societies of closed social networks, according to Huntington (1968), political culture will be susceptible to suspicion, jealousy and hostility towards tribal or familial outsiders.

Hence, the health of a civil society democracy requires the creation and defence of organisational structures and conditions which allow minority or opposition groups to arise as needed (Benson 1986, 368). Granted structural features by themselves cannot create internal democracy, but, at the very least, they would promote an environment of tolerance towards opposition and participation (Lipset 1961, 50). Structurally established possibilities for participation are advantageous where a strong organisation is present to mobilise member participation. The probability of this mobilisation depends on the
strength of organisations at the societal level, their organisational penetration and the mobilisational efforts of their leaders (E. Stephens 1980, 76-77, 247, 253). Certain sectors of the public, alongside the membership, can also impose pressure on the union leader to conform to democratic practices (J. Coleman 1960, 208). To conclude, the greater the influence of the membership, and the greater the membership’s participation, the more difficult it will be for an oligarchy to enforce policies and actions that conflict with members’ values or needs (Lipset 1960b, 237).

I.4. Conclusion:
In this chapter, I have addressed three questions that I posed in the introduction. In the process of doing so, I also carried out a theoretical discussion on the conduct and institutionalisation of participatory democracy at two stages. My arguments illustrate why participation in and through civil society are important in democracies. I have also introduced context-specific limitations on my theoretical arguments when necessary. In the next part of the dissertation, I shall examine how to balance my theoretical arguments with context-specific problems in Hungary, Poland and Romania. This endeavour will allow me to assess the democratic qualities of these countries, while asking if, when, and how these countries’ experiences converge?
PART II:

A Historical Perspective to Democratisation and Interest Group Configuration in Hungary, Poland and Romania: Conceptualising Convergence
CHAPTER II: The Period Under Communism

II.1. Introduction:

In order to solve the riddle I presented at the end of the Chapter I, I will discuss the communist, transition and democratisation periods in Hungary, Poland and Romania in the second part of my dissertation in the next three consecutive chapters. I will argue that we should understand the historical forms of interaction among the context, institutions, elites, and public in Hungary, Poland and Romania in order for an accurate projection towards understanding the relationship between democratisation and the invigoration of civil society in the democratic consolidation period. This approach is more accurate than accounting for the country-specific historical differences as the sole causes of the ensuing socio-political developments.

While discussing the country-specific trajectories of communist regimes, dissidence and the extent of societal adaptation in Chapter II and types of transition to democracy in Chapter III, I will also explore the similarities among countries under study beyond country-specific structures. The key endeavour of this part of the thesis is to illustrate similarities among countries with regard to the shared communist context, alongside country-specific structural differences, and the implications of shared historical legacy on the democratisation period. Henceforth, Chapter II illustrates why we should look underneath the structures in communist societies rather than focusing only on the formal structures.
Under communism, regardless of type, people experienced a dual existence at the societal (micro sphere) and at the system (macro sphere) levels. There was little structural formal communication between these levels, leaving the mezzo sphere of institutions void. This did not mean that the communist context did not influence the public. Peoples’ ways of thinking were affected, however, either through various adaptation techniques that they developed to cope with communism, or through being subconsciously exposed to the infiltration of patrimonialism and elite rule.

At the same time, in all three countries there were cycles of dissidence, and parallel or ensuing informal interactions among political elites, the dissident elites and the public. These interactions left structures of communism in abstract. While in concrete, the mode of interactions and who dominates these interactions became more and more important. This resulted in the crumbling of formal communist structures towards the end of communism, which further affected the whole communist context by bringing its collapse. Despite country-specific communist particularities, this framework operated in all three countries. An active adaptation process between the communist state and society modified both of them in all three countries, albeit to different degrees (Rychard 1991 and 1993; Kwaśniewicz 1992, 123).

To fully understand historical legacies of the communist period, one should pay close attention to the communist socio-political context, interactions among elites, dissidents and the public, as well as the institutions of the communist regime and of opposition. Thus, I argue that the basic obstruction towards the invigoration of civil society during
the democratisation period is the prevalence of earlier social experiences in the post-communist *habitus*\(^{32}\). Various imprinted ideologies, goals, and strategies affect new perceptions of actors even under new conditions (Kamenitsa 1998, 314-315; Vajda 1993). Communism was not unidimensional and unidirectional in the countries under study. Each country has had particular *features* of the communist model as well as differing *experiences* in the communist period. Moreover, even within each country, there have been different *periods* of communism. Hence, this thesis is not a denial of structural differences of communist states, dissidence and types of transition in countries under study. Still, the *general* experiences of East-Central Europeans were quite different than what was required for installing democratic institutions (Heinrich 1999, 133; Marody 1991, 33-39; Rychard 1991) with respect to civil society. Metaphorically, therefore, each member of the family may be different, but in a family picture one can see the similarities among the various members.

II.2. The Period under Communism in Hungary, Poland and Romania: Types of State and Societal Adaptation, Types of Dissidence

II.2.a. Types of State and Societal Adaptation:

There were two institutional channels common in communist systems: party and government. They functioned in concert by controlling, mobilising and leading the society. The party treated the society and its segments as ‘masses’ to be directed according to instructions from above. In this context, interest groups were at best a means of mass coercion to enhance state power. As a result, the party absorbed both the state and society with the help of state-monopolised indoctrination, and extensive use of

political terror (Fejtő 1996; Miłosz 1981; Verdery 1996). Therefore, the system was organised in such a way that no societal power could structurally have emerged and persisted out of the control of the communist party (Wesołowski 1991, 79-80; Zhang 1994). The styles of governing, however, have been divergent in the cases under study. This divergence is a result of the different types of communist states in Hungary, Poland, and Romania.

At the societal level under communism, there was an ongoing coexistence of the ideological versus the actual society (Hankiss 1991, 308). Societies sought to develop strategies of adaptation in response to transformative policies of the communist regimes. This inevitably paved the way for a context in which authorities allowed and tolerated informalities in order to level the ineffective functioning from above (Rychard 1993, 80-82). Although the type of communist state determined the extent, it is plausible to argue that people had separate lives in their private or societal sphere (microworld) as opposed to the communist system (macroworld) in all three countries under study. Therefore, on the surface everything could have looked normal with classical lip service to communist values, while in the private spheres, once people were out of the realm of the symbolically acceptable values, the situation would have been very different. That was why, and how, informalities and personal links replaced alien institutions of the system (Kołankiewicz 1994; Nowak 1984, 160 cited in Rychard 1993, 21).

33 Only the theory of totalitarianism started from the assumption that there was a unified political culture in the Communist societies. As an example, Szczechpański (1970, 26) stated that, ‘there was not one totalitarian political culture in Poland, but rather three: the party’s culture, the church’s culture and a laicist culture of Westernised intellectuals’.

34 See surveys carried in Poland while under communism regarding the deficit at the institutional level (Rychard 1993, 92).
The effect of this context on the citizenry at large was difficult to measure. Nevertheless, some surveys carried out under communism provided the basics to make inferences on the general effect of this context on citizen behaviour. A study on Hungary in the mid-eighties, for example, showed ambiguities and contradictions characterised by various types of political orientations. The most typical elements of the citizens’ political orientation were summarised by the following sentiments: ‘Politics was important in the abstract, not important in the concrete’ and ‘Democracy exists in general but not in particular’ (Bruszt 1988, 43). The public had no institutionalised relationship with politics, they related to it only in general. By their own assessment of the situation in Hungary, the citizens were ‘consumers’ of politics over which they had little influence (Bruszt 1988, 59). Out of these results, one should pay more attention to the respondents’ contrast between the ‘abstract’ and ‘concrete’ and ‘particular’ and ‘general’.

Another process of adaptation was ‘adaptation through opposition’. This was a sub- or semi-conscious process, where the demarcation line between adaptational and oppositional components to communist tactics was very much blurred (Frentzel-Zagorska 1990, 762). This adaptation ‘became embedded and inherent [even] in the dissident elite since they were brought up under communism and that was why they later responded to the make up of the political adversary’ (Szczepański 1991a, 214). The effects of adaptation processes will be clearer once I discuss the democratisation period in all three countries in Chapter IV. Here, however, I will examine the types of the communist state, the extent of societal adaptation, and types of dissidence in countries under study.
II.2.a. Poland:

The Polish communist regime consisted of a weak party-state with little legitimacy. The state continuously vacillated between oppression and relaxation during the communist period. Factional movements and spontaneous protests continuously and cyclically challenged the authority through 1956, 1968, 1970 and 1976\(^{35}\) and culminated with the formation of Solidarity. Solidarity, unique in East-Central Europe, found its niche in an unreceptive political context amidst the frequent conflicts among dissidents, authoritarian political elite, reformist political elite and the public. The rise of Solidarity demonstrated that ‘social organisations were able to grow and spread in inhospitable environments through iterative cycles of conflict’ (Fox 1996, 1092).

Despite their strength, societal actors in Poland could never attain the position of an institutional opposition, but remained essentially social movements (Frentzel-Zagorska 1997, 114). The legalisation of Solidarity in August/September 1980, however, could be considered as an exception in terms of the relations between the communist state and dissidence in Poland. It was ‘new evolutionism\(^{36}\)’ at its best. For the first time, the communist party was driven back into the state by the emancipation of the society through civil self-organisation. Solidarity undermined the position of the communist party in relation to labour once the state authorities recognised workers’ rights to establish an independent trade union of their own choice. The following 14 months of

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\(^{35}\) See section I.3.a for communist attempts to increase participation in Poland at the face of increasing workers’ unrest in 1970s.

\(^{36}\) This attitude differs from previous reformist attempts by assuming the essential unreformability of the party itself and holding faith in the power of the working class as the only way to press for increased democracy in the face of a resistant state. It assumed that an independent social movement could attain its goals of worker self-management and citizen self-government while recognising the party’s control over national politics, economic planning and the instruments of coercion (Michnik 1985).
independence, until the martial law in December 1981, gave people a taste of freedom, democracy, unity and independence.

The introduction of martial law in December 1981, however, showed that authorities were able to crush opposition whenever they wanted (Karpiński 1987-1988). Under the martial law, the Polish communist regime attempted to co-opt the intelligentsia, similar to the attempts of the Hungarian regime. This attempt was meant to hinder widespread cooperation between the dissident intelligentsia and the citizenry in Poland. The authorities created an organisation called the Patriotic Movement for the National Renaissance (PRON) in May 1982, and offered Wałęsa a high post in this body. PRON sought to initiate dialogue between the regime and the parts of intelligentsia, which were more inclined towards collaborating with the regime. Still, it was Wałęsa who continuously received the bulk of the support from the intelligentsia, especially from Mazowiecki and Geremek (Fontaine 1995, 288-289). A later attempt to co-opt dissident intelligentsia among the ranks of the communist party came in 1986. This time the Polish regime created a consultative council beside the president of the council of state, whose members were intellectuals and scientists, most of whom this time were closer to the opposition. Critically, no subject was taboo for this institution and the discussions were extensively published (Fontaine 1995, 295). These institutions may have had some success in co-opting some parts of the dissident intelligentsia, however, unlike in Hungary, they could not subdue mass dissidence.

37 See sections II. 2. a Hungary and II. 2. b Hungary.
38 A Catholic intellectual and the first non-communist prime minister of Poland.
The introduction of martial law and its aftermath made the Polish society realise that it is not possible to reform the communist system\textsuperscript{40}. The government’s attempts in the 1983-1989 period to decentralise the organisational structures at various political and economic levels as well as the state (Kurczewska 1995) were never credible. Still, the All-Poland Alliance of Trade Unions (OPZZ), the official trade union, benefited from an increasing government sensitivity to labour issues while Solidarity was under repression. Nevertheless, receiving governmental sympathy led to the polarisation between the national leadership and local chapters within OPZZ, which in return weakened its position vis-à-vis the state\textsuperscript{41}.

In return, Solidarity put an emphasis on ‘our state’, which implied a conflict between the official communist state and an alternative sphere of state. The idea was that once the opposition could have got a hold of the state, it would become ‘our state’, and hence all problems would be magically solved\textsuperscript{42} (Ost 1993; Szczepański 1991a and 1991b; Wesołowski 1995, 113). Domański\textsuperscript{43} put this emphasis on ‘our state’ in a historical perspective and argued that ‘this was very much due to Poles living under a state created by forces of occupation’. As a result, there was ‘a public activity within two mutually exclusive institutional worlds in Poland: the voluntary [informal] institutions of the invisible state of Poles and the compulsory institutions of the visible legal-administrative

\begin{footnotes}
\footnotetext[39]{Future Minister of Foreign Affairs under the AWS-Solidarity government of Jerzy Buzek.}
\footnotetext[40]{Jadwiga Koralewicz, \textit{Polish Academy of Sciences} and Zbigniew Bujak, (personal interview, Warsaw, April 2002).}
\footnotetext[41]{See the survey Poles’81 on OPZZ members’ attitude towards strengthening the role of the PZPR (Polish United Workers’ Party) in the exercise of power (Kolarska and Rychard 1987, 75).}
\footnotetext[42]{According to Frentzel-Zagorska (1997), this expectancy is a very serious burden on Solidarity – especially during the democratisation period. I will assess the effects of this burden in the Chapter IV.}
\footnotetext[43]{Henryk Domański, Polish Academy of Sciences, (personal interview, Warsaw, April 2002).}
\end{footnotes}
systems of [foreign] states’ (Kurczewska 1995, 74). Solidarity was thus an attempt to fill the niche at the mezzo level with an egalitarian, moralistic approach.

Polarisation between independent groups and the communist state was inevitable in the sense that both of them emphasised their own establishments as the Polish state (Rychard 1993, 21). People learned through their dissident tradition how to be self-sufficient and how to defend themselves against the claims of the communist state (Kurczewska 1995, 91). Strikes and demonstrations became the means of defence against the regime. Consequently, the introduction of martial law in December 1981 made even those who were previously reluctant to approve strikes and demonstrations sympathise with collective action against the authoritarian state (Adamski 1990, 21).

In Poland, a conflict broke out in a confrontational manner shaking the system to its foundations. The constant shift between the micro and macro spheres generated societal tensions and dispersed behaviour towards issues (Koralewicz-Zębik 1985 in Rychard 1993, 107). Their tensions were socially harmful and they created a legitimised duality between public and private, between fiction and truth. Wńuk-Lipiński (1982, 81) labelled this phenomenon a type of ‘social schizophrenia’ in the permanent presence of ‘dimorphism of values’. This phenomenon was assertive in the internalisation of ambiguities as common conditions.

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44 Kurczewska (1995, 78) calls the first type of state a ‘civil society state’ whereas the second one is a nation state. Out of her detailed discussion on Poland in the period between 1791 and 1989, what emerges is that citizenship models of Poland have been very much blurred within an interaction of formalities versus informalities. This historical account supports Rychard’s studies on informal spheres of Polish society during and in the aftermath of dissidence.
II.2.a. Hungary:

Similar to other communist states, there was no difference between the regime and the state in Hungary during communism. The party and the official trade unions were interwoven, sharing the monopoly of coercive force with the state (Fellegi 1992, 119-125). Yet, what set the Hungarian communist state apart from other communist states was its attempts for a gradual political opening and economic reforms in search of greater legitimacy, beginning with the New Economic Mechanism (NEM) in the 1960s. I will discuss the effects of these legitimacy seeking attempts on Hungarian dissidence and society in detail in the coming section on Hungary. Here, I highlight the interaction between the intelligentsia and the communist regime in Hungary in light of the gradual opening attempts by the Hungarian communist state.

The realisation that the communist party could not govern the country without a certain degree of co-operation with the citizenry was the main motive behind the gradual attempts of opening in Hungary (Hankiss 1991). This meant a revision of the bureaucratic, party-dominated political structures, which were built after 1956. As a result, from the early 1980s onward policy-making was not under the exclusive monopoly of the higher boards of the party. New ideological and institutional structures were formed and they influenced political decision-making. The result was one of the

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45 Like other experiments in economic reform in the region, the NEM was motivated by the need to overcome the structural limitations of Soviet-style industrialisation. NEM was based on many of the principles of agricultural reform that were at the centre of Imre Nagy’s New Course. When finally promulgated in 1968, the implementation of the NEM consisted of the following planks: 1) reform in the industrial sector such that enterprises were to become autonomous and profit maximising; 2) devolution of planning to the local level; and 3) wage and price reform (see Falk 2003, 113-115 for a more detailed description).
best examples of *formal-elite based pluralism*, where officially acknowledged interests only pretended to represent the real interests (Wesołowski 1991, 80). Csizmadia (2001, 144) calls this the ‘re-networking of the official politics’.

Consequently, the government introduced a new machinery to co-ordinate their activities in late 1980s: National Council for Reconciliation of Interests (OÉT). OÉT legitimised bargaining among the ruling party, its state bureaucracy, and various social organisations. Nonetheless, Kovács (1994 in Cox and Váss 1995, 158) had a rather cynical opinion of OÉT. She argued that, ‘the main objective of the government behind establishing OÉT was to restrain interest groups’ demands in order to prevent them from stretching the limits of the existing political system’. After all, this policy-making process cultivated various elite structures and embedded those with proper cultural and possible political capitals into the system (Frentzel-Zagorska 1997; Hankiss 1991; Wesołowski 1991). In short, networks of elite interactions increased the possibilities of informal interactions in the system and left existing policy-making structures in abstract.

One should go back in time and closely look at the events in the aftermath of the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 in order to understand this picture better. Given the

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46 I borrow Tőkés’ (1990) definition of intelligentsia in my thesis, which refers to educated people with a self-appointed responsibility for the nation’s destiny. Also see Malia (1961) for a better understanding of the place of intelligentsia in Eastern European polities.

47 Within the framework of the OÉT, the social partners had certain rights to information, to express their opinions and to consent in certain areas. They had the right to receive information regarding all economic, social and labour issues that directly or indirectly had a significant effect on them. Upon the social partners request, the government was to provide information regarding the given issue either verbally or in writing. Their right to express their opinion meant that the government could only take decisions or take action after the social partners’ opinion had been asked, and the pro and contra interests as well as supporting and rebutting arguments have been discussed. The social partners exercised these rights during both the pre-legislative and general consultation. According to the right to consent, the government could only decisions
widespread atomisation after 1956, the only means of reaching beyond the private sphere without being tainted politically was through occupational roles. Members of certain occupations, such as doctors, priests or schoolteachers, met through their occupational organisations. Their occupational roles also allowed them to gain access to a large number of people from a position of authority. The communist party, in return, felt the need to approach these notables in an attempt to build local prestige and support (Róna-Tas 1991, 26-27). These routes, at the end, served to forge a strong role for the intelligentsia in the system, despite the intelligentsia’s distance from the citizenry. In this *formal elite based pluralism*, however, clientelistic and paternalistic networks as well as nepotism and old or new boys’ networks of corruption and bribery were inevitable (Hankiss 1991).

The late 1960s brought some changes in the Hungarian regime, particularly in the economy. Parallel to interest groups’ organising themselves into non-autonomous entities under the conditions of NEM, the economic reforms brought about a strengthening of professionalism within their structures. The state made every effort to control and licence the interest groups through the existing system of the organisational channels. Corporatist development contributed to the erosion of the state socialist system, but also prevented business and employers’ groups from developing themselves into democratic, well-organised, efficient and stable organisations. Similar problems were faced by trade unions. In the late Kádár era, the employees were integrated into the bargaining system.

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*regarding certain issues jointly with the social partners, and could only take action with their approval (Héthy 1999, 185-186).*
Through this integration based on paternalistic networks, workers gained periodic wage increases and relative autonomy from the party-state (Bruszt 1995, 265-266). Though in the long run these attempts of co-optation and control proved themselves to be futile, in the short run they were effective.

The relaxation of restrictions on the second economy and state’s attempts of incorporation had a stabilising influence in Hungary, distracting people from the kind of political opposition emerging in Poland (Cox and Váss 1995, 156-158). Kádár knew that the ideology and language of the communist order did not mean anything to the population at large. He realised that the only way to make the population accept the regime was through satisfying the essential needs of the population. That was how the ‘goulash communism’ was born in 1968 over a base of NEM. In this context, Kádár’s slogan became ‘whoever is not against us is with us’ (Fontaine 1995, 299, 302). Still, similar to other communist governments, attempts to organise independent associations were not tolerated in Hungary. The Hungarian regime used repression when necessary to disrupt organisational activities with undesired political content or more openly dissident political activities. The Hungarian opposition came to realise the limits of its activity within communism and hence developed a more compromising attitude (Frentzel-Zagorska 1997).

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48 The Hungarian Chamber of Commerce became a relatively independent representative of the interests of the state enterprise managements. After the 1970s, the organisations of artisans and retailers gained a say in the economic decision-making processes. These were all unparalleled in the COMECON states.

49 According to Hankiss (1991, 307), the characteristics of the second economy are as follows: it is not planned and organised by the state; it is more or less an informal economy and only partially affected by the formal systems of regulation that govern and control the first economy; it is not linked to the dominant
This gradual opening also had implications for the communist party itself. At a certain point, it served to create a counter elite among the ranks of the Hungarian communist party. This was not all that surprising as the Hungarian ruling elite – at least since the Kádár era – was considered relatively enlightened and effective. Toward the end of the regime, the party and the non-party intellectual elites were able to form a unified stance. This counter-elite turned its back on Marxism-Leninism, especially on the part of the doctrine that addressed the working class (E. Szalai 1996a, 12). Increasing the influence of softliners within the party, e.g. Imre Pozsgay\(^{50}\), consequently, paved the way for transition from authoritarianism to democracy (Fellegi 1992; Frentzel-Zagorska 1997, 122; Wesolowski 1991, 89-93).

Thus, the Hungarian communist model was not only economy-centred but also non-confrontational. Starting from 1965, some parts of the Hungarian intelligentsia had been critical rather than oppositional to the regime. They concentrated their efforts in pushing the establishment to implement economic reform first of all and then in the 1980s, to bring the party’s reformist camp to power (Frentzel-Zagorska 1997, 134). The cadre bureaucracy and the intelligentsia were increasingly recruited from highly skilled professionals, and consequently these two strata became almost indistinguishable in their \textit{habitus}\(^{51}\) (Konrád and Szelényi 1991, 343; E. Szalai 1996a, 9-10). Party loyalty was no longer an obligation for the intelligentsia to be promoted towards higher positions. This is somewhat contrary to the positively discriminating status of party members in Poland.

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\(^{50}\) A reform-minded senior member of the Hungarian Communist Party, who also was the Minister of Culture in the 1970s.

\(^{51}\) Type of owners, that is, to state ownership; it is not linked to the dominant type of management, that is, to large enterprises.
with regard to promotion within bureaucracy. Decreasing the influence of party loyalty paved the way for reformism to become a hegemonic ideology in Hungary, and led to decreasing attraction to the old cadre existence.

By mutual compromise, this process led to the ‘dilution of the communist ideology’ among the ranks of most of the communist intelligentsia alongside a ‘dilution of dissidence’ among the ranks of a part of the oppositional intelligentsia. Unlike in Poland, the Hungarian society managed to develop compromising attitudes despite micro networks retaining their importance. Furthermore, the second society in Hungary was never a complete negation of official society, but was structured in a random multidimensional way (Hankiss 1991, 324). This illustrates another feature of adaptation in the face of permeable boundaries between the second and first societies. Although constant coexistence made the individual prone to contradiction between the first and second societies, the social crisis was not as grave in Hungary as it was in Poland.

To conclude, both Poland and Hungary had a certain, albeit limited, pattern of pluralism during communism. A possible difference is that, while in Poland, pluralism has

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51 See Konrád and Szelényi (1991, esp. 343-345) for similar educational credentials of these two strata, their common exposure to the West and enfeebling ideological commitment to the communist party.
52 See Koralewicz and Wińk-Lipiński (1985, especially 229-232) study on visions of Polish society. Also see Koralewicz and Ziolkowski (1993) for the results of a survey carried out as regards to how education was downplayed as against party membership by Polish respondents’ evaluation of factors affecting material success towards the end of 1970s.
53 In Hungarian society, the value forming strength of the family was evident in the aggressive re-socialising periods of socialism, both in the 1950s and 1960s. Then, the family represented a bulwark, protection, tradition, it sent out messages within the whole society, even if those ‘family’ values differed from each other a great deal. The ‘education for community’ policy of socialism, however, sought to destroy the harmonising closed community of the family with significant success (Völgyes 2001, 172).
54 In the post-Stalinist period of 1960s, Frentzel-Zagorska (1997) argues that there has been lame pluralism with many pseudo-independent bodies. This carved a more plural and liberal type of regime in Poland along with Hungary. The result was dissidence movements. Thanks to dissidence movements in Hungary
implied conflicts between dissidence and the state, in Hungary pluralism brought motives to seek compromises through elite settlements and informal networks. Similar to Poland, ‘adaptation through opposition’ also took place in Hungary. Nevertheless, different from Poland, its opposition component became gradually much weaker and the adaptational component much stronger. Hence, adaptation brought about more compromising tendencies in search of effectiveness.

Although the effects of these differences toward the democratisation period remain to be seen in Chapter IV and V, one can explain this divergence: in Hungary there was social support for the regime in Hungary and in Poland the party-state was met with popular dissidence. Surveys carried out in 1985 indicated that 88% of Hungarian respondents in 1985 declared confidence in national leadership, while 10%-16% said that they had significant chances to influence the government institutions and 19%-31% said that there had been transparency in government institutions. Bruszt (1988), in an attempt to explain these results, drew attention to Hungarian citizens’ tendency to judge politics from a vantage point of effectiveness.

II.2.a.Romania:

There is a consensus in the literature regarding the Romanian communist regime: it never sought opening, but became more and more oppressive in implementing a personal

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and Poland, the party-state elites revised not only the basic principles of ideology but also the network of institutions covering all aspects of citizens’ lives. Gierek’s period, for example, presented Poland with a type of social contract similar to that of Kádár’s in Hungary in search for legitimacy. Accordingly, the Polish regime guaranteed increases in the standard of living and greater availability of consumer goods, provision of welfare benefits and other incentives. In return, individuals were to accept rule over society as well as effective withdrawal from active politics and unsanctioned public associations (Kurczewska 1995, 96; Weigle and Butterfield 1992, 6-8).

55 See (Bruszt 1988, 64, 69-70).
dictatorship under the guise of communism (of many, the following are notable: Linz and Stepan 1996; Shafir 1985; Verdery 1996; Zhang 1994). Communism in the Romanian context was renamed socialist patrimonialism (Linden 1986; Snyder 1998) or else sultanism (Chehabi and Linz, 1998a; Linz and Stepan, 1996). In brief, Ceaușescu’s rule in Romania involved the manipulation of key personnel, institutions and society. His rule sought a balance between the Romanian Communist Party (PCR), the army, and the Securitate. Checks and balances manifested directly to undermine the autonomy of these institutions, and from this system came the basis of regime stability. In this context, Ceaușescu maintained his authority through personnel patronage rather than ideology, charisma or impersonal law. The dictator’s patronage networks penetrated both into the state and society and made up for the extreme personalisation and the low levels of institutionalisation of sultanism (Chehabi and Linz, 1998b, 27).

In order to totally rid the society of any attempts of opposition, the Ceaușescu regime simply permeated fear into both the public and the private spheres, especially through the Securitate. The result was that the Romanian communist state did not leave any niche for opposition, unlike the Hungarian and the Polish regimes. Still at the face of all these factors, arguing that communists have never faced any opposition in Romania, in my opinion, is not a true description of the situation in this country. Rather, it is more plausible to say that opposition never attained as powerful a position as it did in Poland, nor even as much as in Hungary. I will discuss this issue in detail in the next section on Romania. In this section, however, I will discuss specific features of the Romanian

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56 See (Culic 1999; Mingiu-Pippidi 1999a; Linz and Stepan; 1996; Nelson 1995; Ratesh 1993; Tismaneanu 1991 and 1992) for a detailed discussion.
communist regime and will try to examine why it led to a weaker opposition in the country.
The underground Romanian communist party was a peripheral formation, entirely dominated by the Comintern at its inception. This was due to the virtually non-existing industrial structures and predominance of the peasantry\(^{57}\) (Roberts 1969; Shafir 1985). In this largely peasant society, democracy let alone socialism would have never created an alternative to right wing populism. In a context as such, the traditional Romanian peasant populism țărăanism\(^{58}\), historically, forged a much better alliance with nationalism rather than socialism\(^{59}\). The PCR, therefore, could manage to achieve national prominence and establish its hegemony only under the umbrella of the Soviet army (Tismaneanu 1991, 123). As a result what came up in 1947 as the Romanian regime, was an externally imposed Marxist language and a monolithic political system.

Yet, the PCR elite was also aware that, the communist regime was not legitimate and not supported among the Romanians at large. Its foreign character, certainly, did not help to increase its ailing levels of support either. Thus, the PCR elite chose to ease Romania’s links with the Soviet Union and turned inwards in search of legitimacy for the communist regime. Moreover, the classification of Romania as an agricultural polity/economy under the specialisation attempts within Council for Mutual Economic Co-operation (COMECON)\(^{60}\) and the following rejection of this classification by the communist elite

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\(^{57}\) Rouček (1971, 96) argued that, ‘socialist parties could not become important in Romanian rural society. The landless labourers and insufficiently landed proprietors have been partially satisfied by the agrarian reform, and their energy [was] now absorbed by an appetite for more land’.

\(^{58}\) For further discussion on țărăanism, see Hitchins (1983).

\(^{59}\) For a detailed discussion on this topic in an earlier study over continuities in Romanian nationalism over three different political periods in the 20th century, see Korkut (2001b).

\(^{60}\) Specialisation was advocated by the Soviet Union and implied that, Romania would only remain as a major supplier of agricultural products to the industrially advanced members of the community, but will not become an industrialised country (Verdery 1995). The Romanian communist elite portrayed this policy as a main assault on industrialisation attempts in their country, which started during the interwar period
was the opportunity to show the Romanian nation their patriotism. This opposition to the specialisation put the Romanian communist elite in opposition to Khrushchev.

Also, quite strategically, by opposing Khrushchev himself, the PCR elite could also have avoided engaging Khrushchev’s de-Stalinization policies. As such, they managed to protect their power base from possible Soviet infiltration (Linz and Stepan 1996, 347; Tismaneanu 1991, 128). Despite the fact that the Romanian regime sought to extend the legitimacy of the Grand National Assembly and the Socialist Unity Front after the Prague Spring and the riots in Poland in the 1970s, these modifications did not entail yielding of any authority (Linden 1986, 351). After all, in Romania, anti-Stalinism remained more of a criticism of the Soviet Union than of the type of leadership and political configurations associated with Stalin (Holmes 1983, 86).

In return, the PCR leadership committed itself in forging an autochthonous legitimacy at home (Verdery 1995) in search of domestic support. The Romanian regime imposed a so-called ‘anti-Soviet Stalinism’. This defiance of Moscow made Ceauşescu both a national and an international hero (Linz and Stepan 1996, 348; Rady 1992, 42). The consequence was nationalising the communist party through integration of all things Romanian into the new version of party history with Ceauşescu as its head. In Ceauşescu’s mind, the legitimacy of communism would come through an appeal to the values of the nation

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(Roberts 1969, 343) and were carried out in the first decades of the communist regime with enormous sacrifices (Verdery 1995).

61 Campeanu and Radzai (1991) argue that the invasion of Hungary by the Soviet troops in 1956 worked for the benefit of Romania. Khrushchev, in an effort to present that the Soviet Union was not only able to send its troops into certain countries, but also withdraw them from others. Indeed, Khruschev withdrew troops from Romania in 1958. Therefore, Romania became the only signatory of the Warsaw Pact to be relieved of Soviet military occupation.
alongside Marxist-Leninist slogans (Jowitt 1975; Shafir 1985). In his speeches, Ceauşescu tended to emphasise the importance of knowing and learning one’s past and honouring history. He asserted that,

\[ \text{[O]nly under socialism can the nation come to full flower . . . unlike capitalist nations, the nation under socialism constitutes a progressive force . . . the nation will continue to be for a long time to come, the basis for the development of our society (Ceauşescu 1969 [1966], 374 in Verdery 1995, 118).} \]

This was a major break with socialist internationalism. This new attitude took the type of a ‘social contract’, with Ceauşescu’s attempts to identify the PCR not only with the proletariat, but also with the whole nation. The result was a gradual delegitimation of official Marxism and its death as official ideology (Linz and Stepan 1996, 355). This ultimately and crucially served for the dilution of communist structures and swept away any effects of communist institutionalisation. As such, Ceauşescuism appeared as a desperate attempt by a beleaguered elite to gain domestic authority and international recognition\(^62\) by emphasising national prestige and influence, although it never possessed any of them (Tismaneanu 1991, 123; Verdery 1995)\(^63\).

Still, the PCR attempts created an enduring effort to circumvent the evolution of the Romanian communist political culture into a post-totalitarian configuration, in which the party’s leading role would be limited significantly by the rise of semi-official and unofficial groups and associations. In contrast, there was an extensive and intensive

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\(^{62}\) Ceauşescu was a supporter of the Prague Spring and refused to send Romanian troops for the invasion of Czechoslovakia. He established links with the West, criticised the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet troops and of Cambodia by Vietnam and refused to boycott the 1980 Los Angeles Olympic games (Fontaine, 1995).

\(^{63}\) Tismaneanu (1991, 126) designates Romanian ‘exceptionalism’ as ‘domesticism’: the compulsive wish to carry the Stalinist logic to an extreme, to strengthen the party’s grip on society and prevent the coagulation of any autonomous centre of political, social and cultural initiative.
mobilisation into a vast army of regime-created organisations. In no other Eastern European country were so many organisations politicised (with the possible exception of Albania). Even small organisations with no intrinsic political character, such as an organisation of people concerned with the bees were organised by the party-state. Hence, the system interfered more deeply in the aspects of people’s life than in any other East European country (Linz and Stepan 1996, 355). Hence, all the possibilities of emergence of a counter-elite, for instance similar to the stratum in Hungary, were hindered.

In contrast to the Hungarian political elite but perhaps similar to the Polish, the PCR political elite required ideological allegiance from the political elite. After a while, the elite, in an ideological allegiance created in a frantic mood, was also required to pay homage to Ceaușescu. Those elite strata, which failed to abide by these policies, were harshly oppressed (Culic 1999, 50-55). The stubborn rejection of any attempt at democratisation is thus the consequence of a consistent political outlook inherently suspicious of diversity. In this context, even different interpretations of Marxism was not possible in Romania in contrast to Poland and Hungary, as ‘experts feared that the negative, emancipatory dimension of Hegelian-Marxism would inspire a critique of the status quo’ (Tismaneanu 1986 and 1991, 136).

Ceaușescu built up his power base within the PCR apparatus with a group of middle-rank activists whose careers depended on Ceaușescu’s personal protection. He accumulated the functions of the first secretary of the party, the president of the Republic, the chief of the armed forces, the president of the sate council, the council of defence and the
supreme council of economic and social development. Under these circumstances, not surprisingly, clientelism and patronage functioned as the main principles of political advancement (Fontaine 1995, 305; Tismaneanu 1991, 149). Parts of party intelligentsia, who reached a certain amount of popularity among the party rank and file, were incrementally marginalized even before they dared to challenge the conducător, the Supreme Leader.

The party control resulted in the total atomisation of the society, the silence of the intellectuals, and extreme centralisation. Only those intellectuals with relevant political capital could make use of cultural capital, unlike in Poland and Hungary at the end of their communist regimes (Corlaciu 1984; Culic 1999, 52-53, 63). Thus, Nicolae and Elena Ceaușescu concentrated all power in their hands, and believed that they had established absolute control over all the party and state agencies. Hence, patrimonialism replaced institutionalism of communism. Nonetheless, they were unaware of the growing discontentment across the society. That is why I call the Romanian political elite oblivious at the face of increasing popular discontent.

Hence, Romania presented a case, where identification of individuals with the common values and objectives of system – at least in the public sphere – was accomplished. This regime underlined the party as the sole ‘conscious factor’ in the system amidst organised participation and lack of independent trade unions (Linz and Stepan 1996, 351; Shafir 1985, 53-56). Therefore, it is quite difficult to account what was left in the micro-sphere and how it survived during this regime. Although societal resignation at the face of
totalitarian power is a plausible hypothesis, the idea that the independent life of society had been completely suppressed was wrong (Tismaneanu 1992, 142). More probable is that the Romanian society also developed similar adaptation techniques as Hungarians and Poles did. After all, as Tismaneanu (1990, 6) and Nelson (1995, 219) argued, individual solutions to escape the ideological constraints imposed by authorities were the most common results of the withering away of the utopia at the public level in Eastern European countries, and Romania was no exception to this withering away.

Nonetheless, a crucial difference between Romania and the rest might be that while informalities as a means of adaptation was tolerated in Poland and promoted in Hungary, the Romanian regime sought to control even the informalities.

II.2.b. Types of Dissidence:

Dissidence movements carve spaces for themselves in the weakness of the communist states. Poland and Hungary are major examples to this phenomenon. In these two countries, there were a number of opposition groups or alliances; each with a wide range of political thinking: socialist, social democratic, democratic, liberal, Christian and nationalist. Still, the difference between these two was that, Hungary had an uprising once in 1956 and the politics in this country were normalised with brutality, which discouraged dissidence for the next thirty years or so. Whereas Poland, dissidence was

64 One public survey, that I came across, was done by Gallup International with the Romanians travelling to the West. It showed that, Romanian respondents were positive about their evaluation of socialism in their country in the middle to late 1970s. A comparison of the 1979-80 survey conducted for Radio Free Europe with data collected in 1984-85, however, demonstrated the severity of the Ceaușescu regime’s political decline among the people it ruled. Among five East European states, Ceaușescu’s Romania suffered the largest negative shift of public attitudes in the early 1980s. Positive evaluations of the performance of Romanian socialism dropped by 24% while negative answers increased by 25%. This very large movement toward nonsupportive responses was almost 50% greater than the negative shift in responses to the same question among Polish nationals (Nelson 1995, 219-220).

65 See Smolar (1991) and Walicki (1990) for a detailed account of dissident groups in Poland.
quasi permanent since 1956 as the Soviet Union itself never risk of entering Poland (unlike Hungary and Czechoslovakia) in order re-establish the order (Fontaine 1995, 300). On the other hand, Romania, as a result of sultanism under Ceaușescu, was unable to generate such notable dissidence. I will try to illustrate how different types of dissidence came into existence beginning with Poland.

II.2.b.Poland:

The opposition groups in Poland did not share any common ideological outlook, but shared a belief in the pluralistic character of Polish society, the need for this pluralism to be reflected in the political structure, and above all, the need to break down the regime’s information monopoly. In their goals and in their commitment to the protection of basic human rights, they also found themselves in a tacit alliance with the Church starting from 197666 (Meiklejohn Terry 1996, 131, 134). The Solidarity movement was not the only dissidence movement in Poland yet by far the biggest. Along with Solidarity, there also were opponents to the regime within the Polish United Workers Party (PZPR) ranks

66 ‘Since 1956 the Church, especially as represented by its political activists in the ‘Znak (sign)’ parliamentary group, had pursued a neopositivist strategy based on a tacit compromise with the regime combined with non-acceptance of its ideology and a belief, shared with Marxist revisionists, in the possibility of evolutionary change within the existing institutional structure. This neopositivist strategy of Znak was influenced by the tradition of political realism and 19th century positivism in its rejection of any idea of revolutionary struggle for Poland’s independence as well as its focus on organic work aimed at preserving and developing Polish culture within the context of the existing system’ (Meiklejohn Terry 1996, 131). For a further discussion of neopositivist tradition of Poland, see Rupnik (1979). ‘For the Church, the acid test of its relationship with the regime came in the confrontation over proposed amendments to the constitution in late 1975 and early 1976. Three amendments evoked particular controversy. First, the incorporation into the constitution of the ‘leading role’ of the PZPR, in what was now to be called the Polish Socialist Republic, set the party above the formal institutions of the state and was intended to provide a new source of legitimacy for its monopolistic position. Second, the inclusion of a reference to Poland’s ‘unshakable fraternal bond with the Soviet Union’ was seen by many as nothing less than a legalisation of the Brezhnev Doctrine and an unacceptable limitation on Poland’s sovereignty. The third was a provision ‘inseparably’ linking the rights of the citizens to the ‘conscientious fulfilling of duties to the fatherland’, which the Church feared would provide the legal basis for discriminating against believers’. Although, the ensuing debate eventually forced the regime to modify the amendments, for Catholics it also marked the end of neopositivism (Meiklejohn 1996, 131-132).
(Szczepański 1991a) as well as critical Marxists out of the PZPR ranks. The dissidence movement in Poland was not limited to the last years of the regime either. There had been a cyclical opposition towards the regime, which manifested themselves in the events of 1956, 1968, and 1970s (Morawski 1982). Peace activists were also active in Poland in terms of inserting their concerns (Lazarski 1990) as well as a few entrepreneurs and managers coming together under the auspices of the Club of Rome. I will put my emphasis on Solidarity in this section, as it was the decisive and all inclusive dissidence movement in Poland to have swept away the communist regime.

The communist systems, in general, have paid a tremendous effort to separate the ordinary people from the intelligentsia (Lipski 1985, 46) and they were successful to a large extent in Hungary and Romania. It was only in Poland that the dissident intelligentsia was able to bridge the gaps between themselves and the public starting from late 1970s until the very end of the regime. The crucial events to convince the dissident intelligentsia to become active supporters of workers’ interests were unrests in Ursus and Radom in 1976 (Michnik 1998, 58-59). That was how the Workers’ Defence Committee (KOR) came into existence. KOR was active immediately following the June

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68 Jozef Niźnik carried out the post of presidency of Club of Rome during Jaruzelski’s Poland. Club of Rome was a group of influential people in the late 1960s. They came together to draw attention of people to global problems (pollution, employment and non-renewable resources) and published a report called ‘Limits of growth’. In its Warsaw branch there were more than 100 individuals of different ideological origins, including Marxists. The intention was to bring people of different origin together under one umbrella (Jozef Niźnik, personal interview, Warsaw, April 2002).
69 Ursus and Radom strikes came after the price hikes in 1976 without any consultation. The strikes lasted only for one day. The reason for the short duration was that the prime minister went on national television to indicate the withdrawal of the package. The most dramatic events occurred at Radom, a city southeast of Warsaw, and at the Ursus Tractor Factory in the Warsaw suburbs. At Ursus, nearly the entire factory supported the impromptu strike. In Radom, the strikes were more extensive – workers from a large number of factories participated, gained control of most of the city, ransacked local party headquarters, and towards the end of the day were involved in street battles with security forces (Falk 2003, 34).
strikes (Meiklejohn Terry 1996, 134) to defend the workers through establishing committees. The movement rested on the edification of independent institutions in a civil society, in which people do not want to be pupils, soldiers, or slaves; but act as citizens (Lipski 1985, 49). Although set up to specifically to defend the interests of workers, KOR nevertheless, remained for more than a year almost exclusively the domain of intellectuals in search of a connection with workers. It was only in 1978 that workers began to involve themselves in significant numbers (Meiklejohn Terry 1996, 135).

The KOR movement did not have hierarchy, bureaucracy, and chairmen, but just members. The committee developed a custom that even if only one person objected to a settlement the final decision was postponed until a compromise is reached. It sought mutual understanding, self-respect and support among the intellectuals, students, peasants and workers (Lipski 1985, 49, 199, 259). The reorganisation and politicisation of KOR coincided with an expansion and diversification of the opposition movement. Among the new entries was the Movement for the Defence of Human and Civil Rights (ROPCiO). Founded in March 1977, whose ideological roots lay more in Poland’s nationalist and Christian Democratic traditions than in the leftist leaning KOR70 (Meiklejohn Terry 1996, 134). At the start of the 1980s, KOR came to the conclusion that the ideas, which the organisation had set before the society, should now be taken over by a great mass social movement, of which Solidarity was the most important element (Lipski 1985, 432).

70 In 1978 ROPCiO split. The more nationalistic faction eventually became the Confederation for an Independent Poland (KPN), by far the most conservative of all opposition groups (Meiklejohn Terry 1996, 134).
Briefly, it is plausible to say that while dissenting, Solidarity neither attained an internal organisational structure nor a joint programme of action. In the absence of formal channels of interest articulation open to independent social actors, Solidarity relied heavily on demonstrations and distrust of fixed internal structures (Szczepański 1991a, 207; Weigle and Butterfield 1992). As a result, in 1984 42.7\% of even the PZPR members became in favour of strikes and demonstrations\textsuperscript{71} (Adamski 1990, 24). Hence, the protest activities held the micro sphere together (Rychard 1993, 21) and these structures became essential elements of the abrupt grass-roots development towards alternative institutions in Poland (Koralewicz and Wńuk-Lipiński, 1985, 234).

In terms of organisational structures, the Commission of Solidarity (TTK) was at the top, followed by regional organisations in between, and finally an interim factory commission at the bottom. The organisation was determined not to accept a distinction between the leader and the led. The assumption was that everyone viewed the situation in the same way and had the same goals. Leaders were treated simply as experts or organisers, to whom the body of movement temporarily delegated some functions in pursuit of common goals. The leader was perceived as ‘one of us’, and hence nobody was prepared to give him or her any special powers or prerogatives. The principal function of the leadership was to symbolise the continuity and the unity of the movement (Smolar 1991, 182-185). As a result, Solidarity extended its participative rhetoric through a conviction to

\textsuperscript{71} The recognition of workers’ right to strike in 1982 (Rusu, 1999/2000) might be a possible explanation as to why the percentage elevated.
implement ‘workers’ self-management’ (Cirtautas and Mokrzycki 1995, 126), and hence managed to adopt the communist party’s rhetoric to opposition (Michnik 1985 and 1998). Still, along with this mass appeal, ‘charismatic leadership had also been a very important feature of Solidarity and found its embodiment in Wałęsa and the Polish Pope’ (Podgórecki 1992, 143). In this context, the internal discourse of Solidarity was ‘unity of the movement’ along with encouraging each social group to represent their own interests (Kennedy 1992). Thus Solidarity did not have a specified class basis, it was rather a movement for the rights of all oppressed, although the workers undertook the resistance (Rychard 1993).

This anti-institutionalist approach, which Solidarity stood to represent, was a reflection of a general dislike of an institutionally organised society in the Polish political culture.

Surveys carried out at the end of 1983 and the beginning of 1984 by a team from the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology demonstrated that the majority of respondents from a national sample perceive the ‘institutionally organised society as hostile’. Hence, institutional life appeared as a social reality created from above and perceived as definitely unfavourable or not friendly by most respondents. Furthermore, according to 80% of the respondents, there were embedded non-legitimate social inequalities, and lack of political democracy within the institutions of the communist regime in Poland (Koralewicz and Wińk-Lipiński 1985, 227).

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72 Worker self-management is based on institutionalising the decision-making authority of the workforce over the management of enterprise through particular organs of democratic workers’ representation such as workers’ councils.

73 Henryk Domański, Polish Academy of Sciences, (personal interview, Warsaw, April 2002).
Nevertheless, Solidarity showed aspirations of working class not only to establish self-governed autonomous industrial democracy, but also to transform themselves into a social movement and to create alternatives to those of governments. As a result Solidarity showed that the absence of a suitable political system for interest articulation of workers could make social movements adopt political objectives (Morawski 1988). Perhaps not all that surprising, the Poles’81 survey results also showed that respondents’ support for self-management went together with their demand for the restriction of PZPR’s role in the exercise of political power (Kolarska and Rychard 1987, 76).

In line, Solidarity’s dissidence against real socialism showed that, the political space was not limited by or confined to state borders. As such, the ‘volume’ of political space depended on the broadness of political horizons of the citizens. Contextually the idea among the Solidarity ranks was that, once the opposition could have got hold of the state, it would become ‘our state’, and hence all problems would be magically solved (Ost 1993; Szczepański 1991a and 1991b; Wesołowski 1995, 113). Hence, the Solidarity ranks expected that once the authorities provided the nation with a relaxed political environment, and once they abandon police control over the public, the nation would easily manage to organise its life around self-governed bodies in an effort to effectively pursue its interests and the spirit of democracy. This also was a manifestation of overconfidence in democracy, which ‘would assure substantively beneficial outcomes for the Polish nation in collective, [once] the internal divisions would be overcome and the society would be liberated from all existing problems’ (Cirtautas and Mokrzycki 1995,

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74 A team from the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology have been carrying out rounds of surveys in Poland since the 80s. These surveys are named Polacy (Poles) and the year they were carried out.
As such, Poland appeared a typical case of opposition as a mass movement diminishing the trust in the communist party.

II.2.b. Hungary:
The Hungarian opposition, contrary to Poland, was mainly elitist and narrow. The Hungarian communist authorities assured more space for intellectual independence in an attempt to co-opt the intellectuals into the system or at least to silence their dissidence. There were selective attacks on independent intellectuals in the mid 1970s in Hungary rather than the broad attack on the intelligentsia and students in Poland in 1968 (Kennedy 1992, 42-46). As I will discuss later, however, these co-optation attempts still fell short of hindering opposition. Yet, in the conflict initiating the process of political change, the opposition’s apparent social base was the broadly defined intelligentsia (Wesołowski 1991, 90) without any representation of workers and peasants. The intelligentsia established its hegemony within the civil society rather than popularising the civil society itself (Kennedy 1992). This was a main difference between Hungary and Poland.

What was common to Poland, independent trade unions, became part of the democratic opposition in Hungary only towards the very end of the communist regime. There are series of hypotheses to explain the absence of workers’ dissidence. Kennedy (1992, 46-

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75 This over reliance on society as against formal institutions of politics has been an important feature of anti-politics in a context where politicians were power hungry (Konrád, 1987); anti-politics could not enter the realm of politics, since dissidents did not have the mandate to act as a government (Michnik, 1985); and power was negative; therefore as soon as anti-politics accepted power, it became evil, corrupt and egoistic politics (Havel, 1985). Samizdat publications became the means of articulating and permeating this discussion on society and state.

76 Still this does not mean that in Hungary there were no civil organisations. Most of the organisations were active in the micro sphere such as sport, cultural pursuits and leisure activities. See Cox and Váss (1995) for a detailed account of civil associations in Hungary from 1932 to 1989.
53) proposed that in Hungary workers’ involvement in the second economy hindered their dissidence. Another hypothesis to this extent was that, Hungarian workers were economically satisfied and they feared that dissidence would bring a genesis towards economic conditions similar to Poland\textsuperscript{77}. Hence, while the Polish employees had been working in workers’ self-governments or trade unions at the time of the transition, the elite of the Hungarian working class was more concerned with the introduction of new forms of private enterprises (Bruszt 1995, 266).

On this basis, Szelényi (1988 in Frentzel-Zagorska 1997, 133) called the Hungarian way as the ‘embourgeoisement’ of the masses versus ‘self-organisation’ of the Polish society. He continued,

while the Hungarians worked their way together during the last decade toward greater autonomy by expanding the second economy (in a sense an individual strategy), the Poles confronted the power structure directly in the political sphere, through trade unions, the KOR, political organisations and collective action.

Similarly, Fehér and A. Heller as well as Arató discuss individuality as regards to the Hungarian political culture as follows:

\textsuperscript{77} János Kende, trade union historian from Hungary, (personal interview, Budapest, June 2002). He put forward this hypothesis in an interview in June 2002 in Budapest. He also thought that the SZOT officials were not really happy with the implementation of second economy in Hungary from late 60s onwards. Another trade union historian Judit Lux, however, trade union historian from Hungary, (personal interview, Budapest, June 2002). She put forward that the SZOT was an autonomous trade union in Hungary during the communist period and trade union leaders have been the members of the communist party presidium. As such, her expectancy would be that they could have prevented the communist party in Hungary from a shift towards second economy, i.e. embourgeoisement of the working classes. To this extent, I have my reservations. As a survey by Beskid, Bokor, and Kolosi (1983) illustrated, in both Hungary and Poland ‘the blue collar workers stand much better chance of being found within poverty brackets than intelligentsia or white-collar workers’ (see tables 11 and 12 in pages 46-48). Furthermore, this study also presented a similar picture of the relative-deprivation phenomenon in two countries.
The Hungarian revolution [of 1956] marked the first time that the Stalinist autocracy was challenged totally and uncompromisingly . . . at the fundamental level of the political organisation of society. It engendered a new substantive principle . . . the emergence of the individual as the centre of the political discourse (Fehér and A. Heller 1983,128).

Their [Hungarians] second experience in a historical frame has been the 1968 Kádár reform, which still suggested that only individual endeavours could bring forth success in one way or in another. The narrow opposition in the Hungarian example came up with programme suggestions to encourage and exaggerate beginnings of a demand for political indifference (Arató 1992, 66) translated from Hungarian.

In this context of individualistic appeal, Kennedy’s (1992, 46-53) second hypothesis was that, the Hungarian workers were unable to unify behind any ideology, such as Catholicism or anti-partism as did the Polish workers. This hypothesis has plausible grounds. Churches normalised their relations with the state in Hungary as a part of the implicit and accepted understanding that underpinned social unity (Völgyes 2001, 171). Only Cardinal Mindszenty remained a staunch opponent of the communist regime in Hungary, but he was kept in exile in the American Embassy in Budapest.

Returning to the issue on the prevalent feelings of individualism among Hungarians, Vajda (interview cited by Frentzel-Zagorska 1997, 123) asserted that, ‘they [Hungarians] concentrated their energy on shaping their lives as individuals but showed no tendency to organise at the societal level’.

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78 Cardinal Mindszenty was a zealous defender of the material and spiritual interests of the clergy. He has been among the forerunners of reformists of the 1956. After the defeat, he sought refuge in the American Embassy in Budapest and has remained a staunch opponent of the communist regime. For a detailed discussion on Cardinal Mindszenty and his position as a dissident, see Fejtő (1996, 148-156).
Even though these were over-generalisations, it seemed true that Hungary’s experience within the Austro-Hungarian monarchy must to some extent have had shaped popular attitudes by promoting a tendency to compromise with the overwhelming power on the best possible conditions (Frentzel-Zagorska 1997, 123).

All these arguments led one to understand why the Hungarian dissidence movement resulted in narrow elitist structures.

While discussing the narrow bases of Hungarian opposition, one should still not forget the legacy of 1956. The only time Hungarians came together as a mass opposition to one party regime, and the Soviet dominance resulted in invasion and persecution. This made the dissident circles in Hungary realise that, the communists were here to stay (Frentzel-Zagorska 1997) and permeated an idea that the only way to transform the system was to change the character of the communist ruling group rather than to replace it. This context brought a search for ‘relative autonomy’ in Hungarian society despite its yielding format. Hence, various interactions came to offer alternatives to even replacements of communist structures. In E. Szalai’s words the Hungarian society was molded in such a frame that,

They] achieved their aims primarily by means of individual ‘deals’, which helped them to work their way through the channels of power. As a result of atomisation of interests, social groupings remained more or less laterally separate and common interests and values remained obscure and even invisible. Furthermore, those who might have expressed the interests and values of particular groups were more interested in what they might obtain for themselves and their families through involvement in the second economy (1996b, 30).

This narrow and individualistic demands of the opposition fit quite well in what the Kádár regime could offer in terms of gradual opening up.

79 Henryk DomANSki, Polish Academy of Sciences, also asserted a similar idea in a personal interview in Warsaw in April 2002.
Looking back at the intelligentsia in Hungary, it is possible to identify three important groups in the period from 1970s to the late 1980s: (1) dissident intellectuals who had little or no access to official positions and publications (later this group came to call themselves the democratic opposition); (2) populist writers, poets, and artists who had limited access to official cultural outlets; (3) reformist intellectuals, those in official positions with access to scholarly and other official outlets\(^{80}\) (Jenkins 1993, 3). Only in the second half of the 1980s came a plethora of largely self-organised associations in Hungary, such as environmentalist groups or organisations of youth and peace activists (Haraszti 1990). Though their numbers were few, some of these groups even had overlapping membership with intellectual dissident groups (Cox and Váss, 1995, 159; Jenkins 1993, 16). In the second half of the 1980s, the intellectual circles gained sophisticated identities or in Enyedi’s words: a subculture forming capacity (1993 in Csizmadia 2001, 144). New identities within new subcultures led to a new notion of politics and this new notion preferred a type of politics strengthened by constitutional rights while rejecting Kádár’s paternalism. This new notion of politics manifested itself in the emerging civil society, which later the dissidents shaped into political networks (Csizmadia 2001, 145). In this context, the third group of intelligentsia as well as softliners from the communist party also co-operated with the emerging civil society\(^{81}\).

\(^{80}\) Fellegi calls these elite strata as mid-level bureaucracies. He uses Juan Linz’s (1973, 199) category and labels them as pseudo or semi opposition. In Linz’s words (cited in Fellegi 1992, 137), ‘the semi opposition is strictly related to the regime and its power structures. In the absence of institutionalised pluralism, its social bases exist within the regime’s institutions, such as the Communist party or [its] auxiliary organisations. Semi opposition groups can be found in the realms of regime bureaucracies (such as trade unions), education and professional organisations, and business organisations’. As it stands, there are legitimate grounds to consider that there has been a shift from the nomenclatura strata into the newly configured civil society organisations. In the following sections of this paper, I will assess this issue to a more detailed extent.

\(^{81}\) See III. 3. a for further discussion on this topic.
The subculture forming capacity of the opposition marked the end of compromised coexistence and started the transition period in Hungary.

The crucial turning point for the Hungarian dissidence was their demand for *társadalmi szerződés*\(^{82}\) (social contract) in 1987. With this contract, the democratic opposition circle for the first time suggested the importance of fostering a social contract with all interested parties in order to achieve economic reforms. ‘The contract was intended to have mass-based appeal; it was written simply, with very concrete suggestions as to how one might begin to turn from a stance of generalised dissatisfaction and pessimism to targeted activism’ (Falk 2003, 278). Moreover, the contract suggested that the acknowledgement of the leading role of the party should not limit the system moving towards constitutionally guaranteed pluralism. The contract finally called for a new law on social organisations. Most crucially however, the social contract signalled an important advance in the development of opposition into a political movement with a programme (Jenkins 1993, 18). In conjunction with the dissident intellectuals, softliners from the communist party were also engaged in discussions over the contract\(^{83}\). This group hoped to *reform* the regime by pushing the communist party to gradually relinquish its remaining operative powers to the state, and elevating the state to a new power position vis-à-vis the

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\(^{82}\) The most important programmatic statement of ‘radical reformism’ remains the 1987 special issue of *Beszélő*, outlining the editors’ call for a new social contract. The programme of ‘radical reformism’ was premised on being tactical rather than totalising. It did not set its sights on great heights. In the words of Bence and Kis ‘radical reformism doesn’t offer a political program in the strict sense of the word; it merely expounds some tactical considerations’ (1980, 285 cited in Falk 2003, 277). ‘With the possibility of Kádár’s departure from the political scene, combined with the ever-widening circle of dissent, Kis and others sensed that this would be a key document for discussion and debate. Their intention was not to produce a statement of utopian vision or call for radical grass-root action, but they did want to move beyond the relatively narrow base of largely Budapest intellectuals to a wider audience’ (Falk 2003, 278).

\(^{83}\) See Jenkins (1993,18-20) for details.
communist party\textsuperscript{84}. Debates over the social contract, after all, were important to show the culture of discussion in Hungary among certain elites as opposed to the mass demonstrations in Poland\textsuperscript{85}. Therefore, the main difference between Hungary and Poland remained the fact that the Hungarian opposition presented a programme for change.

The spring and summer of 1988 saw the inception of a new number of independent initiatives. Among these initiatives came new trade unions (Jenkins 1993, 26). The composition of the first trade union also set Hungary apart from Poland. In contrast to Solidarity, a trade union for masses, the TDDSZ (Democratic Alliance of Scientific Workers) was a free trade union for the intelligentsia. Despite its symbolic value, starting independent trade union activities with a trade union as such was still telling as to the scope of dissidence in Hungary. Furthermore, this trade union did not take a directly political reformist stand, but rather it set and expressed goals in line with the interests of its members.

Independent initiatives came in Hungary near the very end of the communist regime. The Alliance of Young Democrats (FIDESZ), Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF) and the Alliance of Free Democrats\textsuperscript{86} (SZDSZ) are all examples of these initiatives. One phenomenon that these dissident organisations have had in common was that, they all emerged out of informal personal, professional, and intellectual networks to become

\textsuperscript{84} See Kornai’s (1991) study in this respect on different fractions of Hungarian economic elite and their reform proposals for the system.

\textsuperscript{85} A study by Csepeli \textit{et al.} (1996, especially page 49) also found out the relative paucity of effective political-ideological slogans to mobilise crowds and demonstrations stimulated by these slogans in Hungary.

\textsuperscript{86} This organisation was initially called Network of Independent Initiatives.
formal political organisations (Jenkins 1993; Kennedy 1992) and with the exception of FIDESZ, they were all elite clusters. Berényi explained this as follows,

By fostering the development of a second, informal economy after 1968 the communist government in Hungary created an environment where informal individual bargaining was allowed, but where any type of collective action based on solidarity met with immediate and severe repression. In this atmosphere people learned that it was not by collective action based on trust and solidarity but by informal individual bargaining that much be achieved’ (1999, 122-123 author’s own italics).

By January 1989, the law on associations came into effect and these organisations were no longer competing for supporters to increase their organisational strength, but also they were beginning to compete for potential voters (Jenkins 1993, 28, 39, 44; Róna-Tas 1991, 15). These informal networks, thereby, created the basis for future political capital for the Hungarian intelligentsia (Hankiss 1991; Konrád and Szelényi 1991, 339; Róna-Tas 1991, 19).

II.2.b.Romania:

In the other countries of the Warsaw Pact, political change has either been preceded by a long period of incubation, during which political segments of the society had time to work out possible alternatives to the existing regimes, or had at least come about against the background of unmistakable signs of Soviet encouragement of an alternative to the existing leadership of the ruling party. Neither of these factors, facilitating a relatively peaceful transfer of power existed in Romania (Shafir 1990, 36).

This background makes Romania a very interesting case in a regional comparison. How this background actually affects civil society in the aftermath of the regime change remains to be seen in the Chapter IV and V.

I intend to start my discussion on dissidence in Romania with asserting that, it was not completely true to say that there was no dissidence in Romania during the Ceauşescu
regime. Yet, it was not completely untrue to say that Romania at best experienced an ‘isolated dissidence’ (Ratesh 1993, 11). The previous section on Romania illustrated that the political space for opposition was narrow in Romania due to the vertical patron-client linkages as well as extended state surveillance and control (Snyder 1998, 55-56). In this section, my aim is to explore the specific features of the Romanian dissidence that left it isolated.

One can talk about three types of opposition in Romania, although they were not all equivalent in significance: (1) sporadic riots; (2) individual or intelligentsia opposition; (3) the religious and minority opposition. The extent to which individual opposition extended beyond the context of the intellectual opposition is very difficult to determine. In very rare cases, however, individual opposition turned into a mass opposition. If we are to ask why opposition remained isolated, however, briefly the explanations are as follows: few instances of large scale popular revolt; no independent church to provide a nucleus; little contact between the intelligentsia and the workers (Nelson 1995, 221; C. Petrescu 2002).

The first mobilisation wave against communism occurred in Romania after the Romanian army switched sides in 1944. This period is known as ‘resistance in the mountains’87. Aside from the ‘resistance in the mountains’, with the influence of the Hungarian uprising of 1956, there came numerous local peasants’ riots, workers’ strikes and some

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87 This movement was developed on the assumption that a confrontation between the Anglo-Americans and the Soviets was imminent. Some former officers and soldiers, students, teachers, priests, rank and file members of the traditional parties, peasants organised themselves in the partisan groups and hid in the
intellectuals attempts to initiate critical debates over cultural issues in two waves: 1958 and 1977 in Romania. The most active elements in riots were students, especially in the university centres of Timişoara and Cluj. Until 1958, there were 21 strikes\textsuperscript{88}. Yet, the regime acted quickly in repressing the emerging rebellion and, unlike in Poland, there was no reformist intelligentsia, which could have co-operated with these revolting people. Criticism by the intellectuals was absent after the communist take-over. The most prominent intellectuals either emigrated or fell victims to the repression either during the post-1945 wave of repression or after the events of 1956 (Ch. Petrescu 2002, 5-8). As a result, more people understood that communism was permanent and subsequently, the spirit of the ‘resistance in the mountains’ ebbed away.

Still the opposition to communism did not completely die out\textsuperscript{89}. After ‘the resistance in the mountains’, the largest act of resistance with an intellectually driven protest for human rights and an important workers’ strike occurred in 1977. It is important to mention that there was no connection between the two events. The authorities repressed the former in less than three months from the release of its first document (Ch. Petrescu 2002, 7). The workers’ resistance in Jiu Valley, however, lasted longer. Around 35,000 miners went on a strike calling the regime a ‘bourgeois proletariat’. The riots were mountains, waiting for the right moment to stir a nation-wide anti-communist revolution (Ch. Petrescu 2002, 2-3).

\textsuperscript{88} See D. Petrescu (1999) for the primary data regarding strikes in communist Romania.

\textsuperscript{89} From 1958 to 1977, with the notable exception of 1972 Jiu Valley strike, there were no workers’ protests. In explaining the lack of protest, one has to pay attention to ‘the new social contract’ between the state, the only employer, and the employees. This brought an increase in living standards. As a result of the programme of industrialisation and urbanisation, launched in 1958, a massive migration wave from countryside to cities occurred, and the living standard of a significant segment of the population changed for the better. As for the intellectuals, there was no open criticism. By 1964, the regime released all political prisoners and changed its tactic from suppression to prevention (Ch. Petrescu 2002, 6; also see Coposu 1998 on the events of 1964).
against the governments’ attempts to increase the retirement age and to decrease the pension benefits. Interesting enough, they came almost at the same time with the workers’ unrest in Poland. That was why the Jiu Valley action seemed to have spurred the regime to put forth at least some semblance of a mechanism to increase worker involvement in enterprise direction (Nelson 1980, 545 cited in Holmes 1983, 235, 237). Nonetheless, the five most important leaders of this strike were soon to be swiftly eliminated while the country turned into a concentration camp (Nelson 1995, 220).

Another event was the Brașov incident in 1987\(^{90}\). This time it was not just a strike centred on economic demands, but a violent outburst with strong political overtones. The workers directed their protest against the regime and the Secretary General of the party. The Brașov incident was also remarkable in the sense that it illustrated a change in the attitudinal antagonism toward the Ceaușescu regime, which was largely individual or local until then. Also, the incident was crucial in the sense that it displayed that the relations between the working classes and the regime were not operating all so well. Brucan (1988 in Ratesh 1993, 11) asserted that, this was a turning point in the relations between the PCR and the working class, which until then had ensured the political stability of the regime. In Brucan’s words, ‘the cup of anger has spilled over and that the working class no longer accepts being treated as an obedient servant’. Henceforth, sporadic strikes became the major characteristics of protest in Romania (Nelson 1995,

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\(^{90}\) The Brașov incident refers to a major strike in 1987 at the Steagul Rosu (The Red Flag) Truck factory in Brașov on 15 November 1987. This revolt broke up in a period of deep economic crisis, when shortages were already an endemic phenomenon, encompassing basic products, such as food, gasoline, heating fuel, electricity etc. The initial group of 300-350 protestors increased to a crowd of 3,000 – 4,000 people, by the time the miners arrived in the centre. The strike lasted half a day, after which, the special intervention troops dispersed the crowd. It was the first time that in conditions of deep crisis some solidarity between workers from different factories occurred (Ch. Petrescu 2002, 10).
Following act of defiance was the formation of Free Trade Union of the Working People of Romania (SLOMMR), which comprised a membership of more than two thousand people from different parts of the country. Its programme included quite radical changes, and the regime’s response to these demands came in the form of terror. Although the Union existed only for two weeks, it nonetheless left a major imprint on the history of Romanian resistance to communism (Ratesh 1993, 12).

With these acts of resistance in mind, we can draw certain parallels. In contrast to Poland but similar to Hungary, a larger coalition between the workers and the intelligentsia could not be established in Romania. This was despite a near cyclical workers’ unrest in Romania, similar to that in Poland. Hence, a possible reason as to why dissidence remained isolated in Romania was the absence of co-operation between the dissident intellectuals and the ordinary people. The Romanian intelligentsia could neither co-operate among each other nor could establish links with the softliners from the communist party unlike in Hungary. In Romania, in contrast to Poland and Hungary, there has been a relative success of terror and co-optation strategies by the Romanian communist regime to hinder the intelligentsia. One commonality in all cases was, however, the dilution of communist structures in one way or another.

Still, one should delve deeper into the specific features of the Romanian intelligentsia in order to understand why dissidence at large was missing in this country. In terms of intellectual dissidence in Romania, one can talk about two different groups. The first
group was those who advocated an alternative understanding of Marxism as against Ceaușescuism, while in the second group were those who took themselves out of the Marxist discourse and conceptualised both the Ceaușescuism and Marxism as two types of the same menace. The Marxist heretics of the first group were all eliminated from the PCR. Two notable thinkers were Silviu Brucan and Pavel Campeanu, who, in Tismaneanu’s words, were ‘free-floating’. Brucan\textsuperscript{91} showed personal courage in critising Ceaușescu’s disastrous course and called for the democratisation of Romania’s political system (Tismaneanu 1991, 147). Towards the end of the regime came the ‘letter of six’ in March 1989, which referred to a letter signed by six critics of Ceaușescu from the communist party ranks. It was the most prominent public dissent within the party, gathering the signatures of several former leading figures of the Communist Party. This open letter was addressed to Ceaușescu and it created a political platform for potential opposition within the party, although it did not have expected effect in Romania (Ratesh 1993, 12). The letter emphasised that, ‘Romania is and remains a European country’. The letter called for reforms \textit{a la prestroika} in the Soviet Union.

Nevertheless, these six were immediately put under house arrest while Ceaușescu criticised Gorbachev’s policies of being some right wing attacks on socialism. In this picture, one may also try to include Iliescu, who has been the most prominent actor in Romanian politics in the aftermath of the transition to democracy. He was a dissident

\textsuperscript{91} Ratesh (1993, 100) wrote the following about Brucan. ‘Brucan was an opponent of the regime as well, but still could travel to the U.S. He had quite radical views, departing from Stalinist dogma and a staunch critique of the regime. However, his objective was limited to a ‘dialogue between the power and the civil society’. As a lifetime Communist and Marxist theoretician, he was worried for what he called ‘the fate of socialism’. He was optimistic to an extent that the socialist countries are able to overcome the present impasse’.
against Ceaușescuism and was pushed out of the central committee of the communist party, despite his earlier extensive work in the youth branches of the PCR. As he stated later, his first impression of the beginning of the Ceaușescu regime was marked with full of hope of opening that he and the young people of his generation followed with romanticism and a certain kind of enthusiasm. Iliescu was referring to the declaration of independence from Moscow and the relative liberalisation of the social, political and intellectual life of the country over several years (Ratesh 1993, 50).

A second group of intellectuals were those who mainly remained in isolation, and failed to translate their daring acts into significant movements. The Ceaușescu regime approached culture as a type of revolutionary action ‘led and guided by the party’. The regime used the Writers’ Union to strictly control the intellectual activity in the country especially after the infamous ‘July Theses’ (Corlaciu 1984; Culic 1999, 52-53; Nelson 1995, 312). Nevertheless, from time to time, intellectuals themselves managed to create niches in the regime for opposition. Paul Goma was one of them. The Goma group, similar to Charter 77, became the first meaningful intellectual movement in

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93 The ideological guidelines announced at the 1969 Party Congress were followed in 1971 by the ‘July Theses’, which amounted to the commencement of an offensive against the autonomisation of culture, stressing the necessary socio-political role of intellectual activity. Over the next few years there was a series of assaults on the independence of such intellectual institutions as the Writers’ Union and the Romanian Academy (see Culic 1999, 52-53 and 56-60 for further discussion).
94 Paul Goma took the initiative of establishing a sister group to Charter 77. He managed to collect 200 signatures for an open letter for the Belgrade Conference. This represented the most important effort of the Romanian society after the war to make the political power holders to respect the law and the principles that they claim to abide by (Tanase 1977, 8).
95 Charter 77 designated a movement for human rights. The promotion and protection of human rights of Czechoslovak citizens was the official raison d’être of the organisation. The founding document of the organisation, the declaration of January 1, 1977, comprehensively detailed the litany of violations of international agreements that the Czechoslovak government put its signature (see Falk 2003, 88-92 for further details).
Ceaușescu’s Romania (Ratesh 1993, 12). However, it did not have any influence over the regime towards opening.

Another group was the ‘Monday Circle’. Although, this group did not have an opportunity to openly criticise the regime, the best literary critics, who belonged to this group, refused to praise bad writers who praised the regime (Linz and Stepan 1996, 353) and that was their isolated opposition. One more instance of cultural resistance, this time explicit, came after the exclusion of Mircea Dinescu from the Party and the Writers’ Union on the grounds of giving an interview, critical of the regime, to the French newspaper *Libération*. In response, a group of seven public figures signed an open letter of protest addressed to the President of the Writers’ Union (Culic 1999, 53). In the end, however, these intellectual activities were even short of coming up, for example, with any *samizdat* publication.

Along with the cultural policies of the regime, other policies also received criticism from the intellectuals. One of these policies was the systemisation of villages. Doina Cornea, a teacher of French from Cluj-Napoca, firmly stood against the systemisation programme and denounced the economic, human and moral values of the regime. Indeed, the opposition was sufficient, and the fulfillment of the programme was delayed (Nelson 1995, 209). Nonetheless, the attempt behind this systemisation programme was to

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96 A poet who could show some explicit cultural resistance to the Ceaușescu regime in Romania (see Culic 1999, 53).
97 Ceaușescu adopted Khruchtchev’s idea of creating agrovilles in order to wipe of the differences and contradictions between the cities and the villages and regroup the villagers in order to make them live like city-dwellers (Fontaine 1995, 309).
eradicate cultural heritage especially those belonging to the minorities in Romania. And this brings us to the third type of dissidence in Romania, namely religious.

As I discussed above, over time the PCR propaganda turned into a moderate commitment to hard-line communism insisting that foreign conspiracies and ethnic minorities threaten Romania’s national roots (Tismaneanu 1992). In terms of the religious scene, the immediate result was an emphasis on the religious and the ‘autochthonous’ role of the Romanian Orthodox Church against other, especially minority, churches (Korkut 2001b, 15). Regarding this issue, there is no unanimity in the literature on the role of the Orthodox Church under communism. Some authors accused the Church of consciously and deliberately compromising with the regime in an attempt to discredit minority churches in Romania. Similarly, Ratesh (1993, 13), and Linz and Stepan (1996, 351) argued that the Orthodox Church was remarkably resilient, as it did not have any autonomy. Regardless, as the case of the Romanian Orthodox priest Gheorghe Calciu\textsuperscript{98} illustrated, those who dared to take a tough stance against the state and church co-operation were either expelled or voluntarily left the country (Nelson 1995, 215).

In the religious sphere, the overall aim of the PCR became the repression of religious worship and the subordination of the ecclesiastical hierarchy to the Party’s objectives. Through this policy the Romanian government aimed at reducing the weight of the Church’s influence in general, but it was the minority churches that were affected the worst. Their freedom of action was reduced through decreasing the autonomy of their churches and by conferring disproportionate influence to the Romanians belonging to the
same denomination (Joy and Ludányi 1994). Meanwhile, the communist regime praised the Orthodox Church as the official church of Romania. The regime presented the Orthodox Church as worship that had enabled Romanians to survive centuries of foreign rule as a single nation. To this extent, Verdery (1999) argues that the Orthodox Church not only declined to oppose the party, but also collaborated with it. Her arguments suggest that, as a tool of PCR’s propaganda campaigns, the Orthodox Church therefore stigmatised other faiths as ‘non-Romanian’ and became a loyal servant of nationalist state policy.

Nevertheless, the suppression of those belonging to the Greek Catholic church was the most severe⁹⁹. In 1948, the Romanian Communists banned the Greek Catholic Church, confiscated its property, and forcibly merged its followers with the Romanian Orthodox Church. Many Greek Catholics had to become either Roman Catholic or Orthodox; others took Greek Catholic religious observance underground. The Orthodox Church sought to display the Greek Catholics as agents of the West out to destroy true Romanian values. The Orthodox Church also propagated that the Hungarians were Catholic as well as Greek Catholics; therefore Greek Catholics are actually Hungarians (or at least Hungarian allies) working to separate Transylvania from Romania (Verdery 1999, 74).

The PCR, therefore, actively created cleavages between the different segments and strata of Romanian society. These policies made prominent Hungarians increasingly strident in their criticism of Ceauşescu especially as the socioeconomic and political injustices increased (Nelson 1995, 206-208).

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Given this background, how the Romanian transition process began creates a complicated picture for researchers. It was difficult to understand how opposition activities and values were embedded within groups, and how groups grew out in the absence of independent civic institutions. As the discussion above displayed, in totalitarian cases such as Romania, a collective identity conceptualised as group membership shared by adherents based on interaction in submerged networks (Johnston and Lio 1998, 461), remains largely missing. Therefore, it is my contention that in Romania the transition process came as a result of an explosion as soon as individuals could manifest their opposition.

Yet how could a population, if completely atomised, foster enough solidarity to face the risk of state retribution. Who were the actors who prompted social action? According to Tarrow (1991), once a concrete political structure starts to dissolve, menaces to its integrity can arise rapidly. The Eastern German example presented interesting similarities to Romania as the ‘resource mobilisation approach’ demonstrated. Accordingly, there always was a ‘mobilisational potential’ embedded within the societies under the repressive states and only at one specific moment could this potential be directed into activity against the authoritarian regime (Pfaff 1996, 113). Hence, loose networks of friends and acquaintances and informal ties can leave authoritarian strictures in abstract even under the most repressive regimes.

II.2.c. Conclusion:

The Table II. 1 below presents an account of different variables with regards to different types of states, societal adaptation, and dissidence under communism.

[Table II.1 about here]

Their differences withstanding, the existence of opposition activity in Poland and Hungary was crucial, compared to the isolated opposition of Romania. In Hungary and Poland, dissidents reclaimed sovereignty in the name of the *polis*, against the party-state, through opposition activities. This was a notable determinant of these countries’ subsequent routes of political change. Poland and Hungary experienced a rather peaceful transition to democracy through roundtable negotiations, whereas Romania experienced a violent overthrow of the Ceaușescu regime. I shall further discuss the nature of transition to democracy in these three countries in the next chapter.

II.3. Projections towards the Democratisation Period in the Light of Legacies from the Communist Period:

In the following section I shall demonstrate the plausibility of the convergence hypothesis towards the democratisation period despite historical country-specific structural differences. Initially, I shall present the basic similarities among countries under study based on their communist experiences. Then I will show how possible country-specific divergences can cause similar occurrences.
II.3.a.Country-Specific Historical Legacies or Similarities?

With regards to the picture I portrayed in this chapter, I expect the effects of a general historical legacy of communism to manifest itself in the following ways during the democratisation period in Hungary, Poland and Romania:

(1) institutionalisation of informal links and patron-client form of relationships in terms of policy-making between the respective governments and interest groups as against institutionalisation of formal universal participatory mechanisms.

(2) differences between institutional effect ‘in concrete’ and ‘in abstract’.

(3) patrimonial and an elitist approach from the political elite towards the civil society alongside a similar approach from the civil society elite towards the members of civil society organisations.

Hypothetically, this convergence was a result of the predominance of interactions in all cases both among and within the political elite, the dissident elite, and the public underneath the communist structures. Hence, interactions left the communist structures in the abstract in all three countries. I discuss the plausibility of these expectancies presented above while producing projections towards the democratisation period for the countries under study in rest of this section.

A possible projection towards the democratisation period is that the relationship between the interest groups and the state will remain very much politicised and personalised. Meanwhile, respective policy-making structures will remain in the abstract. This is a result of the general communist legacy, where informal interactions have become a ‘social order or pattern that have attained a certain state or property’ (Jepperson 1991, 145). I discussed possible reasons of this possible outcome previously in detail.
That is why the expectancy is that under the democratic consolidation period political
links between the governmental party or parties and the interest groups will affect the
mode of policy-making, rather than institutionalised participatory policy-making
structures. One can expect either conflict-based or cleavage-oriented relations, depending
on who occupies the government. This context may also imply a process, similar to
*parentela* relationship, where a certain cleavage of political parties and interest
organisations can monopolise the policy-making processes at the expense of the other
groups in society. Given the communist legacy, the political parties may even try to
permeate into interest organisations.

In terms of both policy-making and internal decision-making procedures, my dissertation
expects, first of all, a visible discrepancy between what is going on in concrete and in
abstract. Communism left a historical legacy of public’s paying lip service to institutions,
while people had separate lives in their own social sphere. As I discussed above, these
strategies of adjustment led to the emergence of unclear and inconsistent identities for
certain sections of society. In this respect, contradictions, informalities, ambiguities and
ambivalent attitudes towards social realities gained an upper hand in the absence of
binding institutional structures.

Chapter I and Chapter II discussed the general features of the communist systems in
terms of policy-making and their attitudes towards participation in length. The latter also
discussed the high possibility that these attitudes permeated into people’s behaviour
through adaptational strategies of the same actors. The projection, therefore, is that
elitism and politicisation will have an impact on how civil society organisations handle their internal decision-making procedures. Only Solidarity groups will present an exception to the conduct of internal decision-making in an elitist manner, given their earlier participatory legacy. While interactions deconstructed the communist structures and the context, types of adaptation to communism, conscious or subconscious, have left their legacies on peoples’ behaviour. This means there are not only simple legacies of communism in terms of an atomised society, and elitist and non-participatory political culture, but also ways of coping with communism can affect individuals’ later behaviours (Rychard 1991, 7).

In this respect, Poland experienced the clearest duality between the micro and macro spheres. The relationship between the dissidence and the state in Poland was affected by who held the governmental authority under communism. The dissidence was against the state occupied by the communist government and a ‘polymorphous party’\(^{100}\). Yet had the state belonged to the dissidence organisations through their own government, given the Solidarity rhetoric, there would not have been any grounds to expect an adversarial relationship between the two. As I illustrated earlier, Solidarity was also by definition against formal institutions. The organisation owed its consistency to its constant fight against an illegitimate state. In this respect, an interview drew my attention to the clandestine structures and state of war in Poland during the dissidence period\(^{101}\). Domański explained this situation through the absence of a genuine Polish state\(^{102}\). In his opinion, this was a result of the partitioning and the occupation up until the 3\(^{rd}\) Republic

\(^{100}\) All other institutions of state and society are subordinates to the party. Party ensures the monopoly of the use of state apparatuses (Rupnik 1993).

\(^{101}\) Irena Pańków, Polish Academy of Sciences, (personal interview, Warsaw, April 2002).
in Poland. The extent of the effect of this particular legacy on democratisation period in Poland, therefore, will be more visible.

The Hungarian communist regime, on the other hand, differentiated itself from the rest of the communist regimes with its preference for gradual change through boosting the second economy and corporatist co-optation techniques directed towards the intelligentsia. In turn, there were visible compromising and individualist tendencies at the societal level. In this context, one can think that the positive legacies for the democratisation period are compromising tendencies developed over time and experience with some forms of corporatism in Hungary. Nevertheless, as illustrated above, corporatism was used as a cover for informal elite interactions in Hungary. Rather than providing societal organisations with the means of policy participation, the corporatist tactics of the regime sought to co-opt those with proper capital into the system. Thus, informalities and old boys’ networks, which developed under the cover of corporatist structures prevail, neglecting the communist structures. Given this context, it is plausible to hypothesise patron-client links and elitism will prevail during the conduct of policy-making in Hungary in the democratisation period. Still, whether prior experience with corporatist structures will make any differences in policy-making Hungary during the democratisation period, compared to the same processes in Poland and Romania, remains to be seen.

Different from Poland, but similar to perhaps to Romania, the new political elite in Hungary will not have large bases of support. This is due to the fact that mass activity

102 Polish Academy of Sciences, (personal interview, Warsaw, April 2002).
was missing in the dissidence period in Hungary up until the very end of the communist regime. This context infers attempts to extend patronage and to divide the society between ‘us’ versus ‘them’ especially in the early years of transition to democracy.

The Romanian communist regime’s legacy, in terms of relations between the state and interest groups is, very negative. The previous system(s) in Romania did not leave any democratic legacy as points of references. At its best, Romanian communism proved itself as plausibly the most penetrating system with vertical linkages of patronage. The communist attempts of extending participation in the 1970s, similar to the rest of the communist countries of the former Warsaw Pact, did not go beyond extending the dominance of the party towards the masses. Also more similar to Poland than to Hungary, the only means conceivable to change undesired policies was through popular uprisings in Romania. That is why, it is plausible to expect similar levels of embedded elitism regarding policy-making and internal decision-making of interest groups in Romania, if not higher than in Hungary and Poland. Also violence and demonstrations will be appealing tools for the interest groups to voice their interests in Romania. In a picture as such, elite interactions will continue to affect policy-making leaving trilateral bodies in abstract.

In Poland, the dissidence could gain grounds because the dissident elite managed to establish firm links with the ordinary people. In contrast, in Hungary (after 1956) and in Romania these links were missing. In the aftermath of the regime change, civil society needs to be created from scratch in Romania as it had no predecessor, which is more similar to Hungary than to Poland. In Hungary, this will be an easier process given the
formation of some civil society organizations towards the end of the regime. In Romania, in contrast, the communist regime harshly hindered the dissident elite. Therefore the expectancy is the prevalence of patronage seeking efforts from the political elite towards the civil society. Nevertheless in Romania, more so than in Poland and in Hungary, patronage links will be shaped anew for every election as a result of the historical lack of dissident organisations and the lack of a significant social-democrat version of the old communist party. Hence, there will be deep cleavages running across the interest groups on the basis of their new formed, but slippery, alliances contra or with the government.

In this respect, the Table II.2 presents how we reach similar outcomes despite country-specific trajectories in line with the D. Rueschemeyer. E. Stephens, and J. Stephens (1992, 76) methodology.

[Table II.2 about here]

II.3.b.Conclusion:

There are two corollaries from the discussion above. First, there are grounds to compare the democratisation periods in Hungary, Poland and Romania. Second, we can project common hypotheses towards autonomy and dependence of interest groups with the state; the forms of policy-making, internal configurations of decision-making and perceptions of social realities in these three countries. Cross-national divergences are possible, but they will not go beyond differences among the members in a family picture. The next two chapters of this part of the dissertation will continue with discussing the plausibility of this hypothesis.
CHAPTER III: The Transition Period

III.1. Introduction:

Regarding what affects regime termination/transition to democracy, the major discussion in the transition literature is centred on whether it is the structural factors (also known as functionalist see Pridham 1994, 16) or the agents (also known as genetic), who play a crucial role for the termination of authoritarianism. I evaluated these two approaches in the introduction chapter. The transition literature hypothesised that democracy emerged as a result of transitional moments, in which the balance between supporters and opponents of the authoritarian regime was relatively equal and also uncertain (McFaul 2002, 2). Therefore, there are multiple paths to regime change following the demise of the authoritarian rule, and only some lead to democracy. A corollary position argues that the prior type of authoritarian regime influences the choice of these paths (Linz and Stepan 1996).

It is true that the agency-oriented explanations of transitions have some relevance for regime termination, especially in Hungary and Romania. In Hungary, the emergence of liberal apparatchiks and their co-operation with the democratic opposition prepared for the end of the regime (Bozóki and Karácsony 2000, 378, 393-394). In regards to

103 See Preface, p. 8.
Romania, later accounts of the regime change displayed that, alongside mass uprising, certain sections of the communist and military intelligentsia were actively trying to remove the ailing Ceaușescu regime (Karl and Schmitter 2002; Ratesh 1993). Although it sounds plausible to argue that the country-specific structures bring forth agents, as my discussion in the previous chapter demonstrated, communist countries had similarities underneath even in the most different structures. Hence, one can argue that the contingent developments and individual choices (Anderson 1999, 2) had a simultaneous effect on the transition to democracy. Although path-dependence can explain how transitions came up, strategic variables, such as agents, external variables and unexpected twist of events also equally qualify to affect the result of transitions. Thus, a temporal\textsuperscript{105}, rather than uniform structural path dependence argument, may explain the way the transitions turned out in the manner they occurred in Hungary, Poland and Romania. In accordance with this assumption, I will assess mode of transitions in countries under study in this chapter.

III.2. Points of Crises – Decision to Open Up

The previous chapter elaborated the conditions that facilitated transition talks in Hungary, Poland and Romania. In the face of elevating demands for liberation either from the dissident elites or societies at large, the communist regimes chose either to portray themselves as engaged in political reform or remained oblivious. The incumbents’ very decision to compromise their own legitimacy, and approach the opposition also illustrated the weakness of their hold on power (Shain and Linz 1995, 48). It was also clear that the ideological, institutional, repressive and personal resources of the incumbent regime were

\textsuperscript{105} This suggests that the choices made at certain critical junctures influence the course of regime formation (McFaul 2002, 39).
exhausted and continued resistance may result in the incumbent elite’s losing even more ground in the end (Rustow 1970).

Furthermore, the transition to democracy in Latin America showed that, semi-democratic governments were often faced with more public protest than totally excluding regimes. This was a result of implicit tolerance, towards opposition in the former (Eckstein 1989). In Eastern Europe, regardless of the type of regime, once there was light at the end of the tunnel dissident activities towards liberation expanded quite fast. As such, more people began to perceive that joining the larger collective action would carry few costs and there was sudden drop of fear in the entire population (Tarrow 1994 in Fox 1997, 121; Zhang 1994).

Still, the three countries under the scope of my study diverge to a large extent on how the transition talks started (points of crises). Yet, the Hungarian and Polish regimes converge on the opening trends. I will briefly discuss points of crises and decision to open up case by case.

III.2.a.Hungary

Regarding the Hungarian transition, some argued that the fall of communism was mainly due to the emergence of civil society (Arató 1991; Wesolowski 1995 in Berényi 1999, 66), while others claimed that it was the split within the ruling Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party (MSZMP) that brought about the systemic change in 1989-90 (Berényi 1999, 66; Bernard 1993; Szelényi 1995). Still, Linz and Stepan (1996, 304) assert that, ‘part of the growth and empowerment of civil society may be due to a momentary
alliance of parts of the state with parts of the civil society, both parts betting of course that in the end they will be the ultimate winner’. Bozóki and Karácsony (2000) in their seminal essay on the character of the components of the transition talks in Hungary, also advocate a similar point. In my opinion, this is quite a succinct description of how transition to democracy started in Hungary, and why the nature of interactions can offer better explanations than structural features.

Therefore, this section advocates a conviction that, the emergence of softliners among the party circles towards the end of the regime enabled a grand coalition, composed of reformist wing of the party oligarchy, state bureaucracy, managers of the big and medium companies in industries and agriculture as well as emerging layers of entrepreneurs in Hungary (Wesołowski 1991, 98-99). The tacit co-operation between this stratum and the emerging civil society organisations quickly, keenly and cunningly broadened this niche\(^{106}\) in the communist system towards transition to democracy.

The communist soft-liners assumed the dominant position within the MSZMP with Imre Pozsgay, Miklós Németh and Rezső Nyers fraction winning against the conservative wing of the party\(^{107}\) (Bozóki and Karácsony 2000, 394). That was the crucial point.

\(^{106}\) See Fox’s (1996) discussion on Mexico for a broader perspective on how these niches grow in authoritarian environments.

\(^{107}\) Initially, Pozsgay, within the communist party, brought his forces together with the Károly Grósz fraction in order for Kádár’s failure. Pozsgay pursued an alliance with Grósz since he did not have enough internal support for success. He had to oust the party apparatus in motion in order to marginalize the Kádár fraction. Grósz understood this very well. Pozsgay was popular only out of the party ranks, whereas in return the party machine belonged to Grósz. Grósz, however, could only have maintained his influence in the ranks of the marginal party members if this would have insulated the party from the society. However, the Party already could not operate in the old format. By the end of 1988, the party members did not believe in Grósz any longer, and that the white terror can threaten. Pozsgay, in return, won the battle thanks
Afterwards, the softliners could come out of the closet and display their established relationship with the dissident elite more freely. Still, the MSZMP elite believed that a ‘multiparty system could come into being only under the basis of the acceptance of socialist pluralism’ (Bozóki and Karácsony 2000, 393). The realisation among the incumbents that they could pursue their interests better in a democratic environment brought the final decision to open up (Stepan 1986) in Hungary. Beyond that, ‘in order to achieve their radical goals, leaders of the opposition in Central Europe had to convince the reformist wing of the communist leadership that they would not be killed or jailed during the transition’ (Bozóki 2002, 7). That was the conjuncture through which roundtable talks came about in Hungary.

III.2.a.Poland:

In Poland, on the other hand, there was a gradual change. This was due to the specific experience with Solidarity as a mass movement in the country. The negotiations for change in Poland started in 1980. 1989 was the closing chapter of this long historical process. Bozóki (2002, 7-8) summarises this process in Poland as a decade-long transition from ‘ideocratic’ communism to an authoritarian, then to a military regime, and finally, to democracy. That is why it is relatively difficult to ascertain a clear-cut point of crises. Still, there is not a consensus on whether the dissidence movement in Poland had better chances to affect the transition process as compared to Hungary. In perspective, it

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108 It appeared that since the 1970s, there were contacts between Imre Pozsgay – then the Minister of Culture – and the MDF elite. The MDF elite was critical of western modernisation and consumer society. This might be the main point of departure for the co-operation between the MDF elite and the softliners (Bozóki and Karácsony 2000, 377).
is plausible to assume that the consistent and widespread demand for change in Poland must have strengthened the position of the opposition during the transition talks.

Nonetheless, as Zbigniew Bujak asserted during an interview in Warsaw in April 2002, the democratic opposition in Poland, by the time the transition talks started, was still not really aware that time was ripe for roundtable talks to lead to transition to democracy. Although he inserted that they were aware of the regime’s weakness, Solidarity did not believe that it could displace the communist party up until it found itself amidst the transition talks receiving one concession after another. One can explain this attitude of Solidarity with its rather discouraging experience under the martial law. After all, martial law illustrated that the Polish communist state could sweep away the opposition whenever it deemed necessary. Regardless, this time the incumbent communist elite chose not to block the democratic change, but rather concentrated their considerable residual power over the transition process to force the counterelites to adopt an ‘accommodationist’ stance (Munck and Skalnik Leff 1999, 199). Hence, Solidarity came to realise its potential power vis-à-vis the incumbent regime only when it started receiving concessions from the communist elite. This position of Solidarity also suggested that the organisation lacked a comprehensive programme for change.

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109 The results of a survey already in 1984 shows that almost 30% of the respondents asserted that, ‘Poland need[ed] decentralised power without the leading role of PUWP, based on the participation of various social forces’ (Adamski et al. 1985, 242-243).

110 During the martial law, he spent four years hiding and was caught in 1985. After three months of imprisonment, however, he was set free by the authorities. In his words, this was the crucial point for him to realise the weakness of the communist state in Poland (personal interview, Warsaw, April 2002).

111 Zbigniew Bujak (personal interview, Warsaw, April 2002).
One more factor, which is perhaps the most crucial, is the enigma regarding the possible behaviour of the Soviet Union (Munck and Skalnik Leff 1999). As Polish transition talks were the first to start, neither the actors from the incumbent regime nor the opposition knew the limits of the tolerance from the Soviet Union. We will see the effects of this enigma in the results of Polish transition talks.

III.2.a. Romania:

As the previous chapter illustrated, the behaviour of the Romanian political elite can at best be called negligent at the face of dissidence. The Ceaușescu regime refused to acknowledge its increasing weakness and continued its resort to repression. Ratesh gave an account of December 1989 events in Romania as follows:

The revolution started under the auspices of a vigil in Timișoara. There was prevalent unrest in the region as a result of Ceaușescu's plan for village systemisation. The communist party illustrated a total rejection of the core of the events by denouncing the movement as a real offensive by reactionary, imperialist circles against socialism aiming at destabilising the situation in the socialist countries, diminishing socialism and weakening its stand in Europe and worldwide. The regime's attitude towards the uprising was terror. However, after a while the army refused to shoot people but began to fraternise with them. When the demonstrations reached Bucharest, this time workers became more active. After all the shooting in Bucharest, the demonstrators got the virtual control of the city and a 'Popular Democratic Front' came into being. Overall, there was no organisation and no sort of leadership. The situation was a real madhouse, where governments were formed one after another, while everyone was trying to run the country. In that chaos, General Militaru invited Iliescu to the television studio. Iliescu came to announce that a Committee of National Salvation would be formed with the aim of restoring order (1993, 36).

In Romania, it seemed as if people were waiting for a sparkle to start their activity against the communist regime and the uprising in Timișoara was the decisive moment. This gives evidentiary support to the predominance of interactions at the societal level underneath the communist structures. These interactions provided the only avenue for ‘genuine
participation in public life’ and an opportunity to define ‘actual interests and needs’. Informal ties resulted in-group solidarities, which significantly lowered the barriers to action. This was especially the case when grievances became more openly expressed in the wake of existing crises.

Demonstrators against the Ceauşescu regime symbolically framed the protest movement in such a way as to make effective use of collective narratives and to simultaneously undercut the legitimacy of the regime. That was how informally organised social networks came to acquire their revolutionary potential (Pfaff, 1996) although mostly in disarray (Chehabi and Linz 1998b, 44). Nevertheless, while there was violence and spontaneous mobilisation, it seemed like the actual conduct of the transition and its outcome never escaped the control of forces from within the ancien régime (Karl and Scmitter 2002; Ratesh 1993). In the next chapter on the democratisation period, I will display this process more in length.

The above discussion illustrates that while the negotiations started in Poland and Hungary with the decision of the incumbent elite, in Romania, the negotiations came after the revolutionaries disengaged themselves from the dictatorial regime. This section also showed that interaction among and within the political elites, the dissident elites and the citizenry became the most visible in starting up of the transition processes. In the next section, I will show how types of transition were affected by the way transitions started up.
III.3. Transition Period: Types of Transition:

Only if and when certain transitional conditions were present did it become meaningful to classify a given case as entering a potential regime change towards a democratic outcome (Karl and Schmitter 2002, 17). I presented these various conditions in the previous chapter and section. Depending on these conditions, transition from undemocratic forms of government to democracy may take diverse forms\(^{112}\): (1) transformations or reforma occurs when elites in power take the lead in bringing about democracy; (2) replacement or ruptura occurs when opposition groups takes the lead in bringing about democracy, and (3) transplacement or ruptforma comes out as a joint action by government and opposition group for democracy\(^{113}\). In my study, all three cases have experienced different types of transition. Still, in all three cases, irrespective of the type of transition, elites were prominent (Huntington 1991). For this reason, I shall begin this section with a discussion on elite roles during transition in countries under study.

Despite Bunce’s contention that the primary thrust of transitology, elites are central and publics are peripheral during transition talks, does not export well to the East (2002, 23),

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\(^{112}\) Early experiences with democratic politics prove themselves to support a healthy transition process. Southern European transitions, for example, attract one’s attention with widespread value-consensus and structural integration among elites. See Burton, Gunther, and Higley (1992), Higley and Pakulski (1992), Hamann (1998), Giner (1986), Manuel (1998), Maravall and Santamaria (1991), Pridham (1994) for a detailed discussion on the roles of different actors in democratic transitions in Southern Europe. Also see Helfand (1999) for a detailed discussion on agrarian sector in transition to democracy, Pereira (1993) for middle-class dispositions towards democracy and D. Rueschemeyer, E. Stephens, and J. Stephens (1992) for business class attitudes during democratic transition in Latin America. The literature on the role of civil society for democratisation in Latin American also shows an elite preference to democracy with limited involvement from civil society associations as a source of transition. See Linz and Stepan (1996), Stepan (1988).

I find that all three transition talks took place in a very elitist manner. Even in Poland, despite its type of dissidence, the transition talks took place under the auspices of elites. In the transitology literature, this elite bias is justified through the need for precise terms to be negotiated, and heavy risks with regard to the future of the transition talks (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Rustow 1970). Still, the process of transitions ‘should be understood as a series of different and sometimes fluctuating stages that allow varying opportunities for elite action and mass influence’ (Pridham and Vanhanen 1994, 3). The external factors such as the location of the country and the international framework also place an impact on the transition process. Since transitology literature has discussed these factors in great length, I will keep my focus on the types of transitions in Hungary, Poland and Romania.

III.3.a. Poland:

When we look at the transition talks, it is possible to identify two elite groups in Poland: the incumbent elite and the Solidarity elite. It appears that during the transition talks the Solidarity elite gradually increased its power vis-à-vis the incumbent elite. In the commencement of the round-table talks, nevertheless, the Solidarity elite did not seem to think that it could replace the political power of the communist party by a pluralist democratic system (Bujak interview 2002; Vajda 1993). This reserved position of the dissident elite in Poland was due to the legacy of martial law and their fear of a possible intervention by the Soviets. As Bujak narrated the process more than a decade after,

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114 In particular, elite success was dependent on their abilities to exclude the masses from direct participation in the transition process and especially the opposition elites’ ability to enforce transition pacts on their groups (Zhang, 1994).

115 For a detailed discussion see among many Schmitter introduction to Bunce (2002); O’Donnell, Schmitter and Whitehead (1986); Pridham (1995).
The programme maximum for Solidarity was to become a ‘free trade union’. During and a little before round-table talks, only few people like me, Bojislav Geremek and Tadeusz Mazowiecki had a feeling that we could ask for more and go deeper. The round-table talks were going on in different branches: political, trade union, self-government, ecology, and economics. We first thought trade union table was the most important one, as we could not believe that things would change in the political sphere as fast. Then, bigger issues came to the political table. Michnik asked for a free newspaper without any hope and the communist authorities approved it without problems. In certain times, experts would join the talks with suggestions regarding how to change the system. Balcerowicz, for example, was coming up with suggestions for self-government within enterprises, which in part could be privatised too. We became more convinced to ask for more, when the government side started to talk about establishing a Senate and going for elections for the Sejm. That was the end.

The settlement in Poland was as follows: while Solidarity won the relegalisation of its trade union in the roundtable agreement of April 1989, the Communists restricted opposition participation in elections to a mere 35 percent of the seats in the Sejm. Holdovers from the former regime thus dominated the incompletely democratised ‘contractual’ Sejm. Moreover, a constitutional revision established a president, to be selected by the Sejm, with potentially substantial independent, but ill-defined powers crafted as an additional foothold for the Communist party leader General Jaruzelski. Nevertheless, Solidarity’s strong electoral showing in June 1989, attributable to the sheer strength of the opposition, its mass base, and the leadership skills of Lech Wałęsa, demonstrated that the Communist strategy had backfired (Munck and Skalnik Leff 1999).

Munck and Skalnik Leff (1999) argued that this compromised democracy was due to considerable control over the transition process of the incumbent elite. Therefore, power-sharing governments are generally formed when the incumbents, though their authority is

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116 Bujak asserted during the same interview that, in 1986 when the communist regime freed him right after five months after searching for him everywhere for five years, he thought to himself that then the regime
severely weakened, remain strong enough to exercise control. The opposition’s agreement to share power, thereby partially legitimating the incumbents, also demonstrates the oppositions’ relative weakness or its hesitation to assume power alone (Shain and Linz 1995, 42).

It might be true that the transition came too unexpected in Poland and Solidarity did not have time to prepare any projects or programmes for transition. As narrated by Bujak, during the transition talks the Solidarity elite only gradually gained a dominant position. This result was mainly due to the enigma related to the possible response of the Soviets to the Polish talks. For these reasons, I argue against Munck and Skalnik’s (1999) thesis which states that the result of the transition talk – compromised democracy for more than two and a half years in Poland – was due to considerable control over the transition process of the incumbent elite. In the following Hungarian transition talks we will see that although the incumbents were in a better situation, the dissident elite brought forth multiparty elections all at once as they saw that the Soviet Union stood aloof from Poland during its transition. To conclude, one can say that the Polish transition started in mid 1970s with KOR, took the form of *transplacement* or *ruptiforma* during the transition talks and ended up as *replacement* or *ruptura* with the results of the first free elections in 1991, two and a half years after the completion of the transition talks.

**III.3.a.Hungary:**

The transition talks in Hungary saw the simultaneous attempts of the softliners’ to co-opt the opposition into their ranks and the oppositions’ attempts to change the mode of the
regime and/or change of regime. The opposition was also incoherent in what it stood for. One could see three kinds of opposition attitude during the transition talks: (1) ultramoderates: who were after a Polish type of settlement; (2) moderate opposition: whose representatives would never accept something less than free elections, but in order to reach them they showed willingness to accept a Polish type of temporary contract; (3) self-limited radicals, who believed that for those questions left open, they should seek for direct public support for solutions. In the end, the third group, in order not to lose the grounds to the first, distrustfully approached the viewpoint of the moderates (Bozóki and Karácsony 2000, 404).

Although Frenzel-Zagorska (1997, 98) argued that the framework for roundtable talks preceded the emergence of civil society and its self-organisation in Hungary, in reality the roundtable talks occurred with the participation of three socio-political organisations (although not with very big membership figures), two opposition parties (MDF and SZDSZ) and MSZMP and its allies. The three socio-political organisations: Democratic Confederation of Free Trade Unions (LIGA), Bajcsy-Zsilinszky-Endre Brotherly Society (BZSBT) and FIDESZ, by the time round-table talks occurred, already established links with the opposition parties. It was difficult for Viktor Orbán, one of the leaders of FIDESZ movement, to accept a low key position in the transition negotiations. While Orbán shifted towards radicalism, the members of FIDESZ felt themselves closer to SZDSZ and the LIGA. The links between FIDESZ and SZDSZ, after all, remained at the co-ordination level (Bozóki and Karácsony 2000, 364-375, 403). The opposition parties, in the meantime, were already in the process of becoming political parties. The
communist MSZMP was also strategically turning into a social democratic party. That is why, it would not be wrong to call the Hungarian transition talks, unlike any other, as a form of negotiations between the regime and an already constituted political society (Linz and Stepan 1996, 307).

The reform wing of the Communist elite had been building bridges to the more responsive currents in the political and cultural opposition for several years prior to 1989 (Bozóki and Karácsony 2000; Wesołowski 1991) in search of a political liberalisation formula for ‘socialist pluralism’ that would validate effective economic reform (Munck and Skalnik Leff 1999, 203). This is important in the sense that, the transition to democracy emanated out of the niche created by the reformer communist intelligentsia in Hungary and the dissidence managed to fill in that niche soon with three major platforms noted above. At the same time, both the dissidence and the incumbent elite managed to develop compromising tendencies.

Antall, the head of MDF, elevated himself to the moderate right wing leadership during the roundtable talks. In that way, he also kept the right wing under control. As a result, MDF was the moderate right wing and the softliners from the communist party controlled the centrum ranks. In the decisive moments of 1989, Antall’s circle became the most powerful with the influence of these softliners. On the other hand, Antall did not approach the circles of the third sector. Antall saw the third sector as a competitor. This

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117 See Bozóki and Karácsony (2000) for a detailed discussion on this issue.
118 The first non-communist prime minister of Hungary in the aftermath of the transition to democracy.
was completely unlike the earlier co-optation attempts of Pozsgay (Bozóki and Karácsony 2000, 403).

Akin to Poland’s situation, the dissident organisations took the lead during the talks and as a result the communists lost ground to the opposition. Yet in contrast to Poland, the Hungarian transition talks achieved both through extricating the country from the old regime and by creating the institutional order of a democratic regime (Bozóki 2002). The one complication was related to the Communists’ effort to create an institutional base for themselves, in a manner reminiscent of Poland, by instituting a popularly elected presidency prior to the first competitive parliamentary elections. The opposition MDF initially accepted this proposal, but the stratagem was torpedoed when the rest of the opposition took the issue to a popular referendum\textsuperscript{119} in fall 1989 (Munck and Skalnik Leff 1999, 204). At the end of the referendum, it was decided that the Hungarian Parliament would elect the Hungarian president, which was to be composed after the multi-party elections. As a result, the Hungarian transition started as transformation \textit{or reforma}\textsuperscript{120} and then became transplacement or \textit{ruptforma}.

\textbf{III.3.a.Romania:}

Romania went through a mixture of a rather violent replacement or \textit{ruptura} and transformation or \textit{reforma}. With the mass uprising triggered by the events at Timișoara, a

\textsuperscript{119} Communist strategists calculated that their better-known and better-organised candidate would win on a crest of popular appreciation of the Communists’ willingness to open the system. That is why they wanted the president to be popularly elected (Munck and Skalnik Leff 1999, 204).

\textsuperscript{120} Linz and Stepan (1996, 306) assert four very important facilitating conditions for \textit{reforma}. These are such that, both moderates in the regime and moderates in the democratic opposition have some power capacity, both of the above players come to believe that considering all the alternatives, negotiations are the preferred alternative, both moderate players have and/or develop strategic and tactical negotiating capacity, and the moderate players become the dominant players on their side.
certain section of insider elite began pushing the ruling elite out of power. Closer inspection of Romania might even suggest that, while there no doubt was some violence and spontaneous popular mobilisation, the actual conduct of the transition and its outcome never escaped the control of the forces from within the *ancien regime* (Karl and Schmitter 2002; Ratesh 1993). Although the masses initially sought to displace the authoritarian government, those elites later with the best contacts, became power holders in the absence of a balancing popular movement (Ratesh 1993). In the end, the Romanian uprising was too short, spontaneous, and politically manipulated to produce round-table talks.

Instead a revolutionary committee was quickly formed with Iliescu, Petre Roman (neo-communist elite) and with several military personnel closely connected with the Ceauşescu regime. Later, two signers of the ‘Letter of Six’, Silviu Brucan and Alexandru Barladeanu, also joined them (Ratesh 1993, 44-50). Hence, the parallel putsch and the December 1989 revolution brought forth a heterogeneous political group FSN (the National Salvation Front), led by ex-communist politicians. This group was not even interested in a power-sharing formula; they used the ‘roundtable’ talks only as a façade for democratisation (Goina 2000). Once the sultan fell, however, there was no nationally known democratic movement or individual who could contest effectively for the control of state power. This was largely due to the totalitarian tendencies of the previous government, which it displayed until the very last moment (Linz and Stepan 1996, 354). It was clear that any new leader would have needed at least some acquiescence from the army and from the *Securitate*, and Iliescu was able to acquire this acquiescence.
As we will see in the following chapter, the coalition between the polity members and revolutionary movements was anti-revolutionary in its consequences. In fact, transition talks in Romania gave the impression that they were formed precisely in order to prevent the further growth of movements led by radical social forces (Goodwin and Skocpol 1989, 500-501).

III.4. Conclusion:

In this framework, the critical points of transition to democracy were in Poland, when Wałęsa successfully forced direct elections to the presidency, which he won in December 1990 and the fully competitive elections in October 1991; in Hungary, when the referendum of fall 1989 failed to approve a popularly elected presidency prior to the first competitive parliamentary elections. In Romania, however, while the December Revolution ended with communist totalitarianism, the critical point of transition came only in the 1996 elections. We will see how democratisation period affected the invigoration of civil society in countries under study in the following chapter.

This chapter showed a continuous interaction among dissident masses, dissident elites, communist soft-liners and communist hard-liners under the communist regime in countries under study. Transition to democracy came about when the most favourable conditions were created as a result of these interactions. The communist state could be the most important structure to determine the mode of relationship among these actors. Nevertheless, as we have already seen, the structure of the communist states was also affected by this interaction. In my opinion, it was not the specific structures of the communist state or dissidence, but the complicated nature of interaction among those
actors above, which determined country-specific paths out of communism. That is the reason why, in the aftermath of transition to democracy rather than the historical country-specific structural differences, the form of different interaction patterns affect the invigoration of civil society. Hence, we cannot draw unidimensional transition paths for countries; we should aim at grasping the whole picture of interactions.
CHAPTER IV: The Democratisation Period

IV.1. Introduction:

This chapter starts with the empirical discussion on the convergence hypothesis. It first and foremost attempts to examine to what extent elitism is embedded within the operations of the political and civil societies during the democratisation period. It also intends to portray the scope of patron-client relationships and their impact on the institutionalisation of participatory policy-making in the countries under study. To this extent, hypothetically, the post-transition politics in Hungary, Poland and Romania repeatedly illustrate three trajectories: (1) dominant position of the state vis-à-vis the civil society; (2) missing link between leaders and masses in civil society organisations; (3) abstract institutionalisation of the participatory aspects of democracy. These repeated trajectories are parallel to what I presented as historical legacies at the end of the Chapter II.

My dissertation consecutively presents what might be considered an ideal with respect to formal institutionalisation of participation at two stages in Chapter I. The country-specific historical legacies came in Chapter II. In this chapter and the following Chapter V, my dissertation shows what is actual. My hypothesis is that, similar to the communist period, the prevalence of interactions this time among the political elite and the civil society elite leaves institutionalisation of participatory modes of decision-making in abstract. My thesis argues this is where both the historical continuities and convergence reside.
I suggest that there are six reasons of repeated trajectories in countries under study. They are as follows: (1) elite monopoly on deciding for the nature and conduct of political and economic changes; (2) personalisation as against institutionalisation of changes; (3) twofold elite convergence; (4) enfeebled institutionalisation of policy-making; (5) elite domination in civil society; (6) politicisation of civil society and elite shift from the civil sphere into the political sphere. I am going to discuss the plausibility of primarily the first four trajectories in this chapter with the help of the literature review, whereas the rest will be evaluated in the next chapter with the help of personal interview results.

In order to test the effect of my independent variable, the democratisation period, on my dependent variable, the invigoration of civil society, I group my hypotheses regarding (1) autonomy of civil society organisations; (2) internal democracy of organisations; (3) types of policy-making in countries. I am going to present these hypotheses at the end of this chapter. Chapter V will test the plausibility of these hypotheses with the help of the data collected through interviews in Hungary, Poland and Romania from March 2001 to August 2001. Thus, the time span of the democratisation period under study in these three countries covers the events from the first constitutive elections until the end of the fieldwork period, August 2001.

IV.2. The Democratisation Period:

Chapter III concluded that transition to democratisation had critical points in Hungary, Poland and Romania. Hungary surpassed the critical points of transition to democracy the earliest shortly followed by Poland. That is why this chapter will study the democratisation period in Hungary and Poland together. Along with the politics of the
democratisation period in these two countries, I will pay a special attention to the autonomy of civil society and forms of policy-making in these two countries in this section. Following, there will be a discussion on post-transition Romanian politics in the third section. Romania proved itself to be a more difficult case than Hungary and Poland in terms of its transition to democracy. Until the elections in 1996, the Romanian politics was under the influence of an authoritarian neo-communist elite. The results of the 1996 elections, however, were significant for Romania on its road towards democratic consolidation. In this respect, this chapter will examine post-transition Romanian politics in two periods: prior to the 1996 elections and since the 1996 elections.

IV.2.a. The Democratisation Period in Poland and Hungary:

Passivity and Provisionality:

The most imminent impact of the transition to democracy on the Polish society was a sense of living ‘in suspense, provisional circumstances and a state of transition marked by apprehensions associated with an obscure and uncertain future, but also marked by a vague hope of change’ (Tarkowska 1993, 95-96). Living in suspense is nothing new either for the Polish in particular or for the East-Central European societies in general, given their familiarity with ‘dual existence’ under communism. Under the post-transition circumstances, although of different nature than it was under communism, the societies in the region are under the spell of dependence and passivity once again (Tarkowska 1993). This is largely due to the governing styles of the first governments, which deterred citizen participation. This strategy, for example, in Hungary largely ‘contributed to the growth of uncertainty in the society and the decline in the time

121 See Chapter II for conditions of ‘dual existence’.
horizon of people, and thereby, to a rapid increase of the support for the forces, perceived as representing paternalistic policies’ (Bruszt 1995, 284).

A possible implication of these provisional circumstances (thereafter provisionality) is ‘passive tolerance’ of respective societies for the reform policies during the beginning of the democratisation period. The governments were very well served by the social attitude of passivity and passive permissiveness (Rychard 1993, 83). In this respect, we will see that the regime transformation lacked sufficient rebuilding of the political and economic institutions. The post-communist political order was not shaped, but rather accepted. Even in the language of contention, such as strikes, one would find evidence of broad support of labour, as an example, for market economy122 (Ekiert and Kubik 1998, 560). The implication of the strong belief in post-communism was that, one must be obedient, even though it is difficult, because it is our government (Rychard 1993, 119, 127, 130).

At the same time, the reformers did not really understand the need to develop a legal and institutional framework of negotiations with social actors (Gorniak and Jerschina 1995, 177). Even worse, as in Hungary, the reformers began their activity by creating the constitutional conditions for insulating economic decision-making from the parliamentary opposition (Bruszt 1995, 276) through a model of top-down elite reform (Bozóki 2002, 37). This resulted in ‘popular dissatisfaction with the regime change [which] even fuelled this perception of [transition] negotiations: as a secret, non-democratic, conspirational,

122 See Gardawski et al (1999, 153, 157, 159) for 1998 data for trade union leaders’ reaction to economic changes in Poland.
well-designed elite-game over or against, the masses' \(^{123}\) (Bozóki 2002, 34). Thus, as Arató (1990b in Lomax 1997, 42) put it, ‘the aims of elite democracy and economic liberalism virtually coincided [during the democratic consolidation period], and the greatest enemy was an organised civil society’.

A possible cause of passive support can be people’s initial trust in *our state* after the regime change, which makes them personalise the changes. What I mean by personalisation is that, the citizenry consider changes as an organic element of their lives, carried out by an avant-garde elite but not delegated to institutions. Hence, they attribute changes not with institutions but with particular personalities. This suggests a historical continuity in the sense that, as previous two chapters of this part showed, under communism as well modifications to the system came about as a result of interactions among the elite.

A possible cause of the absence of civic engagement is a new tide of conformism at the level of the citizenry. Surveys demonstrate that, teaching their offspring conformist standards of behaviour continues to be a prudent investment for future for Polish parents, despite the change of times and transition to democracy (Slomczyński *et al.* 1999, 136). Furthermore, findings from other surveys conducted in Poland throughout 1978, 1992, and 1995 illustrated that, an appeal for an authoritarian, possibly technocratic, leadership was still prevalent. People rely on experts, but not on their own capacities (Slomczyński *et al.* 1999, 93). Although this data is limited to Poland, I find it plausible to generalise it

\(^{123}\) In this sense, some thought that the inclusion of former communists in the transition negotiations corrupted the genesis of new democracy. See Bozóki (2002, 33-34) for a further discussion.
to other East-Central European societies, which were also amidst similar serious changes. This appeal for conformism, however, first and foremost challenges the historical legacy of dissidence under communism especially in Poland. In my opinion, the personalisation of changes and conformism explain the prevalence of general feelings of provisionality and passivity among the citizenry.

In this context of prevalent passivity, the groundwork of changes during the beginning of the democratisation period was particular persons (new political elite), but not institutions. The new elite adopted a moral role and became pivotal for changes. Moreover, this new elite determined the limits of their avant-garde roles themselves. That was how the post-transition environment bolstered provisionality. The 1990 report Ludność Polski on the Polish population and its situation found out the difficulty of ascribing to the present state of affairs a clear and coherent semantic and interpretative structure [among the respondents]. People lacked the language, terminology, parameters to think and speak about the prevailing situation to assess it (Kolarska-Bobinska 1994, 59).

The panacea for provisionality and passivity would be enabling citizen involvement into decision-making through formal institutions. In contrast, uncertainties of post-communism have fostered an ever-greater reliance on networks. This led to a replication of practices of using network capital that developed under communism to cope with problems and to seize opportunities (Sik and Wellman 1999, 225, 243-244). Although in Hungary, institutions in a formal, legal sense can easily be replicated, the development of institutional effectiveness proved to be an evolutionary, slow adaptation process. Not very dissimilar to the communist structures, democratic formal institutions also remained only as shells in many cases (Habuda 1995, 309, 311). Therefore, as the next sections
will discuss, the panacea for provisionality was not as easily obtainable as one would think.

In line with the assumptions of the institutionalist theory discussed in the introduction chapter, one would have expected civil society organisations to create the groundwork for citizenry to articulate their demands. Yet, the civil society failed to that extent. It is my contention that there are three reasons of this failure: (1) the elite convergence between the civil society organisations and the political parties; (2) the resulting hindrance to the institutionalisation of formal relations between the civil society and the state; (3) embedded elitism and missing participation into decision-making within the organisations themselves. I am going to discuss what were the possible causes of these outcomes in the coming sections.

*Elite continuity, convergence and emergence, and the likely impact of these processes on post-transition politics of Poland and Hungary:*

In the immediate aftermath of transition to democracy, the previous dissident elite faced with three options: shift into the political sphere, occupy positions within the new civil

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124 Notice that in my evaluation of the role of civil society in the aftermath of regime change in countries under study, I never go as far as arguing a government-in-waiting role for previous dissident organisations. See Cahalen (1994) for details on government-in-waiting theories on dissidence.

125 See Boussard (2000), Fitzsimmons and Anner (1999), Goma and Font (1996), Helfand (1993) for a detailed discussion on how transitions affect trade unions in Central and Latin American contexts. Also the way Fitzsimmons and Anner (1999), Forewalker (1994) evaluate union action in Latin America drew many similarities to Solidarity as a mass movement of opposition. Trade unions came to recognise that they have to work with a coalition of progressive forces in order to increase their standing. Umbrella organisations include women’s organisations, environmentalists, peasant organisations, intellectual caucuses, nationalist movements, and the Catholic Church. Still, historically labour occupied a dominant position in civil society in Latin America, for example, and made crucial contributions to democratisation. After all, these movements acted like ‘schools of democracy’ and direct democratic tendencies cooled down the internal tensions. Also see O’Donnel (1977), Maravall and Santamaría (1991), Waylen (1993) for a detailed discussion on in what ways could political organisation co-opt civil society organisation into their own ranks.
society organisations or else go back to their previous positions in academia, literature or in arts. The first and the third options, inevitably, implied decapitation for previous dissident organisations (Rychard 1993, 8) both in Hungary and Poland. Meanwhile, the movement versus the formal organisation became a main strategic dilemma for former dissidence movements (Szabó 1994, 139) and the majority of dissident organisations chose the second option, and carried their organisations into the political arena.

The former nomenclatura, on the other hand, was assumed to have shifted into the economic sphere (Fellegi 1992) or stayed in the bureaucratic (Bozóki 2002) or in the political realm. However, a survey carried out between 1992-1993 on Polish entrepreneurs showed that,

> membership in the communist party hindered, rather than helped, one to become self-employed. . . . [Therefore] it is important to note that no analysis of the data supports the supposition that former membership in the Communist party might have positively influenced the choice of an entrepreneurial career under the new system (Slomczyński et al. 1999, 47).

It is not a key goal of the dissertation to find out what happened to the old nomenclatura. However, I find it plausible to assume that there was a major shift into new independent civil society from the nomenclatura circles\(^\text{126}\) (MacShane 1994). Presumably, this was how the previous transmission belt trade unions in Poland and Hungary survived the

\(^{126}\) See Adamski (1993 and 1999) and Gardawski (1996) to this extent. They extend an argument that for example, the OPZZ in Poland continued to be mainly the trade union of the former communist party members whereas Solidarity kept the intellectuals and the workers. Also, see Leś and Nałęcz (2001) findings on employment in civil sector in Eastern Europe. They illustrate that 11% of all employment in the civil sector is in professional organisations (trade unions and business organisations). The level is only 5% in the European Union. This provides some clues as to how crowded civil society organisations can be in Central Europe with different levels of bureaucracies, and as such may support my hypothesis on the shift from the political sphere into the civil sphere in the aftermath of regime change.
regime change and consolidated their positions fast, despite an initial decline in their membership levels.\footnote{For example, the OPZZ in Poland and MSZOSZ in Hungary managed to retain their structures as well as utilising their previous experiences and cultivated staff. This is despite their being the trade unions from the communist era.}

The most significant result of these shifts and transformations, however, was first of all ‘political elite emergence’ and following ‘elite convergence’ in Polish and Hungarian politics. In Poland, political elite emergence occurred when the previous dissidents from the Solidarity camp went into politics in the post-transition period. Later this continued with OPZZ taking part in the Left Democratic Alliance (SLD - the social-democratic version of PZPR). This process inevitably implicated the politicisation of interest organisations. In this respect, the explanation that the union leaders offered about their political roles to their constituencies was that they are there to ensure legal changes during the transition period (1997 OPZZ Programme Declaration in I. Pańków 2000, 257). The intimate relationship between the politics and civil society, however, fell short of satisfying the workers.\footnote{In time, people’s dissatisfaction with the system only grew worse and civil society organisations as parts of this system were influenced by this negative attitude. In this respect, the results of a survey from 1998 are quite important. 20% of the respondents from 202 factories in Poland asserted that, the Solidarity trade union does not serve workers well and almost 17% believe that the Solidarity trade union does not serve the country well. Comparably, the OPZZ received more trust from the respondents in terms of its abilities to serve the country and the workers’ interests. Another survey, carried out by CBOS showed that in Poland in 1999, 52% of the Poles had a negative while 30% of them had a positive perception of civil society in their countries (Wł. Pańków and Gąciarz 2001).}

To the extent that the activists and leaders of civil groups become involved in party politics, it is plausible to argue that the overlapping of personnel contributes more to party influence on civil society than to influence on macro-politics by civil organisations (Cox and Váss 1995, 175-176; MacShane 1994, 360-361).
This picture, nevertheless, is quite reminiscent of how the communist party used to co-opt white-collar intelligentsia out of the trade unions.

The politicisation reached such an extent that in 1997 Solidarity formed the Solidarity Election Coalition (AWS)\(^{129}\) to run against the SLD in 1997. As Irena Pańków inserted during an interview in Warsaw,

> Mission of Solidarity, their myth, compels them to enter into politics as ‘trade union against’. When Solidarity people become politicians, however, they forget about their own values. That is how they betrayed their own original understanding of democracy based on participation and spontaneous processes\(^{130}\).

Solidarity, during the general elections of 1997, presented itself as a wide anticommunist social resistance movement, and won in the elections. This election strategy was quite reminiscent of Solidarity activities from 1980 to 1981 (Rychard 1998). Nevertheless, its tenure in government was quite disappointing, even for the Solidarity activists themselves\(^{131}\). Despite Solidarity’s disappointment with political power and its outright defeat in the 2001 elections, politicisation nonetheless still remained as an appealing political tool for other unions in Poland. The last general elections in 2001 saw farmers’ trade unions becoming political parties and running in the elections on the Samoobrona lists\(^{132}\).

\(^{129}\) See Rusu (1999/2000) for a detailed description of different stages of how Solidarity became politicised in Poland.

\(^{130}\) Irena Pańków, Polish Academy of Sciences (personal interview, Warsaw, April 2002).

\(^{131}\) In the following chapter, I am going to illustrate the extent of this disappointment with the help of some quotations from my interviews.

In Hungary, on the other hand, ‘political elite emergence’ was more outright and clearer in the beginning with the total conversion of the previous dissidence (MDF, SZDSZ, FIDESZ) into political parties. Although elite convergence was not as clear as it was in Poland (meaning interest organisations do not get into election coalitions), one can still talk about links between the Hungarian National Trade Union Confederation (MSZOSZ - the sequel to the communist trade union SZOT) and the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP - the social-democratic version of the old Hungarian communist party MSZMP) as well as MDF and Munkásstanácsok (Workers’ Councils) Trade Union Confederation and some employers’ organisations. The 1998 election period also saw leaders from the LIGA confederation and federations shifting into politics through FIDESZ. What is more, although cleavages were pretty well defined in Poland all throughout the democratisation period in Hungary, elite convergence was on more slippery grounds. One can also add the more crowded interest organisation scene in Hungary as a possible cause of slippery grounds of elite convergence.

For our purposes, the main impact of elite convergence on the post-transition politics is a redundant and abstract formal mechanism of policy-making where interactions underneath the formal structures prevail. As we will see more clearly in the next chapter, the bulk of the negotiations between the political and civil societies, in terms of policy-making, depend on patron-client links. One might advocate that elite convergence is not very much different than those links especially between the left wing parties and trade unions in Western Europe. In fact, political parties in the West can ensure that they have counterparts within the civil society. Politicians see a benefit for their governments if

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133 See last section of Chapter II for a discussion on this topic.
there is a relationship between state officials and interest groups. However, what appeared in the post-transition politics of East-Central Europe is that, as a result of elite convergence political parties see interest groups as an extension of their parties. This is once again quite reminiscent of the legacy of relations between the communist party and the transmission belts. What is different now, on the other hand, is the multi-party environment, which leads the political elite into seeking more solid links with groups in order to face the competition\textsuperscript{134}. I am going to discuss the effects of this relationship more in detail in the forthcoming section on policy-making.

To conclude, it is plausible to argue that the context described above served for the prevalence of provisionality and left institutionalisation of participatory aspects of democracy only in abstract. In the face of elite convergence and political elite emergence, the citizenry suddenly found themselves asking in Poland, ‘how was it that Solidarity could at the same time be government/trade union/the nation, me?’ (Ludnosc Polski 1990 in Kolarska-Bobinska 1994, 68). It is plausible to argue that peoples’ ambiguity towards politics and their passivity – therefore provisionality – is very much related to elite convergence and elite emergence in Hungary and Poland during the democratisation period. We will have a better understanding of this process as I go along with my discussion in the rest of this section and in the coming chapter. Before that, however, I would like illustrate the extent of elitism in Hungarian and Polish politics.

\textsuperscript{134} I owe this analysis to Professor Ronald Manzer, University of Toronto.
The Extent of Elitism and Its Effects in Polish and Hungarian Politics:

As I argued earlier, elitism is nothing new in East-Central European politics. This phenomenon is still common despite democratisation. In any case, it is always possible to see an authoritarian personality serving as a leader in the regime of a constitutional democracy and conversely a democratic personality serving as the leader in an authoritarian system of rule (Tucker 1981, 68). Tucker’s argument becomes clearer as we look at styles of governing carried out arguably by Wałęsa, Antall as well as later by Klaus and Orbán, and certainly by Meciar and Iliescu. McFaul labels democrats as such, ‘hegemonic democrats’ (2002, 18). These democrats, therefore, were previously not members of the elite and became important only because of their widespread social support. These new political actors sought to impose their will on the weaker elites from the ancien régime, be they soft liners, hard-liners or even dissidents. As an example, in order to undermine the credentials of round-table elite, who played a vital role in the process of non-violent transitions, Orbán and Wałęsa went as far as picturing round-table talks as preparing the safety net whereby communists could preserve themselves for the future (Bozóki 2002, 36).

An easy explanation of elitism and low tolerance for opposition on the part of the new political elite was that they had to insert themselves as crucial actors in an environment of deep economic and political crises and at the cost of citizens’ high expectancies. That was how and why intolerance towards opposition and elite dominance in policy-making became prevalent (Engelbrekt 1997; Ost 1996; Vejvoda 1997). Nevertheless, I find the current political elites’ socialisation through communism and their ‘adaptation to
communist tactics through opposition’ more plausible explanations of elitism. Thus, I
approach continuity in elitist tactics in the aftermath of the regime change as a possible
impact of previous communist cognitive traditions.

All new democracies in the region had to build political parties and civil societies, often
almost from scratch, to develop leadership, organisational capacities, and legal
knowledge (Kideckel 2001, 102). In some ways, this was a continuation of a common
theme in East-Central Europe:

The repeated tendency of many of these states over the course of their histories
to embrace the political ideas and models of the West, but in the absence of
those very factors that had given rise to – and supported – those ideas and
models (Bunce 2002, 13-14).

Therefore, what Bunce argues has had a very crucial impact on the formal
institutionalisation of participatory policy-making procedures. Democracy remained
above all an imported product, open to interpretation in the most suitable way for various
purposes (Hadjiisky 2001, 57). While the new charismatic political elite claimed to stand
for the representation of the true national interest (Ágh 2001a, 96), politicisation of
historical issues, elite fights, continuous urban-rural cleavage all became frequent
obstacles to democratisation135.

The process accounted above first tarnished the representative democracy as it led to a
decrease in the decision-making competency and effectiveness of national Parliaments
(Fellegi 1992, 140-148). Second, it hindered civil society organisations as it created an

135 See Michnik (1998) and Konrád (1995)'s writings in the immediate aftermath of regime transition for a
further discussion. Also see, Corrin (1991), Fellegi (1992), Jasiewicz (1993), Rupnik (1993) and Vajda
(1993).
unbalanced power structure between the civil and political societies (Berényi 1999, 113). Yet, the most crucial result was polarisation across various camps in the democratising countries. The 1996 presidential elections and 1997 general elections in Poland and the last general elections in Hungary in 2002 illustrated that polarisation still remains. By April 2002, Poland was very much polarised between Krzaklewski\textsuperscript{136} (the leader of Solidarity) and Miller (the prime minister) along the lines of Solidarity and OPZZ\textsuperscript{137} or between right and left. Hence, it is plausible to argue that the major role that elites occupy in the political systems paves the way for polarisation in new democracies.

Interesting enough, amidst all these, societal support was always taken granted by the political elite\textsuperscript{138}, which may suggest that people may always be susceptible to manipulation in the absence of an institutionalised political framework to advocate their demands (R. Hill 1994). That is why my basic argument is that at all stages of the democratisation process, institutionalisation of a lively and independent civil society is invaluable in order to generate political alternatives and to monitor government and state.

Following my argument above on the extent of elite convergence in Poland, it appears that Poland experienced a more serious polarisation than Hungary. This is a possible result of historically lacking of culture of compromise in this country. This suggests a more politicised civil society with more prevalent patron-client links in Poland, as

\textsuperscript{136}Krzaklewski lost his position in Solidarity Trade Union Confederation in September 2002 following criticisms of his record, and especially of excessive involvement in politics (See European Industrial Relations Observatory on-line report on Poland).

\textsuperscript{137}Włodzimierz Pańskow, Polish Academy of Sciences, (personal interview, Warsaw, April 2002).

\textsuperscript{138}See Bernhard (1996); Hausner (1995); Kloc (1992); Kolarska-Bobinska (1994); Marciniak (1992); Ost (2000); Rychard (1998); Staniszkis (1990).
compared to Hungary. This is both despite of and due to the historical legacies in Poland. Despite its legacy, as Poland must have cultivated a base for comprehensive civic action to follow in the democratisation period due the presence of Solidarity, as a mass based organisation, in this country; and because of its legacy, as the polarisation was deep across the public already during the period under communism. We will have a better understanding of the current extent of elitism in Hungary and Poland much better once I analyse the data from my interviews in the next chapter.

Back to elitism and its impact on population at large, a survey in 1997 showed that 76% of the Polish respondents think ‘people like me do not have an influence on politics in our country’. Although there has been a gradual increase in people’s perception of influence since the regime change, the level of those who think that they have influence is still very low. Positively in 1997 those respondents, who thought that their abilities to influence politics in their country increased since 1989, reached 32%. Whereas 18% thought that their chances fell compared to 1989, and 37% of respondents believed that, there was no change in terms of their chances to influence the politics in their country (CBOS, 1997). On the other hand, an earlier research conducted by Bruszt and Simon in Hungary showed that, between 1985 and 1991, the proportion of those who agreed with the statement the ordinary person was always excluded from power rose from 40% to 75% (E. Szalai 1996b, 33, 35,36). These results are quite telling about how the citizenry feel at the face of elitism in post-transition politics. This environment certainly has an impact on people’s evaluation of civil society in their countries. As people’s dissatisfaction with the

139 It was 7% in 1992, 10% in 1993 and 19% in 1997.
system increases, civil society organisations as a part of the system also receive their shares (Wł. Pańków and Gąciarz 2001).

**Autonomy of Civil Society Organisations:**

The question in this respect is that, how well does civil society do at the moment in Hungary and Poland? It appears that, in the democratisation period, the autonomy of civil society vis-à-vis the state is determined by its potential and ability to forge links with the political elite, preferably in government. This context exalts civil society organisations’ dependence on the political elite and hence patronage. Therefore, it is plausible to expect that the political elite, rather than political institutions, will be dominant with respect to the relations between the government and civil society. This picture reminds us of the prevalence of interactions rather than formal institutional structures under communism in the countries under study. The corollary is that, preferences for informality are difficult to change. As Berényi argues, cultural norms could have been changed, had the citizens seen more could have been achieved by using formal institutions than by resorting to informal, individual bargaining (1999, 23). As Chapter I demonstrated, I laid my trust in participatory civil society to that extent. With respect to this argument, the next section provides us with a discussion on the possible configurations of civil society in Poland and Hungary.

**Configurations and Modelling of Civil Society**

The democratisation period was challenging for the previous dissident organisations (Szabó 1994, 139). Solidarity, for example, experienced the most comprehensive

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140 A survey from 1999 in Poland showed that 52% of the Poles had a negative while 30% of them had a positive perception of civil society in their countries (See Wł. Pańków and Gąciarz 2001).
transformation possible. As I illustrated in the previous chapter, the union owned much of its success to citizens’ committees during its struggle against the communist authorities and later during the transition to democracy. The Solidarity trade union established the citizen committees at the local level for the more educated members of the union. Later, in 1989, these committees nominated the candidates for the coming elections. Hence the citizens’ committees paved for the creation of the political organisations that emanated out of the Solidarity trade union.

However, once Solidarity won the elections in 1989, the organisational structures of the union firmed up, rivalry ensued between the central structures of the union and the citizens’ committees over political leadership. This period also saw the removal of people with liberal orientations from the Solidarity ranks. The recently elected mayor of Warsaw Mr. Kaciński – then head of the metal workers’ federation – called for a divide between people with left and right orientations within Solidarity. Wałęsa also supported this divide. With Wałęsa running against Mazowiecki for presidency later in 1991, there came a ‘war at the top’. This was symptomatic of Solidarity taking certain dimensions, and in 1991, the second wave of leaders with nationalist, right wing orientations became more influential within Solidarity.

On paper, the new leadership structure were critical of those with political aspirations and called them zdrajca, which means defected or traitor in Polish. Nevertheless, when a

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141 He was the previous head of the conservative right wing ‘Justice and Law’ party
possibility arose the same people did not hesitate to go into politics themselves. With the eventual decay of the citizens’ committees, there remained no correlation between the activities of the branch secretariats at regional and national levels (Hausner 1995, 120). The coming chapter will demonstrate that the lack of correlation between the local and central bodies is a common ailment for interest groups in the region.

Another ailment was that there were few worker presidents or general secretaries. Even enterprise unions tend to be led by officials with managerial or technical qualifications, notably engineers, but not workers themselves (MacShane 1994, 348). MacShane continues

> The absence of a widespread workplace-based movement in 1989 meant that there was no springboard for leaders from among rank-and-file workers. The leadership of the post 1989 unions is anomalous in that [as] it is divorced by education and work experience from the social categories it purports to represent. Thus, the unions in Eastern Europe should be seen as socio-political groupings in addition to their function of defending workers’ employment (349).

Although further empirical analysis is required, one might plausibly argue that there is certain intelligentsia infiltration into the presidential posts within the interest groups in Hungary and Poland. It is also not uncommon for interest group leaders to shift into the political arena through making use of their expertise and education – hence cultural capital – and positions in civil society organisations. Thus, leaders’ utilising civil society positions for personal gains can also be a possible ailment for organisations (Korkut forthcoming), as the next chapter will illustrate to a broader extent.

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142 Zbigniew Bujak (personal interview, Warsaw, April 2002).
In light of this hypothesis, we have another perspective towards demonstrating elite emergence and elite convergence. Plausibly, civil society elites’ aims to shift into the political sphere prepare the grounds for rapprochement between the political and civil societies. However, the majority of workers by the late 1990s did not see any benefit for themselves in these arrangements. This is another fundamental difference between similar arrangements in the West and those in the East-Central Europe. The workers tended to believe that unions used such links exclusively to serve the particular interests of the trade union apparatus and certain narrow social or political interest groups. As such, the trade unions’ role as employee representatives was curtailed as a result of their hyper-strong political roles. Although trade unions are usually viewed as representative of workers in a general sense, workers seem to prefer individual strategies and personal contact with the management structures in resolving problems (Wł. Pańkó w and Gąciarz 2001, 77-78, 86). Thus, the sense that the new leaders work for their personal interests, and politics is at best a dirty movement becomes more prevalent among the population at large and workers in particular (Leftwich Curry and Fajfer 1996, 258).

In this environment of absent participatory civil society organisations, historical legacies manifest themselves easier. The communist period did not provide the legacies needed for the emergence of democratic civil society organisations in post-communist contexts (Heinrich 1999, 133). Hypothetically, communist legacies will affect the configurations of internal decision-making of organisations under study in the post-communist contexts regarding (1) the way interest groups carry out internal decision-making strictly from

143 To this extent see CBOS (1997) and how workers whether trade unions serve for the general good of their country or not.
above in a hierarchical manner; (2) the position of various elite networks embedded into the internal structures; (3) as an indirect result of the second, interest group leaders’ utilisation of their positions in organisations for their future career projects; (4) symbolic attempts of involving grassroots members into internal decision-making; (5) widespread hierarchy, informalities and elitism in internal structures and (6) the continuing contrast between the ‘abstract’ versus ‘concrete’ and ‘general’ versus ‘specific’ in terms of evaluations of internal democracy.

This picture portrayed above is also widely applicable to Hungary (Lomax 1997), while a crucial historical difference between the Hungarian and the Polish groups stands: the Hungarian dissidence groups were elitist in nature. Therefore, the legacy, which the new civil society organisations could receive in Hungary, is elitism. Yet in Poland, Solidarity was a mass dissident organisation with well-established links between the masses and the elites. Although the data in the next chapter will demonstrate the extent, Solidarity groups must have cultivated elitism after transition to democracy. The next chapter will present the actual picture in detail and we will have an opportunity to see whether these inferences hold true.

*Forms of Policy-Making:*

As I have introduced in the first chapter, we need a strong state to promote formal institutionalisation of participatory policy-making, rather than elite congregations making decisions for the benefit of the masses. In Wesolowski’s view (1995, 126-127), the reason why socialists return to power in Poland was due to their emphasis on an active role for the state during the transformation process. Yet, post-transition states – invaded
by elite cliques – cannot remain impartial and hence fail to provide a supportive environment for participation of all. In a context as such, what counts is who occupies positions in various state institutions rather than the institutions themselves. Therefore, states in the post-transition processes remain very much under the spell of the governments and related set of interactions, which each government establishes with its clientele. In terms of policy-making, the functioning of the tripartite process in Poland and Hungary present how interactions among elite cliques leave the formal structures in abstract. I will start my discussion on this process with Poland.

The Polish state failed to introduce tripartism until 1994\textsuperscript{144}. To begin with, tripartite institutionalisation of policy-making was not in the interest of Solidarity trade union. The union, after all, could expect to benefit more from their direct contacts with the government, at the expense of other various interest organisations (Héthy and Kyloh 1995, 7-8; Slomp, Van Hoof, and Moerel 1996, 347). This pattern was quite reminiscent of parentela relationship, which I discussed in Chapter I. The first attempts towards formally institutionalising policy-making came in Poland in 1994, after the SLD won in the elections. Albeit, these attempts were crippled. The politicians strove to pull the government out of labour relations, despite its being the largest employer in the economy. The employers’ organisations visualised the state as the guarantor and arbiter in institutionalised yet decentralised negotiations between employers and trade unions. The

\textsuperscript{144} Before, the institutionalisation of tripartism, there were attempts to formalise a ‘pact on state enterprises in transformation’. This pact has had pragmatic goals for the government to win Solidarity’s support for the reform process, and so avert the danger of the Union descending into an anti-reformist position. After all, the pact was signed by the major trade unions Solidarity and OPZZ as well as seven of the remaining trade unions. The pact also foresaw a tripartite commission whose task will be to formulate proposals about social and economic policy priorities. This was the only lasting impact of the pact as the rest fell to pieces

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labour, on the other hand, did not refrain from seeking bilateral agreements. Therefore, the introduction of tripartism into policy-making did not change much the character of social dialogue in Poland. At their best, token negotiations and non-binding agreements drew the borders of social dialogue (Ost 2000). Thus, the structures did not have any effect in concrete.

Briefly, within the tripartite Commission, there were the government with four members; the Confederation of Polish Employers with four members; Solidarity with four members; OPZZ with four members; and one member from each of the remaining trade unions. Everybody has one vote in this configuration. The presence of all of these members and a consensus among them was required for decision-making (Sobotka 1999, 268). Hausner argues that,

\begin{quotation}
For many reasons, it is difficult to imagine that the Tripartite Commission on Socio-Economic Issues will play a significant role in shaping socio-economic policy or collective labour relations, as its function is merely consultative. Moreover, the operation of the Commission itself and its ability to establish a common position may easily be paralysed as, according to its statute, a representative of every party entitled to vote must be present if a sitting is to be legally binding (1995, 117).
\end{quotation}

The commission also fell short of representing all the parties, such as Solidarity’80 and the farmers’ trade unions. It also lacked the formal criteria for measuring representativeness (Sobotka 1999, 268). There was, for example, only one group, the KPP\textsuperscript{145}, to represent the employers’ organisations in the tripartite commission in Poland.

\textsuperscript{145} KPP stands for Confederation of Polish Employers. The organisation was founded in November 1989 by delegates from the eight most representative Polish employers’ federations and small enterprise associations joined in creating this organisation, which operates at the national level (Slomp. Van Hoof, and Moerel 1996, 346).
One of the possible reasons behind the relatively small importance of the Tripartite Council is due to the organisational weakness of employers (Jasiecki 1997 in I. Pańsków 2000, 253). Soon, there also emerged some problems between the Commission and the Parliament. The decisions were not automatically converted into legislation and the social actors argued that this provided governments with room for manoeuvre with respect to their commitments (Héthy 1994, 332).

Another problem was extensive politicisation of the process as a result of elite convergence especially between the trade unions and political parties. The fact that trade unions directly participated in power disturbs the model functioning of the Tripartite Council. One of the negotiating partners can play a double role: that of an employees’ association and that of government (I. Pańsków 2000, 253). Furthermore, once a rival political party was in power, trade unions refuse to sit in the commission arguing that the negotiations were not between independent partners. Therefore, deep segmentation between the rival camps paralysed tripartite negotiations. (Hausner 1995, 118; Ost, 2000, 515; Slomp. Van Hoof, and Moerel 1996, 352).

Hence, the dilution of borders between the political and civil spheres result in feeble institutionalisation and frequent resorts to patron-client forms of relationship in Poland. In this context, as regards to interest groups’ attitudes towards the state, there remain no major differences between the previous transmission belts and previous dissidence organisations. Transition to democratisation after all provides the former with independence, whereas the activities of the latter are legitimated by the post-transition
state. What counts the most in post-transition environments, however, is who occupies the government.

On the Hungarian side, tripartism was not new. Already in the Németh government in 1988 the Hungarian OÉT was in place. By then, the workers’ side was represented by SZOT, the official trade union, and the Organisation of Chambers of Commerce represented the employers’ side. In the following Antall period, new trade unions and employer organisations were invited to join the tripartite organisation and hence the number of the represented increased. OÉT took the name Interest Reconciliation Council (ÉT). The Antall government, in principle, was open to trade unions’ demand for negotiations and promised consultations on a wide range of issues, including employment, fiscal policy, agriculture and industry. However, the government failed to honour its commitments (Héthy 1995, 91).

Critics argued that the Antall government sought at its best to maintain the exclusive role of the government in shaping the economic policy to co-opt and partially compensate various economic groups in order to politically neutralise them (Bruszt 1994, 213). This was very similar to the previous Kádár era co-optation tactics in Hungary. Once again, this method of co-optation was quite effective in a post-transition situation where common causes were still weak in Hungary (E. Szalai 1996b, 37). The ÉT decisions, as a result, did not become legally binding on the government (Berényi 1999, 116), and the government used ÉT only as a showcase for interest co-ordination while minimising its practical significance (Ágh 2001a, 15; Andor 2000). This picture suggested prevailing
interactions in Hungary underneath the formal structures despite the regime change. Real control in economy was confined to a circle in which a major role was played by the bargains and conflicts among different units and levels of expert bodies. Especially during the rounds of privatisation, the government sought increased personal dependence of public enterprise managers on the state bureaucracy and party politicians to maintain its scope of control (Bruszt 1995, 277-278).

In this context, there were two major crises between the government and the large traditional unions. The first was when the Antall government started to question the legitimacy and the representativeness of the traditional trade unions, especially of MSZOSZ, and the second was on labour legislative reforms. The liberal parties in opposition also supported the government against MSZOSZ. For some time, there even seemed a chance that the traditional trade unions would collapse or decline in importance. In the meantime, MSZOSZ, under this political pressure, sought to appeal to its links with MSZP while confirming its legitimacy and representativeness in the social security board after works’ council elections in May 1993. This reassertion of MSZOSZ in 1993 caused considerable concern both in the governing coalition and the liberals just before the parliamentary elections of May 1994.

To summarise, the impact of these conflicts on the ÉT was its over-politicisation, and polarisation between different ideological extremes. The conflict also showed that MSZOSZ lacked the government’s acceptance despite the same government’s de facto
acceptance of its legitimacy and representativeness, along with five other confederations, through enabling its participation in the ÉT. Thereafter the government abandoned its attempts at labour legislative reforms to tilt the industrial relations playing field in favour of the new independent trade unions at the expense of their old reformed counterparts. The government adopted a more balanced approach to its responsibilities in this field (Héthy and Kyloh 1995, 11-13, 33-34; Héthy 1995, 81-82).

In the meantime, there have been problems between the government and other sectors of civil society. The most crucial was the taxi and bus blockade in Budapest after price rises in gas. The conflict could only be solved with the direct intervention of ÉT in settling the dispute, despite the fact that the drivers did not have any representatives within the Council. The taxi drivers’ blockade showed that government needed negotiations to settle conflicts (Bruszt 1994, 220; Héthy and Kyloh 1995, 21). Another round of protests came from Association of People Living Below the Social Minimum (LAÉT) in 1992 to support the two million persons, said to be living under the officially declared minimum standard of living at the time. The LAÉT supporters threatened to withhold their taxes, and collected signatures in support of a referendum calling for the dissolution of the parliament and holding of new elections (Lomax 1997, 48).

One more important civic action that occurred during the Antall government was the Democratic Charter movement. Essentially, the Democratic Charter was an intellectual

\[^{146}\text{Unions have been subjected to repeated tests of representativeness, along with the elections the self-governments of health and pension insurance in 1993, there also came elections to works council and public servants’ council elections in 1995 and 1998 (Héthy 1999, 182).}\]
\[^{147}\text{See Sik (1994) for a detailed discussion on taxi drivers’ blockade.}\]
movement (Bozóki 1996; Csizmadia 2001, 146) and crucially portrayed the embedded role of intellectuals in the Hungarian civil society (Lomax 1997, 50). The movement rose against certain authoritarian policies of the government. The activists questioned the legitimacy of the government and attempted to correct the system in a consensual way. Later, the movement also attempted to raise consciousness in the society against rising racism and the governmental attempts to block legislation, which would allow wider civil control of and access to the media (Linz and Stepan 1996, 314).

These movements illustrated not only disillusionment and apathy, but also increasing willingness among the citizenry to participate in civic action or other forms of extra parliamentary activity. Although the intellectuals were the avant-gardes, these movements still demonstrated the limits of ‘passive tolerance’ of the citizenry. Certainly, the quality of Hungarian democracy would have improved drastically had more effective and more diverse ways for civil society to exercise a mediating effect on political society been created (Linz and Stepan 1996). However, quite reminiscent of Kádár’s tactics, the MDF led coalition government only sought negotiations with trade unions and business organisation once it realised the erosion of its political support (Bruszt 1995, 282).

In contrast, MSZP committed itself to developing comprehensive and consensus based social policies as a reaction to certain extreme right policies as well as market reforms (Markowski and Tóka 1994, 75). After elected, the social-liberal Horn government coalition promised to finish the formal institutionalisation process of policy-making by concluding a ‘social-economic’ pact with the interest organisations. This would be
modelled around the famous ‘Spanish Moncloa Pact’\textsuperscript{148} and would fully regulate the workings of the ÉT and provide a constitutional basis for its activities. Nonetheless, the Horn government as well failed to reach an all-embracing agreement.

Like Poland, the governments’ failure was greatly due to the trade unions’ preference for bilateral agreements with the government as well as the back door political channels, rather than utilising transparent tripartite mechanisms. Hence, once again in Hungary, interactions between the political and civil society elites left formal structures in the abstract. That was why under the Horn government period, the formal sessions of ÉT were preceded and prepared by very intensive informal consultations. In any case, the infamous Bokros package\textsuperscript{149} of 1995 signed the end of co-operation between the social actors and the government (Héthy and Kyloh 1995, 3; Héthy 1999, 191). Therefore, although the 1994 elections raised the hopes that new government would eliminate the networks of clientelism in policy-making, and improve professional control over institutions; the main message of the Horn government, loyalty to the patron and to the party, still retain its importance during policy-making (L. Lengyel 1996, 183 in Berényi 1999, 119).

In brief, the organisational structure of the ÉT comprised of six trade unions and nine employers’ organisations, which took part in the Council. Member organisations on both

\textsuperscript{148} This agreement was signed by the government, parliamentary parties, and trade unions to give the Spanish government some authority for economic transformation of the country in return for serious political reforms (Maravall and Santamaria 1991).

\textsuperscript{149} The ‘Bokros package’, in line with IMF demands, proposed the introduction of an import tax, regular devaluation of the Hungarian Forint, a number of restrictive budgetary measures. The package was published a day before the arrival of the IMF delegation, created a huge uproar. Two ministers resigned,
sides were given equal status and voting strength. The government did not predetermine which trade unions or employer organisations were to be considered representative. The Council was composed of a plenary session and various specialised committees for debate among experts and academic researchers associated with the organisations represented in the Council (Héthy and Kyloh 1995, 11-13; Héthy 1995, 81-82). The Council was not a legislative body and some of its decisions had no consequences for legislation. When legislation was needed to implement the Council’s decisions, the fundamental question was who was entitled to issue the necessary legal provisions. Whether the government should consult the Council before or after a draft law was submitted to the Parliament remained a moot point. If the draft law was already in the Parliament, the Council’s social partners might receive the impression that they were being marginalised and their comments were only being sought as formality. If, on the other hand, the comments from the Council were incorporated at an initial stage, this often engendered the reluctance on the part of legislators due to their feeling that a deal was being imposed on them from outside. That was why there were instances where the Council was critical of consultations within the Parliament after the submission of a draft law (Héthy 1995, 85-86).

As the discussion above illustrated, the democratisation period did not really introduce institutionalised mechanisms for policy-making in Hungary (E. Szalai 1996b). Gy. many civil organisations and the press criticised the government for the negative social consequences of the package. Nevertheless, it was accepted by the Parliament (Válki 2001, 291).

150 There existed two possibilities: First, the government had the power to issue regulations in the form of government or ministerial decrees. In this case, legislation was practically automatic as the government was involved both in the Council agreement and the legislation to implement this decision. Second, important agreements, concerning labour legislation must have been reflected in parliamentary legislation before they entered into force.
Lengyel’s (1995) research on business elite showed that, about half of those questioned all from the economic elite agreed with the statement that ‘if you wanted to get ahead, you must break or bend the rules from time to time’ (E. Szalai 1996b, 33). Csaba Áron Kantor (a former workers’ council leader) took the view that: the Hungarian worker realised that he or she could pursue his or her interests only through personal channels, as before. In other words, if a worker wanted a wage rise she or he must make a deal with the management and less privileged workers must try to supplement their wages in the shadow economy\(^{151}\) (Bruszt and Simon 1992 in E. Szalai 1996b, 35). The first issue was especially very similar to what Wł. Panków and Gąciarz (2001, 87, 89) found in their research: the relations between workers and their bosses were increasingly taking a form that could be described as enlightened and humanitarian paternalism in Poland.

With respect to policy-making, the Orbán government – which took the office in 1998 – attempted to centralise all decision-making powers in the hands of the government, in rhetoric, to gain time and enhance policy capacity of the government. The Orbán government made it clear that it would not let employee and employer organisations have a say in matters within its own responsibility. The prime ministers’ office assumed a central role and had taken on the function of interest reconciliation. The result was an attempt to control civil society, by putting pressure on media and top civil organisations (Ágh 2001a, 101; Völgyes 2001). In this context, the ÉT mechanism was altered and the ÉT was bisected into the Economic Council (GT) and the National Labour Council

\(^{151}\) Strikes have been sporadic and insignificant in Hungary since the Strike Act 1989. A possible explanation is that the county’s vast informal economy provides some compensation to important groups in the work-force for losses caused by governmental policies (Ladó. J. Szalai, and Sziraczky 1991 in Héthy 1994, 327).
(OMT) for consultation on economic policy and legislation. The former convened with the participation, beyond the national trade union confederation and employers’ associations, of all-important economic actors that had no seats in the previous ÉT\textsuperscript{152}. In essence, the Council was supposed to meet every six months but in the end met quite infrequently with yearlong breaks\textsuperscript{153}. Despite their multitude, the organisations in the Council remained short of promoting themselves as crucial actors in the policy-making process\textsuperscript{154}.

Thus, the new set of tripartite organisations was still born and had only very restricted powers (Ágh 2001b; Héthy 1999, 195). This new method for interest representation in Hungary received harsh criticisms starting with the European Union Economic and Social Committee (ECOSOC) to the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) and the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU)\textsuperscript{155}. This period also saw major examples of direct action and demonstrations by workers in the public sectors (Borbély 2001, 67-68). In my view, this new pattern of policy-making only served to dilute tripartism in Hungary and, in a disguised manner, strengthened centralisation of policy-making within the governmental realm. This, after all, led to the strengthening of certain organisations, which I will mention in the next Chapter, in policy-making vis-à-vis the others. In contrast to the collaboration argument laid out in Chapter I, this pattern

\textsuperscript{152} These organisations were industrial chambers, the National Bank of Hungary, the Stock Exchange Council and foreign investors.
\textsuperscript{153} BBC Monitoring April 9, 2001.
\textsuperscript{154} Antal Panykó, Secretary of Social Dialogue, Prime Ministers’ Office (personal interview, Budapest, Summer, 2001).
\textsuperscript{155} MTI In-depth Weekly Analysis, November 17, 2000, Hungary.
of policy-making increased state autonomy and strength unilaterally against civil society organisations.
One last problem between the Orbán government and trade unions was due to the attempted modifications in the Labour Code. All trade union confederations in Hungary could agree on one issue for once and they were all against these modifications. On May Day in 2001, more than 5,000 demonstrated against the new labour code, charging that it restricted workers’ rights. Along with this public protest, the intelligentsia of the Hungarian society once again assumed its moral duty and sent a letter signed by forty intellectuals to underline the humiliating and unacceptable position the amendments were to put the workers into.

It appeared that the Orbán government looked for ‘depoliticised passivity’ of the citizenry and co-optation of the elite, once again similar to Kádár’s tactics in post-communist Hungary. In this attempt, the government engaged in various types of successful political networks to assure its re-election (Csizmadia 2001). Hence, the government tried to curb the autonomy of emerging civic actors if these actors were not its supporters. Similar to the Antall period, the government sought to polarise the society between ‘us’ versus ‘them’ (Völgyes 2001). To conclude, during the Orbán government’s tenure the

156 On 17 April, Hungary’s parliament adopted a bill to amend the Labour Code. Employers and unions disagreed sharply on points related to working hours and the right of employers to lend out their workers. The unions claimed that the changes increased employee vulnerability. The amendments included more room for employers to redirect or relocate employees, the setting of the minimum number of non-work days per week from two to one (MTI In-depth weekly analysis, April 27, 2001).


158 Among those organisations, Csizmadia (2001) mentions the Batthyány Circle of Professors, Civil Democrats’ Society, Political Co-operation Forum, and Hungarian Civil Co-operation Association. One organisation, the Republican Guards, attracted much of criticism from the Socialist party on grounds that, during the census the members of this organisation disguised themselves as census commissioners to pry into the private lives of persons, who live in the same neighbourhood with the leading pro-governing party politicians (Hungary Around the Clock, May 2, 2001). Certainly, the opposition groups also resorted to this form of networking. The Third Road Union for Hungary, led by the previous president Árpád Göncz, can be mentioned as an example (Népszabadság January 22, 2001).

159 József Feiler, Friends of the Earth, (personal interview, Budapest, July 2001).
majoritarian versus consensual democracy has turned out to be the biggest public political controversy in Hungary (Ágh 2001a, 106).

*Poland and Hungary Conclusions:*

Ágh (1995 and 2001b) argues that, in East-Central Europe the new political elite was not ready to accept civil society and its representatives as partners. That is how, legislatures and governments either attempted to weaken and exclude interest groups from policy-making or to strengthen and include them in policy-making through co-opting them into their own political movements (Bruszt 1994; Evans 1992). If weakened, however, labour organisations would be unable to moderate the effects of spreading mass deprivation (Ost and Crowley 2001, 4-5). Agricultural Producers’ Associations also ran into a similar inability in case they are not consulted (Korkut 2002b, 308-309). This would heighten their constituencies’ appeal in extremist solutions. The Polish election results in 2001 demonstrated this point (Gomez and Kość 2001). Testing a relationship between the increasing appeal in extremist parties and weak interest reconciliation is unfortunately beyond the scope of this study. Nonetheless, it is apparent that as political society becomes more obstructionist, interest groups cannot develop techniques to tame these marginalised sectors of society.

In this section, I demonstrated that the interaction of elite cliques in various areas leave the formal institutions of policy-making in the abstract and hinder the development of participatory modes of decision-making. In this framework, provisionality takes an upper hand. I assessed this argument with respect to the political as well as the civil sphere.
Once again, Hungary and Poland present different structures. Hungary presents an example of elite convergence to a weaker extent. It has relatively more developed corporatist policy-making structures (Seleny 1999) and polarisation is weaker. Poland, in return, has higher levels of elite convergence, deep segmentation and more recently established tripartite policy-making structures. Despite all this, however, informalities and interactions between various elite still run underneath the structures in both countries and determine the patterns of policy-making.

In this respect, the European Union Commission Reports on Accession urgently advised Hungary and Poland to carry on with the required improvements in terms of social dialogue. According to the Commission Report in 2000, Hungary was dealing with the consequences of ‘non-functioning formal institutional structures’. The Commission has been critical of the Orbán government’s use of the GT as a conduit for the dissemination of information to a wide range of interests groups, which excluded the opportunity for dialogue. Hence, the Orbán government was strongly advised to make additional efforts to ensure that opportunities for real social dialogue would be provided, and that are followed up in the appropriate manners. The 2001 report did not display any improvements in social dialogue in the country either. The relationship between the government and social partners in the area of social dialogue was noted by the lack of confidence and trust. As a result, it appears that Hungary has two major problems in terms of social dialogue: non-functioning formalised structures of dialogue and the lack of trust between the government and the social actors.
The MSZP – SZDSZ coalition government, which took office after the April 2002 elections in Hungary promised comprehensive reform of industrial relations system. The government seeks to (1) reintroduce the state institutional network dealing with labour market issues; (2) reconstruct the national level tripartite social dialogue; (3) reinforce the sectoral social dialogue and collective bargaining; and (4) strengthen the position of workplace level union sections.\textsuperscript{161} The relative success of this new institution building process remains to be seen.

As regards to Poland, however, the Commission Report drew attention to the increasing polarisation in the country between Solidarity and the OPZZ trade union confederations, which resulted in the final withdrawal of the latter from the Commission for Social and Economic Affairs in 2000. Thus, despite the new act on the Tripartite Commission for Social and Economic Issues, adopted in August 2001, the Commission Report drew attention to the need to make the tripartite process more effective and to ensure the participation of all relevant social partners. The 2002 European Commission Report still underlined the same ailments in the system of social dialogue in Poland. The report, especially, noted that preparation of the social actors for social dialogue at the European level has been missing in Poland. Still, there were two important developments in 2002 in terms of social dialogue and future social partners. First, was the introduction of regional (voivodeship) commissions for social dialogue, based on legislation passed in July 2001. Second, a new national trade union centre, the Trade Unions Forum was established in 2002. In November 2002, this Forum consisted of 36 trade unions and had approximately 300,000 members. A significant number of unions associated with Forum were formerly

\textsuperscript{161} See European Industrial Relations Observatory on-line report on Hungary (2002).
involved with OPZZ. Having fulfilled all the requirements set by law, the new centre is now seeking a seat on the Tripartite Commission\textsuperscript{162}.

With respect to this environment, the graph below demonstrate how elitism, elite convergence, abstract institutions, provisionality and patron-client relationships all lead to decreasing citizen participation into politics in Poland and Hungary.

[Graph IV.1 about here]

\textbf{IV.2.b. The Democratisation Period in Romania:}

With respect to its dissidence and transition periods in East-Central Europe, Romania presented a major idiosyncrasy in structural terms\textsuperscript{163}. Yet, at the end of the Chapter II, I demonstrated that what was underneath the communist structures in Romania, was not very much different than in Hungary and Poland. Still, in the aftermath of its revolutionary way out of communism, transition to democracy took longer in Romania. Until 1996, there was at best a provisional period of democracy in this country. Overall the Romanian case illustrated that without continued organised mass participation, revolution falls short of completely sweeping aside authoritarian elements.

That was how the revolution was captured and usurped by a neo-communist elite in Romania. Total absence of social movements in this country prevented society from producing an alternative elite to run against the communist apparatchiks. Moreover, Romania saw little elite pact during its immediate transition. Thus, it became relatively

\textsuperscript{162} See European Industrial Relations Observatory on-line report on Poland (2002).
\textsuperscript{163} See the last section in Chapter II.
easier for Iliescu to retain a strategic position within the newly inaugurated regime (Ratesh 1993, 48-57). In this environment, the Romanian politics saw the dominance of a political elite, which was comprised of neo-communists.

That was how the post-revolution political scene in Romania fell under the spell of neopatrimonialism until the 1996 elections. The period following the elections in 1996, however, bore many similarities to the situation in Hungary and Poland after 1990 in terms of state and civil society relations. Below, I will discuss this assumption's plausibility. The 1996 elections brought a new government in power, but this government displayed what can best be described as clumsiness in search of an ‘amateurish consociational democracy’ (Mungiu-Pippidi 1999b, 136 and 2001, 237). The late 2000 general elections results in turn showed that patrimony was still quite appealing for Romanians. The Social Democratic Party (PDS - the sequel to FSN) won the elections. Its victory was due to citizens’ preference for strong government, possibly made of experts, not politicians. This was not in contradiction to the understanding of democracy

There are four more factors in the literature on why and how Iliescu could sustain his position in the aftermath of the December Revolution in Romania. First, neither the oppositional intellectual elite nor the population at large could overcome the resistance of those communists entrenched within the state bureaucracy, the army, Securitate and the mass media (Jasiewicz 1993; Linz and Stepan 1996; Mungiu-Pippidi 1999a, 87). Second, both the oppositional intellectual elite and the revitalised traditional parties chose the wrong messages to attract the masses. Neither dissident romanticism nor issues from the interwar period could have attracted the masses (Culic 1999, 65). Third, the means of conveying messages through demonstrations and mass rallies was also not appropriate. The ordinary citizen was still experiencing the trauma of the Ceaușescu terror and the exaggerated human losses of the revolution. In this environment, mass demonstrations in Bucharest against the Iliescu regime meant another wave of terror that the ordinary citizenry wanted to avoid. That is why Iliescu could easily win against the opposition with his programme underlying order and avoidance of economic restructuring at the expense of people’s welfare. Fourth, the oppositional intellectual elite failed to conceive the stateness problem in Romania. Romanians have been extremely conscientious about their national integrity and as a result a nationalist appeal has always been prone to attract the masses (Korkut 2001b). The Iliescu government, similar to Ceaușescu, has exploited and exaggerated the threat to national integrity and blamed the opponent intellectual elite to be collaborators of Hungarians.
in Romania, as the coexistence of a strong party government with more direct forms of democracy was what the large majority wanted in Romania. Hence, the Romanians liked Iliescu’s specific quality as a good communist, an administrator who was not a politician (Mungiu-Pippidi 2001, 238, 244-245, 249).

_The Period until the 1996 elections:_

No doubt Iliescu is the most important political actor in post-revolutionary Romania. He proclaimed himself a ‘democrat’. This was on the basis that he was the acclaimed leader of the revolution, and his party was composed of provisional committees, directly elected by collectives in factories, state institutions, schools and universities (Mungiu-Pippidi 1999b, 140). His doctrine on democracy was based on national consensus. As such, the most important problems of the transition would be solved by technocratic means with consensus, which would benefit all. Iliescu, in this context, never accepted the idea that opposition was a political institution indispensable to liberal democracy. The opposition could be tolerated, but it should stop its attacks on governmental policies, especially economic reforms, and instead support the government and wait patiently for the elections to compete for power. Iliescu, therefore, envisaged a sort of political corporatism as regards to policy-making (Culic 1999, 66; Gilberg 1992; Mungiu Pippidi 1999b, 140-141; Ratesh 1993).

Potential civil society formations were largely missing in order to balance this understanding of democracy. The Romanian transition demanded the new governments

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165 Here post-communist elite means to say political elite of the former regime, who bear the ideological and institutional heritage of communism for their ideology and policy-making, and defined by their residual communist attitudes (Mungiu-Pippidi 2001, 231).
to build interest representation from scratch, but, as we will see, the political elite often failed in this respect. Until 1996, one can talk about three different actors within the Romanian third sector: the intelligentsia, the miners and the emerging interest groups. The first actor showed discontent to Iliescu’s understanding of democracy and organised rallies to ask him to resign in the name of democracy immediately following the transition. These rallies also had a cathartic function to the oppositional intelligentsia to free themselves from guilt and anxiety of their earlier compliance with the communist regime (Culic 1999, 65-67). The rally in January 1990 was the first democratic move against neo-patrimonialism in Romania. Organised by the intelligentsia, it was limited to Bucharest. Hence, it could remotely affect the rest of the country, where the population have been craving for order and economic development. Regardless, the intelligentsia movement was intimidated by the violent hindrances of the Iliescu regime.\footnote{The FSN decided to participate in the May 1990 elections. The opposition, however, denounced Iliescu’s actions as an abuse of power and attempted to create a new one-party state (Mungiu Pippidi 1999a, 87). Their position was quite justified since the time frame between the Revolution and the constitutive elections was not long enough for the opposition to organise itself. The Group for Social Dialogue (GDS) and the Timișoara Society constituted the opposition. Between these two groups, the former has been inspired by the Polish KOR, yet it remained as a close association of a limited number of miners.}

Iliescu used miners to burst the intellectuals’ bubble. In an attempt to display the new regime’s credentials, Iliescu called upon the coal miners to come to Bucharest to defend their government and rid the city of ‘hooligans’. The government subsequently placed the workers against intellectuals and students. For two days in Bucharest, the miners not only brutally beat students, but also seriously damaged the headquarters of two main opposition parties and attacked several Roma settlements. Iliescu’s manipulation of the miners was quite telling about the populist and patronage seeking behaviour of the new
political elite in Romania. It also showed similarities to the Ceauşescu regime in its attempts to isolate the intelligentsia from the public. Overall, the first organised public endeavour to raise consciousness about politics was suppressed harshly in Romania. This also showed that the new regime was not prepared for any form of dialogue, let alone concessions (Mungiu-Pippidi 1999a, 91-92). As the miners were leaving, Iliescu went to the train station and publicly addressed and thanked them. His discourse was more akin to a nondemocratic revolutionary leader rather than a democratic head of state (Linz and Stepan 1996, 362).

Until 1996 the third actor in the third sector, the interest groups, could not make themselves visible as an independent actor. Historically, the workers’ movements were solitary rather than in solidarity in Romania. In line with the general communist legacy, Iliescu’s party sought to establish strong ties with National Confederation of Free Trade Unions (CNSLR), which basically replaced the old communist Romanian General Trade Union Confederation (UGSR), as well as with the miners’ organisations (Kideckel 1999, 113, 116). This move was the first sign of elite convergence in Romanian politics. Through this close co-operation with FSN, the CNSLR also sought to consolidate its power by direct involvement in national politics. Although CNSLR officials maintained a

people. The latter, however, proclaimed a ‘Timișoara Declaration’, which became the ordinance of the major rally held in University Square in Bucharest against the Iliescu regime.

167 This coalition, however, did not last long. The introduction of the so-called second stage of price liberalisation in April 1991 led to considerable social unrest and ultimately to the downfall of the Roman government in September, which was directly triggered by the march on Bucharest of the miners from the Jiu Valley (Blokker 2002, 171). The miners had marched on the capital before, twice in 1990 and once in 1991, leading to the resignation of the Prime Minister Roman. Miners’ protests, however, have quite a long history in Romania, being the only social group that was able to bring Ceauşescu to negotiate after a strike of almost a week in 1977 (Chiaburu 1999, 115 in Blokker 2002, ft. 16). The miners’ privileged position indeed stems from communist times and has prevailed throughout the post-1989 period.
close relationship with the FSN, the head of the trade union, Victor Ciorbea, was a (right-of-centre) Peasant Party fixture. As the later events will show, this ideological clash divided CNSLR between the Ciorbea and Mitrea\textsuperscript{168} factions. Ciorbea went on to establish his own trade union confederation the Democratic Trade Union Confederation of Romania (CDSR) in order to leave for politics in a few years’ time (Kideckel 2001, 102, 104).

However, the CNSRL declined rather rapidly in influence, as the number of trade union confederations with diversified political orientations and social bases quickly proliferated. Four other nation-wide confederations came into existence\textsuperscript{169}. Among many, one advantage was that with the new independent trade unions, workers were not eager to serve as the watchdogs for the government (Mungiu Pippidi 1999a, 91-92). This time the combination of increased politicisation, and competition between unions rendered their collective power quite ineffective, even if the frequent and sometimes violent strikes gave labour the image of being powerful (Kideckel 1999, 113). We will have a better understanding of this process in the next section.

Like in Hungary and Poland, the elites sought to co-opt union leaders for their purposes. In this light of claim, the neo-communist dominance in Romania happened first, by communists’ using their political positions and networks to stay in power and second, through a policy aimed at the reproduction of that power (Verdery and Kligman 1992),

\textsuperscript{168} As I will illustrate shortly, Miron Mitrea (future Minister of Transportation of Romania during the Vasile government) and Victor Ciorbea both ended up in politics later.
while subordinating the emerging interest organisations to their political power. Soon after the first, Iliescu invited miners to Bucharest for a second time to disrupt the government of Petre Roman (Kideckel 2001, 103) while simultaneously blaming it for the economic difficulties inflicted upon citizenry (Blokker 2002, 171). Quite in line with Goodwin and Skocpol’s explanation of revolutions, the revolutionary movement in Romania won broad popular support as long as it was patrimonial and was willing and able to deliver state-like collective goods to its constituencies (1989, 493). However, the result was over-politicisation of trade unions and overt elite convergence between the political forces and the interest groups seen also in Poland more so than in Hungary. Yet, elite convergence was on slippery grounds in Romania, this time more comparable to Hungary’s situation than to Poland. The implications of this process on the autonomy of interest groups were not all positive.\(^{170}\)

Romanians felt that it was hard to break out of the psychological state of helplessness and chronic dependence on the authorities, which long years of totalitarianism had forged. In this context it was not hard to imagine that they would be under the effect of a similar – if not to a larger – ‘passivity’ and ‘provisionality’, which haunted the Polish and Hungarian societies to a degree. Environments as such would not imply any institutionalisation of participatory policy-making. The Graph VI.2 demonstrates the effect of this first period of democracy in Romania on the invigoration of civil society.

[Graph VI. 2 about here]

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\(^{169}\) See Kideckel (2001, 102-103) for details. Meridian trade union confederation is left out in Kideckel’s accounts. This confederation, at the moment, represents workers from metallurgy industrial plants.

\(^{170}\) See Chapter V.
The Period in the aftermath of 1996 elections:

With the 1996 elections, the country experienced both political elite emergence and elite convergence at the same time. Intellectual elites from the ranks of the Democratic Convention (CD) turned their organisation into a political party and certain civil society actors, including trade unions, signed electoral pacts with the CD. The immediate result was decapitation for the already small non-government sector due to the massive transfer of skilled staff and experts to the government (Mungiu-Pippidi 2001, 240). Built on this platform, however, the CD won the elections.

Victor Ciorbea headed the new government coalition, despite his previous statements regarding the handicaps that trade unions suffer when they co-operate with political parties in Romania. The CD engaged in negotiations with various social actors in order to build up ‘consociational democracy’ (Mihes and Casale 1999; Mungiu-Pippidi 1999b, 136) in Romania. Their governmental programme, ‘Contract With Romania’, entailed a list of problems to be solved in 200 days. As a crucial part of this consociationalist attempts, the new government established a tripartite body. I follow the discussion of the 1996 elections in Romania with a discussion on the forms of policy-making in this country.

Forms of Policy-Making in Romania:

Until 1996, governments in Romania argued that trade unions and employers’ organisations have had other avenues for consultations on economic policy issues, and hence blocked the introduction of law on tripartism. As a result, issues of

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representativeness were not settled and a much required participatory environment of policy-making was not institutionalised. This led to an environment, analogous to Poland and Hungary, where interactions were prominent enough to leave formal structures in the abstract. In the absence of formal mechanisms, the Romanian governments exacerbated tensions between competing trade union confederations, which is problematic as Romania has been one of the most strike-prone countries in the region (Héthy and Kyloh, 1995). The result was a profound lack of co-operation and mutual respect among social partners. The Labour Relations Department organised informal and ad hoc tripartite meetings in the absence of an institutionalised format of meetings. Yet, even this form of dialogue rarely went beyond providing the government with a reading of the social pulse (Stefan 1995, 133, 137, 140).

In this environment, internal weaknesses of trade unions and the union leaders’ compliance with the employer eroded trade unions’ power. Some analysts noted a huge gap between the view of union leaders and the ordinary due paying members173. Ciorbea noted the other handicaps in a newspaper article174, namely the lack of vertical communications between grassroots’ members and the union leadership and alliances with political parties, which aimed to reduce the unions once more to transmission belts. In terms of configurations and the modelling of civil society organisations, post-transition Romanian organisations to a degree resembled the previous communist transmission belts. We will see to what extent this environment suggests similarities to the Hungarian and Polish scene in the chapter to come.

172 Michael Shafir, Transitions Online, 27-12-1996
173 See Nine O’Clock, May 23, 2001, Romania.
In terms of social dialogue, the tripartite secretary introduced by the CD government was composed of three members from the government and the social partners. It hardly survived a year however, and was disbanded in 1997 when the trade unions did not keep an agreement made with the employers’ organisation, Patronatul Roman\textsuperscript{175}, and with the government on financing the operations of the secretariat. Additionally, all trade union confederations wanted to have their own representative in the body rather than a single representative. This became another point of crisis. Thereafter, the Economic and Social Council (CES) came into existence in 1997 as an independent tripartite body to provide social dialogue among the government, trade unions and employers’ organisations. It was composed of 27 members appointed by social partners. Similar to tripartite organisations in Hungary and Poland, the CES fulfils an advisory role by endorsing certain draft legislations submitted to the parliament as well as certain government decisions (Mihes and Casale 1999, 278-279).

The second blow to the CD governments’ attempts to institutionalising of policy-making in a consociational manner, were continuous social protests. One of the gravest uprisings took place in the mining sector. As a direct reaction to government intentions to thoroughly restructure the mining industry, miners from the Jiu Valley went on strike in January 1999, led by Miron Cozma, a trade union leader\textsuperscript{176}. In order to protest against the closure of several mines and factories, and to demand for an increase in wages, the miners marched on Bucharest (Martin and Cristesco-Martin 1999, 397; Roper 2000, 105). Their case was exploited this time by the extreme right Great Romania Party to put the

\textsuperscript{174} See Romania Libera, 23 April 1994 (in Stefan 1995, 141-142).
\textsuperscript{175} In 1995, the Patronatul Roman was initiated with the participation of 5 employers’ organisations.
\textsuperscript{176} See Kideckel (2001) for a detailed discussion on how workers feel about Cozma.
government in corner. The government was weak in the face of miners’ action. What continuous strikes in Romania suggested, however, was the absence of negotiation between representatives of labour and the state. In this respect, violent demonstrations were the only means of interest articulation still ten years after the revolution. Under these circumstances, trade union support towards Ciorbea’s government made many analysts note the huge gap between the views of union leaders and the ordinary due paying members in Romania\textsuperscript{177}.

Problems over the employment law between the following Isarescu cabinet and the trade union confederations,\textsuperscript{178} as well as the murder of a trade union leader in Iaşi signed the end of the already frail relations between the trade unions and the government. Especially in the latter case, the rumour has been that, the trade unionist was assassinated as a result of dragging on employer-employee conflict inflicted by privatisation in his company\textsuperscript{179}. The government was incapable of resolving the case quickly and subsequently the case became another political tool to be exploited by the extreme right before the elections\textsuperscript{180}.

Overall, the CD proved itself to be an elitist organisation\textsuperscript{181}. This period demonstrated that westernising intellectuals undermined their own position by their inability to communicate their ideas to population at large in Romania (Blokker 2002). The lack of co-operation between the elite and the citizenry seemed to have repeated itself once again in Romania in the post-1996 period. In the face of complete political and economic

\begin{footnotes}
\item[177] Nine O’Clock, May 23, 2001, Romania.
\item[178] Nine O’clock, June 26, 2000.
\item[179] BBC Monitoring, September 7, 2000.
\end{footnotes}
failure of the CD, Romania organised both governmental and presidential elections in December 2000. Not even the former president, Constantinescu, believed that the CD had any chances to win. That was why he announced that he was defeated in political life, as he could not prevent corruption and the informal networks. Hence, he did not run for another term in office (Mungiu-Pippidi 2001, 232). The population was also quite tired of the power politics within coalitions and wanted a strong government. Trade unions, as well as employers’ organisations, have once again made electoral pacts with political parties. Nonetheless this time, Iliescu’s party, PDS, was their favourite. The elections brought major success for the PDS as well as the extreme right, the Great Romania Party. After the elections, the PDS formed a one-party minority government with Adrian Năstase as the prime minister.

Electoral coalition between the PDS and the interest groups resulted in another shift of the elite from the civil sphere into the political. This was the third wave of elite convergence between the civil and political societies in Romania. As a result of the electoral coalition, soon came a social accord between the government and the interest groups a few months after the elections. In exchange to various promises from the government, the trade unions committed themselves to avoid initiating or encouraging actions that might trouble the social peace climate. The accord also included a calendar of meetings likely to elaborate or amend a number of laws pertaining to working relations. An economic and social evolution monitoring committee was also set up in order to

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181 Vice-president, CNSLR-Fraţia Trade Union Confederation, Romania.
supervise the implementation of the accord’s provisions\textsuperscript{182}. In return, the Năstase government persuaded trade unions not to strike for one year\textsuperscript{183}.

Nonetheless, the first crack in the relations between the governing party and the trade unions came soon after signing the social contract. Cartel Alfa Trade Union Confederation indicated that all trade unions had various and punctual problems, which cannot be solved by resorting to a unique social pact and certain privatisation cases\textsuperscript{184}. In this respect, the EU Commission report directed criticisms to the Romanian government, similar to Hungary and Poland. It criticized the PDS government’s use of ordinances to push through legislation, thereby bypassing formal parliamentary procedures and social dialogue mechanisms. The report pointed out that, in terms of social dialogue, despite existing legal provisions, much legislation was approved without adequate consultation of social partners and without full consultation with the CES. Therefore, Romania was still prone to routine problems in terms of structured social dialogue.

The main problem for Romania, similar to the other countries, was that the structures existed but were not accorded sufficient importance. What were required were structures to be used in ways that permitted effective social dialogue. Moreover, the governments’ capacity to monitor these structures needed to be reinforced. Along with this, consultation with stakeholders (social partners, NGOs, the business community) when drafting legislation needed to be improved. Even though the CES ought to allow social partners to comment on legislation, the Commission reported that the Council has not been systematically consulted. The Commission Report in 2002, however, noted some

\textsuperscript{183} The Economist Intelligence Unit, June 6, 2001.
developments in the area of social dialogue. The Romanian government concluded a Social Pact with the majority of trade unions in January 2002, and there came another Pact in June 2002 with the two trade unions that did not sign the original agreement.

In conclusion, the post-1996 politics in Romania has the following points of convergence with politics in Hungary and Poland: prevalent elite convergence, politicisation of civil society, reliance on informal, patron-client relations between the interest group elite and the political elite in the face of weak institutionalisation of policy-making. Variance in degrees withstanding, I foresee a not-so-diverging picture of civil society in post-1996 Romania, compared to Hungary and Poland. As a result, I assume that – as portrayed by the Graph IV.1 – the prevalence of interactions as against institutionalisation of formal mechanisms of participatory policy-making becomes the case in Romania. Regarding Hungary, Poland and Romania, therefore, I have the following hypotheses, which I will test with the help of my data in the next chapter.

[Table IV. 1 about here]

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184 Political News, April 25, 200, Romania.
PART III:

Conclusion: Testing the Relationship between Democratisation and the Invigoration of Civil Society
Chapter V: A Discussion on the Current Position of Civil Society in Hungary, Poland and Romania

V.1. Introduction:

Part II of this dissertation laid down the historical background of my convergence argument while examining the periods of communism, the democratic transition, and democratisation in Hungary, Poland and Romania. I presented the mode and the extent of interactions among various actors under different periods in these three countries. I demonstrated how these interactions left formal structures in the abstract. I argued for the need to examine what laid underneath the formal structures in order for a better understanding of events. Therefore, the continuity from the period under communism into the democratic consolidation period in Hungary, Poland and Romania, manifested itself with regards to the prevalence of informal elite links, elites’ patrimonial approach towards the citizenry, and the politicised relationship between the state and civil society.

My discussion on the democratisation period in Chapter IV showed how these phenomena still prevail in the countries under study, regardless of formal structural differences and histories. The prevalence of these phenomena is the very reason why the democratisation period has not paved the necessary path for the invigoration of civil society. Rather than path-dependency in purely structural terms, there is a temporal and selective path-dependency.

This chapter, therefore, will test whether formal structural variations (historical or current) in Hungary, Poland and Romania affect respondents’ evaluations of the position
of civil society in their countries. Hence, Part II of this dissertation is crucial in presenting my argument and the conclusions I propose. The data, which I collected through interviews regarding the position of civil society more than a decade after transition in Hungary, Poland and Romania, will provide the necessary material to test the three hypotheses, I present in Chapter IV. At the end of Part III, I shall argue that country-specific structures of the communist state, dissidence, and transition to democracy do not affect the conditions of civil society invigoration in Hungary, Poland and Romania.

This chapter will test hypotheses regarding (1) the autonomy of civil society organisations; (2) forms of policy-making; and (3) internal configurations of interest groups in Poland, Hungary and Romania. To facilitate this test, I will use the data, which I gathered from 62 interviews from March 2001 to August 2001 with representatives from trade union confederations and federations, employers’ organisations and agricultural producers’ associations in Hungary, Poland and Romania. Also, I gathered further data through a thorough study of internal statutes of interest groups, where and when available. A discussion on the validity of my hypotheses in the light of this data will portray the current position of civil society in Hungary, Poland and Romania as well as how the democratisation period influence the invigoration of civil society.

My interviews were based on questionnaires and lasted approximately an hour, depending on the language of the interview. The questionnaire was a combination of both
qualitative (open ended) and quantitative questions (rank, agree/disagree, etc.)\(^\text{185}\). In this chapter, I will present mean values, calculated on the basis of numerical values assigned as answers. I did not want to interpret all responses in numerical terms, as I thought this would simplify some responses. Based on the belief that, ‘most political phenomena can only be judged qualitatively; and the conversion of judgements into quantitative indices to facilitate comparison and assessment involves subjectivity’ (Beetham 1994, 33), I will rely on direct references to interviewees to portray the general picture\(^\text{186}\). The questionnaire is translated in Hungarian for Hungarian interviewees and Polish for Poles. I used English and French questionnaires in Romania\(^\text{187}\). With the help of the questionnaire, I sought to learn mainly the following: conditions of internal democracy inside the civil society groups and forms of interest group participation into policy-making in countries under study. A full list of the names and the position of the interviewees with full date and place of interview is in Appendix I.

**V.2. Operationalisation of Hypotheses:**

**V.2.a. Forms of Policy-Making and Autonomy of Interest Groups from the Political Society**

**Hypothesis I:** The autonomy of interest groups will be determined predominantly by personal links, leaving respective policy-making structures in the abstract.

**Hypothesis II:** All three countries see dominance of the political elite and the prevalence of informal channels in terms of policy-making.

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\(^{185}\) I am indebted to Gábor Tőka, who helped to prepare the questionnaire and prepare me for the fieldwork process.

\(^{186}\) Please refer to Appendix II for the questionnaire.

\(^{187}\) I would like to thank Tania Gosselin in her invaluable help for translating the questionnaire in French. I also would like to thank my Hungarian teacher, Dániel Jakócs for his help in translating my questionnaire into Hungarian. I also would like to thank the ‘anonymous secretary’ who took time to translate the questionnaire into Polish. Last but not the least, I would like to thank Çğdem Çmar for arranging a Russian translation of the questionnaire (under the most inconvenient conditions).
In order to see how plausible these two hypotheses are, I will assess the following: the extent of elite convergence (Tables V.1 and V.2); respondents’ evaluation of certain factors affecting the success of an interest group (Table V.3); policy-making routes (Table V.4); interest groups’ position vis-à-vis the state (Tables V.5; V.6 and V.7).

[Table V.1. about here]

Respondents from all three countries similarly attributed an important role onto the interest groups for the recruitment of future politicians. From this, it became plausible to argue that a prior position in an interest group rendered a form of political capital for the future political leaders. Evaluations from Poland and Romania displayed that respondents agreed that interest groups could turn into political parties once opportunities arouse, while the Hungarian respondents did not agree with this statement. For the time being, we can see that the civil society in Poland and Romania is more politicised than the civil society in Hungary. The table below gives a better idea on the elite convergence. It is based on the interest groups’ responses on links with political parties, and their members running in the elections.

[Table V.2 about here]

In this context, the table below gives an idea as to whether the political links between the civil society organisations and the political society affected the success of an interest group or not.

[Table V.3 about here]

These results show that the respondents first of all do not think that links with opposition parties affect their success in any of the three countries. Many respondents from all three countries said that political parties are interested in establishing links with interest groups, while in opposition. This is because of certain attempts by political parties to use
interest groups as a component of opposition against the government and to guarantee their support for general elections. Once in government, political parties do not keep their promises and do not comprehensively collaborate with civil society organisations.

On the basis of the mean scores, the respondents, with the exception of the Polish interviewees, think that personal links between the ministries and their organisation do not necessarily influence the success of their organisation\textsuperscript{188}. Still, as I will soon demonstrate, respondents from different interest groups talked about the necessity of establishing links with political parties in government in order to increase their impact on policy-making. Therefore, the question is, although elite convergence does not necessarily bring success for interest groups, why do we still see this phenomenon occurring? One possible cause is the career strategies of interest group elite to shift into the political sphere.

Table V.2 showed that the leaderships of interest organisations were in a conspicuous relationship with the political elite. At the aggregate level more than one-third of all groups either had political links or had a member from their executive committee with political aspirations. The table also suggests that there were shifts from the civil sphere into the political sphere. In this context, the president of Spiru Haret, a teachers’ trade union from Romania, asserted that skilled leadership and shifts towards the political arena were beneficial for their organisation to establish good contacts with the ministries.

\textsuperscript{188} The first three factors to affect the success of an interest group in countries under study are as follows, in Hungary: skilled leadership, number of members and financial resources; in Poland: skilled leadership, financial resources and involving many experts in internal decision-making; in Romania, skilled leadership, involving many experts in internal decision-making and financial resources.
Nevertheless, as put forth by quite a few other respondents, those leaders who shifted from the civil society into the political arena did not reciprocate support for their organisations once they had become politicians. This raises the question whether there is some other motive behind elite convergence.

Hypothetically, interest organisations’ leaders established political links in two steps. Notice that both of these steps were at the expense of members’ general participation into internal decision-making of interest organisations. In this process, the civil society elite made extensive use of available social and cultural capital.

- **Step I: Cultural Capital and Its Transformation into Politically-Relevant Social Capital:**

Social capital is a by-product of social interactions and networks. In my view, there are two types of social capital produced within interest groups. La Due Lake and Huckfeldt (1998, 568) introduced the first one called ‘politically-relevant social capital’. The production of politically relevant social capital is a function of the incumbents’ political expertise within an individual network of relations, and the frequency of political interactions within the network. The second one is ‘participatory social capital’. Participatory social capital is created through ordinary member participation into the internal decision-making of an organisation. Voting\(^{189}\), as well as permanent links between the presidency and the rank and file\(^{190}\), provides the basis of this form of social capital.

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189 Vice-president of the BNS Trade Union Confederation and the President of Cartel Sprenza Metal Workers’ Union, Romania.

190 Vice-president, Nutricomb, Agricultural Producers’ Organisation, Romania.
In this context, the interviews showed that possessing expertise [cultural capital] increased one’s chances to acquire executive positions within the interest groups. Cultural capital, therefore, becomes possibly germane to be transformed into politically relevant social capital at the interest group level\textsuperscript{191}. A member of the Council of Presidents of MOSZ, the National Federation of Agricultural Co-operators and Producers, in Hungary asserted that local branches and ordinary members, without expertise, acted only as obstacles to a fast and swift decision-making process. That was why the head of general office from MSZOSZ trade union confederation thought that ‘decision-making should reside where the information resides. If the information is at the central level, then decision-making should happen at the central level’. As the manager president of KISOSZ, the National Federation of Traders and Caterers from Hungary, asserted, hierarchy in decision-making was a derivative of expertise. Thus, participatory social capital was very much hindered by embedded elitism in the internal decision-making of organisations. The next section will demonstrate the impacts of embedded elitism in internal decision-making of interest groups in more length.

\textit{- Step II: Politically Relevant Social Capital and Cultural Capital, and their transformation into Political Capital:}

In the absence of well-institutionalised policy-making in East-Central Europe, a long-term engagement with a political party became an option for interest groups, given their belief that an engagement as such would provide them with higher levels of policy influence at the governmental level. This rapprochement brings interest organisation elite

\textsuperscript{191} President, Meridian Trade Union Confederation, Romania; President, VASAS Federation of Hungarian Metal Workers, Hungary.
close to the political elite\textsuperscript{192}. Table V.3 illustrated the extent of this rapprochement Hungary, Poland and Romania. The 1996 and 2000 elections in Romania and the 1997 elections in Poland saw extreme examples of this rapprochement.

Professional qualifications were always important for politicians, and the elite from the interest organisations possess such qualifications\textsuperscript{193}. That is how the political parties become inclined to recruit people from the interest groups. In this way, they could attract well-trained people into their ranks as well as possibly attracting the members of interest organisations – where these well-trained people previously served – as voters. To that extent, one respondent without any hesitation argued that interest groups should be a school for training future politicians\textsuperscript{194}. The implication of this process was a shift of the most qualified from interest groups into the political sphere.

Most of the time, members of interest organisations saw this shift as a chance to provide them with better chances of interest representation once their people were elected\textsuperscript{195}. Nevertheless, there are two questions one should ask regarding this process: (1) whether those elected reciprocate support to their previous organisations once elected and (2)

\textsuperscript{192} See Chapter IV for a detailed discussion on this topic.
\textsuperscript{193} President, Trade Union of Hungarian Railwaymen, Hungary; Vice-president, Nutricomb, Agricultural Producers’ Organisation, Romania; President, ANAA, The National Association of Agricultural Activists, Romania.
\textsuperscript{194} Member of the Council of Presidents, MOSZ, National Federation of Agricultural Co-operators and Producers, Hungary.
\textsuperscript{195} President, Agro-Frăţia Trade Union for Food Industries, Romania; President, FSIA Agricultural Producers’ Association, Romania; Vice-President, CNSLR-Frăţia Trade Union Confederation, Romania; President, Meridian Trade Union Confederation, Romania; President, KDSZSZ Transportation Workers’ Trade Union Federation, Hungary; Manager President, Solidarność Miners’ and Energy Workers’ Secretariat, Poland; Vice-president of Solidarność Trade Union Confederation, Poland; International Relations Representative of VDSZSZ, Free Trade Union of Railway Workers, Hungary; Vice-president of OPZZ FZZ ‘Metalowcy’ Metal Workers’ Federation, Poland; President of NSZZ RI The Independent Autonomus Trade Unions of Individual Farmers, Poland.
whether these alliances increase policy satisfaction of the interest organisations, which 
sent their members into the political ranks.

Those who shift from interest groups ranks into the political sphere are unwilling or at 
their best slow to reciprocate support for their previous organisations. In Romania, as 
an example, the December 2000 elections once again saw shifts from the interest groups 
into the political sphere to an extent that the president of the Agro-Fraţia Trade Union for 
Food Industry remarked, ‘interest groups and political parties were completely mixed 
up’. The CNSLR-Fraţia Trade Union Confederation had an electoral alliance with PDS 
during the last elections, which resulted with the previous president of the confederation, 
the president of the telecom and public services federations becoming deputies. 
Additionally, the president of the UGIR, the Union of General Industrialists of Romania, 
became the Minister of Industry. The effects of this latest round of elite convergence in 
Romania remain to be seen, but at the time of the interviews some problems were already 
visible. Some trade unions were already unsatisfied with the governments’ failure to keep 
its promises and timetable of the ‘social accord’. Whereas the employers’ organisations 
were complaining that the trade unions became more powerful as a result of the social 
accord. After the negative experience with the Victor Ciorbea government, however,

196 President, Spiru Haret, Teachers’ Trade Union Federation, Romania; President, Meridian Trade Union 
Confederation, Romania; Head of International Relations Department, LIGA Trade Union Confederation, 
Hungary; Head of International Relations Department, Munkástanácsok Workers’ Councils’ Trade Union 
Confederation, Hungary; Vice-President, Solidarność Trade Union Confederation, Poland.

197 Vice-President, CNSLR-Fraţia Trade Union Confederation, Romania.

198 Executive Manager, UGIR 1903, Economic Centre for Business and Services, Romania.

199 President, Meridian Trade Union Confederation, Romania.

200 President, UGIR, the Union of General Industrialists of Romania; Director, Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry of Romania and Bucharest Municipality, Romania; Executive Secretary, ADER, The Alliance for 
Economic Development in Romania.
the vice-president of the CDSR trade union confederation this time did not sympathise with the trade unions having any major relationship with political parties.

The previous Hungarian Minister of Labour, who formerly was the president of the trade union confederation LIGA, was also a typical example of non-reciprocation. He was elected from the ranks of the FIDESZ-Hungarian Civic Party (FIDESZ-MPP) in Hungary and – despite the trade unions’ expectancies – his tenure in the office proved to be ruinous for the relationship between the government and trade unions. Also, the Minister of Education was an ex-trade union leader in the Orbán cabinet as well as the Political State Secretary of the primeminister’s office. Respondents did not believe that these politicians reciprocated support to their organisations, once elected\textsuperscript{201}. In Poland, on the other hand, in the previous parliament there were 46 members of the Sejm elected from trade unions\textsuperscript{202}. Despite all, this very period proved itself to be devastating in terms of the relations between interest groups and the government in Poland. As I will show below, the policy satisfaction of Polish interest organisations with the government of this period was very low.

An interim conclusion is that the relationship between political parties and interest group leadership benefits only the political parties and those elite with the suitable qualifications to shift into politics\textsuperscript{203}. This is how politically relevant social capital and

\textsuperscript{201} International Relations Officer, VDSZSZ, Free Trade Union of Railway Workers, Hungary; Head of International Relations Department, LIGA Trade Union Confederation, Hungary.

\textsuperscript{202} Vice-President of Federation of Mining Workers, OPZZ, Poland.

\textsuperscript{203} President, Meridian Trade Union Confederation, Romania; Executive Manager, UGIR 1903, Economic Centre for Business and Services, Romania; Executive Director, AOAR, The Businessmen’s Association of Romania, Romania.
cultural capital transformed into political capital\textsuperscript{204}. In turn, civil society lost a multitude of skilled staff and experts to the government (Mungiu-Pippidi 2001, 244). Not surprisingly, the head of the international relations office from the \textit{Munkástanácsok} (Workers’ Councils) trade union confederation in Hungary complained that the trade unions lacked the expertise to contribute to decision-making, even if they had had the opportunity. This picture vaguely reminds us of the relationship between transmission belt organisations and the communist party, with respect to the decision of many members of the intelligentsia to join the communist party under the pretense of representing proletarian workers’ interests.

In this respect, we should also analyse the routes of policy-making in the countries under study on the basis of interest groups’ evaluation. Table V.4 presents numerical values assigned to certain routes of policy-making.

[Table V.4 about here]

Among all three countries, seemingly, only the Hungarian respondents show a stronger preference for institutionalised channels to talk to government officials on policy issues, \textit{if these institutionalised links exist}. In Poland, almost all respondents considered that personal links are the best means to reach governmental officials. In Romania, on the other hand, the mean calculations of responses were too close to differentiate among various channels. Thereby it is plausible to argue that in Romania all three routes are crucial, depending on the context. The informal talks, however, presented that despite the importance institutionalised channels may seemingly attain, they remained at best in the

\textsuperscript{204} President, ‘Hangya’ Co-operatives of Agricultural Producers, Director of International and Training Affairs; IPOSZ, Hungarian Association of Craftsmen’s Corporations, Hungary; Deputy President, OPZZ
abstract in respondents’ minds. Given that personal links did not predominantly affect the success of interest groups in pursuing their members’ interests either, I intend to portray how then policy-making operated in countries under study. I will start with Hungary.

V.2.a.Hungary

An easy explanation as to why in Hungary institutionalised channels drew relative importance would be the prior experience with corporatism and compromise in Hungary. I do not deny that this very experience may place Hungary in a different position vis-à-vis the rest. Nevertheless, once one examines the informal talks and answers to the open-ended questions, one can see that, similar to the communist period, in Hungary informal relations and interactions are still running underneath the structures. I am going to illustrate this with the help of direct references from my interviews.

It appears that a certain number of respondents in Hungary would agree that social dialogue should be very important in theory, but what happens is that patron-client relations are decisive for governments’ approach to interest groups²⁰⁵. What is more, as the general secretary of the ÉSZT trade union confederation put it, even patron-client links are on slippery grounds as the Hungarian democracy is pretty young for interest groups and political parties to establish long-term relationships. The Hungarian respondents realise that if there are too many personal links between the political groups and civil society, then the process loses all its objectivity. What is interesting is that trade unions from the

²⁰⁵ International Relations Representative of VDSZSZ, Free Trade Unions of Railway Workers’, Hungary; President, KDSZSZ Transportation Workers’ Trade Union Federation, Hungary; President, Trade Union of Hungarian Railwaymen, Hungary.
left wing of the political spectrum accuse those from the right of opting for patronage rather than formal participatory institutions of policy-making, and vice versa. Even within the same confederation, sometimes, there can be divides. While respondents from the first camp asserted that, under the previous MSZP coalition government, the formal institutionalised mechanisms of interest articulation were operating properly, the second camp and some respondents from the employers’ organisations argued that the Orbán coalition government operated a more practical and democratic policy-making model.

Still, the most severe critique of patronage towards the Orbán government came from the president of the Trade Union of Hungarian Railwaymen. Accordingly,

> There are many groups, which have been patronised by the government. There are those groups with only 10-15 members [that is what the law requires]. These groups are established mostly at the expense of existing groups by the government in order to weaken them. *translated from Hungarian*

Given this picture, the conviction among some Hungarian respondents was that they needed to have their own people in politics in order to affect decisions. Hence, in Hungary formal institutional structures are in place, but the problem is to work these

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206 President and vice-president, LIGA PDSZ Democratic Union of Pedagogists, Hungary.
207 All interviews from the MSZOSZ Trade Union Confederation and individual federations as well as some interviewees from LIGA and ASZSZ (Autonóm) Alliance of Autonomous Trade Unions Confederations.
208 President, Transportation Workers’ Federation, Munkástanácsok, Hungary; President and vice-president, LIGA PDSZ Democratic Union of Pedagogists, Hungary; Manager President, KISOSZ National Federation of Traders’ and Caterers, Hungary; International Relations Representative, MGYOSZ, Confederation of Hungarian Employers and Industrialists, Hungary; Director of International and Training Affairs, IPOSZ, Hungarian Association of Craftsmen’s Corporations, Hungary.
209 Head of General Office, MSZOSZ Trade Union Confederation, Hungary; President and Vice-president, LIGA PDSZ Democratic Union of Pedagogists, Hungary; General Secretary, ‘Hangya’ Co-operative Association of Agricultural Producers, Hungary; IPOSZ, Hungarian Association of Craftsmen’s Corporations, Hungary. Similar to this group, the Vice-president, VOSZ National Association of Entrepreneurs and Employers, Hungary asserted that interest groups should be loyal to political parties.
structures in practice. The Orbán government, reportedly, had had its favourites among the interest groups ‘not as a part of power, but as a tool to keep power, corruption and connections were extremely important’. In the words of the vice-president of VOSZ, National Association of Entrepreneurs and Employers from Hungary, ‘now the situation is worse than it was under Kádár. He was a dictator but at least he was consulting us’.

At the country level, perhaps not surprisingly, Hungarian respondents illustrated the lowest levels of satisfaction with their government. The conclusion, therefore, is that the Hungarian respondents would welcome institutionalised decision-making models had they existed. The reality, however, is that the prevalence of interactions among certain elites leave the structures of policy-making in the abstract. That is how contacts between the civil and political societies serve the ends of the latter rather than the former. Hence, political elites are hindering the chances of full development of institutionalised channels as well as hindering interest groups’ capacities to represent the interest of their members in full capacity.

210 President and vice-president, LIGA PDSZ Democratic Union of Pedagogists, Hungary; Head of the International Relations Office, Munkástanácsok trade union confederation, Hungary; Manager President, KISOSZ, Hungary; Secretary of Social Dialogue in Hungarian Ministry of Economic Affairs – Employers’ Side.
211 The President of the KDSZSZ Transportation Workers’ Trade Union Federation from Hungary mentions SZEF (Forum for the Co-operation of Trade Unions), LIGA, Munkástanácsok trade union confederations in this category. I did not come across any confirmation of his argument during my interviews with those organisations, mentioned by him.
212 Member of the Council of Presidents, MOSZ, National Federation of Agricultural Co-operators and Producers, Hungary.
213 During the time of the interview, Orbán coalition government was in office.
214 International Relations Representative of VDSZSZ Free Trade Unions of Railway Workers’, Hungary; Head of International Relations Department, LIGA Trade Union Confederation, Hungary; President, Iron and Metal Workers’ Trade Union, Hungary; President, Trade Union of Hungarian Railwaymen, Hungary.
V.2.a.Poland:

The prevailing choice to use personal links rather than institutionalised channels is not all surprising in Poland in the light of the discussion in Part II. Respondents noted that, the previous government led by the AWS tended to favour some groups vis-à-vis the others. Even the respondents from the Solidarity groups showed dissatisfaction with the AWS government. In this context, the president of the ZZG Trade Union of Coal Miners likens the social dialogue in Poland to a shallow process, where there are no rules of decision-making and governments just listen to whoever is there at the right moment. This context makes many respondents from the labour sector complain about the discrepancy between what politicians promise before the elections and what is done after the elections. Still the belief is that, in the face of facetious social dialogue, labour groups can only influence the government via their own deputies in the Sejm\textsuperscript{215}. Or else, as the director in chief from the Association of Chambers of Agriculture asserted, governments only remember their pre-elections promises once they protest\textsuperscript{216}.

The employers’ and agricultural producers’ organisations, on the other hand, believe that unless governments treat them as political parties, public power would not be represented in policy-making\textsuperscript{217}. This portrays the completely distorted picture of the interest group scene in Poland more than a decade after the country’s transition to democracy. In light of the prevalent elite convergence between the political parties and the trade unions, the

\textsuperscript{215} Vice-president, FZZ, ‘Metalowcy’ Federation of Metal Workers’ Trade Union, Poland; Vice-president and Director of Gdańsk Employers’ Organisation, Poland; Deputy-president, OPZZ, Trade Union Confederation, Poland; Chairman of Solidarność Food Workers’ Secretariat, Poland; Director in Chief, Association of Chambers of Agriculture, Poland.

\textsuperscript{216} See Ekiert and Kubik (1998).
employers’ organisations also aspire for a political role. This is nothing new. The Polish employers’ have been considering whether they should also become a political party since the start of the regime change (Kuczyńska 1992).

V.2.a.Romania:

Romanian respondents, like Hungarian and Polish respondents, complain about the shallow institutionalisation processes of participatory policy-making in their countries\textsuperscript{218}, although with the realisation that time is unripe for this framework to develop\textsuperscript{219}. Accordingly, the process of social dialogue in Romania suffers a great deal from hypocritical attitudes of governments or political parties. Either governments do not respect the implications of the social accord, despite the existence of the CES, or political parties listen to interest groups only before elections\textsuperscript{220}. Still, the vice-president of Nutricomb, the Agricultural Producers’ Organisation, thinks that civil society should have good links with the opposition and government parties. Needless to say, those in power have the priority. Thus, the aspirations of civil society organisations to establish contacts with the political parties seem similar to a heedless love.

There are a few reasons why interest groups believe that formal institutions are missing in terms of policy-making in Romania. These are as follows: (1) governments do not respect

\textsuperscript{217} Deputy Director of Foreign Department, PKPP Polish Confederation of Private Employers, Poland; Director in Chief, KRIR, National Council of Agricultural Chambers, Poland; Vice-president and Director of Gdańsk Employers’ Organisation, Poland.

\textsuperscript{218} Executive Director, AOAR, the Businessman’s Association of Romania, Romania; Head of International Relations Department and European Integration, Patronatul Roman and National Confederation of Romanian Employers, Romania; Vice-president, Nutricomb, Agricultural Producers’ Organisation, Romania.

\textsuperscript{219} President, Meridian Trade Union Confederation, Romania.

\textsuperscript{220} Vice-president of the BNS Trade Union Confederation and President of Cartel Sprentza Metal Workers’ Union, Romania; President, Spiru Haret, Teachers’ Trade Union Federation, Romania.
the law; (2) they lack mechanisms to sustain their help to interest groups; (3) they are afraid of trade union power; (4) some interest groups capture the state – similar to parentela forms of relationship – at the expense of others; (5) lack of communication between the ministers and the prime minister in the cabinet; (6) similar to Hungary, political parties have their cronies. Therefore, in the words of the vice-president of the Cartel-ALFA trade union confederation,

The political class [in Romania] does not represent Romanian society at large. They only represent certain interest groups, which promote some interests closer to the interests of the political class.

In this view, the vice-president of CNSLR-Frația showed how interest group leaders tend to pay lip service to institutions by saying, ‘I will rank the institutions the highest in your questionnaire, but in practice whenever we have a problem we resort to personal links’.

Despite these criticisms, Romanian interest groups state that they are almost ‘satisfied’ with the current government’s attitude towards interest group participation in policy-making in Romania. The interviews occurred just after the PDS success in the Romanian elections, mainly as a result of an alliance between the political and civil groups. The following political spring for Romania, at the time of the interviews, may have determined the answers to this question to a large extent (Korkut 2002b). Yet, one interesting result is that Romania does not seem to be lagging far behind Hungary and Poland, despite the previous experiences of this country.

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221 President, Spiru Haret, Teachers’ Trade Union Federation, Romania.  
222 President, The Central National Confederation of Romanian Miners’ Syndicates, Romania.  
223 Vice-president, National Trade Union Confederation ‘Cartel ALFA’, Romania.  
224 Vice-President, CNSLR-Frația Trade Union Confederation, Romania.  
225 President, Alma Mater, University Trade Unions Federation, Romania.  
226 Vice-president, Nutricomb, Agricultural Producers’ Organisation, Romania.
V.2.a. Conclusion:

Given the discussion above, it is not a major surprise that satisfaction with governments’ approach to interest groups is entirely low in Hungary and Poland, and in Romania equally close to ‘somewhat unsatisfied’ and satisfied.

[Table V.5 about here]

In terms of policy-making, a comparison of party politicians and interest groups show that interest groups assess party politicians either as more influential or a lot more influential than themselves. At the country level, Romanian respondents are slightly more optimistic of the role of interest groups in policy-making, compared to their Hungarian and Polish counterparts.

[Table V.6 about here]

One more issue is that there are sectoral differences between the trade unions and employers’ organisations (including agricultural producers’ associations) in terms of their abilities to reach officials at the ministry levels. On average, the employers’ organisations find ministries more accessible. The discrepancy was the most acute in Hungary. Nine respondents from the labour sector asked for a meeting for ‘many’ or ‘ten’ times, yet they could either not meet with an official or met only once or twice. A few others (four respondents) met a few times with an official. One respondent himself, a parliamentarian at the time of the interview, stated that he could meet with the officials as many times as possible. Whereas Hungarian employers’ groups stated that they asked for a meeting ‘many’ times and could meet ‘many’ times, even ‘daily’ or ‘weekly’. This is quite paradoxical, in some cases, given an earlier criticism towards the lack of communication between the ministries and their organisations that they directed.
In Poland and Romania, however, there is no visible difference between the labour sector and the employers. There are, however, a few discrepancies among the groups. In both countries, some groups say that on average, they find their ministries accessible, while the others have fewer chances to talk with an official. This can be explained by broader patronage links in these countries. This might also be as a result of the more flirtatious relationship between labour groups and political parties in Poland and Romania compared to Hungary. Still, an assessment of how effective these meetings have been was another question.

At the aggregate level, employers’ groups leave meetings with the ministerial personnel with more satisfaction than their labour counterparts. In Poland and in Hungary, groups converge on evaluating the effectiveness of their meetings with officials: somewhere in between ‘effective’ and ‘somewhat ineffective’. Romanian interest groups, on the other hand, state that they have a more co-operative relationship with officials at ministry levels. Their level of contentment with these meetings is between ‘somewhat effective’ and ‘effective’. Groups from the labour sector evaluate these meetings as more ineffective than their employer counterparts. In Hungary, the level of satisfaction with these meetings is the lowest. Table V.7 displays answers to the question on the effectiveness of these meetings in making ministries listen to organisations’ views at the aggregate level.

[Table V.7 about here]

Hence, the story goes that in Hungary not every interest group could meet with ministerial officials and when they met the results were not effective. In Poland, only
those groups with better established personal links could meet with ministerial officials, yet the result was still not very effective. In Romania, on the other hand, certain groups could meet with ministerial officials and they evaluated these meetings as effective.

Overall, it appears that interest groups lack sufficient means to place an impact on the conduct of policy-making due to the dominance of the political elite in this sphere. This dominance not only deters civil society from representing the interests of their constituencies in policy-making, but also leaves the formal structures of policy-making in the abstract. These findings are broadly in line with my hypotheses I and II. It is also interesting to see groups still complaining about the effects of systemic transformation more than a decade after the regime change. Yet, it seems as if especially the trade unions are facing grave consequences, and they still need to learn how to lobby at the governmental level to have a say on the conduct of policy rather than exposing themselves to the influences of political parties at any cost. In order to correct the misconduct in the regime of policy-making in Hungary, Poland and Romania, we need to have both a strong state and strong civil society to co-operate towards collaborative policy-making processes.

227 President, KDSZSZ, Transportation Workers’ Trade Union Federation, Hungary; President, SZTDSZ, Welfare Workers’ Trade Union, Hungary; Vice-president, Solidarność Trade Union Confederation Transportation Workers’ Branch, Poland.
V.2.b. An Evaluation of Internal Decision-Making within Interest Groups from a Participatory Point of View:

Hypothesis III: Resort to elitism and hierarchical decision-making structures during internal decision-making will be common features of interest groups.

Quite related to internal democracy within interest organisations is how and whether interest groups incorporate their members into internal decision-making and give them information regarding governmental policy proposals. The interviews showed that almost all groups under study contacted their members on policy proposals. Most common routes were through conferences or executive committee meetings. From the perspective of democratically operating organisations, everything looked as expected on the surface. Nevertheless, answers to further questions illustrated that conferences did not happen very frequently nor lasted long. In nearly all groups interviewed, conferences took place every four or five years and lasted only a few days. In the interviews, executive committee and presidium meetings were also mentioned as other possible routes of involving members in internal decision-making. Yet, my reading of the internal statutes of interest organisations demonstrated that secondary decision-making bodies were extremely self-contained and oligarchic (Korkut 2002a). Even detailed accounts of proceedings were unlikely to be published, although decisions were briefly mentioned in the union press. Hence, incorporating members into internal decision-making through conferences seemingly does not go much beyond a symbolic attempt.

The next step was to inquire about the interest groups’ levels of autonomy from and dependency on their members, and the levels of hierarchy in internal decision-making in Hungarian, Polish and Romanian interest groups.
All three countries present similarly hierarchical interest group structures. Nevertheless, the Hungarian and Romanian respondents maintained relatively higher levels of dependence on their members than their Polish counterparts.

The following was an enquiry on whether presidents were elected and how many candidates ran in the elections for presidency. The presidents of all groups under study were elected through secret voting procedures, with the exception of five Romanian organisations. In the bulk of these organisations, however, the elections were one-candidate elections with an overt tendency to re-elect the incumbent president. It also appeared that there were different types of bodies to elect presidents: conferences, presidium or executive committee meetings. Some respondents stated that there was a general preference for low numbers of candidates for presidency due to the inclinations and attempts towards limiting pluralism within their organisations. Therefore, elections for presidential posts were mainly symbolic and fell short of serving as concrete aspects of internal democracy and accountability.

The questionnaire also presented a series of statements to the respondents to elaborate on some of their statements on participation. Table V.11 and Graph V.I presents an

228 Vice-president, VOSZ National Association of Entrepreneurs and Employers, Hungary; Manager president, KISOSZ National Federation of Traders and Caterers, Hungary.
evaluation and comparison of those statements, related to the participation in internal decision-making. The statements are classified as follows:

[Table V. 10 about here]

[Table V. 11 about here]

[Graph V. 1 about here]

The table above, first and foremost, illustrates that ‘mean calculations’ on statements related to participation are extremely close to each other both across the three countries and within each country. Graph V.1 illustrates this very close distribution of mean scores. We can also see that respondents agreed with almost all statements, considering that in a scale from 1 to 7 almost all mean calculations are higher than 3.50. The only two marginal variants were the ‘pro-elite individualist hierarchy seeker’ option in Hungary and the ‘extreme pro-democracy egalitarian’ option in Poland. Therefore, it is possible to talk about ‘acquiescence effect’: agreeing with all statements related to participation, regardless of their negative or positive content. We can possibly infer that terms related to participation are somewhat abstract in the minds of the respondents. Still, on the basis of mean calculations on different statements, I have the following insight.

In Hungarian interest groups, pro-democrats/extreme pro-democrats and egalitarians types were more common. This suggests that the Hungarian respondents have a more visible tendency to agree with opening decision-making procedures to members. For the Polish respondents, however, there is a big difference between extreme and pro-democrats. Respondents think that members can be allowed to take part in decision-

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229 I owe an earlier version of this classification to Eero Olli.
230 I owe this analysis to Gunnar Grendstad.
making only in certain cases. The Romanian picture is quite similar to the Hungarian picture. There is not a big difference between the extreme pro-democrats and pro-democrats. On the other hand, egalitarianism is more appreciated by the Hungarian respondents. In Poland and Romania, however, hierarchy seekers are more predominant. Still, in Poland and Romania three out of the four highest mean scores, and two in Hungary went to either pro-elite or pro-expert individualist hierarchy seeker statements. Therefore, it is plausible to say that there also is a visible inclination among the respondents to limit participation into internal decision-making.

When factors affecting the success of an interest group are evaluated, however, elitist tendencies become more overt. Following table V. 12 are the country evaluations on these factors.231

[Table V. 12 about here]

In all countries under study, ‘skilled leadership’ is mentioned as the most important factor for the success of an interest group232. ‘Skilled leadership’ received the highest mean score in Poland, followed by Romania and Hungary. This especially is a contrast to the civil society traditions in Poland, where the KOR and Solidarity movements presented the only cases in Eastern Europe where elite and mass co-operation could bring organisational success. Plausibly, in Poland in particular, the explanation for this overt

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231 This question presented following factors to the respondent: skilled leadership, number of members, financial resources, involving many experts into decision-making, establishing umbrella organisations, hierarchical decision-making structures, personal links between the ministeries and the interest groups, dependence to political parties in opposition.

232 Among the labour groups, 11 out of 18 in Hungary, 5 out of 7 in Poland, and 10 out of 12 in Romania stated that ‘skilled leadership’ is very important for the success of an interest group.
preference for elitism can be a direct result of ‘adaptation through opposition’, which I accounted in the previous chapters\textsuperscript{233}.

Another sign of pro-elitism is the ranks appropriated to ‘involving many experts in internal decision-making’ for the success of an interest group. This is certainly very important for the Romanian respondents, followed by the Hungarian and the Polish. As such, quality is mentioned more often than quantity by interest groups in affecting success. The vice-president of the BNS Trade Union Confederation from Romania, in this respect, went as far as to suggest that his trade union would not even need members as long as there were skilled presidents. The lack of appreciation for number of members in interest groups is quite concerning given the fast decrease in their membership figures (especially of trade unions) since the regime change in East-Central Europe. Yet, in accordance with the egalitarian answers above in Hungary, the number of members has been stated as an important factor right after skilled leadership. Despite respondents’ hierarchical description of their organisations, hierarchical decision-making structures did not attract high scores for the success of an interest group.

In this context, the Table V. 13 illustrates how the responses on what affects the development of interest representation in Hungary, Poland and Romania.

[Table V. 13 about here]

To present an interim summary, the Hungarian interest groups present a slightly more pro-democratic and egalitarian interest group structure in comparison to the other two countries. They also argued that number of members is an important factor – still after

\textsuperscript{233} See esp. p. 64.
skilled leadership – for the success of an interest group. Nevertheless, they do not have as high consideration for member participation in interest group activities in effect to the development of interest representation in their country. On the other hand, Polish respondents argued skilled leadership as an important factor for the success of an interest group and presented a rather weak pro-democratic attitude relative to the Hungarian and Romanian respondents. However, they give member participation in interest group activities for the development of interest representation higher ranks than Hungarian respondents. An inclination for expertise in internal decision-making and pro-expert tendencies have also been apparent in Romania. In this last question, Romanians rated experts in the third place for development of interest representation in their country. This is the highest among all three countries.

- Symbolic or Concrete: What is the Extent of Internal Democracy in Civil Society Organisations in Hungary, Poland and Romania?

In general, internal decision-making seems to rest on three major and three minor pillars in organisations. Major pillars are the conferences, the president and the secondary decision-making organs. Experts, local branches and ordinary members are the minor pillars of internal decision-making. ‘Members’ category covers ordinary members, federations, branch, professional and representations, depending on the group under

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234 What I mean by conferences is general assemblies or general congresses of interest groups. Notice that, interest groups tend to differentiate between congresses and conferences, as the former happens in between two conferences.

235 These are as follows: Operational board, board of directors, national council, steering committee, college of directors, confederal committee, coordination committee, management council, general committee of directors, managerial college, senate, general assembly, presidium, grand presidium, main board, syndical council, collective of co/presidents, confederation board, council of affiliates. All secondary organs have been re-grouped under the executive committee in the statistical calculations and interpretations.
study. Table V.14 presents interviewees’ evaluations on the effects of various internal decision-making channels.

If we are to expect ‘conferences’ as the most democratic means of decision-making, then the Hungarian and Romanian interest groups appear to be democratic, more so than their Polish counterparts. Yet as I argued above, conferences happened quite infrequently in interest groups and decision-making rested on some unaccountable secondary decision-making bodies almost all the time. Local branches, experts and ordinary members do not appear to be effective in internal decision-making as Table V.14 suggests. Nevertheless, many respondents asserted that local branches and ordinary members were already included in internal decision-making through conferences. Concerning decision-making procedures at the local levels, some respondents state that local branches have the highest rank. As we look at the internal decision-making structures, however, it appears that local branches are heavily affected by the decisions of central authorities. Be that as it may, local branches, ordinary members or federations can barely establish a limited influence. Moreover, their influence is rather indirect: only through sending delegates to local and national conferences. Yet, quite often, these delegates do not even elect members of main decision-making bodies236.

The informal talks, however, demonstrate what the respondents thought in concrete – rather than symbolically – regarding the aspects of members’ rights and roles in internal group decision-making procedures. It appeared that in the formal questionnaire,
respondents sometimes paid lip service and did not say much beyond the abstract. Some respondents, for example, first praised the need for involving members in internal decision-making while immediately establishing limits. Or else they argued that, in theory, interest groups should provide their members with opportunities, but this did not mean that they should give them the right to decide on practical terms. One respondent expressed the view that only the smallest number of decision takers is needed in internal decision-making in order to avoid controversy. As the talks continued, the difference between the abstract and concrete aspects of internal democracy in the minds of the respondents became much clearer.

Answering the questionnaire, some Hungarian respondents first ranked conferences as the most crucial mechanism of internal decision-making and put presidents or the secondary bodies after the conferences in terms of their effects. Nevertheless, during the informal talks following the questionnaire, the same respondents showed an elitist attitude towards internal decision-making with an entrenched belief in sustaining vertical bonds of dependency regarding their relations with members. In the words of one of the members of the Council of Presidents of MOSZ, it was ‘the role of the elites to direct ordinary members towards real interest. Elites can provide members with opportunities,

236 Internal decision-making statutes give a detailed account on the roles and duties of these organs. Please consult web addresses listed in the bibliography to access these internal statutes. Also see Korkut (2002a) for a more detailed discussion.

237 Head of General Office, MSZOSZ, Confederations of Hungarian Trade Unions, Hungary.

238 President, Solidarność Transportation Workers’ Secretariat, Poland.

239 President, SZTDSZ Welfare Workers’ Trade Union, Hungary; President, LIGA Trade Union of Iron and Metal Industry, Hungary; Manager President, KISOSZ, National Federation of Traders and Caterers, Hungary; Head of General Office, MSZOSZ, Confederations of Hungarian Trade Unions, Hungary; President, KASZ, Union of Commercial Employees, Hungary; Member of the Council of Presidents, MOSZ, National Federation of Agricultural Co-operators and Producers, Hungary; Secretary General,
but this did not mean that [they] should give the members the right to decide’. The President of VASAS, Federation of Hungarian Metal Workers emphasised that the tactical procedures of their union should be exclusive for the presidency.

The importance of presidency regarding decision-making was a repeating theme. The president of the OPZZ Miners’ Trade Union Federation from Poland and the manager president of the KISOSZ from Hungary also emphasised the predominant role of the presidency in internal decision-making, in contrast to their earlier answers to the questionnaire. The president of Agro-Fraţia from Romania joined the circle by arguing that ‘presidents did not have to consult anyone in terms of internal decision-making’. This role attributed to the presidents went as far as ‘deciding about the true intentions of members’ in the words of the International Affairs representative of VDSZSZ, the Free Trade Union of Railway Workers, from Hungary. It seemed as if the avant-garde role of the elite to lead the ordinary citizens, as it used to be under communism, was still quite entrenched in the minds of the respondents. One more thing that these respondents had in common was their assessment of the conferences as the most important internal decision-making organ in the formal questionnaire. This leads one to believe that there is quite a gap between the symbolic accounts of internal decision-making versus the concrete. This attitude is quite clear in the words of the Vice-president of VOSZ.

Members are always invited to talk about common problems, but members cannot take part in everyday decisions. We have open elections to discourage people from running. In any case, why Kis János is better than Nagy János. We do not want opposition or too many quarrels. translated from Hungarian

ÉSZT, Confederation Unions of Professionals, Hungary; President, VASAS Federation of Hungarian Metal Workers, Hungary.
Interestingly enough, he still ranked conferences as the most crucial mechanism of internal decision-making and responded that the elections for the presidential post were through secret voting in the formal questionnaire. Despite all the praise for presidents, perhaps it was true for one respondent 240 to say that ‘presidents seemed to be stuck at their positions and hence not easily removable in Hungary, despite all the disappointment with the civil sector’.

Two last examples are from Romania regarding the almost predetermined role of presidents in their organisations. Notice that the first respondent can only develop his arguments on participation of members while implicitly emphasising the role of the president, while the second respondent cannot clearly present that her organisation has internal democracy without mentioning the dominant role for the president.

Conference of the federation is just like revolutionary mass. It is the general meeting of the electors. Each elector elects some Cartel-Sprenza member. To identify with the trade union, this is very important. Voting makes people members of the trade union in their minds. In our decision-making, affiliated trade union leaders are also very important. Presidents on the other hand do not have a right to vote. If I were to decide, I would have gone for electing presidents not only through 16 federations, but also through everyone active at the factory level. There are two types of president. One is the leader and the other is the conducător 241. The conducător is the representative of the workers. And the leader shapes the membership demands. Vice-president, BNS Trade Union Confederation and President, Cartel Sprenza Metal Workers’ Union, Romania 242. translated from Romanian

Everyone is in a position to propose something. Conference makes the final decisions. You cannot do without permanent connections between the members and the leadership. Succursales 243 can make decisions concerning their own fields. If anything more, they control central bodies. Within the

240 The respondent did not want his name to be quoted.
241 Notice that he refers to the president of his trade union with the same word that Ceaușescu identified himself with.
242 The respondent did not give any ranks for decision-making components.
243 Local organisations in Romanian.
organisation, we expect everyone to voice his or her interests. This would increase our credibility. Still, our statute says that presidents can take certain decisions only by themselves. Vice-President, Nutricomb Agricultural Producers’ Organisation, Romania.\textsuperscript{244} \textit{translated from Romanian}

These views on decision-making to be carried out by the presidents or the secondary bodies of organisations can be attributable, to the charisma or expertise, which these bodies possessed\textsuperscript{245}. The President NSZZ RI Solidarność The Independent Autonomous Trade Unions of Individual Farmers from Poland argued that, ‘at the central level, members were better informed and with better expertise. Also they had better links with ministries, governments and parliament. That was why decisions should reside at the central levels’. The Head of General Office from MSZOSZ also presented a similar stance regarding this issue. Another group of respondents from Poland stated that the number of participants in internal decision-making should be limited to those with resources\textsuperscript{246}. The crudest example of this attitude went as follows:

We have currently 250-500 people in the \textit{zjazd}\textsuperscript{247}. That is the main decision-making body. But we would like to decrease this number to 32 in order to make it more efficient Chief Director, Association of Chambers of Agriculture, Poland. \textit{translated from Polish}

On political terms, it would be very difficult if all members were contacted. Even at \textit{zjazd}, policy proposals are discussed in smaller groups, President, NSZZ RI Solidarność The Independent Autonomous Trade Unions of Individual Farmers, Poland. \textit{translated from Polish}

To conclude, despite some symbolic attempts at inclusion, internal decision-making channels are closed to members. The informal interviews especially showed the

\textsuperscript{244} The respondent ranked conferences as the first decision-making component and she put president at the second place in her rank.

\textsuperscript{245} Vice-president, Cartel-Alfa Trade Union Confederation, Romania.

\textsuperscript{246} President and Vice-president, Gdańsk Employers’ Association, Poland; President, Association of Chambers of Agriculture, Poland.

\textsuperscript{247} Polish word for conference
importance of elite networks in determining internal decision-making of organisations. Therefore, member participation does not happen in practical terms, but stay only in the abstract theoretical level. In this context, the first conclusion is that interest organisations are run in a spirit of elitism and non-participatory hierarchical thinking. Civil society in the countries under study has not yet travelled far beyond the symbolic participation of the communist period.

Hence, one can see similarities to the communist period in these countries. As one respondent noted,

Mentalities do not change very fast, as long as the socio-economic situation is similar to that of communism. Hence, what we have is democratic feudalism. Feudals need vassals. That is why political parties approach us. Our leadership becomes the vassal and everybody in our organisation works for the vassal not for the general interest. Vice-president, CNSLR-Frația, Trade Union Confederation, Romania, translated from Romanian

There were some respondents, who attributed the elite dominance in decision-making to expertise. Although this is a legitimate argument, my discussion showed that the interest organisation elite used their cultural capital and leadership positions in order to further their long-term career projects. The extent of elite convergence showed a constant shift from the leadership of civil society organisations into politics. Nevertheless, those who joined political parties do not necessarily provide reciprocal benefits to their previous organisations. Hence, the second conclusion is that there are remarkable elite strata that beyond superficial agreement to democratic values are driven by career orientations. Similar to communism, there still are some elites who pretend to represent the citizenry while paving the way for embetterment of their own careers. Therefore, the general discussion in this section shows the plausibility of my third hypothesis.
Chapter VI: Tracing Links from the Period of Communism to the Period of Democratisation in (each of) Hungary, Poland and Romania

An Explanation for the Relationship between Democratisation and the Invigoration of Civil Society

This dissertation intends to demonstrate convergence between Hungary, Poland and Romania with respect to the invigoration of civil society under the democratisation period, despite historical country-specific structural differences. In order to illustrate this convergence, I have explored what lay underneath the formal structures, and thereby examined the prevalence of elitism and patron-client relationships in Hungary, Poland and Romania. Proposing a theoretical cross between individualising and universalising comparison (Tilly 1984, 81), I have identified the common properties of elitism and patron-client relationships in a single approach; and I conclude that, elite interactions are prevalent in all three cases at the expense of the formal structures, which remain abstract and secondary. This picture affects the relationship between democratisation and the invigoration of civil society and hinders the development of participation. That is how and why, the influence of democratisation on the invigoration of civil society is not significant.

In this respect, historical country-specific structures did not necessarily provide unidirectional trajectories towards subsequent political periods. Evidently, using country-specific structural legacies as the only compass for explaining the future was not a
productive methodology. Therefore, in structural terms, there are intrinsic dangers in assuming that the best indicator of a state’s future is its past (Braun 1999, 4). Social scientists must look beneath the formal structures and examine cognitive traditions to assess the effects of historical legacies. Cognitive traditions, as residuals, developed in the past, but remain active in the present cultural processes, not only (and often not at all) as elements of the past, but also as elements of the present (Williams 1977, 122). As this dissertation demonstrates, cognitive traditions and habits from the previous regimes – as certain experiences, meaning and values – are more durable than the effects of the formal structures. Therefore, historical legacies prove themselves important in so much as they frame the conduct of interactions.

My dissertation does not propose a broad uniformity between Poland, Hungary and Romania. There are obvious socio-economic differences between these countries, which various numbers and indices reveal. However, this dissertation does argue that the common elements of these three countries, with respect to the relationship between democratisation and the invigoration of civil society, were more influential than the individual characteristic. Likewise, I do not attempt to question the comparative success of democracies in these three countries. Quantitative studies of this issue are abundant in political science literature. The reduction of social realities to numbers, however, tends to be inexhaustive and subjective (Beetham 1994).

Complex multivariate causal patterns operate in the social world, such that a given outcome may occur because of the presence of more than one independent variable, may not occur at times because the influence of one independent variable is outweighed by other influences working in the opposite direction (Lieberson 1992, 106).
An important task of the social scientist, therefore, is to do the interpretive work that numbers cannot.

Thus, I have proposed a qualitative methodology towards understanding the complex nature of interactions between structures, elite groups, and occasionally the public in Hungary, Poland and Romania, in periods of communism, transition and democratisation. Here I find historical continuity in that, formal structures remain in abstract in all three countries, regardless of the period under study. Moreover, the predominance of informal interactions was the cause of this neglect of formal structures. Hence, arguably, the democratisation period did not create a participatory framework for the invigoration of civil society as one might otherwise expect.

Nevertheless, I do recognise the need for flexibility in my argument. A certain degree of randomness is inherent to research in political science, as it is to social life and scientific inquiry. One of the fundamental goals of inference is to distinguish the systematic component of the phenomena we study from the nonsystematic component. My objective has been to provide evidence that particular events or processes in Hungary, Poland and Romania are the result of commonly shared systematic forces (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994, 55-56, 60). In this respect, analysis of the interviews in the last chapter reveals that interviewees systematically selected certain meanings and practices for emphasis. Regarding the three case countries under study, I found the following systematic hindrances with respect to the invigoration of civil society:
Elite networks in the system predominated in the period under communism in Hungary. Once the impacts of the events of 1956 at the system level had subsided, the communist state sought to co-opt the intelligentsia into the system, at the expense of diluting communist ideology. Likewise, the communist state attempted to appease the public by developing an informal second-economy. The system ultimately bore many informalities underneath the formal structures. Regime change came about through elite settlement. The democratisation period again privileges informalities and old boys’ networks’ over formal structures. In this respect, my fieldwork demonstrates the discrepancy between answers to the formal questionnaire and informal responses to various questions, perhaps more clearly in Hungary than in any other case. The population might consider consulting existing institutions if the institutions exist in concrete, but elitism and patron-client relationships undermine the institutional participation. Institutionalisation as such, however, only guarantees a minimal civil society, and not necessarily one that will contribute to long-term democratic settlement through the formation of an active, participatory civic culture.

In Poland, on the other hand, mass-based dissidence gathered around charismatic leadership and its rejection of the communist state was the most important characteristic of the period under communism. A duality existed between micro- and macro-structures, each composed of prominent informal personal relations. In the aftermath of the regime change the previous micro-structure re-surfaced in Poland. Poland proved itself to be the case where informal links received the highest approval rates. Poland presents a new form of duality: polarisation and deep cleavages between the right and left wings of the

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246 See Williams (1977, 115-116)
political spectrum. Hence, belligerent confrontation between these two camps was still visible at the time of the interviews. What was unexpected in Poland, however, was embedded elitism. I would have expected that Solidarity organisations (at the very least) would present greater internal democracy, given their historical legacy. In spite of its charismatic leadership, however, Solidarity owed its success to the well-developed links between its ordinary members and leadership. My expectation thus proved to be false. Therefore, the dissident Solidarity, with well developed connections between ordinary citizens and elites was an historical exception, rather than the region’s future.

The last case country, Romania was structurally unique under communism. The country had unstable networks of opposition, as a result of the lack of connections between the dissident intelligentsia and the citizenry (and the resulting resignation of its population). The communist state dominated until its removal by a mass uprising, just as informal ties were transforming into group solidarities. The communist legacy in Romania – perhaps much stronger than the other two cases – is patrimonialistic. Despite prior disappointments, the present civil society still feels that unless it establishes patron-client links with political parties, it cannot possibly represent the interests of its constituencies. These links, nevertheless, are unreliable. It is significant that the Romanian picture, especially in the aftermath of 1996, is comparable to the Hungarian and Polish situations, with visibly similar forms of elitism and patron-client linkages.

Therefore, the widespread recourse to elitism and patron-client linkages leaves formal structures in abstract once again, and hinders the capacity of democratisation to
invigorate civil society. Likewise, the propensity of all groups towards oligarchy means that these groups do not necessarily represent those whom they purport to represent. This outcome has a crucial impact on the quality of democracy in the countries under study. Let me clearly state that this dissertation is in no way an endeavour to contest the importance of the development of democracy in post-communist Europe, but rather it is an attempt to explain the development of democratic qualities in a broad perspective. This attempt assumes that ‘many East-Central European countries already achieved consolidation and so now it is time to look at the qualities of democracies’ (Karl and Schmitter 2002, 11, 26). In this sense,

The analysis of democratic regimes should, therefore, enlarge the restricted definition of democracy offered by transitology and should include the aspects of relations between the governments and the governed, who are generally ignored, through an establishment of civil control and the creation of a system of collective negotiations among social partners (Guilhot and Schmitter 2000, 628) translated from French.

At the beginning of the 1990s, the opening of the process of democratisation signified a change in the political opportunity structure for civil society organisations with greater legitimacy and greater resources. However, as I have illustrated, the expansion of political society corroded the civil society. The political parties within the democratising state, in a manner of speaking, colonised civil society as a strategy of governance or co-optation. The evaporation of civil society organisations, especially in Poland, after the transition is not part of the normal pattern of democratic politics; rather it implies that the current democracy is thin in quality (Grugel 2002, 113-114). The politicians of the democratisation period are partly responsible for that effect. For the new professional politicians, keeping channels of communication open with groups outside the parties and parliaments violated their narrow conception of democracy, or appeared to be a luxury.
Yet the importance I attribute to civil society is not an attack on state sovereignty. Like the state, civil society also has the potential to become authoritarian. Either version of authoritarianism might hinder the ability of large portions of the citizenry to participate in the democratic process. In this respect, I have suggested how and why the relationship between the state and the civil society must be balanced. The relationship between civil society and the state should neither threaten state autonomy nor neglect the civil sector during policy-making. In my understanding, the state occupies an important position in providing and maintaining this balance. Hence, the expansion of political participation must be accompanied by the development of stronger, more complex, and more autonomous political institutions.

Nevertheless, the reality in Hungary, Poland and Romania differs from the ideal collaboration that I envisioned in Chapter I. It appears that civil society organisations cannot defend their autonomy, but depend on their political parties for strength. This dependence is more visible in Poland and Romania, than it is in Hungary. However, the interview results demonstrated that neither close alliance with parties nor distance from politics brings success to interest groups. Clearly, state and civil society strength have not developed simultaneously in any of the countries under study.

State and civil society togetherness, on the other hand, is largely the prerogative of the political party in power. Due to the prevalence of patron-client links, institutions do not guarantee impartiality; the party in power, collaborating with its client in civil society, can act at the expense of those excluded from the power circles. In such a scenario one
cannot speak of a comprehensive state and civil society relationship. Preferential
treatment is common Poland, Hungary and Romania and as long as these inequalities
persist, participation is hindered and resource distribution is biased. With respect to this
process, I have drawn attention to the *parentela* type of relationships visible in Southern
Europe. This similarity is plausibly due to Poland’s, Hungary’s, and Romania’s common
authoritarian, patrimonial historical legacy, as well as to the socio-political similarities of
East-Central and Southern Europe. Still, further research is necessary to explain these
apparent similarities.

The objective of this dissertation is not to examine the conditions under which
institutionalisation would support the invigoration of civil society. This is an issue of
medium- and long-term developments in East-Central Europe. This dissertation,
however, does illustrate that formal structures are not yet appropriately important in
Hungary, Poland and Romania. In the interest of the invigoration of civil society,
however, I emphasise that the institutionalisation of participation is necessary to both
policy-making and the member participation in internal decision-making of civil society
organisations. Granted the relational character of institutions – that is the process by
which a given institutional configuration shapes interactions – is more important than the
formal characteristics of these institutions (Thelen and Steinmo 1992, 6); but so long as
continuous interactions between institutions and the people increase the latter’s political
efficacy, it is possible to account for an institutional effect.
In this respect, I do not present any examples for Hungary, Poland and Romania to follow in improving the participatory quality of their respective democracies. Neither do I suggest that participation is inherently weak or strong in comparison to any given region. Institutions and the environments within which they survive are mutually dependent. Greater democracy in the external environment will instil greater democracy in institutions and, as expected, greater democracy in institutions will encourage greater democracy in the political system (Hartman and Lau, 1980). As this dissertation has demonstrated, the political and social environments of Hungary, Poland and Romania – at the moment – do not support participatory environments. However, improvements in environments will follow the emergence of concrete participatory institutions in East-Central Europe. As an example, already the resolutions of the 5th Congress of MSZOSZ drew a more participatory and transparent framework for this organisation’s internal decision making to tackle the challenges of Hungary’s accession to the European Union.\textsuperscript{249}

Historical institutionalism begins with the assumption that institutions are never constructed entirely from scratch. Successor institutions bear the stamp of their collapsed predecessors, partly because they are reconstituted from the fragments of those predecessors (Thelen and Steinmo 1992, 15). We may approach the forms of policy-making and organisational internal decision-making in Hungary, Poland and Romania from this perspective, and assume that lack of participation in these structures is due to the effect of the legacies of earlier institutional models in the region. It is nevertheless strikingly different from the period under communism, that, this time (with the transition

\textsuperscript{249} See 5th MSZOSZ Congress resolutions in 22-23 November 2002
to democracy), formal institutions are legitimate in Hungary, Poland and Romania. I assume, in the introduction to my dissertation, that the legitimacy of institutions will permeate institutional effect into mass behaviour. Despite wide public acceptance of new formal structures as the legitimate forms of policy-making and interest representation, however, individual interactions may still ignore these structures. The political context, as a result, does not become participatory solely through the legitimacy of formal institutions.

This dissertation demonstrates that a major obstacle to public participation: cognitive traditions. Although state socialist institutions clearly failed to create the ‘socialist man or woman’, they have generated a state of mind, a set of expectations, and assumptions that prove inimical to the growth of democratic and civil institutions. The undemocratic context and institutional structures nurtured these cognitive traditions under communism even in Hungary and Poland. In postcommunist environments, these cognitive traditions may tempt societal actors to confront new situations in old, familiar ways260.

With the transition to democracy, both the context and institutions in Hungary, Poland and Romania are formally democratic, but the mode of interaction remains undemocratic. Therefore, the mode of interaction hinders the capacity of the context and institutions to develop participation beyond formal democracy. Poor routes of participation in the political context and in formal institutions, in return, cannot guarantee democratic mode of interaction. The solution to this ‘chicken and egg’ problem is, I would argue, to generate greater public participation into the system. In this case only, the context, the
form of interactions, and the formal institutions would all be compatible; and in time new
cognitive traditions and a new *habitus* may result. Thus, democratisation may gradually
help to invigorate civil society.

Patterns of participation establish political norms and organisational structures. The more
balanced the power relations in the operation of these organisational structures, the more
actors will abide by a larger variety of channels of social participation and self-protection
(Arató 1999, 239 and 2000, 73). A democratic civil society, in this respect, presupposes
long-term cultural developments that cannot be designed. But institutional design may
help to promote an opportunity structure for forms of activity that positively influences
cultural development itself (Arató 1999, 244). Any institutional order, after all, develops,
persists, and changes through a process of continuous interaction, negotiation and
struggle between its participants (Eisenstadt and Roniger 1981, 274).

This dissertation opposes the argument that, ‘with the right institutions in place, there are
no barriers to the development of a Western-style democracy and market society’ (Eyal,
Szelényi, and Townsley 1998, 38). Institutions cannot be transplanted, and the basic fact
‘humans learn and adapt, are rational and evolve’ does not preclude the fact of tradition
or guarantee that evolutionary change will be rational (Eyal, Szelényi, and Townsley
1998, 38). It is possible that citizens will become accustomed to new institutions,
develop a sense of loyalty, and adopt cognitive expectations, but this possibly does not
imply an administrative production of meaning. Institutions establish an order that is

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250 See Eyal, Szelényi, and Townsley (1998, 41) for a detailed discussion.
always potentially contested, tolerated, supported or enforced by external actors (Offe 1995, 47-48, 50).

A distinctive and comparative feature of any dominant social order, in this respect, is the extent of its reach in the range of practices and experiences. Formations, as effective movements and tendencies, also have a significant (and sometimes decisive) influence on the active development of a culture (Williams 1977, 117, 118, 125). The cultural formations of postcommunism, therefore, must be explored for their potential contribution to the production of ‘new meanings and value, new practices, new relationships and kinds of relationships’ (Kennedy 2002, 117-118). That is, they may contribute to the production of a new *habitus*. Although it is correct to say that, at least in part, ‘transition’ and ‘post-communism’ refer to the past, both are also forward-looking and, thus involve the past, the present, and the future. In my dissertation, I do not contend that the past may forecast or the present predetermine the future, but rather that influences and interplay among the three may help explain the problems, prospects, and choices for the future impact of democratisation on the invigoration of civil society.
# Tables

## Preface:

Table Pre.1. Types of State, Types of Dissidence, The Extent of Adaptation and Types of Transition/Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of Communist State</th>
<th>Types of Dissidence</th>
<th>The Extent of Societal Adaptation to the Communist Regime</th>
<th>Types of Transition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Poland**               | -Low infiltration into the society  
                           -Ideologically discriminating  
                           -Unsuccessful in intellectual co-optation  
                           -Sporadic reform attempts  
                           -No active communist softliners | -Mass-based dissidence around a charismatic leader  
                           -Total rejection of the communist state  
                           -Able to create an alternative sphere out of the control of the communist state | -Prevalent personal relations and informal links at the societal (micro) level  
                           -Redundant communist state institutions (macro) | Gradual |
| **Hungary**              | -Low infiltration into the society  
                           -Ideologically compromising  
                           -Successful intellectual co-optation  
                           -Gradual reform attempts 1968 onwards  
                           -Active communist softliners | -Networks of individual dissidents without formal mass organisations  
                           -Compromising with the communist state  
                           -Able to expand the reformist niche in the system with momentary alliances with the softliners | -Developed informal relations both within close elite networks and within second economy (micro)  
                           -Formal elite based pluralism at the system level (macro) | Gradual |
| **Romania**              | -Comprehensive infiltration into the society  
                           -Ideologically discriminating  
                           -Successful intellectual co-optation  
                           -Very rare reform attempts  
                           -No softliners | -Very unstable networks,  
                           -Mass unrest in cycles  
                           -Able to transform the informal ties into group solidarities only towards the end of the regime | -Atomised personal relations at the societal (micro) level  
                           -Extreme uses of patronage at the system (macro) level. | Revolution |
Chapter I:

Table I. 1. Summary of Possible Approaches To the Roles of State and Civil Society in Policy-making

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Approach</th>
<th>Main Idea</th>
<th>Strength</th>
<th>Weakness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Society Centred/Pluralist</td>
<td>Advocates building networks of organisations and representation across the state to distribute state responsibility to an active and empowered civic sector</td>
<td>Emphasises the importance of non-state actors</td>
<td>Neglects the importance of the state as a policy actor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Centred</td>
<td>Advocates autonomy in policy-making through bureaucratic elitism and control</td>
<td>‘Brings the state back in’</td>
<td>Excessively pre-occupied with state autonomy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporatist</td>
<td>Argues that the demands of multiple interest groups may undermine the autonomy of the state</td>
<td>Emphasises the importance of state autonomy in policy making</td>
<td>Hierarchical Elitist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neo-Marxist</td>
<td>Disputes the assumption that all groups will have equal opportunity to participate in policy-making, because the distribution of resources to groups in capitalist systems will be unequal</td>
<td>Recognises the possible inequality of resource distribution</td>
<td>Demands state intervention to prevent individual group dominance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clientela</td>
<td>Denotes a privileged legitimacy between a national administration and a single group, rather than the categorical legitimacy of all groups in a given social sector</td>
<td>Symbiotic form of interdependence between the national administration and the ‘legitimate’ group</td>
<td>Preferential treatment of one group over the others in a given social sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parentela</td>
<td>Denotes an exceptional relationship between a political party and an interest group</td>
<td>Members of the selected interest organisation enjoy special privileges</td>
<td>Low institutionalisation of policy-making and extensive use of patron-client networks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist</td>
<td>Interwoven relationship between the communist party, the state and non-state actors at the expense of the independence of the latter two actors</td>
<td>Little official dissent</td>
<td>Strict hierarchy Secretrieve Extensive Patronage Treatment of non-state actors as ‘transmission belts’ Formal elite-based pluralism</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Chapter II:

Table II.1. The Effects of Different Types of State and Societal Adaptation, and Forms of Dissidence/Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Oppositions’ reliance on mass participation</th>
<th>Organisational structure of opposition</th>
<th>Attitudes of the population towards the communist state</th>
<th>Configuration of the public sphere</th>
<th>Determinant of the success of opposition</th>
<th>Opening Trends</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>Numerous</td>
<td>Mass-based dissidence around a charismatic leader</td>
<td>Rejection</td>
<td>Prevalent personal relations and informal links, redundant communist state institutions</td>
<td>Ability to create an alternative sphere out of the control of the communist state</td>
<td>Cyclically gradual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>To a small extent</td>
<td>Networks of individuals without formal organisation</td>
<td>Compromising</td>
<td>Informal relations developed within close elite networks, alongside formal elite based pluralism</td>
<td>Ability to expand the niche in the system with momentary alliances with the softliners</td>
<td>Gradual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>Cyclical and Sporadic</td>
<td>Very unstable networks</td>
<td>Resignation</td>
<td>Total dominance of the communist regime in the public sphere</td>
<td>Ability to transform the informal ties into group solidarities</td>
<td>Almost none</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table II.2. Similar Outcomes/Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Prevalence of Informalities vis-à-vis the institutionalisation of formal universal participatory mechanism of policy-making</th>
<th>Differences between procedures ‘in concrete’ and ‘in abstract’</th>
<th>Patrimonial and Elitist approach in both spheres of political and civil society</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>- Historical prevalence of clandestine and informality over formal structures</td>
<td>- Dual existence in two spheres under communism</td>
<td>- Adaptation through opposition to simple communist procedures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>- Prevalence of old boys’ networks and informal interactions under the cover of corporatist procedures</td>
<td>- Tradition of the second economy</td>
<td>- Historical elite dominance in the economic and political spheres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>- Very strong legacy of patron-client links under Ceauşescu’s patrimonialism</td>
<td>- Suppressed micro sphere under communism through paper tiger institutions of communism</td>
<td>- Dominant elitist and weak participatory traditions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter IV:

Table IV.1. Hypotheses towards the Democratisation Period in Hungary, Poland and Romania

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Autonomy of Civil Society Organisations</th>
<th>The autonomy of interest groups will be determined predominantly by personal links, leaving respective policy-making structures in the abstract</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Forms of Policy-Making</td>
<td>All three countries will see dominance of political elite and informal channels in terms of policy-making</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal Configurations of Interest Groups</td>
<td>Resort to elitism and hierarchical decision-making structures during internal decision-making will be common features of interest groups.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter V:

Mean calculations on all ranks rest on the assumption that there are equal differences between each and every rank.

Table V. 1. The extent of elite convergence/Countries/Mean scores – Standard Deviation – Number of Respondents of agreement/disagreement with the statement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interest Groups are Important for the Recruitment of Future Political Leaders</th>
<th>In our Country it is Common to see Interest Groups Joining or Becoming Political Parties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>3.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>5.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>5.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N.B.1: 1 stands for strongly disagree and 7 stands for strongly agree

Table V. 2. Number of Interest Groups with Political Links/Countries/Total Number of Interviews

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of groups with open political links</th>
<th>Number of groups who had any member of its executive committee running in the elections</th>
<th>Total Number of Interviews</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

251 Answers to questions 16 and 18 are put in this category.
Table V. 3. Two Factors\textsuperscript{252} Affecting the Success of an Interest Group/Countries/Mean Score – Standard Deviations – Number of Respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Personal links between the Ministries and the Interest Groups</th>
<th>Closeness to Political Parties in Opposition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hungary</strong></td>
<td>5.04</td>
<td>5.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.94</td>
<td>2.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>24</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Poland</strong></td>
<td>3.00</td>
<td>5.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.86</td>
<td>1.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Romania</strong></td>
<td>4.05</td>
<td>5.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.12</td>
<td>1.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>22</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N.B. 1 is very influential while 8 is very uninfluential

Table V. 4. Interest Groups Evaluation of Channels to Reach Government/Countries/Mean Calculations – Standard Deviation – Number of Respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Institutional Channels of Interest Representation (if exist)</th>
<th>Personal Links between People Working in Ministries and Our 'Umbrella Organisation'</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hungary</strong></td>
<td>1.53</td>
<td>2.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>1.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Poland</strong></td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>1.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Romania</strong></td>
<td>1.95</td>
<td>1.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>20</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N.B. 1 is very influential while 4 is no influence

\textsuperscript{252} I presented my respondents with 8 factors in total. I, hereby, present those related with political links.
Table V. 5. Satisfaction with Government’s Approach Towards Interest Groups/Countries/Number of Respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Very Satisfied</th>
<th>Somewhat Satisfied</th>
<th>Satisfied</th>
<th>Somewhat Unsatisfied</th>
<th>Very Unsatisfied</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table V. 6. Comparison of the Effects of Interest Groups and Party Politicians in Policy-Making/Countries/Number of Respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Interest groups are a lot more influential than party politicians</th>
<th>Interest groups are more influential than party politicians</th>
<th>Party politicians and interest groups both have a similar influence</th>
<th>Party politicians are more influential than interest groups</th>
<th>Party politicians are a lot more influential than interest groups</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table V. 7. Levels of Effectiveness of the Meetings Between Interest Groups and Ministries/Number of Respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Very Effective</th>
<th>Somewhat Effective</th>
<th>Effective</th>
<th>Somewhat Ineffective</th>
<th>Very Ineffective</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table V. 8. Levels of Autonomy within Interest Groups/Countries/Number of Respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Very Autonomous</th>
<th>Autonomous</th>
<th>Somewhat Autonomous</th>
<th>Somewhat Dependent</th>
<th>Dependent</th>
<th>Very Dependent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hungary</strong></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Poland</strong></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Romania</strong></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table V. 9. Levels of Hierarchy within Interest Groups/Countries/Number of Respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Hierarchical</th>
<th>Somewhat Hierarchical</th>
<th>Somewhat Non-hierarchical</th>
<th>Non-hierarchical</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hungary</strong></td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Poland</strong></td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Romania</strong></td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table V. 10. Classification of Statements Related to Internal Decision-making

- **PRO-DEMOCRATIC EGALITARIAN**
  - *Internal decision making should be open to all the members when it comes to certain policies*

- **EXTREMELY PRO-DEMOCRATIC EGALITARIAN**
  - *Internal decision making should be open to all members on every question all the time*

- **PRO-EXPERT INDIVIDUALIST/HIERARCHY SEEKER**
  - *Internal decision making should be open to those members who have the greatest expertise on the issues in question*

- **PRO-ELITE HIERARCHY SEEKER**
  - *Internal decision making should be open to those members who make the most contribution to your organisation (time/money/voluntary work, etc.)*

- **PRO-HIERARCHY HIERARCHY SEEKER**
  - *An interest group works best if the decisions are institutionalised in central bodies other than subunits*

- **PRO-ELITE INDIVIDUALIST/HIERARCHY SEEKER**
  - *Enlarging participation in internal decision making hinders efficient decision making*
Table V. 11. Statements Related to Internal Decision-making/Countries/Mean Values – Standard Deviation - Number of Respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statements Related to Internal Decision-making</th>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Mean Values</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
<th>Number of Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Internal decision-making should be open to all the members when it comes to certain policies</td>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>5.62</td>
<td>1.83</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5.29</td>
<td>1.95</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4.75</td>
<td>2.20</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4.14</td>
<td>2.33</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3.50</td>
<td>1.79</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3.05</td>
<td>1.89</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>6.00</td>
<td>1.41</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2.77</td>
<td>1.92</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4.69</td>
<td>2.10</td>
<td>13</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5.17</td>
<td>2.04</td>
<td>12</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>2.70</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4.14</td>
<td>2.25</td>
<td>14</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>4.79</td>
<td>2.15</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5.13</td>
<td>1.94</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5.80</td>
<td>1.32</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4.79</td>
<td>1.93</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>5.00</td>
<td>1.76</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5.04</td>
<td>1.58</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N.B. 1 stands for strongly disagree and 7 stands for strongly agree</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table V. 12. Factors Affecting the Success of an Interest Group/Countries/Mean Scores – Standard Deviation – Number of Respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors Affecting the Success of an Interest Group</th>
<th>Countries</th>
<th>Mean Scores</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
<th>Number of Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Skilled Leadership</td>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>2.35</td>
<td>1.43</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2.43</td>
<td>1.98</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3.76</td>
<td>1.74</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4.90</td>
<td>2.08</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>1.67</td>
<td>1.57</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3.08</td>
<td>1.97</td>
<td>12</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4.89</td>
<td>1.60</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>2.03</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2.70</td>
<td>1.08</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4.19</td>
<td>1.85</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Note (1) 1 means strongly agree - 8 means strongly disagree</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

251
Table V. 13: Factors Affecting the Development of Interest Representation/Countries/Mean Scores – Standard Deviation – Number of Respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Governments and Ministries</th>
<th>Opposition parties</th>
<th>Member participation in interest group activities</th>
<th>Financial situation of interest groups</th>
<th>Patron-client types of relations</th>
<th>EU enlargement process</th>
<th>Regime change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hungary</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.29</td>
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<td><strong>Poland</strong></td>
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<td>3.50</td>
<td>4.07</td>
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<td>4.64</td>
<td>4.85</td>
<td>4.92</td>
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<tr>
<td>1.83</td>
<td>2.53</td>
<td>2.34</td>
<td>2.18</td>
<td>2.44</td>
<td>1.91</td>
<td>1.88</td>
</tr>
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<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Romania</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>4.08</td>
<td>3.43</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>4.86</td>
<td>4.54</td>
<td>5.10</td>
<td>6.35</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1.91</td>
<td>1.79</td>
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<td>24</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N.B. 1 stands for no influence and 7 stands for very influential

Table V. 14: List of Internal Decision-making Components/Countries/Mean Calculations – Standard Deviations of Ranks/Number of Respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conferences</th>
<th>Executive Committee</th>
<th>President</th>
<th>Local Branches</th>
<th>Experts</th>
<th>Ordinary Members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hungary</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.27</td>
<td>1.91</td>
<td>2.70</td>
<td>3.29</td>
<td>3.84</td>
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<td>.70</td>
<td>.95</td>
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<td>1.49</td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td>1.95</td>
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<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Poland</strong></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>2.00</td>
<td>1.53</td>
<td>1.77</td>
<td>3.88</td>
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<td>.64</td>
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<td>14</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Romania</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.39</td>
<td>1.90</td>
<td>2.41</td>
<td>3.45</td>
<td>3.59</td>
<td>4.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.94</td>
<td>.64</td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>1.21</td>
<td>1.06</td>
<td>1.16</td>
</tr>
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<td>23</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N.B. 1 stands for the maximum effect whereas 6 stands for minimum effect
Graphs

Chapter IV:

Graph IV. 1 – Development of Weak Institutionalisation of Policy-making in Hungary and Poland

Transition talks result → New Political Elite assumes a moral duty for change → ‘Our State’ takes hold → Personalisation of changes

↑

Elite Convergence

Prevalence of interactions as against institutionalisation of formal mechanisms of participatory policy-making

Provisionality

Weak Institutions

Patron-client type of relations
Graph IV. 2 - The effect of the First Period of Democracy in Romania on the Invigoration of Civil Society

Romanian Revolution → Neo-communist elite assumes power → Complete dominance of the political elite → No tolerance for civil society
Chapter V:

Graph V. 1- Mean Scores Each Classification Received in Hungary, Poland and Romania

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hungary</th>
<th>Poland</th>
<th>Romania</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>6.00 PRODEM/EGAL</td>
<td>5.80 PROEXP/HIES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.62 PRODEM/EGAL</td>
<td>5.04 PROELITE/HIES</td>
<td>5.13 EXTPRODEM/EGAL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.29 EXTPRODEM/EGAL</td>
<td>5.00 PROHIE/HIES</td>
<td>5.04 PROELITE/INDHIES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>4.79 PROELITE/HIES</td>
<td>4.79 PRODEM/EGAL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.75 PROEXP/INDHIES</td>
<td>4.14 PROELITE/INDHIES</td>
<td>4.79 PROELITE/HIES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.14 PROELITE/HIES</td>
<td>4.00 PROHIE/HIES</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.50 PROHIE/HIES</td>
<td>2.77 EXTPRODEM/EGAL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.05 PROELITE/INDHIES</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix I: List of Interviewees:

List of Interviewees from Interest Groups:

Romania:

-Ion Albu, Meridian Trade Union Confederation, President, (Bucharest, 27 April 2001).

-Câtâlin Andrei, UGIR 1903 Union of General Industrialists of Romania, Executive Manager, (Bucharest, 27 March 2001).


-Vasile Berinde, CNPR Patronatul National Confederation of Romanian Employers, Head of International Relations Department, (Bucharest, 26 March 2001).

-Răzvăn C. Bobulescu, Alma Mater University Trade Unions Federation of Romania, President, (Bucharest, 28 March 2001).

-Gheorghe Căpățână, BNS Trade Union Confederation, Vice-president, (Bucharest, 25 April 2001).

-Nicușor Mihai Ciobanu, Sprenza-BNS Metal Workers’ Industry, President and BNS Blocul National Sindical Trade Union Confederation, Vice-president, (Bucharest, 25 April 2001).

-Radu Colceag, FSLIA Agricultural Industrial Federation, President, (Bucharest, 26 March 2001).

-Marin Condescu, The National Confederation of Romanian Mining Workers, President, (Bucharest, 26 March 2001).

-Câtâlin Croitoru, FEN National Education Federation, Founding President, (Bucharest, 28 March 2001).

-Petru Sorin Dondea, Cartel-Alfa Trade Union Confederation, Vice-president, (Bucharest, 27 March 2001).

-Ioan Georgescu, Agro-Fraţia Trade Union for Food Industry, President, (Bucharest, 26 April 2001).

-Emilian Grasu, Fundaţia Casa Fermierului Agricultural Producers’ Association, President, (Bucharest, 26 April 2001).

- Mircea Ionescu, *AOAR The Businessmen’s Association of Romania*, Executive Director, (Bucharest, 26 March 2001).


- Vasile Lazăr, *ADER The Alliance for Economic Development in Romania*, Executive Secretary, (Bucharest, 26 April 2001).


- Stefan Mladen, *BÂNESĂ Airport Transportation Trade Union*, President, (Bucharest, 30 April 2001).


- Ion Pop, *Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Romania and Bucharest Municipality*, Director, (Bucharest, 28 March 2001).


- Gheorghe Simion, *CNSLR-Frația Trade Union Confederation*, International Relations Representative, (Bucharest, 29 March 2001).

Hungary:

-Antallfy Gábor, KISOSZ National Federation of Traders and Caterers, Manager President, (Budapest, 29 June 2001).

-Bánk Gábor, ÉSZT Confederation of Unions of Professionals, Secretary General, (Budapest, 19 July 2001).

-Benkő István, MSZOSZ National Confederation of Hungarian Trade Unions, Head of General Office, (Budapest, 9 April 2001).

-Bereczky András, Federation of Agricultural Workers, President, (Budapest, 20 March 2001).

-Borbáth Gábor, SZEFPDSZ Democratic Union of Pedagogists, President, (Budapest, 26 June 2001).

-Boros Terézia, MGYOSZ Confederation of Hungarian Employers and Industrialists, International Relations Representative, (Budapest, 28 June 2001).

-Filipsz László, MOSZ Hungarian National Federation of Agricultural Co-operators and Producers, Member of the Council of Presidents, (Budapest, 29 June 2001).

-Gecov Krisztina, Munkástanácsok Trade Union Confederation, International Relations Representative, (Budapest, 29 June 2001).

-Gergély Pál, Autonóm Trade Union Confederation, Senior Expert, (Budapest, 22 March 2001).

-Kajtárné Botár Borbála, MKSZSZ Hungarian Trade Union for Education and Vocational Training, President, (Budapest, 25 June 2001).

-Károlyi Miklós, VOSZ National Association of Entrepreneurs and Employers, Vice-president, (Budapest, 28 June 2001).

-Kerpen Gábor, LIGA PDSZ Democratic Union of Pedagogists, Member of the Governing Committee, (Budapest, 17 July 2001).

-Kollér Érika, LIGA Trade Union Confederation, Head of International Department, (Budapest, 19 March 2001).

-Kónya Gusztavné, STDSZ Welfare Workers Trade Union, President, (Budapest, 23 March 2001).

-Márkus Imre, Trade Union of Hungarian Railwaymen, President, (Budapest, 27 June 2001).


Poland:

-Czesław Bonisławski, KZR The National Union of Framers, Farmer Circles and Organisations, President, (Warsaw, 29 May 2001).

-Sławomir Broniarz, ZNP Scientific Workers’ Trade Union of Poland, President, (Warsaw, 21 May 2001).


-Wojciech Kaczmarek, OPZZ All-Poland Alliance of Trade Unions, Deputy President, (Warsaw, 29 May 2001).

-Urszula Karpińska, PKPP Polish Confederation of Private Employers, Deputy Director Foreign Department, (Warsaw, 22 May 2001).


-Stefan Kubowicz, Solidarność Education Branch, President and Solidarność Trade Union Confederation, Vice-president, (Gdansk, 28 May 2001).

-Henryk Latarnik, Solidarność Miners’ and Energy Workers’ Secretariat, Manager, (Katowice, 23 May 2001).

-Władysław Mucha, ZZG Trade Union of Coal Miners in Poland, Vice-president and OPZZ All-Poland Alliance of Trade Unions, Auditor of the Revision Commission, (Katowice, 23 May 2001).

-Mirosław Nowicki, Solidarność Food Workers’ Secretariat, Chairman, (Warsaw, 22 May 2001).


-Roman Wierzbicki, NSZZ RI Solidarność The Independent Autonomous Trade Union of Individual Farmers, President, (Warsaw, 22 May 2001).

-Stanisław Wittek, Association of Chambers of Agriculture, Chief Director, (Warsaw, 30 May 2001).

-Tadeusz Zawadzki, Solidarność - Transportation Workers’ Secretariat, Vice-president, (Warsaw, 22 May 2001).
List of Academicians, Civil Society Activists and Governmental Officers Interviewed:

-Zbigniew Bujak, (Warsaw, 26 April 2002).

-Henryk Domański, Polish Academy of Sciences, (Warsaw, 26 April 2002).

-József Feiler, Friends of the Earth, (Budapest, 23 June 2001).

-János Kende, MSZOSZ Trade Union Historian, (Budapest, 11 June 2002).

-Jadwiga Koralewicz, Polish Academy of Sciences, (Warsaw, 26 April 2002).

-Judit Lux, MSZOSZ Trade Union Historian, (Budapest, 22 June 2002).

-Sławomir Nałęcz, Polish Academy of Sciences, (Warsaw, 19 April 2002).

-Józef Niźnik, Polish Academy of Sciences, (Warsaw, 23 April 2002).

-Irena Pańków, Polish Academy of Sciences, (Warsaw, 22 April 2002).

-Włodzimierz Pańków, Polish Academy of Sciences, (Warsaw, 7 May 2002).

-Antal Panykó, Secretary of Social Dialogue, Prime Ministers’ Office, (Budapest, 12 July 2001).

-Włodzimierz Wesołowski, Polish Academy of Sciences, (Warsaw, 25 April 2002).
Appendix II: The Interview Questions

1. When was your organisation established?
2. If before the regime change, Are there any organisations, which your organisation was affiliated before the regime change? If yes, which?
3. Is your organisation part of an ‘umbrella organisation’?
4. In your sector, is membership to your organisation ‘mandatory’ or ‘optional’?
5. How many members does your interest organisation have?
   - 1-499
   - 500-1499
   - 1500-3499
   - 3500-
6. How much influence does the following have, on the development of interest representation in your country? (Please give a rate from 1-7. N.B. 1 is no influence while 7 is very influential)
   - Government and the apparatus of ministries
   - The opposition parties
   - Citizen participation in interest group activities
   - Financial situation of the interest groups
   - Patron-client type of relations between some political organisations and some interest groups
   - EU enlargement
   - Regime change
6a) Please state if there is any other important factor than these __________________
7. What determines government’s approach to interest groups?
8. How many weeks does it usually take to register an interest organisation in your country?
9. Can you please rank the following from 1 to 6 on the basis of their effect on decisions of your organisation?
   - Conference/General meeting of members or delegates
   - The Umbrella Group
   - The executive committee of your organisation
   - President of the organisation
• Local branches
• The experts of your organisation
• Ordinary members

10. Do you usually invite your members to discuss any government policy proposal?

10a. If yes, what are the most common ways?

11. How autonomous do you think are the decisions of your interest organisation from your members?

• Very autonomous
• Autonomous
• Somewhat autonomous
• Somewhat dependent
• Dependent
• Very dependent

12. Is the president of your interest group elected? If yes, how?

12a. How many candidates contested?

13. Please state on a scale from 1 to 7, to what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements (N.B. 1 stands for strongly disagree and 7 stands for strongly agree)

• Enlarging participation in internal decision making hinders efficient decision making
• Internal decision making should be open to all the members when it comes to certain policies
• Internal decision making should be open to those members who make the most contribution to your organisation (time/money/voluntary work, etc.)
• Internal decision making should be open to those members who have the greatest expertise on the issues in question
• Internal decision making should be open to all members on every question all the time
• Interest groups benefit their members financially
• Personal benefit usually overrides common benefit in interest groups
• An interest group works best if the decisions are institutionalised in central bodies other than subunits
• In our country it is common to see interest groups joining or becoming political parties
• Interest groups are important for the recruitment of future political leaders

14. Please rank the following from 1 to 8 on the basis of their importance for the success of an interest group
• Number of members
• Skilled leadership
• Personal links between the ministries and the interest groups
• Closeness to political parties in opposition
• Hierarchical decision making structures
• Involving many experts in decision making
• Financial resources
• Establishing umbrella organisations

15. Please tell me how would you describe decision making in your organisation
• Hierarchical
• Somewhat hierarchical
• Somewhat non-hierarchical
• Non-hierarchical

16. Do you have any members who hold a position in a ministry/parliament/government?
17. Does your organisation have an agreement on co-operation with a political party? (If yes, which one? Why?)
18. Has anyone from your executive body run in the last parliamentary elections?
19. Usually how sympathetic are the following parties to the position of your group? (please rank them)
[I presented a different party list for each country]
20. How much influence do interest organisations have over policy making compared to party politicians? Please choose the one applies
   1. interest groups are a lot more influential than party politicians
   2. interest groups are more influential than party politicians
   3. party politicians and interest groups both have a similar influence
   4. party politicians are more influential than interest groups
   5. party politicians are a lot more influential than interest groups
21. How satisfied are you with the current government’s attitude towards interest group participation in policy making in your country?
   - Very satisfied
   - Somewhat satisfied
   - Satisfied
   - Somewhat unsatisfied
   - Very unsatisfied

22. How important are the following to be able to talk to government officials about policy issues. (Please rank them from 1 (very influential) to 3 (no influence))
   - Personal links between people working in ministries and our organisation
   - Being a part of an ‘umbrella organisation’
   - The existence of institutionalised channels of interest representation

23. Did you ask for a meeting with an official at the ministry level last year? If yes, how many times?

23a. (if yes) How effective do you think, were these meetings in making government listen to your organisations’ views
   - Very effective
   - Somewhat effective
   - Effective
   - Somewhat ineffective
   - Very ineffective

24. Can you please rank the following interest group sectors on the basis of their chances to influence governmental policies?
   - Labour
   - Business
   - Agriculture
   - Environment

25. To the best of your knowledge, how many civil organisations from your sector participated in the preparation of ministerial decisions in 2000?
26. Do you work with other interest groups from different sectors than yours to promote particular proposals?
   If yes, why?
27. How similar are the views of the following to your policy standing?
   a) business groups
   b) agricultural groups
   c) environmental groups
28. Please tell me approximately how much of your organisation’s income come from the following sources
   a) government funding
   b) donations from foreign countries
   c) donations from foreign organisations
   d) members contribution
   e) donations from private companies
28a. Was there any other sources? (please specify) ________________
29. Has any of these income sources created later problems for your organisation, in terms of allegations or responsibility to reciprocate?
Thank you!
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