CONTENTS

ARTICLES

Mina Sumaadii
Mongolian Values and Attitudes toward Democracy 137

Ana Jese Perkovic
National Heroes vs. EU Benefits: Croatia and the EU Conditionality 177

Umut Koldas
Intermingled Cycles of Hegemony-Building: Europeanization and Minority Policies in Greece during the Simitis Period 202

Marat Grebennikov
Is Leviathan Back? Circassian Ethnic Mobilization after the 2012 Presidential Elections in Russia 234

BOOK REVIEWS

Olivera Simic, Regulation of Sexual Conduct in UN Peacekeeping Operations (Berlin: Springer, 2012)
Reviewed by: Rajeesh Kumar 257

Reviewed by: Emmanuel Kipole 259

Reviewed by: Martin Molder 262

Reviewed by: Mark Castelino 264

 Reviewed by: Patrick Hein 266

 NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS 270

 CfP Vol. 8, No. 3, September 2013 271
MONGOLIAN VALUES AND ATTITUDES TOWARD DEMOCRACY

Mina Sümadii
Central European University

Abstract
For most of modern history Mongolia has been isolated from the world due to the geopolitical struggles between Russia and China. As the Communist system collapsed and liberal democracy was established, many outsiders wondered why the country succeeded in democratization where other neighboring ex-Soviet states had failed. The odds were mainly against the country, due to high levels of poverty and geographical distance from established mature democracies. Nevertheless, in Mongolia the common answer is that the political culture was compatible with the principles of liberal democracy. This work is an empirical study of macro and micro developments based on modernization theory. It explores the values and attitudes of the general population in an effort to examine what makes it pro-democratic. The main finding is that the general claim of modernization theory is applicable to Mongolia, but in relation to political culture as a mediator between economic development and democratization.

Keywords: Mongolia, democratization, public opinion, trend lines

1. Introduction

There is a great deal of literature on the causes and conditions of successful democratization. A variety of empirical studies in the post-Soviet bloc have been conducted in order to test different propositions, nonetheless due to lack of individual level data in Mongolia, the country has been neglected as a case. In *The Third Wave*, Samuel Huntington introduced the idea of three waves of democratization based on historical processes.1 Mongolia stands as a success story of democratization in the region, because it is considered “one of the more remarkable outliers of the post-communist universe in regards to democratization,” because it is “the only third wave democracy east of the Balkans that avoided political erosion and successfully consolidated democracy.”2 In addition to “the peaceful manner” of the process, it is also believed to be “one of the least likely cases” to undergo a successful transition to democracy.3

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Mongolia’s geographical position between Russia and China heavily influenced most of its political developments in the 20th century and continues to affect policy-making. However, in comparison to other post-Soviet countries in Central Asia, Mongolia managed to preserve its cultural heritage, language, and avoid “Russification.” Furthermore, in general, landlocked states outside Europe face the worst problems and are “uniformly poor.” These contribute to the “total anomaly” status according to macro-level system analysis based on the traditions of Seymour Martin Lipset and Samuel Huntington.

In recent years, Mongolian democratic success has been widely associated with pro-democratic political culture. However, for most of the 20th century, the way to independence and modernity had appeared to be through Communism. Through the efforts of Russian and Mongolian Bolsheviks, in 1921 Mongolia became the second socialist state in the world, and a:

- testing ground for much of the Communist policy in the Third World: methods of education, cultural work, collectivization, and anti-religious propaganda that appeared later in other countries were first introduced by Soviet advisors in Mongolia, who ran the country on behalf of its Communist rulers.

Throughout the communist period, Mongolia maintained a status similar to Soviet satellites. It wasn’t incorporated into the territory of the Soviet Union and remained a buffer state due to the Soviet Union’s geopolitical rivalry with China. A single-party state with the governing Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party (MPRP) was formed, which resembled a Soviet satellite and followed a path strongly influenced by the Soviet Union, to the extent that it collapsed in a similar fashion. The leaders of the MPRP followed Mikhail Gorbachev’s glasnost’ and perestroika, which led to open calls to end the dictatorial rule of the Party and the formation of the Mongolian Democratic Union. The young Mongolian reformers developed programs that led to the largest demonstration in the country, and in 1990 the

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MPRP resigned and the first democratic elections were held.\textsuperscript{12} Multiparty elections were introduced in the 1990s, and in 2007 the government officially declared the democratic transition to be complete.

The constitution of 1992 introduced a semi-presidential form of government, which resulted in constant power struggles between the office of the president and the parliament. The president is directly elected by popular vote, but his power is severely limited by the parliament, to which he is directly accountable. The prime minister is elected by the parliament and is also accountable to it. This creates a sort of system of checks-and-balances between the institutions, where there is much overlap between the offices of the president, the prime minister, and the parliament.\textsuperscript{13} This is considered one of the institutional strengths which prevented Mongolia from the drift into authoritarianism seen in former Soviet states in Asia.\textsuperscript{14} Moreover, the country has consistently been ranked as democratic and free by foreign observers.\textsuperscript{15}

In summary, Mongolia’s location between China and Russia historically limited its foreign policy options and resulted in a focus on preserving sovereignty and avoiding dependence on either neighbor.\textsuperscript{16} In addition, the absence of a sufficiently strong “national father figure” in the executive who could monopolize power during transition has also contributed to Mongolia’s success.\textsuperscript{17} The efficiency of international donor contributions during the transitional period and especially during the systemic crisis in the late 1990s is also an important factor to consider.\textsuperscript{18} However, availability of data makes it possible to test whether suggestions that Mongolia is an outlier are justified. In this work, I would like to examine another significant but hitherto largely neglected aspect which contributed to the successful transition and consolidation of democracy, despite all the favorable and unfavorable developments, which can described as the Mongolian “critical mass.”\textsuperscript{19}

\textsuperscript{12} Most prominent of Mongolian young elites were educated in Moscow and Eastern Europe, which consequently echoed the transition processes of those regions. See Morris Rossabi. \textit{Modern Mongolia: From Khans to Commissars to Capitalists}. (Berkley: University of California Press, 2005).

\textsuperscript{13} Sumati Luvsandendev, “Mongolia.” \textit{KAS Democratic Report} (2009), 81-82.

\textsuperscript{14} Fish, “Mongolia.”

\textsuperscript{15} Freedom House, Polity IV, UNDP.

\textsuperscript{16} Narangoa, “Mongolia and Preventive Diplomacy” and Wachman “Mongolia’s Geopolitical Gambit.”


\textsuperscript{18} Fritz, “Mongolia: Dependent Democratization.”

The Revised Modernization Theory

In order to do this, a theoretical framework will be built on general modernization theory, which holds that economic aspects matter to democratization. The term modernization entails a number of concepts, generally indicating a shift from a traditional to modern society. In the context of Mongolia, the focus is on the aspect of modernization that is relevant to developing countries and the post-Communist bloc in their efforts to reach the level of developed countries.

The modernization theory received empirical support through the work of Seymour Martin Lipset, who established a link between the level of development of a given country and its probability of being democratic. Moreover, “[i]t is considered as one of the best established correlations; however, causes of this relationship are debatable.” In the original study, the patterns between averages of economic development indicators in European, English-speaking and Latin American countries allowed Lipset to conclude that “the more well-to-do a nation, the more likely it will sustain democracy.”

The more recent developments of modernization theory can be divided into two main branches: the theory of democratic culture represented by Inglehart and Welzel, and the theory of economic development represented by Przeworski and Limongi. The theory of democratic culture holds that a key prerequisite of democracy is support for democratic norms and the associated behavior among citizenry. For Inglehart and Welzel, the general public’s democratic values are the appropriate method of indicating the prospects of consolidating democratic governments.

In contrast, in the theory of economic development, modernization theory was tested on time-series analysis of cross-sections and it was concluded that modernization doesn’t necessarily bring democracy. In their methods the authors suggested that one of the main indicators of economic development should be per capita GDP as a good predictor of the stability of democracies. And most notably the findings demonstrated that economics play a crucial role in democratic survival. However, in a later work, it was clarified that although the level of

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21 Barbara Geddes, cited in Inglehart and Welzel, Modernization, 169.
22 Lipset 1959, 30 in Wucherpfennig and Deutsch 2009.
24 Wucherpfennig and Deutsch, “Modernization.”
26 Ibid., 177.
economic development is among the best predictors of political regimes, there are persistent dictatorships or flourishing democracies against the odds.\textsuperscript{27}

From the beginning of the transition, and for most of the 1990s, Mongolia was in a state of continuous economic decline. Przeworski and Limongi’s emphasis on the positive role of economic performance for newly established democracies’ survival can only offer an explanation for the steady process of democratization in Mongolia without reverting back or leading to another alternative mostly for the period after 2000.\textsuperscript{28} The GDP per capita survival threshold was reached only in 2006.\textsuperscript{29} In addition, the lingering economic crisis with few advances and worsening conditions throughout the first decade led to an eventual systemic crisis, which at the time had a high chance of undermining the established regime. Hence, modernization theory’s economic development branch, focused on the macro level, offers an insufficient explanation of democratization, especially due to the linearity it requires for democratic survival in new regimes. This leads to the notion that by itself, it does not provide for the underlying reasons for the start of democratization or an explanation for regime survival in the face of long economic downfalls.\textsuperscript{30}

Nevertheless, the main theoretical statement of modernization theory should still correspond to the notion that economic development is a positive factor in democratization. Economic development is also favorable for further development of efficient democracy by being a driving force for social change. This implies approaching the mature liberal democracy standard in a consolidated regime. Alternatively, persistent economic decline and crisis will lead to reversal of democratization during the transitional period. In a consolidated regime this will entail departing further from mature democracy. However, it should be noted that being social science phenomena, these claims are probabilistic and not deterministic.\textsuperscript{31} That is to say, making predictive statements is subject to great uncertainty. In the end, this leads to the puzzle the present research seeks to resolve: if economic development is a sufficient and necessary condition for a political democracy to develop or be sustainable, why is Mongolia a democracy?


\textsuperscript{28} Przeworski and Limongi’s main finding was that in countries with GDP per capita under $1000, the probability that a democracy would regress in a particular year was 0.125, leading to an expected life of eight years (1997, 165). Nonetheless, it is the potentially explanation for the mechanism behind the systemic crisis of the late 1990s in Mongolia.

\textsuperscript{29} EBRD, NSOM, World Bank.

\textsuperscript{30} Inglehart and Welzel, \textit{Modernization}, 167-169.

\textsuperscript{31} Ibid., 157.
Considering Mongolia’s historic low levels of economic development and economic downturns throughout the transition process, Inglehart and Welzel’s revised claim of modernization theory with political culture as a mediator between economic development and democratization is applicable. This will require reassessment of how economic and social phenomena relate and the methodology will be discussed in the next section.

3. Methodology

To begin with, the closest counterparts to Mongolia in Central Asia of the Third wave democracies are Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Their historical nomadic roots and Soviet legacies make them the most similar cases for comparison. Nevertheless, the current religious and social structures of these societies are different. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan no longer have significant nomadic populations. Moreover, the persistence of strong clan networks in politics and an Islamic tradition are among potential explanations for their failure in successful democratization.\(^{32}\) In contrast, Mongolia has a third of the population living as traditional nomads and clan influence is considered very weak, as two thirds of the population claim to be Chinggizids. Additionally, the dominant religion is Lamaist Buddhism, which possibly presents less of a cultural barrier to democratization.\(^{33}\) A third factor is that Mongolia is one of the least densely populated countries in the world, with a little less than half of the population residing in the capital, Ulaanbaatar.\(^{34}\) These features combined make it a unique case not suitable for a cross-country small n comparative analysis.

Furthermore, the research question is associational with the general purpose of finding the strength of associations between the constructs in the pro-democratic culture claim. Performing empirical (quantitative) analysis with the micro unit of analysis as the individual and transitioning to the macro level of political culture potentially resolves some of the methodological implications. Most studies of political culture rely on survey analysis, reinforced by the argument that only aggregated attitudes of individuals can influence macro-political institutions, in turn representing the "connection between individual values and what governments do."\(^{35}\)

In view of the fact that the key to Mongolian success in democratization lies in its political culture, aggregating individual-level data without considering standard


\(^{33}\) Fritz, “Mongolia," 77.

\(^{34}\) Estimated at 2.78 mln resides on the territory of 1.5 mln km² (NSOM 2010, 47).

demographics will entail an assumption of homogeneity of subclasses. On the one hand, this benefits the analysis by producing inferences at a rather general level. On the other hand, it also raises the potential of committing an ecological fallacy if individual-level inferences follow from analysis of macro level or aggregated indicators. Nevertheless, if interpreted and used correctly, “survey data avoids the ecological fallacy of drawing inferences about individuals from aggregate data, such as election results, or from such reified terms as national history and traditions.” Theoretically, the notion of political culture is considered a macro level construct, and also considering that “cultural and historical approaches predict common opinions among individuals within a country, and differences between countries,” adds to support the assumption of homogeneity.

Finally, Krishna et al. claim that most analysts’ findings have been based on aggregate level data or indexes, and conclusions of individual behavior were also derived that way. This produced a number of outlier cases where democracy was successful despite high levels of poverty. Their studies in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, based on analysis of individual-level data, demonstrated that poor people in those regions do not value democracy any less than their richer counterparts. In order to assess public pro-democratic values empirically most of the following analysis will be based on data drawn from opinion polls covering the period from 1995 to 2012. This will involve analysis of social and economic aspects that influence the population in their support for and willingness to participate in the democratic system. In this work, Pippa Norris’ dimensions of mass level political support consisting of evaluation of current political regime and “support for democracy per se” will be addressed.

4. Evaluation of Current Regime

Ganbat, Tusalem, and Yang’s former studies have underlined that, although Mongolians view political institutions with skepticism and are rather negative when evaluating efficiency of political participation, they are confident in their own ability to participate in politics. This phenomenon has been understood as a
“frustrated desire for political influence.” Prohl and Luvsandendev also highlighted a negative evaluation of institutions, with an exception of the president. Furthermore, they established a correlation between belief in voter’s influence and satisfaction with the political system, which corresponded with election cycles. This satisfaction was particularly high when people believed that casting a vote was worthwhile. Consequently, this suggested weak political support for institutions, but not a disapproval of the political system as a whole. This allows us to infer that political self-confidence is at the core of these links. Thus, it will be necessary to look at the assessment of personal ability to influence politics, which generally in a democracy is manifested in belief in voters’ influence, or in other words, belief in political efficacy. As a standard, it holds that if people are going to be affected by political decisions they should have a say in making them.

Following from this, Mishler and Rose indicate that in studies of popular support in post-Communist regimes economic factors dominate, with the main disagreement being on the principal sources of economic effects. They stress the reciprocal effects of economic and political evaluations conditioned by countries’ communist legacies. In those societies support for a political regime is significantly shaped by economic factors, as in command economies citizens were used to holding the government responsible for both macroeconomic and individual welfare.

In the case of Mongolia, Pomfret describes the presence of two major economic stabilizers contributing to post-Communist development. One can be attributed to the “traditional pastoral lifestyle” and the other to the informal economy. The nomadic household is largely outside of the formal monetary economy and is subject to seasonal earnings. Such circumstances would mean that “household income is a poor proxy for poverty” and as a result relying on household earnings would present a limited picture of the micro-level well-being. In addition, household contributions of migrant workers are not captured. These aspects of the informal economy were very crucial during the transitional period and the systemic

44 Ibid., 109-112.
46 Ibid., 5-6.
47 Pomfret, “Transition.”
48 Ibid., 152.
49 Michael Bratton in Krishna, Poverty, 31.
crisis of the late 1990s and still are significant contributors to the main economy. In the end, suggesting that economic effects depicted in official statistics provide only “a partial picture of how individuals cope with the challenges of transformation through activities in multiple economies.” Such gaps in economic data affect both household incomes and GDP per capita measurements. Consequently, the main economic considerations should be at a non-monetary level, yet depict material well-being, which can be captured by the objectivity of the standard of living.

Finally, Mishler and Rose assert that people have a certain degree of patience in deficient regimes as long as there’s a belief that circumstances are likely to improve in the nearest future. In the context of post-Communist regimes these future expectations would also most likely be economic in nature due to the impact of social and economic transformations.

5. Regime Support Hypotheses

Following on from the above and from Limongi and Przeworski’s main claim that GDP per capita depicts macro-level economic development favorable to democratic survival, it is possible to put forward the following propositions. In particular, the main consequence of economic development should be increasing citizens’ standard of living (H1). This is the first main step in developing the desired support for democracy on the micro level. In the context of Mongolia, however, due to very low levels of material security as a base, increasing the standard of living will lead to the belief that circumstances will improve in the foreseeable future (H2). This is a crucial step in a society with a high level of poverty.

Next, to secure these interests, the system will have to maintain legitimacy by providing elections as the general method of citizen participation in politics. All of this is reflected in the corresponding belief in the ability to influence political decisions or feeling of political efficacy, which for the general population is mainly limited to casting an effective vote (H3). Then, increasing material well-being should be associated with improving macroeconomic conditions and consequent positive assessment (H4). After that, testing the ability to make informed political decisions and assessing political involvement will lead to investigating societal interest in politics (H5). This has been posited, despite previous research and inferences from general political interest concluding that it either depicts the role of politics in the lives of ordinary citizens, or possibly represents high level of

50 Rose, Diverging Paths, 8.
societal development.\(^5^2\) And finally, increasing material well-being should lead to increasing support of the regime \((H_6)\). Table 1 below shows the indicators selected, while Table 2 summarizes the hypotheses.

### Table 1: Concepts and Indicators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Concept</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Abbr</th>
<th>Level</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economic Development</td>
<td>GDP per capita</td>
<td>[ED]</td>
<td>Macro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Future economic expectations(^5^3)</td>
<td>Future outlook</td>
<td>[F]</td>
<td>Micro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political efficacy</td>
<td>Belief in Voter Influence</td>
<td>[V]</td>
<td>Micro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political involvement</td>
<td>Interest in Politics</td>
<td>[I]</td>
<td>Micro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support of the Political Regime(^5^4)</td>
<td>Satisfaction with the Political System</td>
<td>[S]</td>
<td>Micro/Macro</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 2: Summary of Core Hypotheses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypotheses</th>
<th>Statement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Main Hypothesis</td>
<td>If revised modernization theory in Mongolian context is supported then increasing economic development will encourage development towards mature liberal democracy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Null Hypothesis</td>
<td>Decreasing economic development will lead Mongolian democracy away from becoming a mature liberal democracy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Development</td>
<td>\textit{Hypothesis 1}: Increasing economic development will produce an increase in standard of living.([ED] \rightarrow [L])</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Future Economic</td>
<td>\textit{Hypothesis 2}: An increase in standard of living will (\rightarrow)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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\(^5^3\) It should be noted that this is Personal Future Economic Expectations, questionnaires structure makes it economic in nature (not shown here). Tested and shown different from future macroeconomic assessment and expectations of economic development in 5 years’ time (not addressed).

\(^5^4\) 1995-2007 “How much are you satisfied with the present political system?” and 2008-2012 “How much are you satisfied with the Democracy and present political system?” To test confidence, comparison with satisfaction with government and opposition was done, which demonstrated that all three are highly correlated (Appendix 4: Systemic Variables).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expectations</th>
<th>produce an increase in future economic expectation. [L]→[F]</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political Efficacy</td>
<td>Hypothesis 3: An increase in standard of living will produce an increase in belief in political efficacy. [L]→[V]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macroeconomic Assessment</td>
<td>Hypothesis 4: An increase in standard of living will be associated with increase in evaluation of macroeconomic performance. [L]↔[E]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Involvement</td>
<td>Hypothesis 5: An increase in standard of living will produce an increase in political involvement. [L]→[I]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support of the Political Regime</td>
<td>Hypothesis 6: An increase in standard of living will produce an increase support of the political regime. [L]→[S]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1 illustrates the multilevel process of change, and Figure 2 depicts the assumed causal order for the micro level process in more detail. It can be seen that the processes depicted in Figure 1 require multilevel thinking. In order to examine them I divide the analysis of regime support into trend lines and log linear modeling for mathematical simplicity. These phenomena are influenced by the dynamics of time and as subjects to the same cause, the affected variables are most likely interrelated (depicted in Figure 2). Consequently, trend lines will cover the dynamics of change and make it possible to distinguish situational and structural factors at work. Log linear analysis will involve finding a model that can represent regime support.

**Figure 1: The Multilevel Process of Change**

6. Support for Democracy

The dimension of political support seen in supporting democracy *per se*, which implies supporting it as a political good, can be assessed in different ways. Among three identified methods the first would be the assessment of people’s preference of democracy over other types of regimes. This method was especially prevalent in post-Communist and transitional regimes where the citizens were believed to be “better judges of differences due to first-hand experience.” The second method would be Inglehart and Welzel’s analysis of primacy of “self-expression” over “survival” values, which reveals democratic support for intrinsic reasons or instrumental purposes. In other words, support of it as a political good or a source of economic gain.

The third evaluative method is a definition of democracy compiled from mass opinion. This was attempted in former studies in Mongolia. The Asian Barometer survey asked respondents to provide a definition or meaning of democracy. This measurement was implemented to reflect whether “minimalist (procedural) or maximalist (substantive)” understanding of democracy prevails in the society. The findings led to the conclusion that “substantive interpretations of democracy among Mongolians are minimal at best” and most “identify democracy with a minimalist...
definition of basic freedoms.” In other words, that most people don’t know exactly what they want in terms of democracy.

However, a further available subjective measurement of valuing democracy as a political good can be drawn from the general value theory elaborated by Schwartz, which describes values as “desirable, trans-situational goals, varying in importance, that serve as guiding principles in people’s lives.” These goals create belief systems that trigger action according to circumstances and are interrelated with many other competing values. Moreover, if values are “conceptions of the desirable, used in moral discourse, with a particular relevance for behavior” the degree to which particular values are prevalent can suggest the underlying belief system. In terms of supporting democracy as a political good, the values concerned are political, which involve only a segment of the individual’s life. Furthermore, even if certain political values are held, most people are not actively engaged in politics to advance them, suggesting a limited role of politics in people’s lives. Nevertheless, examining different levels of importance that people assign to values will offer general directions of their expectations.

In general, the three main principles of democracy are freedom, equality, and justice. However, the content of specific democratic values can be very extensive. The broad definition of liberal democracy includes valuing individual freedom, rights, justice, equality, and divergent views. The block of statements included in Politbarometer surveys covers a range of democratic principles and issues, which are measured by degrees of importance assigned to each value. This makes it possible to indirectly assess what democracy involves or represents to the masses, and will be selected for the analysis. As a preferred analytic method, factor analysis will aid in reducing the information on democratic values and issues in order to evaluate support of democracy per se. In particular, it will represent a large number of relationships in a simpler way.

To conclude, the main theoretical claim of the revised modernization theory is stated as economic development and is associated with democratization and political culture; they go together and are subject to the dynamics of time. Ideally, the research question requires comprehensiveness and a multilevel answer.

58 Ibid., 10.
60 Ibid., 28.
61 Ibid.
62 Rose, “Political Behavior.”
63 See Appendix 3: Liberal Democratic Principles and Issues 2008-2012 for list of values.
64 Inglehart and Welzel, Modernization.
However, due to impossibility of the former, and the practical limitations of achieving the latter, simplicity will be introduced to provide mathematical thinking and clarity. Moreover, despite the scope, the availability of empirical data restricted inferences to be based only on recent development, thus whether the main claim holds will be a subject of time. As a result, many of the assumptions made might suffer from oversimplification. Nonetheless, with certain limitations on interpretations, testing of the proposed hypotheses will be carried out in the following analyses.

6.1 Trend lines 1995-2012

If the hypothesized systemic performance is “best” evaluated by the population, trend lines will depict those long-term social changes. They also offer an evaluation of the impact of time, and potentially estimate the dynamics of multilevel changes. To begin with, one of the first hypothesized transitions was from macro-level economic development to micro-level individual well-being. It can be seen from Figure 3 that macro-level economic development experienced a sharp drop after 1989 with the start of the transition, and hitting its lowest point in 1993. It also depicts that the low continued throughout the rest of the 1990s, only bottoming out in the early 2000s. It thus corresponds to initial economic breakdown, long-term stagnation of 1990s, and eventual improvements. The subsequent sharp rise began from 2005, matching the start of growth due to mining developments.

Figure 3: Macro and Micro Economic Development Indicators

![Graph showing GDP per capita and standard of living trends from 1981 to 2012.](image)


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65 Standard of living presented is a result of collapsing categories “very good,” “good”, and “not good - not bad”. As the dominant category is “not good - not bad” and “very good” is practically non-existent, this is the beyond “survival” level (complete figure in Appendix 5: Present Standard of Living).

66 Politbarometers from 1995 to 2000 covered only Ulaanbaatar (UB), due to unique demographic structure of the society it can be argued that the samples are still representative of the whole population.
Next, some substantial trends in well-being can be observed during this period, even if available data only covers the period after 1995. There are some fluctuations, with the first visible sharp drop matching the systemic crisis of the late 1990s, caused by stagnant economic conditions for most of the 1990s. Furthermore, the first actual victory of the Democratic Union led to two dismissals in the government adding to mass disillusionment with the competence of the established system. Most probably, as Rose asserts with the passage of about a decade, people’s patience deteriorates as they no longer evaluate current regimes by comparison to previous regimes or potential improvements, but based solely on their present performance. As a result, the systemic survival at this stage is mostly attributed to the role of international donors and economic stabilizers. It can be speculated that the second sharp drop seen from 2004 to 2006 matches the decline of social welfare coverage as a result of failure of government coalition at the time, and the third sharp drop reflects the impacts of the global financial crisis. Otherwise, overall there is a gradual increase, which suggests that the material conditions of citizens did improve, but with some drawbacks.

After that, as shown in Figure 4 satisfaction with the political system, belief in political efficacy and assessment of macroeconomic conditions reveal considerable fluctuations related to changes in government. However, macroeconomic evaluations are more negative, which probably reflects the underdeveloped institutions and persistence of poverty. Satisfaction with the political system showed a sharp rise in 2007, and reached a steady high point in the period between the fifth and sixth parliamentary elections. This coincides with the money distributed as an election campaign promise; nevertheless, this “incentive” was only partially fulfilled and thus the influence started to drop steadily.

Also, in Figure 4 it can be seen that political interest remained rather moderate and stable for most of the period. However, during the fifth election cycle it began a steady drop, which has two potential explanations. One is the influence of the new generation that did not know the previous regime and, to put it simply, assigns less value to political aspects. The other is that with the passage of time, unrealistic expectations of democracy started weakening. In comparison, the future economic expectations were mostly positive, but showed some fluctuations in the period between 1995 and 2000, another effect of the political crisis. Afterwards they rose gradually and remained steady.

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69 Fritz, “Mongolia”; Pomfret, “Transition.”
70 2008 financial crisis.
Overall, these results show that material well-being improved together with general macroeconomic developments. This supports the claim that macroeconomic developments over time also improved micro-level living conditions, supporting *Hypothesis 1*. Moreover, future economic expectations reached their peak with the start of sustained economic development, supporting *Hypothesis 2*. However, even though throughout the examined period political involvement was stable and rather moderate, it has gone into a decline in the last few years. This does not support the notion that it will rise with material well-being, thus *Hypothesis 4* did not receive sufficient support. The most obvious possibility is that the positive change should entail a much larger time span. In addition, it is subject to a plurality of people’s interests and also, despite some improvements, the general material level of well-being has not reached the favorable level. Then again, if the decline continues, it is potentially an indicator of mass disillusionment. This could suggest no substantive

The variables measurement consisted of different Likert-scales of two, four, and five levels of measurement. Thus in order to create comparable trend lines I've standardized them using scaling from -2 to +2. Two level variable SUM(maxV*1:minV*-1)/Total, four level variable SUM(maxV*2:maxV*1:minV*-1:minV*-2)/Total, five level variable SUM(maxV*2:maxV*1:V*0:min:V*-1:minV*-2)/Total.

improvement in the quality of the regime, which in the long run could prove harmful for the democratic system by undermining its support.

Belief in voter influence or political efficacy goes through considerable fluctuations with changes in government, reaching its peak in election years, which suggests the relevance of election campaigns. Moreover, this trend is most closely correlated with satisfaction with the political system. Nevertheless, satisfaction with the political system had gradually improved to a slightly more positive evaluation, but with considerable fluctuations. Similarly, macroeconomic performance evaluations fluctuated with changes in government, but were rather negative. Even though there is a slight improvement over time, one might speculate that weakness of institutions and poor “rule-of-law” are related to this negative assessment. Thus, support of Hypotheses 3, 5, and 6 will further require testing by log linear analysis in the next section.

6.2 The Regime Support Model

Now we move to next stage of the trend analysis: current standard of living \([L]\), future economic expectations \([F]\), and feelings of political efficacy \([V]\) were seen as the main positive factors in the hypothesized system.\(^72\) Political interest \([I]\) was rather moderate and seemed to go into decline. Macroeconomic conditions assessment \([E]\) was mainly negative throughout the period. Consequently, this section will examine the strength of their links through log linear modeling.\(^73\)

First of all, explanatory and response variable associations were tested. Political interest was statistically tested on the relationship with other indicators, but in the end did not satisfy the criteria of \(p\)-value below 0.05 for the \(\chi^2\) Test of Independence. Macroeconomic performance assessment \([E]\) passed the test, but the resulting log linear models had rather poor explanatory power.\(^74\) Substantively, this

\(^{72}\) See Figure 2 Micro Level System in Regime Support Hypotheses section.
\(^{73}\) The system includes multiple associations among categorical social science variables, which can be handled by flexibility of log linear technique. In particular, instead of fitting data to a model, it suggests finding a model to fit the data. Moreover, it permits us to express categorical data in the form of a linear model by using log values. The software used for this part of the analysis was the “psych” package in R. For practical reasons and for clarity, categories were collapsed to create lower levels of measurement (see Appendix 10).
\(^{74}\) The models did not seem impressive: the best fitting model included multiple high order interactions and had a \(p\)-value of 0.10. Also the five-way models were not ran on previous surveys, only on April 2012, since it had a large enough sample size \((n=5020)\). Other samples had an insufficient size \((n\sim 1000)\) to provide reliable fit measurements. Two-way and three-way models, including macroeconomic assessment, also did not fit the data well. I did not find it necessary to exhaust all possible combinations.
leads to the conclusion that egocentric evaluations dominate and contain the most explanatory power.

Therefore, satisfaction with democracy \([S]\), standard of living \([L]\), political efficacy \([V]\), and future economic expectations \([F]\) were tested, and they satisfied the criteria of \(p\)-value below 0.05 for the \(\chi^2\) Test of Independence. This implies that the variables are not independent, thus rejecting the null hypothesis of overall variable independence and allowing for log linear analysis. The \(\chi^2\) was 318.2 with \(df = 11\) and \(p\)-value<.001(1.243e-61), indicating a statistically significant association between these variables. Moreover, Table 3 (n=3962) demonstrates that there are no zero cells, implying no reduction in test power. It also shows that these data will not fit a regular additive model, which requires the difference to be approximately equal.

Table 3: Cross tabulations of Political Efficacy, Standard of Living, Future Economic Expectations, and Satisfaction with Democracy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Efficacy</th>
<th>Standard of Living</th>
<th>Future Expectations</th>
<th>0 (Dissatisfied)</th>
<th>1 (Satisfied)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0 (Weak) 0 (Bad)</td>
<td></td>
<td>0 (Pessimistic)</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0 (Weak) 0 (Average)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 (Optimistic)</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0 (Weak) 0 (Optimistic)</td>
<td></td>
<td>0 (Pessimistic)</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0 (Weak) 0 (Optimistic)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 (Optimistic)</td>
<td>447</td>
<td>642</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 (Optimistic) 0 (Bad)</td>
<td></td>
<td>0 (Pessimistic)</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 (Optimistic) 0 (Average)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 (Optimistic)</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>338</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 (Optimistic) 0 (Average)</td>
<td></td>
<td>0 (Pessimistic)</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 (Optimistic) 0 (Average)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 (Optimistic)</td>
<td>556</td>
<td>1202</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To increase confidence in satisfaction with the democracy variable, it was compared to satisfaction with government and opposition variables. The trend lines in Appendix 4: Systemic Variables demonstrate that the three variables are highly correlated, which allows one to consider satisfaction with the political system as a “satisfactory” measurement for the evaluation of the established regime. Though the correlation of opposition is a side effect leading to a conclusion that people do not distinguish between the government and opposition. The implication is it depicts a rotation without improvement (See Richard Rose, “Democratic and Undemocratic States,” Studies in Public Policy 444 (2008).
Finally, in the process of searching for the “best fitting model”, Knoke and Burke’s work was used for reference. First, a baseline model [all explanatory][the response] or [VLF][S] was selected. Second, interaction terms were added to improve the fit. Third, the resulting models were evaluated for most substantive and statistical significance. In addition, running models at different periods of time and with different interaction terms makes it possible to evaluate the significance of different associations, which can aid in approximating the underlying causal structure. A further consideration is that larger samples require more complex models to pass goodness-of-fit tests. Thus, looking at previous comparable surveys with smaller sample size aided the search.

Table 4: Log Linear Models

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Fitted Marginals</th>
<th>April 2012 Fit (p)</th>
<th>April 2011 Fit (p)</th>
<th>October 2010 Fit (p)</th>
<th>April 2010 Fit (p)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>[VLF][S]</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>[VLF][VS]</td>
<td>1.998401e-15</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>[VLF][LS]</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>[VLF][FS]</td>
<td>5.675825e-08</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>[VLFS][LS]</td>
<td>7.993606e-15</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>[VLFS][VS][LS]</td>
<td>0.5053405</td>
<td>0.727612</td>
<td>0.0592234</td>
<td>0.2478373</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>[VLFS][LS][FS]</td>
<td>3.000488e-08</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>[VLFS][VS][LS][FS]</td>
<td>0.4961563</td>
<td>0.5911399</td>
<td>0.5173547</td>
<td>0.2590765</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>[VLFS][VLS][FS]</td>
<td>0.4488285</td>
<td>0.431616</td>
<td>0.6537358</td>
<td>0.1539966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>[VLFS][VLS][VS]</td>
<td>0.3548742</td>
<td>0.4968378</td>
<td>0.6396748</td>
<td>0.7843583</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>[VLFS][LFS][VS]</td>
<td>0.756737</td>
<td>0.5921486</td>
<td>0.3573312</td>
<td>0.1894376</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>[VLFS][LFS][VS]</td>
<td>0.7862492</td>
<td>0.3939074</td>
<td>0.4729964</td>
<td>0.09464824</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the end I selected Model 11 for further analysis. The results in Table 4 under the April 2012 column show that this model has a very good fit (p=0.75) in comparison to less parsimonious Models 6, 8, 9, and 10. In addition, compared to 6, 9, and 12, it has stability at other points in time. Comparatively, it satisfied the condition of “best fitting” model (statistically significant and substantively meaningful) and is represented in Figure 5. This model contains two three-factor associations and one two-factor association. It can be interpreted as showing that standard of living is mutually related to political efficacy and future expectations [VLF] and mutually related to future expectations and satisfaction with democracy [LFS], and that political efficacy is related to satisfaction with democracy [VS].

---


77 [S] conceptualized as the response variable, whose odds are a function of [L],[F], and [V].

78 I did not rerun the models that did not fit the data in April 2012 on previous years.
Moreover, the hypothesized response variable [S] is allowed to interact with the explanatory variables [V], [L], and [F]. In this case it has a significant relationship with political efficacy, and a significant joint relationship with standard of living and future expectations. From Table 4 it can also be seen that statistically including interactions of standard of living and future economic expectations considerably improves the fit of the model. Substantively, this suggests the core influence produced by the simultaneous presence of the two. Hence, if the model is correct the following two tables summarize the results:

Table 5: Fitted Values for Model [VLF][LFS][VS]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0 (Weak)</td>
<td>0 (Bad)</td>
<td>0 (Pessimistic)</td>
<td>51.24857 19.75138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 (Optimistic)</td>
<td>138.4143 189.5857</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 (Average)</td>
<td>42.29351 24.70645</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 (Strong)</td>
<td>0 (Bad)</td>
<td>0 (Pessimistic)</td>
<td>47.75142 28.24862</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 (Optimistic)</td>
<td>158.5857 333.4143</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

“•” marks higher order associations. In this case three-way associations.
Note: Model fit: $\chi^2 = 1.18729$, df=3, $p=0.7567$)

Table 6: Estimated Odds and Odds Ratio Calculations for Model [VLF][LFS][VS]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0 (Weak)</td>
<td>0 (Bad)</td>
<td>0 (Pessimistic)</td>
<td>0.385404</td>
<td>3.553932</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 (Optimistic)</td>
<td>1.369698</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 (Average)</td>
<td>0.584166</td>
<td>2.430412</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 (Optimistic)</td>
<td>1.419765</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 (Strong)</td>
<td>0 (Bad)</td>
<td>0 (Pessimistic)</td>
<td>0.591577</td>
<td>3.553932</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 (Optimistic)</td>
<td>2.102423</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 (Average)</td>
<td>0.896668</td>
<td>2.430413</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 (Optimistic)</td>
<td>2.179274</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The results in Table 5 suggest that the fitted values do not deviate much from the observed values presented in Table 3. Therefore, the model has good estimative power. In addition, from the results depicted in Table 6, it can be said that the odds of satisfaction with democracy improve with the presence of each factor, but much more significantly for those who are optimistic about the nearest future. Similarly, the odds improve in the presence of other factors, but not as significantly for those who are pessimistic. For instance, for those who don’t believe in political efficacy and are pessimistic about the nearest future, the odds of being satisfied with democracy are 0.38 and 0.58 (bad and average standards of living respectively). In comparison, regardless of standard of living, for those who don’t believe in political efficacy but are optimistic about the nearest future, the odds of being satisfied with democracy are about 1.4. Alternatively, for those who believe in political efficacy and are pessimistic about the nearest future, the odds of being satisfied with democracy are 0.59 and 0.89 (for bad and average standard of living respectively). Likewise, regardless of standard of living, for those who believe in political efficacy but are optimistic about the nearest future, the odds of being satisfied with democracy are slightly greater than 2.1.

80 Satisfies that in log linear modeling $\chi^2$ goodness-of-fit should be small relative to degrees of freedom. Alternatively $L_2 =1.18447$, df=3.
Furthermore, the consequences of the fitted model are the symmetry of odds ratios. Thus, for respondents who have a bad standard of living, regardless of whether they believe or not in political efficacy, as long as they believe that in the near future life circumstances will be better, they are 3.55 times more likely to be satisfied with the present political system. Alternatively, for respondents who have an average standard of living, regardless of whether they believe or not in political efficacy, as long as they believe that in the nearest future life circumstances will improve, they are 2.43 times more likely to be satisfied with the present political system. This corresponds to the notion that with rising material security, people become more critical of their political system.

Trend analysis and statistical results from log linear analysis disconfirm the complete hypothesized causal order on the micro level at the current stage of development. The suggested substantive reason for this is the importance of self-centered economic assessments due to low levels of material well-being. Nevertheless, the implications of the model are that respondents with a bad standard of living, regardless of whether or not they believe in political efficacy, as long as there is belief that in the nearest future circumstances will improve, are three and a half times more likely to be satisfied with the present political system. Alternatively, respondents that have an average standard of living, regardless of whether or not they believe in political efficacy as long as they believe that in the near future life circumstances will become better, are two and a half times more likely to be satisfied with the present political system. For the respondents with a bad standard of living, future economic optimism plays a much more prominent role in regime support and they are less critical. Nevertheless in this case, systemic support and evaluation is dependent on the respondent’s present living conditions, belief in political efficacy, and most importantly, on future economic optimism (support H1, H3, H6). The following graphical representation of the micro-level system support was made from the results of log linear analysis:

81 See Figure 2 Micro Level System in Regime Support Hypotheses section.
From Figure 6 it can be seen that the original micro-level system had to be altered. This suggested system disproves some components of the original micro level causal system and reveals that standard of living and future economic expectations are the core influences. The model represents the basis of political equilibrium, which was achieved by the democratic system in Mongolia. Following from here the next, section will examine what democracy as a political system potentially represents to the general public.

7. Model of Democracy as a Political Good

In the assessment of support for democracy per se various values and issues are included in the concept. In an ideal world, one’s theory would suggest hypotheses for a confirmatory factor analysis model, they would be tested, and the appropriate conclusions would be drawn. However in practice, due to the ‘insurmountable uncertainties’ of social science research, the choice was in favor of exploratory factor analysis to determine the structure of democratic value scale orientations. The analysis was made with SPSS and interpreted according to methods by Kim and Mueller and the results are displayed in the following table:

---

82 Combined theoretical causal structure and statistical model. [Uyt] dynamic system subject to effects of outside and unmeasured variables.

### Table 7: Three-Factor Model of Liberal Democratic Values

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimension</th>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Factor 1</th>
<th>Factor 2</th>
<th>Factor 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Libertarian</td>
<td>Everybody can believe in what he/she wants</td>
<td>0.616</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>I can travel wherever I want</td>
<td>0.586</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Everybody can express his/her opinion freely</td>
<td>0.565</td>
<td>0.357</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Media and research are uncensored in Mongolia</td>
<td>0.537</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Everybody has the right to enter one's desired profession</td>
<td>0.496</td>
<td>0.401</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All parties have an equal chance to come into government</td>
<td>0.469</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All people have equal educational opportunities</td>
<td>0.462</td>
<td>0.433</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Everybody can participate in the activities of their choice during one's free time</td>
<td>0.446</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egalitarian</td>
<td>All people are equally treated by the law</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Men and women have equal rights</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>There is a free, democratic market</td>
<td>0.546</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Liberalism</td>
<td>Income differences are kept as small as possible*</td>
<td>0.537</td>
<td>0.364</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Social differences are kept as small as possible</td>
<td>0.402</td>
<td>0.704</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The state provides for social justice in a market economy</td>
<td>0.407</td>
<td>0.622</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Everybody has the freedom to decide about his property</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.606</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The state provides as many social security services as possible</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.377</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eigenvalues</td>
<td></td>
<td>5.864</td>
<td>1.613</td>
<td>1.074</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of Variance explained</td>
<td></td>
<td>33.056</td>
<td>6.655</td>
<td>3.146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cumulative Percent of Variance Explained</td>
<td></td>
<td>33.056</td>
<td>39.711</td>
<td>42.857</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$\chi^2$ with 75 degrees of freedom = 1261.495

*in 2012 this variable was affected by variability, otherwise presents an indicator of Social Liberalism Dimension.

Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood.
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.
Rotation Converged in 7 iterations.

*Note.* Loadings <0.35 suppressed.

Table 7 summarizes the results of the three-factor model, which depicts the orientation in support of democracy *per se*. The factor names are based on the traditions of liberal political philosophy. The first factor, categorized as the
Libertarian Dimension, can be identified by high factor loadings on statements that can be grouped by their adherence to the fundamental value of self-ownership in the theory of Robert Nozick. The second factor, categorized as the Egalitarian Dimension, is identified by higher priority of equal outcomes and market competition, grouped under economic egalitarianism linked with the traditions of John Maynard Keynes. The last factor, the Social Liberalism Dimension, can be identified by high factor loadings on statements valuing combinations of state’s role in ensuring social justice and general equality, grouped by the theory of Karl Marx. However, the specificity of this dimension is in the inclusion of a high factor loading on the freedom to decide about one’s property.\(^{84}\)

Overall this suggests that people differentiate among the different values, and distinct value systems can be formed from them. The results of factor analysis revealed the presence of distinct value orientations. Considering that the larger the sample size in relation to the number of variables, the more reliable the resulting factors, we can accept the last factorial model as the most stable and proceed to the interpretations. Statistically, the first factor accounts for as much variance as possible, the second accounts for as much variance left unexplained by the first, while the third accounts for variance left unexplained by the first two. If Schwartz’s general hierarchy of values is applied to democratic values, it can be argued that substantively, the Libertarian Dimension carries the most information. The values of freedom of belief, expression, and travel carry high factor loadings and contribute most to the description of this dimension.\(^{85}\) Moreover, they are consistently linked together and can be considered the main indicators of this orientation. In general, it is suggested that this value dimension constitutes a belief system reflecting a sense of personal liberty or inalienable rights.

In the Egalitarian Dimension, the values of equal treatment by law, gender equality, and democratic market carry high factor loadings and are the main indicators.\(^{86}\) This dimension can be considered Keynesian for underlying substantive reasons, which does not necessarily imply the importance of general equality, but rather of equality of opportunities.\(^{87}\) In the context of Mongolia, the low levels of material well-being will lead to an emphasis on the importance of freedom of opportunity, which is necessary to improve life circumstances.

\(^{84}\) It is suggested that this is not coincidental as it persisted in this dimension in other analyses. The possibility is that the nature of this value dimension implies that people will want redistribution, but will not want it to affect their property.

\(^{85}\) Schwartz, “Basic Human Values.”

\(^{86}\) It should be noted that this dimension’s indicators are less stable in comparison to the indicators of other dimensions when tested on smaller samples. However, they are consistently grouped together.

\(^{87}\) Another potential name is Economic Egalitarianism.
The values of the state ensuring social justice in market economy, small income and social differences contribute to the Social Liberalism Dimension. However, this also includes a high loading on freedom of property. This dimension is most clearly defined and consistently present, reflecting the belief system valuing social justice in the society. It has consistent high factor loadings, reflecting the high priority of these values, which are likely to be emphasized due to the feelings of injustice caused by the unequally distributed economic growth in society. There are very few winners in the new system and a large impoverished mass, which is proportionally more visible in a small population.

8. Conclusions

In conclusion, the main objective of the present work was to test a general theory in a national setting to uncover reasons behind successful democratization in a suggested anomaly state. Overall, the empirical analysis and findings do not contradict each other and are favorable to the general theoretical claim of modernization theory with regard to cultural conditions. However, testing the main theoretical claim entails a very ambitious scope, since tracing social changes covers an extensive time period, and should reflect society’s entire historical process. This created multiple limitations on how far this study could be taken with only a quantitative approach, especially when population statistics and surveys were introduced relatively late. Moreover, some of the simplifying assumptions made do not reflect the complexity of the world and at some points mathematical clarity came at a cost of descriptive depth.

Nonetheless, when separating societies generally into hunting and gathering and agrarian empires, scholars infer that the former are "relatively liberal, egalitarian, and democratic" in comparison to the latter, which predominantly emphasize collective values and conformity. The traditional culture of Mongolia is pastoral nomadism, which predisposes the people to high values of individual autonomy. This in turn suggests that Rose’s realist notion of liberal democracy and a choice of "lesser evil" (by judgment that no other system does better to protect individual rights) would make it the preferred trajectory of development.

The results of the analyses of value dimensions and log linear modeling are in favor of support of democracy motivated by mainly by economic gain as a form of governance in Mongolia. Examining trend lines revealed cycles of conditioned political support. In addition, with Mishler and Rose it can be argued that in transitional regimes, people can better assess their regimes against other

88 Iglehart and Welzel, Modernization.
89 Iglehart and Welzel, Modernization, 35.
90 Rose, “Democratic and Undemocratic States.”
alternative, altogether adding to the suggestion that they are mainly “rational democrats.”\textsuperscript{91} This also implies that self-centered economic assessments are more important for systemic evaluations. Moreover, in general, interests have to be secure and become favorable in the foreseeable future. This potentially accounts for the tolerance of systemic deficiencies in the society. Most importantly, even if there was some improvement in material well-being over time, society has not reached the level of material security necessary to overcome basic needs. Consequently, leading to a conclusion that if there is a major influence of economic development in relation to support of the regime, then it is most probably high hopes for a better future.

Even if society is predominantly poor, the findings suggested that people in general are not against democracy.\textsuperscript{92} The most probable difference is that the proportion of those valuing democracy for economic gains (instrumental support) is more prevalent. According to Inglehart and Welzel, the main problem with this instrumental support is that it generally entails less tolerance in society.\textsuperscript{93} In addition, the communist system’s equally distributed poverty was replaced with a system of market competition, which resulted in winners and losers of the new system. However, as Prohl and Luvsandendev revealed, the issue is that there are very few winners and too many who consider themselves losers.\textsuperscript{94} The view that “winner takes all” is leading a feeling of social injustice in society. In particular, the small population of the country, mainly concentrated in the capital, makes inequality very visible. Even if the government has little transparency and accountability, people can easily observe errors and injustices. Therefore, all of this adds to multiple risks and uncertainties in a developing society.

In sum, this work examined the claim of pro-democratic political culture in Mongolia, which at the moment is widely accepted by the public as a common sense argument. In the process, empirical support was built on the basis of inferences from revised modernization theory represented by Inglehart and Welzel and findings in the New Democracies Barometers by Rose et al. in order to explore the scientific basis. Additionally, the generated case-specific theoretical propositions and methodology have made a small contribution to the existing literature by demonstrating how unique features can be managed. This work offers insights into how liberal democracy was sustained in a society culturally distant from the West. The findings empirically supplement previous studies, which used the political culture argument, but were restricted by availability of data or their approach. In the end, considering the complexity of analyzing changing societies, this study can

\textsuperscript{91} Mishler and Rose, “Learning and Re-learning Regime Support” “Political Support for Incomplete Democracies.”
\textsuperscript{92} According to NSOM 2010 almost 40% living under the poverty line.
\textsuperscript{93} Inglehart and Welzel, Modernization, 115-123.
\textsuperscript{94} Prohl and Luvsandendev, Voters Voices.
be used as a starting point for further research on Mongolia’s democratic development in particular, and on uncovering different issues of democratization in general.
### APPENDICES

#### Appendix 1: Politbarometers and Elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Politbarometers conducted by the Sant Maral Foundation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(each survey is marked &quot;●&quot;)</td>
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<td>● ●</td>
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<td>● ●</td>
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**Parliamentary elections**

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MPRP</td>
<td>MNPD/MSDP coalition</td>
<td>MPRP</td>
<td>MPRP</td>
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**Presidential elections and names of incumbent presidents**

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<tr>
<td>Ogibat</td>
<td>Bagband</td>
<td>Bagband</td>
<td>Erkhbayar</td>
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## Appendix 2: Politbarometer Variables – Systemic Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Labels</th>
<th>Value Labels</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>1995-2007</strong></td>
<td><strong>How much are you satisfied with the present political system?</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfied – 1</td>
<td>Rather satisfied – 2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rather not satisfied – 3</td>
<td>Not satisfied – 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Answer – 8</td>
<td>Don’t Know – 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2008-2012</strong></td>
<td><strong>How much are you satisfied with the Democracy and present political system?</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfied – 1</td>
<td>Rather satisfied – 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rather not satisfied – 3</td>
<td>Not satisfied – 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Answer – 8</td>
<td>Don’t Know – 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1995-2012</strong></td>
<td><strong>In general, how do you evaluate the present economic situation in Mongolia?</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very good – 1</td>
<td>Good – 2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Not good, not bad – 3</td>
<td>Bad – 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very Bad – 5</td>
<td>No Answer – 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t Know – 9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1995-2012</strong></td>
<td><strong>How much are you interested in politics?</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very strongly interested - 1</td>
<td>Rather interested - 2</td>
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<td>Slightly interested - 3</td>
<td>Rather not interested - 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totally not interested – 5</td>
<td>No Answer – 8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Don’t Know – 9</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>1997-2012</strong></td>
<td><strong>In general, how satisfied are you with the government?</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Satisfied – 1</td>
<td>Rather satisfied – 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rather not satisfied – 3</td>
<td>Not satisfied – 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Answer – 8</td>
<td>Don’t Know – 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>1997-2012</strong></td>
<td><strong>How satisfied are you with the opposition?</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Satisfied – 1</td>
<td>Rather satisfied – 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rather not satisfied – 3</td>
<td>Not satisfied – 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Answer – 8</td>
<td>Don’t Know – 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Question</td>
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<tr>
<td>1995-2012</td>
<td>How is your present personal and family's standard of living?</td>
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<td>1995-2012</td>
<td>In your opinion, how strong is voters' influence on political decision making?</td>
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<td>1995-2012</td>
<td>How do you evaluate your nearest future?</td>
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Label: The following statements describe democratic principles and issues. Please rate the importance of each statement listed below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Label</th>
<th>Value Label</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I can travel wherever I want</td>
<td>Very Important – 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Everybody can believe in what he/she wants</td>
<td>Rather Important – 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Everybody can express his/her opinion freely</td>
<td>Rather not Important – 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Media and research are uncensored in Mongolia</td>
<td>Totally Unimportant – 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Everybody has the right to enter one's desired profession</td>
<td>No Answer – 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Everybody can participate in the activities of their choice during one's free time</td>
<td>Don't Know – 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There is a free, democratic market</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men and women have equal rights</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>All parties have an equal chance to come into government</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All people have equal educational opportunities</td>
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<tr>
<td>Income differences are kept as small as possible</td>
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<tr>
<td>All people are equally treated by the law</td>
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<tr>
<td>The state provides as many social security services as possible</td>
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<tr>
<td>Everybody has the freedom to decide about his property</td>
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<tr>
<td>Social differences are kept as small as possible</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>The state provides for social justice in a market economy</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 4: Systemic Variables

Trend lines are the result of collapsing categories “satisfied” and “rather satisfied.” It can be seen that the three are strongly correlated, which led to a conclusion that respondents do not distinguish between the government and opposition.

Appendix 5: Present Standard of Living
Appendix 6: Belief in Voters Influence – Political Efficacy

Appendix 7: Present Economic Situation – Assessment of Macroeconomic Situation
Appendix 8: Interest in Politics – Political Involvement

Appendix 9: Future Economic Expectations
### Appendix 10: Recoding of Variables for Log Linear Model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RESPONSE VARIABLE</th>
<th>Original</th>
<th>Recoded</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>stfdemo – Satisfaction with democracy and present system</td>
<td>(1) Satisfied, (2) Rather Satisfied, (3) Rather not satisfied, (4) Not satisfied</td>
<td>stdem (S) (0) Dissatisfied (including categories 3 and 4) (1) Satisfied (including categories 1 and 2) → valid n: (0) 1883, (1) 2877; total 4760</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EXPLANATORY VARIABLES</td>
<td>Original</td>
<td>Recoded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>voteinfl – In your opinion, how strong is voters' influence on political decision making?</td>
<td>(1) Very Strong, (2) Rather strong, (3) Rather Little, (4) None</td>
<td>voteinfl (V) (0) Weak (incl. cat. 3 and 4) (1) Strong (incl. cat. 1 and 2) → valid n: (0) 1844, (1) 2642; total 4486</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>llevel – How is your personal and family’s life level situation?</td>
<td>(1) Very good, (2) Good, (3) Not good, not bad, (4) Bad, (5) Very Bad</td>
<td>llevel (L) (0) Bad (incl. cat. 4 and 5) (1) Average (incl. cat. 1, 2, 3) → valid n: (0) 1198, (1) 3795; total 4992</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>future – How do you evaluate your nearest future?</td>
<td>(1) Rather Optimistic, (2) Rather Pessimistic</td>
<td>future (F) (0) Pessimistic (incl. cat. 2) (1) Optimistic (incl. cat. 1) → valid n: (0) 344, (1) 4268; total 4612</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>intpols - How much are you interested in politics?</td>
<td>(1)Very strongly interested, (2) Rather interested, (3) Slightly interested, (4) Rather not interested, (5) Totally not interested</td>
<td>intpols (I) (0) Not interested (incl. cat. 4 and 5) (1) Interested (incl. cat. 1, 2, 3) → valid n: (0) 2213, (1) 2733; total 4946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>macroecon - In general, how do you evaluate the present economic situation in Mongolia?</td>
<td>(1)Very good, (2) Good, (3) Not good, not bad, (4) Bad, (5) Very Bad</td>
<td>macroecon (E) (0) Bad (incl. cat. 4 and 5) (1) Average (incl. cat. 1, 2, 3) → valid n: (0) 2126, (1) 2661; total 4787</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Bibliography:
Mina Sumaadii: Mongolian Values and Attitudes toward Democracy


*Empirical Data*


NATIONAL HEROES VS. EU BENEFITS: CROATIA AND THE EU CONDITIONALITY

Ana Jese Perkovic
University of Ljubljana

Abstract
With the powerful attraction of membership and conditionality, the EU has been encouraging democratic processes in the Western Balkans, however not always as successfully as in Central-Eastern Europe. This article looks at how the condition of full cooperation with the ICTY influenced political discourses and public opinion in Croatia by challenging national identity which was partially built on the patriotic war and national heroes from the 1990s. The question is why domestic political elites still complied with the ICTY condition although it clashed with national identity. The main argument is that even if the so-called ‘ICTY condition’ is unpopular with the public because it challenges national identity, domestic political elites still complied with it because the benefits of the European integration process are greater than its costs.

Keywords: EU conditionality, Croatia, political discourse, national identity

1. Introduction

The European Union (EU) has played a major role in Western Balkan societies in the past twenty years. Not only was the EU one of the main international actors in bringing to an end the armed conflicts in the Balkans during the 1990s, it was also the most important foreign actor in the reconstruction and reconciliation processes after the wars and has been one of the biggest aid donors in the region. Relations between the Western Balkans and the EU are complex and they influence all aspects of the integration process. The Western Balkan countries embarked on the European integration process at the beginning of this century, they are adopting EU rules and conditions more or less successfully, the EU is carefully monitoring the accession process and is using different mechanisms and tools to implement its basic principles. The functioning of these EU tools has been in the centre of research of EU studies. With the EU integration of the Central-Eastern Europe (CEE) in the 1990s the theoretical frameworks of the EU conditionality were based on the social action of this region. However, in past years authors have also researched EU conditionality in the Western Balkans, hence this article contributes to the analysis of the EU integration in the Western Balkans.

The case of Croatian general Ante Gotovina is closely connected to the start of Croatia’s official negotiations with the EU back in 2005. In this article we will look at how the condition of full cooperation with the ICTY influenced the political discourses and public opinion of Croatia by challenging national identity, which was partially built on the patriotic war and national heroes from the 1990s, as well as
why domestic political elites still complied with this condition. Is the attraction of EU membership so powerful to outweigh a national hero? The case study of Croatia was selected on the basis of two important facts: first, Croatia was the first of the Western Balkan countries to start with EU negotiations and has been considerably ahead in the EU integration process; second, the start of EU negotiations with Croatia was postponed due to allegedly poor cooperation with ICTY and this represented a precedent: for the first time the EU made the ICTY officially a precondition sine qua non for EU accession process. According to EU policies, this precondition is crucial for the reconciliation process in the region, however it aroused different reactions amongst the public, especially when the indicted were brought to court.

The analysis of political discourses in Croatia is based on newspaper articles, analysing the biggest left-leaning and right-leaning newspapers in a period beginning December 2004, when Croatia got positive signals at the EU Council for the start of negotiations, until the end of March 2005 when the EU negotiations were definitely postponed. A qualitative approach was used when analysing the newspaper articles, more specifically the statements of the high-ranking Croatian politicians were gathered and analysed.

The article is composed of two sections: the theoretical overview of EU conditionality and the case-study analysis. Firstly, we will look at what has been written about EU conditionality so far, especially in the area of the Western Balkans, and what EU conditionality is. Secondly, we will examine a specific EU condition for the Western Balkans, the so-called ‘ICTY condition’ that the EU applied for the Western Balkan countries that were at war during the 1990s. Thirdly, we will analyse political discourses in Croatia and finally, Croatian public opinion, when we will also try to answer the questions set above.

The main argument here is that although the so-called ‘ICTY condition’ undermined national identity and was unpopular with the public, domestic political elites still complied with it because they were already too deeply involved in the accession process and turning away from it would be too costly. However, the EU had to apply serious sanctions in order to press the elites to fulfil the condition.

2. The EU Conditionality

EU conditionality has been an important foreign-policy tool of the EU and is occupying the minds of many academics. There has been a lot of research and theorising about this tool in the past fifteen years. In this article we shall expose the authors that have, in our opinion, significantly contributed to the development of this area because they have developed new theoretical frameworks or introduced
new concepts in the area of EU conditionality: Frank Schimmelfennig¹, who developed the rationalist theoretical framework (rhetorical action) and explained how supporters of EU enlargement won out over the rationalistic superior negotiating power of their opponents (later Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier² analysed EU conditionality with governance approach); Milada Vachudova³ (2005), who elaborated the concepts of EU passive (the prospect of EU membership) and active leverage (EU conditionality) in the case of Central and Eastern Europe; Heather Grabbe⁴, who has focused on the costs and benefit analysis; and James Hughes, Gwendolyn Sasse and Claire Gordon⁵, who have critically examined the study of EU conditionality that, in their opinion, is characterised by ‘a concentration on the analysis of its correlation with macro-level democratization and marketization, rather than empirically tracking clear causal relationships in policies and institution-building⁶. All these authors based their studies on Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and have inspired our thinking about the functioning of EU conditionality in the Western Balkans. Often it appears that the Western Balkan societies react differently to this EU tool then CEE societies, which has been observed and researched by several authors in the past years, however a thorough all-inclusive research such as that Milada Vachudova⁷ produced on the CEE has not yet been written in the case of the Western Balkans. Instead, authors have dealt with specific problems or phenomena in the Western Balkans that were encouraged or influenced by EU conditionality.

Othon Anastasakis⁸ made an overview of normative and functional conditionality in the Western Balkans and emphasised the problem of criteria inconsistency on the

⁶ Hughes, Sasse and Gordon, *Europeanization, 10.*
⁷ Vachudova, *Europe Undivided.*
part of EU. Florian Trauner\(^9\), on the other hand, saw EU conditionality as a continuing successful foreign policy tool in the Western Balkans even if criteria for EU membership were higher. However, the biggest leverage for rule adoption in the Western Balkans has been policy conditionality and not membership conditionality, which Trauner\(^10\) demonstrates with two case studies, Macedonia and Croatia, and with the incentive of visa-liberalisation regime.

Freyburg and Richter\(^11\) critically examine the functioning of EU conditionality and question whether the success story of CEE can be repeated in the case of the Western Balkans. They argue in the case of Croatia that “national identity significantly influences the effectiveness of external democratization by political conditionality”\(^12\), “specifically, the EU’s conditionality regarding the prosecution of war crimes clashes with a national identity forged in a context of ethnic conflict”\(^13\).

George Vasilev\(^14\) compares ethnically diverse Western Balkan states Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia and explores how EU conditionality influenced the relationship between the ethnic groups. Vasilev argues that the “EU’s main focus in previous eastward enlargements was on the production of normative policy outcomes, its primary focus in Bosnia and Macedonia has been to generate normative procedures”\(^15\).

Dzihic and Wieser\(^16\) examine the influence of EU conditionality on democratization in Bosnia and Herzegovina. They state that the effectiveness of EU conditionality is weakened by the increasing domestic political costs of compliance. Andrew Konitzer\(^17\) looks at the influence of EU conditionality on party rhetoric and the transformation of leading political parties from nationalistic to pro-European parties in Croatia and Serbia.


\(^10\) Trauner, “From membership conditionality to policy conditionality,” 2009.


\(^12\) Ibid., 275.

\(^13\) Ibid., 264.


\(^15\) Ibid., 51.


This article deals with a specific issue – the influence of EU conditionality on political discourse and public opinion in Croatia in 2005 when negotiations were postponed by challenging national identity.

Observing the accession process very carefully, it is noticeable that the EU has been using the leverage of potential EU membership and conditionality throughout the accession process in order to give encouragement to the candidate countries in adopting European values and norms, the so-called Copenhagen criteria. EU conditionality actually started as conditionality in the aid programmes designed for Eastern Europe after 1989 (e.g. the PHARE programme) and was similar to the aid programme conditionality of other international actors (IMF, World Bank). It subsequently developed into a political conditionality of democracy promotion, rule of law and respect for human rights. Hughes, Sasse and Gordon¹⁸ distinguish between two main categories of conditionality: formal conditionality, on the one hand, which embodies “the publicly stated conditions as set out in the broad principles of the Copenhagen criteria and the legal framework of the acquis”, and informal conditionality, on the other hand, which includes “the operational pressures and recommendations applied by actors within the Commission to achieve particular outcomes during their interactions with candidate counterparts in the course of enlargement”. Informal conditionality increases the likelihood of inconsistency in the message communicated by Commission officials over time¹⁹.

In theory, governments accept and implement EU rules for different reasons. There is a rationalist and constructivist argument as to why the EU would want to enlarge and why states would apply for EU membership. The rationalist argument is about the costs and benefits of enlargement, hence the egoistic reasons of each state, when the political elites would behave rationally and calculate what brings them more benefits; the constructivist argument is about establishing a community of peace and stability in Europe; moreover it is about the overarching European identity that each nation on the European continent belongs to. According to the first argument, a government would adopt EU rules only when benefits are greater than costs whereas, according to the second argument, governments would adopt EU rules based on a discursive concept – it believes that the state belongs to Europe and the new EU rules are good for the state – rules are imported voluntarily as the result of perceived domestic utility rather than the careful balancing of EU rewards versus adjustment costs.

As with the CEE, the Western Balkan “desire [...] to join the EU, [...] allow the EU an unprecedented influence in restructuring domestic institutions and the entire range

¹⁹ Ibid., 26.
of public policies [...]“20. or even challenging national identity as in the case of Croatia. Schimmelfennig, Engert and Knobel21 argue that the probability of rule adoption varies mainly with the size of adoption costs. The promise of EU membership and the threat of exclusion mean that the credibility of EU conditionality is quite high, hence the extent of domestic political costs determines the readiness of the government to meet EU demands.

Generally, these costs increase the more the EU conditions negatively affect the security and integrity of the state, the government’s domestic power base, and its core political practices of power preservations.22

Nevertheless, it is also important how much progress a country has made at a particular point in time: the further it has progressed, the more costly it would be to turn away from the process.

There are different opinions on whether EU conditionality has had a positive or negative effect on candidate countries. Schimmelfennig and Vachudova both argue that due to the strong leverage of the prospect of EU membership the CEE countries strengthened liberal democracy. Vachudova23 argues that the deliberate conditionality exercised in the EU’s pre-accession process has been so powerful because it “builds on the benefits of the membership”. Once the EU developed its active leverage, it had so much attraction over domestic politics because the potential benefits24 of membership were so appealing. Rulers that disqualified their states from EU membership by maintaining illiberal politics and instituting only partial economic reforms such as, for example, Croatian President Franjo Tuđman, could not turn their back on the EU because the EU was too popular with the electorate. Their participation in the EU’s pre-accession process opened the door to criticism of their domestic policies, strengthening the hand of their domestic opponents25. Vachudova agrees with Kempe and Meurs who argue that active leverage, namely EU conditionality in bilateral relations with individual countries, is at present the most important instrument for implementing certain EU objectives in the Western Balkans.26

23 Vachudova, Europe Undivided, 17.
24 For example, access to the structural funds and more foreign direct investments.
25 Vachudova, Europe Undivided, 99.
Moreover, EU conditionality can also encourage euroscepticism in the candidate countries. Implementing unpopular policies lowers the support of the public on the one hand, on the other hand the political elites continue to comply with EU conditions. EU conditionality has the potential to frustrate a candidate country as it moves towards greater European integration in the medium term because conditionality involves costs to the candidate countries in the implementation of what is essentially a moving target within an “evolving process that is highly politicized, especially on the EU side”\(^27\). Grabbe argues that the conditionality rules are too loose and result in difficulties when the candidates themselves try to analyse the EU accession conditionality and what they are required to do.\(^28\) This is certainly one way of looking at it, however one must take into account that EU accession is a political project and that power asymmetry plays a big role in the whole process, thus the EU can change or at least modify the conditions for each particular situation.

The EU conditionality is saturated with inconsistency in its implementation.\(^29\) There have been numerous cases demonstrating

the inconsistency with which the EC, Western governments and multilateral organizations applied conditionality and their backsliding from sanctions when their own selfish economic and security interests were considered to be paramount to normative political conditionality.\(^30\)

These inconsistencies diminish the transformative power of EU conditionality to a certain degree and also frustrate a candidate country that has difficulties with following the rules which are constantly changing.

There is a consensus among these studies that for the adoption of the *acquis* EU conditionality has a strong causal effect in the steering policy and institutional change in the post-socialist countries. In general, EU conditionality has been viewed as an important lever for democracy promotion and has been seen as having made a significant contribution to “foreign-made democracy” in the CEE. Whether the same “positive” effect is emerging in the Western Balkans is debatable. Specifically, one can argue that the “ICTY condition” encouraged Western Balkan governments to arrest generals and politicians that were suspected of committing war crimes and contributed to reconciliation in the region. However, some of these cases are still highly disputed amongst the public, because they challenged national identity. Freyburg and Richter argue that EU conditionality “only trigger[s] democratic

\(^{27}\) Grabbe, *Profiting from EU enlargement*, 252.

\(^{28}\) Ibid., 31.

\(^{29}\) Hughes, Sasse and Gordon, *Europeanization*.

\(^{30}\) Ibid., 18-19.
change if certain conditions are met" and say that national identity determines whether EU conditionality is effective. We argue that EU conditionality influences national identity with ICTY condition, because it prosecutes national war-heroes, but does not trigger identity change as Freyburg and Richter argue. As we will show further in this article, political elites were reluctant in bringing General Gotovina to court due to different reasons (public support, political power, national identity, national sovereignty etc.), however, in the end they complied with the EU’s condition, because of the attraction of EU membership and benefits that it brings.

3. “Special” EU conditions for the Western Balkans

Before even beginning negotiations with the EU and besides fulfilling for the first time the Copenhagen criteria, Croatia had to meet one specific condition that also set a standard for the majority of the Western Balkan countries that have been aspiring to EU membership: full cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), a legacy of the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s. This is a condition sine qua non for the countries that were involved in these wars: Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro. Cooperation with the ICTY is not a condition that has to be fulfilled in order to join the EU, but it is a precondition to even begin the EU accession process. The cooperation has to be continued all the way through the accession process; otherwise the process can be stopped and postponed. In this chapter we will look closely at what was happening at the beginning of 2005 when the negotiations with Croatia were postponed.

In 2004 Croatia was moving quickly ahead in its EU integration process. In April its application for EU membership received a positive Opinion (Avis) from the European Commission, in June the EU Council granted Croatia a Candidate Country status, and in December the decision was taken to open accession negotiations with Croatia on 17 March 2005 provided there was a full cooperation with the ICTY. Croatia was also satisfied that it would go through the whole integration process by itself and would not have to be packaged together with any other country from the Western Balkans or with Turkey, which could also mean further waiting for Croatia.

However, the situation became more complicated and the EU started putting further pressure on the Croatian government to resolve the Gotovina case. In January 2005 Croatian Prime Minister Ivo Sanader assured Javier Solana, the EU High Representative, that Croatia had been doing everything it could to solve its last case. At the end of January 2005, when the Commission presented the negotiation framework, the Commission’s evaluation of the cooperation with the

32 HINA. “Juncker i Del Ponte o suradnji Hrvatske s ICTY-em.” (Juncker and Del Ponet on the Croatian cooperation with ICTY) HINA, 11 February 2005.
ICTY was negative, saying that Croatia had not done everything in its power to bring Gotovina to The Hague. Also, Carla del Ponte, chief prosecutor, presented the ICTY’s opinion on Croatia to Luxembourg’s Prime Minister Jean Claude Juncker, who presided over the EU Council at that time, and to the wider public, emphasising that full cooperation by Croatia with the ICTY means capturing and sending General Gotovina to the Court in The Hague.33

The meaning of ‘full cooperation’ with ICTY changed from ‘fully cooperating’ to actually ‘finding General Gotovina’. In the eyes of the Croatian public, the EU was acting inconsistently and losing credibility. Not only did the EU postpone the start of the negotiations, it also wanted to imprison General Gotovina who was a war hero and a patriot for a substantial part of the Croatian population. The headlines of articles in the Croatian daily newspaper Jutarnji list from the second half of 2004 provide evidence of the anticipation of the start of negotiations and also the uncertainty as to when would this happen: Negotiations at the beginning of 2005 (Pregovori pocetkom 2005)34, Conditions for negotiations (Uvjeti za pregovore)35, Negotiations after all? (Ipak pregovori?)36, Waiting for negotiations (Cekajući pregovore)37. At the beginning of 2005, Croatian politicians interpreted the situation as good and non-alarming since the signals had been different from different sides. However, although not united in agreeing on how to treat Croatia, the EU was persistent in pursuing fulfilment of its condition and it halted the start of the negotiations, even though it was losing support among the Croatian public.

Nevertheless, active cooperation with the ICTY became a major issue for Croatia and consequently also for other Western Balkan countries that were involved in the wars of the 1990s. In view of the fact that the EU has put Croatia under significant pressure to help the ICTY with its investigation and confirmed cooperation with the ICTY as a precondition for even starting the accession negotiations, EU conditionality entered a new phase. If we take a look back at past enlargements, we can see that each enlargement wave had additional requirements for the candidate countries according to their past political regimes, economic needs, level of development and other socio-economic and political circumstances. In the case of the former Yugoslavia, except for Slovenia, we can see that the wars of the 1990s

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33 HINA. “Juncker i Del Ponte o suradnji Hrvatske s ICTY-em.” (Juncker and Del Ponet on the Croatian cooperation with ICTY) HINA, 11 February 2005.
had strongly influenced the EU politics of inclusion for these countries and the ICTY condition has been one of them. The reasons for introducing this new condition can be fourfold.

Firstly, capturing war criminals on all sides and putting them on trial in an international court was possibly a means of bringing about reconciliation in the Balkan region and therefore preventing any possible future conflicts, leading to greater political stability and security in the region. Secondly, it might have been a good excuse for delaying the enlargement process because Turkey was close to accession and not all existing member states were supportive of its integration for different reasons. Moreover, some politicians and bureaucrats of the European Commission advocated that the EU was suffering from enlargement fatigue since it had yet to absorb the biggest enlargement wave of 2004 and certain doubts were also occupying the minds of European leaders regarding the accessions of Bulgaria and Romania, which were due in 2007. Thirdly, the EU was trying to change the internal institutional framework because it was no longer able to function effectively due to its growth, hence the debate on the European Constitution was heating up the European public sphere. Finally, the case of Croatia’s cooperation with the ICTY and the delay of negotiations were depicted as an example to the rest of the Western Balkan countries in order to emphasise that the fulfilment of demands of the ICTY was a binding condition that could not be bypassed.

The EU implemented the ICTY condition very strictly and the first time that this condition delayed the EU integration process was in 2005 when the start of the accession negotiations with Croatia was postponed due to the unsatisfactory cooperation of Croatia with the ICTY. On 16 March 2005 the EU’s foreign ministers decided to postpone the launch of accession talks, arguing that Zagreb had not met the related conditions.

4. Croatian political discourses

In this section we will analyse the discourses of the leading Croatian politicians that emerged during the implementation of EU conditionality by using a qualitative approach and examining the Croatian media. In particular we analysed two newspapers: *Jutarnji list*, the biggest left-leaning newspaper and also the biggest newspaper in the country, and *Vjesnik*, its right-leaning counterpart, which was a HDZ\textsuperscript{38} government tool and ceased to exist in 2012. For the purpose of this analysis the on-line archives of the newspapers were reviewed and articles with content relating to EU, negotiations and Gotovina were selected. The on-line archives are

\textsuperscript{38} Hrvatska Demokratska Zajednica (Croatian Democratic Union), a Christian-democratic party of late president Franjo Tuđman and a governing party for almost two decades since 1990.
incomplete, hence only 104 articles and opinion editorials were analysed. The timeline of analysis that interests us is a three months period from December 2004, when Croatia received the nod from Brussels and promises that negotiations would start in March, till the postponement of EU negotiations in March 2005.

Already at the end of 2004, when signals from The Hague were not at all positive, the leading Croatian politicians started to give statements in public that it was internal affairs that were blocking the EU integration and not the Gotovina case so as to redirect attention from the non-cooperation of the Croatian government with the Hague Tribunal. Some Croatian journalists opposed this, saying that it was untrue and immoral to claim that purely internal questions were connected to the start of the negotiations with the EU. At the beginning of 2005, the Croatian government assured Carla del Ponte, the EU and the Croatian constituency that they were doing everything they could to catch Gotovina. At the same time, the Croatian government tried to get assurances from the EU that catching Gotovina was not necessary to start the negotiations.

However, when EU politicians reaffirmed that catching Gotovina was a precondition to start EU negotiations, the Croatian government began to claim that Gotovina was no longer in Croatia, therefore he was not under Croatian jurisdiction so it was not in their power to catch him whilst Carla del Ponte was claiming the opposite. The leading Croatian politicians turned to a self-victimising discourse, which reached the very top when Prime Minister Sanader and President Mesić called on the general to surrender to the ICTY for the sake of their country. A journalist from *Jutarnji list* quoted President Mesić from a pre-election appearance on a television show when he said that he would invite Gotovina to his place for a coffee and try to convince him to surrender, which, “to put it mildly, is ridiculous and irresponsible,” commented the journalist. On 1 March 2005, *Vjesnik* commented on Prime

40 Vjesnik. “Ako Gotovina nije u Hrvatskoj, ne mozemo ga uhititi.” (If Gotovina is not in Croatia, we cannot catch him) *Vjesnik*, 24 February 2005.
41 Vjesnik. “Del Ponte: Gotovina je u Hrvatskoj.” (Del Ponte: Gotovina is in Croatia) *Vjesnik*, 24 February 2005. It turned out eleven months later that Gotovina had escaped from Croatia as he was captured in Spain on the Canary Islands but when he left Croatia is not known.
43 Butkovic, Davor. “Sanader, Mesić i Gotovina.” (*Sanader, Mesić and Gotovina*) *Jutarnji list*, 22 January 2005. English translation: “During one pre-election television appearance, Mesić even said that he would invite Gotovina for a coffee and try to persuade him to surrender which is ridiculous and an irresponsible thing for a politician to say, to put it mildly.”
Minister Sanader’s statement that it would be best for Gotovina and Croatia for the General to surrender to the Court and prove his patriotism in front of the Hague Tribunal\(^44\). The next day *Vjesnik* also reported on the statement by President Mesic that Croatia was ready to give up General Gotovina to The Hague, adding that they admitted that there were powers within the Administration that were protecting ‘Hague fugitives’ but that such powers no longer existed\(^45\).

It was only at the beginning of March 2005 that the government started to take serious action, intensifying police monitoring and searches. The President, the Prime Minister and the President of the Parliament sent a letter (145 pages of a report) to the Court in The Hague and to all EU member states, trying to show that they had searched all across the country and to prove that Gotovina was no longer in Croatia by showing the evidence of the routes the General took to escape from the country (Headline: *We are ready to catch Gotovina.*\(^46\)). In doing so, in the eyes of the Croatian public the government transferred all the responsibility for the start of negotiations onto prosecutor Carla del Ponte (Headline: *Decision on Carla del Ponte*\(^47\). The government was confident of Croatia’s geopolitical importance for the region’s stabilisation which would be further strengthened after the start of Croatia’s negotiations and that the EU would finally concede and start negotiations on time.

Croatian politicians emphasised the disastrous consequences that could arise if negotiations were postponed. The Croatian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Kolinda Grabar-Kitarovic, pointed out that Croatia was being put in an impossible situation

\(^{44}\) Rozankovic, Miroslava. “Sanader pozvao Gotovinu da domoljublje dokaze u Haagu.” (*Sanader called upon Gotovina to prove his patriotism in the Hague*) *Vjesnik*, 1 March 2005. English translation: Sanader mentioned that the best thing for Croatia and the General would be for him to appear in The Hague because he can only refute the charges in a court of law and that Croatia would offer him plenty of legal assistance there. Referring to the cases of Generals Cermak, Markac, Praljak and Petkovic who are also in The Hague along with General Gotovina, Sanader stated that “Had General Gotovina gone to The Hague, today he would be preparing his defence whilst still a free man. I call on him now to prove his love for the homeland in front of the Hague tribunal.”

\(^{45}\) Lopandic, Bruno. “Spremni smo uhititi Gotovinu.” (*We are ready to catch Gotovina*) *Vjesnik*, 2 March 2005. English translation: After meeting with Scheffer, President Mesic again repeated that Croatia was willing to arrest and hand over Ante Gotovina to The Hague if he was in Croatia. “We recognise that there were powers within the Administration in Croatia which were protecting fugitives from The Hague. Those powers no longer exist as of today. If we receive information that Gotovina is in Croatia, we will arrest him and send him to The Hague” announced Mesic.

\(^{46}\) Lopandic, Bruno. “Spremni smo uhititi Gotovinu.” (*We are ready to catch Gotovina*) *Vjesnik*, 2 March 2005.

because the EU’s conditions were made “in such terms that it does not make possible for Croatia to resolve the situation”\textsuperscript{48}. \textit{Vjesnik} commented on the Mesic statement, reporting that out of 626 Hague conditions, Croatia had fulfilled 625 and that it was surely unfair to punish Croatia just because of one condition.\textsuperscript{49} Directly before the EU ministers meeting, Sanader gave an interview to \textit{Vjesnik}, stating that the negotiations had to begin because Croatia deserved it and he was expecting to start.\textsuperscript{50} Also, the opposition leader Ivica Racan of the SDP (Social Democratic Party) stated that making the start of negotiations only conditional on the Gotovina case was unfair and a simplified evaluation of Croatia’s case; the dilemma of the EU versus Gotovina was wrong for Croatia and for the EU as well.\textsuperscript{51} Sanader, Mesic and Racan emphasised that after all the work Croatia had done in such a short time, it deserved to start negotiations on time and it would be a great injustice and humiliation for the Croatian people if that did not happen.\textsuperscript{52}

As shown by the statements made by leading Croatian politicians, self-victimising discourses do not serve only to re-interpret past events, but are also used in articulating current political issues and at the same time they serve to prepare the ground for future debates and contestations of power. Moreover, such discourses encourage the gradual formation of a certain self-image which we can call collective victim identity. Not only has EU conditionality challenged national identity that was build on the Homeland war and national heroes, but has also changed it into a victim-identity. Gotovina did not represent only “the generals of Croatia’s victorious army, but the Homeland War, Croatian sovereignty, the Croatian state, and ultimately all Croats”\textsuperscript{53}. Freyburg and Richter\textsuperscript{54} argue that Croatia experienced a ‘profound national identity change’ towards European identity after 2005 due to the blockade of the EU negotiations. However, Croatia

\textsuperscript{48} Vjesnik. “Del Ponte: Gotovina je u Hrvatskoj.” (Del Ponte: Gotovina is in Croatia) \textit{Vjesnik}, 24 February 2005.

\textsuperscript{49} Rozankovic, Miroslava. “Mesic manje optimističan.” (Mesic is less optimistic) \textit{Vjesnik}, 4 March 2005. English translation: Of 626 Hague conditions, Croatia has met 625. The Head of State is therefore openly asking whether it is fair to punish Croatia for this?

\textsuperscript{50} Latinovic, Andrea and Körbler, Jurica. “Hrvatska ne odustaje od 17. ožujka.” (Hrvatska is not giving up the 17th March) \textit{Vjesnik}, 5 March 2005. English translation: Negotiations should start because Croatia has deserved this. And I expect [to start] them.

\textsuperscript{51} Kapetanic, Sanja. “Datum pocetka pregovora nije najvazniji.” (Date of beginning of negotiations is not the most important) \textit{Vjesnik}, 10 March 2005.

\textsuperscript{52} Vjesnik. “Sanader: Ocekujem odluku o pocetku pregovora.” (Sanader: I am expecting a decision on the start of negotiations) \textit{Vjesnik}, 10 March 2005. English translation: “Afterwards, full of confidence, we are expecting a positive response from the Council of Ministers because Croatia deserves that negotiations begin” said Sanader.


\textsuperscript{54} Freyburg and Richter, “National identity matters.”
(and Slovenia) perceived itself as a more European then other Yugoslav republics already before 1990s, which was also one of the narratives of the independence. After the war in 1990s Croatian identity is compound of European and nationalistic component, which does not seem to be conflicting at all. As shown below, war veterans stated that they were fighting for a European Croatia. Therefore, the EU conditionality did not contribute to the shift from nationalistic to European identity. They go together hand in hand. Depending on the circumstances one or the other component prevails in the public discourse.

In preparing the ground for future debates, the Croatian government was faced with the threat of radicalism and euroscepticism that might grow if negotiations did not start according to the schedule and the consequences would be felt across the whole region. Hence, the politicians who used the self-victimising discourse were actually fuelling the euroscepticism in the public with this exact discourse. Vjesnik commented that radicalism would ‘grow wings’ if the pressure on Croatia continued and that this trend would spread across the region. The newspaper also reported on the President Mesic statement that postponement of negotiations would negatively influence the whole of South-Eastern Europe. On the other hand, a majority of the Croatian political elite were at the same time saying to the Croatian public that it would not be a catastrophe if negotiations were delayed, thereby trying to minimise the importance of its political ‘failure’ and again preparing the ground for the future contesting of power. The case of General Gotovina was becoming an increasingly important political issue, hence the support for Gotovina grew among Croats and so did euroscepticism. In several Dalmatian towns posters with a photo of General Gotovina were displayed, saying that he was not a war criminal but a hero. The Croatian war veterans issued a public statement, saying that they had been fighting for a European Croatia and that the people should not forget this. Gotovina was transformed from a military to political figure without him taking a part in this transformation yet Croatia’s Euro-Atlantic integration depended on his arrest, which was fuelling euroscepticism. Two public figures with radical

55 Latinovic, Andrea and Jurica Körbler. “Očekujem pregovore!” (I expect negotiations!) Vjesnik, 14 March 2005. English translation: Radicalism will grow wings if this trend of putting pressure on Croatia continues. Furthermore, opponents of a European Croatia will continue with their euroscepticism and fear-mongering. It is also realistic to expect that these trends will spread to other countries in the region and then give rise to problems in those countries which are already EU member states.
57 Pavlakovic, “Croatia.”
59 Pavlakovic, “Croatia,” 1716.
views openly defended General Gotovina. The first was Branimir Glavas, a member of HDZ, who by doing so opposed the official stance of his governing party. He stated that Ante Gotovina is “our grand hero” and that the EU would surely find another reason to deny Croatia the start of negotiations if it wasn’t for Gotovina.\(^{60}\) The second was a very popular Croatian priest, Zlatko Sudac, who supported Gotovina and incited euroscepticism. The priest said to the media that the EU accession would bring the legalisation of abortion, apparently not realising that abortion had been legal in Croatia for more than 30 years.\(^{61}\) The media also blamed the EU Council decision to postpone the negotiations for the growing nationalism in Croatia and for the fall in support for the EU.

In order to reduce the growing euroscepticism and to reverse the fall in public support for EU membership, leading Croatian politicians used two discourses to support European integration: first, “Return to Europe”, which was used also by Central and Eastern European countries when the communist regime was overthrown in the 1990s, and emphasises that Croatia has always been a European nation and has to return to its European family and second, “Defence of Europe”, which is emphasising the fight against the Other and preventing the Other from entering Europe, usually a non-Christian Other but also a non-Catholic Other (Croatia represents *Antemurale Christianitatis*) and has been used many times before in the Balkans.\(^{62}\)

Prominent political figures tried to show their devotion to the fulfilment of the ICTY condition because they interpreted the start of negotiations as a success, which would bring far greater benefits compared to the costs of handing over a war hero and losing part of their domestic support. As Vachudova\(^{63}\) argues with the CEE countries, the benefits and attraction of the European integration process were far greater than the costs, meaning painful economic reforms in most of the countries; in the case of Croatia, EU membership outweighed not just the economic reforms but also a hero from a patriotic war which has been a feature of public discourse in Croatia since 1991. At the last moment, on 14 March 2005, they even froze Gotovina’s assets but the only solution was the actual capture of the General.

The EU took into account Del Ponte’s evaluation but nevertheless some member states supported Croatia immediately starting accession negotiations, mostly

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62 For authors addressing orientalism and balkanism, see also Edward Said, Milica Bakic-Hayden, Maria Todorova, Slobodan Drakulic and Bojan Baskar. For an example of similar discourses in Slovenia, see Mandelc, 2011.
63 Vachudova, *Europe Undivided*. 

because of Croatia’s perceived strategic importance. These countries were its neighbours (Slovenia, Hungary) and mostly the countries from the region of Central Europe (Austria, Slovakia and Italy). Those strongly opposed were led by the United Kingdom, followed by Sweden, Finland and Denmark. German passiveness and French silence were the source of much disappointment in Croatia because Germany was considered a traditional ally. In the end, both countries agreed with the UK position by remaining silent. In March 2005 the EU council of ministers decided to put the start of negotiations with Croatia on indefinite hold.

In October 2005 prosecutor del Ponte stated that Croatia had been fully cooperating with the ICTY but Gotovina had yet to be found. Since Gotovina was captured in December 2005, the ICTY probably had reliable information on Gotovina in October 2005, therefore Croatia fulfilled the ‘ICTY condition’ and the negotiations were started. Nevertheless, not all of the EU member states were convinced by Carla del Ponte’s recommendation and the ICTY’s positive opinion on Croatia was not enough to start the negotiations. Ironically, it could be said that Croatia was ‘saved’ by Turkey. Austria, as a traditional ally of the Balkans, pressed hard on those member states that were in favour of the start of negotiations with Turkey, especially the UK, by threatening to use its veto if they did not support Croatia. Therefore, the EU agreed to formally open membership talks with Croatia and Turkey on 3 October 2005 and the screening process in Croatia started on 20 October 2005.

5. Croatian public opinion

The attitude of the Croatian public towards the EU was ambivalent overall; it was very positive at the beginning of the EU integration process but became quite negative during the “Gotovina crisis”. This public attitude was mostly defined by national circumstances. The implementation of ICTY condition and Croatian political discourses influenced Croatian public opinion, because they challenged national identity.

For the purposes of this analysis of public opinion we took the opinion polls conducted by the Ministry of European Affairs, later the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration. Between 2000 and 2005 the Ministry conducted the opinion polls on Croatia’s membership and, only after the start of negotiations, the

64 Butkovic, Davor. “Ipak pregovori?” (Negotiations after all?) Jutarnji list, 27 November 2004. English translation: “... the extent to which Croatian officials must rely on the logic of higher political interests, even if from that logic comes the promise of concrete German support which probably also means concrete support from the French in view of the fact that German and French government policy is expressly aligned, in particular after the US intervention in Iraq.”

65 General Ante Gotovina was found not guilty on all charges and released from the prison in November 2012. On 1st July 2013 Croatia joined European Union.
opinion on EU membership was measured by a Eurobarometer but with a different methodology. For the purposes of this analysis the source of the Ministry was used, because it coincides with the timeline of the analysis.

**Figure 1: Croatian Public Opinion on the EU Accession of Croatia (2000-2005)**

Support for EU membership was high and stable until 2004, with 72-79% of the participants in favour of Croatia’s membership and only around 8-14% against (See Graph 1). However, the percentage of those against was steadily rising and in December 2003 had already reached 21%. In 2004, support for membership fell from three quarters of the population to around 51% later in the year. The percentage of those against the EU membership rose to 39%. Support dropped even further when the problems with the search of General Gotovina began in the beginning of 2005, and continued when EU negotiations were postponed in March 2005. For the first time the number of those against the EU membership was higher (47%) than those in favour (41%). A similar trend continued throughout 2005 and even the start of the EU negotiations with Croatia in October 2005 did not persuade Croatains to change their mind about the EU. In December 2005 those against the accession were still more numerous than those in favour.

One way of interpreting this data is that support in the CEE states also fell the closer they came to actual membership. For example, at the beginning of 2004, two
months before joining the EU, support for EU membership in Slovenia was at its lowest point at just 40% as shown by the Eurobarometer 2004. Apparently, the closer the country gets to the EU membership, the lower the enthusiasm about EU amongst the population. However, Croatia in this period was only getting closer to the negotiations and was not at the doorstep of EU membership. On the other hand, as mentioned in the previous chapter, some Croatian politicians were also interpreting this as growing euroscepticism, which could be attributed to different causes. Some eurosceptics presented arguments which were mostly not connected with the Gotovina case but rather with solving of Croatia’s serious economic problems. The arguments were that, first, Croatia was not economically developed enough to compete in the EU market and had been lacking successful reforms since 1905, therefore joining the EU would not help Croatia economically; and second, EU membership would mean ceding a part of its sovereignty, which would be a major mistake because the EU is burdened with a fundamental ‘democratic deficit’\(^6^6\). Not all eurosceptics were against the accession \textit{per se} but were pleading for accession to take place later due to the passive reform policy of Croatia’s government. The Gotovina crisis was drawing attention away from the domestic economic crisis which was useful for the local politicians that were gaining political power by nationalistic discourse.

One reason for growing euroscepticism was also decreasing trust in the EU on the part of Croatian citizens, who at the beginning of the process believed that EU membership would bring them economic benefits. However, the integration process had not brought any real change for the better; on the contrary, the economic crisis was persisting and EU membership seemed too far away from the present and too abstract. Some politicians embarked on a negative campaign and frightened citizens with stricter EU rules that would apply and endanger Croatian agriculture. One of the famous billboards from 2005 said: “The EU is not cool, but cheese and cream are. Think about it!” (\textit{EU nije cool ali sir i vrhnje jesu. Razmisli!}). The author of this billboard was the former chief editor of the newspaper \textit{Vjesnik}, Nenad Ivanković, under the umbrella of political organisation, close to the Franjo Tuđman circle, SIN (Samostalnost i napredak, eng.: Independency and progress).\(^6^7\)

The Croatian media attacked the exaggerated euroscepticism which might take Croatia back to Tuđman’s times: economically underdeveloped, corrupt, undemocratic and isolated. Some journalists together with certain politicians drew

\(^6^6\) Also other smaller European nations have been dissatisfied with growing democratic deficits, not only member states (Ireland and Denmark) but also countries that have temporarily rejected membership (Norway, Switzerland). Habermas, Jürgen. “Why Europe needs a constitution”, \textit{New Left Review} 11 (2001): 14. Tihomir Ponos, “Europska unija ne rjesava nijedan ozbiljan problem Hrvatske.” (European union does not solve any of the serious problems of Croatia) \textit{Vjesnik}, 26 February 2005.

\(^6^7\) Butkovic, Davor. “Zasto moramo u EU?” (Why do we have to enter EU?) \textit{Jutarnji list}, 21 August 2004.
attention to the consequences of a stalling European integration: a rise in nationalism, weakening of pro-European elites, threat to regional stability and re-establishing of tensions between the countries of the former Yugoslavia.\textsuperscript{68} Their concerns were reasonable, not only because of manifestations of ethnic nationalism in its worst form at the start of the 1990s, but even in the years 1999-2000 an all-encompassing European survey showed that Croats were the fourth most xenophobic nation out of 32 European nations, coming only after Turkey, Bulgaria and Romania.\textsuperscript{69} Ramet explains that xenophobia, which was encouraged by the war, diminishes with peace and prosperity, although this process is slower in isolated rural areas, among conservatives and less educated people who are insecure and turn towards institutionalised religion.\textsuperscript{70}

An important factor in the relationship of Croatian citizens towards the EU (but also in other small countries, such as Slovenia) was nationalism, which was connected to the perception of national and European identity. Two dimensions, protectionism and xenophobia, represent an obstacle in forming support for EU membership, while the third dimension inclusive nationalism, when people perceive themselves as Europeans, can diminish the effects of the first two or even have a positive impact on support for EU membership. Fearful of how to preserve their national identity, many Croatian citizens had a negative attitude towards the EU and a threat to the national heroes from the Hague tribunal even increased this fear since national heroism substantially contributed to the formation of independent Croatia and the new Croatian identity during the 1990s. However, leading conservative Croatian politicians, creators and protectors of the new Croatian state and identity, supported the EU membership as “national identity would upgrade and round up with Euro-Atlantic membership”.\textsuperscript{71} While Eurosceptics and Europhiles were discussing protection of the national interest within or outside the EU, Vidmar Horvat argues that the \textit{Europeanness} of Slovene identity was never in question and the same is true for Croatian identity in public discourses, which was always


\textsuperscript{70} Ramet, “Građanske vrijednosti u demokratskoj tranziciji”, 26-27.

perceived as European.\textsuperscript{72} On the contrary, \textit{Europeanness} became an instrument of historic differentiation and solidification of cultural distinction in the region,\textsuperscript{73} as presented in the previous chapter with the examples of the two discourses: “Return to Europe” and “Defence of Europe”.

The population’s orientation in any candidate country towards the EU is fluid and under the influence of everyday political and socio-economic life, discourses of political parties and decision-making in the parliament; therefore the role of media and politicians is crucial in shaping public opinion and national identity in the framework of European identity. The EU influenced Croatian public opinion with its unpopular demands of EU conditionality, trying to set a standard for other Western Balkan countries as did the self-victimising discourse of Croatian politicians. Croatian political elites accepted the demands although the public support was falling, however the HDZ government did not lose a lot of support and won again at the next elections. In the case of Croatia, EU conditionality played a role in shaping public opinion and in this particular case the public opinion was formed in a conflicted context of a clash between the national (sovereignty, pride, war heroes) and the European imperative (conditionality, ‘humiliation’ with conditioning, imposed interpretations of war and war crimes). The domestic political elites were trying at the same time to be transmitters of the conflict between the European Union and domestic public and an ally of the domestic public in order to lower the costs and preserve the benefits of the EU integration process.

6. Conclusion

With the powerful attraction of EU membership and EU conditionality, the EU has been promoting democratic reforms in the Western Balkans, sometimes more and sometimes less successfully. Many academics argue that EU conditionality has been the most successful foreign policy tool of the EU in the past three decades. This article shows that EU conditionality has a different impact on the Western Balkan societies than it has had on CEE. EU conditionality proved efficient in the case of Croatia in fulfilling the legal standards, which are the basis for democratising the legal-political systems of candidate countries. However, the implementation of conditionality and its impact on the domestic social and political processes was different than in CEE. This article does not explain why the impact is different and leaves it for future research.

\textsuperscript{72} Ksenija Vidmar Horvat, \textit{Zemljevidi vmesnosti. Eseji o evropski kulturi in indentiteti po koncu hladne vojne}. (The maps of inbetweenness. Essays on European culture and identity after the end of Cold War.) (Ljubljana: Sophia, 2009), 26-27.

\textsuperscript{73} Vidmar Horvat, \textit{Zemljevidi vmesnosti}, 27.
The implementation of the ICTY condition in Croatia set a standard for other Western Balkan countries: without sufficient cooperation with the ICTY there can be no EU integration. However, the ICTY condition challenged national identity by influencing political discourses and public opinion. The insistence on bringing General Ante Gotovina, a national war hero, to court and the postponement of negotiations caused public frustration, the support for EU integration dropped whilst euroscepticism and nationalism were on the rise. EU conditionality clashed with national identity, which was based on the Homeland War and national war heroes from 1990s. The party in power in 2005, a centre-right HDZ, which was established by Tuđman, had to choose between the European Union on one hand and General Gotovina with public support on the other. Hence, the leading Croatian politicians complied with the EU conditions and at the same time used the discourse of self-victimisation in the domestic public sphere in order to prepare the ground for future contestations of power. Furthermore, by using self-victimising discourse in trying to secure their position in power, they actually encouraged euroscepticism in Croatia and fuelled nationalism.

This case-study shows that complying with EU conditionality is not always a straightforward process but depends on domestic social processes and national identity. National political elites proved to be a transmitter of the conflict between the European Union and national public, trying to satisfy both sides in order to gain benefits and stay in power. In the case of Croatia, the EU benefits outweighed a national war hero. For a long time the Croatian political elites were manoeuvring between the European Union and domestic constituency, implementing only the most obvious reforms. Due to the low level of public support for EU membership in Croatia since 2005, the motivation to join the European Union was mostly on the side of the Croatian political elites.

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INTERMINGLED CYCLES OF HEGEMONY-BUILDING: EUROPEANIZATION AND MINORITY POLICIES IN GREECE DURING THE SIMITIS PERIOD

Umut Koldas
Near East University

Abstract
Drawing on the changes and continuities in Greek official discourse and state policies towards the Turkish speaking Muslim minority in the 1990s, this article discusses the impact of Europeanization process on the state-minority relations in Greece from the neo-Gramscian perspective. Referring to an upper cycle of hegemony-in-building process between the EU and Greece in the late 1990s, the article addresses the discursive and/or practical changes and continuities in the minority policy framework during the 1990s as well as prospects of the Greek state’s relations with the Turkish/Muslim minority. Within this context, it examines the likelihood of a hegemonic relationship between the Greek state and the Turkish/Muslim minority, based on the consent of the latter under the framework of a broader hegemonic structure of the European Union.

Keywords: hegemony, Greece, European Union, Turkish/Muslim minority

1. Introduction:

The Greek policies toward the Turkish-Muslim minority evolved significantly from the climate of tolerance of the 1930s to the EU-led hegemonic transformation in the late 1990s. The course of bilateral relations between Turkey and Greece, the interventions of foreign powers, internal socio-political and economic factors, and the national and international conjuncture had an impact on the evolution of these policies. The Europeanization however, exerted significant pressure on the Greek ruling elite for a structural change in their stance and policies towards the minorities in line with the requirements of EU membership, especially from the mid-1990s onwards.

Historically, the transformation of the Greek-Turkish minority relationship from that of a "fifth column (enemy in our midst) vs. authority seeking to suppress it," as understood in populist discourse up to the 1990s, to one of politically constructed consent between "hegemon and subordinate." was set in motion with the precariousness of the political sphere during the Greek Civil War of the early 1940s, followed by a re-structuring of Greek politics and economy after the Second World War. A Greek-Turkish rapprochement in the early 1950s was cut short by the attacks on ethnic Greeks in Istanbul in 1955. These developments, together with the Cyprus issue moving to the front of the Greek political agenda in the 1970s, were integral
to the nationalist posturing\(^1\) and anti-Turkish populism of both the PASOK and the New Democracy parties in governments which they led or shared from the late 1970s to the mid-1990s.

The Simitis-led Europeanization, which took place in Greece between 1996 and 2004 is considered the second wave of Europeanization following the initialization of Euro-guided foreign and domestic policies by the Konstatin Mitsotakis government between 1990 and 1993\(^2\). Within this context, the status of minority rights in Greece and the Greek ruling elite’s minority policies have been an important component of the Europeanization process. Among all other minorities, the Turkish speaking Muslim minority has been distinguished from others due to its kinship ties with the “Big Neighbor” and its potential to be a “fifth column” in Greece. Therefore, compared to other minorities, the Greek hegemony-building process, which would require the consent of the Turkish-Muslim minority in Greece to fall under the intellectual and moral leadership of the Greek ruling elite (and Greek dominant socioeconomic forces) pursued a more complicated and multifaceted trajectory within the context of Europeanization.

This study is an attempt to apply the Gramscian notion of hegemony to the multi-cyclical relations between the European Union (EU), the Greek ruling elite and the Turkish Muslim minority during the Simitis period within the context of Europeanization. The main argument of the article can be summarized on in three dimensions. First, the nature of relationship between the European Union and its member and candidate states is hegemonic. This hegemony, which is defined as political leadership based on the consent of the led, necessitates diffusion and popularization of the EU’s worldview among both political and civil societies of the member and candidate countries. In this respect, the EU can be labeled a “normative regional hegemon”\(^3\) which transforms domestic structures and worldviews of the peripheral regional actors on many issues (such as minority affairs) in line with the dominant value-system of the core ones (leading socio-economic forces\(^4\) or the historic bloc\(^5\)) in the EU. Therefore, a Gramscian perspective can be very helpful in evaluating and comprehending the changes in the policies and

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actions of the peripheral member states (such as Greece of the 1990s) in different fields of socio-economic relations (such as state-minority relations).

Second, from a Gramscian perspective, Europeanization can be defined as the process of diffusing and popularizing the European norms, values and worldview in the region. Looking at the changing nature of relationship between the EU and Greece in the mid-1990s, it is possible to label the initiatives of Greece’s ruling elites towards Europeanization as the beginning of such a hegemony-in-building process. However, this process does not necessarily result in a static and absolute form of hegemony. It may well face crises unless hegemony-in-building is accepted and internalized by the member countries. In other words, the consent of “the led to be led” should be reproduced and kept alive continuously for a successful hegemony.

Third, the relationship between the Europeanization of Greece and its implications for the minority policies of the Greek ruling classes is worth analyzing in order to shed light on the nature and operation of two interconnected cycles of hegemony-in-building processes: the first cycle takes place between the EU as core regional historic bloc and the peripheral national historic blocs as subordinates while a second cycle is experienced between the national historic blocs of the peripheral countries and the minorities as their subordinates.

This article is structured in six sections. The first discusses the Gramscian theoretical framework to explore the relationship between the Greeks and Turkish minority in the course of Europeanization. This section also includes a review of the literature on Europeanization, Greek-EU relations and the non-Gramscian literature on both the relations between the EU and Greece and the status of minority affairs in Greece. The second section describes the changes and continuities in the Greek

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6 The historic bloc is defined in the Gramscian conceptual framework as “The conception of historic bloc in which precisely material forces are the content and ideologies are the form, though this distinction between form and content has purely didactic value, since the material forces would be inconceivable historically without form and the ideologies would be individual fancies without the material forces.” See, Anne, S. Sassoon, *Gramsci’s Politics* (Minneapolis: University of Minesorra Press, 1987), 120. In this respect, an historical bloc refers to the way in which leading social forces within a specific national context establish a relationship over contending social forces. It is more than simply a political alliance between social forces represented by classes or fractions of classes. It indicates the integration of a variety of different class interests that are propagated throughout society “bringing about not only a unison of economic and political aims, but also intellectual and moral unity...on a “universal” plane” (Bieler and Morton 2004) For a more detailed conceptual assessment of historic bloc in the case of European Union, see, Andreas Bieler and Adam D. Morton, “A critical theory route to hegemony, world order and historical change: neo-Gramscian perspectives in International Relations”, *Capital & Class*, 28 (2004): 85-113.
minority policies under Simitis leadership in the course of Europeanization. The following section elaborates on the legal and political aspects of the hegemony-in-building processes by referring to various developments in this era between the Greek state and the minorities. Next, I scrutinize the dilemmas of the Simitis Government in the course of Europeanization as well as the crises of hegemony-in-building which were experienced both the EU and Greek historic blocs. The article concludes by illustrating the theoretical and practical implications of Gramscian approach in assessing the relations of hegemony between the EU-like supranational regional frameworks; the peripheral national historic blocs and the subordinate minorities.

2. Theoretical Background and Methodology

Regarding the theoretical and methodological paths, this article is based on qualitative analysis of secondary and primary texts from a Gramscian perspective. There has been increasing use of Gramscian notions and conceptualizations in defining the nature relationship between the EU and some of its member states. The literature is composed of a variety of studies ranging from the theoretical foundations of EU integration to neo-Gramscian analysis of EU’s environmental policies (particularly emissions trading). Topics in the neo-Gramscian literature include the political economy of EU integration, European capitalist structuring and the class struggle in EU, socio-economic dimensions and the role of social forces in the restructuring of Europe. Some research has also been carried out to investigate civil society and the operation of democratic procedures, norms,

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11 Bieler, and Morton, Social Forces, 25–43.

values and the democratic deficit in Europe and the European Union from a Gramscian perspective.

There has also been a wide-ranging non-Gramscian literature on both the relations between the EU and Greece and the status of minority affairs in Greece. The first set of studies reflects various aspects of hegemonic relations between the EU and Greece. They support the use of a Gramscian approach with the evidence they offer on receptiveness of Greek administrative system of the European vision and European policy formation processes; dilemmas of Greece with regard to integration and centralism of the EU; differentiations between the policy design and implementation due to domestic challenges and the nature of Greek structures; challenges and disproportion in the consolidation of Europeanization in the Greek regions (particularly in the Western Thrace where the Turkish/Muslim minority is found). The second set of studies offer detailed analyses on the status of the minorities in Greece by referring to the legal status of minorities and Islam in Greece; their freedom of movement, citizenship issues, and education.

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These two sets of studies provide researchers with insightful hints about the nature of the relations among the dominant and subordinate actors at regional and domestic levels of analysis.

However, few studies are found where a Gramscian perspective on the two intermingled cycles of hegemony building processes is applied the hegemonic cycle between the EU and Greek dominant socio-political and economic forces and the cycle between the Greek dominant social forces and minorities in Greece. This article aims to provide an empirical analysis and Gramscian overview of these two cycles of hegemony-building processes through putting particular emphasis on the changes and continuities in Greece’s minority policies during the Simitis period under the impact of Euro-guided (or EU-dominant) re-structuring.

In Gramscian terms, hegemony can be defined as:

the state of ‘total social authority’ which, at certain specific conjunctures, a specific class alliance wins, by a combination of ‘coercion’ and ‘consent’, over the whole social formation, and its dominated classes: not only at the economic level, but also at the level of political and ideological leadership, in civil, intellectual and moral life as well as the material level: and over the terrain of civil society as well as in and through the condensed relations of the State.\(^{24}\)

In this respect, hegemony is not a static mode of dominance simply based on coercion. It is rather a dynamic process which is persistently renovated, reconstructed, protected, and customized\(^{25}\) in line with the changing conditions of the relationship between the dominant and subordinate actors. The consent of the subordinate classes to the intellectual and moral leadership of the dominant ones is not always taken for granted. In other words, hegemony is not always accepted and internalized by the subordinate actors without a resistance. Therefore it is not immune from certain opposition, limitation, changes, challenges\(^{26}\) or crises.

According to Gramsci, an endurable and crisis-free hegemony requires ethico-political leadership and intellectual-moral superiority of a historic bloc (an organic system of socioeconomic, ideological and cultural alliances)\(^{27}\) and the persistent


\(^{26}\) Ibid.

reproduction of the consent of the other groups\textsuperscript{28} in the civil society\textsuperscript{29} through persuading them to accept and internalize the views, values and norms\textsuperscript{30} of the historic bloc. According to Strinati, hegemony is activated and consolidated culturally and ideologically through the institutions of civil society (i.e. education, the family, the church, the mass media, popular culture) in mature liberal-democratic capitalist societies.”\textsuperscript{31} Drawing on this assessment, both Europeanization and the attempts to restructuring of the Greek ruling elite and polity under the Simitis government can be considered as two parallel hegemonic processes.

In fact, until the mid-1990s, the Greek ruling elites did not systematically attempt or did not manage to form a historic bloc which would embrace the minorities by seeking to obtain their consent on the elite’s intellectual and moral leadership. They rather tried to maintain the ropes of “the system of control” tight over the unreliable fifth column of the kin neighbor (Turkey) through the utilization of relatively more coercive means and policies.

As Greece took concrete steps toward a stronger “Europeanization” with the Simitis governments. P. Ioakimidis has described Europeanization as

\begin{quote}
 a process of ‘internalization of environmental inputs’ by the political and societal systems of EU member states, and, as such, it entails a steady redefinition of functions, relationships, boundaries, values and cultural traits, regulatory patterns that shape the internal dynamics of the political system. It involves the redefinition of boundaries between the state and society as well as of the relationships within state structures and within society.\textsuperscript{32}
\end{quote}

According to this framework, a Europeanizing Greek state can be assumed to consent \textit{a priori} to restructure its institutions and policies in line with European values on minority rights and security. Changes along this line in the discourse and practices of the Greek state would also, however, increase its capacity to build a new form of hegemony over the Turkish /Muslim minority by presenting itself as a more Europeanized state exhibiting greater respect for minority rights. Thus, the Europeanization of Greece and the formation of grounds for higher levels of consent of the subordinate minorities in the ruling elite (as well as dominant socio-

\textsuperscript{28} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{29} Sue Golding, \textit{Gramsci’s Democratic Theory: Contributions to a Post-Liberal Democracy}, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992)
\textsuperscript{31} Dominic Strinati, \textit{An Introduction to Theories of Popular Culture}, (London; Routledge, 1995),
economic forces) can be considered as interconnected hegemony-building processes. In this respect, the Simitis period is an important turning point in the relations between the Greek dominant state structures and the Turkish/Muslim minority. With the impact of the EU’s “normative-hegemony-in-building” under the strong wave of Europeanization, Greek decision-makers seemed to shift their minority policies from the anti-minority populism to a policy of “hegemony-in-building” by seeking legitimacy and consent in the eyes of minorities.

As a result, during this period, the European Union appeared as a historic bloc with its values and institutional framework. In this respect, Europeanization for Greece has become a process of hegemony-in-building of EU over Greek socioeconomic and political forces rather than coercive imposition of those institutions and values to Greek civil and political societies. A parallel hegemony building process was initiated by the Greek-dominated socioeconomic and political forces over the minorities. Although this process was surely influenced by the upper hegemonic cycle of Europeanization, it was not simply a parerga of EU’s hegemony. It was rather an attempt towards the restructuring of Greek political and civil societies initiated by Euro-guided ruling elite and socioeconomic forces.

It is then possible to observe that the 1990s has witnessed two intermingled cycles of hegemony building processes in the case of Greece: hegemony of the European Union over Greek ruling elite (which was mainly materialized in the context of Europeanization) and the hegemony of the Greek ruling elite over the Muslim/Turkish minorities and other segments of Greek society, which was highly influenced by the Euro-guided changes in the Greek polity in line with either pragmatic or value-laden policy preferences of the Greek leadership.

3. The Simitis Period: Europeanization and Hegemony-in-building

The Simitis-Papandreou government came to the power in 1996 and wasted no time in adopting objectives of modernization and alignment with EU norms. It also introduced a political style which was less formalistic and more pragmatic, less symbolic and more issue oriented. Melakopides defines the main tenets of Greek foreign policy during the Simitis period by referring to “Simitis Doctrine” as follows:

[...] as compared to Andreas Papandreou's vociferous radicalism and his generally "inflexible" stance towards Turkey, Greek Prime Minister Costas Simitis' policies and operational code have crystallized some distinct features. This is shown by their twofold foundation: first, the principles and practice of International Law, International Ethics, mutual support with like-minded international actors, and the utilization of the relevant International Institutions. Second, there is a coherent

commitment to the manifold (but primarily economic and diplomatic) strengthening of Greece and to a rational (i.e. never excessive) strategy of deterrence. In any event, and as demonstrated by the low-key "verbal acts" which voice his operational code, Simitis' rhetoric is mild, moderate, and authentically constructive. [...] his doctrine is founded solidly on such "cosmopolitan" values, as moderation, communication, mediation, peaceful resolution of disputes, caring, generosity, and ecological sensitivity. [...]".  

In fact, the main characteristics of the political stance of the Simitis government were "moderate pragmatism", "rhetoric of modernization"\textsuperscript{35}, "adoption of neoliberal agenda"\textsuperscript{36}, "pro-European profile"\textsuperscript{37}, "political re-structuralization toward the European center-left"\textsuperscript{38}, and "a constructive realist foreign policy based on cooperation, pragmatism and taking leading role in the troubled Balkans"\textsuperscript{39}, in place of the isolationist anti-Westernism, veto diplomacy, and the vendetta politics of Andreas Papandreou.\textsuperscript{40}

These shifts were part of the new trend of Europeanization of Greece's political system, economy, and society as a whole\textsuperscript{41} as the EU's political and economic dynamics came to dominate the organizational logic of national politics and policy making. Chryssochoou, Stavridis, and Moschonas argue that the institutional modernization of PASOK along European lines brought about "democratization of its internal structure”, changes that were later adopted by the other parties as well\textsuperscript{42}. This modernization and rising consent to the dominance of European norms and regulations began to dislodge the primacy of ‘populism’ as a strategy for mass

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{37} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{39} Fotios Moustakis, \textit{The Greek-Turkish Relationship and NATO}, (London: Frank Cass, 2003), 48.
\textsuperscript{40} George Kassimeris, “The 2004 Greek Election: PASOK's Monopoly Ends”, \textit{West European Politics} 27 (November 2004): 944.
\end{flushleft}
mobilization, replacing it with rational and realistic problem solving within a framework of functioning political pluralism. A clear departure from PASOK’s clientalism of the 1980s, this process opened the door to changes in attitude by political organizations on a variety of issues, including that of the minorities.

The nation’s minority policy-making was soon to feel the impacts of the Europeanization process, in parallel with such factors as a general decline in nationalist passions, the government’s clear expression of an intent to shift toward pragmatism in foreign policy43 and improve relations with Turkey, the emergence of a more pragmatic leadership from within the Turkish/Muslim minority which appeared to act relatively independently of Turkey, and the Simitis government’s abandonment of PASOK’s populist anti-Turkish rhetoric. Intensified political interaction between Greece and the EU naturally meant the ascendency of the EU mechanisms and regulations over Greek policy-making, which in turn meant closer EU monitoring of minority policies. Dia Anagnostou and Anna Triandafyllidou comment on this relationship:

While prompted by Greece’s membership in the EU, regional reforms, as much as the liberalization of the rights of Thrace’s Muslims were actually facilitated by the Europeanization of domestic political and government elites in the 1990s. Greek governments became particularly sensitive about the country’s relations with and overall performance in the EU. Greece began to thoroughly depend on structural funds that comprised a considerable influx of resources for her ailing economy, and was eager to dispel her hitherto reputation as an uncommitted member of the Union. The view that respect for human rights and minorities was indispensable in promoting Greece’s national interests in Europe began to gain ground among domestic political elites and across political parties.44

Even with EU institutional pressure on Greece in the form of “monitoring procedures”, a fundamental re-conceptualization of Greek national identity in a more multicultural mode45 was slow to emerge. Yet compliance with European norms did motivate the political elite to re-contextualize minority issues to some degree.

The economic relationship between Greece and the EU was also a factor in persuading Greece to reconsider its stance toward its Turkish/Muslim minority, which was mostly located in one of the most underdeveloped regions of the country. New directions for change thus began to take shape in the intersection

43 AIM Athens, “Greece’s Hate Media Breed Popular Hate Culture”, 21 February 1998
between the decentralization process and the allocation of structural and regional development funds in the Western Thrace. In other words, Greece faced the need for political and legal changes at the local level in the process of creating of new arrangements for distribution of regional development funds.

The economic facet of the "Europeanization" of Greece's minority policies mainly consisted in Greece’s efforts in adopting its regional development programs to the EU’s cohesion requirements, within the “Europe of the Regions” framework. The objectives of this framework, including re-organization of territorial structures, revitalization of sub-national politics and creating channels for open communication between local and minority groups and the authorities, seemed to be compatible with Turkish/Muslim minority demands as well. The cohesion processes were able to foster cooperation between the state and the regional minority as it encouraged sub-national authorities and minorities to engage in civic and political efforts focusing on social issues, development, and local governance rather than on cultural homogeneity and ethno-national solidarity. Yet the absence of widespread public demand for sub-national structures capable of exercising effective autonomy within the public sphere was a persistent problem.

According to Paraskevopoulos, existence or building of a strong civil society is a must for the success of the regional development programs financed by the EU structural funds which aim at supporting the local productive system through mobilization of regional and local actors of civil society (such as minorities living in the Western Thrace). Thus, “norms and networks of civic engagement that sustain ‘civicness’ and a strong civil society constitute a necessary prerequisite for effective partnerships between state, society and market organizations.” For Gramsci, civil society is a sphere where political power of the dominant groups –that is partly embodied in the state- is consolidated in parallel with materialization and amalgamation of national-popular collective. Therefore, civil society is conceptualized by Gramsci as a public domain, where the values, ideologies, and norms of the dominant groups (in this case Greek historic bloc) are disseminated.

46 Dia Anagnostou, "Breaking the Cycle of Nationalism: The EU, Regional Policy and the Minority of Western Thrace", South European Society and Politics 6 (Summer 2001): 100-101.
47 Ibid.
49 Ibid.
through various institutions and voluntary associations of society. Thus and so, the constituents of civil society, namely; private and voluntary organs such as schools, religious institutions, media, political parties, non-governmental organizations enhance in “molecular” construction of socio-political consciousness. In this respect, hegemonic co-optation of groups (such as minorities) in civil society would result in manufacturing consent among the subordinate groups to the hegemony of the dominant classes.

However, in the case of Thrace, such an active engagement by the Turkish/Muslim minority in Greek local productions was curtailed by the ramifications of enduring hierarchical clientalistic relations as well as difficulties in the elimination of the impact of centralized state structure and encouragement of a strong civil society in the region. The situation was further exacerbated by the structural dilemmas and problems of the Greek political administration system. The system was squeezed between the ambitions of modernization/Europeanization and the legacy of a political system characterized by patronage, a low degree of legitimacy and institutionalization. Under these conditions, it would not be easy either for the Simitis leadership or the EU to operate their control and sanction mechanisms competently over the efficient use of the structural funds.

This is largely why regional economic and institutional changes made under the hegemonic guidance of the European Union still failed to significantly impact economic development, political participation, educational achievement, and public employment among the Turkish/Muslim minority. They did facilitate some forms of cooperation and supported confidence building measures between Christian and Muslim members of the regional councils as part of joint decision-making processes over distribution and implementation of the EU structural funds.

54 Paraskevopoulos, “Social capital and the public-private divide in Greek regions”, 154-177.
57 Dia Anagnostou and Anna Triandafyllidou, “Regions, minorities and European policies: A state of the art report on the Turkish Muslims of Western Thrace (Greece)” Project report (D1 and D2) prepared for the EUROREG project funded by the European Commission
However, it did not seem that they generated tangible solutions to economic underdevelopment of the region, which had resulted in internal migration of some 15,000 members of the Muslim minority from Western Thrace to Athens since the 1970s. As in the economic and political spheres, Greece’s foreign policy was also not immune to the Europeanization process under Simitis’ leadership. The most significant change in this area was Greece’s doubled efforts to rectify its negative perceptions in the eyes of its EU partners who tended to perceive Greece as an awkward and recreant partner clinging to long-held national positions at the expense of community solidarity. Image rectification efforts in the context of foreign policy Europeanization were made at four different levels: European policy, foreign policy objectives, policy instruments and style, and foreign policy making insofar as institutions, procedures and processes. Reflected at these different levels, the European orientation ushered in gradual transformation of the identity and style of Greek foreign relations as well as in positions on sensitive issues such as minorities and relations with Turkey.

In sum, “the transformed position of Greek foreign policy toward Turkey and Turkey-EU relations” during the Simitis-Papandreou era did make headway in overcoming mutual distrust between the state and the Turkish minority as well as in overcoming the “fifth column” and “Big Brother” syndromes. A sample of actions from the Simitis period showing confidence-building inclinations include the Greek-Turkish Madrid Agreement that was signed on 9 July 1997 for stability in the

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62 Big Neighbour Syndrome is defined by A. M. Navaratna-Bandara as the abnormal state of fear from a "neighboring state which is relatively larger (by any meaningful measure) and which has the capability to intervene in the affairs of the secession-affected country by economic, political, or military means" in A. M. Navaratna-Bandara Management of Ethnic Secessionist Conflict: Big Neighbour Syndrome, Aldershot: Darmouth Publishing Company (1995).
Aegean earthquake diplomacy and disaster-related collaboration following the devastating earthquakes in 1999 in both countries, the resignation of hardliner Theo Pangalos as Foreign Secretary following the Ocalan crisis in 1999, and a new “policy of constructive engagement in the fields of low politics” designed and to some extent implemented by both nation’s Foreign Affairs Ministers. Interestingly, these shifts took place following three major crises between the two states. The first crisis was the S-300 missiles crisis, which erupted after release of Greek Cypriot plans to station S-300 missiles and control the air corridor between Greece and Cyprus in 1998. The second crisis, the Imia/Kardak confrontation, took place between 1997 and 1998 over the sovereignty status of these Aegean islets. The last crisis occurred during the capture of Abdullah Ocalan, the head of the PKK (the Kurdish Worker’s Party), in January 1999. The Turkish government harshly criticized the Greek government for sponsoring terrorism because it assisted in Ocalan’s escape and hosted him in one of its embassies during the Turkish state’s pursuit of him. Ironically, these crises resulted in pragmatic (or idealist) reassessment of national interests and/or ideals in both Greece and Turkey.

This new policy line, which was pursued by the Greek ruling elite, helped in the gradual decline of bilateral conflicts and the initiation of a constructive dialogue among the various actors of two countries, which gave way to a boost in the practice of “civic diplomacy” or "second-track diplomacy" in addition to inter-state policies of rapprochement. This historic rapprochement, however, did not necessarily emerge from the emotions of mutual sympathy or even from purely pragmatic considerations or national interests. The European Union played an important role in the evolution of this détente, especially in pressuring Greece to solve its problems with its neighbors. In parallel to this process, Europeanization became a main tenet of PASOK’s rhetoric of modernization, social transformation, economic liberalization, and political re-structuring; its impacts are easily observed in Greece’s politics, economics, and foreign policy. Yet as the EU-Greece relationship

66 Önis, “Greek Turkish Relations and European Union”, 31-45.
was anything but symmetrical, increased “Greek dependence on EU regulations and policy initiatives” amounted to a deepening of the EU’s hegemony over the Greek socioeconomic and political structures from the mid-1990s onwards.

4. The Legal and Political Dimensions of Minority Policies

According to a statement by the Greek Foreign Affairs Ministry from 1999, Greece had committed itself to the strict application of the principles of "equality in the face of the law" ("isonomia") and "equality of civil rights" ("isopoliteia") for all Greek citizens of Thrace. In such official statements Greece was described as acting in accordance with current international agreements, and with standards set by international law on the treatment of minorities. The Foreign Ministry website stated that Greece respects all existing regulations regarding the special status of the Muslim minority in Thrace.

The new government's changing attitudes were also visible in several steps taken in the legal and political arenas in the late 1990s and early 2000s in response to demands made by the international community. Some of the measures signaling attitudinal change are lifting limitations on the freedom of movement of minority members in the mountainous zones of Western Thrace, removing the discriminatory Article 19 of the Greek Citizenship Law in 1998, signing the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, and including the minority in affirmative action programs in education.

In the legal sphere, abolishment of Article 19 of the Greek Citizenship Law 3370/1955 in 1998 was a major sign of changing attitudes amongst lawmakers and political circles during the Simitis period. While in force, Article 19 had been an salient instrument in the isolation, denationalization, and even expulsion of

74 Ibid.
76 Ibid.
Turkish/Muslim minority members. In addition to stating that persons of non-Greek origin may be deprived of their Greek citizenship if they leave the country without proven intent to return, Article 19 also authorized the Interior Ministry, according to the International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, to “take the decision to terminate their citizenship without either giving the individual in question the opportunity to explain his/her intentions or notifying them about the decision”\textsuperscript{77}. In the next clause, the Greek authorities were permitted to strip those individuals of citizenship who had placed themselves "in the service of foreign powers" [especially Turkey]\textsuperscript{78}. Nicholas Sitaropoulos argues that application of these clauses to Macedonians and Turks between 1955 and 1998 strongly suggests the state’s intention to

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rid itself of a host of members of ethnic or ‘politico-ideological’ groups viewed by the state as dangerous to the country’s wished-for homogeneity, or even its territorial integrity.\textsuperscript{79}
\end{quote}

Within this context, 60,004 ‘Greeks of different descent’ were stripped of Greek citizenship in those 44 years\textsuperscript{80}. Abolition of this article was a clear sign of the state’s changing perceptions of its “alloyens” or citizens of non-Greek descent. Following its annulment, the Ministry of Public Order further tasked other Ministries with providing identity and travel documents to those who had become stateless as a result of these clauses\textsuperscript{81}.

While the nationalistic discourse of the early 1990s had fundamentally contradicted EU and other European institutional legal criteria, the above politico-legal moves appeared to signal the objective of re-establishing mutual confidence with the state’s non-Greek citizens by adopting European human rights and minority protection standards. Nevertheless, as may be seen in the Constitutional reform of 2001 that worked to strengthen political majorities\textsuperscript{82}, as well as the identity card conflict of 2000/2001 regarding whether or not to include religious affiliation on

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{78} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{80} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{81} AIM Athens, “Greek Muslims-Finally Citizens, Ghosts finally come alive!,” 19 December 1997.
\end{flushleft}
national identity (ID) cards, the government’s legislative efforts were not free of quandaries and controversy, including persistent suspicions regarding the minorities. These moves, part of what I call a ‘hegemony building-in-process’ on the part of the European Union vis-à-vis Greece, also produced new sources of friction, new tensions between “national interests and European norms and legal authority,” or simply between “national and European sovereignty.”

At the same time, tensions resulting from a similar hegemony building-in-process on the part of the Greek state vis-à-vis the minority may be detected in the higher number of legal cases taken to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) by Turkish/Muslim minority members between 1996 and 2004. Intensification of “minority mobilization for claiming their rights” together with minority members’ choosing to apply to European legal institutions with their cases rather than to those available in Greece indicates the state’s failure to persuade minority members to increase their integration and loyalty to the Greek legal structures. This crisis in the hegemony building process was exacerbated by regional dynamics such as Turkey’s favorable view of the Turkish/Muslim minority’s bringing their cases to the ECHR rather than to the Greek legal institutions.

In the political sphere, significant changes in Turkish/Muslim minority status were observed in the characteristics of and roles undertaken by the minority leadership within an increasingly democratized and Europeanized political sphere during the Simitis period. This included changes in the nature of political relationships at the prefecture level riding on two waves of reform in the local administrative organization during the 1990s resulting in the creation of sub-national structures.

With its pro-European stance, the PASOK of Simitis promoted local government institutions as independent partners within the Community Support Frameworks, as part of his integrationist stance vis-à-vis the minority. Prior to these initiatives the government had not appeared to seek the consent of the minority in decisions regarding them. Now, prefecture politics provided a ground for state authorities and minority members to undertake political communication toward (re)building

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86 Ibid. 27-48.
trust, notwithstanding severe difficulties in their implementation on the ground as well as in their economic impact in the region.\footnote{88}

To contextualize those issues within the Gramscian theoretical framework about the cycles of hegemony one can use the following table. Table 1 indicates the relationship between the empirical data and theoretical framework through highlighting the interconnection between the some developments and the policies pursued during the Simitis period in the process of hegemony-in-building between the Greek state and the Turkish/Muslim minority by referring to the main tenets of the hegemonic relations between the EU and the Greek ruling classes (or historic bloc).

Table 1: The dynamics and theoretical implications of intermingled cycles of hegemony among the EU, Greek Historic Bloc and Turkish/Muslim minority

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue-Fields</th>
<th>Policies and instruments of the EU's hegemony-in-building over Greece</th>
<th>Policies and instruments of the Greek state's hegemony-in-building over minority</th>
<th>Implications of those policies for the relations between Greek state and the Turkish Muslim minority</th>
<th>Theoretical implications</th>
<th>moments and reasons of crisis of hegemony-in-building</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economic issues</td>
<td>Structural funds, regional development funds, EU's cohesion requirements</td>
<td>1. adopting its regional development programs to EU's cohesion requirements 2. decentralization process; allocation of developmental funds in the regions (such as Western Thrace)</td>
<td>cohesion policies foster cooperation between the state and regional minority and acquire the consent of the minorities to engage in civic and political efforts in Greek public sphere</td>
<td>passive revolutionary acts in order to acquire the consent of the minorities to engage in civic and political efforts in Greek public sphere and passive acceptance of dominant Greek political community</td>
<td>ramifications of enduring hierarchical clientalistic relations as well as difficulties in the elimination of the impact of centralized state structure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutionalization and political arena</td>
<td>Institutional pressure on Greece: monitoring procedures and the implementation of the Community Support Frameworks (the CSF)</td>
<td>1. institutional modernization and internal democratization of the governing party (PASOK) 2. departure from clientalism 3. promotion of local governments as partners to the CSF.</td>
<td>1. increasing political communication between the state and the minority to integrate minority to national political framework and structure 2. promoting active civic participation of minority members to prefecture politics and Greek political processes</td>
<td>hegemonic cooptation of groups (such as minorities) in civil society would result in manufacturing consent among the subordinate groups to the hegemony of the dominant classes</td>
<td>absence of widespread public demand for sub-national structures that are capable of exercising effective autonomy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Socio-cultural issues</th>
<th>Identity formation and/or/v.s. Greekness recontextualization of Greek national identity in a more multicultural mode. attempts towards subordination of the Turkish/Muslim ethno-religious belonging to civic identity under the intellectual-moral values of Greek / European historic blocs and dominant classes power of the dominant group does not derive from its coercive capacity. its power and ethico-political superiority is rooted in its ability to attain recognition of the other segments of society about its intellectual and moral leadership. double talk of the Simitis leadership and stereotypical rear-guard nationalistic, xenophobic &amp; isolationist rhetoric of some political figures in the PASOK and Greek government.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legal framework</td>
<td>The EU’s Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities 1. Removal of discriminatory Article 19 of Greek Citizenship Law in 1998 2. Including the minority in affirmative action programs. Elimination of a tool of isolation, denationalization and expulsion of Turkish/Muslim minority is an important step towards confidence-building between the state and Turkish/Muslim citizens. Hegemony of dominant group is also consolidated through creation and implementation of certain conception of law. Law provides the dominant group with necessary tools and ethico-political grounds for pursuing its legitimized suppressive actions to sustain its moral leadership over the others. Criticism of the state for failing to address minority concerns on religious freedoms, elections of mufti, the administration of waqfs, discrimination in education and the job market; the Constitutional reform of 2001 that worked to strengthen political majority; the identity card conflict of 2000/2001; the inter-state disputes between Turkey &amp; Greece in the late 1990s such as Imia/Kardak confrontation; the S-300 missiles crisis; the capture of the head of the PKK (the Kurdish Worker’s Party).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign policy</td>
<td>Good neighborhood policy (zero problem with the neighbors approach) 1. improvement of relations with Turkey 2. abandonment of anti-Turkish rhetoric. The emergence of a more pragmatic minority leadership acting relatively independent from Turkey and engaging in socio-economic and political activities in Greek civil and political societies. Elimination of possible counter-hegemonic moves which could be organized by the minority leadership and supported by Turkey against the Greek historic bloc.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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221
In Gramscian terms, hegemony-building is about “changing values, controlling behavior and motivating consent, both in economic production and in maintaining allegiance to or at least passive acceptance of the state”\(^8^9\) through manufacturing consent on the side of the subordinate segments of society. This has not been a major concern of the Greek elites in their relations with the Turkish/Muslim minority until the Simitis period. The latter has witnessed two interconnected processes of hegemony-building. On the one hand, Greek historic bloc faced with the necessity of changing the values of Greek society, controlling its behavior and motivating consent among different segments of the society to the values of Europe and processes of Europeanization. On the other hand, having influenced (particularly but not exclusively) by the first cycle of hegemony building, the Simitis-led ruling classes initiated a hegemony building process between the Greek state and the Turkish Muslim minority. Within the context of Europeanization, minority policies pursued by the Simitis governments aimed at manufacturing consent among the minority members to subordination, “allegiance to or passive acceptance” of the Greek state. In this respect, Simitis period can be characterized as initial phase of hegemony-in-building process between the Greek state and Turkish/Muslim minority, which was not immune from the moments of crisis.

5. Dilemmas of the Simitis Government, Crises of Hegemony-in-building

By 2000, it began to appear that the Simitis government had been less than successful in mobilizing new channels of communication toward increasing Turkish/Muslim minority’s confidence in the state’s regional policies. Gaps begin to appear between the state’s discourse and its practice. The minority felt that ethnocentrism continued to influence implementation of the EU-funded aid programs, notwithstanding changes in the state’s discourse regarding the minorities. Some members expressed dissatisfaction and distrust, criticizing the state for failing to address their concerns about such matters as religious freedoms, elections of mufti, the administration of waqfs, and discrimination in education and the job market\(^9^0\). In the course of minority policy implementation it became clear that the Simitis government was caught in a dilemma between internalizing European values regarding minorities and maintaining an ethno/religio-centric “system of control.”

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The 2000s were also marked by a debate in which the government was criticized by some political circles, especially the far right wing, for not doing enough to encourage Greek couples to have large families, thus leaving the Greek population open to the threat of becoming a minority in its own country in the face of a rapidly growing Muslim population. In such an atmosphere, launching reforms to improve the status and situation of the Turkish/Muslim minority was not going to be easy. Such fears as losing ground demographically were kept alive by an enduring heritage of antipathy promoted by previous governments as part of the more general anti-Turkish populist rhetoric. To cope with such accusations as leading the Greek population toward minority status, the government chose a "double talk" strategy which included different discourses on minority issues for different circles and contexts. This naturally created difficulties in understanding the true position and intentions of the government in this area.

Two discursive tacks dominated the rhetoric. The first was mainly in response to pressures exerted by the U.S., international human rights organizations, and the EU. Appearing often in Papandreou's speeches, this mode emphasized acknowledgment of the right to minority self-definition and implementation of international human rights standards in Greece. Greek intellectuals were invited to initiate some self-critical and introspective approaches such as admitting to stereotyping, hate speech, and disguised discrimination and ethnocentrism in education, selective criticism of human rights violations, non-democratic regimes, nationalism, and racism with references not only to the past but also the present. Absorption of these new forms of expression by a Greek public opinion heavily conditioned by deep-seated nationalistic views was by no means simple and straightforward.

The second discursive track drew on the traditional approaches that had nourished anti-Turkish populism since time immemorial in Greece. This defensive rhetoric featured denial of self-definition by the minorities and their problems in Greece. Panayote Elias Dimitras, for instance, argues that despite the new government's minority policy, the prevailing attitude among Greeks is that there was no minority in the country; in addition to that, among those few who thought otherwise most also believed that whatever minorities might exist face no major problems, at least of a magnitude that could explain bona fide international interest in them.

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93 AIM Athens, “‘Zero Hour' of Greek Turkish Friendship,” 19 August 2000.
With the stereotypical rear-guard nationalistic, xenophobic, and the isolationist rhetoric of, for example, Pangalos⁹⁷, accusing the new voices of selling out the interests of the Greek people, it was a major task for Greek modernizers to create and begin operating in a more tolerant mode in regard to minority issues, especially in the domestic political sphere. In order to see this shift materialize, Simitis and Papandreou knew that they first had to prepare the public opinion, until then molded by suspicion. Yet efforts of the Simitis government to manage the incompatibility between these two modes of expression did not succeed in overcoming the image of double talk with regard to the Muslim minority in Greece both domestically and internationally.

Regarding the annulment of the infamous Article 19 of the Citizenship Law, for instance,

the Foreign Minister and two Deputy Ministers of the Simitis government were reported to have constantly assured the international society, that this “notorious”, “unconstitutional”, and “contrary to every human rights agreement” legislation would be abolished, as it was a violation of human rights.⁹⁸

Yet concurrently with the speeches of these three ministers, the Interior Minister of the same cabinet was assuring concerned nationalist constituencies in Thrace that no such plans existed and that the law would continue to be enforced⁹⁹. Another example of double-talk took place during a foreign policy debate in the cabinet in June 2000, when Foreign Minister George Papandreou, known for acknowledging the right to minority self-definition and for promoting the process of internalizing coexistence with the Turks¹⁰⁰, yet in this debate appeared to reference the nationalist approach to minorities as formulated in the Treaty of Lausanne and defended aggressive and nationalistic positions toward Turkey¹⁰¹.

This double-talk blurred the Simitis government’s minority policy vision throughout the late 1990s and into the early 2000s. It also went hand in hand with three parallel and interconnected hegemonic crises: the crisis in Greece-EU relations, in state and nationalist circles relations, and in relations between the state and the Turkish/Muslim minority. The first crisis involved, as mentioned above, the

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⁹⁹ Ibid.
¹⁰¹ AIM Athens, “Papandreou's New (Nationalist?) Greek Foreign Policy Doctrine,” 8 July 2000.
The deepening of hegemony of the EU over Greece as part of the Europeanization process restarted by the Simitis government in the late 1990s. Notwithstanding government moves toward internalization of some EU norms and regulations, it was really too early to speak of consensus on a deep transformation in the political and socio-economic spheres across the broad segments of Greek political and civil society. As a structural reform was blocked by various group interests and a good part of Greek society showed itself to be less than enthusiastic about the Europeanization project, the EU’s hegemony building-in-process suffered a crisis even in its initial stages. The second crisis appeared when the Simitis government’s attempted to construct a hegemony over the political sphere, one that seemed to consist of convincing political actors across the political spectrum of the sacrifices to be made in order to fulfill requirements for rising to a hegemonic position within the EU.

A third crisis may be detected in the Simitis government’s hegemony building project vis-à-vis the Turkish/Muslim minority. In this process the Simitis government soon appeared to be a mediator between the EU and Greek socio-economic and political forces, seeking to garner consensus on both sides for smooth progress in the maturation of the hegemonic relationship. On the one hand it tried to persuade local interests and opinion to embrace and meet the demands of the hegemon in fashioning their positions on minority issues; on the other hand, it tried to convince EU policy making centers to adopt appeasement policies in order to satisfy public opinion and economic and political interests in attempts to build consensus on the Europeanization of minority relations. The link between economic prosperity hoped-for successes in the cohesion process and in the regional development programs of the EU, and speaking out on sacrifices to be borne in the course of decentralization and shifts from traditional minority policies can be considered the main connections established between the Europeanization demands of the EU and consensus seeking within Greece’s traditional political and socio-economic spheres.

Regarding the third crisis, the first impulse of the Simitis and Papandreou leadership was to attempt to suppress populist voices persistently critical of post-1995 minority politics. This response was related to the first two crises. The hegemony-building aspirations of the state with respect to the minority were actually materializing with the emergence of more pragmatic cadres of minority leadership on the minority side and with increased efforts toward a guided integration of the minority into the broader society on the state side. This process was undergirded by contributions

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from the international community such as guidance from the EU and recommendations of the US, which included the need to formulate new policies for the post-Communist Balkans and to improve relations with Turkey.

6. Conclusion

It is argued here that EU hegemony over Greek institutional structures and domestic policies was constituted in a series of inter-connected features such as external penetration of the state administration by the EU, dependence on EU aid, “fragmentation”, and “core executive’ empowerment”\(^\text{104}\). Resulting internalization of the supremacy of EU norms over existing domestic ones by the political community was reflected in the opposition New Democracy party’s belief that “the EU decided on everything and that the country is on automatic pilot”\(^\text{105}\) during the Simitis government. The period is strongly marked by a renewed Europeanization of Greece’s minority policies and the emergence of the potential for a hegemony building process on the part of the Greek state with regards to the Turkish/Muslim minority which parallels the deepening of a hegemonic relationship between the EU and Greece during this period.

Prior to the Simitis period the Greek state had never so energetically sought to bring onto the agenda the situation and status of the Turkish/Muslim minority within the nation’s political, economic, and social structures with the goal of establishing a hegemony backed by the consent of the minority. What differentiated the Simitis period from its predecessors is that only in this period did the potential for such a relationship actually see the light of day. As noted above, this potential was closely interconnected with a parallel process between a leading EU and a subordinate Greece, which consented to the leadership/dominance (hegemony) of this supranational structure over its practical and discursive acts regarding minorities and related issues.

Looking at the prospects for future relationships, the scope of discussions may be broadened around the possibility of transformation of the Greek-Turkish minority relations from one between "suppressor and fifth column" as had survived (or thrived) in populist discursive frameworks until the 1990s, to a hegemonic type of relationship between the "hegemon and the subordinate" developing under the influence of a parallel hegemonic process (Euro-guided democratization and Europeanization) between the EU and Greece.


However, in the course of a deeper analysis of the future of the hegemony-in-building processes, the possible ramifications of the recent economic crisis in Greece should also be taken into consideration. The global economic crisis, which has been experienced by Greece from 2008 onwards, has had significant repercussions on the two abovementioned intermingled processes of hegemony in building that were initiated during the Simitis period; the one between the EU and Greek state/society and the other one between the Greek state and the minorities in Greece (particularly Turkish-Muslim minority). As the deepening of economic crisis would shake the very basis of the ‘consent of the led’ to the leadership of the dominant actor(s), hegemony building processes may face with more serious crises in the future.

In this respect future research may explore the endurance of those hegemony-in-building processes under the light of deeper assessment of implications of recent economic crisis on the hegemonic relationships among the EU, Greek state/ruling classes and the minorities. Future research may also include the Gramscian analysis of the hegemonic triangles among the EU, the other EU member and/or candidate states which were hit by the economic crises and the minorities living in those countries.

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IS LEVIATHAN BACK? CIRCASSIAN ETHNIC MOBILIZATION AFTER THE 2012 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS IN RUSSIA

Marat Grebennikov
Concordia University

Abstract
This article explores the hypothesis that ongoing instability in the North Caucasus can no longer be explained by its violent history of colonization. Instead, instability is carefully negotiated by ethnic elites, who do not see the North Caucasus as an indispensable part of the Russian Federation and who can only make a public show of action on the eve of crucial political campaigns: the 2012 presidential elections and the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi. Focusing on the question of ethnicity and its relation to federal politics in the North Caucasus, the main argument of the article is while Circassian ethnicity and ethnic politics in general, have been partly the outcome of the authoritarian rule of the Russian Imperial and Soviet legacies, the way ethnicity has been and is being politicized by the ethnic, federal, and international actors, have created serious grounds for the rise and the consolidation of Circassian nationalism in the North Caucasus.

Keywords: Circassians, Caucasus, mobilization, ethnicity, Putin

1. Introduction

In the aftermath of the 2012 Russian presidential election, which caused unprecedented public apathy, Putin’s authoritarian political model has lost a lot of its luster. Pervasive corruption and a significant spike in ethnic tension in the North Caucasus have also fueled a sense of alienation among a broad slice of the population. Nationalism in Russia has undergone a dramatic shift, one that Putin, seemingly, has been unprepared to respond to. Economic uncertainty has also boosted the popularity of ethnic nationalism. This trend is emphasized by the growing popularity of the slogan “Russia for the Russians” among ethnic Russians. President Putin has been reluctant to acknowledge this trend in public. Instead, he seems to ignore the rise of ethnic nationalists, casting them as trouble-makers whose personal agendas ignite the disintegration of the Russian Federation. However, as long as genuine federalism in Russia remains vague, the state will be, in its essence, an imperial entity. As such, it can be ruled only undemocratically, with Putin’s repeated warnings that any attempts to set up ethnicity-based political institutions will not be permitted. Such statements indicate unequivocally that force will be necessary to enforce his vision of Russia. But how far can Putin go if a large number of nationalists in the North Caucasus are not behind him?

One ethnic group, the Circassians, share the distinction of being the oldest continually identifiable ethnic group in the North Caucasus. Despite the fact that

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only around one million Circassians live in the region, the Circassians make an
interesting case study because they form what is known as the “Circassian world,”
and they have showed a strong sense of common purpose in response to the many
challenges in the most volatile region of Russia – the North Caucasus. To explain
the path Circassian nationalism is taking after the 2012 presidential election, I will
first turn to the classic theoretical literature on this subject, Gellner’s work on
nations and modernity1 and Anthony Smith’s famous theory of ethnosymbolism,
which both translate well to the Russian context. Smith’s definition of the ethnic as
a named human population with a myth of common ancestry, shared historical
memories, elements of shared culture, an association with a specific “homeland”
and a measure of solidarity can accurately apply to the Circassian ethnic minority.2

Gellner’s concept of nationalism as a principle that holds that the political and
national unit should be congruent is also evocative of the Circassian nationalist
desire to forge a political entity in which the rights of the Circassians have primacy.3
The rise of Circassian nationalism is not just part of the worldwide resurgence of the
politics of ethnic identity. This resurgence has deep causes and will gain strength in
both the Caucasus and the diaspora. The Circassians are one of the autochthonous
peoples of the North West Caucasus. Their call themselves Adyge and they are
“titular” nations in the republics of Adyghea, Karachay-Cherkessia and Kabardino-
Balkaria.4 Smaller numbers of Circassians also live in adjacent Russian regions.
Circassians, as much dispersed in their homeland as in diaspora worldwide, live in
several constituent units of the Russian Federation that are cut off from each other
both geographically and administratively.5 Henze describes the Circassians as a
people with a common language, common pride in their history and fierce
adherence to traditions, but without a written language or recorded laws, and with
an absence of administrative structure and of organisation to provide for their own
defence6.

Like the ancient Greek cities, Circassian tribes were never united politically, raided
each other and took prisoners and hostages and then met in councils on neutral

2 Anthony D. Smith, Ethno-symbolism and Nationalism: A Cultural Approach
(Routledge, 2009).
3 Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, 6-7.
4 Zeynel Abidin Besleney, “Circassian Nationalism and the Internet,” Open
5 Ibid.
6 Paul Henze, “Circassian Resistance to Russia,” in: The North Caucasus Barrier. The
Russian Advance towards the Muslim World, ed. Marie Bennigsen-Broxup (Hurst & Co,
ground to regulate relations between tribes and clans, debate political issues, and hold games and festivals; feelings of common nationality were not institutionalised beyond this level. In both the Soviet and post-Soviet periods, the terminology used in Russian academia and the administrative structures to define the Circassians was somewhat inconsistent. The official Soviet bureaucracy defined them as Adyghean, Cherkess, Kabardian and Shapsough depending on their place of residence and the dialect of the Circassian language spoken. The first Russians to come into regular contact with Circassians were paramilitary Cossacks, who established their settlements in the plains north of the Kuban River in the 16th century to patrol the Russian Empire’s southern frontiers. Cossacks, who included men of very diverse origins, struck up alliances with these leaders and married and intermingled with both Circassian and Nogay Tatars, adopting to a large extent their customs and style of life which was in many respects of a higher quality than the Russians had attained at the time.

The Karachay-Cherkessia Autonomous Region was formed on April 12, 1922. By a law of the Russian Federal Socialist Republic (RSFSR) of July 3, 1991, it was transformed into the Karachay-Cherkessia Soviet Socialist Republic as part of the RSFSR. The administrative center of the republic is Cherkessk. In Kabardino-Balkaria, ethnic Kabardins (or Circassians) account for a majority of the republic’s population – 57.2%, or 492,000 people. Ethnic Circassians comprise 12% in Karachay-Cherkessia, or a little more than 51,000 people. Finally, ethnic Adygeans, who are also Circassians, comprise barely a quarter of the total population of Adygea, numbering just over 110,000 people.

Most social scientists do not attribute a significant role to an ethnic factor in contemporary social transformations; they assume that the transformative power of globalization and of bureaucratic rationality will ultimately obliterate it. Yet the contemporary phenomenon of ethnic groups politically mobilizing against the state has demonstrated that it is necessary to include the ethnic factor in the analysis of social transformations. Ethnic mobilization is thus far more than political campaigning on the basis of ethnicity. It occurs not only at the time of elections but also at the time of particular events that can form a basis for mass action. In order to situate the phenomenon of Circassian ethnic mobilization adequately in a wider socio-political context we need a broad conceptualization of the term “political mobilization”, one that goes beyond merely the field of electoral politics. This article would only have a narrow understanding of the process of Circassian mobilization if it was to exclude from its scope those forms of political action that take place outside the official electoral politics, ranging from peaceful protests to
radical calls for a boycott of the Sochi Winter Olympics. The Circassian mobilization is multi-dimensional; it is not just ethnic, but also, cultural, indigenous and minority rights-oriented.

The first section of the article discusses the so-called “Circassian question” through the lenses of political history of the Circassian diaspora both in the Caucasus and worldwide. Problems of Circassian ethnic identity and participation of the Circassians in the political process have been assessed from different perspectives in the second section. The third section deals with the issue of Circassian genocide and its projection as an issue over the 2014 Winter Olympic Games. Then, the strategic goals and the main components of the Circassian ethnic mobilization after the 2012 presidential election in Russia are discussed and analysed in the fourth section. The conclusion summarizes the key findings and highlights the intricate interrelationship between Circassian ethnic politics and the Kremlin’s policies of encouraging hostilities between ethnic groups in the North Caucasus.

2. The “Circassian Question”

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union one of the most serious internal policy challenges facing the Russian Federation has unquestionably been Moscow’s relations with the North Caucasus diasporas. The Circassian diaspora came about as a result of the Russian Empire’s conquest of the Northwest Caucasus in the 1860s, when approximately a million people were forcibly removed from their land and deported to the Ottoman Empire. Up to a third died from hunger and diseases in the Russian controlled coastal areas before their departure, on overcrowded ships or in refugee camps on their arrival in Anatolia and the Balkans. The descendants of those who survived the deportation, which Circassians and an increasing number of scholars and journalists call the “Circassians Genocide,” currently number around 3 million in Turkey and 400,000 elsewhere in Syria, Jordan, Israel, the USA and the Western Europe. It is important to note that to the extent that disputes have arisen they are not inherently ethnic, but rather are social and economic with an ethnic component. In the early Soviet period ethnic disputes were subdued and practically nonexistent due to a well-functioning system of the social and economic incentives.

Since the early 1960s, a process of ethnic or demographic homogenization has taken place in the North Caucasus, though at a slower speed in the west than in the eastern parts. Ethnic Russians have been steadily leaving the region in a process

10 Besleney, “Circassian Nationalism and the Internet.”
11 Ibid.
that began when the Balkars and the Karachai returned from exile in Central Asia in the late 1950s. This could also be seen as a counter reaction to the demographic Russification of the Soviet era—enhanced by the North Caucasian re-ethnification processes since 1991. These tendencies increase the legitimacy of the type of self-determination found among the titular-nationalities of the North Caucasian peoples and, in some way, counteracts the Russification processes mentioned earlier. Internally in the republics, the ethnic homogenization processes are to some extent countered by the on-going process of urbanization, by which many villages have lost half of their population since the fall of the Soviet Union. The relationship that exists between the big Russian state that shares its name with a dominant ethnic group, the Russians or so-called “Staatsvolk” and the Circassians, as ethnic minorities located in the southern periphery, can only be labelled an asymmetric power-relationship.

This relationship is further challenged by the fact that for an extended period both groups have been troubled by questions of identity and identification as part of the transitional uncertainties that also occurred in many other areas of the post-Soviet space. This is a type of structural problem in the so-called asymmetrical ethno-federalism of Russia that dates back to the state-formation process that began in 1991—a federal model with a solid built-in conflict potential. The widespread anti-Caucasian xenophobia and the tendency of the Russian media to constantly link the North Caucasus to issues such as terror and violence to many Circassians end up stressing the point made by Andreas Wimmer on ethno-national dominance as performed by various elite actors in Russia, and how this can function as a mobilizing factor among ethno-cultural minorities.

Andreas Wimmer distinguishes between inclusivist and exclusivist types of dominant ethnicity, by which he states that the more exclusivist variant delineates a field of political tension and can represent a more contested and conflictive mode of ethno-national dominance. Wimmer use the term ethno-national dominance

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13 Ibid., 122.
15 Hansen, “Renewed Circassian Mobilization,” 121.
18 Hansen, “Renewed Circassian Mobilization,” 121.
to cover both dominant ethnicity and dominant nationhood, which can be useful in relation to the Russian context where the two forms often are mixed and often not defined. Within contemporary Russia there seems to be a tendency to switch between being inclusivist and exclusivist in a manner that has similarities with the earlier periods of the Soviet Union and the Russian Empire, when, for instance, periods of “Russification” could shift with periods of “nativization.”

Hansen points out that elements of this can also be found in the Circassian regions today, where local languages and history are being taught in schools and published in books, but due to enormous developments in the electronic media, especially in television and on the internet, the Russian language has a strengthened position vis-à-vis the local languages. The system of dominating ethnic groups is also found on the secondary level of the republics, which Wimmer has termed as “dominant minorities.” In Kabardino-Balkaria, Balkars regularly complain about the domination of the Kabardians, as do the Cherkess about the Karachai in Karachai-Cherkessia. In the republic of Adygea, Adygs and Russians are mutually complaining about each other. The closely related Turkish-speaking peoples of Balkars and Karachai are also undergoing a process of mobilization and increased cooperation as found among the Circassians. These two parallel mobilization processes partly enhance each other, which is a by-product of the double-titular republic structure.

The course of events in Karachay-Cherkessia demonstrate that, even in a multinational society where there are many prerequisites for ethnic tensions, responsible government attempting to provide for successful economic development may be able to prevent conflict because people who have some prospects of economic prosperity are not willing to sacrifice that perspective to the selfish interest of nationalist politicians. Ethnic divisions are also suppressed as a result of cross-cutting cleavages within ethnic groups in Karachay-Cherkessia. Even though ethnic tensions in Karachay-Cherkessia have calmed down after an intense conflict erupted in 1999 over disputed elections, the risks of their conflagration still come from three sources: traditional Karachay-Cherkessian tensions; animosity between these ethnic groups and the Cossacks, who are widely perceived to be a part of Moscow’s control system; and growing Islamic supranational groups drawing on local Muslims that who have been marginalized by their respective ethnicities and often implicated in a series of attacks on local police.

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20 Hansen, “Renewed Circassian Mobilization,” 121.
21 Ibid.
22 Wimmer, “Dominant Ethnicity and Nationhood”, 47.
23 Hansen, “Renewed Circassian Mobilization,” 121.
24 Among the Karachays, the pre-revolution social classes included Bii (barons), Uzden (yeomen) and Kul (serfs). The Soviet regime led to the extermination or exile of the Bis, the dispossession of the Uzden, and the usurpation of power by Kuls. Despite representing 40% of Karachays today, Kuls continue to hold most important social and political positions.
and civilians. The potential source of conflict with the Cossacks has been overshadowed by the rift between the Karachay and the Cherkess since the election of Semenov as president (a retired general and a paternal descendant of one of the Karachay’s clans) in 1999. Unlike in Chechnya, Moscow always demonstrated a willingness to mediate this dispute, demonstrating a proactive attitude rather than the reactive response. Under pressure from Moscow Semenov did not dispute the results of the 2001 parliamentary elections suggesting that no one in the region is willing to replicate the fate of the Chechens. However, the growing power of radical Islamic groups associated mainly with ethnic Karachay and the response to this by federal authorities are becoming now of greater concern.

Notwithstanding the fact that the Cherkess and Kabardins are closely related Circassian peoples living in the north of these republics, and the Karachay and Balkars are Turkic people living in the south, two ethnically divided republics, Karachay-Cherkessia and Kabardino-Balkaria, were created as part of the “divide and rule” policy of the Soviet regime. Thus, instead of two ethnically homogenous republics, Stalin created two mutually contemptuous (if not hostile) units laying the foundations for ethnic strife that began to reassert itself with the first presidential elections in Karachay-Cherkessia in 1999. In 1999, Vladimir Semenov, an ethnic Karachay, won a run-off against Stanislav Derev, a Cherkess. Perceived electoral frauds led to demonstrations and acts of violence, as the Cherkess and the Abazins started to vow for secession from Karachay-Cherkessia. Only Moscow’s intervention with unprecedented resources deployed to the region prevented violence. Semenov retained power until the 2003 presidential elections when, in contrast to 1999, only ethnic Karachay candidates ran for office and Semenov was narrowly defeated by Mustafa Batdyev. From time to time Karachay-Cherkessia experiences waves of terrorist attacks associated with ethnic Karachay involvement in Islamic extremist organizations, such as Hizbu at-Tauhid, aiming to establish an Islamic state in the Caucasus. These type of attacks involves small car-bombs killing police and some ambushes targeting pro-governmental civilians on trains and in towns and lead to a series of reprisal arrests. These attacks remain a disturbing trend especially with the continuation of series of attacks committed against Circassians leaders in Karachay-Cherkessia, Adyghea and Kabardino-Balkaria. At present, the Kremlin is unwilling to resolve any of the three main components of the Circassian question: recognition of the genocide, the unification of the multiple Circassian regions into a single republic within the Russian Federation, and the repatriation of the Diaspora. After the wave of demonstrations against Caucasian ethnic minorities, it was obvious that any decision in favour of Circassians could beef up Russian

25 The Karachays are a Sunni Muslim Turkic people who closely related to the Balkars and Abkhaz, and less closely to the Nogai and Kumyk of Dagestan. The Karachays group identity and cohesion, although relatively low compared to other ethnic groups due to strong tribal (rather than communal) identification, is in the process of solidifying due to the inferior socio-economic status coupled with enticing slogans of pan-Turkic and Islamic solidarity.
nationalism, which is by far more dangerous than Circassian nationalism, so the Russian authorities apparently adopted the “tactics of silence” on the Circassian question.

3. Ethnic Nationalism as Mobilizing Ideology

Problems of Circassian ethnic identity and participation of the Circassians in the political process have been assessed from different perspectives – Circassians after the fall of the Soviet Union, Circassians and gender, Circassians and the Internet, Circassians in Turkey, and the strategic goals of Circassian nationalism. As Zhemukhov points out, while composing a common ethnic community, the Circassians did not represent a unified mass national movement either at the time of Russian conquest or during the Soviet ethno-territorial delimitation. Instead, they share a common ideology based on a common memories of what they regarded as genocide committed during the conquest of the North Caucasus in the 19th century. The Circassian organizations maintain three goals: recognition of the genocide, unification of Circassian territories in one homeland, and repatriation of the expelled population. Zhemukhov provides a new typology of Circassian movements: nationalists, sovereigntists (unification of the Circassians as a single autonomous region within Russia), culturalist (development of culture and language inside the regions where they live), accommodationists (local political elites incorporated into the Russian state policy), and centrist. In Zhemukhov’s view, the centrist position was stronger during the first Circassian movement in 1989–2000 when the positions of nationalists and accommodationists were less different than during the second movement.

The active involvement of Russia and Georgia resulted in the polarization of the movement and prevented establishment of an active centrist strand in the

28 Besleney, “Circassian Nationalism and the Internet;” Hansen, “Renewed Circassian Mobilization.”
31 Zhemukhov, “The Birth of Modern Circassian Nationalism.”
contemporary Circassian movement. Zhemukhov also notes that the main differences between opposing Circassian position are based on different views of the Russian role in the movement. Accommodationists and culturalists regard the Circassian issue as an internal Russian problem, while centrists, sovereigntists, and nationalists claim that it is an international one, causing further polarization of the contemporary Circassian movement.

Since 2005, the Circassian nationalist movement has been moving in a new direction as Circassians around the world have begun to mobilize demanding international recognition of the 19 century atrocities committed by the Russian Empire in its conquest of the Northwest Caucasus. While sharing with sovereigntists the concept of recognition of the genocide by the international community, nationalists have different approach to other issues, for example the unconditional cancelation of the 2014 Sochi Olympics and creation of an independent Circassian state. On 4 October 2007 the nationalists appealed to the Russian president Vladimir Putin to cancel the Sochi Olympics and recognize the Circassian genocide. Likewise, numerous appeals for recognition of their brutal deportation as genocide have been rejected twice by the Russian Duma in 2006 and in 2011. Unlike the Chechens, who at least received an apology from the Soviet regime, the Circassians remain the only ethnic group in the North Caucasus omitted from any sort of apology from Soviet or Russian authorities for the historical injustices they experienced in the 19th century. In the international arena, however, the Circassian diaspora has been much more successful in approaching this goal. Thus, on 6 April 2008, the Parliament of Israel fulfilled the request of the Circassian community and established the 21st of May as an official Day of Memory and Sorrow of the Circassian People.

In March 2010, Circassian representatives from six different countries participated in an international conference organized in Tbilisi, Georgia: “Hidden Nations, Enduring Crimes: The Circassians and the Peoples of the Caucasus Between Past and Future.” The conference offered an unprecedented opportunity to examine the problem as the Georgian parliament had begun to examine evidence from historians and scholars as to whether the above-mentioned deportation of the Circassians constitute genocide. After some deliberations, on 20 May 2011 Georgia’s parliament recognized the Circassian Genocide which took place towards

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32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid.
the end of the Russian Empire’s conquest of the region, culminating in 1864. Georgia became the first country to recognize 19th century forced deportations of Circassians by Tsarist Russia in the northwest Caucasus as “genocide”. Such conferences attended by US, Turkish, and European scholars (out of curiosity rather than professional interest) are held in the countries where Adig communities influence local politics and able to provide favorable media coverage. The Adig nationalist ideology is also diffused particularly among the younger Adig generation through a number ethnic organizations (the Circassian Congress in Adyghea; the Kabardin Congress, The Independent Public Research Center, and the Public Human Rights Center in Kabardino-Balkaria). Karachay and Balkar activists are also actively engaging into interpretations of myths about the history of their kin, being convinced that the Karachay and Balkar peoples who are actually of the Turkic origin are Alans and thus are somehow entitled to the territories formerly owned by the latter.

Many experts believe, however, that Georgia took an obviously political decision. Apart from the fact that it is clearly a result of Georgia’s current post-war rhetoric with Russia, if Georgia really aspires to the moral leadership of the Caucasus, it must also recognise the Armenian genocide, something Armenian groups have requested on several occasions. Moreover, as Thomas de Waal points out, it is striking that Georgia has only recognised as genocide the Tsarist murder of Circassians and not the very similar murder of the Abkhaz in 1867 and 1877. If it would also recognise deported Abkhaz as refugees, it would be hard to disagree with Abkhazian efforts to bring about the return of its diaspora. It would also undermine Georgia’s claim that Abkhazia’s independence project is rejected by a majority of the people who have a right to live there. It seems unilateral for the parliament of Georgia to be contemplating a resolution declaring the 1864 deportations of the Circassians to be genocide. Circassians and Abkhaz are ethnically and linguistically related and the 1867 deportations were a continuation of what the Russian imperial government had done in Circassia just to the north only three years before.
Clashes between the two ethnic groups would likely force Russia to militarily intervene on behalf of peace and stability creating ethnic repercussions in Kabardino-Balkaria and Adygea. The assassination of Fral Shebzukhov is only one in a series of attacks committed against Circassians (Adige) leaders in Karachay-Cherkessia. In the two other Circassian republics of Adygea and Kabardino-Balkaria, political leaders have been assaulted and hospitalized, but rarely has a murder taken place so openly and demonstratively. With the 2014 Sochi Olympics on the horizon, the Kremlin could be gambling that a low-intensity conflict in Karachay-Cherkessia would dampen the activity of the Circassian nationalist movement (both in the Caucasus and among its 7 million strong overseas diaspora) by diverting the attention of Circassian nationalists away from their plans of opposing the 2014 Sochi Olympics.

The first wave of Circassian nationalist activism crystalized in the early 1990s during Boris Yeltsin’s period in power. Within a few years it gained popular support and became a key element in the struggle for power in the North Caucasus. Even though most of the demands of the nationalists were heard and acted upon by the federal authorities, in Karachay-Cherkessia they found themselves locked in a secondary position under the Karachay majority. After Putin became President, the International Circassian Association was gradually taken over by the pro-Moscow functionaries of the ruling Kabardin elites. By 2000 some of the leading members who refused to be co-opted, including Ibragim Yaganov and Valery Khatazhukov, had been excluded from the political scene, leaving no functioning independent nationalist organizations. Thus, post-Soviet local bureaucratic elites, who had already adapted to post-Soviet political realities, firmly restored themselves to positions of influence and integrated these nationalist movements into the pro-Kremlin organizations. In spite of the fact that the Circassian nationalist movement are still run by veterans of the early 1990s the situation has been changing. A younger generation of activists, unlike the veterans, has no experiences of the war in Abkhazia and is not bounded by the traditionally unquestioned authority of the elders in Circassian society.

The International Circassian Association (ICA) founded in 1991 is actually an umbrella organization comprising the main Circassian organizations of the time in the Caucasus and in the diaspora in Turkey, Europe, the USA, Syria and Jordan. It was very influential during the war in Abkhazia in 1992-1993 and then in Karachay-

41 Fral Shebzukhov, an adviser to Karachay-Cherkessia’s President Boris Ebzeyev who was in line to become Prime Minister, was murdered on May 12, 2010 in Cherkessk.
42 For instance, Adygheya’s status was upgraded to a republic.
Cherkessia during the political power struggle in 1998-99 between the Karachay and Circassians. However, after falling under the full control of the pro-Moscow Kabardin elites in the early 2000s, ICA leaders have repeatedly stated that they no longer intend to engage in ethnic politics and are merely concerned with the cultural and linguistic needs of the Circassian community. Nevertheless, the Adige Khases in Adyghea and Karachay-Cherkessia, under the respective leaderships of Arambi Khapai and Mukhammed Cherkhesov, have begun actively engaging in ethnic politics. Their position on political issues such as the unification of Circassian peoples or the Circassian genocide thus differs significantly from the official position of the ICA, of which both organizations are members.\textsuperscript{44} Besleney points out that non-aligned groups of Circassian activists that have a different support base pursue different recruitment strategies and are very keen to engage with international political actors for their cause, all of which distinguishes them from the ICA. “The Cherkessian Congress”, “Youth Khase” and “Khase” in Adyghea, Karachay-Cherkessia and Kabardino-Balkaria come into this category as all of them have come into being in the late 2000s.

4. The issue of “Circassian Genocide” and the 2014 Winter Olympic Games in Sochi\textsuperscript{45}

There is an almost universal agreement across the whole spectrum of Circassian society on the concept of the genocide against the Circassian nation by the Russian Empire. Furthermore, the parliaments of both Kabardino-Balkaria and Adyghea passed laws, in 1992 and 1996 respectively, officially recognizing what they named “the Circassian Genocide” and also appealed to the Russian Duma for such recognition.\textsuperscript{46} This issue becomes divisive, as Besleney points out, when organizations want to elevate the problem to international dimension by co-opting the Circassian diaspora.\textsuperscript{47} A good example of this would be the protest actions of some diaspora Circassians activists against the Sochi Olympics during the last Winter Olympic Games in Vancouver. More recently in March 2010, following a conference on the issue in Tbilisi, an official appeal was made by Circassians delegates to the Georgian Parliament to recognize the “Circassian Genocide.”\textsuperscript{48} These efforts resulted in Georgia’s parliament formally recognized the Circassian

\textsuperscript{44} Besleney, “Circassian Nationalism and the Internet.”
\textsuperscript{45} An additional factor behind the tension between the Russian authorities and the Circassians in the run-up to the Olympics is the creation in 2010 of the Northern Caucasus Federal District (NCFO), which officially divided Adygea (and Shapsugia) from the other administrative subdivisions containing a Circassian ethnic element and created a bureaucratic obstacle to the inclusion of Circassians of the NCFO in activities connected to the Olympics.
\textsuperscript{46} Besleney, “Circassian Nationalism and the Internet.”
\textsuperscript{47} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{48} Ibid.
genocide which took place towards the end of the Russian Empire’s conquest of the region, culminating in 1864.

As previously mentioned, Georgia became the first country to recognize the 19th century forced deportations of Circassians by the Tsarist Russia in the northwest Caucasus as “genocide”. While new activists want to further push the issue wherever possible, the established or state sponsored organizations are prone to a more conciliatory position with regard to the Russian authorities. On the one hand, it is a factor in the collective historical memory of the Circassian peoples and in their allegiance to a common historical narrative. On the other hand, the narratives of the numerous sacrifices attributed to the Circassians during the war with the Russian Empire from 1820s to the 1860s, and during their subsequent resettlement in the Ottoman Empire, are often used by the local elites of the Circassian republics to exert pressure on the federal authorities for further subsidies and subventions. At the same time, some specialists cast doubt upon the validity of applying the term “genocide” to the policy of the Russian Empire. This critique stems not only from the fact that this term came into use in international law only after the Nuremberg trials, but also with the fact that the Russian empire did not seek to murder the Circassians as an entire ethnic group. Rather, it is more appropriate to describe the policy of enforced resettlement in the Ottoman Empire as ethnic cleansings.

However, the outright denial of the Circassian sufferings as genocide does nothing to facilitate interethnic dialogue in the North Caucasus but rather solidifies more radical position of the Circassian diaspora. Even though after the Georgian-Abkhazian war of 1992-1993, in which volunteers from the Circassian republics also played an active role by virtue of their ethnic kinship with the Abkhazians, the consolidation of the Circassian peoples had reached a new level sufficient to transform the Circassian national movement into a new political player in the Caucasus, it did not happen. Experts indicate that the reasons behind the failure of the Circassian national movement to come up with consolidated position are multiple. For example, Turkey-based Circassian organizations split in their attitude towards the Russo-Georgian War in 2008 as well as in their intention to raise the question of Russian responsibility for the Circassian genocide carried out by the Russian Empire at the international level before the 2014 Olympic Games. Political analysts suggest that, contrary to the fact that Circassians have expected

49 Ibid.
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid.
53 Ibid.
Turkey to back their efforts to restore justice in their homeland. Turkey’s geopolitical aspirations and domestic situation, together with Russia’s ability to play on both, severely limited Ankara’s ability to play that role. There are a few main reasons for which Turkey, despite the presence of a large Circassian diaspora and the role its members play in the Turkish armed forces, will never be the ally Circassians had hoped for. First, Turkey is extremely reluctant to press for Russian recognition of the genocide of the Circassians because that will immediately change Russia’s stance the 1915 mass murder of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire, something the Turks are desperately trying to avoid. Second, Turkey is unwilling to play an ethnic card against Russia because it recognizes that Russia could play an ethnic card back with greater success, targeting the Kurdish national movement in Turkey in particular. Third, Turkey is vigorously trying to assert itself as a key player in the larger geopolitics of the Caucasus and Central Asia, a possibility that requires some level of cooperation with Moscow. It would be undercut if the Turks became more heavily involved in Circassian issues that temper with Moscow’s internal affairs. The republican status of Adyghea is another cause of continual friction between Circassians activists and the federal center, as Moscow seems to have made plans to merge it with Krasnodar Krai, in which Adyghea is a geographical enclave.

The 2014 Olympic Games in Sochi constitutes a key issue in the ongoing transnational Circassian mobilization, but a number of what could be called structural issues also contribute as mobilizing factors. These include anti-Caucasian xenophobia, the role of ethnic Russians as the dominant ethnic group in the Russian Federation, the double-titular composition of some of the republics in the North Caucasus, and the general process of ethnic homogenization. Skakov and Silaev argue that one factor behind the intensification of interest in the historical grievances of the Circassians is the 2014 Winter Olympics in Krasnaya Polyana, a settlement that was created on the site of the Circassian mountain village of Kbaade. There is a broadly accepted perception amongst the Circassian peoples that Sochi was the last bulwark in their resistance to the Russian Empire’s conquest of Circassian lands. As such it holds a significant place in the collective Circassian consciousness.

For this reason there was indignation at President Putin’s speech to the International Olympics Committee in July 2007 when he listed the ancient Greeks, Kolkhi and Cossacks amongst the former inhabitants of Sochi, but did not make any

56 Skakov and Silaev, “The ‘Cherkessian Factor’,” 3.
mention at all of the autochthonous peoples, the Circassians. To make thing worse, the Russian Olympic Committee invited a Cossack dance troupe to the Vancouver Olympics to represent the culture of the region. As Skakov and Silaev point out, several Circassian activists, speak of an allegedly joint Russian-Abkhazian position in favor of holding the games in Sochi. The reason for these differences can be found not only in the traditional arguments between the Circassian and the Abkhazian national movements but also in consideration of the very materialistic nature of the local population. The Olympic Games in Sochi brings significant profit for quasi-sovereign Abkhazia from tourism, supplying construction materials and goods for smuggling, while the Circassian elites remain marginalized.

In his assessment of the Circassian position on the issue of holding the Winter Olympics in Sochi, declared by President Medvedev to be another “Russian National Project”, Besleney points out three distinct attitudes. First, few organizations, such as the Cherkess Congress, want the Games to be cancelled. They insist that the Olympics cannot be held on land where thousands of Circassians were murdered in the Russo-Circassian War and that 2014 is the 150th anniversary of what they call “the Circassian Genocide”. Second, other groups, including the Adige Khase of Adyghea and many intellectuals and academics in the Circassian world, want increased and visible Circassian participation, similar to the role of North American and Australian indigenous peoples in past Olympics. The third attitude was that of the ICA and reflected the official Russian position that there should be no special Circassian dimension at all. However, a vigorous campaign of increased public attention mounted by the other groups in recent months has somehow forced the ICA and its member organizations towards a gradual acceptance of the second approach.

5. Circassian Ethnic Mobilization after the 2012 Presidential Elections

On January 23 2012 Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin published an article in Nezavisimaya Gazeta about ethnic relations in the Russian Federation as he geared up for presidential elections in March 2012. To a large extent the article was implicitly devoted to Moscow’s policy toward the North Caucasus. Putin proclaimed ethnic Russians “state constituting people”, something Russian nationalists had always advocated previously. At the same time, Putin compared those demonstrating under the banner “Stop Feeding the Caucasus” to the people who broke up the Soviet Union and proclaimed that the self-determination of the ethnic Russian people was as part of a “poly-ethnic civilization, united by a Russian cultural

57 Historically, the paramilitary Cossacks units were primary combat forces who played a pivotal role in the demise of historical Circassia, so this was just adding insult to injury.
58 Besleney, “Circassian Nationalism and the Internet.”
Despite the fact that Putin is often characterized as a nationalist, it would be more accurate to call him an opportunist who exploits other people’s prejudices when politically expedient. In fact, he believes that Russian identity doesn’t depend on somebody’s ethnicity but on whether they have adopted the “cultural code” of Russian civilization. However, even if Putin believes so firmly that the country’s existence depends on interethnic harmony, little been done to implement it over the past decade.

The importance of the “Circassian question” (see table 1) is systematically muted by the Russian authorities insofar as it affects, firstly, policy towards Abkhazia, and, secondly, the situation in the Northern Caucasus. Due to the presence of an extensive and influential Abkhazian diaspora in Turkey, that country was and will remain a most important external partner for Abkhazia on an equal footing with Russia. Indeed this was so even before Russia recognized Abkhazia and will, to all appearances, continue to remain so in the future. In the current context, Abkhazia’s “horizontal ties” with the diaspora may be more important than Ankara’s official position with respect to the political status of Abkhazia. The “Circassian question” is also reflected in the attempts made by the Abkhazian government to find ways of surmounting the demographic problem posed by the dwindling Abkhazian population of the republic, immediately addressed by the repatriation of Abazins from countries in the Near East and Russia. In those republics of the Russian Federation that contain a Circassian ethnic component more complex and multilevel processes are taking place over the past two decades: the privatization of budgetary allocations by local elites, the freedom from supervision and pervasive corruption at all levels of governance, and the transformation of the law-enforcement and the judiciary into an instrument serving the rent-seeking ethnic clans. The slogan of ethnic consolidation has been also actively manipulated by local elites as they deemed necessary, both to garner additional subsidies from the federal center, as well as to block those political initiatives that might undermine their privileged status.

On February 28, 2011 President Medvedev appointed two heads of the North Caucasian republics Karachay-Cherkessia and Chechnya. Karachay-Cherkessia received a new leader, 35-year-old Rashid Temrezov, while the previous president of the republic, Boris Ebzeyev was dismissed from his post before completing his

60 Skakov and Silaev, “The ‘Cherkessian Factor’.”
61 Ibid.
first term which should have lasted until 2013. Although Medvedev’s decree cited “his own request” as the reason for Ebzeyev’s dismissal, the slow socio-economic development of Karachay-Cherkessia was widely viewed as the primary reason. However, an activist from Karachay-Cherkessia, Murat Gukemukhov, told Voice of America that Boris Ebzeyev failed to control the republic.

Table 1: Key Goals and Components of the “Circassian question” in Russia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Goals</th>
<th>Components</th>
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<tr>
<td>1. Recognition of the genocide</td>
<td>1. Civil society mobilization</td>
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<td>2. Unification of the multiple Circassian regions into a single republic within the Russian Federation</td>
<td>2. Youth mobilization</td>
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<td>3. Repatriation of the diaspora</td>
<td>3. Internet and mass media campaigns</td>
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<td></td>
<td>4. Connecting with international NGOs and human rights groups</td>
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As late as February 24 2011, when he tried to rally the local parliament to support him to block his dismissal from the office, only 30 of 73 deputies of the republican parliament turned up to vote. Gukemukhov asserted that Ebzeyev lacked influence among high-ranking officials in Moscow, respect among local elites, and the necessary management skills to be in charge of this complex republic. Boris Ebzeyev’s sudden dismissal was evidence of one of the most spectacular failures of the new model for appointing regional governors in the North Caucasus, given that he was the first among Medvedev’s regional appointees and was unable to survive even for one full term. Having an extensive professional background as a professor of law, Ebzeyev was one of the contributors of the Russian constitution and served as a judge on Russia’s Constitutional Court from 1991 to 2008. The newly appointed head of Karachay-Cherkessia, Rashid Temrezov, stated on March 1, 2011 that his main goal would be improving the socio-economic situation in the republic and reducing its dependency on Moscow’s financial aid.

63  RIA Novosti, February 28, 2011.
64  RIA Novosti, February 26, 2011.
On June 21, 2011, the Russian Public Chamber’s working group on the North Caucasus held a public hearing on the problems of divided peoples who involuntarily found themselves separated by state boundaries. The Circassian issue was one of the most discussed themes, as a majority of ethnic Circassians live outside their homeland in Russia’s North Caucasus since the expulsions by the Russian empire in the nineteenth century. Besides the Circassians, the working group also recognized the Lezgins, Avars, Tsakhurs and Rutuls as divided peoples. The participants in the hearing produced a list of recommendations for the Russian government that particularly addressed Circassians. They advised the authorities in Moscow to make adjustments to Russian law in order to grant members of the Circassian diaspora the status of compatriots with a simplified path to Russian citizenship. The government was also asked to examine the possibility of organizing resettlement programs for members of the Circassian diaspora willing to return to their historic homeland in Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachay-Cherkessia, Adighea, the Krasnodar and Stavropol regions and the Mozdok district of North Ossetia. However, all these proposals were muted after the 2012 presidential elections.

Before the 2012 presidential election in Russia, Georgia was by far the biggest accomplishment of all the Circassian campaigns. No other country, besides Georgia, recognized the genocide and was weighing the possibility to boycott the Sochi Winter Olympic Games. Nonetheless, the parliamentary elections of 1 October 2012 in Georgia overlapped with the time in which newly re-elected President Putin was reshaping his image as a powerful player in the Caucasus. After the parliamentary elections of October 2012, the balance of power has shifted in Georgia and with it the positioning of Georgia regarding the Circassian question. As soon as Ivanishvili assumed the legislative power in Georgia, the “new government says it is seeking to turn down the temperature with Moscow and engage Russia on issues of common interest, such as trade” without abandoning its intention to join NATO and the European Union. Georgia also continues to question Russia’s recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia but, in order to revive negotiations, Ivanishvili has to offer something to Russia and the Circassian political agenda seems to be ideal. If the Circassian question was one of the key policy issues

This is a non-governmental public organization that is supposed to represent all major interest groups in the Russian society. In fact, its creation was initialized and approved by the incumbent political regime to legitimize its monopoly on decision-making processes in Russia.

Bidzina Ivanishvili (the Georgian Dream) won almost 55% of the votes, a result that ensured 85 seats from the 150 seats that compose the Georgian National Parliament. Presidential The United National Movement decreased from almost 60% (119 seats) in the parliamentary election of 2008 to 40% (65 seats) in 2012.

for Saakashvili, Ivanishvili has opted for a totally different approach; the very existence of the project "the Circassian Genocide" has been called into question and there is a significant decrease of political support to the ongoing activities at the Circassian Cultural Center in Georgia.

While President Boris Yeltsin permitted varying degrees of autonomy for the Caucasian republics, the ascendency of President Vladimir Putin brought a recentralization of government authority in the mid-2000s. However, as soon as Putin began his third term as president in May 2012, the Kremlin moved swiftly to modify its method of governance. It has now made it easier to register political parties and is bringing back direct elections of governors, although both come with notable restrictions. It has stopped ignoring protests mobilized its own supporters to publicly counter the opposition and reached out to various groups of less radical or hard-line opponents, offering them buy-ins into the system through, for example, consultative mechanisms. At the same time, it has sought to strengthen its own instruments of power: control of the key electronic media, the law enforcement system, appealing to the authority of the Russian Orthodox Church and reliance on the traditional paramilitary units, the Cossacks. Cossacks have experienced a revival in the Krasnodar region, where they were provided with financial support, uniforms and official status. Seven years ago they drove out a local population of Meskhetian Turks. In a speech to police officers on August 2, 2012 governor of the Krasnodar krai and a close ally of President Putin, Alexander Tkachev (whose region will host the 2014 Olympics) announced that as of September, 1000 Cossacks would be paid from the budget to maintain public order. He stressed the importance of controlling the migration of non-Russians from the North Caucasus region and stressed that the Cossacks would take measures beyond what the police were allowed. Governor Tkachev said that his enlistment of Cossacks was intended purely to enforce Russian migration laws but his speech contained incendiary language about relations between ethnic groups in southern Russia.

Pointing to the Krasnodar krai, Tkachev noted that this region did not belong to the Russian Empire; it belonged to the Caucasian people, the Circassians. However, as Tkachev put it, due to the fact that the Circassian land was added to the Russian Empire so recently, it was vulnerable to non-Russian influences and demanded that ethnic Russians stand up to curb the increasing migration from North Caucasus regions. Citing the example of Kosovo, where ethnic Albanians initially were a minority and then became the majority, Tkachev said he was determined to preserve the predominance of ethnic Russians in the Krasnodar krai. More than $20

million will be allocated to the newly created Cossack police force over the next year.\textsuperscript{72} Since the Krasnodar region is hosting the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics, such provocative initiatives are clearly in line with the Kremlin’s effort to keep North Caucasians away from the region. Having made clearly discriminatory statements, Tkachev confirmed via Twitter that he is determined to fight “illegal migration”.\textsuperscript{73} Tkachev’s statements seemingly mark a hardening of the Russian government’s positions in the region and the absence of political will for dialogue and compromise. Furthermore, as the positions of the ethnic Russian regions harden, the North Caucasian republics are likely to react in an asymmetric manner.

Since the republican elites cannot afford to make anti-Russian statements, they will pursue anti-Russian policies informally or at least turn a blind eye to nationalist civil activism. In fact, Tkachev once again articulated Putin’s views that internal migrants from the North Caucasus are not welcomed by ethnic Russians, who consider them outsiders to say the least. Responding to the growth of nationalism and the apparent reluctance or inability of the Russian state to do something about it, the Circassians are likely to step up resistance along ethnic lines to defend their rights. For example, when the prime minister of Adygea met with a member of the Jordanian parliament, Munir Sobrok, who came to explore the situation in the republic and make inquiries as to whether the Adygean authorities were prepared to accept Circassian refugees from Syria, mounting pressure by two opposing sides – officials in Moscow and the Circassian activists in the North Caucasus – resulted in a state of denial on the part of Adygean officials to resolve the issue.\textsuperscript{74} At a conference in Maikop on June 30 2012, the Adygean leadership was harshly criticized by Circassian activists for inaction in regard to facilitating the Syrian Circassians’ repatriation.\textsuperscript{75} Since the Russian government shows no signs of readiness to address a plethora of Circassian grievances, ethnic identity will continue to be the main driving force of political mobilization of Circassian peoples in the North Caucasus.

6. Conclusion

The core of the Circassian problem for the federal authorities appears to be the existence of large and strong Circassian diaspora outside Russia that is still ignored by Moscow. The conflict in Syria has further galvanized Circassian activists and the more the Kremlin postpones finding a resolution to the Circassian problem, the

\textsuperscript{72} http://www.yuga.ru/articles/society/6390.html, last accessed March 15, 2013.
\textsuperscript{73} Twitter, https://twitter.com/antkachev, last accessed March 15, 2013.
\textsuperscript{74} According to Albert Kazharov, a deputy of the Russian Federation Council from Kabardino-Balkaria, an estimated 2000 Syrian Circassians may relocate to the North Caucasus, but the Russian legislation prevents them from doing so (http://kommersant.ru/doc/1977996).
more negative is the international informational background. In spite of Moscow’s persistent attempts to soft-pedal and ignore the Circassian problem, this issue has gained momentum due to the changing map of the Middle East, rising Circassians activism, and Russia’s own actions in the Caucasus, which have convinced Georgian policymakers to adopt a proactive strategy toward the North Caucasus. The ethnic consolidation of the Circassian peoples within the boundaries of distinct administrative and territorial formations, alongside the broad development of the radical Islamist movement, becomes a powerfully destabilizing factor in the event that the current political order in the Northern Caucasus breaks down further. The evolution of Circassian nationalism also highlights the initial failure of post-Soviet nation-building policies, the weakness of civil society and the transparency of patriotic nationalism created only to justify the vital interests of the ruling elites, which by promoting confusion between the public and the private have succeeded in carving up the most profitable political, bureaucratic and economic functions.

The Circassian movement has already developed a clear ideology and made significant efforts toward achieving its strategic goals. The Circassian genocide has been recognized by the parliaments of Kabardino-Balkaria (1992), Adygea (1996), Abkhazia (1997), and Georgia (2011). The opportunity to address – both in positive and negative approaches – the hosting of the 2014 Olympics in Sochi, the last capital of Circassia, on the 150th anniversary of the Circassian Genocide, created new possibilities for the Circassian movement. After the 2012 presidential elections Moscow has not yet developed a coherent policy to address the Circassian issue which allows regional pro-government elites to come forward with provocative grass-root initiatives. On the one hand, the Kremlin cannot take any effective repressive measures against the Circassian movement because it has already become an international issue and it would further damage Russia’s reputation and undermine the very meaning of hosting the prestigious Olympic Games. On the other hand, the Kremlin cannot positively resolve the Circassian issues because that would put it in direct confrontation with other nationalist movements, which are also gaining strength in the North Caucasus. In the absence of political will for dialogue and compromise, the Russian government will further try either to ignore the Circassian nationalism or to split it by gaining control over a number of Circassian activist groups. It is no longer the armed resistance in the North Caucasus that is pressing for the separation of the region from the Russian Federation: the Russian authorities’ actions and policies are essentially advancing the same cause by tacitly encouraging hostilities between ethnic groups in the North Caucasus. To secure influence over the peoples of the Caucasus, the Kremlin will continue to use tested and proven methods, essence of which – “divide and conquer” – remains unchanged across time and space.
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Rajeesh Kumar
Jawaharlal Nehru University

Reports of sexual abuse and exploitation by UN peacekeepers were a black mark in the history of United Nations Peacekeeping. The metamorphosis of peacekeepers to perpetrators has been part of almost all the discussions on peacekeeping in the last two decades. In the 1990s the discussions centred on the absence of rules and procedures for preventing sexual exploitation by the peacekeepers. The discussions have forced the United Nations to make some regulatory measures to prevent such actions and to form laws to penalize peacekeepers who violate these codes of conduct. The culmination of all these developments was the formation of Secretary General’s Bulletin (SGB) commonly known as Zero Tolerance Policy (ZTP) in the year 2003. In the meantime, the discourse over the sexual exploitation has taken a new shape by debating pros and cons of the new rule.

Olivera Simic’s *Regulation of Sexual Conduct in UN Peacekeeping Operations* is a critique of United Nations response to sexual exploitation in Peacekeeping Operations. By dissecting the wording and provisions of SGB, the author tries to uncover the United Nations’ perception of sexual exploitation and SGB’s lack of differentiation between sexual exploitation and sexual relationship. Intended to prevent sexual exploitation and abuse, the Zero Tolerance Policy openly bans all sexual activities including consensual sex between UN peacekeepers and local women. The book is also a feminist critique of common understanding of women as powerless and unequal in general and women as victims and peacekeepers as predators in the context of peacekeeping operations in particular.

The book has seven chapters and provides a comprehensive understanding of a complex issue. The first three chapters provide conceptual and theoretical frameworks for the study through evaluating the institutional responses of the United Nations towards sexual exploitation in the context of peacekeeping, from ad-hoc missions to the Zero Tolerance Policy. The details of the historical development of peacekeeping operations, the development of rules and provisions against sexual exploitation and abuse in peacekeeping operations, and also the profiling of peacekeepers are worthwhile in locating the empirical evidence of the study. The next chapter outlines the methodological framework for the empirical research and tries to locate the research in the context of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The next two chapters analyze the opinions of the interviewees regarding all sexual relationships in peacekeeping operations against the backdrop of SGB. These two
Book Reviews

chapters evaluate the pros and cons of the SGB and interviewees responses towards the provisions of SGB. Finally, the book proposes a revision of SGB in consultation with people directly affected by its provisions.

The book has put forth two central arguments. First, the United Nations’ responses towards sexual exploitation in peacekeeping operations are instrumental, based on gender stereotypes and a radical feminist approach. According to author, these responses are the outcomes of the notion that women are victims, powerless and unequal comparing with male peacekeepers. It also replicates the patriarchal language. Second, through prohibiting all sexual relationships including consensual sex between local women and peacekeepers, the SGB type casts local women and peacekeepers. The SGB also denies the sexual agency and autonomy of women and violates international human rights law. This over-inclusive, blanket ban of all sexual relationships between peacekeepers and local women will not be able to offer anything constructive to the local women rather than deepening their vulnerability. According to the author, the SGB has failed in distinguishing the difference between exploitative and non-exploitative sex.

The heart of the book lies in the empirical evidence generated through a comprehensive but restricted and parsimonious field study and explaining this evidence with theoretical and conceptual thinking established in the first three chapters. The empirical studies points out that the United Nations’ response to sexual exploitation in peacekeeping operations, especially the SGB, ignore the lived experiences of women and peacekeepers, two groups directly affected by these policies. The methodology and research design, especially the qualitative interviews, the author applies in this study for explaining the lives of people are also worth mentioning. The author has employed one of the best methods to explain a sensitive and highly personal issue of sexual relationships. This methodology helps the author to provide an in-depth, comprehensive answer to the research question. Through investigating the experiences of Bosnian women and peacekeepers and analysing it against the backdrop of the provisions of SGB, the study utilizes the beauty of case study method in its limitation of generality. Simic has taken up a categorically challenging responsibility of finding interviewees, conducting interviews, and is successful in guaranteeing the confidentiality for the interviewees. By seeking the perceptions of local women and peacekeepers who engaged in sexual relationships in the context of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Simic also succeeded in achieving the final goal of a research: value addition. The author deserves praise for daring to investigate such a complex issue of sexual agency and analysing it with the support of much side-stepped (in the field of international relations) ‘sex positive’ feminist approach.

However, due to the complexity of the issue under concern, this work also has selected inevitable drawbacks. First, by arguing that the United Nations policies
towards sexual conduct are imperial and colonial in nature, the author falls into the same category of age old critics of the United Nations that see the institution as a post-war agent with a “civilizing mission”. While talking about the sexual agency of women, the author fails to recognize the spokes of patriarchy in the reality of contemporary society, and contradicts herself by arguing that nation states have the right to make laws and norms for regulating prostitution. Since, the concept of ‘agency’ and ‘freedom’ are complex and subjective, and any generalization is impossible, it would be difficult to say with whom the final decision making power rests. Hence, for a global organization like the UN, it would be difficult (though not impossible) to produce norms and laws in consultation with each and every individual and society even if it would be the best solution. By supporting a naïve argument that the prohibition of sexual exploitation would encourage racism, discrimination and stigmatization without evidence, the author sometimes fails to recall the quality of a researcher and value of a research work.

Nonetheless, the book offers certain qualities in research design, methodology and provides a splendid explanation in its research findings. Taking the agency of women seriously through a ‘sex positive’ feminist approach, and questioning the general view of vulnerability of women in post-conflict societies, Simic offers an innovative and imaginative research critique of the United Nations’ perception and policies of sexual exploitation in peacekeeping. It proposes a contextual revisiting of United Nations policies for regulating sexual conduct in peacekeeping operations against the backdrop of new research findings. Therefore, this work is essential reading for students, scholars as well as practitioners and policy makers. It will undeniably contribute to the further research in this field.


Emmanuel Kipole
University of Dar es Salaam

Apparently capitalism and neo-liberalism have elevated the market to a position of omnipotence as a spontaneously occurring best resources’ distributor. However, neo-liberalism as a philosophy that informs capitalism has always sparked divergent opinions as to its core spirit and practice. Neo-liberalism has always been netted into different perspectives. Although the consensual bottom-line of neo-liberalism philosophy is the free market, there is no consensus on its interpretation, contextualization and practices. As a whole, there is optimism in neo-liberalism the same as there is skepticism.
The varying perspectives and the challenges caused by the recent economic downturn have intensified interest to interrogate neo-liberalism in terms of theory-nexus-praxis. Whereas neo-liberalism suggests that the free market is the best allocator of resources in the economy, the actual practice does not seem to endorse this fact. Theory and practice of neo-liberalism on seem to be antithetical in this respect; some schools of thought point to neo-liberalism as the main culprit of the on-going economic recession. This title, then, is a timely and relevant contribution that attempts to bring a new line of thinking about neo-liberalism.

The book makes an analysis of “the free market concept” as a cornerstone of neo-liberalism by gauging it on a scale to test its claimed spontaneity above social, economical and political environments. The test result presented by the authors shows that “the market” is a product of a society and is both shaping and being shaped by social and political conditions prevailing in a particular setting. Unlike the neoliberal claims that market is superior to the social conditions, the book suggests a view that social and institutional frameworks are paramount in shaping “the market”. As the title of the book suggests, the authors are promulgating the project of thinking beyond a common place that neo-liberalism is about the free market. They argue that neo-liberalism can be understood in full by inquiring about the extra-market factors in the sense that it is never omnipotent to the environments in which it resides. The authors contend that the institutional and social environment in which neo-liberalism operates are very vital in shaping its practice. Furthermore, the book contends that the market has never been free from the control of the state in terms of regulatory mechanisms and directives; rather the state’s control over the market and economy has been reconfigured to suit the time, people and space. There has never been “real freedom” of the market anywhere in the world as neoliberals would like to imply, but rather there have been a series of regulatory mechanisms to govern the market even in the purportedly top liberal countries such as the United States of America, Canada, the United Kingdom and Australia.

In that respect, claims that neo-liberalism is all about the free market, in the perspective of the authors, become a fallacy and lack logical validation. There are basic forces which operate in front and behind neo-liberalism which are responsible for shaping the free market that need to be recognized. Total disembodiment of the economy from its social mooring is impractical and at best unattainable, and if attempted, the economy becomes amenable to suffocation. This argument accentuates the point that attempts to disentangle the economy from its political and social basis is counterproductive and has detrimental consequences. The authors draw on evidence to support their argument by inferring the trend in the leading liberal market economies such as the USA which is currently moving towards a “neomanagerialism” style where the state is taking new role in directing the economy. Despite the fact that the USA has never at any point turned a blind
eyes to regulating its economy, the power of the US state in the economy after the 2007 recession is increasing significantly.

The authors have, to a great extent, articulated the course of their argument by employing several concrete cases of the ways in which neo-liberalism is administered, particularly interesting being the analysis of the root-cause of the current economic recession and the subsequent efforts in combating the recession. The book is enriched with individual country cases for implementing neo liberal policy which substantiate the varied practices attributed to different social and political settings. To convey their message, they have thoughtfully employed the key arguments of the liberal scholars such as Milton Friedman and Friedrich von Hayek while at the same times gauging their theoretical point of view against contending views of scholar like Karl Polanyi. The book used the concept of “embeddedness” to advance the argument that the market is not omnipotent, rather is the product of the society in which it resides. Furthermore, the orderly subdivision of the book into four parts is sequenced in a way to enable a reader to chronologically follow the development of neo liberalism as a concept, its coherence, practice and ultimately its prospects. The parts are systematically arranged in a way to drive home a point that “markets” are socially constructed and that the role of the state in the economy cannot be underestimated.

Notwithstanding the pointed strengths in advancing their core argument, the empirical cases that the authors employ, despite the fact that they are plausible, are too droning as they restrict their scope to such limited cases as Australia, the USA and the United Kingdom. Based on the claim by neoliberals that “[T]here is no alternative”(TINA) to neo-liberalism globally, expanding the examination of neo-liberalism to cover a global scope in terms of its experience not only becomes desirable but an imperative. The book would have been more informative and a basis for generalization delivered had it taken aboard the East Asian, Chinese, Latin American and African experiences in their endeavour to embrace this dogma of the West.

As a whole, the title is one of the useful pieces for researchers, scholars in international political economy, economists as well as policy makers of both newly democratizing countries and of countries which are at the threshold of “de-democratization” due to the consequences of neo-liberalism, if we are to take the conception of the free market as the centerpiece of liberal democracy. For anyone interested with the on-going economic conundrum, this title gives an interesting insight into this topical debate.

Martin Mölder
Central European University

Analyzing coalition governments in Western parliamentary democracies has followed more or less the same design throughout the years. The objective has been to “predict” or “explain” the formation of governments in general. Although the explanatory power of models has improved, even the most comprehensive are able to predict government formation in less than half of the cases.¹ This can mean either that the process of coalition formation is to a significant extent idiosyncratic or that current models have not been fully specified.

It is the latter approach that is taken by the book *Puzzles of Government Formation*. The research design follows recent suggestions about the implementation of mixed methods and nested analysis² and sets out to first determine the cases that are not explained by coalition theories. Classical office and policy based theories are used to define such “puzzles”. Institutional theories are mentioned, but only to state that they will not be included in the initial analysis (p. 10). Although the vast majority of coalitions are thus left unexplained, the authors decide to focus on cases that are relatively least likely (pp. 14-15). The specific selection of cases is not fully explained and many other even more unlikely cases could have been chosen. Nevertheless, instances of government formation from Sweden, Norway, Austria, Spain, Finland, the Netherlands and Belgium were chosen as in-depth case studies. These cases can be considered puzzling because they were either minority governments, oversized coalitions, which according to office based theories should not form, or non-connected coalitions and coalitions excluding the median legislator, which should not form according to policy based coalition theories.

Thinking about solutions to these “puzzles”, the case studies indeed suggest variables, which in principle could be used in improved models. For example, a variable for multiple interconnected party systems could be operationalized and included, as well as electoral volatility and the fortunes of individual parties (p. 199). Furthermore, one of the lessons of the book is that more attention should be paid to defining coalitions (pp. 195-196). Many of the cases suggest that parliamentary or policy coalitions that do not include membership in government can serve the same

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262
function as government coalitions. A recurrent theme is the skill of political leaders (p. 196) or specific commitments made prior to coalition bargaining. These, however, are factors that cannot be included in general models. We can thus say that this book succeeds in the objectives it sets for itself in that it is able to propose variables that could indeed improve general models, but at the same time it shows the limitations of such modelling.

Although the book purports to solve puzzles, it also raises some questions. What is “deviant” is determined by what we imagine to be the factors that should influence the formation of coalitions. The book begins by taking into account policy and office theories and disregards institutions in determining what is puzzling. By now, however, it is beyond evident that institutions help to explain a lot of variance in coalition formation and office and policy alone are quite poor predictors. Perhaps the cases that were selected would not have been so puzzling, if institutional factors that we already know have a very significant impact were taken into account. Indeed, the case studies make a lot of reference to different institutional factors in explaining the “puzzling” cases.

The other puzzle implicitly raised relates to the role that assumptions should play in coalition research. It is noted both by the editors in the introduction (p. 5) and by Ilja van Beest in his account of social psychological studies of coalitions (p. 37) that such research in politics should be more critical and self-aware about its assumptions and not so reluctant to reconsider the role of rational choice theory, the source of the assumptions. Yet the way that the puzzles in this book are defined follows exactly the prescriptions of coalition formation theory soaked in classical rational choice assumptions about the behaviour of political parties. In this sense the book still starts from theories and assumptions that are known to be very poor approximations of reality and that it itself says should not be made light-heartedly and should perhaps be reconsidered. By and large, office and policy theories tell us that minimal winning governments and connected governments are the norm and everything else is puzzling. Reality has been telling us that in fact they are not the predominant norm. In this context what perhaps is truly puzzling is that we still take them to be the norm, even if we say that we should not and even if we know that they are not.

But is it also perhaps in this last characteristic of the book that its greatest merit for research in coalitions lies. For it shows again that what is puzzling for office and policy theories alone, has in fact quite obvious explanations in the calculations and behaviour of parties, suggesting yet again that research in coalitions should start looking far over and beyond the former. It indicates important elements that have been missing in models, but also what remain beyond the reach of general models of coalition formation. It is thus essential reading for anybody interested in coalition research and some of the more recent developments therein.

Mark Castelino
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München

J.G.A. (John) Pocock is a renowned historian of political ideas and is most associated with the so-called “Cambridge School” of political thought whose founding members in the 1960’s also include Quentin Skinner and John Dunn. This volume is a collection of essays arranged more-or-less in chronological order of publication that are “concerned with relations between history and political theory” (ix) and encompasses the full length of Pocock’s half-century-long writing career. As such, it is very instructive for getting a grasp of a major author in a significant current of contemporary political thought.

The “Cambridge approach” to the interpretation and understanding of texts in the history of political thought is distinguished by its *method*, which emphasizes to a great extent the historical *context* in which a given political text (book, essay, or other) was composed. While the three original representatives of this school have differing areas of focus, they share the view that the *meaning* of the text for the reader cannot be separated from its context. Pocock himself emphasizes the *language* used by political actors in *discourse* with their contemporaries, a feature of his writing that finds ample mention in this volume. This approach “is one in which I identify languages of political conceptualization, select patterns of implication which they may bear, and try to trace the working out of these implications in the history of thought” (p. 26).

Indeed, language presents itself in the book as the vehicle by which is mediated the relationship between its two main themes: *politics* and *history*. This theme is manifest in the structure of the book: the first part is entitled “Political Thought as History” and the second, “History as Political Thought”, with an “Intermezzo” on Skinner. Language emerges thus in the political context in manifold forms as it
manifests itself in history: as discourse, as dialogue, as narrative, as historiography, as “illocutionary” means to political action.

In pursuing his development of this program, Pocock presents a biographical perspective on his work in that the two parts reflect the changing emphasis of his primary occupation in the course of his career. The first part is chiefly concerned with methods for analyzing political theories in their historical context, or, as the title of one essay runs, “Working on Ideas in Time” (pp. 20-32). He describes in this piece, for instance, how “the history of political ideas, the history of political thought, considered as an activity, could very conveniently be treated as the history of political language or languages” (p. 26). But what exactly does Pocock mean when he uses the word “language,” particularly in the first part? Not the culturally and historically rooted distinct languages, e.g. English or French, nor any system of signs and signifiers, notwithstanding Pocock’s proclivity for using French (and occasionally German) words and expressions. Rather, it is the emphasis on language as a determining force for action in the political sphere that comes out most strongly in the first part, and one sees affinities between Pocock and Skinner in particular.

For Pocock, the historian of politics, the concept of “language” as thus understood is indeed important: “The historian of political discourse who is emerging from this account of his practice spends his time learning the ‘languages’, idioms, rhetorics or paradigms in which discourse has been conducted, and at the same time studying the acts of utterance which have been performed in these ‘languages’, or in language formed as a composite of them” (p. 89).

Pocock’s attention to utterances makes manifest his “membership” in the “Cambridge School” of political thought, for like Skinner’s “speech-act theory,” Pocock’s concept of “political language” bears particularly on the way in which texts are approached and read. At the center of the thought of both authors lies the relation between history and philosophy, a theme that comes out most clearly in the aforementioned “intermezzo” on Skinner (p. 133):

The methodological problem before us both is the following: ‘Is it possible to assert a continuity of debate, extending across generations and centuries, without imposing a false pattern and engaging in a false prolepsis? To claim that it is possible, one must be able to demonstrate (1) the continuity of the languages in which the debate was conducted and (2) the connexions between the speech acts by whose performance it was conducted.

Skinner’s approach, centered around speech-acts, attempts to discern what the author is “doing”, but Pocock’s notion of language in politics is somewhat different and brings him in his later work to quite a different perspective on political thought.
The second part of the book, entitled “History as political thought,” is largely concerned with the theme of historiography, or the writing of history (-ies), here in the political context, which in this collection is represented by Pocock’s later work. Clearly, the (written) history of a political community can be very controversial (what is to be included, what excluded, hushed up?) - hence why the theme is politically charged. The essays in this part of the book “inquire in what sense the historian of a society may be its citizen, participant in it through recounting and renarrating its history, which she or he shares with those who do not recount and need not think of it” (p. x). The five essays (pp. 9-13) that comprise this part of the book broach themes that are connected with the main subject of historiography, including: the modes by which a chronicle of contemporary events may be transmitted to posterity; the understanding and meaning of traditions; and the role of myth (itself a form of story-telling) in the historiography of a political community, particularly in upholding authority.

The author does indeed take account of the balancing-act that is often necessary to perform between history and philosophy in the history of political thought. The question does throughout the book come to the fore regarding this interaction between the two disciplines, and is encapsulated in one passage quite well: “The questions with which political philosophers come to deal may perhaps be perennial – I do not intend to deny this, though I do think we need critical means of determining when to say it and when not – but precisely when they are, they cannot be historical” (52). Yet do texts in the history of political thought not bear within themselves an applicability to present-day political problems? Is the text not only related to its composer and to his or her own historical context, but also to the individual reader, regardless of the historical period in which the text is read? It seems that if this last possibility were excluded, the study of texts in the history of political thought, a standard component of the discipline of political science, may well become a purely historical endeavor, a documentation of what has happened in the past without normative appraisal and without relevance to the present. It is a balancing-act indeed that is nonetheless handled well by Pocock in this highly recommendable volume of essays.

Nermin Abadan-Unat, Turks in Europe (London: Berghahn 2011)

Patrick Hein
Meiji University

In his 2010 best-selling book Germany Is Doing Away with Itself former German Central Bank executive member Thilo Sarrazin denounced the structural integration unwillingness of the Turkish community in Germany. The book sparked a fierce controversy especially among young, liberal, German-speaking Turks who felt
deeply offended by Sarrazin’s allegations. The German unease with Islam and Turkey has cast a shadow over bilateral relations between the two states. With the rise of radical Islam and ongoing human rights violations in Turkey, tensions have been on the increase.

Turkey is the only Muslim country with one foot in Europe and an active member of the Western defense alliance NATO. Despite the strong secular foundations laid by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk who abolished the trappings of the Islamic state and replaced them with Western institutions, Turkey’s aspirations to become a full-fledged member of the EU have not been fulfilled as of today. Hopes that the 4 million Turkish migrants who moved to Europe would settle for good there and feel emotionally attached to their new home did not eventuate. The voluminous study by Nermin Abadan-Unat, a Turkish-German scholar who is also called the “mother of Turkish migration research” (p. xiii), has explored the intentions and actual outcomes of Turkish migration policies from a historical perspective. Her research is based on empirical surveys investigating the disillusioning and harsh experiences of Turkish migrants in Europe over a time span covering more than 50 years. Her study was initially published in Turkish (2002) before being translated into German (2005). The English edition (2011) has been substantially revised. The goal of the study is to show that labor export migration did neither improve the status of Turkish migrants nor benefit the Turkish economy for two reasons. One reason it that migration has been used by the Turkish government as a tool of “social engineering” (xxi), the second reason is that migration “primarily served to benefit migrant-accepting states and their financial capital” (p. xxiv).

Though conceived as a historical study, the information is not presented in a chronological or narrative order except for the first chapter which examines the historical phases of Turkish emigration to Europe. The remaining chapters of the study are structured along major theme blocs. Chapter 2 covers migration to the Middle East and Russia. Chapter 3 presents two major empirical studies that depict the negative outcomes of migration: one is about the difficult living and working conditions of Turkish migrants in Germany, the other about difficulties Turkish migrants face when returning to their home country and resettling there. The author tells us that migrants face the challenges of “marginalized lifestyles” (p. 71) in the host country on one hand and increased levels of “dependency” (p. 82) and estrangement in the country of origin on the other hand. The subsequent chapters touch upon major themes of migration such as migrant women (chapter 4); educational challenges for the second and third generation of migrants (chapter 5); the activities of Islamic civil society organizations (chapter 6); the development of ethnic niche businesses and ethnic enterprises in host countries (chapter 7); citizenship issues and political participation of migrants (chapter 8); xenophobia trends against foreigners (chapter 9). The last two chapters are concerned with predicting future developments. In this regard, chapter 10 looks at the changing
attitudes of Turks who have grown up or settled for good in Europe (the so called Euro-Turks) while chapter 11 offers an outlook on future transnational developments in migration research.

The major strength of the study is the wealth of empirical data that supports the main thesis of the book. According to the author, migration has not benefited Turkey as the goal of economic development through labor export as a way to acquire European industrial skills was never achieved (p. 23). From the perspective of the migrant it did not pay off either. Abadan-Unat argues that many of the migrants who had “respectable professions” (p. 53) in Turkey saw their socio-economic status worsening as they had to accept lower worker status in Germany. Moreover, the first generation of migrants suffered from cultural identity diffusion and “did not aspire to be integrated” (p. 114).

Integration is a key concept of modern migration science, yet in the book of Abadan-Unat the concept remains somehow fluid. The author refers to it in more detail only in the final chapter of her study. On one side she defines integration as a “watered-down version of a strict assimilation policy” with all the “exclusionist elements of assimilation” (p. 224). Hence, in her concluding remarks she estimates that integration does not seem to have offered a solution to the problems of the migrant Turks in Europe (p. 241). On the other side she depicts integration as a positive concept opposed to the disadvantages of discrimination (p. 208). The theoretical arguments of the author leaves room for interpretation and leave many questions open. In the same light her comments on the head scarf issue and honor killings remain somewhat ambiguous, if not controversial. She asserts for example in the case of honor killings that “those cultural values (traditional values, PH) can sometimes be considered a resistance against assimilation” (p. 111).

The author remains equally ambiguous about the importance of identifying with democratic and constitutional values in a secular state governed by the rule of law. She sees for example a trend towards an open “Islamophobia” in Europe (pp. 139, 241) and maintains that it is “impossible to realize the conditions Tibi sets forth for Euro-Islam” (142). Bassam Tibi is a German scholar of Syrian descent who has coined the concept of Leitkultur (guiding or dominant culture) in 1996 to defend liberal values against the growing Islamic cultural fundamentalism in Europe. According to Tibi values can either be imposed in coercive ways through violence and indoctrination or shared in positive ways through respect, tolerance, acceptance and mutual understanding. According to Tibi the Leitkultur concept encompasses a commitment to human rights, separation of religion and state, pluralism, human dignity and mutual tolerance. In similar terms the principle of “constitutional patriotism”, a concept associated with the liberal German scholar Juergen Habermas, posits that citizenship relies on shared, universal (republican or democratic) values, rather than on a common history or ethnic origin.
Even though Abadan-Unat does not disclose her own scientific position or offer her own compelling migration theory it is to her merit to summarize secondary independent research findings throughout her book. The point she makes is that many second and third generation Turks have overcome their conflicting identities and have come to value the culture and traditions of their European host countries (p. 206). In other words, the study opens the door to a promising perspective for critical thinking on changes in migrants’ transnational identity formation, civic values and human rights awareness.
NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

Mark. Castelino is a PhD student in Political Science at the Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität Munich. He holds MA degrees in Philosophy and Political Science at the Universities of Montréal and Calgary. E-mail: macastelino@hotmail.com.

Marat Grebennikov is instructor at the Department of Political Science, Concordia University. His areas of interest are the impact of religion on the post-Soviet political system and state-minority relations in the Caucasus. E-mail: marat.grebennikov@yandex.ru.

Patrick Hein holds a MA in Political Science from Marburg University and is an English lecturer at the Global School of Japanese Studies at Meiji University. E-mail: p_heinjp@yahoo.co.jp.

Ana Jese Perkovic is researcher at the Department of Sociology at University of Ljubljana, Slovenia and a PhD candidate in European Studies at University of Ljubljana. E-mail: anajese@gmail.com.

Emmanuel Kipole is researcher at the Department of Political Science and Public Administration, University of Dar es Salaam. E-mail: kipole@hotmail.com.

Umut Koldas is Lecturer at the Near East University. His research interests include: democratization, state-minority relations in the Middle East and the Mediterranean region, and Israeli affairs. E-mail: ukoldas@yahoo.com.

Rajeesh Kumar is a Doctoral Candidate at Centre for International Politics, Organization and Disarmament, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. E-mail: rajeeshjnu@gmail.com.

Martin Mölder is a PhD Candidate at the Doctoral School of Political Science, Public Policy, and International Relations, Central European University Budapest. E-mail: molder_martin@ceu-budapest.edu.

Mina Sumaadii works as Research Manager at Sant Maral Foundation, Mongolia. She holds a MA in Political Science from Central European University Budapest. E-mail: mina sumaadii@gmail.com.
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