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TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE DYNAMICS IN SLOVAKIA:
FROM SILENCE TO THE NATION’S MEMORY INSTITUTE

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Abstract
The purpose of this article is to identify and explain the dynamics of transitional justice in Slovakia. Furthermore, it focuses on the Nation’s Memory Institute and its role in the process of dealing with the past. The dynamics are explained through the existence of constraints – the type of the regime change, the nature of the Communist regime and elite configuration. Transition process in Slovakia can be divided into three distinct phases, in which the interplay of the constraints allows for the application of various transitional justice mechanisms. The main finding of the article is that throughout the existence of the independent Slovakia, the elite configuration was the variable which affected the process the most. Favorable elite configuration allowed for the establishment of the institute in 2002, which can be considered a “breaking of the silence” when it comes to dealing with the past in Slovakia.

Keywords: transitional justice, regime change, elite configuration, Slovakia.

1. Introduction

Dealing with past crimes is a challenge faced by every new political regime being established in a country with a criminal past. There are two basic approaches to this challenge: either forgetting and forgiving or addressing the criminal past. Huntington argues that the decision to deal with the past has to be quick, because as time passes the discredited groups are able to regain influence.¹ The tendency to forget and forgive simply increases with the passage of time.

The post-communist transitions to democracy are all part of the third wave of democratization and they share some common characteristics that distinguish them from the previous cases of transition. Claus Offe labeled them as “triple transitions.” This triple transition encompassed the political regime change (introduction of democratic rules of the game, building up the new constitutional framework), economic transition (the introduction of the market economy) and transformation at the level of nationhood (redefinition of national identities).² All of these problems have to be addressed simultaneously.

² Claus Offe, Varieties of Transition. The East European and East German Experience (Cambridge: M. I. T. Press, 1997).
Slovakia experienced the change from communist rule as a part of Czechoslovakia. Czechoslovak elites addressed the past through a series of measures, including a limited number of criminal prosecutions and a rather severe lustration. After the breakup of the federation, Slovakia adopted the “politics of silence”. However, in 2002 a law establishing the Nation’s Memory Institute and access to the secret police files was passed in the parliament. This development meant that the silence was broken after 13 years, which goes against Huntington’s expectation.

The purpose of this article is to provide some insights into the transitional justice developments in Slovakia. The main research question is: What were the dynamics of transitional justice in Slovakia and how they can be explained? The transitional justice theorists argue that it is the context, which imposes constraints and shapes the choice of transitional justice mechanisms. I am going to argue that the dynamics in Slovakia can be explained by the interplay of hard constraints on transitional justice: the nature of the nondemocratic regime, character of regime change and elite configuration.

The transitional justice literature on post-communist societies usually deals with Czechoslovakia as a unit of analysis, with focus on the Czech Republic after the federation dissolution (e.g. Welsh³ or David⁴). The main exception is the work of Nedelsky⁵, who deals with the Slovak case separately but does not sufficiently account for all of the specifics of the Slovakian experience with democratization and the consolidation of democracy. Moreover, her work focuses mainly on secret file access and lustration, while this article demands a wider analysis.

Szomolanyi argues that Slovakia was the only country in the east European region, which experienced a quadruple transition. Except for the problems identified by Offe, Slovakia had to build its independent state shortly after the transition. The state-building, which already started in 1992, was a completely different challenge for the Czech Republic, which maintained most of the administrative and

institutional capacities of the old republic and for Slovakia, which had little experience of self-government.\(^6\)

Erika Harris goes even further and suggests that the Slovak transition was so complex that it should be divided into three stages, which “affect one another, but nevertheless have distinct characteristics within the main post-communist transition.”\(^7\) The first stage was a common experience in Czechoslovakia within the still existing federation. The second stage was the notorious period of Mečiarism between 1994 and 1998, which is associated with the independent state-building. The final phase was the period of 1998-2002, after the critical 1998 elections and the victory of pro-European democratic forces. This period is characterized by Europeanization, which later resulted in NATO and EU ascension.

In the first section, I will briefly define my stance towards transitional justice and discuss various constraints to its implementation. Then I will deal with the hard constraints in the Slovak case. The final section will provide an overview of transitional justice policies in the three transition phases, with an explanation of their adaptation based on the interplay of given hard constraints. In this article, I am only dealing with the transitional justice mechanisms aimed at mitigating grievances caused by the communist regime.

2. Transitional Justice and its Constraints

Transitional justice can be in its broadest sense understood as a “conception of justice associated with periods of political change, characterized by legal responses to confront the wrongdoings of repressive predecessor regimes.”\(^8\) Pursuing justice after the repressive regime removal is an important challenge for any new regime. According to Zalaquett, any transitional justice policy “should have two overarching objectives: to prevent recurrence of such abuses and to repair the damage they caused.”\(^9\) He further emphasizes that in terms of aims a transitional justice policy should not only be in connection with the above mentioned universal objectives but

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Méndez argues that pursuing transitional justice is necessary for the new political order and that granting impunity to the perpetrators can lead to the recurrence of the abuses in the future:

The pursuit of retrospective justice is an urgent task of democratization, as it highlights the fundamental character of the new order to be established, an order based on the rule of law and on respect for the dignity and worth of each human person.11

The new regime also holds responsibilities towards its victims. The most fundamental of the victim’s rights, according to Méndez, is the right to know the truth about the past injustices, including details which were kept secret. This information should be provided to the whole society. Connected to this is the duty of the new regime is to grant reparations to the victims and to acknowledge them as valuable members of the new post-transitional society. Moreover, the members of armed and security forces, which carried out the past crimes, should be excluded from the post-transition enforcement and intelligence bodies.12

Transitional justice is a complex phenomenon which can be achieved through various mechanisms, which have significantly different legal implications. These include criminal justice, reparatory justice (which includes material reparations or moral acknowledgement), vetting of the candidates for various public positions (lustration) and truth-revelation (revelation of the criminal practices of the former regime to the public). In practice, transitional justice constitutes a mixture of given approaches and they differ from country to country, even within the same region. It is a result of various constraints on their selection.

After the removal of the old regime, the new elites usually function within a specific context and they face various challenges, which affect the possibilities of addressing the past crimes. These can be overall labeled as the transitional justice constraints. Jon Elster divides the constraints into two main categories: the hard constraints, which render some mechanisms absolutely unfeasible and soft constraints, which create trade-offs between justice and other goals (such as democracy or economic reconstruction).13

10 Ibid., 6.
12 Ibid., 12.
The most prominent of the hard constraints is the nature of the regime transition. The character of the regime change, actors who initiate the transition and the relative strength of the opposition and government are all factors, which influence subsequent possibilities of transitional justice pursuit. For a detailed discussion see Huntington’s analysis of the “torturer problem.”

Another constraint, which can be classified as a hard constraint in Elster’s terminology is the nature of the criminal regime and the type of crimes it committed. The reason for this is that different types of crimes call for different ways of their addressing. An integral part of this problem is the legitimacy of the past regime. In such cases where the regime enjoyed relatively high legitimacy among its population, the choice of a severe mechanism is unlikely. Connected to both these constraints is the issue of balance of power between old and new elites within the new system. If the old elites are able to retain power, or enjoy electoral success in the forthcoming elections, then thorough pursuit of transitional justice remains unlikely.

The soft constraints include structural constraints such as the nature of the economy and the need of its transformation, availability of resources or the limited capacity of the legal system. The complexity of the transition along with the scarcity of the resources creates a trade-off between the other goals of the transition (such as institutional changes or transformation of the economy) and transitional justice. Therefore soft constraints can also lead to the adoption of the “forget and forgive” approach.

3. Hard Constraints on Transitional Justice in Slovakia

The nature of the communist regime is the first variable, which influences the choice of transitional justice mechanisms after the fall of the regime. Nedelsky argues that it is the nature of the former regime – manifested in its level of legitimacy and opposition to the regime – which influenced the pursuit of transitional justice in Slovakia and eventually its divergence from the Czech case. (Nedelsky 2004) The Czechoslovak post-Stalinist communist regime is characterized as rigid and unreformed system (e.g. Elster; Judt; Linz and Stepan). Rather high level of

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14 Huntington, *The third wave*, 231.
opposition persecution and lack of legitimacy during the normalization period (1969-1989) and rigid old elites suggest that post-communist elites would employ a rather strict transitional justice approach in both Czech Republic and Slovakia. However, the levels of regime legitimacy as well as the extent of opposition should be treated separately in the two parts of the federation.

The regime enjoyed higher levels of legitimacy in Slovakia and therefore the opposition was rather weak and very limited in numbers. The first reason is the modernization of the society. Slovakia experienced a socialist industrialization. In 1948, when the communist regime was installed, there was a large difference between Slovakia and Czech lands. By 1989, the situation was more or less the same in both parts of the federation. Modernization of the society brought improvement in economic, as well as social opportunities for the majority of the society.

Secondly, Nedelsky argues that during the Prague spring, “Slovak leaders were much more focused on enhancing Slovak national sovereignty ... [than] liberalization and democratization.” The existence of the wartime Slovak state proved that Slovak self-government was possible. The “Slovak question” was to some extent existent within the society since the beginning of the communist regime. This ambition was partly fulfilled in 1968, when political system of Czechoslovakia was formally federalized and in this sense the legitimacy of the regime was strengthened.

Purges within the party and society after the Prague spring were not as harsh in Slovakia as in the rest of the country. Harris characterizes the situation:

[I]n Slovakia, when people lost their positions, usually they remained within the same enterprise, the collaborators were tolerated, people retreated to their country cottages and nurtured their networks and generally adapted well.

People learned to accept the regime and therefore the normalization period in Slovakia was more lenient. This all contributed to the low levels of polarization...

21 For a thorough analysis see Nedelsky, Divergent Responses, 82-88.
23 Nedelsky, “Czechoslovakia,” 42.
24 Even in the Stalinist times, this can be illustrated at the trials with so called “bourgeois nationalists” – which included the later normalization leader Husák.
within the society, the difference between the supporters and opponents of the regime was not so visible.

The second variable which imposes constraints on the possibility of transitional justice mechanisms choice is the nature of the regime change from nondemocratic regime. In case of Czechoslovakia it opened up possibilities to employ transitional justice. Kitschelt characterizes the Czechoslovak transition as a transition by “implosion of the old order.”

In this case the old elites succumb to the mass protests of the civil society in a short period of time. This type of transition can also be labeled a “regime collapse.” Empirical evidence proves that swift changes occurred: the creation of the interim Government of National Understanding already in December 1989, the election of Havel as a president on December 29, with following constitutional changes and the scheduling of the free elections for June 1990. However part of the old elite was able to secure limited influence in the shaping of the new order.

Szomolanyi defines the Czechoslovak transition as a “negotiated collapse.” The old rigid elites did not participate in the roundtable talks, the negotiations were held between the moderate communists, who however did not hold any significant power under the old regime, and the opposition representatives. Therefore the negotiations were not held between the old regime representatives and the opposition elites, but only among the new emerging elite.

In this sense the regime transition was a collapse, which afterwards included some negotiations that were not initiated while old elites were in power.

The elite configuration in the transition period is the final hard constraint I am going to discuss. Since it is the elite, who make decisions on the transitional justice legislation, it is important to examine whether the old elite was able to maintain their position in the new emerging political order. It is even more important in the case of Slovakia, which experienced long transition divided into three distinct phases. I am going to discuss elite transformation in each of these periods.

The first phase is to a large extent determined by the nature of regime transition and character of communist opposition. According to Elster, Offe and Preuss, the non-violent character of the regime change implies that the old elite are not completely discredited. Combined with the incoherent and fragmented opposition, which is brought together after the mass protests, they argue that old elite is

27 Linz and Stepan, Problems, 316.
needed in the subsequent transformation process.\textsuperscript{29} This problem of “lack of transformative vanguard” occurred in the Czechoslovak case. The regime change was characterized by the creation of umbrella opposition organizations – in the Czech context, the Civic Forum (OF), in the Slovak, Public Against Violence (VPN), which consisted of individuals with divergent opinions – including the dissidents, grey zone and reform communists (from the period of Prague Spring). Both these movements were formed only after the mass protests had already started. Calda argues that old elites were able to secure representation and influence in the newly emerging regime due to the fact that personal questions were negotiated in the roundtable talks, in which OF and VPN made too much concession to the communists. This was a result of the fear of use of violence, as well as overestimation of the communist’s real power.\textsuperscript{30} A coalition consisting of moderate representatives of both the old and new elite legitimizes both anticommunist opposition, as well as some old regime groups and therefore did not lead to widespread sanctions of individuals or whole groups.\textsuperscript{31}

Another important factor affecting the elite configuration was the ability of the Communist party in Slovakia to undergo a successful transformation. It changed its name to the Communist Party of Slovakia – The Party of Democratic Left and the Communist reference was completely excluded in January 1991. This was associated with re-registration of all the members, which served as an alleged break with the past regime, adaptation to the conditions of pluralism and reorientation as a social democratic party.\textsuperscript{32} However, it also led to a steep decline in membership.

Nevertheless, the first phase was dominated by the anticommunist elite, who had the highest electoral gains in the 1990 elections both in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Civic forum was able to gain more than 50% of the vote, while the biggest representation from Slovakia was secured by VPN (32.5%) and Christian democrats (KDH – almost 19%). This suggests that the first phase delineated by the first two elections resulted in an elite configuration conducive to transitional justice pursuit. The second phase is characteristic by the dominance of HZDS (Movement for Democratic Slovakia) of Vladimír Mečiar. The party was seceded from VPN in 1991 and it was “dominated by former managers and communist party cadres.”\textsuperscript{33} This was a result of the fact that HZDS was established by the former VPN members who did

\textsuperscript{29} Elster, \textit{Institutional Design}, 11-14.
\textsuperscript{33} Nedelsky, “\textit{Divergent Responses},” 90.
not agree with the liberal orientation of the party, many of which were former communists.\(^{34}\) Mečiar himself was a member of the party, who was purged after 1968, although he was able to maintain his job as a lawyer\(^{35}\).

HZDS became the most popular political party in Slovakia after the 1992 elections, securing 74 out of 150 mandates in the Slovak parliament. These elections brought strengthening of the personal continuity with the old regime representatives in Slovakia – 99 out of 150 members of parliament were former communists.\(^{36}\) The dominance of HZDS was disrupted for a short period of time in 1994, after a larger number of parliamentary representatives left the party. In subsequent early elections, HZDS regained its dominance, securing 61 seats in the parliament. During this phase, SDL (in coalition with 3 smaller parties) became the second biggest party with electoral gain of slightly over 10%, but it did not become member of the ruling coalition.

The third period of transition brought a radical change in Slovak politics. HZDS, although winning the largest number of representatives in the parliament (with 27% of the votes), was not able to construct the ruling coalition. Instead, a broad anti Mečiar coalition of ideologically divergent parties was created. It included both center right parties united within electoral party SDK\(^{37}\), the transformed former communist SDL, which was able to secure almost 15% percent of votes, a coalition of Hungarian parties (SMK) and a small center left party SOP. This period was characterized by ever increasing fragmentation of the parliamentary parties – including the collapse of the SDK coalition, the creation of SDKU by Mikuláš Dzurinda in 2000 and the split of SDL which resulted in establishment of Smer by Róbert Fico. This fragmentation of the parliament in fact led to the creation of political groupings, which were more supportive of transitional justice.

The approach of the relevant political subjects towards transitional justice can be roughly identified in the research conducted by Benoit and Laver.\(^{38}\) The research was based on expert surveys conducted between 2002 and 2003 (with members of academia, research institutes and to a lesser extent journalists and politicians) on

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34 Szomolányi, Kl’ukatá cesta, 46.
35 Mečiar was accused of being a secret police collaborator since 1976, although direct evidence was never provided. For a detailed discussion, see Nedelsky, Czechoslovakia, 89-90.
36 Szomolányi, Kl’ukatá cesta, 90.
37 Special electoral party SDK, consisting of 5 opposition center right parties was created due to the changes in electoral law (higher threshold for coalitions) passed by Mečiar before the elections.
various policy dimensions of political parties. One of the dimensions they were interested in was the treatment of former communists by the political parties. The scores by Slovak political parties were following:

### Table 1: Attitude towards Transitional Justice

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>SDL</th>
<th>HZDS</th>
<th>SDKU</th>
<th>KDH</th>
<th>SMK</th>
<th>Smer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Former communists</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The table is based on Benoit and Laver.\(^{39}\)

The score indicates the party position on the continuous scale from 1 to 20, where 1 represents the approach that former communists should have “same rights and opportunities to participate in public life”, 20 is the opinion that “former communist should be kept out from public life as far as possible.”\(^{40}\) This statistic is by no means an exhaustive indicator of attitudes of relevant political actors towards transitional justice, but it but it can serve as an indication of a direction certain party (or their coalition) adopts towards policies of dealing with the past. Moreover, it can be concluded that Christian democrats (KDH) were at the time the most interested in harsh transitional justice pursuit, followed by SDKU and SMK.

To summarize, it can be concluded that the old elites were able to preserve some influence in all of the transition stages in Slovakia. This influence however varied, and the third stage of transition can be expected to be the most conducive for transitional justice from the elite configuration point of view.

### 4. Transitional Justice Dynamics in Slovakia

As argued above, the Slovak transition can be characterized by the existence of three distinct phases. In each of the phases the hard constraints on transitional justice were interplaying with each other in different way and therefore the enactment of transitional justice legislature, as well as its implementation in practice was different. In this chapter, I am going to inspect the dynamics of transitional justice in detail.

#### 4.1 Slovakia within Czechoslovak Federation (1989-1993)

This phase is characterized by the close proximity of the regime change. The period of December 1989 until February 1990 was characterized by resignation of communist deputies from the parliament, which were replaced by cooptation of mostly noncommunist representatives. Therefore the beginning of the first phase of transition was characterized by the adaptation of almost no transitional justice

\(^{39}\) Ibid., 256.

\(^{40}\) Ibid., 173.
measures, explained by the retaining of power by the old elites in both executive and legislative bodies. The only exception were judicial rehabilitations, which occurred already in April 1990, before the first elections.

The major turning point was the 1990 June election when the elite configuration changed rapidly. The elections brought a major victory for the democratic forces and therefore the constraint of elite continuation was eliminated. The first set of mechanisms adopted fall under the reparatory justice category – judicial rehabilitation, extrajudicial rehabilitation and restitutions. As I already mentioned, the first transitional justice mechanism was the Act on judicial rehabilitation (nb. 119/1990). The purpose of this law was to

repeal the sentences based on acts that conflicted with the principles of democratic society respectful of political rights and civil liberties guaranteed by the Constitution and provided for in international documents [...]  

This was a symbolic act, a form of moral acknowledgement of the unlawful suffering, which did not bring any material compensation for the victims. It acknowledged that some activities of the victims, which were labeled criminal under the old regime, were morally right and in accordance with the values of any democratic society. Judicial rehabilitations were granted to more than 220 000 persons in Czechoslovakia.  

The Act on extrajudicial rehabilitation (nb. 87/1991) was passed in February 1991 and its aim was to “mitigate grievances, which arose through application of civil law, labor acts and various administrative acts ... [and] which were in conflict with the principles of a democratic society.” The mitigation of grievance was to be carried out through revocation of some of the acts, return of the confiscated asset, and provision of financial compensation or adjustments in social security payments for the victims. Therefore this act did not only provide symbolic rehabilitation to the victims, but it resulted in limited material gains.

The idea behind property restitutions in Czechoslovakia was the alleviation of the injustices committed by the past regime. The nature of the grievances is the confiscation and nationalization of the property against the will of its rightful owner; moreover these requisitions were made without proper compensation or no compensation at all. Jablonovský argues that the state was aware of its lawful duty to compensate owners for the seized property (since the nationalization decrees

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41 Act on judicial rehabilitation, nb. 119/1990, §1.
include provisions for compensation for the expropriated property). Property was often nationalized without proper compensation and therefore the state violated its own legislature.\textsuperscript{44}

A prelude to the actual restitutions of property was the November 1990 Act on the return of the assets of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia to the people of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic (nb. 496/1990). In practice, it meant nationalization of the properties owned by the communist party. This early initiative was followed by passing of various restitution laws – which can be divided into three broad categories – restitution of the agricultural property, restitution of estates and church property restitution.

Restitution of estates was already enacted in October 1990 with the Act on mitigation of certain property related injustices (nb. 403/1990). This law states explicitly that some cases of confiscation and nationalization between 1948 and 1989 were unjust. The mitigation of the injustices was to be carried out either by returning of the property, or financial compensation to the entitled person (owner or lawful heir). However, it did not allow for restitutions of other types of property.\textsuperscript{45}

Therefore the law had to be amended several times and other restitution laws had to be prepared as well. Agricultural properties, as well as forests restitutions were regulated in the May 1991 Act on modification of the ownership of land and other agricultural property (nb. 229/1991). This law allowed for restitutions only to the citizens of the country with permanent residence. The church property restitutions were started by the July 1990 Act on the modification of some of the property relations of religious orders and congregations (nb. 298/1990). This provided for the return of the property to various church organizations, which were expropriated during the 1950s. At the same time, the Act on the settlement of property relations between the Greek Catholic and Orthodox Church (nb. 211/1990) was passed in the Slovak parliament. This was needed due to the fact that communist regime expropriated the Greek Catholic church and transferred its property to the Orthodox church.

Symbolic condemnation of the communist regime came with the November 1991 Act on the period of oppression (nb. 480/1991). This act explicitly labeled the past regime as the period of oppression and stated that “between 1948 and 1989 the communist regime violated human rights and its own laws.”\textsuperscript{46} By passing this law,

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{45} Ibid., 13.
\textsuperscript{46} Act on the period of oppression, nb. 480/1991, §1.
\end{flushright}

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the new democratic regime delegitimized the old one and tried to differentiate itself from the period of oppression with a new period of freedom. However the law provides for the legal continuity of the legislation passed under the communist regime. “Legal acts adopted in the period [of oppression] ... shall be repealed only if so provided by specific laws.”

A specific post-communist transitional justice mechanism, which was first adopted in Czechoslovakia, was lustration. The so called “wild lustration” was already applied before the elections when some of the parties screened their candidates voluntarily before the 1990 elections (OF and VPN) and revelations of secret police collaboration was misused for political goals. This wild lustration is associated with information leaks from the Ministry of Interior and public accusation of collaboration directed towards some publicly active individuals. In this sense the lustration law can be seen as an attempt to govern the screenings and make the process transparent. The lustration law (Act establishing certain additional conditions for the performance of certain functions in state bodies and organizations of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, the Czech Republic and Slovak Republic (nb. 451/1991)) institutionalized an exclusive lustration system, a system in which officials associated with the old regime were completely excluded from the public life. The main idea behind the lustration law was to exclude old elites from the new emerging democratic order and in this sense facilitate discontinuity with the totalitarian regime and protect the nascent democratic order.

On the other hand, it was criticized on the basis of violation of legal certainty principle and institutionalization of collective guilt by both former communists and some of the dissidents. Lustration legislature was valid for the whole federation; however it was never thoroughly applied in Slovakia. This can be explained by the fact that the ruling Slovak elites (after the 1992 elections) were not in favor of punitive accountability mechanisms.

Criminal prosecution was a mechanism, which was used in a very limited manner during this period. Prosecutions were initiated against high-ranking communist officials for abuse of their power and the unlawful crackdown against the 1988 and 1989 demonstrations. The first ever trial was of the communist official and the initiator of brutal police interventions, Miroslav Štěpán, who was sentenced to 15

47 Ibid., §2.
49 David, “From Prague,” 353.
years in jail. Criminal prosecutions concerned mostly Czech nationals, but one of the individuals held criminally responsible was also Slovak Alojz Lorenc, who was the deputy minister of interior and the former head of the state security. Lorenc was found guilty of preventive roundup of citizens in 1988-89. This activity was mainly aimed at dissidents, who were prevented from attending demonstrations. Lorenc was sentenced to 4 years in prison by the Czech court, but in the meantime the federation was dissolved and he avoided imprisonment by staying in the Slovak Republic and refusing to commence his sentence in the Czech Republic. As a result his trial had to be opened again in Slovakia.

Transitional justice in post-communist environment is closely connected to the secret police archives and in this sense access to these files can be considered as the most important truth-telling mechanism. Despite of the fact that Czechoslovak federal parliament adopted a strict lustration law; the secret files were not made accessible to the public, nor made available for research. Federal Prime Minister Čalfa argued that “the government is convinced that the publication, at a time when democratic institutions and habits are not yet consolidated, would expose these persons and their families to harassment, and would therefore be an ill-considered step.”

### 4.2 Slovakia under Mečiar (1993-1998)

The second transition phase, which is a phase of the first years of existence of independent Slovakia, was characterized by the government of elites, who were not interested in thorough pursuit of transitional justice. The break-up of the federation, however, meant legal continuity of the existing federal legislation, which included the transitional justice measures discussed above.

It is important to emphasize that lustration law was not implemented in Slovakia even during the existence of the federation. After the breakup of the federation, Slovakia inherited the lustration legislation. There were attempts to repeal the lustration law. It was petitioned in the Slovak constitutional court arguing, that it is not consistent with the Charter of Rights and Freedoms included in the Slovak constitution. The court did not proceed with this application with the explanation, that the law was already petitioned in the federal Czechoslovak constitutional court, which decided that it does not violate rights and freedoms of the screened individuals. Therefore formally, lustration legislation was in effect and required

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52 Marián Čalfa in Nedelsky, “Czechoslovakia,” 51.
the establishment of procedural rules. However, no lustration agency was established (the federal one was in Prague) and the lustrations were not carried out in practice. The lustration law, which was originally intended to be in effect for five years, simply expired at the beginning of 1996.

The main explanation of non-pursuit of lustration is the elite configuration constraint, which emerged as a consequence of 1992 elections, which brought electoral victory of HZDS. Kunicova and Nalepa argue that HZDS, although agreeing with some mild forms of transitional justice, did not agree with the harsh federal lustration law and “Mečiar’s gate keeping powers prevented the federal lustration law from being implemented [in Slovakia].”

Therefore the elite configuration in the newly established independent state can be considered the main reason for the turn to “politics of silence” in Slovakia.

The most important act passed during this period was the March 1996 Act on the immorality and illegality of the communist system (nb. 125/1996). Surprisingly this law came during this transition phase and it was supported by both coalition and opposition parties. The facts that HZDS was not interested in punitive measures and this law remained only at the symbolic level throughout the second transition phase can explain its support for it. Such a law was, according to the drafters, necessary to give special reverence to the victims of the communist system, to acknowledge them significant share in the restoration of freedom and democracy, to keep in the nation’s memory suffering and sacrifices of thousands of its citizens, to avoid the recurrence of any attempts to restore the totalitarian system in any form and taking into account the necessity to deal with the communist system.

The law identifies two goals of transitional justice – acknowledgement of the victims and deterrence of the recurrence of crimes. In accord with the first goal, the law officially thanks the victims of the communist repression for their struggle for freedom.

Another significant outcome of the law was the acceptance of the fact that various crimes were committed under the communist regime by state officials. Although the law did not state explicitly that the regime was criminal, it claims that the communist party “did not prevent its members and their accomplices from committing crimes and violations of basic human rights and freedoms.” Moreover, the law lifted the statute of limitation for the crimes committed between February

54 Ibid., 18-19.
55 Act on the immorality and illegality of the communist system, nb. 125/1996, Preamble.
56 Ibid., §1.
57 These included, for example, crimes of terrorism, murder, bodily harm and other.
1948 and December 1989 if “for political reasons incompatible with the fundamental principles of the rule of law of a democratic state there was no final conviction or a waiver of the indictment.”\textsuperscript{58} This was an important regulation for the possible criminal justice pursuit. However, no specific mechanisms were created for the pursuit of criminal justice and therefore the whole law remained only symbolic in practice. This can be explained by the fact, that the ruling parties were not really interested in opening any criminal cases, due to the circumstances already discussed.

\textit{4.3 Slovakia after Mečiar (1998-2002)}

The last phase of the transition is characterized by the government of anti Mečiar coalition of liberal, socialist as well as conservative parties. As previously discussed, this was the phase which was most conducive to the pursuit of transitional justice due to the lowest extent of transitional justice constraints.

In connection to the judicial reparations act (already enacted in 1990), the July 2002 Act on one time financial premium provision for political prisoners (nb. 462/2002) provided financial compensation to one of the category of the communist regime victims. This law can also be seen as a partial fulfillment of the commitment given in the law on the immorality of the communist regime to compensate the victims. The financial allowance was provided to the victims or the family members of victims, who spent at least 3 years in jail and who were later rehabilitated.

At the end of 1999, minister of justice Ján Čarnogurský came up with the initiative to establish a body, which would be responsible for investigating communist crimes and initiating criminal prosecutions. It was to be based on the Czech model where the Office for the Documentation and Investigation of Communist Crimes functions under the Ministry of Interior and it is a police body. This was, however, rejected both by opposition, as well as some of the coalition parties – it was especially opposed by SDL.\textsuperscript{59} (Kunicova and Nalepa 2006, 20)

The year 2002 also saw the conclusion of the Lorenc case, whose criminal trial was ongoing since the establishment of the independent Slovakia. He was sentenced to 15 months conditionally for the offense of abuse of authority. To this date, it is the only criminal case, which concluded with a conviction.

The unsuccessful plan of Čarnogurský resulted in the establishment of the Department for the documentation of the crimes of communism within the Ministry of Justice. Foundation of this small department did not require the support of

\textsuperscript{58} Act on the immorality and illegality of the communist system, §4.
\textsuperscript{59} Kunicova and Nalepa, \textit{Coming To Terms}, 20.
parliament and therefore its establishment was possible already at the beginning of the third phase. It consisted of only 2 persons and its responsibility was to collect documents concerning the period 1948-89, start with the documentation of the crimes committed during the communist period and to provide consultation services to the victims (concerning the restitutions and compensations). It had access to a limited amount of archival material, because some of it was deposited within the Ministry of Interior.

The major turning point was the year 2002, when just a few months before the elections an Act on the declassification of the documents on the activities of state security authorities between 1939 - 1989 and the establishment of the Nation’s Memory Institute (law on memory of the nation) nb. 553/2002 was passed in parliament. This brought “the breaking of the silence”, which was a result of the developments after the break up of Czechoslovakia.

5. Nation’s Memory Institute (NMI)

The establishment of the institute was accomplished in August 2002, after parliament had outvoted the presidential veto. The law establishing the institute was supported by a wide range of political parties and factions in the parliament. This was the result of the political developments after the 1998 elections. The main exceptions were SDL and to some extent HZDS. In the first voting session in July 2002, 82 out of 93 present MPs voted for the law. Most of the SDL representatives were not present or abstained from the vote. The second time the law was presented in the parliament after the presidential veto and it gained 82 votes out of 115 present in the assembly. This time more than half of the HZDS representatives were not present or abstained, although the rest voted for the law. None of the SDL representatives voted for the law. Political support for the law was therefore possible due to the favorable elite configuration which was a result of 1998 elections and subsequent fragmentation of political parties in the parliament. Moreover, the proximity to the elections (in September 2002) created an environment in which the supporters of the law from the ruling coalition were no longer constrained by their coalition partners, especially the SDL. The threat of a breakdown in the coalition was no longer relevant.

61 At the time of the vote, the parliament was rather fragmented. At the time of the first vote, there were 7 parliamentary factions and one of the largest clubs was independents (30). During the second vote, the number of factions increased to 8 and there were 31 independent representatives.
62 But even 2 SDL MPs voted for the law.
63 Kunicova and Nalepa, Coming To Terms, 22.
NMI is supposed to examine not only the era of communist dictatorship, but also the era of Slovak state. This is a result of the fact that Slovakia was not able to address either its communist past, or the earlier nondemocratic past in an unbiased sense. Impartial study of the Slovak state was not possible during the existence of the Communist regime. Supporters of the law presented it as an attempt to overcome the “forgetting” of the past, by which the Slovak approach to transitional justice can be characterized. The preamble of the founding law states that it is important to bear in mind that

those who do not know their past, are condemned to repeat it, and that no unlawful act on behalf of the State against its citizens may be protected by secrecy or forgotten.\(^\text{64}\)

Therefore the state has a duty to disclose the truth about its past, as well as duty to address the harm done to the victims is emphasized. There is “the duty of our state to rectify the wrongdoings to all those who suffered damage on behalf of a State, which violated human rights and its own laws.”\(^\text{65}\)

One of the most important developments of the Act was the full disclosure of security police files, which were, until then, still inaccessible. The duties to administer and research the files were given to the newly established institution – NMI.

5.1 Functions of the Institute

The newly established institute was provided with several mechanisms to address the past. In the following section, I will provide an overview of what the NMI actually does and how these functions can be organized from the analytical point of view.

The truth revelation function is primarily connected to the publication of information from the secret police files. In practice, it includes a wide range of activities. One of the functions of the institute is the provision of this information to the interested individuals. Upon request, any person has to be provided with information as to whether a file regarding him or her exists, whether there is a report containing the results of the intelligence, and be provided with the copies of

\(^{64}\) On the declassification of the documents on the activities of state security authorities in 1939-1989 and the establishment of the Nation’s Memory Institute, 553/2002, Preamble.

\(^{65}\) Act on the declassification of the documents on the activities of state security authorities between 1939 - 1989 and the establishment of the Nation’s Memory Institute, 553/2002, Preamble.
these relevant documents. The first personal screenings began in 2003, after the establishment of the institute. This was a lengthy procedure, since the Institute had to make an inventory of and analyze all of the relevant documents.

Morbacher claims that the disclosure of information contained in the files helps citizens to uncover the full truth about their past and how it was affected by this repressive component. This function of the NMI enabled both those who knew that they were of interest to the secret police, as well as those who did not know that someone manipulated their lives, to learn what information was collected about them and how the state security influenced their lives.\(^66\)

The goal of truth telling was not only aimed at provision of information to individual persons, but also to the whole society. Therefore after the information was processed, the lists of perpetrators, collaborators and victims were made available for the public. The Institute does not only work with the files deposited in its own archive, but also conducts research in other archives to fulfill its goals. One of the crucial functions of the Institute is to “to publish data on executors of the persecution and their activity.”\(^67\)

When it comes to collaborators, the Institute grants access to the registration protocols of the secret police, which include names of the secret collaborators. The files itself are held in the archive, which was made available for researchers in 2005. In 2007, it was made accessible for the general public as well. This led to an increased interest by the media in the issue of collaboration. Other truth telling activities of the institute include historical research. To fulfill the function to conduct full and impartial evaluation of the period of oppression, particularly to analyze the causes and manner of loss of freedom, symptoms of fascist and Communist regimes and their ideologies, involvement of domestic and foreign persons ...\(^68\)

the NMI has its own department of historical research. Since its establishment, the vision of the institute was to employ young historians unburdened by the past (meaning that they did not carry out their research during the communism). Therefore they would be able to provide unbiased evaluation of the period of


\(^{67}\) Act on the declassification of the documents on the activities of state security authorities between 1939 - 1989 and the establishment of the Nation’s Memory Institute, 553/2002, §8.

\(^{68}\) Ibid., §8.
oppression. The results of this activity include publication of historical books, studies, and a professional journal, *Pamäť Národa* (Memory of the Nation).

The publication of the names of the secret police collaborators created various responses in the society. In a limited number of cases, the identification of collaboration of the persons holding public office led to their resignation. In this sense, the impact of the institute’s functioning resembles lustration. However, resignation from the post was a very rare response. The list of identified collaborators included politicians, prominent entrepreneurs, sportsmen and members of the clergy (including the catholic archbishop Ján Sokol). Nedelsky claims that this activity was able to capture public’s interest and created a societal debate, which led to the stark condemnation of these individuals by the public.

On the other hand, a number of identified collaborators questioned the reliability of the information included in the files and several lawsuits were filed against the NMI. Until the end of 2010, 43 lawsuits were initiated on the basis of defamation. The plaintiffs claimed that the information in the file was inaccurate and demand a “verdict that they are wrongly registered in the state security protocols and they did not cooperate knowingly.” Twenty four lawsuits were lawfully decided, out of which 12 in favor of the NMI and 12 in favor of the plaintiff. These developments in the courts suggest that indeed the information in the files cannot be considered unconditionally accurate and therefore its publication can create moral problems, specifically incorrectly labeling as a collaborator an innocent person.

Since 2006, it is the institute’s responsibility to accept and evaluate the applications for granting the status of the anticomunist resistance member based on the law on anticomunist resistance. This status is awarded to the persons who were either members of illegal anti-communist organizations, political prisoners, members of a foreign resistance movement or who carried out other anti-communist activities focused on the restoration of freedom and democracy.

Based on the law on memory of the nation, another of the tasks of the institute is to “make motions for criminal prosecution of crimes and criminal offenses [Nazi

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69 Matej Medvedický and Ondrej Podolec, “Sekcia vedeckého výskumu. [Department of scientific research],” *Pamäť Národa*, (vol. 2, 2007), 73.
70 The first was the case of state secretary Ján Hurný, who abdicated after his name appeared in the collaborators list, in spite of the fact that he denied the authenticity of the file. The latest was the case of Pavol Šuňuk, who was a Military Counterintelligence functionary between 1980 and 1989. He was appointed a Head of the legislative section at the Ministry of Agriculture and decided to resign from his position in 2012.
crimes, communist crimes and other crimes), in cooperation with the Attorney General’s Office of the Slovak Republic.” Morbacher claims that Slovakia lags behind other states in the pursuit of criminal prosecutions due to the political developments after the split of Czechoslovakia and the reluctance of state organs to initiate prosecutions. The establishment of the NMI, its documentation of the crimes and identification of the perpetrators was a possibility to initiate criminal prosecutions.

The first four submissions were presented in 2007, being three cases of murder and one case of torture. The first three cases are still open, while the latter was suspended due to the fact that the defendant “in neither of her testimonies, nor in the any written statements stated that the investigators used any kind of physical violence or forced her to confess.” In 2008, the cases of the 42 murders at the borders by the members of Border Patrol were submitted to the Attorney General’s Office. The NMI tried to classify these cases as crimes against humanity, due to the fact that there is no statute of limitation for these crimes. The last two cases were submitted in 2009 and these were also documentations of murders.

The Attorney General’s Office prepared a regulation for local attorney offices which states that the cases submitted by the NMI are not to be qualified as crimes against humanity. Although the law on immorality of the communist regime lifted the statute of limitation on crimes committed between 1948 and 1989, more than 20 years had passed and therefore most of the crimes were statute barred. It seems clear, then, that “despite of the commenced prosecutions in individual cases, [it is very likely that the crimes] will never be punished by the Slovak courts.”

6. Conclusion

The purpose of this article was to analyze the dynamics of transitional justice in Slovakia and to answer the question as to what was the reason for the “breaking of the silence” in 2002. The analysis of the dynamics showed that it is crucial to divide the Slovak transition into three distinct phases, under which the interplay of the analyzed constraints is different and therefore the approach towards dealing with

72 Act on the declassification of the documents on the activities of state security authorities between 1939 - 1989 and the establishment of the Nation’s Memory Institute, 553/2002, Preamble, §8
73 Ľubomír Morbacher, “Trestnoprávne vyrovnávanie sa s komunistickou minulost’ou na Slovensku a úloha ÚPN v tomto procese. [Criminal dealing with the Communist past in Slovakia and the role of NMI in this process],” Pamäť Národa (Vol. 3 2008), 77-78
75 Morbacher, Zločiny komunismu, 149.
the past varies as well. The first phase was still confined within the common federation framework and it was affected by both the type of regime change and the ability of the new elites to dominate politics. Therefore a wide range of transitional justice mechanisms – including lustration, reparatory justice and very limited criminal justice – were adopted. These mechanisms were valid for the whole federation and the legislation passed in this period established the basis for Slovak transitional justice.

The second phase, characterized by the domination of Vladimír Mečiar over Slovak political life, brought the birth of independence for Slovak Republic and the “beginning of silence” when it comes to dealing with the past. The existing legislation was not repealed, but the exclusive measures – such as lustration – were not applied at all. The only exception was the law on immorality of the communist regime, which remained, however, only in the symbolic realm. The reason for this was the fact that elite configuration in the main legislative body changed dramatically. The continual presence of the old elites in Slovak politics was to some extent determined by the lack of political opposition under the communist regime, which resulted in the need for them to participate in the political life.

The third phase brought a rapid change, which was primarily a result of a complete elite turnover. The conditions for transitional justice pursuit were made even more favorable with the growing fragmentation of the parliamentary forces. These developments led to the breaking of silence in 2002, which resulted in the establishment of the Nation’s Memory Institute. Therefore it can be concluded that elite configuration was the key variable, which affected the pursuit of transitional justice in the independent Slovakia.

The Slovak case shows that although all of the constraints are in play when deciding about which transitional justice mechanisms to adopt, it is the elites who play the most important role. They can, on the one hand, halt transitional justice even when all other constraints are conducive to its pursuit. On the other hand, it is the elites who can decide to pursue transitional justice even though several years have passed since the regime change occurred.

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GLOBALIZATION, GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, AND COSMOPOLITANISM: 
A CRITICAL EXPLORATION OF EUROPEAN PRACTICE

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Abstract
The current state of international relations is littered with notions of ‘globalization’, ‘global governance’ and ‘cosmopolitanism’, all of which speak to the changing world. One regional governance establishment that has caught the attention of many for its success is the European Union (EU), despite its inherent challenges. The article undertakes a conceptual analysis of global governance and cosmopolitanism, after which it places the EU into perspective to assess the feasibility of its cosmopolitan vision. The article admits and appreciates all the efforts that have been put into making the Union a formidable regional body. However, the overarching argument is that it remains idealistic to envisage a Europe that is fully cosmopolitan, one that reveals the solidarity and hybridity of the various nationhoods and cultures that currently prevail in the region.

Keywords: cosmopolitanism, global governance, globalization, EU, idealism.

1. Introduction

The end of the Cold War dealt a great blow to those (particularly the realists) who had fetishized the nation-state, both in analytical and geographical/physical terms. Although the U.S. came out of the Cold War as a global hegemon, it was met with a multiplicity of actors that do not necessarily require the consent of states to act. There is no doubt globalization has brought changes to the world, ranging from “Hollywoodization” or “McDonaldization” to transnational social and political-economic arrangements or actors who would have played only a negligible role in the Westphalian sense. It is worth noting that this almost unavoidable

1 I would like to thank Dr. Andy Knight for his thoughtful comments on an earlier draft of this paper as well as the anonymous reviewers and editors of this journal for their insightful feedback.

2 For Joseph Nye, this has made the notion of ‘soft power’ more relevant in our current times as it has become prudent to seek non-coercive ways of achieving ends that were pursued coercively in the past. For an in-depth evaluation of soft power in the context of America’s role, see Joseph S. Nye Jr. Soft Power: The Means To Success In World Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 2005).

3 Susan Strange was one of the scholars who posed a critical question about the role or rather retreat of the state in the post-Cold War era. See Susan Strange, The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

interconnectedness comes with both merits and downfalls, and there is no consensus on which of these aspects weighs more. In the context of the changing post-Cold War era, it has become relatively prudent to approach both theory and practice from a multi-perspective standpoint, although some still celebrate the inert rigidity of traditional theories; hence the proliferation of many theories that claim to describe existing phenomena, or sometimes, claim to prophesize the future ideal. In the camp of international relations theory, however, there seem to be a group of theories that have gained hegemonic positions although they hardly depict anything other than abstract orthodoxies. The paper mainly contends that although the concepts of “global governance” and “cosmopolitanism” have gained currency in international relations theory, much still needs to done to find the connection between the theory and the “facts” on the ground – particularly regarding the notion of “cosmopolitanism”. These concepts, for the most part, remain too abstract to serve practically-oriented theoretical functions.

This article adopts a critical theoretical perspective which considers “the ‘fact of globalization’ in relation to the goal of realizing the norms of human emancipation and democracy”. This perspective is methodologically placed in discourse analysis, which aims to tear apart these popular concepts to ascertain their practical significance. By revealing what has been referred to by this author elsewhere as the ‘practicality deficit’ in theory, we can attempt to establish how the theory can be useful to its specific purpose, based on the a priori assumption that every theory is for someone and for some purpose as Robert Cox argues. It is this praxeologically-oriented thinking that is absent in the extremely abstract variants of both theories of global governance and cosmopolitanism. The focus is on cosmopolitanism as IR theory, but it will be futile to discuss this concept without reference to global governance or globalization since both are connected to cosmopolitanism in many ways. While these concepts mean different things to their proponents, all three will be used interchangeably in some portions of this paper. For the specificity of the vision of cosmopolitanism, the point of reference shall be the European Union (EU) – a post-national political construction which has become a model that reveals the

6 See, for instance, Francis Fukuyama’s unpopular declaration of The End of History and the Last Man (Free Press, 1992).
possibility of a regional or even global cosmopolitan order, yet fraught with many challenges. With regard to the EU example, it is clear that a great deal of effort is going toward building a much united Europe, one similar to the United States of America. However, this agenda faces so many daunting challenges that are not onlytoppling the agenda itself, but also revealing an existential crisis within the Union that can potentially affect its future potency. This article commends some of the efforts that the European Commission and other established EU institutions are making towards building a stronger Europe but also argues that these efforts are yet to fully reach the stage of a demonstrable possibility. In sum, the paper will show that cosmopolitanism, particularly as it stands in Europe, is only an ideal-type which has lost touch with the realities of enduring differences that pertain at all levels—ideologically, politically, culturally, and historically.

This article has five sections. Beginning with the premise that globalization is mainly “a process whereby economic, political, social and cultural differences are lessened by greater interaction across national boundaries,” the first section examines the concept of global governance. Following this is a discussion of hybridity, subsidiarity, solidarism and multi-level governance – concepts that are regarded as subsets of cosmopolitanism in this particular paper, with no intention to oversimplify their complex meanings. The third part details what cosmopolitanism means. The fourth section places the discussion in the context of the EU to ascertain what the Union has been doing so far to advance its cosmopolitan agenda, and the final section examines how what has been espoused in theory reflects the actual practices within the Union. As already alluded to, the EU will be used as the case study because it represents an archetype of an organization that has achieved some success in the face of debilitating challenges. Particularly with regard to our topic of discussion, it is the EU that seems to be making attempts towards consolidating the abstract notions of global governance and cosmopolitanism into something relatively ‘real’.

2. The idea of global governance

Today it is common knowledge that one can no longer regard international relations “as the analysis of the relations between clearly and securely bounded sovereign states responding to the challenges of an immutable anarchy” as these relations are pervaded with complex political, economic and social linkages at a global level. It is within this era that ‘global governance’ surged both as a robust concept and a feasible organizational arrangement. Robert Keohane and Joseph

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Nye, for instance, in their 1977 work *Power and Interdependence* posited an ideal-type opposite to realism which they called ‘complex interdependence’ – a configuration that reveals the continuous blurring of the lines between what is local/domestic and what is international/global. This arrangement is characterised by multiple channels of politics, including interstate, transgovernmental, and transnational; multiple issues besides military security, the result of the absence of hierarchy among issues; and limited resort to military force due to the costs attached to its usage. This notion of ‘soft power’ derives from the claim that the limited role of force leads one to expect states to rely on alternative instruments and ways of wielding power.

Later on, in 1984, Keohane, from this same perspective, posited the possibility of non-hegemonic cooperation which derives from ‘complementary interests’. He has in recent years differentiated between ‘interdependence’ and ‘globalization’. To him, the former refers to a “state of the world” while globalization denotes “a trend of increasing transnational flows and increasingly thick networks of interdependence.”\(^\text{11}\) The logic of global governance, which is “governance without government”\(^\text{12}\) thrives more under mutual interests which derive from shared norms and beliefs. Those who consider it to be a “summative phenomenon” see global governance as a “purposive activity” that aims to “steer and modify the behavior of actors who operate on the global stage in such a manner as to avoid deadly conflicts and control intense socio-economic and political competition.”\(^\text{13}\) This is conceptualized to be multi-level and non-hierarchical governance ranging from multilateralism to ‘plurilateralism’ to transnational civil society. Basically, summative global governance is targeted to dealing with the proliferating, and sometimes conflicting, centers of authority.

Global governance is made possible by norms that are often seen as intervening variables between states, “mediating between interests and political outcomes with no independent explanatory power.”\(^\text{14}\) They generally set the rules of behaviour, jurisdictions, and the varying dimensions of responsibility. Ted Hopf’s argument about the logic of habit clearly shows how international norms may become so

routinized to the point that they are “unintentional, unconscious, involuntary, and effortless, that is, they do consume limited cognitive processing capacity.”\(^\text{15}\) Antje speaks to the duality embedded in norms. To this author, the three logics when dealing with how norms work include 1) Norms as Facts: The Logic of Appropriateness, 2) Norms as Disputed Facts: the Logic of Arguing, and 3) the Logic of Contestedness: between facts and norms.\(^\text{16}\) The proposition is that social norms acquire a degree of appropriateness over time through habitual practices while legal norms – like that of the EU – require social and political institutions to solidify their meanings. This can be achieved through continuous normative practice.

Even for some key global governance theorists, three questions remain despite the success of some global governance regimes.\(^\text{17}\) These include 1) governance of, by and for whom?; 2) is global governance or just all over the map?; and 3) can global governance keep pace? None of these questions can be answered with great certainty. Thus, Whitman’s modest conclusion is that “perhaps we need to begin a consideration of the global governance prospect with a humility appropriate to the circumstances we have already created for ourselves and others.”\(^\text{18}\) He believes that the success of global governance will be incumbent on legal enforcement but one can argue that this normative change is not possible in the current state of things, that is, the apparent absence of a specific, identifiable and legitimate enforcer.

While all this can be elusive, Andrew Moravcsik is convinced that with reference to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, for example, governments turn to international enforcement when “the benefits of reducing future political uncertainty outweigh the ‘sovereignty costs’ of membership.”\(^\text{19}\) To the realists, anarchy still prevails in the absence of a global government although some global-governance-believing constructivists insist that the overarching normative lexicon has been transformed from one of “anarchy in a system of states to governance within a global society,” thereby giving new


\(^{18}\) Ibid., 201.

meanings to words like sovereignty, territory, authority and security.\textsuperscript{20} As will be shown below, these ‘new’ meanings remain ambiguous in the context of the EU and even in the international regime broadly defined. For instance, while states have surrendered a portion of their sovereignty to the European Commission, there exists a fair amount of authority to deny a referendum from passing.\textsuperscript{21}

In the final analysis, one can safely say that the global governance ideal greatly informs notions of cosmopolitanism or vice versa, although some theorists belonging to this perspective will not readily accept this. The argument here is that while the nexus can be blurred, one reinforces the other. In this regard, the success of global governance reveals the possibility of cosmopolitanism.

3. What is cosmopolitanism?

Cosmopolitanism simply “means ‘world citizenship’ and implies belonging on the part of all individuals in a universal community of human beings as moral persons.”\textsuperscript{22} This same understanding of universality informs the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the United Nations, and other regional/global governance arrangements (although not all regional arrangements can be included in this category). The term also represents the triumph of local affiliation as opposed to state affiliation, and challenges the idea of a fixed order embodied in the state. It is a framework of ideas and principles that guide the governance of the challenges that come with the changing times. Some scholars (such as Giulio Gallarotti) maintain that underlying cosmopolitanism is the idea of ‘smart power’ that denotes a fair synthesis of ‘hard power’ as posited by the realists and ‘soft power’ as conceptualized by neoliberals and constructivists – often representing the position of critical realism. David Held argues that although there appears to be the absence of a supranational authority – a ‘higher coordinating body’ – states have always been concerned with cooperation and consensus-building at different levels.

On the level of principles, Held posits that cosmopolitanism works through a set of universally shared principles that “can form the basis for the protection and


\textsuperscript{21} The Dutch saying ‘no’ to the European constitution in 2005 is a case in point. See BBC, “Varied reasons behind the Dutch No,” http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4601731.stm (accessed October 5, 2012).

\textsuperscript{22} Patrick Hayden, “Cosmopolitanism Past and Present” in Patrick Hayden ed. \textit{The Ashgate Research Companion to Ethics and International Relations} (Surrey, England and Burlington, USA: Ashgate, 2009), 59.
nurturing of each person’s equal significance in ‘the moral realm’ of humanity.”

In this regard, cosmopolitanism comes with a strong ‘moralistic’ orientation. Cosmopolitanism is about deliberation and consensual decision-making linked to law, and thus can be more important than just (state) power and economic strength. The two main strands of cosmopolitanism are moral cosmopolitanism and legal (institutional) cosmopolitanism. The former fits more into the definition provided above while the latter emphasizes the creation of “transforming institutional schemes” that aim at providing “concrete procedural and organizational mechanisms” for dealing with issues that affect all people. While these two strands exist, cosmopolitanism has three fundamental characteristics, namely; individualism (that is, human beings or human welfare being the center of concern); universality; and the generality of human dignity or status.

With universalism come concepts such as transnationalism and communitarianism, both of which have the similar premise of a highly connected world order, although they are unique in other conceptual contexts. However, it is worth pointing out that there has been an age-old debate over cosmopolitanism and communitarianism and how these two ethical positions address the value assumptions (regarding ‘the good’) that underpin the daily choices individuals face. Even in the ethical sense, a concise definition of ‘the (general) good’ remains problematic. The point is that what can be considered ‘good’ cannot be thought of as an external reality ‘out there’; it is embedded in normative subjectivities either manifest or latent.

Religion plays a role in the discussion of ‘universalism’ within the EU. There are speculations that the entrance of Turkey into the EU can potentially cause problems for a Union that is already in the midst of an existential crisis. This conjecture is premised on the country’s ‘Muslim identity’. However, we cannot assume that the Christian faith is monolithic in beliefs, norms, customs and rituals, and that Europe without Turkey (or other world religions) will necessarily be more united. In essence, any concept of cosmopolitanism must be based on the ‘unity of humans’ rather than on religious belief. Reference to cosmopolitanism in the EU will be to legal-institutional cosmopolitanism as the Union represents a somewhat ‘concrete’ organizational mechanism that seeks to advance the welfare/progress of all European member states alike.

24 Hayden, “Cosmopolitanism Past and Present,” 43.
Hybridity, Subsidiarity, Solidarism and Multi-Level Governance

Hybridity simply denotes a mixture, and in the context of cosmopolitanism, it is reflected through a high sense of interconnectedness that human beings generally share; one that can result in a stronger sense of global integration. Those who posit this “high-level synthesis” argue that its full establishment will “eradicate violent and non-violent harm from relations between social groups.” With hybridity comes the notion of ‘globalism’ which eventually leads to ‘globality’ a case where boundaries (be it geographical, political, ideological, and cultural) give way to complete homogeneity – a condition where everyone competes with everyone for everything. This process will result in the fruition of the ‘global village’ idea, a kind of ‘global common’ that erodes all differences between and among societies through the process of time/space compression.

Globalization does not necessarily lead to cosmopolitanism but it is certainly “the raw material for its possibility.” As a disposition of ‘openness’, cosmopolitanism “is expressed by an emotional and ethical commitment towards universalism, selflessness, worldliness and communitarianism, and thus such values should be identifiable in the practices, attitudes and identifications of individuals.” Also embedded in this idea are the concepts of subsidiarity and solidarism. Subsidiarity is an international norm that requires decisions to be made at the lowest level as possible before resorting to other levels, if needed. This norm usually seeks to structure the distribution of competences between a supranational organization and its member states or polities. Subsidiarity allows for multi-level governance which permits issues to be dealt with at different levels (local, domestic, regional, intraregional, or international) depending on what the condition demands/requires. A multilateral subsidiarity governance arrangement has at its heart the idea of ‘burden sharing’, a case where the competencies of different levels of governance are utilized. This model “allows the more immediate levels (those most affected by a decision-making fall-out) to be responsible for carrying out tasks for which they

30 Ibid., 730.
have certain competence." This is also based on the notion that no single level can deal with the entire governance burden, particularly when placed in the context of the changing times where hitherto local or domestic issues have reached global proportions. This ‘post-national constellation’, according to Nancy Fraser, challenges the six main national presumptions which include nation-state sovereignty, national economy, national citizenry, national language, national literature, and national infrastructure of communication. She argues that today, every one of these presumptions “is problematic if not simply patently counterfactual.”

Solidarism, though a contested term, denotes the “normative convergence by states on issues like self-determination and human rights.” This is separate from pluralism in the sense that the former “approximates a ‘constitution’ for international society” which may permit intervention against non-conforming members while a pluralist international society is “one which permits normative diversity and in which there is little propensity to make binding, enforceable rules.” Barry Buzan’s reinterpretation of the English School theory shows that solidarism actually refers to “the convergence in domestic institutions and values across states, and the propensity of states to cooperate on the basis of shared normative projects, whatever those institutions, values, and projects happen to be.” The keywords here are convergence, cooperation, institutions and values: it is these notions that cement the broader conception of cosmopolitanism. In this context, solidarism can occur not just in political or human rights terms, but it can be conceptualized in economic and socio-cultural terms. In the case of the EU, it is uncertain if a clear distinction can be drawn between these two concepts of convergence. Since the EU has a constitution which is binding on member states, it can fit into the solidarism perspective of the English School but it certainly also allows for some ‘domestic autonomy’ especially for powerful, usually founding, states. It is within this autonomy that Great Britain, for instance, although not a founding state maintains its currency autonomy, and it also explains why no single lingua franca has been agreed upon. For instance, the entrance portal to the EU website has twenty-three language options, a choice close to the number of member states of the Union.

What follows is an analysis of EU cosmopolitanism in a more in-depth manner.

35 Ibid., 41.
36 Cited in ibid., 420.
4. The EU Cosmopolitan Agenda

Evolving from the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951 and the European Economic Community of 1957, the EU came into existence upon the signing of the Treaty of Rome by its ‘inner’ six founders, namely; Germany, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg, France, and the Netherlands.\(^\text{37}\) The Union currently has twenty-seven member states with several others hoping to become members eventually, including Turkey and Macedonia, while Croatia will become a Member State in 2013. Many reasons, including geopolitical and strategic, account for this trend towards enlargement but the fact that the institution has moved from six to twenty-seven member states in about five decades speaks to some success. Global governance, though it denotes governance without government as already indicated, does require a relatively well established institutional arrangement.

The EU has done more than this. While the proposed constitution was rejected in a referendum in 2005, institutions like the European Commission, European Parliament, the European Court of Justice, European Ombudsman, European Central Bank, and the European Council exist with the aim of facilitating democratic decision-making and presenting Europe as a stronger force to the rest of the world. It is out of these arrangements that one can identify the quest to build a ‘United States of Europe’. In line with engendering a sense of ‘Europeanness’ and following the recommendations of the 1985 Adonnino Committee, measures have been taken to give the Union a ‘human face’. With budgetary support from the European Parliament, the ‘People’s Europe Campaign’ has been launched to invent new European symbols and culture-building initiatives such a standardized European passport, European logo and flag, anthem, among others.

For proper multi-level governance, the Union adopted the subsidiarity principle at the 1990 Maastricht summit which required that decisions should be made at the lowest level as possible, but since then there has been a continuous battle over the norm’s actual definition. It was after the summit that the name ‘European Union’ actually came to stay. The skirmishes or ambiguities are often between the various actors of the Union, notably the European Commission, the member states, the regions, and the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and when each of these levels of competencies should be utilized. Although subsidiarity was expected to reinforce the position of domestic actors in European decision-making, due to the vagueness and elusive formulation of this norm “member states were likely to invoke subsidiarity as an instrument to protect national interests” and “[t]he Commission was equally likely to mobilize subsidiarity for further integrative policies at the European level.”\(^\text{38}\) This tends to create an institutional deadlock.

\(^{37}\) Information for this section, unless otherwise noted, is readily available on the EU website, see http://europa.eu/index_en.htm.

Many steps have been and are still being taken to ensure the Union reaches its cosmopolitan goal. Beyond the official institutional arrangement, there is a good amount of scholarly support behind this objective. These scholars range from those who envisage a “United States of Europe” or a “cosmopolitan Europe” both of which are underpinned by Habermas’ idea of ‘post-national citizenship’ – a kind of citizenship that transcends the rigid boundaries of the various European nation-states. Habermas and Derrida both threw their weight behind this cause by pleading for a common European foreign policy, insisting that the core EU countries should find ways of endowing the Union “with certain qualities of a state.” According to them, the absence of a common foreign policy regarding the invasion of Iraq, for instance, was made explicit on 15 February 2003 when mass demonstrations were held in London, Rome, Madrid, Barcelona, Berlin and Paris to react against European involvement in the war on terror. With a common policy that binds Europe together, Habermas and Derrida argue that the region will be able to counterbalance the hegemonic unilateralist tendencies of the United States. More than a decade ago, Habermas argued that in order to entrench the goal of European unification, it is necessary to move beyond a ‘mere market’ and adopt a constitution. The justification is that the intergovernmental arrangement adopted at Maastricht “lacks that power of symbolic crystallization which only a political act of foundation can give.”

His call for a constitution is based on the belief that a European constitution would enhance the capacity of the member states of the Union to act jointly, without prejudicing the particular course and content of what policies it might adopt. It would constitute a necessary, not a sufficient condition for the kind of policies some of us are inclined to advocate.

In order to undermine the EU’s meta-power game and give way to cosmopolitanism and sufficiently in line with Habermas’ argument, Beck and Grande (2007) argue for four main strategies that can be undertaken at the state level, namely; 1) (neo)nationalist egoism which limits the exclusive pursuance of one’s ‘national interests’; 2) intergovernmental minimalism which encourages states to cooperate and cede their sovereign rights to European institutions; 3) cosmopolitan realism which permits states to pursue their interests ‘realistically’ while considering the other members’ interests and 4) cosmopolitan idealism which emphasize the

40 Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida, ‘February 15; or, What Binds Europeans Together: A Plea for a Common Foreign Policy, Beginning in Core Europe’ in Max Pensky ed. Critical Globalization Theory, 27-34.
42 Ibid., 12.
absolute subordination of individual national interests as it denotes acting ‘idealistically’ instead of ‘realistically’. They also outline capital and technocratic strategies Europe can undertake to overcome the power game and arrive at ‘genuine’ cosmopolitanism. While some of these strategies are feasible, particularly intergovernmental minimalism, they seem overly idealistic when placed in the context of the contemporary Europe. Even the idea of adopting cosmopolitan realism and idealism simultaneously is ambiguous.

5. Idealism vs. Reality: The EU Cosmopolitanism Challenge

Many people have questioned the extent to which the EU can maintain a cosmopolitan identity amidst the differences that prevail among members. There is nothing wrong with having some form of ‘intersubjective consensus’ among a people of a particular region, but to assume that this consensus will result in the total relinquishing of their particular national/ethnic identities is quite far-fetched. In other instances, what is considered a ‘norm’ which derives from practices that are widely accepted are not necessarily shared by all. In any case, referring to the EU as an indication of European cosmopolitanism can be misleading in many respects. Although research shows that it is mainly an elitist project, the Union still prides itself on building some sense of ‘Europeanness’ through superficial symbolic arrangements such as EU flag, anthem, logo, licence plates, passports as though these will remove Europeans’ specific nationalities and give them all one identity.

A telling example of why the sense of ‘Europeanness’ has not yet been established is captured by the deadlock that occurred in the spring of 2005 when the French and

44 In the context of religion and world order, Knight (2010) finds that the ‘intersubjective consensus’ needed to establish a unified world order is missing among the world’s religions. The point here is that if this kind of unifying consensus is absent or almost impossible among religions which share similar faith-driven premises, then it remains problematic in the case of Europe with diverse identities and nationalistic belief systems. In principle, the solidification of any norm requires a ‘generalized sharedness’ in that norm. For instance, Björkdahl (2002) defines norms as the “intersubjective understandings that constitute actors’ interests and identities, and create expectations as well as prescribe what appropriate behaviour ought to be” (21). Until this understanding is maintained, EU cosmopolitanism will remain only a utopian ideal!
the Dutch said no to the proposed constitutional treaty. A lot of interpretation has been given to explain this incident, but one of the main concerns is the absence of coordination and/or communication between the European masses and the elites or what Schmidt calls “lack of communicative discourse” which results from a nonexistent public sphere. The EU, which began as an elitist organization, has not been able to bring the public or the domestic actors to play significant roles in it. There remains a strong disagreement between the EU governments and their publics over several issues. Apart from the fact that the people have realised the Union is an elite project, it has also been realised that domestic leaders use the EU as a scapegoat to relinquish their responsibilities to their nation. It is only assumed that domestic issues will automatically be addressed once the Union is solidified, but the issue goes beyond this. Therefore, the issue here should not be that Europe needs a constitution; rather, it should be focused on whether this legally-binding arrangement is possible or not amidst the ongoing internal dynamics.

Having been established as an economic organization, based on what is known as ‘negative integration’, democratic legitimacy has become a “hard currency” in the EU. Also, the multi-level or multi-centred nature of European governance has also resulted in what Schmidt calls a ‘fragmented democracy’. The EU is arguably one of the most democratic regional organizations in the world today, but Schmidt’s argument is based on the fact that it lacks a demos or a single people. This is not to essentialize the nation-states democracies as possessing a singularity, or that they necessarily follow Abraham Lincoln’s dictum of government by the people, of the people, and for the people. But the point is meant to elucidate the argument that the fragmentation in governance disallows the organization from escaping the democratic deficit. The Union is only a regional body of nation-states which does not possess the traditional attributes of a government but it certainly has

49 According to Gillingham (2003), ‘negative integration’ occurs through markets, the case where particular economic institutions are created to ensure the optimal performance of the market. Transforming this market-oriented or monetary approach into a more democracy or governance-driven one has been one of the problems of the EU. A historical institutionalist analysis by Pierson (1996) also shows that evolving from the EEC, there are limits in treating the European Community as an instrument that facilitates collective action or decision-making among sovereign states. He suggests we conceptualize integration as “a path-dependent process producing a fragmented but discernible multi-tiered European polity” (p. 123).
50 It is worth noting here that Cederman (2001) constructs the notion of ‘bounded integration’ in the EU which, instead of accepting or denying the existence of a European demos from the onset, rather attempts to problematize it as socially constructed and ‘sticky’.
arrangements that should make it more and more ‘majoritarian’ in the sense of a democratic government. To be precise, the fact that there have been direct elections every five years since 1979 shows that the EU enjoys a good amount of democracy, although voter turnout has been below 50 percent since 1999. However, while the establishment of the European Parliament was meant to address the divide Schmidt notes, voting is still hijacked by well-organized lobby groups who have interests that may not be representative of the general public. Cosmopolitanism in the European sense “preserves the idea of a single human destiny, a telos for all mankind and the conception of a future – and ineluctable – emergence of a single human culture.” However, Pagden argues that it is a false hope to think that “the truly cosmopolitan vision of the cosmopolis” is achievable. This kind of multi-level governance actually denotes the conglomeration or multiplicity of actors and levels of governance; there is therefore a problem when an organization that purports to be of this character is unable to tap into the nuances of each of the levels.

The question, however, is whether all the people in the various member states be adequately involved in the decision-making processes of the Union without neglecting some minority interests? If possible, to what extent can this happen? The inability to carefully coordinate the multi-leveled competencies is fundamental to the Union’s inability to construct a cosmopolitan Europe, one that blurs the divisions and universalizes individual nationalistic sentiments. But it is worth noting that while the member states have rendered parts of their sovereignty to be part of the Union, they still possess a significant amount of power to maintain their pre-existing social identities, even amidst the plethora of forces that prevent them from doing so. For cosmopolitanism to work there is the need to move from an ‘I’ to a ‘we’ feeling. Regardless of some commonalities that pertain among EU member states, this strong sense of cohesion is absent. As of now, we cannot decidedly point to the “European people.” Where this sense of belonging to Europe is nonexistent, it remains elusive to envision cosmopolitanism – something that relies greatly on shared and consensual norms, beliefs, and principles. On another level, the duality of the EU as both an intergovernmental and a supranational organization has resulted in some of the many normative challenges it faces. This conflict is well captured by van Kersbergen and Verbeek in the following statement:

One would expect norm reinforcement to be easier and less conflictual in more supranational contexts, because such systems at least have some form of norm

reinforcing mechanisms, such as an advanced system of law. Yet, because the polity of the EU is simultaneously an intergovernmental and a supranational polity, a battle over norms remains a distinct possibility here too.53

The duality captured in the statement above enables actors to continually ‘redefine’ pre-existing norms in which case certain actors might have more influence in such re-negotiations than others, making the EU susceptible to an “imperfect competence regime.” As argued by Beck and Grande, the cosmopolitan utopia might be able to help Europe overcome its ‘debilitating malaise’ (which result from its lack of a robust public sphere, the disconnect between the EU level of governance and domestic levels, its economic performance, and its Eastern enlargement) when established. For now, however, this has yet to prove a possibility in the immediate future. This malaise places Europe in a threatening ‘existential deficit’.54 In general, European politics shows a ‘highly complex conflict structure’ which Beck and Grande identify in three dimensions, namely: 1) institutional conflicts over the distribution of power between the Union and its member states; 2) ideological-cultural conflicts which reveals divergence visions and images of the future of Europe and its cultural identity; and 3) material-distributional conflicts which result from the apparent regional and structural inequities.55 To summarize this section, these three dimensions of conflict present a formidable setback to European cosmopolitanism.

6. Cosmopolitanism: Depletion of cultures and nations?

Globalization may be expected to erode all boundaries but the recent security threats have rather increased the need to strengthen national security and safeguard one’s cultural and overall existential potential. In the midst of the globalizing trend, nations have managed to survive with a good amount of their culture and identity intact. A study of ‘ordinary cosmopolitanism’56 in Australia by

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54 See Andrews, “Telling Tales of Conformity and Mutual Interests,” 209-223. Additionally, recent widespread economic and social protests in EU member countries such as Ireland, Greece, the UK and France reveals the fundamental existential crisis the Union is facing in contemporary times. In economic terms, the pejorative acronym PIIGS has come to stay signalling the downward spiral of the economies of Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece, and Spain, with the addition of Great Britain – all EU member countries. The now political union has also to deal with these emerging economic (or fiscal) concerns if the institution aims to survive the times.
55 Beck and Grande, Cosmopolitan Europe, 139-41.
56 “Ordinary” in this context refers to a vast group of middle class members. There is a contention in the literature about the distinction between elite and ordinary cosmopolitanism. The question often asked is whether middle class or low-income people are more likely to hold cosmopolitan views than the privileged elites who have better income, higher education and potential for socio-economic mobility. The study by Skrbis and
Skrbis and Woodward, for instance, revealed ambiguities surrounding the concepts of openness and fluidity that come with the cosmopolitan project. The idea of a cosmopolitan culture, as already alluded to, denotes cultural cross-pollination, fluidity and hybridity. In this case, regardless of trends towards general openness, the authors found a mix of sentiments of weakening national culture and culture loss. Also, the idea of openness was filled with nationalistic loyalties, apprehensions and various forms of egocentricities. The three main ambiguous dispositional themes that emerge from their study include: choice and opportunity in economic terms versus commercialization and exploitation; homogeneity, borderlessness versus loss of home – the flattening of all diversity; enhanced communication and mobility versus dangerous and unpleasant security threats.

For every single good thing that people see globalization bringing there is a counter disposition. Based on this result, they admit that it is problematic and somewhat futile to think of cosmopolitanism as “a continuum of openness – a continuum on which more openness, tolerance and acceptance of diversity corresponds with a more intensely cosmopolitan identity.”\(^{57}\) The data they gathered suggest that while cosmopolitanism is a possibility, it should not be imagined as a soon-to-arrive system of social organization. So, while cosmopolitanism or in this regard globalization may come with many positive connotations/experiences, there are negatives which derive from people’s cultural and existential anxieties. Even a study of European cosmopolitanism that found ample grounding for openness and recognition of difference also found the ‘social reality’ of cosmopolitanism ambiguous as next to openness was the more ‘banal’, non-cosmopolitan sentiments of the people. This study shows that while cosmopolitanism has a foothold in Europe, when placed the context of ‘reality’, “there are different forms of cosmopolitanism coexisting with nationalism, particularism and pluralistic positions.”\(^{58}\) In any case, none of these concepts or ideological positions is adequate in its own rights.\(^{59}\) It is based on this that the paper has questioned notions of cosmopolitanism that seem to discount the ‘nation’ as they envisage a post-national arrangement that shares almost no resemblance with arrangements characteristic of nation-states.

Woodward somewhat settles this debate by showing that one need not belong to an elite group to hold such views.

59 See an attempt to synthesize nationalism and cosmopolitanism in Brett Bowden, “Nationalism and Cosmopolitanism: Irreconcilable Differences or Possible Bedfellows?” *National Identities* 5, no. 3 (2003), 235-249.
In his 1996 article Etienne Balibar asked the question, “is European citizenship possible?” For proponents of cosmopolitanism, the answer to this will be probably a resounding ‘yes’ but Balibar showed how no simple deductions can be made as ‘nations’ thrive. This article seems outdated since changes have occurred since the year 2000. However, the argument pursued so far indicates that we need to continually question and problematize (maybe, not yet reject) this cosmopolitan ideal. It has become even clearer in these globalizing times that the kind of national self-consciousness, “the unique spirit of the nation” as Habermas calls it, is not embodied in the EU because “[a] plurality of European public and social spaces exist, often beyond the control of, or unrelated to, the EU or its member states.” As a result of this plurality of spaces, it is difficult to think of a harmonious, cohesive, coherent, and unified European society. It would be useful therefore to accept the nations as they are instead of trying to ‘unify’ them into one singularity – potentially leading to a kind of cosmopolitanism that does not target a universalized public through the depletion of diversity, culture, and individualized identities.

This author agrees with Stefan Auer in that the attempt to move towards a more federalist Europe with the underlying ideal of ‘post-national citizenship’ is both unrealistic and undesirable, as well as his plea for “a Europe that accepts nationhoods, a Europe comfortable with a vast variety of political cultures.” This argument is summed up in two words: “nations matter,” and it is not going to wither away anytime soon. If it is peace and unity that the EU seeks, both desirable outcomes could be attained outside the construction of a federalist Europe because not all federations around the world are necessarily peaceful or united. Rather, the EU needs to 1) re-envision its identity as a ‘regional state’ with nation-states members in overlapping policy communities; 2) re-envision its democracy with appropriate decision-making procedures; and 3) re-envision the European economy through innovative initiatives that can deal with the economic crisis some member states are facing.

63 For more on this, see Craig J. Calhoun, *Nations Matter: Culture, History and the Cosmopolitan Dream* (New York: Routledge, 2007).
7. Conclusion

Unlike global governance in general, which seems to have become visible through the processes of the UN and many regional and international organizations, albeit with some challenges, cosmopolitanism as an ideal has yet to become fine-tuned. For now, it indeed remains contentious how it will become a reality, making the concept itself no less utopian. The EU as an organization has been and could potentially remain a strong force for ‘good’. But one can certainly doubt if its existence would necessarily result in the realization of the cosmopolitan dreams of Europe. While cosmopolitanism has become a fashionable term for people with a more neoliberal or perhaps global ontology, there are ambiguities (or if you like, continuities and discontinuities) with the notion of global citizenship and the extent to which human beings will begin to reach binding and enforceable agreements of common interest. Linklater admits that

No less important is whether different cultures can find a common ground in a grand narrative that harnesses the more sophisticated self-understandings of the age to a cosmopolitan political project than can combine moral legitimacy with respect on the grounds of practicality.\(^{65}\)

At the EU level, it appears that both the ‘moral legitimacy’ and the ‘grounds of practicality’ needed for a formidable cosmopolitan project are missing. Perhaps, David Held’s idea of a cosmopolitan democratic community, although equally fraught with challenges, can work better in the European context. According to him, this community does not require any form of political or cultural integration that leads to consensus on a variety of beliefs, values and norms. Rather, it must be

An ensemble of organizations, associations and agencies pursuing their own projects, whether these are economic, social or cultural; but these projects must always also be subject to the constraints of democratic processes and a common structure of political action.\(^{66}\)

In this sense, there may be some uniformity in terms of a common organizational structure but at the same time difference in so many issue areas. For me, this appears a far more feasible community than the ‘European community’ the EU is trying to construct – a community where difference and diversity are not slaughtered on an altar of solidarism but rather embraced as essential parts of the democratic process. We must realise though that even a neoliberal institutionalist such as Robert Keohane sees cosmopolitan democracy as “a distant ideal, not a feasible option for our time.”\(^{67}\)

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65  Linklater, “Human Interconnectedness,” 315.
66  Held, Democracy and the Global Order, 278, my emphasis.
On the contrary, Held argues that cosmopolitanism is “in the here and now” since it “is already embedded in the rule systems and institutions which have transformed the sovereign states system in a number of important respects.” But Keohane is quite right since cosmopolitanism, as defined at least in this paper, does not exist anywhere as of now although increasing levels of regional and global integration of varying forms point to its future possibility. We do need a law of global citizens, as argued by María Lara, because only such laws can shield individuals from the tendency of states to go astray. However, until such laws are established, widely accepted, and ‘practicalized’, we can only assume that they exist even when there is glaring evidence to the contrary. Particularly in the context of Europe, there is the need for a more robust sense of ‘community’, ‘culture’, and ‘universal acceptance’ at every level of analysis, all of which are currently absent (or rather ambiguous) in the EU regime.

This article has argued that the EU cosmopolitan agenda is far-fetched mainly because the degree of uniformity, consensus and hybridity required for it to be successful are not properly in place. With the quest to enrich the theoretical debate around the EU, and generally global governance regimes, this paper has sought to show that the very idea of ‘cosmopolitanism’ is not necessarily sensitive to cultural and national differences and diversity. And this has been a primary bane to its current utility in praxis-oriented theoretical discussions. This must be addressed before we can begin a discussion of whether cosmopolitanism will really ever occur or not. For those who believe it already exists, it will be useful to explain how the notion resides in the same arena as difference, diversity, and nationhood. Future research in this area can also consider a more empirical assessment of what some non-key EU members think of the Union as it stands in these turbulent times, particularly the potential for a more solidly grounded universalist Europe.

Bibliography


68 Held, Cosmopolitanism, 50.
69 Any of the non-founding member states fits into this category of ‘non-key’ members, at least in this paper.


GLOBAL DEMOCRACY: COERCION-BASED APPROACH

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Abstract
This article explores arguments for democratically arranged global governance. Beside practical questions, this issue entails many moral considerations such as those of duties we owe to people living outside our borders. I explore several arguments that seek to explore the ground and scope of justice by focusing on the characteristics of basic structure, the three most prominent being the coercion-based, the pervasive impact/all affected principles and the cooperation argument. Their critical assessment shows how none is able to refute the need for global application of duties of justice. Although global application of duties of justice does not necessarily entail global democracy, I argue that some kind of coercive power is required and that necessarily entails the need for democratic accountability. Furthermore, there are problems of global collective action and certain policy problems in solving which democracy proves to be the best method, since it gives everyone an equal say.

Keywords: global democracy, distributive justice, basic structure, collective action, accountability.

1. Introduction

The idea that there is a need for constituting some kind of global governance is becoming more and more prominent in the contemporary discussions in political theory. The world is becoming more interrelated and the events in one part of the world often have very serious impact on the places and people in other parts of the world. Although there are many different views on the process of globalization, ranging from hyperglobalist to skeptical views, there is no doubt that there are several issues that can be clearly identified as global concerns, because of their influence on almost every society and individual on the planet to some extent. Global issues are matters of great social concern that affect human populations both globally and locally.

However, it has to be noted that global issues are not only of practical matter, but also entail serious moral considerations. What kind of duties do we owe to other people and on what grounds do we base these duties? If we do owe some kind of duties to other people, do we think that those duties should be merely humanitarian duties, duty to intervene in order to help in the cases of absolute deprivation, or we...
think that we owe them stronger duties, those of justice? Duties of justice are concerned not only with helping those in need, but also with relative deprivation and overall redistribution of resources, duties and rights on the global level.

Many argue that while certain conditions for application of some principles are present on both levels, conditions for application of principles of distributive justice are present only at the state level. The relationship between compatriots possesses certain special trait or is based on condition relevant for generating duty to alleviate inequality. This kind of arguments poses serious challenge to proponents of global duties of justice. In order to refute this kind of argument it is necessary to show the special condition of justice being met at national level is either not relevant or it can be found on global level as well.

In this paper, I identify and critically assess the most important arguments that are usually used in justifying or denying global duty of distributive justice. I broadly divide these arguments into three groups: arguments from coercion, arguments from pervasive impact/all affected interests, and arguments from cooperation. After careful consideration of these arguments, I will show why the cooperation based argument is the most successful one.

Further, I will show that although we can justify the existence of global duties of distributive justice, that does not necessarily entail the need for constituting global demos because, ideally, it is possible to discharge these duties by just behavior of each state on their own territory. However, due to the fact of “partial compliance”\(^2\), there is a need for coercive mechanism that will secure implementation of duties of justice on global level. In order to avoid non-compliance and free-riding, we need to form some form of central institution or set of institutions that will secure that parties participate equally and fairly in global system. We need an institution or network of institutions which will secure that first, all states respect basic rights of their citizens, second, participate in common redistributive scheme, third, respect the solutions commonly made among states in order to solve common issues and fourth, has an ability to mediate and settle the issues that could arise between some states.

Hence, in order to realize duties of justice and address problems of global collective action, we need coercion. I argue that global institutions have to be democratically arranged because they are coercive, and this creates the need for authorizing the enforcement of power on the coerced people (in this case, the global population) and for creating system of accountability against the misuse of power.

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The second argument for creating the global demos that I propose is the need to resolve the problems of global collective action, in which individuals have to make joint effort and split the costs of an action to achieve benefit for all. Global problems, such as global warming, require actions that are precisely of this kind.

I will show why democracy is so important in resolving such issues. I will argue that although the democratic method does not satisfy some objective, epistemic standard, it is important in situations where the reliable method for achieving a “correct” answer is not available, and the solutions for problems of global collective action are mostly of this kind. Since it is not possible to decide upon the issue in some other way (through expertise, for example), the fairest thing to do is to give everyone an equal say in the decision-making process through some kind of representation in global assembly.

2. Three arguments

Rawls considers the basic structure of society to be the location of justice. He defines basic structure “as the way in which major social institutions fit together into one system, and how they assign fundamental rights and duties and shape the division of advantages that arise through social cooperation”. 3 Basic structure includes the fundamental political, social and economic institutions of society: the political constitution, the legal system, judiciary and the market. It is important because the institutions comprising basic structure are responsible for distribution of the main benefits and burdens in the society. However, it is not completely clear what is the main characteristic of these fundamental institutions. As Arash Abizadeh points out, there are at least three different ways in which we can define the institutions comprising this basic structure: as the institutions that define and direct the basic terms of social cooperation; as the institutions that have extensive and pervasive impact upon person’s life prospects or as the institutions that have coercive power. 4 Depending on the position on basic structure we take, we will come to the quite different conclusions on the scope justice should have.

When it comes to the content of justice, we can accept some form of Rawlsian principles of justice as valid ones, regardless of whether we support cosmopolitan or anti-cosmopolitan positions. I believe that Rawls gives an agreeable account of people’s fundamental interests, or primary goods. 5 Principles of justice are rules

5 Primary goods are the goods that all people could agree on to be essential for ability of each person to form a rational plan on his/her life and to pursue his/her own conception of the good life. Some of the primary goods include the basic rights and liberties, income and wealth, powers of office, opportunities, health and so on.
according to which these primary goods should be distributed in the society. Rawlsian principles, while being attentive to inequality, leave enough space for personal freedom, since they allow wealthy people/nations to continue to prosper, with only limitation being that resulting inequalities must be to the greatest advantage of those least advantaged. However, I will not pursue the issue of content of justice further, since the primary focus is on the scope of justice.

I will now explore three above mentioned interpretations of basic structure in order to see which one gives the best account on our intuitions and understanding of social justice. After evaluating each argument, I will explore what the possible consequences on the scope of justice that each of these arguments entail are. The choice of the relevant principle as the distinctive feature of the basic structure will strongly influence on our position about the scope of justice, and subsequently, on the justification or rejection of global democracy.

I will also explore the capability of each argument to serve as justification for global democracy. Each of them entails certain conclusions about the boundaries of the demos, the issue often neglected in the democratic theory. The constitution of demos cannot be perceived simply as a democratic process, since for democratic decision-making to be possible, we should already have a designated group of people who are entitled to vote on that issue. Therefore, we need to find a principle that although it is not democratic in itself, corresponds with underlying values of democracy to a great extent. This means that we cannot simply state that any kind of procedure can be used for constitution of demos, no matter what is the eventual composition of the demos. We cannot leave the demos to define itself on whatever ground they choose, as Joseph Schumpeter\(^6\) suggests. We need to explore what are principles that can justify the constitution of demos. In this respect, I will examine how successful the three arguments are in serving as basis for justification of global democracy. Which of them provides the most successful justification and grounds for constituting global demos: “All people who are affected by a decision should have a say in decision-making”; “All people belonging to the same system of coercion should have the right to participate in decision-making process” or “All people who are participating in the same cooperative scheme should have an equal right to participate in decision-making process”?

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According to argument from coercion, proposed by Blake\textsuperscript{7} and Nagel\textsuperscript{8}, what limits the scope of justice to state level is the fact of state coercion. Although they both base their arguments on the fact of the state coercion, they have different explanations for the significance of coercion for creating duties of justice.

Blake states that one of the most important values in human life is autonomy. In order to act autonomously and pursue his/her own goals, each person has to have decent conditions. Therefore, we have a humanitarian duty to reduce absolute deprivation, on a global scale. However, state membership is morally significant because the state is coercive. It limits the number of options available to us, and puts some restrictions on our exercising autonomy. Therefore, if autonomy is valuable, state coercion should be justified somehow to the citizens, and that is done by state’s devotion to equality. The principles of justice in relative terms are only applicable within the state borders, because there is no coercive political power on the global level. There are no institutions that have coercive power comparable to states; states have legitimate coercive power only over their own citizens.

According to Nagel, duties of justice arise only under two conditions: if there is coercion and if that coercion claims authority while coercing us by doing it, so to say, in our name. The state coercion is different from other forms of coercion because it is endorsed by centralized authority, and although we have an opportunity to participate in forming the general will, we have to comply with the decisions no matter if we agree with them or not. Since the state generates many arbitrary inequalities by its coercive action, it is necessary to justify these inequalities and gain consent by giving place to some duties of distributive justice. If there is no accountability to those that state coerces (foreigners) than state can endorse pure coercion without meeting demands of distributive justice.

Blake’s and Nagel’s argument have problems with understanding of coercion, as well as with the empirical fact that states also coerce people that are not their own citizens. For them, the state is seen as the one that somehow “direct” the distributions of burdens and benefits in the society, by imposing certain laws or for example property rights. This is certainly true. However, most of the disadvantages and advantages in the society are not result of the conscious plan of the state and are not enforced by state power. The prevailing standard of beauty in each society, for example, is not supported by any kind of intentional and deliberate decision of


the state or some particular part of society. Morally arbitrary inequalities are produced by the basic structure, but understood more broadly than coercion-based argument suggests. Blake himself defines coercion as:

> an intentional action, designed to replace the chosen option with the choice of another. Coercion... expresses a relationship of domination, violating the autonomy of the individual by replacing that individual's chosen plans and pursuits with those of another.\(^9\)

He points out that coercion cannot simply be detected by the number of options that a person has. Coercion, therefore, has more specified, intentional dimension than simply having an effect on someone’s choices.

If we accept that coercive power of the state defined in this manner is the prevailing feature of basic structure, we will have to omit many ways in which basic structure shapes the distribution of advantages and disadvantages, going well beyond and beneath the scope of the state’s coercive power. We can, for example, include the legal system as the obvious way in which state coercive power has a great influence on someone’s autonomy. However, this sort of distinction would not be able to include more subtle, gray areas of basic structure, such as market activities or the way in which certain inborn talents transform into social advantages.

Insisting on “political” coercion enforced by the state simply fails to grasp many of our intuitions and understandings of justice. One intended implication of Blake’s theory is to show that even though there are some global problems that came up as the result of synergy of different individuals’ or governments’ actions, citizens and governments cannot be held responsible for something they did not consciously decide or plan. Although they have humanitarian duties toward other people, states owe duties of justice only to their citizens because of these special, intended coercive actions toward its citizens, which are morally more significant than the mere influence on someone, since those actions infringe autonomy.

However, if we accept this definition of coercion, we may lose a case for duties of distributive justice even on domestic level. Without the usual, broader understanding of basic structure, it is quite hard to defend the existence of duties of justice in cases where people are affected by arbitrary inequalities that are not generated by the state. Hence, it cannot be explained why society has the right to claim a part of the rewards acquired by using people’s inborn talents. In this way, the whole notion of morally arbitrary inequalities, especially natural ones, which is central for justification of redistributive policies, makes little sense.

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The second problem with Blake’s argument is that it fails to address the coercion of the state towards non-citizens in an appropriate manner. It is clear that some form of coercion exists on the global level, and it can be claimed that the structure of the global order which consists of nation states is coercive. The boundaries of states can be perceived as a form of coercion, since they, to begin with, limit the freedom of movement of individuals. Although states do not coerce citizens of other states directly, they prevent them from crossing their borders and have power to deny residence to them. Blake’s response is that this kind of coercion is qualitatively different from the coercion imposed by the state, because it does not affect the life of individuals so profoundly and pervasively as state coercion does. Therefore it is necessarily limited in scope, and duties that arise from it are weaker. The reason is that they coerce in different ways, because their impact is not as pervasive as my own state’s is. But this presumed fact is simply empirically false.

This can be illustrated by the example that David Miller\textsuperscript{10} employs in order to distinguish coercion from what he calls mere prevention. He uses immigration policies aiming to exclude illegal immigrants from the territory governed by the state. This policy is not coercive, at least in the narrow sense, because it does not force a person to follow a certain course of action, but is preventive, since a person is only denied one of the possible courses of action. Miller himself notes, however, that this depends significantly on the importance of the blocked action for prevented person. However, in most cases it is quite difficult to distinguish prevention from coercion, because sometimes by preventing someone from doing something means taking away his/her only option, or one of the very few ones.

In such cases, such as the one mentioned above, the whole system of prevention in the end results in coercion. It is clear that mere refraining from action in cases of violation of human rights or forced migration cannot be the appropriate solution for dealing with these issues. As Abizadeh\textsuperscript{11} correctly notes, since the coercion imposed to non-citizens is not legally defined, states can coerce the non-citizens lawlessly and without owing them any kind of duties of justice.

With or without direct state coercion, the distribution of burdens and benefits is present on the global level. There are many issues in which a decision by one state can profoundly affect citizens of other states. The United States’ decision not to ratify the Kyoto protocol profoundly affects all the other countries, especially developing ones. The pervasiveness and immediacy of this kind of global issues becomes even more obvious if we take the example of the Maldives, future existence of which is questionable with the current level of global warming, since

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\textsuperscript{10} David Miller, “Democracy’s Domain”, \textit{Philosophy and Public Affairs} 37:3 (2009), 201-228.

\textsuperscript{11} Abizadeh, “Cooperation, Pervasive Impact, and Coercion: On the Scope (not Site) of Distributive Justice”, 318-358.
the islands are on average only two meters above sea level which has been constantly rising in recent decades. In this and in many similar cases it becomes apparent that a distinction between direct, intended or immediate state coercion and other indirect forms of coercion becomes morally irrelevant. It is possible to show that other forms of coercion have significant effect on exercising people’s autonomy.

This kind of argument does not provide a sufficient justification for refraining from the exercise of our duties of justice globally, since it is possible to show that the injustice can emerge even if everyone is acting justly. Even if no one is guilty, someone has to be held responsible for the consequences of certain action. In the present institutional arrangement some nations and individuals are suffering injustice as the mere result of existing institutional arrangement, in which the supremacy of national sovereignty allows basically every regime to be considered legitimate. If the effects of other kinds of coercion are the same or even larger than those of state coercion, why should we insist on existence of different standards and principles for them?

If we accept the argument from coercion, that does not lead us to the conclusion that our duties towards our co-nationals are somehow stronger because of the system of coercion, but on the contrary, it leads to the conclusion that we are not responsible for restricting the type of inequalities that Nagel calls social and non-political (such as market outcomes) even when it comes to our co-nationals. Such position does not show us why there should be significant difference in treatment of our compatriots and other people.

On the other hand, if we manage to show that the creation of coercive institutions in the narrow sense, or sovereign institutions, on the global level is absolutely necessary for discharging duties of justice globally, the argument from coercion can be employed in order to justify the need for creation of some kind of democratic institutions on the global level. Nagel takes a Hobbesian stance, claiming that government, or sovereign power, is necessary as an enabling condition of justice. Although he uses this argument as a justification for opposite position, by claiming special importance of the state and government, I believe that his argument can partly be used if modified by considering coercion as something that needs to be established as a necessary tool for implementing duties of justice, not as something that generates the duties of justice. Justice requires coercion, not the other way around.

In order to implement duties of justice, we would have to coordinate many countries and people with different positions on global level, and therefore we need law that is backed up by some kind of monopoly of force. This coercive institution(s) does not have to be in the form of “world government”, but it has to have some
coercive mechanisms in order to secure the compliance necessary for discharging duties of justice globally. As Nagel points out “…collective self-interest cannot be realized by the independent motivation of self-interested individuals unless each of them has the assurance that others will conform if he does.”

How is democracy important when it comes to creating global coercive structures? We can justify the creation of global demos in order to secure the accountability of the coercive structures. Although the principles of justice, especially basic rights, are not and should not be the object of democratic decision-making, democratic control and accountability are proven to be essential in preserving these rights. At the same time, it is quite hard to imagine a country in which liberal rights are protected by the law, but the country is not democratic. Although Hayek suggests that it is possible to have liberalism without democracy and the other way around, we can note that systems lacking some kind of democratic accountability never actually respected the rights of their citizens. Even though democratic decision-making does not possess some kind of extraordinary epistemic value, we can note its value in two key aspects: first, it is the best way to secure accountability of the rulers to those who are ruled over; and second, it is the best way to make decisions in situations of collective action in which we do not have any other reliable method for coming to the right answer. In these situations, giving everyone the equal chance to participate in decision-making process seems the most plausible solution.

4. Pervasive Impact/All Affected Interests

Rawls justifies the application of principles of justice on basic structure because the basic structure of the society has the “profound and pervasive” impact on the individual’s life chances, attitudes and goals which is “present from birth”. If basic structure is primarily important because of its impact, it seems logical that principles of justice should be applicable to all institutions that have pervasive impact on individual’s life. According to this interpretation, both coercion-based understanding of basic structure and Rawls own cooperation-based argument define basic structure too narrowly. This argument, besides extending the scope of justice to global level, deepens it on the substantive level, by including in the basic structure internal relationships inside institutions. What matters is the scope of pervasive impact, not the scope of potential cooperation. Principles of justice should be applied to all people whose lives are pervasively impacted by basic structure. If we take into consideration the extent of global interconnectedness, it is clear that justice has to be global in scope.

G. A. Cohen, one of the proponents of pervasive impact argument, argues that since Rawls is concerned with pervasive impact of institutions on our lives, the principle of justice should be expanded on all actions that make such pervasive impact, even on individual actions. If we do not expand the application of principle, we necessarily collapse into coercion-based argument again.\textsuperscript{15} Cohen proposes different understanding of the basic structure as “the broad coercive outline of society”.\textsuperscript{16} Therefore, individual actions within institutions with pervasive impact on other people’s lives should be subject to principles of justice, too.

An argument similar to Cohen’s is also made in attempts to justify the need for constitution of a global demos. Robert Goodin explores the principle appropriate for constitution of the demos, and asserts that is logically incoherent to claim that demos can be constituted by “ordinary democratic decision making”.\textsuperscript{17} Therefore, we need a principle which is independent on democratic procedure itself in order to determine the membership in demos. Goodin claims that consideration of principles on which current demos around the world are constituted demonstrates that the principles commonly used are those of territoriality, nationality and history.\textsuperscript{18} Those principles are chosen because each of them represents an approximation for principle that underlies all of them: the principle of all affected interests. Mutual influence is crucial for appropriate determination of the membership in the demos. Goodin claims that use of this principle evokes the well-known notion of self-legislation: all those who are subject to the rule should participate in making the rule.\textsuperscript{19} Allowing people’s interests to be represented is the best way to secure these interests being protected. However, the demos rarely includes everybody that is being affected by its decisions and therefore, the only solution is to radically expand demos globally, since it is impossible to limit the effects of the demos.

The main problem with the pervasive impact/all affected principles argument is the wrong interpretation of the site that principles of justice should be applied. Although Rawls is indecisive and vague when it comes to specifying what institutions comprise the basic structure, he is quite specific on principles of justice being applied to institutions and institutions only: “By major institutions I understand the political constitution and the principal economic and social arrangements.”\textsuperscript{20} As Pogge\textsuperscript{21} warns, we should not confuse the issues of justice with

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{16} Ibid, 19.
\item \textsuperscript{17} Robert Goodin, “Enfranchising All Affected Interests, and Its Alternatives”, \textit{Philosophy and Public Affairs} 35 (2007), 43.
\item \textsuperscript{18} Ibid., 48.
\item \textsuperscript{19} Ibid., 51.
\item \textsuperscript{20} Rawls, \textit{A Theory of Justice}, 7-8.
\end{itemize}
those of morality. While justice is concerned with evaluation of social institutions, morality evaluates individual behavior. Justice is concerned with overall “rules of the game” in society; it is concerned with choice of certain social practice, not with choices made within them. Individuals do not have to follow the principles of justice in their everyday life choices, because there is background justice secured by principles. By virtue of background justice being maintained, individuals are free to pursue their own plans and goals. Therefore, the mere fact of affecting someone does not entail correction of individual behavior, except in the case of explicitly harming someone. Also, as Pogge rightly recognizes, not every collective action is considered to be institution. What Rawls has in mind when mentioning institutions are wider patterns of social practice, not corporations and other organizations, which he addresses as “associations”.22

We can criticize Goodin’s conclusions in the same manner. All affected interests principle does not succeed to justify the creation of global democracy. In various situations in which people are being influenced by the decision of the demos they do not belong to, the main problem is not that affected people are excluded from the decision-making process, but the fact that background justice that serves as safeguard of equality is not maintained. A consistent application of duties of justice on individual behavior would lead to serious infringement of individual freedom. As Miklosi23 points out, the fact that we are influenced by someone’s decision is not important; what is important is the fact that we do not have an equal opportunity to influence others. The opportunity to influence depends on democratic decision-making only when it comes to collective action problems; when it comes to private choices, opportunity to influence depends on the background justice being maintained. Put differently, what matters is that the rules and conditions of game are fair, not the outcome of the game. Hence, if we secure the proper application of principles of justice on global basic structure, we do not necessarily need democratic decision-making in order to include affected people.

I conclude, then, that pervasive impact/all affected interests principle is not successful as an argument for both global justice and global democracy, since it, first, has a wrong interpretation of basic structure and second, fails to distinguish between ordinary individual/collective action and social practice. When closely examined, the pervasive impact/all affected interests principle happens to diverge from our usual intuitions on fairness.

22 Ibid., 23.
5. Cooperation-based argument

As Abizadeh points out, Rawls defines the elements of society’s basic structure in three ways.

Rawls defines society’s basic structure as comprising of “the way in which the main political and social institutions of society [a] fit together into one system of social cooperation, and the way they [b] assign basic rights and duties and [c] regulate the division of advantages that arises from social cooperation over time.”

The primary subject of justice is basic structure. Principles of justice regulate the terms of social cooperation, and they do not apply to personal relations within society; individuals and organizations that are not part of the basic structure do not have the duty to apply principles of justice in their everyday conduct. Institutions of basic structure must secure the background justice of the system in which individuals and associations act. Although nobody is directly responsible for inequalities in the society, because they did not arise as a product of anyone’s conscious plan, some terms of mutual cooperation have to be settled by basic institutions in order to make sure that cooperation is truly advantageous for everybody. Consequences of individual acts are so indirect that we cannot expect individuals to somehow presuppose and predict them; therefore, we need a system that will effectively maintain the "background" justice and make sure that people, although inevitably affected by other people choices and opportunities and distribution of advantages and disadvantages created by many individuals through many generations, have roughly equal chances to success and follow their life plans.

Even individual transactions that can be considered fair can accumulate over time and undermine the background justice. Differences in talents and family background would in time result in excessive inequality if not regulated by the principles of justice. The application of principles on basic structure instead on individual behavior avoids putting excessive burdens on individual conduct and therefore secures maximum of freedom.

What happens if we try to apply this argument on global level? Rawls himself, as well as many of his followers, denied the possibility of global application of principles of justice. Although a high level of global interdependence is present, since there are no global institutions that would regulate how institutions fit together into one system of social cooperation, the way in which institutions assign basic rights and regulate the division of advantages that arises from social cooperation over time, there is no global basic structure.

Samuel Freeman’s argument from cooperation is influenced by Rawls’ work. Freeman argues that the principles of justice apply to basic institutions of society which enable political and social cooperation, and therefore include necessary political and legal institutions and rules. Since these kind of basic institutions exist only on the level of state and not on the global level, the principles of justice are applicable only domestically. The primary actors on global level are states, and international interaction is only derivative phenomenon.

However, this position offers an over-simplified definition of basic structure. If we look at the nation states as isolated units, we can support this claim to some extent. However, international relations can be rightly perceived only by observing the dynamics of relations between the nation states. We can say that there are basic institutions on the global level and that mere existence of system of nation states constitutes basic structure. This system defines the basic unit of global order (nation state) and defines certain rules of conduct between them. The mere structure of global world as divided among different states that possess certain resources on their territories is already significant factor which generates inequality.

There is a certain distribution of burdens and benefits as a result of wider social practice, but there are no just institutions that would regulate the terms of fair cooperation. Thus, it seems plausible to suggest creation of institutions necessary for maintaining background justice. Contemporary social practices on a global level exist (global markets, for example), but since they are not subject to principles of justice, the cooperation between actors is not raised in a fair manner. Present advantages and disadvantages of certain countries are in many cases not the result of conscious unfair behavior (although in many cases they are, if we consider colonial heritage), but it can still be shown that they have arisen from the complex interdependent relations. We can treat these inequalities in the same way we treat inequalities of natural endowments among individuals, and conclude that they should be morally irrelevant because it is the matter of pure luck which part of globe a country occupies. Furthermore, we can show how mere institution of nation state and preference for some resources over others among states cause some states and their population to flourish and other to fail.

In order to illustrate this point, I will take the example of a natural resource such as oil. Not only is possession of this resource in abundance undeserved by citizens of oil-producing countries, but also presents an advantage because of the system of international trade that highly appreciates oil as a resource. With the help of this fact, desert countries that are otherwise poor in natural resources, like Saudi Arabia, have an opportunity to achieve considerable economic growth. This example clearly shows how the basic structure on global level distributes advantages and

disadvantages; however, this basic structure is not grounded in fair terms, since there are no principles of justice that apply to it.

The existence of this distribution is particularly obvious when we consider the global market. Rawls explicitly says that the market is an institution of basic structure, although it is not a formal, coercive one. There is a global market, but it is poorly regulated and therefore the existing distribution of burdens and benefits that it produces is not fair. The fact that something that is not part of basic institutions but has influence on the distribution of benefits and burdens is not the reason to neglect it, but to consider widening the scope of application of principles of justice. We have a duty to create fair institutions where they are missing.

It does not seem logical to apply principles of justice only to the system of cooperation that is already fair, since those principles are responsible for maintaining fairness. Principles of justice can be used as guidelines for creating global political institutions. Therefore, argument from cooperation can be used to support cosmopolitan position more convincingly than anticosmopolitan position.

Could an argument from cooperation be used as a principle for constitution of global *demos*? Although it can be argued that since people can exercise their political rights to vote and be elected to public office on a nation-state level, there are no obstacles to make this demand for global governance too, especially because of its coercive nature. Democracy is important because it represents a way to give everybody an opportunity to express their opinion and it is an important part of the demand for the substantive equality of citizens. The notion of democratic governance embodies the idea that citizens should have the same opportunity to participate in government, to influence the outcome of elections and to hold office. In this sense, political liberties represent the important insurance of equality. Global governance that is completely devoid of democratic procedure can become elitist over time, depriving most of the people an opportunity to actively participate in decision-making. Rawls points out that without some kind of democratic institutions there is a danger of politics being captured by private economic interests, which represents a huge problem in contemporary international institutions.26

6. The case for global democracy

After examining the three arguments as the justification for demands of global justice and global democracy respectively, it is possible to make an overall evaluation. Concerning global justice, the coercion and the pervasive impact/all affected interests argument fail in their attempt to dispute and justify the demands

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of global justice respectively, since they offer a counterintuitive and unconvincing account on basic structure.

The coercion-based argument, while concentrating on coercive institutions of society, fails to consider the social practices that represent an important source of inequality. The pervasive impact/all affected interests principle, on the other hand, extends the understanding of basic structure so excessively that completely fails to respect the important difference between the individual/private and public agency. In this sense, the cooperation-based argument corresponds with our ideas of justice in a most appropriate manner, since it addresses morally arbitrary inequalities while leaving in the same time enough space for individual freedom of action. When interpreted appropriately, the cooperation-based argument can serve as a plausible justification for democracy, too. We can perceive a democratic political regime as one of the requirements of justice. The coercion-based argument, although failing to defend coercion as a reason for bringing forth duties of justice, provides a solid argument for democratic arrangement of global institutions.

The conclusion is that principle successful in upholding global justice does not necessarily entail global democracy, and vice versa. Someone could agree that there are arguments for global justice, but could argue that global justice can be achieved in the best way through already existing system on nation states. For example, states can form some kind of voluntary association, as proposed by Christiano.\(^\text{27}\) However, the problem of this kind of voluntary association of states is that leaves complete freedom to some states to disobey and refuse to comply with the implementation of principles of justice. In this way, the attempt to globally apply principles of justice can easily fail. Why would a state decide to comply to such principles if it does not have any guarantee that other states will do the same? Basically, the situation would probably stay more or less the same as in the present world order, in which the liability of a certain state depends on how advantageous or disadvantageous it is for the state to participate and obey the rules of conduct in international organizations. The association of states which relies only on voluntary cooperation of its members would be probably torn between the interests of the most powerful states, and violate the demand for equal opportunity of influence. As Christiano notices, voluntary association model would leave too much space for the hard bargaining between states. In this way, even without employing proper coercion on behalf of more powerful countries, different countries would have to negotiate from rather uneven positions, which would make fairness impossible. Even in the case of voluntary agreement, the inequality of positions among countries would be so considerable that securing equality of opportunity among the countries would be impossible.

\(^\text{27}\) Thomas Christiano, „Democratic Legitimacy and International Institutions“, 2007 (unpublished lecture).
Next, the theory of justice is concerned with equality of individuals, and only indirectly with the equality of states as the communities of people who live closely. By leaving practically all the power to the states, we could not make sure that individuals living in those states are adequately protected. Therefore, it is clear that in order to implement duties of justice globally in an effective way, we need an extra layer of global governance that will possess considerable sovereign power over nation-states. This does not necessarily mean that we have to choose between the voluntary associations of states and world government. It is possible to have several levels of governance that will secure that power is evenly dispersed in order to prevent its misuse. Of course, it would not be necessary for the global level of governance to deal with every issue that may emerge on the lower levels. However, when it comes to guaranteeing basic rights and liberties to every individual on global level and implementation of difference principle on global level, it is not clear how could that be attainable without an institution or set of institutions that would be able to force the states to comply, if necessary.

7. The democratic accountability argument

Imposition of coercive mechanisms demands a creation of effective democratic control of all people who are being coerced. As Miklosi28 points out, being subjected to certain coercive body is not the same as simply being affected. Being subjected fixes our legal status in a way more serious than in the case of non-coercive body. While “coercion” of other actors seriously limits the number of options we have, sovereign power sometimes determines our course of action very precise way and with means not available to other actors.

Although it is possible to conceive of a legal order that respects human rights and makes fair laws without being democratic at the same time, it is less likely that this would be so in reality (or, at least, it has never happened to now). Therefore, it becomes clear that it is morally required to establish coercive collective decision-making procedures in order to implement principles of justice. However, one may argue that this collective decision-making procedure does not have to be democratic. What we are concerned with is the fairness and rightness of the decision. In this case, we care that decision does not violate anyone’s rights and does not make the least advantaged ones worst off. Thus, if we secure the background justice of the basic structure within which individuals follow their morally permissible choices, we do not need some kind of extensive collective decision-making.

28 Zoltan Miklosi, “Against the Principle of All-Affected Interests”.

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However, there are cases in which the decisions of individuals or different levels of governance simply have to be replaced by collectively binding ones. In some cases, it is not possible to define rightness of the decision independently of the procedure, and in such cases, democratic procedure can be justified. It is useful to employ Ronald Dworkin’s distinction between policy and principle to further clarify this point.\(^2\footnote{30 \footnote{Ronald Dworkin, \textit{Taking Rights Seriously} (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977).} Policies are standards that community sets in order to achieve certain desirable goal. Principles are, on the other hand, standards that we observe because they are demanded by justice, independently on the fact that they do or do not produce certain desirable goal. Therefore, we do not need democratic decision-making when it comes to principles of justice, because they can be said to be right or wrong independently on the procedure being used. On the other hand, desirable goals in the society are not straightforwardly right or wrong and they cannot always be determined by experts. Sometimes people have to make a decision about the desirability of certain goals and the order of the preferences concerning public goals.

Certain problems of collective actions require some kind of democratic collective global decision-making, since there is no standard according to which the rightness of the outcome of decision-making process could be evaluated. The problems of collective action are quite different from, for example, processes on the market. On the market, under the condition of equality being secured, people, while following their own preferences, harmonize the price system and have a positive impact on supply and demand scheme. Any kind of collective decision-making would never be so successful in determining process as the market self-correcting mechanism. Problems of collective action are defined by the situation in which multiple individuals would all benefit from a certain action, that, however, has an associated cost making it implausible that any one individual can or will undertake and solve it alone. Without some kind of procedure that is binding for everyone, the public good will not be obtained.

As Gilbert points out, collective action necessarily requires “joint commitment” of participants who consciously contribute to the successful implementation of action.\(^3\footnote{30 \footnote{Margaret Gilbert, \textit{On Social Facts} (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989).} When it comes to collective action problem, the mere fact of having equal chance to influence each other is not enough. Christiano considers this kind of interests to be a special category of interests that are have deep mutual interdependence, because they affect everybody and can be served only through collectively binding decisions.\(^3\footnote{31 \footnote{Christiano, “Democratic Legitimacy and International Institutions”.}} The so-called collective properties basically have the same features of usual public goods; they are non-rival, non-excludable and non-rejectable. Many environmental issues can serve as good examples of this kind
of good. For example, climate change mitigation is the desirable goal for everybody, but it cannot be achieved without participation of majority of states and those who did not participate cannot be excluded from enjoying the benefits of climate change mitigation.

The main difference between simply securing justice and provision of collective properties is that the later suppose interests. When it comes to question of justice, the first concern is to give a right answer according to the principles which help us determine if the answer is correct or incorrect. Collective properties, on the other hand, usually evolve around interests. Our interests are often not simply correct or incorrect; most of the time they simply diverge.

Since there is considerable interdependence of interests and it is not possible to make binding decision without binding everybody, the solution is, according to Christiano, to give everyone an equal share in decision-making. As Christiano asserts, there are aspects of our interest that are not the matter of technical knowledge. Sometimes it is hard to decide which interests should be considered sooner and which later. Sometimes it is simply not possible to reach the right solution from the general point of view when it comes to the problem of collective action. Sometimes we can agree on ends, but not on means that should be employed in order to achieve them. In such case, the fairest procedure is to give everybody an equal say in decision-making. This can be achieved through democratic body in which states or other units on governance have an opportunity to influence on decision-making process by electing their representatives.

8. Conclusion

The question of institutional order that would be capable of solving both the problem of injustice and collective action problems has an increasing significance in modern highly interrelated world. In that respect, many authors examine the possible institutional arrangements while putting aside the issues of justice. In this paper, I have sought to show how issues of justice and democracy are in the end inextricably linked, since views on the scope and ground of justice influence directly on the views on global democracy. Although it seems at the first glance that global application of principles of global justice does not entail the global democracy, this article provided several arguments in order to show why any kind of meaningful application of principles of justice would necessarily entail some kind of democratic decision-making on global level. This article argued that the notion of distributive justice cannot be consistently defended without broadening scope to global level, since the attempt to do so often leave out crucial features of the justice altogether.

Without some kind of procedure that is binding for everyone, the public good will not be obtained. We need democratic procedure for solving collective action
problems on global level. This global democracy assumes however, the global application of principles of justice as a necessary condition for achieving the equal opportunities to actually influence our environment and circumstances of each other’s lives. Principles of justice and democratic principles complement each other in many aspects, mutually reinforcing each other when properly applied. The prospects for future global collective decision-making largely depend on the successful implementation of duties of justice as the guarantee of equality among people.

Bibliography:


SOCIETAL CLEAVAGES AND THE FORMATION OF THE TURKISH PARTY SYSTEM SINCE 1950

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Abstract
This article seeks to identify and describe the relationship between the divisions of party system and social structure in Turkey from a historical–institutional perspective by applying the operational logic of cleavage theory to the Turkish case. The results of this article reveal that Turkey has a distinct historical legacy, resulting in the emergence of some significant cleavages. In addition the paper displays the reflection of these societal cleavages and revealed that not all cleavages are directly reflected in the Turkish party system. Thus the article demonstrates that a Turkish party system is the institutionalizing of a complex arrangement of alliances between significant societal cleavages, which can also change. Generally speaking we can state that socio historical approaches like the cleavage theory are appropriate to explain party system developments in non-European regions.

Key Words: Turkey, party systems, societal cleavage, socio - historical analyses.

1. Introduction

The 2000s were a decade of important political and social change for Turkey. The victory of the Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP, Justice and Development Party) in 2002 changed the Turkish party system by finishing the existence of older parties which dominated Turkish politics in the 1980s and 1990s. Moreover, the AKP’s democratization and Europeanization policy unleashed various societal conflicts between various social groups (religious vs. secular, Turks vs. Kurds, Sunnis vs. Alevis, etc.). While these conflicts existed before the 2000s, the democratization process made it possible that political parties could politicize these conflicts, i.e. they transferred them into the political arena. In addition, social change in Turkey resulted in the emergence of a new religiously devout middle class, challenging the economic and political position of former Kemalist elites. While at the first glance these developments occurred at two separate levels (political arena vs. social structure) one can ask if there is a linkage between these two levels and how it can be explained from an analytic systematic perspective.

From this perspective, the purpose of this article is the identification and description of the relationship between the party system and social structure in Turkey from a historical–institutional perspective by applying the operational logic of cleavage theory. Generally speaking, cleavage theory states, that the formation

1 Special thanks go to Habibe Ilhan and Robert Logan Sparks for ‘fine tuning’ this article.

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of political party systems is the result of prior existing societal and cultural conflict constellations, which, in return, are the results of historical legacies. In this sense, social changes result in a new configuration of conflicts, issues and power relations and thus constitute party systems. In doing so, this article brings a contribution to cleavage research in non-western regions, with Turkey as a less analyzed case in comparative research. Moreover, Turkey differs in its socio-historical developments from other regions, due to the fact that Turkish history never experienced historical developments like the Reformation, Enlightenment or Industrial Revolution or Colonialism. In this sense, the Turkish case is also a good laboratory for testing cleavage theory on a non-western institutional historical environment. Thus, one additional hope is also that the article’s results will provide a contribution to the generalization and de-historicizing attempts of contemporary cleavage research, i.e. to dismantle cleavage theory from its western European ‘origins.’

At the same time, the classic and contemporary research on the Turkish party system is dominated by quantitative institutional approaches, describing its characteristics from the aspects of volatility, fragmentation and polarization. The few structural-historical works are trying to explain the complexity of Turkish politics by detecting one general, all explaining cleavage like center vs. periphery, tradition vs. modernity, Islam vs. Secularism, etc., which is not able to display the complexity of the contemporary Turkish party system and its historical development. For that

2 Jan-Erik Lane and Svante Ersson, European Politics – An Introduction (London: Sage, 1996), 16; Lane and Ersson Politics and Society in Western Europe, 16.
reason, the final aim of this article is also that it results will enhance Turkish political research by presenting an institutional historical perspective which is able to detect and explain the complexity of the Turkish party system and its relationship with social structure.

This article consists of three sections. The following section includes the theoretical and conceptual frameworks, discussing cleavage theory in the context of party system analysis and the conventional framework of the Turkish case. Next I focus on the significant societal cleavages within a distinct socio-historical frame. The fourth section analyzes the manifestation of these societal cleavages on the political level. Starting from the literature on Turkish party history and voting behavior I describe the major ideological party families and the distribution of aggregated voting preferences of distinct social groups.8

2. Theoretical and Conceptual Frameworks

The question about the effects of the formation of party systems has a long tradition in political science and resulted in the emergence of different approaches. However, the central question is which of these approaches best suits to explain the relationship of party structure with non-political phenomena (historical conflicts, social positions, etc.) A brief review of the international comparative research about the formation of party systems presents three major approaches.9 First, the so called institutional approach, which states that the variation of party systems is the result of institutional factors, like electoral laws and constitutions. Duverger’s seminal work stated that the structures of voting systems (plurality voting vs. proportional voting) and party systems (two-party vs. majority party system) are related with each other, because the high/low thresholds of the party systems affects the exclusion/inclusion of small parties into the party system.10 However, authors like Riker, Rae or Sartori questioned Duverger’s results and assumed that the effect of majoritarian vote has only a constitutional effect at the beginning of party system formation.11 Lane and Ersson made the criticism that the institutional approach can

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8 For example, Sabri Sayarı and Yılmaz Esmer, eds., Politics, Parties and Elections in Turkey (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reiner, 2002); Barry Rubin and Metin Heper, ed. Political Parties in Turkey (London: Frank Cass 2002), Tanıl Bora, Murat Gültekin, eds. Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce 9 Vol (İstanbul: İletişim, 2009).
11 Douglas W. Rae, The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971); William H. Riker, Liberalism against Populism (San Fransisco:
‘run into the problem of social indeterminism’ where the social historical context of political phenomena are overlooked. For instance, the focus only on the institutional structure of a party system would not explain the emergence of new parties and political issues, like the emergence of Green parties or post-materialist values in industrialized societies.

The second approach is the rational choice approach, applying the economic principle of profit maximizing on politics. Downs states that political parties and citizens behave rationally and that their political activities can only be explained as an attempt to maximize their personal benefits. Nonetheless, the major flaw of this approach is its assumption that all voters are following their own economic benefits, are all well informed and therefore choose rationally. This assumption neglects the fact that the interests of social groups are not homogenous. Rossteutscher for example stated that politics does not function like the free market, because voters have limited access to political decision processes and to the resources to implement their values and interests.

Finally, the structural historical approach claims that the formation of political party systems is the result of pre-existing societal and cultural conflict constellations, which, in return, are the results of historical legacies. In this context, Seymour M. Lipset’s and Stein Rokkan’s can be seen as the “founding fathers” of the structural-historical approach. Their seminal work of cleavage theory had a very important impact on the discussions of origins and structures of party systems, from a structural historical perspective. According to Lipset and Rokkan the national and industrial revolutions in Western Europe resulted in the emergence of four central conflicts: (1) the conflict between ruling elites in the center and dependent ethnical or religious minority groups in the periphery, (2) a conflict between the secularization tendencies of the state and the church and its privileges, (3) the conflict between rural and commercial/industrial urban interests and (4) the conflict between the working class and property owners. Moreover, the authors said that only when political elites transfer these societal conflicts to the political

References:
12 Lane and Ersson, Politics and Society in Western Europe. 12.
arena will they become institutionalized cleavages. Political parties organize themselves along the identification of cleavage lines. Hence, a cleavage is a continuing political conflict, anchored in the social structure and expressed in a party system, i.e. cleavage structures influence the party structure. On the other hand, not all societal conflicts are cleavages and not all cleavages are reflected by the political party system; thus, the party structure is not a function of societal structure.

As a result, Rokkan’s and Lipset’s cleave theory provides a good description how societal structure as product of historical legacies and party systems are related with each other. In the logic of the cleavage theory, social change results in a new configuration of conflicts, issues and power relations and thus constitutes party systems. Moreover, these conflicts at the societal level are manifested at the level of party politics and party systems. Therefore, the structural historical approach is most suitable by its display of the relationships of party structure with non-political phenomena.

Subsequently, later work on Western Europe has tested and confirmed the findings of Rokkan and Lipset, especially their thesis that the West European party systems reflect the cleavage and party structure of the 1920s. In addition, academic research on cleavages identified new societal and political configurations, which Lipset and Rokkan did not anticipated. However, the application of Lipset and

17 Lipset and Rokkan, Cleavage Structures, Party Systems and Voter Alignments:49; Lane, Ersson, Politics and Society in Western Europe:13.
18 Jan-Erik Lane and Svante Ersson, European Politics – An Introduction (London: Sage, 1996), 16; Lane, Ersson Politics and Society in Western Europe, 16.
20 For an overview about the discussion see, Oskar Niedermayer, „Gesellschaftliche und parteipolitische Konfliktlinien“ (Societal and party political conflict lines). Wähler in Deutschland - Sozialer und politischer Wandel, Gender und Wahlverhalten Noters in
Rokkan’s results in other non-western societies, especially in the new developed democracies in Latin America and post-communist Eastern Europe, demonstrated some diverging results and raised the question to what extent cleavage theory can be applied to a non-Western context. Authors like Caramani or van Biezen stated that the new democratic nations in post-Communist Central and Eastern Europe are characterized by the absence of strong cleavages because of the socialist rule. For them the concept of cleavage was a product of exclusive West-European transformation processes. Consequently, a historical structural analysis is pointless to describe party formation in non-Western regions, especially in new democracies.  

Nonetheless, this statement was challenged by other authors, who demonstrated that the non-Western regions developed different cleavages, because of their diverging socio-historical developments. For instance, academic work about party systems in post-Communist Europe demonstrated that the variation of party system formation in this region can be explained by other factors like ethnic and religious diversity, differences in marketization or variation in the socialist rule. For instance, Kitschelt et al. illustrated that as a result of the specific historical developments class cleavages have not develop in some of Central and Eastern European societies. On the other side Kitschelt proved that the major cleavages in Post-Communist Central- and Eastern Europe evolved around economic (Economic Germany – Social and Political Change, Gender and Voting Behavior) ed, Oskar Niedermayer (Wiesbaden: VS.Verlag, 2009), 31–37.  


Liberals vs. Market Liberals), cultural (secular liberals vs. religious rationalists) and ethnic (ethnic Minorities vs. ethnic Majorities) dimensions. In the same vein, other authors revealed a division over the importance of democracy and a divide between parties of authoritarian and democratic tradition in this region. Finally, Moreno showed the lack of post-materialist and materialist conflicts in Eastern Europe, which was replaced by a clash between fundamentalism and cultural liberalism about the role of church and abortion.

Furthermore, Latin America is another important non-Western region of cleavage research. One important feature of this region is the amount of intraregional variation, both in party system institutionalization and the degree of party structure reflection. Distinct historical factors which explain the variation of party system formation are the historical events after national independence, the form of extension of the franchise, and a common antagonism between secularist liberals and conservatives. Many authors have shown that religious homogeneity, early state consolidation and the coincidence of industrial and landed interest did not resulted in any religious or sectorial cleavages. In addition, authors like Roberts or Mainwairing and Torcal mentioned the absence of clear attitudinal and structural bases of party support, in countries like Uruguay and Columbia. Only in Brazil, Argentina and Peru one could find forms of class based voting. On the other hand,

27 Bornschier, Cleavage Politics in Old and New Democracies: 8
Moreno showed that like in Eastern Europe there was a lack of materialist post-materialist conflict, while Mainwaring and Torcal exposed that there was a similar division between authoritarian and democratic party traditions in this region.\(^{31}\)

From this perspective, Turkey shares with other non-Western regions the fact that it differs in its socio-historical developments from Western world. Turkey never experienced any historical developments like the Reformation, Enlightenment and Industrial Revolution. Moreover, Turkey’s modernization process in the 19\(^{th}\) and 20\(^{th}\) century was influenced by political, economic and cultural developments in Western Europe. On the other hand, and together with Israel, Turkey is the only country in the Middle East with a long standing parliamentary system. Thus, we can conclude that the Turkish party system has been institutionalized and has developed some distinct voting patterns which are connected with Turkish social structure. Consequently, Turkey’s case is also a good laboratory for testing cleavage theory on a non-western institutional historical environment. So how does the general logic of cleavage theory – historical legacies resulting in societal cleavages, which in return are manifested in the party system – express itself in a non-Western socio-historical context?

However, to answer the above-mentioned question we must take three important peculiarities of Turkey under consideration for operational conceptionalization if we want to decide which societal cleavages and their manifestation on the political level we want to analyze. First, while historical developments result in societal conflicts about resources between social groups, we must bear in mind that a cleavages may lead to conflict, but a cleavage need not always be attended by a conflict.\(^{32}\) For instance, some economic groups can try to implement their economic interests within the frame of lobbying in modern democracies, without being recognized by the public. On the other hand there were a lot of uprisings between the Turkish state and the Kurdish minority since 1924, but only in the 1960s and 1970s did Kurdish intellectuals discuss the Kurdish issue and only in early 1990s was the first legal Kurdish party was founded.\(^{33}\) Thus societal cleavages must be politicized by some political groups, like interest groups or political parties. For

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Lane and Erson, *Politics and Society in Western Europe*: 41.

that reason, the article will focus only on those societal conflicts which were transformed to societal cleavages.

Second, Turkish politics lacks the emergence of significant post-materialist political issues, like the environment or abortion.\textsuperscript{34} Thus, political identification of social groups in Turkey is focused on classic social categories, anchored in the social structure which is not replaced by new values and conflict categories like in Western Europe.\textsuperscript{35} For that reason, a clear concept and definition of cleavages in the Turkish case must be limited to those cleavages which are linked only to socio structural categories and may not include dimension of values, like post-materialism, etc. Using Bartolini and Mair’s definition that a cleavage has a) social structural element, b) is an element of identification, i.e. the members of this social groups must identify themselves with this category and c) that it must be organizational manifested by a political party or interest group\textsuperscript{36}, we state that this social groups on the social structure have some shared memory which constitutes their group identity and which is in the operational logic of Lipset and Rokkan a product of historical legacies.

Along these lines, this article focuses on the Turkish party system as an analytical level in which cleavages are manifested. A party system consists of a set of political parties operating in an organized pattern, which can be described by some properties.\textsuperscript{37} Generally speaking, the article assumes that party-systems consist of distinct political conflict lines that are that they are stable, connected with significant social structural positions and thus linked with materiel interests and values.\textsuperscript{38} International comparative research on conflict lines between political parties in a party system focuses on the dimensionality of the conflict structure, i.e. the number and structure of conflict lines in a given structure. The majority of quantitative empirical research focuses on a distinct one dimensional left right


\textsuperscript{35} For a discussion about the value dimension in cleavage research, see, Niedermayer \textit{Gesellschaftliche und parteipolitische Konfliktlinien}: 32 - 33

\textsuperscript{36} Stefano Bartolini and Peter Mair, \textit{Identity, Competition, and Electoral Availability: The Stabilization of European Electorates 1885-1985} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 213 -220.

\textsuperscript{37} Lane and Ersson \textit{Politics and Society in Western Europe}: 134, Caramani “Party Systems” 319

\textsuperscript{38} Niedermayer, Gesellschaftliche und parteipolitische Konfliktlinien: 37.
dimension. Nonetheless, Niedermeyer states that the focus on a one dimensional ‘super structure’ on the left-right dimension is valid as long as the traditional left right orientation is not added to by a new conflict dimension, especially if new regional, ethnic or confessional conflicts emerge. In the Turkish case we assume that the distinct political conflict lines of the Turkish party system are represented by significant ideological party families, which are discussed in Turkish research about political parties and systems. These party families of the Turkish party system consist of one or two political parties, which share a similar ideology and compete for a similar electoral base. In the majority of cases, the fragmentation of these party families is the outcome of inter party rivalries, resulting in the withdrawal of one party faction from the party and founding their own one. Moreover, academic research in the party system on Turkey mentioned that its distinct feature is that the volatility - ‘the net electoral change between two consecutive elections’ - between voting blocs has been minimal, and it has been high within blocs rather than across them. Consequently, we can assume that


40 Niedermayer, Gesellschaftliche und parteipolitische Konfliktlinien, 38 - 39
42 For example see Tanju Tosun Türk Parti Sisteminde Merkez Sağ ve Merkez Solda Parçalanması (Fragmentation between the centre right and the centre left in the Turkish Party System) (İstanbul: Boyut Yayınları, 1999).
voters stay in their voting blocks, and that the structure of these party families are
and stay stable for very long, having an electoral support by distinct social
categories located in the social structure.

3. Historical legacies and resulting cleavages in Turkey

A brief overview of Turkish political history reveals some important observations.
First of all, unlike its Muslim neighbors, the Ottoman Empire never experienced any
sort of colonialism. Until its collapse the Ottoman Empire was an independent
power in Europe. The short period of occupation by the allied forces after the First
World War (1918 – 1923) was finished by Turkish forces during the Independence
War (1919 – 1922). Thus, Turkey never developed any anti-colonial movements and
it had a stronger orientation towards the West.44

Second, the historical development in Turkey neither experienced an industrial
revolution nor was it – as an Islamic civilization – influenced by any Reformation.
Caglar Keyder for instance showed that the Ottoman Empire had only established a
modest form of industrialization, which was destroyed after the end of the First
World War. Only in the 1930s were there attempts at establishing a new heavy
industry under the tutelage of the Kemalist state. On the other side, the Turkish
state protected the rural small land owning agrarian producers with specific traffic
policies, state subsidies and price guaranties for their products. As a result, the
majority of the Turkish workforce was employed in the agrarian sector until the
1990s.45 In addition, scholars of Turkish political history have demonstrated that
Turkish socio-political history was characterized by the existence of an omnipotent
and authoritarian Turkish state, where the articulation of particular interests was not
legitimized.46

Although, Turkish political history is characterized by the lack of distinct historical
developments which were significant for the political development in Western
Europe, a review of the literature of modern Turkish history demonstrates three
important historical legacies which had a significant influence on contemporary

in Transition: Party Performance and Agenda Change,” Political Studies 46 (1998), 544-571,
Özbudun, “Changes and Continuities in the Turkish Party System,” 130.
44 Menderes Cinar, Burhanettin Duran “The specific Evolution of Contempory Political
Islam and its difference” Secular and Islamic Politics in Turkey – The Making of the Justice
45 Çağlar Keyder, State and Class in Turkey. A Study in Capitalist Development.
46 For example, Metin Heper: The State Tradition in Turkey. (Huntington: Eothen
Turkish political history. First, the political and societal modernization process of the Ottoman Empire beginning in the 18th and 19th centuries and the Turkish Republic in the 20th. Turkish modernization can be characterized first by its defensive nature, with its goal to end a perceived backwardness by implementing specific institutions from the West. Moreover, modernization was state centered because it was carried by bureaucratic elites as the only legitimate actors of Turkish modernization, while other social groups or actors were excluded from this project. A more radical break from this state-focused modernization emerged during the authoritarian Kemalist period of the Republic (1923 – 1950). The Kemalist state elites believed that it was not enough to reform the state and its institutions, but that Turkish society with its symbols and traditions must also be transformed. The culmination of these radical reform attempts was the implementation of very rigid secularization, which was rejected by most parts of the population.

Second, the nation building process of the Turkish Republic since 1923 is the next significant historical event of Turkish political history. Contrary to the multi-ethnic and multi-denominational Ottoman Empire, the founders of the Turkish Republic wanted to create a ‘cultural’ homogenous nation, with Turkish as the only spoken language. This resulted not only in the expelling of the Armenians in 1915 and the Greeks in 1923 and 1960s, but also in the endeavor to assimilate the non-Turkish speaking Kurds, whose existence as a separate ethnic group was neglected until the late 1990s.


Finally, the Europeanization process which can be regarded as an effort to adapt Turkish law and economy to EU standards and which can be traced to 1963, with Customs Union in 1995 and the starting of the negotiations with the European Union (EU) in 2003.\textsuperscript{51} This \textit{Europeanization} process has two dimensions. First, the implementing of a more liberal economic system in Turkey, including the renunciation of the former state subsidy economic system and the privatization of state enterprises. The second dimension was political liberalization, which started in the 2000s, when Turkish governments, and particularly the AKP government since 2002, tried to implement the regulations of the Copenhagen political criteria for EU membership. The judiciary system was liberalized, the human rights situation was improved, and the power of the military in civil matters was limited.\textsuperscript{52}

As a result, we can assume that the distinct historical developments of Turkish society has resulted in the emergence of a combination of societal conflicts about economic, political and cultural resources, which became politicized by political actors and thus became significant societal cleavages. How have the aforementioned historical development in Turkey influenced the emergence of significant cleavages? First of all, the literature about class structure in Turkey demonstrated that the lack of industrialization in combination with the aforementioned rigid Turkish state tradition has never allowed the formation of a significant working or commercial class which could challenge the Turkish state.\textsuperscript{53} Neither in the Ottoman Empire nor in the Turkish Republic until economic liberalization in the 1990s, had independent societal actors from the state ever developed. Hence, Turkey never experienced a real social democratic or communist movement, a liberal bourgeoisie party or an agrarian movement and therefore any significant class based voting.\textsuperscript{54}

\textsuperscript{51} Turkey has been an associate member of the European Union (EU) and its predecessors since 1963, with the sign of the Ankara Agreement.


Table 1: Historical Legacies and resulting societal conflicts since 1923

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Historical Legacies</th>
<th>Societal Cleavages</th>
<th>Positions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Modernization process (1923 -)</td>
<td>(1) Kemalist vs. liberal state elites</td>
<td>Turkish Republic should be centralist, nationalist and secular vs. Turkish Republic should be more federal, moderate secular and should respect cultural rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2) Secular state vs. (Islamic) religion</td>
<td>(a) orthodox Sunni organization who want to run their religious schools and lodges vs. secular state who closes them in the name of Turkish secularism (<em>laiklik</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(b) Religious (Sunni-) Muslims who want to express their religiosity in public vs. secular Muslims who see these attempts as an assault on the principles of Turkish secularism (<em>laiklik</em>).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(c) (heterodox) Alevis who want to run their houses of worship (<em>cemevi</em>) and practice their religion in public vs. Secular State who regards these <em>cemevi</em> as lodges, which must be closed in the name of Turkish secularism (<em>laiklik</em>)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nation-building process (1923 -)</td>
<td>(3) Turkish nation state vs. Kurdish minority</td>
<td>Kurdish Minority who wants to speak their language and express their culture. vs. Turkish national state who wants to implement a homogenous (Turkish) culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europeanization process (1995 -)</td>
<td>(4) Pro-European vs. Anti-European state elites</td>
<td>State Elites who want to implement the economic and political regulations of the EU vs. state elites who oppose it.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(5) Anatolian vs. Istanbuli capital</td>
<td>(Religious) Anatolian entrepreneurs who favor the integration of Turkish economy into global economy, vs. (Secular) Istanbul entrepreneurs who favor state support and a less integration of Turkish economy into global economy.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Second, a majority of authors observed a major cleavage within this bureaucratic nation building elite about the ‘nature’ of Turkish Modernization. As presented in Table 1, we can see on the one side a more centralist, nationalist and more secular stance, which was represented by the so called Young Turks and later the Kemalists, who ruled the country between 1909-1918 (Young Turks) and 1923-1950 (Kemalist). On the other side, we observe a group with a more liberal stance, who supported a more federal national state, more cultural rights for minorities and a moderate secularization. This cleavage was renewed and deepened again later by the Europeanization process, between the state elites in the bureaucracy, military and high judiciary. They were divided between those who opposed the political liberalization process and those who supported it, which was called by Ziya Önis as the conflict between “conservative globalist” vs. “defensive nationals”.

In addition, many authors of Turkish politics have discovered a distinct second cleavage between the secular (laikik) and westernized Turkish State and various orthodox Sunni organizations, as a result of Kemalist secularization politics. This conflict has two dimensions. First, a conflict between the Kemalist state and Islamic organizations, who wanted to run their religious schools and practice their rituals in their convents and lodges. Second, a conflict between two different lifestyles and their public expression, which became more public in the late 1990s. On the one side, we can observe a more secular and Western way of life, dominating the public


57 Çarkoğlu and Binnaz. Değişen Türkiye’de Din, Toplum ve Siyaset.

58 Islam does not have an institutionalized church like Christianity. Next to an orthodox and script based interpretation of a ‘state Islam’ other more heterodox or more spiritual orders and convents has been established. During the Ottoman Empire most of them where tolerated by the state, sometimes there were interactions between members of the state elite and this religious virtuosi and movements. The Kemalist state abolished all convents and orders in 1924 and suppressed the members of these movements. However, these movements never vanished. Most of these convents survived the suppression by the Kemalist and became again public after the end of the authoritarian era. In Addition new movements emerged, like the Süleymanç, whose vocation was the teaching of the Koran or the more state indifferent. For an interpretation see, Gökhan Bacik, Ümit Kurt, New Islamic movements and a modern networks. Culture and Religion, Vol.12, No. 1(201) 21 - 37

picture of cities like Istanbul, Izmir and Ankara. On the other side, a more self-confident religious way of life, became more and more visible in the public from the late 1990s. The apex of this conflict climaxed in the headscarf controversy and the claim of religious women to study at universities while wearing their veils, constrained by the Kemalist elites.\(^{60}\)

A third cleavage is the violent clash between the Kemalist State who wanted the implementation of a homogenous national identity during the nation building process and the Kurds, who defend their cultural rights. This conflict resulted in the emergence of a bloody war between the Turkish Army and the Kurdish groups in East and Southeast Anatolia. Civil and non-violent attempts to articulate Kurdish claims in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s were suppressed by the Turkish state. Only in the 2000s was there a possibility for Kurdish politicians to be politically active without the threat of political persecution.\(^{61}\)

The fourth cleavage is the conflict between the old Istanbul economic elites and the new emerging Anatolian economic elites, which emerged in the last decade as a product of economic Europeanization process.\(^{62}\) The “Istanbul Capital” was a product of the state centered economic policy and produced for the home market. The economic actors were protected by tariffs and received state subsidies due to their good relations with the state bureaucracy. However, the emergence of the global post-Fordist labor division and the beginning of the European Customs Union in 1995 changed the position of these elites. Small and middle scale family business enterprises in provincial cities of Anatolia, who never receive financial support from the state, began to adapt to the new global economic situation. Therefore, these Anatolian economic elites were more integrated into the global economy and hence were keen supporters of the economic Europeanization process.\(^{63}\) Hence,


\(^{63}\) Hasan Bülent Kahraman, *Türk Sagı ve AKP* (The Right Wing in Turkey and the AKP) (İstanbul: Agora 2007), 119-120.
these so called ‘Green Capital’ or ‘Anatolian Tigers’ grew in the 1990s and tried to challenge the position of the former economic elites. On the other side, the difference between these two economic actors was not only economic in nature but also cultural and religious. The old Istanbul economic elites supported and lived a more secular Western lifestyle, while the emerging class of Anatolian entrepreneurs had a more traditional and Islamic lifestyle.  

Finally, there is confessional cleavage between heterodox Alevi Muslims and orthodox Sunni Muslims and especially the (Sunni) Turkish state. During the Ottoman Empire, the Alevis were prosecuted by the Sunni state authorities and practiced their rituals in secret. After the fall of the Empire the Alevis supported Atatürk and his plan to establish a new secular Turkish Republic which meant for them more security against Sunnite prosecution. However, despite the support of the Alevis, the Kemalist State closed their traditional ritual houses in the name of Kemalist secularism in 1924. The Kemalist understanding of secularism (laiklik) was not to separate state and religion from each other, but like the Ottoman Empire to allow only one interpretation of Sunni Islam which was controlled by the Turkish State. For that reason, the Turkish state could not allow any alternative religious social groups, next to its unofficial Sunni state religion. For that reason Alevis have enormous problems in practicing their religion, despite the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of religion in Turkey. Their places of worship (cemevi) are not accepted as religious entities but as cultural buildings and their children are forced to visit the obligatory religious education classes in schools, which explains Islam only from a Sunni perspective. Nevertheless, for a long period the Alevis have


65 Koçan and Öncü demonstrated that it is difficult to explain what Alevism is, which is estimated to be between 10% - 30% of Turkish population, because there are different interpenetrations about the idea of Alevism. Some sets of traditions, rules and symbols shape the collective space of Alevi communities, but on the other side the social relations, feelings, thoughts and behavior practiced are multiple and complex. Moreover there are different competing descriptions of Alevism, considering Alevism as a heterodox sect within Islam, as Turkish Anatolian Islam, as a philosophy, as Sufi or Shiite in nature or as a syncretic mixture of elements of Islam, Christianity and Shamanism. See, Gürcan Koçan and Ahmet Öncü “Citizen Alevi in Turkey: Beyond Confirmation and Denial”. *Journal of Historical Sociology*. Volume 17, Issue 4, (2004), 473–474.

66 For a history of Sunni Alevi relations in Ottoman Empire and Turkey see, Ahmet Yaşar Ocağı, *Türk Sufiliğine Bakışlar* (Opinions about Turkish Sufism) (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2002).


68 Mert, *Early Republican Secularism in Turkey*.
accepted their situation in Turkey and many young Alevi became associated with socialist or social democratic political movements, forgetting their religious past. However, the rise of Islamism and violent incidents against Alevi in the 1990s has renewed the interest among Alevi in their identity. Thus, since then, many Alevi have been in favor of the equalization of their sanctuaries and the abolishment of the obligatory religious Sunnite instruction in schools.

4. The Reflection of Societal Cleavages In the Turkish party system

Scholars of Turkish politics have shown that the existence of some ideological party families is a significant element of the Turkish party system and that these ideological party families have some distinct characteristics. First, they consist of one or more political parties sharing a similar political ideology, stable system of ideas, values and beliefs, shared by societal groups, making concrete desirable social and political statements and claims to other social groups. Second, the fragmentation of an ideology party family is the result of inter-party rivalries about

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political and ideological issues, resulting in the break of one party fraction and the founding of a - short lived - new political party, which then declares itself as the guardian of the pure ideology, like the Cumhuriyetçi Güven Partisi, (CGP, Republican Trust Party), as guardian of Kemalism or the Millet Partisi, (MP, Nations Party) as guardian of liberal conservatism in the 1960s and 1970s. Nonetheless, these parties still declare themselves to be part of the same ideological family and represent different interpretations of a political ideology which constitutes these ideological party families. Third, Turkish political history is full of examples of competing parties emerging after a military coup d’etat, not differing in their ideological stance. For example, the parallel emergence of the Yeni Türkiye Partisi, (YTP New Turkey Party) and the Adalet Partisi (AP, Justice Party) after the coup 1960, which claimed to be the true successor of the former Demokrat Partisi (DP, Democracy Party) which ruled Turkey between 1950 and 1960 and was closed after the coup d’etat in 1960. From this perspective, the ideology of a party family exists not only for differentiating itself from other party families. In a political environment, which is characterized by party bans and military coups d’etat (1960, 1980) the ideology of a party family is an important tool for these parties to represent themselves as legitimate successors of former banned parties to their voters. Finally, one characteristic of Turkish party systems is that many Islamic and Kurdish parties were banned by the constitutional court. Many of these parties then established new parties under a new name but with a similar political platform. Thus, Turkish ideological party families also consist of successive established identical political parties under different names.


Table 2: Political Parties within the Party Families, represented in Turkish Parliament since 1950

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Considering these points, the review and re-evaluation of the literature of the Turkish party history illustrates the existence of five successively evolving major ideological part families. First, the liberal conservative center-right Merkez Sağ, second the Kemalist secular left-centrist Merkez Sol, third Turkish nationalism (Türk Milliyetciliği), fourth political İslam (Siyasi İslam) and finally, leftist Kurdish nationalism (Kürtçülük). Wuthrich showed that these labeling were developed by political scientist and journalists and were then used by the political parties to position themselves in the political competition with other parties. Table 2 illustrates the development of the five party families and the various political parties which existed parallel or successively within them.

The transition from authoritarian Kemalist one party rule (1923 – 1950) to a democratic multi-party system in 1950 resulted in the emergence of two diverging party families of Merkez Sağ and Merkez Sol, which dominated Turkish politics for the next two decades. From 1950 onwards, the Merkez Sağ ruled the country and controlled between 40 and 50 per cent of all votes, with some exceptions in the 1970s and 1990s. It was represented in the 1950s by the aforementioned Demokrat Partisi and the Adalet Partisi, in the 1960s and 1970s, the Anavatan Partisi, (ANAP, Motherlands Party) and Dogru Yol Partisi (DYP, Party of the Right Way) in the 1980s and 1990s.


77 Wuthrich, Paradigms and dynamic change in the Turkish Party System. 385.


80 For a history of these parties see, Tanel Demirel ‘Demokrat Parti’ (The Demokrat Party), in: Modern Türkiye’de siyasi düşüncе – Vol.7: Liberalism (Political Thinking in Modern Turkey, Vol. 7: Liberalizm) eds. Tanıl Bora, Murat Gültekin (Istanbul: İletişim, 2005), 480 – 444. Tanel Demirel ‘Adalet Partisi’ (The Adalet Party), in: Modern Türkiye’de siyasi düşüncе – Vol.7: Liberalism (Political Thinking in Modern Turkey, Vol. 7: Liberalizm) eds. Tanıl Bora,
In this context, the Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP, Justice and Development Party), ruling Turkey since 2002, can be described as the newest political representation of the Merkez Sag, after the former center right parties have politically vanished. At the first glance, the AKP developed after an intra-party conflict within political Islam between traditional conservative Islamists and moderate post-Islamists, whereupon the post-Islamic fraction left the party and established their own party. In this case, the AKP can be seen as exception, where one (part of a) party moves from one ideological party family to another one. Nonetheless, while the founders of the AKP had their political socialization at the Islamist Welfare Party, many parliamentarians and party members have their roots in former Merkez Sag parties. However, the party has announced that it is not an Islamist party, and adapted the liberal-conservative creed of Merkez Sag parties. The central ideological creed of these parties was the representation of the will of the excluded people against the elitism of the Kemalists. In this aspect, the politics of Merkez Sag parties have two elements: First, by a more liberal understanding of secularism and a support of cultural conservative values these parties tried to bind the religious voters. Second, by redistributing the economic resources of the center to the periphery, the economic politics of the Merkez Sag allowed the peripheral economic elites access to economic resources, which also resulted in the founding of new economic groups.

In addition, the Merkez Sol party family can be seen as the natural adversary of the Merkez Sag. The political ideology of Merkez Sol was always the defense of the principles of Kemalism as founding ideology of the modern Kemalist state in 1923 and especially secularism against the conservative religious attempts of the Merkez

Murat Gültekin (İstanbul: İletişim, 2005), 548–582. Kahraman, Türk Sağı ve AKP, Nuray Mert Merkez Sağın Kısa Tarihi.
81 Recep Tayip Erdoğan said in an interview ‘With our conservative democrat identity, the Ak Party desires to rebuild the fragmented center-right in Turkey along with eliminating the old understandings of politics, and place our political foundations in the center... The Ak Party, in a very short period, has reached its objective and sits at the very center of Turkish politics’ Radikal, 17 October 2002, quoted from, Wuthrich, ‘Paradigms and dynamic change in the Turkish Party system’, 353, see for the Muslim democratic creed of the AKP, Yalçın Akdoğan, “The Meaning of Conservative Political Identity,” in The Emergence of a New Turkey ed. Hakan Yavuz, (Salt Lake City: University of Utah, 2006), 49–65; Kenan Cayir ‘The Emergence of Turkey’s Contemporary ‘Muslim Democrats’ in Secular and Islamic Politics in Turkey – The making of the Justice and Development Party. Ed. Ümit Cizre (London, Routledge: 2008), 62-79.
82 Nuray Mert Merkez Sağın Kısa Tarihi, 76-78.
83 Kahraman, Türk Sağı ve AKP, 224; Kahraman, Türk Siyasetin Yapısal Analizi I, 216.
Sag and later political Islam. The Merkez Sol collected between 25 and 35 per cent of all votes, mostly controlled by the Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (CHP, Republican Peoples Party). In 1965 the CHP declared itself as a centrist leftist party and integrated social issues like welfare and workers’ rights to its political platform which, in return, gave the CHP the support of leftist intellectuals and blue collar workers in the public enterprises. As a result, the more conservative Kemalists left the CHP and founded 1969, a new but largely unsuccessful party, the Cumhuriyetci Güven Partisi (CGP, Republican Trust Party). In the early 1990s the Merkez Sol was also keen to find solutions for the Kurdish issue and joined a strategic alliance with the Kurdish left national movement. Economically, the Merkez Sol parties were vivid defenders of state enterprises and rejected throughout privatization by the Merkez Sag parties in the 1990s. In the 2000s the centre left lost its former social democratic creed and became more and more the defender of radical Kemalist secularization and of a secular nationalism (Uluslararası). This differed from traditional Turkish nationalism (Milliyetçilik), by avoiding Islam as a vital element of national identity and focusing more on historical secular memories of the ‘War of Independence’ (1919 – 1922) and the founding of the (Kemalist) Republic in 1923.

The Turkish nationalist party camp is the third political group of the Turkish party system. It emerged early together with two aforementioned centrist party families, but in the 1950s and 1960s it played only a marginal role in Turkish politics. Only with the founding of the Milliyetci Hareket Partisi (MHP, Nationalist Action Party) in 1965, Turkish nationalism became an important political actor, when the MHP became part of the two National Front (Milli Cephe) governments in the late 1970s. Turkish nationalism had a consistent ideology, the so called Dokuz Isik (Nine Lights),

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84 For the political position between centre right and centre left for example see, Özkan Ağataş ‘Ortanın Solu: İsmet İnönü’den Bülent Ecevite’ (The Left of The Centre: From İsmet İnönü to Bülent Ecevit ) in Modern Türkiye’dede Siyasal Düşünce – Vol. 8: Sol. (Political Thinking in Modern Turkey, Vol. 8: The Left) 2nd Edition ed. Murat Gültekingil (Istanbul: Iletişim 2008), 194–260; Tosun Türk Parti Sisteminde Merkez Sağ ve Merkez Solsa Parçalanması.


86 Erdem ‘CHP’dede Parti içi Mücadele ‘Kemalizm ve ‘Devrimler’ Tartışmaları Üzerine (About the intra- party struggles between ‘Kemalism’ and ‘Revolutions’ in the CHP)

focusing on anti-communism and pan Turkism during the Cold War era. After the end of the Cold War, the Pan-Turkist element became stronger, together with a support of a specific nationalistic understanding of Islam, as an inevitable source of Turkish morality, culture and identity. In the 2000s the MHP became a more centrist party, where the interests of the State were more important than party ideology, especially when the MHP alongside the CHP became the sole protector of the red lines of the Turkish state against the democratization process of the AKP. Whereas the CHP saw itself as the protector of secularism against a possible threat of Islamization by the AKP, the MHP became the protector of the centralist Turkish state against any cultural concessions for the Kurds.

Political Islam is the fourth ideological political party family. It shares with the Merkez Sag and with Kurdish parties the repetitive experience of political party bans and the reopening under new names. The reason for the emerging of conservative islamicistic party in 1970 was the result of conflict between the İstanbulian economic elites which were supported by the Merkez Sag and an emerging class of Anatolian entrepreneurs of small and middle size companies in Anatolia, which became alienated and disappointed by the Merkez Sag, which they had supported in the 1950s and 1960s. The Milli Nizam Partisi (MNP, Party of National Order) and its successor the Milli Selamet Partisi (MSP, Party of National Salvation) saw themselves as true protector of the interests of these peripheral entrepreneurs.

This ideological principle of political Islam, the so called Milli Gorüş (National View), was a combination of conservative moralism and a specific economic program for different conservative voters but without supporting the introduction of the Sharia. In the 1970s, the MNP supported the idea of the development of a

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89 Çınar; Arıkan, The Nationalist Action Party, 32; Kahraman, Türk Saği ve AKP 75.


national heavy industry and public sector and public support for small and middle sized companies. In the 1990s Refah Partisi (RP, Welfare Party) as successor of the banned MNP and MSP supported private ownership and the integration of the industry to the global economy. In addition, the Refah defended a specific Islamic moral code, the so called Adil Düzen (Just Order), was a critic on capitalism and individualism, and a claim for social justice, freedom of religion, anti-corruption and respect for the working class.

Lastly, the Kurdish left nationalists are the newest political camp in Turkey, appearing on the political landscape in the 1990s, claiming administrative and cultural autonomy for the Kurdish people within a democratic Turkey. This party family has its roots in the leftist environment of the 1960s and 1970s, when Kurdish intellectuals articulated the problems of the Kurdish minority from a more Marxist perspective. The various Kurdish parties, who were founded, banned by the constitutional court and then reopened under a new name since 1991 have always declared themselves to be secular leftist mass parties. From their ideological standpoint they did not only fight against the Turkish state, but also against traditional loci of Kurdish power, the tribal chiefs and the religious orders. Therefore, they had little success attracting religious and traditional Kurds for whom religion is more important than ethnicity.

Table 3: Aggregate Voting Support of the Societal Categories for Party Families during National Elections

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While these five political party families dominated Turkish politics at different times, the question is still how societal cleavages presented in the first section are reflected by the ideological segmentation of the Turkish party system. How do the various social categories identify themselves with the ideological creed of the party families? Table 3 illustrates the voting support of various societal categories (Kurds, Alevis, etc.) for one of these five party families. While Table 2 has demonstrated the fragmented composition of the party families, Table 3 focuses only on the aggregated voting support for the single party families and not for each political party, because of the aforementioned low volatility between these families. These aggregated voting supports are compiled from the literature of Turkish party research and voting behavior. Each of these social categories are the result of societal cleavages, which in return have identified themselves as such social categories, have distinct interests and have formulated them on the political arena. Thus, Table 3 tries to illustrate the reflection of societal cleavages on the level of the Turkish party system.

A brief look to Table 3 reveals some important observations: First of all, the various political families are alliances of different societal groups, or cleavages. For instance, the *Merkez Sag* camp can be defined as a coalition or alliance between religious congregations and orders, the Sunni Kurdish and Turkish rural masses and the mentioned liberal secular elite of the centre, who reject the radical nationalist and centrist politics of the Kemalist elites. On the other hand, we can observe that the emergence of new societal actors due to social change, resulting in the change of these alliances. For instance, the emergence of the export oriented Anatolian entrepreneurs in the 2000s resulted in the end of the former Istanbulian economic elites support for the *Merkez Sag* in the 2000s. In the same vein, the conflict between the Kemalist state and Sunni Islamic interests did not result in the emergence of a separate political party which represented the interests of Islam. The religious votes, which were never homogenous and were shared between the various parties of Merkez Sag and Political Islam, because some religious groups rejected political Islam or the use of Islam as a political ideology and therefore voted for more centre right parties. On the other side, we assume that the Alevis...
also never established their own political parties and supported traditional leftist parties.  

Second, we can observe a clear ideological division between secularism and religion within the political party families, which fits with the observations of other authors on Turkish party systems. This ideological division on the party level is the reflection of the secular (state) – (Islamic) religion cleavage. For instance, political parties with a strict secular stance, like the Merkez Sol and left Kurdish nationalist parties collected the votes of the non-religious secular electoral, like Kemalist state elites and secular leftist Turkish /Kurdish voters. In addition, many or most Alevis also voted also for one of these two party families, due to the fact that the Merkez Sag, Political Islam and Turkish Nationalist blocks used Sunni orthodox Islam for mobilizing the conservative, religious voters. One exception of these voting patterns are moderate secular state elites, who are not only the founders of traditional Merkez Sag parties but also supported these parties.

Third, despite the reflection of the aforementioned secular - religious cleavage on the left/ right dimensions of the Turkish party system, we can observe that with social change this left right dimension weakened. While the right Merkez Sag and the left Merkez Sol gathered the religious/ secular votes, the emergence of new social groups who developed their own identity and formulated their own interests resulted not only in the emergence of new cleavages, but also in an overlapping of ethnic, confessional and economic interests and a breakdown of the right/left differentiation of the Turkish party system. For example, while many Alevis have long voted for the CHP, since the 1990s we can observe a break between Kurdish and Turkish Alevis. The forms vote for Kurdish Left nationalist parties, while the latter ones still vote for the CHP. This can be explained by the more traumatic historical experience of the Kurdish Alevis, whose uprisings in 1925 were brutally suppressed by the Turkish army. In addition, Kurdish Sunnis vote more for conservative parties, while Alevi Kurds have always voted for more leftist parties.

Like other works before explained religion or confessional membership plays a crucial role in Kurdish party support. Generally speaking, the sociostructural cross sectionality and the resulting overlapping of cleavages has developed new party conflict lines, which goes beyond the classical left–right scheme. For instance, while on the left the Kurdish parties defend cultural autonomy for the Kurds, the CHP has refused these political claims. On the whole, the contemporary Turkish party system has become more complicated and is influenced by the historic-structural dynamics of social structure in Turkey.

5. Conclusion
The major aim of this article was to identify and describe the relationship between party systems and social structure and/or social change in Turkey from a structural-historical perspective by applying the operational logic of cleavage theory to the Turkish case. Briefly speaking, the results of this article revealed that Turkey had a distinct historical legacy - lack of industrialization, enlightenment and reformation, the importance of the state centred-defensive modernization, nation-state formation and Europeanization processes - and that these resulted in the lack and emergence of significant relationships between societal groups, mostly as a conflict on access to power and to cultural and economic resources. The fact that the representatives of the societal groups politicized these conflicts, that is they formulated claims on the holders of political power, transformed these conflicts into societal cleavages. These politicization processes were formulated within the frame of distinct political ideologies, which again were used for the purpose of identification of the social groups and their mobilization. Finally, the article described the reflection of these societal cleavages and revealed that not all cleavages are directly reflected in the Turkish party system. For instance, the (Turkish) Alevi decided not to establish an independent political party and established an alliance with the left-centrist Kemalist Merkez Sol or with Kurdish left Nationalism. Moreover, the article also discovered the emergence of some cross-sectionality resulting in an overlapping of different cleavages. For instance,

the Turkish State vs. Kurds cleavage overlapped with the Sunni vs. Alevi Muslims cleavage, which resulted in the support of the Merkez Sol by Turkish Alevis, while the Kurdish speaking Alevis showed generally supported for Kurdish Nationalism. This means that the traditional left right dimension between Merkez Sag – Merkez Sol was as long valid and could explain Turkish party system, as not new ethnical, confessional and economic conflict dimension were added. In this sense, the fragmentation of the Turkish party system is a reflection of the dynamics of the social structure that is social change which in return are the results of distinct historical developments.

Overall, the results of this article refute the aforementioned thesis of authors like Caramani and van Biezen that cleavages are the result of the distinct socio-historical development in Western Europe and therefore socio-historical approaches are not appropriate to explain party system developments in non-European regions. First of all, like the work of cleavages in Latin America or Post-Communist Eastern societies, the findings of this article demonstrated that every region had its own historical legacies, resulting in a the development of distinct significant societal cleavages and which have their own logic of transition to the level of party -systems. Second, the article proved how social change in Turkey resulted in the emergence of new societal actors, which in return had a significant effect on formation of the Turkish party system. Hence, socio–historical approaches and especially cleavage theory are well suited well in explanations party system formation in non-Western societies. Therefore the aim of comparative cleavage theory research should be to detect such dynamics and development in other regions by using the general operational logic of cleavage theory. This is so that future research can provide a contribution to the de-historicizing and generalization of cleavage theory.

Finally, the results in this article demonstrated that the complexity of contemporary Turkish party politics can not only be explained by institutional approaches While one cannot neglect that institutional approaches have provided valuable explanations about party systems, they ignore the fact that party systems are embedded in more complex socio - structural and historical environment. For instance, traditional approaches would not understand why Kurdish and Turkish Alevis have developed different party preferences, especially since the 1990s. The answer would be that Kurdish Alevis have a more negative historical experience than the Turkish Alevis. In addition, classical approaches to Turkish political science, which explain Turkish politics through the existence off one all explaining national cleavage, like left vs. right, tradition vs. modernity, secularism vs. religion, etc. also have problems to understand the complex dynamics of the party system. For
example, the diverging voting pattern of Kurdish and Turkish Alevis cannot be explained only by a center periphery cleavage, because both belong to the periphery.

Nonetheless, the goals of this article were modest and its method had some limitations. First of all, the article wanted only to describe the reflection of societal cleavages by the party system. It did not seek for the historical institutional factors which can explain this reflection. Future research should focus more on how distinct historical institutional characteristics of Turkish politics, like the aforementioned state tradition of Turkey and the transition to democracy in 1950 have an effect on the constitutionalizing of cleavages and their transition to the political level. Moreover, this article used secondary analyses of existing research literature about Turkish politics. A different methodological approach would be to analyze party manifestos, and quantitative data of voting behavior for analyzing the reflection of societal cleavages on the party system. Finally, this article focused only on political parties’ respectively party system as an analytical unit. Future research can also analyze how the societal cleavages are reflected in other levels of the political arena. For instance, the cleavage between Turkish and Kurdish Alevis results also in a division between the interest groups of Alevis. While Turkish Alevis are more or less represented by the Kemalist CEM Vakfi, the leftist Kurdish Alevis are represented more by the Pir Sultan Abdal foundation. These examples illustrate that the use of cleavage theory can be a valuable source for the study of Turkish politics. Therefore Scholars of Turkish Politics should be more open to use this less noticed approach of party system research. This will not only open new perspectives for Turkish political research but will also connect it with international research.
Appendix 1: Political Parties within the ideological party families, represented in Turkish Parliament since 1950

1. **Merkez Sol**

- **CP:** Cumhuriyetçi Partisi (Republican Party) 1967 (Split of from CHP) – 1972 → Renamed **CGP**
- **CGP:** Cumhuriyetçi Güven Partisi (Republican Trust Party; 1972–1980 (banned after coup d’état in 1980)
- **HP:** Halkcı Parti (Populistic Party): 1983 – 1985 -> Emerged with SODEP to SHP
- **SODEP:** Sosyal Demokratik Parti (Social Democratic Party) 1983 – 1985: Emerged with HP to SHP
- **SHP:** Sosyaldemokrat Halkcı Parti (Socialdemocratic Populist Party): 1985 – 1995 fusioned with CHP (2)
- **CHP (2):** Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican Peoples Party): 1995 (Split of from SHP, fusioned in the same year with SHP) –
- **DSP:** Demokratik Sol Parti (Democratic Left Party): 1987 –

2. **Merkez Sag**

- **DP (1):** Demokrat Parti (Democratic Party) 1950 – 1960 (banned after coup d’état in 1960)
- **YTP:** Yeni Türkiye Partisi (New Turkey Party): 1961 – 1973 (self dissolved)
- **ANAP:** Anavatan Partisi (Motherlands Party): 1983 – 2007 -> fused with DYP to DP(2)
- **DYP:** Dogru Yol Partisi (True Path Party): 1987 – 2007 -> fused with ANAP to DP(2)
- **DP (2):** Demokrat Parti (Democratic Party) 2007 –
- **AKP:** Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party): 2001 –

3. **Turkish Nationalism**

- **CKMP:** Cumhuriyetci Köylü ve Millet Partisi (Republican Peasant and Nation Party): - 1958 – 1969: rename in MHP
- BBP: Büyük Birlik Partisi (Great Union Party): 1993 (split of from MHP) –

4. Political Islam/ Milli Görüş

- MNP: Milli Nizam Partisi (National Order Party) 1969 – 1971 (banned by the Constitutional Court)
- SP: Saadet Partisi (Felicity Party): 2001 –

5. Kurdish (Left-) Nationalism

- HEP: Halkın Emek Partisi (Work of the People Party) 1990 – 1993 (banned by the Constitutional Court)
- BDP: Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi (Peace and Democracy Party) 2009 –
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Martin O’Neill and Thad Williamson’s edited volume *Property Owning Democracy: Rawls and Beyond* emerged as a collaborative work after an American Political Science Association conference in Chicago in 2007. Several authors involved with the topic concluded that the Rawlsian concept of property-owning democracy had not been sufficiently developed. Williamon, O’Neill and their associates believed that it is necessary to clarify what such a social arrangement would look like. Moreover, within the context of the economic crisis and the neoliberal attack on the welfare state, the authors considered that a book on Rawlsian just institutions could provide a meaningful rally point for left-leaning parties. The book is divided in 14 individual chapters, each written by a well-known author in the field such as Stuart White, Simone Chambers, Ben Jackson, Alan Thomas, Gar Alperovitz and Nien-he Hsieh. Each chapter outlines and defends a central thesis relating to the topic of just institutions and property owning democracy.

The first chapter, authored by Simone Chambers discusses Rawls’ transition from *A Theory of Justice* to *Political Liberalism* and his apparent withdrawal from a strong interpretation of the demands of justice. Chambers contrasts Rawls’ seeming radicalism in his early work to his attempt to justify a conception of a fair society while taking into account the fact of opinion pluralism in a democracy. Chambers focuses especially on Rawls’ refusal to demand that the difference principle be enshrined in the constitution of a just society. She interprets Rawls as accepting that egalitarianism is subject to public debate, rather than a non-negotiable part of what society should be.

In the second chapter Ben Jackson outlines a history of the term property-owning democracy, incorporating both its conservative and its egalitarian interpretations. He focuses especially on James Meade, the economist who inspired Rawls. The third chapter, authored by Corey Brettschneider, offers a normative justification of welfare rights, as the only way to defend the existence of private property. Brettschneider imagines a dialogue between the owners of private property and those who are excluded, and maintains that only something akin to property owning democracy would satisfy the excluded in an ideal situation.

The fourth chapter is a crucial one in the text. Martin O’Neill develops his previous arguments into a fully-fledged exposition in favor of property owning democracy.
He defines a property owning democracy as a regime which seeks to disperse capital among living persons, blocks the intergenerational transfer of advantage and safeguards politics from the corruption inherent in wealth disparities. Moreover, O’Neill argues that while Rawls’ principles of equal liberties and fair equality of opportunity could also be satisfied by a welfare state, the difference principle can only be implemented under a property owning democracy.

Several other essays in the volume contribute significantly to the debate on just institutions. Stuart White argues that a property owning democracy would be far more stable if it would also benefit from a republican conception of citizenship. Nien-he Hsieh looks at a possible positive effect of instituting a property owning democracy. He shows that such a regime would improve workplace control and democracy and would offer more of a voice to workers in corporate management. He interprets Rawls as a supporter of democratic workplaces, a thesis he infers from Rawls’ concern with the social bases of self-respect. Hsieh believes access to meaningful work is quintessential for self-respect. Since a property owning democracy would lead to more workplace democracy, Hsieh argues, it would be a better regime.

Waheed Hussain maintains that a property owning democracy would be a regime in which democratic corporatist arrangements of labor settlement would prevail. He asserts that this is supported by Rawls’ desire for a society which is stable for the right reasons. Democratic corporatism would, Hussain shows, nurture a sense of justice and provide the basis for a stable society. David Schweickart contrasts a property owning democracy with his own proposal, economic democracy. Unlike Rawls’ suggested arrangement, Schweickart argues economic democracy would require that firms and economic social plans be democratically controlled. Under this scheme, investment banks would be socialized and democratic firms would borrow the means of production, paying an asset tax.

Another seminal contribution of the volume is Thad Williamson’s eleventh chapter. He argues that a property owning democracy would involve giving each American citizen assets worth $100 000. These would be funded from taxing, for the next 25 years, one third of the assets of the top 1% of Americans, which would form, according to Williamson, a fund of around five trillion dollars. This fund could be used to offer each American citizen the above-mentioned sum, diversified in cash reserves, home ownership stakes and stocks and bonds.

The final three chapters outline the relationship between redistribution and human capital (Sonia Sodha), several forms of democratic ownership extant in America (Gar Alperovitz) and a possible strategy to make a property owning democracy appealing to the American public (Thad Williamson). Sodha argues that, in addition to financial capital, human capital distribution through education is quintessential to a
just society and to a true property owning democracy. Finally, Williamson concludes by offering a possible way of achieving a wide redistribution of capital through democratic means. He advocates a campaign of popularization of the wealth inequalities in America, together with an appeal to America’s widely held values of equality of opportunity.

From the philosophical point of view, two chapters deserve particular attention. O’Neill argues that the difference principle is the only one from Rawls’ philosophical scaffolding which underpins his choice of a property owning democracy as the just institutional arrangement. He maintains that Rawls’ demand for fair value of liberties and fair equality of opportunity could also be achieved in a welfare state. O’Neill also attempts to show that some policies, such as limiting funding for political campaigns, could insulate politics from large ownership disparities. Moreover, a reform of the educational system would ensure fair equality of opportunity.

This contention is hard to accept given the intrinsic link between family circumstances and educational outcomes. Even under a rather generous welfare state with a good public education system, the family would still represent a locus where a large part of competences is formed. A child born in a family which is chronically dependent on welfare allowances and internalizes the lack of self-worth such a situation creates will definitely not have similar opportunities as a middle class child. Even though O’Neill argues that a welfare state would mandate a wide dispersal of human capital, he does not take into account the importance of family relations on the formation of human capital.

The second chapter to be criticized is the one authored by Hsieh. The main charge to be brought against him is that he puts too much stock in the Rawlsian framework, including values which are not necessarily Rawlsian. While Rawls supports an egalitarian society and a desideratum of Aristotelian self-development of the individual, imputing a demand for access to meaningful work and workplace democracy is simply putting in too much. These are socialist values and Rawls’ neutrality to conceptions of the good and his political, not comprehensive liberalism, excludes them.

The volume represents a crucial development in the debate on just institutions. Both the question of what institutions would be just and of what arrangements John Rawls would support are hotly debated within its pages. The book aims to be both a philosophical treatise and political manifesto for left-leaning intellectuals.
Since the collapse of communism the countries of Central and Eastern Europe have been undergoing the processes of democratization, marketization, and nation-building, the latter being especially visible in the countries of the former Soviet Union and the former Yugoslavia. In explaining the development of different regime types and divergent transition paths in post-communist countries, scholars rely on different approaches including initial negotiations immediately after the collapse of communism, choices of actors for different forms of institutional design, legacies of the communist past, and the influence of external factors such as the EU. Also, political culture — that is the set of citizens’ orientations towards the political system — is considered to be one of the key variables in the democratization of Central and Eastern European countries.

The book *Mapping Value Orientations in Central and Eastern Europe*, edited by Loek Halman and Malina Voicu, presents a collection of ten articles on post-communist political cultures in Central and Eastern Europe. Using as data the European Values Study surveys, the collection presents a cross-national and longitudinal analysis on cultural, religious, political and economic value patterns of citizens in the countries under investigation. By concentrating on a special set of citizens’ attitudes towards political objects, most of the authors investigate the sources of support for certain value orientations in Central and Eastern European countries in comparison with Western European societies. Based on theoretical underpinnings of previous research, the individual chapters of the book are devoted to questions of the individualization of citizens’ attitudes, attitudes towards economic models and social solidarity, citizens’ support for political systems and political participation, the impact of democratization on citizens’ attitudes towards gender equality, and pride in citizenship. Each of the contributions in the book is well-structured, providing clear research questions, theoretical frameworks and hypotheses, explanations of data, dependent and independent variables, and discussions of the findings.

After an introductory chapter, the second chapter of the book is devoted to the comparison of people’s preferences for individualistic or collectivistic values in Europe. The authors of the article come to the conclusion that Central and Eastern European countries have different trajectories and that each country seems to follow its own path. Chapter three of the book concentrates on the impact of cultural changes upon the legitimacy of institutional design in the market transition debate. Trying to provide a synthesis of different theories, the author emphasizes
the importance of path dependency in the transition to market economy: different transition paths of post-communist countries have different impact on social stratification and social mobility in these countries. In chapter four, the author investigates the mechanism of people’s support for two models of market economy: the free market model and the state intervention model. The author’s analysis shows that support for the free market model is mostly determined by ideology and the support for the state interventionism model is determined by resources. The goal of the fifth chapter is to reveal the origins of social solidarity in the countries under investigation. The authors of this contribution conclude that social solidarity in European societies depends on social capital, social trust, and the economic performance of a country. The most significant difference between Western and Eastern European countries is constituted by social capital, whereas other factors such as concerns about others or readiness to help are more and less similar in all countries. The author of chapter six concentrates on the correspondence of political culture and political structure and identifies four political cultures in Central and Eastern Europe. Chapter seven explores determinants of citizens’ political activism. In their conclusion, the authors find out that people’s political activity is determined — among other factors — by mobilization and the type of a participatory act, for example, a protest or a petition signing. The main research question of chapter eight is to investigate popular satisfaction with democracy in Europe. The author of this contribution comes to the conclusion that different long- and short-term factors correlate with citizens’ satisfaction with democracy: the more developed democracy is, the more satisfaction with democracy increases. At the same time, evaluations of economic performance and being a winner or a loser in the election also have an impact on satisfaction with democracy in all European countries. Chapter nine investigates the mechanism of the change of people’s support for democracy based on two main theories: cohort replacement and intra-cohort change. The findings of the author indicate that in post-communist countries there is support for both theories and, therefore, there is a prospect for development of democratic political culture across Eastern and Central Europe. Chapter ten explores the impact of democratization on gender attitudes and concludes that support for gender equality depends on the level of democracy, which means that in Western European countries support for gender equality is higher than in the post-communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Finally, chapter eleven of the book investigates attitudes towards pride in citizenship in Slovakia. The authors of the study conclude that the stagnation or prevalence of national pride in Slovakia is best explained by the country’s international reputation.

Due to the broad overview of the patterns of citizens’ attitudes towards a wide range of political objects in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the volume has some weak points. The contributions in the volume often do not provide justification for the case selection, and one is frequently left with the impression that the countries are chosen randomly, probably merely to use data from the
survey. Therefore, it comes at no surprise that the common conclusion for all contributions presented in the book points to the heterogeneity of popular orientations and peculiarities of the countries across Europe. Further, with this collection of articles, the book does not add much innovation to the research on political culture. Most of the contributions of the volume would benefit significantly from discussing the role of political culture in the democratization processes of the countries under investigation. Ultimately, the reason for studying political culture in this context lies in its importance for the democratization of transition countries and for the sustainability of democracy in developed countries.

Notwithstanding these criticisms, some of the contributions in the volume present interesting findings, which can be used in further research on political culture. For example, in the investigation of citizens’ support for a market economy in chapter four, the author argues that support for a market economy is a multi-dimensional phenomenon as people have different understandings of how the economy should work in their own country. It is indeed well-observed that people attach different meanings to a particular notion, be it a market economy, democracy or something else. The increasing number of qualitative studies on political culture poses a challenge to the quantitative methods of measuring people’s attitudes towards political objects. Quantitative studies become vulnerable to such issues. Also, chapter seven provides interesting insights into the nature of political culture in Europe. According to the findings of the authors, both Western and Eastern European countries present a high level of unconventional political activism, which depends, however, on different practices in the democratic political cultures in different countries across Europe. In this way, the authors of the chapter question common assumptions about the convergence of Western and Eastern European political cultures, and their thesis underlines the importance of studying social practices in the investigation of the political culture of a certain country. In this way the book is enlightening and thought-provoking and in general, it is an interesting collection of articles devoted to the study of a wide spectrum of people’s attitudes towards political objects. The book would be valuable for students of political culture and transition studies.


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Comparative works on irregular migration policies are still few, so anyone interested in the subject will welcome this book authored by an international team of scholars.
In past years the immigration debate has been heating up on both sides of the Atlantic, pitting advocates for legalizing irregular migrants against those who support stronger anti-immigration measures. Irregular immigrants criticize the attempts by governments to stop them from gaining entry to and building a life in countries with more successful economies. They contend that such practices are unfair and cruel and that they have a human right to stay and try to earn a living.

In their introductory note the editors emphasize the fact that irregular migrants are not a uniform mass but are foremost persons who have decided to leave their country for individual and very different reasons (p. 12). Some migrants consider themselves refugees fleeing corrupt governments; others are moving from poorer nations in search of better opportunities or a higher standard of living. Others only want to join their family members. On the basis of an examination of European and US policies, the authors of this edited volume discuss the impact of migration policies on migrant journeys and verify if the migration control measures implemented by governments deliver what they promise or whether these policies “produce unintended effects rather than achieving the objectives of the policy designers” (p. 17). The overarching research question of this volume is whether the current control policies pursued in the EU and the US are suitable for tackling the problem of irregular migration or not. The book is the result of a joint effort bringing together researchers from various disciplines with a focus on expertise in the areas of political science and ethnology.

This inter-disciplinary approach permits addressing issues from different perspectives and viewpoints. The book is structured along three main pillars: the first part deals with the impact of European migration policies on migrant journeys. In her chapter Araujo sheds light on the historical background of European migration policies by documenting the increasing outplacement of EU migration control to third countries. She concludes that “borders do not disappear, but are displaced, mutate and multiply” (p. 49). In his contribution Kreienbrink takes a closer look at the dynamics of the regularization policy of the Spanish government and challenges the view that regularization has not met the expectations of the stakeholders. In her field research report Heck explores the journeys of transit migrants in Morocco. She takes a critical look at international organizations such as IOM who lend a hand to governments in the area of repatriation. Next, Assopgoum offers a very personal account of a Senegalese migrant forced through the power of unfortunate circumstances to go to Austria. She holds European neocolonial trading practices and bad governance in Senegal equally responsible for the current migration crisis.

The contribution of Haase demonstrates how the Europeanization of Ukranian migration policy has transformed the country into an “immigration country of second choice” (p. 128) for many transit migrants wishing to move to EU territory.
The chapter of Bilecen-Sueoglu defines the “Europeanization of migration policies in Turkey” as a “top down process of member states’ adaptation to the EU” (p. 137). He concludes that Turkey uses migration issues as a leverage to obtain better guarantees from the EU against becoming a “shelter” (p. 150) for unwanted migrants.

The second part highlights the experiences of irregular migrants in the US. Unlike the EU, fear of tighter immigration has sparked massive protests in the US. Since US homeland security measures have tightened measures against undocumented immigration, more and more migrants are reported to have died trying to cross borders as people are forced to take more dangerous routes. Bloch and Silva describe the many challenges Mexicans trying to cross borders to California face. There is no easy or quick fix to resolve the problems migrants face.

The strict anti-immigration laws of Arizona, the ambivalent role of civil society actors who take pride in denouncing irregular migrants, established regular Mexicans who look down on irregular Mexican newcomers on one side, and the pro-human rights stance of immigrant grassroots associations on the other side show how deeply divided the US population is over this issue. In his chapter Cornelius argues that “migrant networks...ties with friends or family in the destination country” (p. 196) are the major root cause for irregular migration and not economic reasons, as widely assumed. He then lashes out against irregular migrants by voicing what seems to be his personal opinion: “If migrants cannot be discouraged from coming here in the first place then our immigration control policies should be crafted in ways that diminish incentives for settling permanently” (p. 196). How does this blunt political statement fit into the scientific context of the book? The editors would have well done to review this sentence carefully as it might easily fuel controversy.

What are the lessons to be learned from these experiences? There are three major unintended migration policy effects that can be observed according to the editors in their conclusive remarks at the end of the volume. First, it is the sending governments economic behavior that worsens exit migration (276); second, increased border control is not likely to deter migrants away from crossing borders now or in the future (p. 278); third clandestine migration leads to the formation of new networks among migrants and strengthens their human rights claims (281). With a critical undertone the study suggests that “inconsistent EU and US policies are policies which aggravate the living conditions in potential emigration regions rather than improving them” (p. 278).

Only a few points from the discussions presented can be highlighted here. One of the strengths of the book is the wealth and variety of information presented. Unfortunately only two contributions (Heck, Assopgoum) trace the individual
journeys and personal accounts of migrants in detail. All the other contributions focus on official policies, political and legal frameworks, and technical procedures. That being said, the chapter by Assopgoum is of particular interest because it stresses the personal challenges migrants face such as family pressure to succeed abroad (p. 92) or the pressure of an education system which puts too much focus on producing academic elites (p. 93).

One would have wished for a more in-depth discussion of the central migrant claim for human rights. The study mentions the human rights dimension of irregular migration only briefly on the sidelines (p. 12, p. 282). There can, for example, be no doubt that despite tighter laws and higher deportation and casualty numbers, the legal position of irregular migrants in the US has seen legal improvements over time. Despite a poor US economy, President Obama has decided to make lives easier for separated family members of irregular migrants by giving them green cards according to a news report\(^1\). The institutionalization of human rights for undocumented workers in the international UN migration convention is another example for the international efforts to strengthen the rights and position of irregular migrants. Finally, one should also not forget to mention the recent moves to make public school education for irregular migrants mandatory in some European countries and regions.

_Crossing and Controlling Borders_ has some limitations. First, it does not fully live up to what the book title promises: tracing the impact of migration policies on the personal lives and difficult choices of migrants. Only two of the twelve contributions seek to elucidate the real life journeys of migrants. Second, it is questionable from a scientific point of view that some arguments and conclusive remarks made in the book are not supported by proof and empirical data. Third, it seems that regular and irregular migration are treated as overlapping topics in the book, an approach that is rather misleading.

**Daniel Branch, Nic Cheeseman, and Leigh Gardner (eds.) Our Turn to Eat: Politics in Kenya Since 1950** (Berlin: Lit Verlag, 2010)

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_Our turn to Eat_ is an edited volume of eleven chapters including an introduction and a conclusion. Its central theme is the nation-building project in the post-colonial Kenya and the major assumption is that colonialism was destructive socially, politically as well as economically. Hence, the post-independence governments had

\(^1\) _Time Magazine_, January 2012, vol. 179, no. 3, 12.
a noble responsibility to address the long standing problems left by the outgoing colonial masters. It should be kept in mind that colonialism did not intend to develop Kenya. Instead, its grand objective was to exploit resources. In order to achieve its mission, colonialists devised several strategies among which was the “divide and rule system.” This simply meant that colonialism divided Africans using ethnicity for smooth exploitation of resources.

When struggling for independence, the elites promised that after decolonization every problem could be fixed. All Kenyans should enjoy the fruits of *Uhuru* (i.e. independence). Contrary to this expectation, the post-independence leaders failed to address the problems of unity and economy thereby questioning the entire logic of national-building project. The book argues that the post-independence governments inherited the same colonial behavior and coercive apparatuses to effect consolidation of their power. In turn, this exacerbated inequality in terms of resource and power distribution. The effect of this was the politics of exclusion and division “them and us”.

As can be noted, the theme of the book is simply that the national building project was by and large a failure. It observes that at the independence celebrations of 1963, most Kenyans cheered the rising of the black, red and green flag of the new Kenya nation. It really gave them hopes of a nation based on equality and peace. This was not to be the case, however, since Kenya has remained for many years a country with high levels of inequality, rampant corruption, as well as ethnic issues which culminated in the 2008 political violence. Hence the authors of this volume stress that Kenya has witnessed continuity rather than change (p. 7).

However, the book slips in a number of ways: First, it places the problems of Kenya solely on the shoulders of the internal leadership failure by the post-independence governments. This is despite the fact that the authors argue for continuity rather than change. To be sure, the book argues that:

> The reasons for shallowness of Kenyan nationalism can be identified in the final two decades of colonial rule. Then, the need to create a loyal African “middle-class” led the colonial regime to manipulate the distribution of lands, jobs, and political opportunities, to co-opt an African elite that quickly developed a distinctive interest in the preservation of the status quo (p. 6).

While I partly share this view with regards to the problem of leadership in Kenya, it is wrong to fail to question the entire essence of independence. Had the authors of this volume read works such as *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa* by Walter Rodney (1972), Third *World Politics: An Introduction* by Christopher Clapham (1985) or *Imperialism and Global Political Economy* by Alex Callinicos (2009) they would have questioned, in the first place, whether Kenya and Africa at large were at some point actually independent. The clear theme in these works is that capitalism
at the phase of imperialism was and remains a driving engine of exploiting the less developed parts of the world. Thus, what actually happened at independence was simply a change in the form of domination while the content of colonialism has persisted. It is for that reason some scholars would argue that it was simply “flag independence.” A balanced view is therefore to analyze Kenya from both internal and external perspectives of continuity.

Second, the book links the occurrences of ethnic problems to multiparty politics. It contends “At the same time, the localized development of political parties fostered inter-group competition and increased the salience of ethnic identities (p.6-7).” I find this strange. Tanzania, unlike Kenya, has about 123 tribes. The country practices multiparty democracy and yet it has the least ethnic issues in Africa. The Afrobarometer survey of 2009 indicates that about 88% of Tanzanians identify themselves first as Tanzanians before any other attributes such as tribal affiliation. Based on this case, I find ethnicity is not an outcome of multiparty politics.

Third, throughout this volume, the term “democracy” is treated as given and that every society should abide with its principles. There is an agreement among scholars that this term is elusive. I know that this omission is informed by the Western domination of the understanding of democracy and that some scholars, such as Juan Linz, have gone so far to suggest that “liberal democracy is the only game in town” (Juan Linz 1990). Hence, the use of democracy needs to be specified. It is by doing so that one would be in a position to assess its feasibility in Africa. On the other hand, it raises an important question as to whether democracy is exportable. If yes, then one would like to know the interests of the exporters; how the recipients react; and how it is sustainable. It is interesting to note that the introduction of liberal democracy in Africa by the Western countries and institutions like in any other countries in the so called the Third World, was compounded by double standards; in some cases aid to those countries was attached with conditions to democratize while in others authoritarian regimes were allowed to exist so long they served the interests of the West (p. 237-9). The military invasions and sanctioning of Iraq, Zimbabwe, Libya and the like is grounded on the quest by the Western powers of resources such as oil and land. All these are justified under the name of “democracy.”

Fourth, the book lacks a guiding theory. This is also the case with all chapters. Theoretical and conceptual framework for a volume like this is important in order to situate the case into wider knowledge; in this way it makes the book solid and scholarly. As it stands now, the book is so specific to the extent that it is limited to understand other cases in Africa or beyond with the same experiences. Despite the mentioned shortcomings, this volume may be useful to students of politics, corruption, as well as African studies.
Imagine being denied access to primary and secondary education. Imagine being unable to ever work legally, to own property or get married. Imagine having difficulties entering a hospital and getting treatment. Imagine it being impossible for you to open a bank account and having no chance of receiving a pension. Imagine being unable to lodge a complaint if robbed or raped, and furthermore, sometimes being the victim at the hands of the police. This is the harsh reality for more than 12 million people around the world who are stateless. Although prohibited under international instruments, statelessness continues to be a corrosive condition that affects almost every aspect of many people’s lives. Caused by political restructuring, various forms of discrimination, technical failings such as conflicting laws, lack of documentation such as birth certificates, and/or the ceasing of statehood, statelessness is an important issue that affects and challenges some of the central aspects of international law and human rights discourse. 

Statelessness and Citizenship edited by Brad K. Blitz and Maureen Lynch presents itself as an important addition to this topic. It embraces the topic of statelessness from a historical perspective and presents it on a very personal level, incorporating numerous individual accounts, as opposed to the majority of related works, which have treated the issue abstractly, as part of international human rights law. The authors of the book fill in a gap in literature with their work by exploring not only the issue of statelessness, but of the importance of having a nationality and in such a way having access to identification documents and their importance in the every day life. They question whether having a citizenship truly makes a difference and to what degree basic human rights are currently enjoyed by the formerly stateless people.

It is possible to divide the volume into three thematic sections, with Chapter One serving as an introduction to the topic and the book itself. What can be identified as the book’s first section, composed of Chapter Two, is a “critical review of the development of international law and the establishment of human rights instruments to prevent and reduce statelessness, followed by an analysis of the gaps in the international legal framework relating to the protection of stateless people” (pp.20). The second section is formed of the volume’s eight country case studies – Kenya, Slovenia, Sri Lanka, Ukraine, Bangladesh, Mauritania, Estonia and Kuwait.

2 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates from 2009.
(and neighboring Gulf countries) – in Chapters Three through Ten respectively. The chapters in this section are largely based on semi-structured interviews conducted with formerly stateless people, with a small number of policy and human rights experts, and with representatives of social services organizations in the respective countries. The selection of the eight countries for the case studies was based on a “set of diverse illustrations of the sites where both domestic and geo-political considerations have shaped national policies regarding the granting of citizenship to non-citizens” (p.19). The book’s final section can be read as an evaluation of the benefits of citizenship. Chapter Eleven offers a summary, comparison and evaluation of the eight country cases, drawing parallels between them. Chapter Twelve, the Epilogue, however, offers concrete recommendations to combat the ill treatment of non-citizens, arbitrary citizenship deprivation and denial, and statelessness, so as to ensure that the basic human right to nationality and the associated social and economic rights are enjoyed by all.

It is the last chapter that distinguishes the book amongst others, making it not merely a volume outlining the hardships faced by the formerly stateless, but providing steps that must be taken to end the ongoing situation. In such a way the book effectively seizes being only a manual for students or researchers of the topic, and broadens the spectrum of potential readers to include professionals working in the field of human rights, both in governmental and non-governmental sectors. Through case studies of countries taking steps to deal with the issues of statelessness the authors provide an example of what to (not) do when dealing with the problem, and uncover that sometimes the ‘success stories’ are not always successful in every aspect and have yet a number of issues to deal with. However, it is important to keep in mind that this book’s central focus is not on describing the pressing needs of the stateless and their daily struggles; its purpose is not to raise awareness. It sets as its goal to focus on nationality and the potential benefits of gaining it, as well as its problems. As all these are overlapping issues, the author’s rarely make a clear distinction between the two and on occasion the focus shifts between them, albeit unintentionally. The work is also entirely qualitative. It lacks statistics and their consequent analysis. Although the presented case studies are valuable as they are, it would be beneficial to incorporate a few tables or graphs to help the reader visualize the greater scope of the issues at hand.

The authors’ threefold solution is perhaps one of the book’s most outstanding merits. The authors do not merely point to a problem, they also suggest a way of solving it. It includes firstly, the improvement of documentation and an increase in public awareness; secondly, institutional reform; thirdly, the clarification of legal norms related to citizenship; and finally, the enforcement of legal norms. The goal and the central objective of these steps is to “transform public understanding so as to render politically unacceptable the abuse of non-citizens and arbitrary denial and deprivation of citizenship” (p. 211).
These steps are more than welcome in today’s world as the legal action previously taken has continued to fall short of what is needed to fully implement the Universal Declaration of Human Right of 1948, which states that every human being is entitled to a nationality. Statelessness still leaves them, albeit to varying degrees, excluded. They are the people who must struggle everyday for their voices to be heard, for their rights to be granted. They are more often than not unable to claim the services that only states can provide. They, by definition, belong to no state at all, yet if they all belonged to one nation, it would be one as large as Greece. They are our world’s growing population of stateless people with no citizenship rights. One must hope that the world hears more and more about them and that their struggles end with the receiving of formal citizenship in the near future. Statelessness and Citizenship truly is a book that takes us a step closer to a possible solution. It is an important, well written and memorable read for anyone concerned with current global problems.


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Is it possible to call a regime that features political campaigns or the ritual of succession through election as democratic? Ever since the collapse of the Soviet Union the world is seeing arrangements that are between “liberal” and “authoritarian” systems. Whether or not election suffices in democracy the answers will be negative. When a political landscape is saturated by interest people will protest and there would be counter protest. These are the issues Graeme R. Robertson’s The Politics of Protest in Hybrid Regimes purport to analyze in Russian politics.

Robertson is concerned with “hybrid regimes,” and he presents a “field work” on Russia. He attempts to tackle the question of protest in Russia especially in recent memory. Will it be that elections are manipulated by elites just “to stay in office”? People have learned to declare their views openly since the end of the Cold War. To Robertson, “protest in the street” has been at least as important as elections in determining the fate of governments” (p. 1). Governments have been brought down and leaders made to change tactics and policies. There is politics behind protest and that is what the author wants his readers to accept.

This is the crux of Robertson's reflections in Russia under Putin. What justifies his assertion is his case study of repressive Russia even though it is seen speaking the
“language of liberal democracy,” albeit “without adopting its practices” (p. 4). For Robertson, to guide their legitimacy against protest by aggrieved citizens which, if left unchecked, will undermine their thrones, politicians in hybrid regimes “experiment with new institutional and organisational strategies to manage and contain competition” (p. 4). This, the author adds is what makes distinction between Yeltsin and Putin’s “weak democracy”.

Much of the book is devoted to making readers understand protest in politics. It is interesting the author sees protest in democracy as “integral part”; hence, this is why autocracies try always to ban it citing Burma where it is often criminalised (p. 20). This has also been the case in the former Soviet Union as Robertson asserts (p. 21). He indicates that protest in hybrid regimes should be seen as “opportunity” when the democratisation process in the post-Communist states of Europe began to take shape (p. 23). But still they do not open up to allow democracy to become entrenched (p. 26). When people are pushed to the wall they react. So Robertson argues that Russians are not “patient” (p. 41). Why do they react? They protest as a result of bad economy in the second half of the 1990s. No doubt the very reason why Russians began protesting due to new freedoms found with the death of Soviet. It should be agreed that they did so out of frustration. Interestingly Robertson provides the connection between Russians’ frustrations with freedoms that have failed to advance “lives” (p. 41).

Another interesting thing about the book is that Robertson talks about the role played by miners in the protest which led to the “disintegration” of the USSR. It was the same miners that are reacting to checkmate Russia’s excesses nowadays (p. 73). This is not an empty assertion as workers still play a significant role toward the betterment of the Russian society though not under any ideology. Robertson elaborates on the reason why Yeltsin’s second term saw numerous protests under the premiership of Evgenii Primakov (p. 101). Many companies were closed down due to the bad economic climate in Russia. This will obviously threatens livelihood to make people protest (p. 105).

Robertson also offers explanations as to why protests declined in the later part of Yeltsin’s years. This is the tactic the author says leaders adopt through “incentives” to support or limit protest. The author never offers reason as to the elevation of Putin to the presidency. It is arguably the case of having someone with knowledge of power shaped by an intelligence capability. This is what Putin still employs, as Robertson cites as the brain behind Putin’s ability to control Russia. Readers will agree with the author here that Putin has been lucky to effectively use the regional governors who have to flocked to support his bid for leadership when they realised Putin would become the next president after Yeltsin (p. 125). This is perhaps the greatest analysis Robertson tendered in his book. It is not surprising that governors would wield influence in the polity of a federal state like Russia. We see how Putin
brought his assets from the former KGB to play the politics of his time (p. 133). This is likely to bring any opposition into submission as it has been the main weapon in the hands of leaders who struggle to survive. No doubt Putin’s strategy works well. However the author left a vacuum on what the opposition may use to survive this onslaught from Putin. Robertson offers a point why “Putin became a household name”. This is seen when opposition is neutralized (p. 147).

In the last chapters, Robertson argues that, due to legitimacy problems, hybrids are “at risk from changes in the streets” because they are at least more “open” than authoritarian states and they have methods for channelling discontent (p. 172). Robertson says that this regime uses censorship and restrictions but tactfully through social networks and independent media. They may even draw from the old methods where necessary as he brings Putin’s use of “special units,” such as the OSMON, to repress discontent (p. 174). The media is seen as collaborators who make distinction between trouble makers and instigators (p. 179). Robertson should have informed readers unequivocally about the influence of Putin’s government on Russian media.

The Kremlin, for Robertson, has worked to create a system that gives the administration “broad discretion” over groups to allow them to operate on the political landscape. On this, the author provides a sound proof in the Federal Law No. 18-F2 that came to “clean-up” the NGOs (p. 192). But the problem here, if any, is what of other laws that are being used to improve support for the regime?

Robertson explores the factors that might have helped Putin to preside over “apparent social peace,” supported by submissive organisations and economic expansion despite the “opposition” (p. 198). Here the author tells of Putin’s survival tactics. Robertson claims that the regime has avoided “censorship and political restrictions,” what you may call divide and rule (p. 199). But would this solve the problem in the streets? The author hints, negatively, as “unrest in the streets” lingers on (p. 199).

If protest is seen as important as elections to democracy or any change of government, as Robertson would want readers to accept, it can be understood that protesters are influenced by “intra-elite politics” (p. 208). We might add a comment the author failed to raise. It is easy to see clear who else is behind the destabilisation of Russia. Fingers of course are being pinpointed at agents from other foreign countries. Whatever maybe the case if there is any weakness in Robertson’s book, this is it. Is there external influence in protests in Russia? Roberson should have said so. One thing that I agree is the claim by Robertson that “electoral revolutions” cannot democratise countries and it will not happen soon in Russia either (p. 212). Both election and protest are birds of a feather. It may sound bizarre but realistically elections are manipulated by the same elites that manoeuvre to see people in the
streets. Roberson has analysed contemporary Russian politics and the men behind the power play as such his book is a must read for its exposition of Russia’s “hybrid regime”.

Ursula van Beek and Edmund Wnuk-Lipinski (eds.), *Democracy under Stress: The Global Crisis and Beyond* (Berlin & Farmington Hills: Barbara Budrich, 2012)

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Every regime is based on some form of redistribution and its very existence is somehow determined by its ability to cope with the developments of its economical base. In many cases the establishment of non-democratic regimes early in the first part of the last century was determined by the great crisis of 1929 followed by a combination of an inability of the structure of the state and its actors to resist the authoritarian prospective.

In the last year researchers in the field of democratization have undertaken efforts to cope with the emergency of the recent economic crisis and its effect on democracy, democratic regimes and new democracies. Part of evidence on democratic theory and democratization has stressed particularly on the direct link between economic condition and the solidity/fragility of democratic regimes (Berg-Schlosser 2002; Huntington 1992 Linz and Stephan 1996). Political scientists who have dealt with the transition to and consolidation of democratic regimes have argued that consolidated democratic regimes are more prone to resist to economic distress (Berg-Schlosser 2002) than authoritarian or totalitarian ones, not considering the fact that economic crisis has been also one of the key determinants to transition (Huntington 1992).

This book offers a perspective on how economic crisis and economic development can affect political regimes and how they respond to the economic and social challenges posed. The authors of the volume explain the necessity of such reflections in the light of not only of the economic crisis but also in the light of turmoil and the political consequences that follow. The volume gathers contribution based on various experiences, each describing regional or local contexts during an economic crisis. The first part offers two general perspectives, one concentrating on the history of financial crisis and its consequences on policy making authored by Stan du Plesis, and the other on the historical aspect of the crisis and the impact of the Great Depression on democracy.

The article from Berg-Schlosser tries to compare the current crisis with the Great Depression. The author suggests that consolidated democracies are less threatened
by the current crisis because the effects produced in 1929 were far more deeper than the ones produced after 2008 (p. 57). Their consolidation provides the internal strength to resist any other attempt to transfer the crisis to a political level, calling into question the nature of democratic regimes. According to Berg-Schlosser, on the other hand, there are similarities between the economic situation of the interwar period and that of new democracies but with a substantial difference. The international situation today is such that it does not put democracies to risk. The author provides another argument by which, due to the confinement of the crisis to the Western World, autocratic and economically successful countries like China or Russia might provide a valid economic and political model for emerging countries.

The third part of the book contains three contributions from Van Beek, Wnuk-Lipinski and a co-authored article from Han Sang–Jin and Lü Peng. All the authors focus on probably the most relevant case, that of China, while analyzing regime-economy performance. Van Beek offers a historical perspective on China and its global economic weight prior to the full blossom of industrial age. Rather than trying to analyze the country as a case of an autocratic regime with a free market economy, the author tends to consider the historical past of China as a formidable tool of legitimacy for the current regime. Van Beek stresses not only the missing variable of accountability (typical of a democratic regime) as an explanatory factor for China’s economic success but also the general philosophy and tradition of the country’s ruling class, based in practice rather than in ideological dogmatism (p. 132). In the conclusion, the author picks up the idea of China’s aim to become a more regional player rather than a global one. To the author, the Chinese model might become an alternative for those countries dissatisfied with the liberal democratic model. This, however, does not necessarily imply that China will take a more prominent international role apart the regional one dictated by cultural similarities shared by the countries in the area. Wnuk-Lipinski’s contribution depicts a rather gloomy situation, taking into account the reformulation of a new world order based on the economic weight of two leading economies like China and the U.S. He suggests, in the same fashion as Van Beek, but with a more global prospective (p. 149), that China might become a trend setter not only in economic terms but also in providing a sort of political model for other countries.

The contribution from Sang Jing and Peng focuses on the salient characteristics of crisis management by the Chinese government. This contribution explores the neo-Keynesian approach undertaken by the Chinese government in order to cope with the economic crisis. The article stresses on the idea that authoritarian governments are more susceptible to economic crisis and their performance is closely linked with economic success. According to the authors the threat to the current Chinese regime lies in its very success: the booming economy. Sang Jing and Peng maintain that there will be a point when China’s growth cycle will come to an end, leading to
a re-arrangement of current political structure. The authors do not make any prediction on how such changes might take place.

The economic crisis has been and continues to be a hot topic within the field of social studies. Yet even if various aspects of the crisis and its implication on democracy are fully dealt with in the volume, the authoritarian response seems to fail some how in providing a generally valid explanation on why authoritarian regimes survive today. This is probably the most interesting part of the book but it focuses only in one prominent case, that of China. The other ‘successful’ authoritarian case, Russia, is not present, while other authoritarian regimes like Venezuela are barely mentioned. Of course, the authoritarian structures of Russia, China or Venezuela are very different in form and quality, but at least one or two more cases would have strengthened the nature of the volume on the authoritarian response to the crisis. On the other hand, the volume (as mentioned by the editor) seems to have gone to publication while various event, like the massive protests in Greece or the Arab Spring, were taking place. Both events, if analyzed, could have given a more general picture on influence of the crisis on both democratic and authoritarian regimes. The volume has been diminished in its value due mainly to the rapid sequence change of events.

The volume remains an interesting contribution in the field of political economy. It confronts and analyses different kind of approaches to the crisis by liberal democracies and autocratic regimes. The book stresses, the idea, that new democracies faces a lower risk today concerning their political stability than autocratic regimes during major economic crisis.

**Bibliography:**


**Susanne Schroter (ed.), Christianity in Indonesia: Perspectives of Power (Munster: LIT Verlag, 2011)**

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*Christianity in Indonesia* is a collection of essays which cover the multicultural and multi religious nation of Indonesia. Although governed by the state doctrine of
Pancasila, Christians in this Muslim majority nation have indigenized their religion and made a significant impact on contemporary Indonesian politics.

The implicit argument set forth by Schroter is, that in spite of the numerous academic initiatives which seek to promote the study of Christianity from an anthropological standpoint, the study of Christianity should not be restricted to a single academic discipline. *Christianity in Indonesia* instead takes a multidisciplinary approach when covering the historical establishment of, and the current day social influence of Christianity in the multi ethnic and multi religious, nation of Indonesia.

The book consists of a dozen academic essays which are organized into two major categorical headings. The first category covers the introduction of Christianity into the archipelago by Christian missionaries. The second category deals with local conflicts, religious rhetoric and the practice of religious and ethnic pluralism in Indonesia. The historical and geographical scope includes modern day Indonesia as well as historical Malaysia under Dutch and Portuguese rule. The first section covers the Dutch Colonial Christian Organizations including the Vereenigade Oostindische Compani, East India Company, Dutch Bible Society, the Catholic Church, Methodist Publishing House, and the Indonesian council of Churches. The second section deals with indigenous groups such as the Ngada of Central Flores, conflicting groups such as Laskar Kristus, FKAWJ, FPI, and the Protestant Masariku Network. Specific geographic regions covered include Flores, East Timor, Ambon and the Moluccas.

Although the majority of the contributors are writing from an anthropological background there are also contributions from scholars in the field of philosophy, political science, theology and South East Asian studies. *Christianity in Indonesia* is a valuable asset for scholars conducting area studies in the fields of history and international relations.

Schroter does an excellent job in covering the history of Christian missionary activities and their integration with the Dutch Colonial government. An integration which has been the source of ambivalence that many political groups harbor today in “a Muslim majority nation have towards the state apparatus perceived as ‘Javanese’ and ‘Muslim’” (p. 9).

The challenges in this book can be relegated to challenges one can expect in any attempt to reconcile multiple academic paradigms within a monograph. These challenges, however, do not pose a significant challenge to the overall integrity of the work. A standardization of rules, concepts and definitions would facilitate the
readers’ understanding of the key topics that need to be elaborated upon in order to properly navigate this work.

For instance when we analyze Crauchler’s essay from a theological standpoint it sheds uncertainty on the Masariku source which claimed, that during the Moluccan conflict their opponents were guilty of writing “anti-Christian” graffiti which purportedly labeled Jesus Christ as being a son of a pig (p. 215). A theologian would recognize that defamation of Jesus Christ is a practice which is actually contrary to core beliefs of the Muslim groups who were accused of committing the act.

On p. 283 in Lorrain Aragon’s essay “Relatives and Rivals in Central Sulawesi,” Aragon states that “The (Sulawesi Highlanders’) aversion to their (pig) meat derives from a Middle Eastern, not a Southeast Asian, cultural tradition.” This statement ignores the religious dimension of why South East Asian Muslims may have an aversion to pork and states it simply as a cultural preference. Many Hui Muslims of Western China also have an aversion toward pork consumption regardless of the fact that they live as minorities among the Han Chinese, who have favored pork as a basic source of protein for centuries. A theological analysis would accurately conclude that such aversion finds its origins in religious prohibitions rather than the imitation of Middle Eastern cultural norms.

Dieter Bartels essay “The Evolution of God in the Spice Islands,” deals with the topic of Indigenization of Islam mainly as accomplished through the acceptance of local adat. A distinction should be made, which defines accommodation of cultural practices within the framework of Islamic orthodoxy versus abandonment of orthodoxy. Without this distinction a reader who is less versed in the tenets of Islamic doctrine and particularities of Indonesian cultural practices may falsely conclude that the indigenization of an adopted religion can be only be achieved through the abandonment of the central tenets of that religion.

Overall Christianity in Indonesia is an excellent resource for anthropologist, historians, and political scientists who are in need of an in depth understanding of the issues religious minorities face within a multicultural and multiethnic nation state. The various essays represented in this work provide a framework in which the reader can study the historical role Christians have played in the development of the Indonesian Republic. Continual study of such developments may provide a great insight towards the future development of Christianity throughout the archipelago.

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Jean-Claude Piris' book focuses, as the title suggests, on a two-sided analysis (legal and political) of the Lisbon Treaty. It is an exquisite mixture of information and academic analyses of the Lisbon Treaty. Piris is deeply involved in the European Union having held positions such as Legal Counsel of the European Council. Therefore, his work is consistently imbued with technical aspects and specific details on any issue pertaining to the EU.

The book consists of eight chapters, framed by an introduction and a conclusion, the latter followed by useful appendices. The volume opens strategically with a foreword by the German Chancellor, Angela Merkel. The choice of the Chancellor and her piece were inspired as they point precisely to the improvements and the importance of the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. Such an introduction, in the form of a foreword entices the reader into looking forward to read the book and become aware of the extent to which the new Treaty has improved the European Union, as Merkel suggests in her half page statement.

In the introduction, Piris tries to define Europe from a few points of view: religiously, geographically, and historically. Apart from this, it is here where he sets his goal: to offer an overview of the Lisbon Treaty, explain its elements from a legal point of view and also place them in a historical and political context.

This is a useful handbook for those studying Community Law or the EU related topics, both professors and students. However, its high degree of technical terms and its very precise manner of analysis can deter the layman from reading it. The aspect of a University Handbook is strengthened even more by the boxes inserted in the text which the author uses to introduce extracts from documents. These are used as examples to support a statement or just to add more colour to strictly academic material. The book is rich in examples, resulting in almost all statements being supported by accurate practical evidence. It is definitely a text written for specialists in the EU affairs. Nevertheless, the work has numerous footnotes which explain in detail all aspects which might need further clarification. The conclusion is made up of a series of questions the author intends to reply to, in order to better set the scene of the Lisbon Treaty, and to attempt a series of predictions concerning its evolution. The conclusion appears to be an excellent summary both of the book itself, as well as of the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty. This part is highly clear and precise.
As far as the organization of the work is concerned, the author takes a specific topic and before analyzing it he places it in a context. For example, presenting the state of affairs as regulated in the past, then in the Constitutional Treaty, and finally in the Lisbon Treaty.

The author vividly describes the process leading the EU from the Constitutional Treaty to the Lisbon Treaty, carefully highlighting the fact that the latter is not an improved and concise version of the former, but a new document adapted to the current needs of the Union. As a matter of fact the book draws a constant comparison between the Constitutional Treaty and the Lisbon Treaty, an action which appears redundant sometimes.

What makes the book rather interactive and attractive to the reader is the fact that Piris takes highly debatable issues such as the decisions of the Constitutional Courts of Germany and the Czech Republic, for instance, and questions them. Sometimes answers are provided; sometimes questions are left unanswered, as food for thought for the reader. This tends to be a characteristic feature of the book – raising questions on the future of the European Union, based on the effects of the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty, but refraining from making assumptions and predictions. These are left to the reader who is entrusted with all the elements they need to make just the right connection.

Another asset of this book is the fact that the author knows how to stress the important issues. Take for instance the manner of shared competences: Piris underlines the areas in which progress occurred and where it was stalled. From this point of view, the writing of Piris is well-balanced: he praises progress when it occurred and criticizes the failures. Although Piris is an advocate of the European project overall, he remains realistic with regards to the drawbacks of the Lisbon Treaty, which he also implacably mentions.

Moreover, the appendices are useful for those interested in analyzing precisely the modifications brought along by the Lisbon Treaty. They are organized in an index form, with the number of the article and its provisions alongside, so that those readers interested in specific matters do not have to go through the entire Treaty or look for a specific chapter of the Treaty in order to get the required information.

A shortcoming of the book is the absence of issue coverage when speaking about financial, economic, social and other internal affairs. Certain domains such as sport, culture, youth training, space, public health, or rights of intellectual property have been neglected. They have all been assembled in the last chapter and offered short presentations, barely one-page long. It was to be expected that in such a grand work some aspects would inevitably be left aside from the centre of attention, but in
the present case, a better usage of the space allotted to the topic is strongly recommended.

The book is written in a light manner, absent of a pompous style, contrary to what the reader would expect from such a work. Even if the choice of words is very technical, the book is easy to read by the persons knowledgeable on the matter, very explicit in some aspects, where needed, full of useful examples and footnotes to guide the reader to further explanations. From the point of view of the structure, the book is well organized, each chapter referring to individualized matters, accompanied by sufficient examples and explanations that rule out any possible after-reading dilemmas.

Taking everything into consideration, Piris' work is exceptional regarding the modifications introduced by the Lisbon Treaty to the European Union. It is comprehensive, has a neutral tone, the argument is well-balanced and well documented. It is a work strongly recommended to those professionals interested in any aspects related to the European Union, as well as to those interested in precise matters, looking for answers or simply an authorized opinion on the matter. Nevertheless, owing to the extent of explanatory footnotes and appendices, the book might be suitable for the layman interested in the changes introduced by the Lisbon Treaty, too.
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