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FOREWORD

Nationalism, Tribalism and Fundamentalism as Political Science Subjects

As the subjects of the papers for this special issue of the CEU Political Science Journal illustrate, nationalism, tribalism and fundamentalism have recently – some would say: finally – become major topics in mainstream political science. An outside observer of the recent history of Anglosaxon political science would, perhaps, be surprised to learn that this was not always the case. During the years of the Cold War, both International Relations and the study of domestic politics were dominated by approaches and themes derived from economics. Whereas the left saw nationalism and religion merely as the bourgeoisie’s instrument to manipulate the working classes, proponents of rational choice and other economistic models seemed, sometimes, to ignore the issue of political fanaticism altogether. While such an approach was always strange as it left a major event of the 20th century, World War II and the Holocaust, largely unexplained within political science (narrowly understood), it has become untenable today.

I would venture to claim that one of the reasons why, lately, we have been so unprepared for the rise of various forms of right-wing extremism across the globe is that many political scientists preferred to leave the study of “marginal” movements representing this phenomenon to historians, ethnographers, sociologists, anthropologists as well as students of culture, region and religion. Mainstream political science chose to concentrate, instead, on “real” political issues such as tax reform, diplomatic bargaining or retrospective voting. As a result, Anglosaxon mainstream political scientists today constitute a minority among those scholars analyzing and commenting on what current world politics is about. Take such prominent potential objects of study as Al’Quaida, the Serbian Radical Party, the European “New Right,” or Zhirinovskii’s misnamed Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR). While there is a lot of journalistic and historical literature as well as some papers or chapters in political science journals on these players,1 we do not seem to have a

single narrowly focused English-language book-length academic study on any of them – neither a monograph by a political scientist, nor a collected volume with contributions from political scientists. This is in spite of the fact that the above-listed are quintessentially political actors who are, if I am allowed to make such an evaluative assessment, responsible for much of the trouble humanity is in today.

Even with regard to as eccentric a figure as Zhirinovskii, sometimes seen as a clown and phenomenon of subculture rather than politics, one could argue, as for instance the prominent Russian democrat Grigori Yavlinski did, that without the LDPR’s rise in the early 1990s, the Yeltsin administration would not have become dominated by the “party of war” faction, and made the decision to intervene in Chechnya in 1994.2

Arguably, it was Yeltsin’s Chechnya adventure that constituted a crucial birth defect and pre-determined the decline of Russian democracy we are observing in the new century. One could say: No Zhirinovskii, no Putin (and add that they are both KGB products). Without the prominent role of nationalism in Russian politics, the chances of democracy in the world’s largest country would, it seems, today be much better.

It might be noteworthy that the relative inattention of political science for nationalism and fundamentalism for many years was only facilitated, but not determined by a seeming lack of prominence of these subjects in world politics during the Cold War. For instance, in the case of the Soviet Union, as recent historical research has shown, the role of cryptic forms of Russian nationalism in the formation of the Soviet leaders’ outlook was apparently higher than previously assumed.3 Thus, at least on the Soviet


2 Itogi, Nezavisimoe televizienie (NTV), 18th December 1995. See also Elena Klepikova and Vladimir Solovyov, Zhirinovsky: The Paradoxes of Russian Fascism. Transl. by Catherine A. Fitzpatrick (Harmonsworth, Middlesex, Viking/Penguin Group, 1995), VII. A leading Russian specialist on contemporary Russian nationalism, Nikolai Mitrokhin, too has stated that the 1993 elections (i.e. Zhirinovskii’s victory) exerted a principal impact on the “ideology of Russian stateness,” and that the resulting processes led to, among other things, the intervention into Chechnya. See his “Ot


side, the commonly assumed core conflict between the West and East as that between a planned and market economy as well as between a monistic and pluralistic political system was less prominent and the role of cultural factors more prevalent than commonly held.

The major reason why nationalism and fundamentalism were, for decades, located at the margins of mainstream Anglosaxon political science has, probably, less to do with any empirical issue, than with research methodology and techniques: As Western political studies were seen on their way to becoming a social science comparable to political economy and business studies (if not a field of study similar to physics or astronomy), the use of formal mathematical models and advanced quantitative techniques evolved into a hallmark of the scholarly value of papers submitted to the major journals of the discipline.

Students considering the entry of a Ph.D. program in political science might have thought of political extremism as one of the more fascinating and relevant issues in the study of politics. Yet, they were confronted with the challenge that approaches derived from economic models are only partly (if at all) applicable to the behavior of political fanatics. The willingness and ability to engage in such modeling, however, was and, often, still is one of the preconditions for a successful academic career, if not, already, an entry-ticket into the doctoral program of a leading political science department. One of the more interesting topics in the history of contemporary political science would be how high the number of graduate students is who were forced to make a choice between studying what they were interested in, and focusing on what was “doable” within the formal modeling paradigm.

This odd situation seems changing today as the public demand for systematic knowledge of the origins, nature and consequences of nationalism and fundamentalism has been rising during the last years. This was, not the

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least, a result of 9/11 which could, even by hard-core “realists,” not be left simply aside as another irrational action by the “lunatic fringe.” Today, as the following papers demonstrate, nationalism and fundamentalism are hot topics that allow political scientists to reach beyond the limits of the Ivory Tower, and give them keys to understanding some of the core conflicts in world politics.

ANDREAS UMLAND
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EDITORIAL

The CEU Political Science Journal is a publication that promotes high-quality academic work in the field of Political Science, as well as in other related fields in the social sciences. The Journal has entered its second year of existence with a fresh look, which will soon be accompanied by a change in the layout of our website and by an expanded body of reviewers and advisors, with increasing members of academia joining us in our efforts to build a competitive publication. Thus, the quality standards that the submissions have to meet are now higher, which is to the advantage of the Journal’s readers. Also, we established a distribution network for the printed version of the Journal covering many universities throughout Europe, which is a good opportunity for submitters to make their work known in the academic environment.

While we successfully co-opted collaborators from other universities, the main work remains in the hands of students, alumni and faculty of the Political Science department at the Central European University. Professors Anil Duman and Carol Harrington joined the Advisory Board, where Professors Sonja Amadae and Carsten Schneider have been active from the beginning of the Journal’s existence. The team of Editorial Assistants is comprised only of CEU Political Science students, while the body of reviewers was supplemented with students, faculty members and scholars from several departments of CEU and other universities in order to cover all the various fields of study that our submitters address.

The CEU Political Science Journal directly tackles the complex processes taking place in Central and Eastern Europe after the fall of Communism. This issue looks at the surge of nationalist feelings and movements, taking over the political spectrum in all the post-Communist states, and at how their emergence shaped the International System in its entirety. The next issue, currently under preparation, will approach the complex transformations in the economies of post-Communist states and the involvement and influence of international organizations.

A special edition of the journal will contain the best papers presented at the Third CEU Graduate Conference in Social Sciences “Challenges for CEE States in an Enlarging EU and a Globalizing World,” which is taking place on the 25-27th of May, 2007, at the Central European University in Budapest. This conference will bring together young researchers mainly from universities throughout Europe and will tackle vital issues for post-Communist states, ranging from environmental challenges to those posed by integration in supranational bodies, such as the EU and NATO.

The book review section, which first appeared in the previous issue, proved to be a good source of references in
various fields of Political Science. Not only has the number of book reviews submitted for publication been high, but also the quality of the reviews and, more important, the importance of the books under review turned this new section into a step forward for the journal. We therefore renew our call for those who wish to review books to send their CV to one of the e-mail addresses listed in the “Contacts” section of our website and we will provide a list of books to be considered for review. Also, authors who wish to have their books under review should contact us. Beside the book review section, we continue to support the work of young researchers, especially those preparing Ph.D. dissertations, through our “work in progress” section. Authors are encouraged to submit their partial works in order to be published in advance and to get useful feedback from the reviewers, the members of the Advisory Board, and from the readers of the journal.

Although the journal now has an improved appearance, the formal paper requirements remain the same and can be found at our web address – [www.ceu.hu/polscijournal]. Articles must consist of 4,000-6,000 words, while any appendixes should not be longer than 5 pages. These requirements apply also to the submissions qualifying as “work in progress,” while the book reviews should not be longer than 1,200 words. Exceptions from these rules might be allowed, but a good justification should be addressed to the members of the Editorial Board, who will consider it only if the reviewers believe that going over the word limit is needed with respect to the content of the article. An additional requirement, which should be met by all submissions, is that any article, work in progress or book review submitted to us for publication should not be under review at other publications or should not have been already accepted for publication elsewhere.

GEORGE JIGLAU
SERGIU GHERGHINA
“PRESENT DANGERS” THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS: RUSSIAN NEO-CONSERVATIVES’ DESIGNS FOR A (RETRO)EMPIRE IN THE “NEAR ABROAD”

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Abstract

This paper will tackle the Russian New Right’s thinking about the “Near Abroad”. Renowned political comparativists compete in theorizing the Russian Right wing’s ideas and ideologies, and arrive at novel definitions for “reactionaries”, “conservatives”, “nationalists”, and “imperialists” as applied to the Russian right-wing intellectuals. In place of adding a new drop to an already sophisticated taxonomy of the Russian New Right, I will focus on the virgin lacuna within the Russian ideational space by bringing to light a plethora of intellectuals who, thus far, escaped categorization as belonging to the New Right but rather received scholarly attention within the framework of the tradition of Russian liberalism. I will illustrate how these “liberal-conservative” or “neo-conservative” intellectuals have become strange bedfellows with neo-Eurasians and their leader Aleksander Dugin in their thoughts vis-à-vis Russia’s exclusive civilizing mission in the “Near Abroad.” I will argue that their thoughts make these thinkers qualified as imperialistic nationalists: united by reflective and wistful hopes to recreate a (retro)empire that would cover the former Soviet states, these “Russian neo-cons” are a carbon copy of Western neo-conservatives, but through the looking glass, as they warn against the “present dangers” stemming from Western involvement in Russia’s backyard which they perceive to be a Western object of desire.

1. Introduction*

There are more ideas on earth than intellectuals imagine. And these ideas are more active, stronger, more resistant, more passionate than politicians think.

Michel Foucault

“The question is” said Alice “whether you can make words mean different things”.

“The question is” said Humpty Dumpty “which is to be the master—that’s all.”

Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking Glass

In searching for solutions for what is perceived to be the socioeconomic, ideological, and spiritual crisis that has overshadowed Russia after the collapse

* I would like to thank Ignacio de la Rasilla del Moral for the inspiring conversations on U.S. neo-conservatism and Gregory Attila Connor for sharing with me his wisdom
of Communism in 1991, and as a response to the disenchantment with liberal democratic reforms of the Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin eras.\(^1\) Russian intellectuals hunt for a panacea to these ailments. In doing so they often find neo-conservatism, or “neokonstvo”\(^2\) in Russian, which manifests itself through a peculiar breed of neo-liberal ideas and patriotic calls for national and imperial resurgence.

Intriguingly, in Russia the term “neo-conservatism” alludes to “liberal-conservatism” but also to Neo-Eurasianism, and is appropriated by and ascribed to figures that adhere to diametrically opposite intellectual traditions and political inclinations. What ideational ground turns liberal Anatolii Chubais and neo-Eurasian Aleksander Dugin into strange bedfellows? As I will illustrate, their seemingly irreconcilable ideas meet at the nexus of their nostalgic, restorationist dreams of regaining and retaining control over the countries of the former Soviet Union, amplified by the grievance at losing the Cold War. In their increasing distrust of the West, these intellectuals accuse the U.S. and Europe of supporting the independence and pro-democratic movements in the “Near Abroad”\(^3\) and hope at settling scores with Western powers in Russia’s backyard.

In this paper, I cover a crucial gap within the Russian ideational landscape by bringing attention to a group of intellectuals who, thus far, seeped


\(^3\) I use the term the “Near Abroad” in its Russian interpretation, to refer to the states of the former Soviet Union beyond Russia’s borders, excluding the Baltics: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. Together with Russia, these countries make up the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).
through the sieve of conventional classifications such as the New Right and liberalism and escaped scholarly attention. In exploring the Russian “neo-con” amalgam, I will put forward evidence towards the assumption that it transcends the notions of Left and Right and is held together by the conviction that Russia has a special historic destiny that will allow it to eventually reassert its greatness by recovering its influence in the affairs in post-Soviet states. As I will argue, Russian neo-conservatism is based on imperialistic nationalism, an overruling idea, which on Russian soil translates into intellectual musings on Russia’s unique providential mission in the “Near Abroad”. By conducting content analysis of the Russian neo-conservatives’ publications of the past decade, I will elucidate that these authors adhere to imperialistic nationalism in thinking and conceptualizing the “Near Abroad” and believe Russia to be “melted” to it by the memory of “common destinies.” I will introduce the reader into the world of Russian neo-conservatives that compose a specter ranging from moderate liberal-conservatives to radical neo-conservatives, or Neo-Eurasians. I will then examine Russian neo-conservatives’ writings on the “Near Abroad.” Finally, I will suggest that Russian neo-conservatives emulate to a large degree their U.S. counterparts, as both groups share the intellectual legacy of the German Conservative Revolution and encourage interventionism or, more specifically, “conservative internationalism”.

2. Gifted Emulators: Neo-conservatives, Russian-style

While the radical Far Right of the post-Soviet political spectrum has been exhaustively analyzed, Russia’s newly


prominent neo-conservatives (henceforth described at times as “neo-cons”) have surprisingly not yet received sufficient attention. This scarcity of research is partially explained by the hybrid composition of the group, a mixed intellectual base of the Russian trend of neo-conservatism, and an imprecise and ever-shifting quality of the concept itself as it applies to the Russian case.

The main defining characteristic of Russian neo-cons is that, as opposed to other forms of conservatism in Russia, neo-conservatives do not act through direct involvement in politics and rarely employ political channels (through, for instance, party participation) nor aspire to seize political power (an impossible, as they realize, goal, in today’s Russia); rather, they act through winning “cultural hegemony” and the creation of ideologically charged structures of civil society. They therefore aim to establish a “semantic supremacy” of neo-conservative ideas, which will eventually become the agent of social change.6

Authors including such early proponents of “soft” authoritarianism as Andranik Migranian7 and Vitalii Naishul8 as well as Sergei Kurginian and Aleksander Panarin personify the early resurrection of a conservative wing within liberalism, as many Russian thinkers turned against globalization while realizing that it could not be avoided. Some of these intellectual figures active during Yeltsin’s era formed the bulk of the conservative drift during Putin’s administration.9 While some of the newly emerged “neo-cons” were self-proclaimed, as they started using this term to acknowledge the difference of their positions with those of “older” conservatives,10 others continued to

7 During the early stages of perestroika Migranian already advocated a “strong hand” theory and a more dictatorial approach to democracy (which he called “demokratura”). See Andranik Migranian and Igor’ Kliamkin, eds., Sotsializm i demokratiya: Diskussionnaya tribuna [“Socialism and Democracy: a Discussion Tribune”] (Moskva, 1990).
10 Headed by a specialist of the Russian Extreme Right, Aleksander Verkhovskii, an informational-analytical Center “Sova” issued a series of website publications in 2004 on neo-conservatism. See Aleksander Verkhovskii et al., “Novyi konservatizm ili antiliberalizm – popytka opredeleniia predmeta” [“New Conservatism and/or
refer to themselves as “liberal-conservatives”.

3. Russian “Neo-cons” Light: Liberal-Conservatives

The liberal version of neo-conservatism as it is understood in Putin’s Russia is rooted in the “legal liberalism” of mid-19th century Westernizers Konstantin Kavelin and Boris Chicherin. Chicherin was a proponent of okhranitel’nyi (paternalist) liberalism (or liberalism with a conservative streak) during the Alexandrine reforms of the 1860s. He famously proclaimed that “[a]t the present moment two things are needed in Russia: liberal measures and a strong government.”11 The ideas of the first Russian liberal conservatives were further developed in the early 20th century by post-Marxist Christian liberals including Semen Frank and Petr Struve. These philosophers were dismayed by the somber outcomes of the revolution and, in reaction to social democracy, propagated strong statehood and patriotism in conjunction with individual freedom.

The ideational core of contemporary Russian neo-conservatism is also composed of predominantly “transformed liberals” – essayists, pundits, and academics who have advocated a conservative interpretation of liberalism since the early 1990s and were expressing their rebellion against modernity and a support for tradition in their publications. The shift of ideational allegiances of these critical intellectuals makes neo-conservatism a truly fascinating phenomenon. The in vogue intellectual Andrei Kolesnikov perceptively called the views of these crestfallen intellectuals a “nostalgic retrospective conservatism”.12 Among the most peculiar manifestations of their swing were the short-lived journal Konservator, and the Serafimovskii Klub.

Konservator was founded as a continuation of the democratic Obshchaya Gazeta that was edited by one of the perestroika reformers, Yegor Yakovlev. The newspaper passed in 2002 to the businessman Viacheslav

Leibman who closed and re-opened it with a set of new journalists, and renamed it Konservator. This formerly liberal democratic publication was then edited by Dmitrii Olshanskii (the former art critic of a pro-Western and pro-democratic newspaper Segodnia, owned by Vladimir Gusinskii). A former liberal, Olshanskii changed his views to conservative and extreme patriotic ones. Like other “born-again” conservatives, he accused Putin’s government of being overly liberal. During its short life (Konservator existed for less than a year in 2003), it served as a platform for a cocktail of ideas composed of left, nationalist, conservative, anti-liberal, and liberal elements, and at times was reminiscent of the publications of the communist-patriotic camp, such as Aleksander Prokhanov’s Zavtra. In many ways, Konservator was a symbol of the death of “classical” liberalism in Russia.

Like those of Konservator, the publicists who created the Serafimovsky Klub come from the liberal democratic camp. Like other former democrats, the Serafims could not accept the destitution brought by the reforms of the 1990s to the majority of the Russian population. A pro-liberal business and economics oriented journal Ekspert opened in 2002 a discussion about conservatism that included such opponents as ultra-religious Vitaly Averyanov and ultra-liberal Kolesnikov. The debate served as an inspiration for a discussion club that believed in its own political philosophy of conservatism. The club was organized in the beginning of 2003 by the editor of Ekspert, Aleksander Privalov, and other journalists of the publication including Maksim Sokolov, Mikhail Leontiev, and Valerii Fadeev. The club was found on the day of Serafim Sarovskii, a Russian Saint – hence the name. To render the image of the club more appealing to the public, the founders also invited Aleksei Balabanov, the director of the popular anti-Western films Brat and Brat-2 to participate in the project.

As stated in their memorandum, the Serafim Club arose in order to unite those who believe in the necessity and possibility of recreating Russia as one of the leading world powers, which, as its members believe, would only be possible through turning from “politics of fear” to “politics of growth.” Serafims are unwavering supporters of private property and the market economy, and believe that individual freedom (and not collectivism) is sacred and is the main value for Russia. The

13 Ibid.
club members are against state *dirigizm* in the economy, but also want to see some role of the state in creating favorable business conditions and using protectionist measures when needed. In foreign policy, Serafims call for concrete measures that would counterpose to what they call American and Islamic projects and for Russia to have its own “global project,” which will counteract that of the *Pax Americana* and *Pax Islamica*. While realizing that Russia is at the moment too weak to assume a leading role in the world, Serafims are hopeful that the country will be able to reacquire its greatness in the future. In the words of Leontiev, the most radical neo-conservative in his imperial nationalism, “Russia should remain an independent ‘subject’ (*sub’ektnost’*) at no matter what price”. As opposed to other states, Russia, these authors believe, cannot exist as an object of other states’ projects.

Reverberating the same idea, Mikhail Remizov points out to Russia’s specific historical path and geographic specificities which preconditions the country to remain an independent “historical subject” in the world defined by “a conflict of civilizations” and believes that national patriotism should be elevated to the status of an official state ideology and permeate all levels of the state apparatus. He also notes that the Russian Federation is “not just a ‘splinter’ of the Russian empire, but its successor, […] a state of a higher order than the post-Soviet states.” He then concludes that “[s]ince Russia is the heir of the Russian Empire it should … become the center of the post-imperial ‘greater space’ that would include the ‘Near Abroad’”.

With these contradictory thoughts in mind, the Serafims were hoping to provide the state with an official ideology. Of all members of intelligentsia who share liberal-conservative views, these thinkers are the closest to the images and ideas as they are cooked at the Kremlin kitchen of political technologists including Modest Kolerov, Gleb Pavlovskii, Aleksei Chadaev, among others to create a new oxymoron, “sovereign democracy,” which is the new official Russian state ideology that is based on the idea that Russia is going through its own path of democratic transition that is subjugated to the supreme power of the state and that is not to be molded according to the Western model of democracy.

The Serafims actively supported Putin’s belligerent strategy in dealing with the Chechen conflict, and are at war with the human rights activists.

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16 Remizov, “Konservatizm segodnia.”
17 Ibid.
activists who are in opposition to Russian policies in Chechnya. Leontiev, for instance, was one of the few Russian journalists who supported the First Chechen War, and Chechen authorities filed a lawsuit against him alleging that he inspired ethnic hatred in the republic.

The Serafim club only lasted until the end of 2004, its meetings ending with a split between Sokolov and Privalov, convinced liberals, and overtly nationalistic Leontiev. The two events that splintered the club were the dissatisfaction of Sokolov and Privalov with what they perceived to be rigged results of the 2003 parliamentary elections and the arrest of businessman Mikhail Khodorkovskii, as both Sokolov and Privalov became mildly critical of the Putin administration.

Serafims never engaged in any direct political activity. The questions of whether these no longer critical intellectuals became politically apathetic, or if the regime creates impermeable barriers that prevent dissenters from taking any action that could potentially destabilize the regime are rhetorical ones.

4. The Hardliners: Dugin and (neo)Eurasianism

While those neo-conservatives who come from the liberal camp share with the U.S. neo-cons a neoliberal-capitalist orientation and follow Milton Freedman in vehemently supporting private property, neo-Eurasians and other die-hard neo-conservatives advocate for protectionism and state de-privatisation of national resources. Neo-Eurasians share many traits of national socialism and are ideationally close to the European New Right, as their ideas reverberate with those of Alain de Benoist, as well as other representatives of the Nouvelle Droite and the Neue Rechte.

Of all current Russian right-wing movements, neo-Eurasianism has attracted the most attention.\textsuperscript{21} A great deal of authors place neo-Eurasian creed on the margins of the ideational and political scene claiming that Eurasian ideas are never going to elevate to the point of becoming an official state ideology.\textsuperscript{22} Despite these scholars’ dismissal of the role of neo-Eurasianism on the contemporary Russian ideational and political arena, such prominent politicians as the Russian Minister of Culture, Aleksander Sokolov, the Vice-Speaker of the Federation Council, Aleksander Torshin, Putin’s adviser Aslanbek


\textsuperscript{22} Dmitri Trenin, \textit{The End of Eurasia: Russia on the Border Between Geopolitics and Globalization} (Moscow: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2001).
Aslakhanov, the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Federation Council, Mikhail Margelov, as well as Eduard Sagalaev, the President of the National Association of Television and Radio Broadcasters are all members of the International Eurasian Movement headed by Dugin. In his attempt to become an official state ideologue, Dugin serves as an adviser to the Duma on geopolitical issues and is an author of many textbooks on geopolitics, which are used in schools and universities around the country. While staying true to the neo-Eurasian credo, Dugin applauds “sovereign democracy,” which has replaced, and might be the final stage of the “managed democracy” of Putin’s first term in power.

Neo-Eurasianism is intellectually entrenched in both national and Western traditions of thought. Dugin and his followers base their ideas on the European Conservative Revolution and the legacy of Oswald Spengler, Carl Schmitt, and such geopoliticians as Karl Haushofer. Consequently, they share with the New Right thinkers (the Conservative Revolution’s offspring) many geopolitical sensibilities, as they aim to form a continental union against the Atlanticist U.S. and against Western globalization and universalism, and to promote particularism.

Contrary to the view of scholars who believe that neo-Eurasians abuse the legacy of the 1920s-1930s Eurasian forefathers, including Nikolai Trubetskoi, Petr Savitskii, Lev Karsavin, Georgii Florovskii, and other authors of the Eurasian manifesto Iskhod k Vostoku (Exodus to the East), and are, in fact, very different from their predecessors, I maintain that the first generation and contemporary Eurasians share many resemblances. Early Eurasianism was ideationally closer, some authors argue, to the vision of the German, and not the French, Conservative Revolution. While being conservative and based on a “retroactive utopia,” Eurasianism was also “turned towards the future” and was a modern, post-revolutionary, even futuristic trend of thought. Some authors have provided impressive analyses of Eurasian discourse by placing it against the backdrop of theories of nationalism and imperialism. These authors portend that, first and foremost, early Eurasians attempted to formulate an ideology that would preserve and justify the Russian empire. To that end, early Eurasians tried to convert Russian nationalist discourse into more appealing calls for

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26 Ibid.
the creation of a federalist state that would ensure respect for different cultures, languages, and religions. However, this was a cynical approach as the federalist model proposed by the Eurasians was not very different from the Soviet model, the latter of which expected all of the nationalities within the USSR “to glorify Communism in their own language.” Shnirelman, for instance, appropriately adopts Peter Alter’s typology to distinguish two types of nationalism. For Alter, “Risorgimento nationalism” relates to a nation that aims to create its own state while “integral nationalism” applies to a nation that already has a state and that is characterized by “radicalism, extremism, militancy, expansionism, and reactionary tendencies.” A vehement critic of Eurasianism, Shnirelman precipitates to qualify this movement as driven by integral nationalism and explicitly points that the movement was in that sense similar to Italian fascism and German Nazism. To prove his point, he notes that Eurasians separated culture into “high” and “low” and believed that Russian culture would serve as a foundation for the formation of “high” Eurasian culture.

Several authors including Shnirelman are wary of early and neo-Eurasians’ assurances that theirs is a doctrine based on the equality of all cultures. Early Eurasians believed in the superiority of the Christian Orthodox religion and Russian culture. The “Ukrainian question” was another “stumbling block” within early Eurasian discourse as Ukraine was considered to be of lower order than Russia. Eurasians thought of Eurasian culture as a structure based on Turanian, Slavic, and Finno-Ugric elements, all adding up to a single Eurasian identity. Furthermore, they used “nationalist methodology” to construct Eurasian identity for the purpose of convincing Turkic-Mongol peoples that they share a historical path with Russians. Yet at the same time Eurasians used a different construction for the Western peoples of the empire, that of tri-unity of Russian, Byelorussian, and Ukrainian peoples. This hybrid of constructivism and primordialism is, according to Shnirelman, responsible for what we perceive to be internal contradictions within Eurasian discourse.

Marlene Laruelle is another scholar who frames early and neo-Eurasianism as primarily a nationalist and imperialist discourse. In reverberating with Nicholas Riazanovsky and

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27 Ibid., 11.
28 Ibid., 4.
29 Ibid., 7.
30 Ibid., 12.
31 Ibid., 9–10.
32 Ibid., 17–18.
33 Laruelle, L’idéologie eurasiste russe ou comment penser l’empire.
34 Riazanovsky is critical of Eurasianism and engaged in famous debates with George Vernadsky, the main representative of Eurasian vision of history. See Nicholas Riazanovsky, “The Emergence of Eurasianism,” California Slavic Studies 1
Shnirelman, she maintains that Eurasians’ primary goal was the legitimization of empire, which Eurasians believed to be the only possible form of political organization for Eurasia due to its geography and multiethnic composition. From this thirst for empire stem contradictions within Eurasian thought and a paradoxical vacillation between universalism and particularism. On the one hand, early Eurasian authors argue that all cultures are equal and reject European universalism. Neo-Eurasians’ mimic their forefathers in their religious-messianic message manifested in their idea of Moscow being a Third Rome and a New Israel that has a historic mission, and, most notably, in their expansionist, nationalist, and imperialist drive. On the other hand, these authors point out that Russia will offer a universal solution to the peoples of Eurasia.

Seen through this historical perspective, there is a certain continuity of ideas between early Eurasians and their post-Soviet imitators such as Dugin and Aleksander Panarin. Both share the “Moscow as the Third Rome” religious and messianic idea. According to Dugin, under nationalism neo-Eurasians understand 1) integration of post-Soviet space, 2) Polyethnism, and 3) “Democratic empire.” They consider these postulates to be opposed to “narrowly nationalistic,” isolationist visions of a “fortress Russia” and of “russification.” Thus, the neo-Eurasian concept of nationalism is imperial and antithetical to liberal democracy and Atlanticism. Dugin conceptualizes Russian imperialist nationalism in geopolitical, not ethnic, nor cultural terms as “[a] space, boundlessness, limitlessness, length, expanse – the taste and the spirit of these elements constitute an integral part of the Russian soul.” He is one of the most vociferous promoters of the “imperial, integrationist, all-embracing and universal” facets of Russian nationalism and believes that “[t]he Russian ethnos is an open ethnos, the one that absorbs all those who want to join in”. Dugin goes as far as comparing Russians to “Eurasian Romans” as they “unite various peoples and languages by their particular spatial–religious worldview”. Russians, therefore, are bound to be imperialistic as they are conditioned by this “supra-ethnic” identity, which makes Russians “to realize unprecedented exploits, to sustain insurmountable sufferings, to

35 Laruelle, L’idéologie eurasiste russe ou comment penser l’empire, 321.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid.
endure inhuman throes and to attain victory.” 40 Most interestingly, Dugin sees Russian imperialistic nationalism as driven by a positive desire for integration and “tolerance” but at the same time Russian “indifference” vis-à-vis subjugated peoples and a strong belief in Russia’s “chosenness.” 41 Dugin concludes his ruminations in his characteristically numinous style by stating that “the empire expands its borders until it does not meet an unsurpassable barrier, and asserts within its boundaries a sacral formula: “here ends the land of people, the land of the spirit, the land of salvation.” 42

5. Common Destiny Appeals: Russian Neo-conservatives and the “Near Abroad”

Max Weber conceptualized a nation as a status group that is held together by common historical memory and that fights for the prestige of power and culture with other nations. National solidarity, argued Weber, is based on shared historical political experiences as “under certain conditions, otherwise heterogeneous peoples can be melted together through common destinies”. 43

The Russian “neo-cons” start from the assumption that Russia and the countries of the “Near Abroad” are bound together by Weberian “common destinies” and “shared historical political experiences.” They lament the dissolution of the Soviet Union, an imperial might that was given up, they believe, without a fight. Already in the mid-1990s Georgi Arbatov prophesized that “[t]he desire to restore the [Soviet] [U]nion will …remain a strong source of imperial moods and political activities”. 44 Referring to the “Near Abroad” or the “territories-straits” where Russia and the West compete over influence, Vadim Tsymburskii introduced in 1995 a concept of a “Great Limitrophe” which refers to “a cross belt of sovereign states” surrounding Russia and that includes Eastern and South Eastern European countries but also Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, as well as the South Caucasus and Central Asia. The Great Limitrophe is composed of “overlapping peripheries” or leftovers of Romano-Germanic, Arab, Iranian, Russian, Chinese, and Indian civilizations that encircle present-day Russia and isolate it from the contemporary power poles. 45

Driven by a neo-Eurasian vogue for conservative, anti-globalist, and anti-universal geopolitics, Tsymburskii presented the world as clashing cultures and civilizations. He prophesized that

40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid.
Russia is in danger of becoming part of a Great Limitrophe and reduced to the margins of history by falling, like the rest of the territories of the Great Limitrophe, under the control of the West.

A decade later, these qualms are echoed by another author who juxtaposes Russian interests in the “Near Abroad” to those of the European Union, which he sees as an “imperial enterprise, as Europe is trying to recreate Pax Romana and move eastward, and will only stop when it destroys the Russian civilizational project and reaches the frontiers of Iran and Iraq.”

Europe, according to this intellectual, has claims over territories including the South Caucasus that formerly constituted part of the Roman Empire. The European project aspires to turn Ukraine into a “lid that sticks Poland close to Europe” and Kaliningrad as a necessary link that ties strategically important Ukraine to Scandinavia and the Baltic States. He forewarns that the time will come when “St. Petersburg will try to integrate with Europe.”

In light of this upcoming Apocalypse and in the aftermath of Color revolutions, there is an increasing belief among intellectuals that the Russian government should become a promoter of democracy in the “Near Abroad,” but not just any democracy but a Russian homegrown version of it. Thus, Remizov and Iuri Solozobov cite Schmitt who pointed out that the Monroe Doctrine, which aimed to secure European non-interference in the Americas, was transformed from an instrument of strategic defense on the American continent to an instrument of conquest and expansionism. These intellectuals suggest that Russia should introduce and implement its own version of the plan, or Monrovski doctrine. Russian neo-conservative intellectuals place the US and the EU together and accuse both in attempting to create an “alternative post-Soviet conglomeration with its center in Kiev, and to place Georgia, Azerbaijan, and

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48 Pro-democratic revolutions in Georgia (the Rose Revolution of 2003) and Ukraine (the Orange Revolution of 2004).
Central Asia under Western control. These thinkers applaud and promote the Russian government’s recognition of non-recognized states in the post-Soviet space as, at the same time as Ukrainian, Georgian, and Moldovan leaders visit Berlin hoping to achieve closer integration with the EU, Moscow invites the heads of the internationally unrecognized breakaway regions of Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transnistria, addresses them as presidents, and, by words and deeds, supports their cause.

6. Anatolii Chubais’s concept of a “Liberal Empire”

Anatoly Chubais wrote an infamous article in 2003 titled “Russia as a liberal empire,” which was published in Nezavisimaia Gazeta and created a splash across different intellectual and political circles. In it, Chubais calls Russia to join the “circle of the great democracies of the 21st century,” as Russia embraces the idea of liberal imperialism and constructs a liberal empire in its “Near Abroad.” For the Chairman of RAO EES, Russia’s energy monopoly, liberal imperialism translates into promoting the “expansion of Russian business outside of the state’s borders” and supporting “basic values of freedom and equality not only in Russia, but in all of the neighboring states.” Far from nurturing dreams of joining the EU and NATO, Russia should become the center of an empire of its own, comparable, in Chubais’ view, to the United States.

To be sure, in explaining what he means by a “liberal empire,” Chubais specifies that such a regime would not allow a conquest of territories, nor the breach of the principle of territorial integrity, nor the law vis-à-vis Russia’s neighbors. However, through his concept he speaks of the support for the principles of human rights and democracy outside of Russian territory. Backed by such intellectuals as Sokolov, Chubais’ concept does translate into advocacy of expansionism in the “Near Abroad”.

As a response to Russia’s policies of using energy as a leverage in the post-Soviet neighborhood, Vladimir Papava, a former Minister of Economy of Georgia and Frederick Starr, take

54 Anatolii Chubais, “Korni idei liberal’noi imperii – v samom rossiiskom liberalizme” [“The Roots of Liberal Empire – in Russian Liberalism Itself”, in Emil’ Pain, Mezhdou imperiei i natsiei (Moskva: Fond Liberal’naia Missiia, 2004), 220. Emphasis is mine.
55 Frederick Starr teaches at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies.
Chubais’ idea of a liberal empire seriously as they see it through the prism of Russia’s resurgent confidence grounded in the country’s vast energy supplies and its use of energy prices to pressure Georgia and Ukraine. These authors warn that “Russia will start by controlling through its large monopolies the economies of post-Soviet states. This empire will be liberal because it will be built with money and not tanks. While theirs is a skewed and alarmist reading of Chubais’ piece, it nevertheless captures the idea which is on the minds of Russian neo-conservatives: that of using whatever means possible to preserve Russia’s influence in the former Soviet states.

7. Neo-Eurasians on the “Near Abroad”

Chubais’ idea was met with both praise and contempt in the neo-Eurasian camp. Dugin sardonically notes that “[i]f Chubais will continue to shout about Russia’s mission…, copying the neo-conservatives from his beloved America, the 21st century is going to be a Russian century”. In his views on the “Near Abroad” Dugin goes further than Chubais: he wishes the eventual recreation of the Soviet empire, in which he views Russia as the successor of the Orthodox Byzantine Empire and of the empire of Chengiz Khan. Dugin also calls for the unification of Georgia and Russia as a way of resolving conflicts in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and believes that Russia and the former Soviet states should emulate the example of the European Union and create their own political and economic association.

Intriguingly, Dugin is vociferously against ultra-nationalism and xenophobia of other representatives of the Russian Far Right and calls for tolerance towards non-Russian peoples of the Russian Federation. He nevertheless stops short in his multiculturallism as it is for the “Great Russian ethnos, which historically has been and still is the axis of state-building” that the special role in this state is reserved.

Dugin juxtaposes the “hate-based” ethnic nationalism that is “morbid, destructive, and provocative” to the “love-based” civic nationalism that is “healthy, creative, and life-assertive.” He wants Putin to

60 Dugin, “Mnenie. Vyzovy ksenofobii” (“An Opinion: Philosophy’s Challenges”), Vremia novostei, July 7, 2006. See also
adopt the “good”, imperialistic nationalism, or, in other words, neo-Eurasianism, as an official state ideology, as it is only within the framework of neo-Eurasianism that the state can provide a sound inter-ethnic policy based on the geopolitical might of Russia and the dominance of the Russian people, but also on respect for other peoples of this would-be-empire. This “love-based nationalism” is nothing to be ashamed of, assures Dugin.

The main voice of contemporary neo-Eurasianism, Dugin proposes specific recipes for each case of “resistance” against Russia in the “Near Abroad.” For Ukraine, he advocates dividing the country into two, acknowledging Western (and pro-European) and Eastern (and pro-Russian) bifurcation as a fait accompli. The former, Dugin mulls over, should join Europe, while the latter should become part of a unified state of Russia and Belarus. Ukraine should be split into two states. With Georgia it is a different story. In a Georgian newspaper, Dugin asserts that “none of the newly formed states of the “Near Abroad” had an independent political history, historically-justified borders, a ruling ideology” thus indicating that Georgia should not even consider that it deserves being an independent country. Thus, concludes Dugin, Russia’s “geopolitical patriotism” in the “Near Abroad” is fully justified. Based on geopolitical theories of Friedrich Ratzel, Halford Mackinder, Alfred Mahan, and Haushoffer, as well as those of Schmitt, Dugin tirelessly propagates the idea of a dualism between the Land (Russian Empire-USSR-Russia) and the Sea (Great Britain, USA, NATO). According to this theory, the Caucasian-Caspian region (North and South Caucasus) is a “coastal zone” which, from the point of view of the “Land” should be included under the sphere of continental influence, while from the point of view of the “Sea” should be used as a basis for expansion into the depths of Eurasia in order to secure politico-military and economic control over the “Land.” Colored revolutions in the “Near Abroad,” warns Dugin, demonstrate that the “Sea” is trying to eliminate the Russian influence in the Caucasus-Caspian region. The GUAM group, which includes Georgia, Ukraine, Moldova, Uzbekistan, and Azerbaijan, is viewed as an anti-Russian body working on the creation of a corridor between Afghanistan to Europe and NATO.


The purpose of the colored revolutions, according to neo-Eurasians, is to weaken Russia’s influence in post-Soviet space. Dugin accuses the West in mobilizing the populations in the “Near Abroad” and in organizing terrorist groups in the Northern Caucasus, where the West supposedly “raises the level of social activity, to aggravate the atmosphere around conflict situations to provide direct communication between organizations that uphold the most radical views.” The West, therefore, “influences people’s consciousness” and turns them into radical revolutionaries. Once the West destabilizes the situation in the Caucasus, it will extend, presages Dugin, its claws to the rest of the Russian Federation. In a very U.S. neo-conesque style, Dugin concludes that “an adequate system of measures should be set against the dangers…to Russian statehood”.

Neo-Eurasians find in Dugin a guiding light that they trust will lead them out of the crisis of modernity and provide an alternative to the Enlightenment project. Dugin foresees the coming Middle Ages, or post-modernity, which will be a return “not to the European Middle Ages with beautiful ladies, noble knights and Crusades, but to an Asiatic caliphate”. Similar to that of other “conservative revolutionaries,” Dugin’s discourse curiously combines the warnings against “present dangers” with reassertions of the decline of the enemy, in Dugin’s case - the West.

8. Those Who Never Sleep: Western Neo-Conservatives Revisited

As this paper reveals through the debates around the “Near Abroad,” Russian “neo-cons” are ideationally related to the following chain in the history of ideas: the neo-conservative cause survived through time, with modifications related to specific historical eras and geographies, from the Weimar Republic’s intellectuals who called for a Conservative Revolution, to the European and U.S. New Right, including U.S. neo-conservatives. Russian neo-conservatives and their early 20th century German counterparts are similar not only in their imperialist nationalism, but also in their methods, as, instead of direct participation in politics, they chose to act through civil society. Both groups are intellectuals who form think tanks, advocacy groups, and use printed media to create ideational spaces, with which they hope to influence national ideology and, eventually, foreign policy.

64 Ibid.
65 Ibid.
Originated in Germany in the 1920s and 1930s, the neo-conservative movement coincided in time with and had a tremendous impact on early Eurasianism, which was born in the Russian émigré circles in Europe. German neo-conservatism was an anti-liberal, anti-modernist response to democratic principles promoted by the Weimar Republic, and at the same time an opposition to Nazi radicalism. The first German neo-conservatives were publicists, pundits and scholars including Arthur Moeller van den Bruck, Schmitt (a student of Weber), Hans Freyer, Edgar Julius Jung and Ernst Jünger, all nationally inclined and anti-Westernist intellectuals who rebelled against the ideals of equality, fraternity and freedom, and aspired to foment a Conservative Revolution that would counter the modern Enlightenment project and bring the Weimar regime to an end.

Resonant with the German neo-conservatives’ drive, the first generation of U.S. “neo-cons” were former Democrats who became disillusioned with liberalism. Similarly to their German counterparts, these young intellectuals did not form a party nor were they prominent politicians, but promulgated their views through media, think tanks, and lobbying groups. The first neo-conservative grouping, the Committee on the Present Danger, was convened in 1950 in the aftermath of World War II with the purpose of building national consensus in containing the Soviet Union and sensitizing the United States to the threat of Communism. The Committee had a second birth in 1976 and once again included foreign policy experts and members of academia who were concerned with the U.S.’s seemingly dovish attitude and were driven to bring the Cold War to an end. Their Manichean worldview and an alarmist, bellicose attitude kept them in constant mobilization mode as their main goal was the same as that of their forefathers: to advocate an assertive policy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. The Committee on the Present Danger is still active today and has transformed into an anti-terrorist initiative that has direct influence on U.S. foreign policy.\textsuperscript{67} A hawkish worldview characterizes contemporary U.S. neo-conservatives who are prepared to face the “Evil,” and to fight - real or imagined - dangers and threats by any means. Lastly, one of the main defining characteristics of U.S. neo-conservatives is their belief in the moral superiority of the U.S. and that no other power can dictate to their country the rules of the game, as they are ready to promote liberal democracy across the globe.

As can be judged from all of the arguments presented above, U.S. and Russian “liberal” neo-conservatives are similar in their disillusionment with liberalism: correspondingly to U.S.

“neo-cons” who rebelled against the New Left in the 1970s-1980s, their Russian counterparts were driven by their conviction that something needs to be changed in order for the country to get out of the crisis which they perceived to be the result of the liberal democratic paradigm shift of the 1990s. Both U.S. and Russian “neo-cons” are also resonant in their intellectual links that go back to Leo Strauss and especially Schmitt. Thus, Boris Mezhuev, a contemporary philosopher influential in Russian neo-conservative circles brings Strauss as a witness to demonstrate that, despite his conservative views, Schmitt was a supporter of the liberal principles of freedom. Mezhuev notes that Schmitt’s patriotic discontent with the despondent situation Germany found itself in as a result of loosing the First World War, makes the German thinker into “one of the best exponents of the Russians’ worldview after the deconstruction of the Soviet empire in 1991.”68 Most importantly, U.S. and Russian neo-conservatives are twins in their imperialist nationalism. Paradoxically, Russian neo-conservatism is therefore both an ideational antithesis and yet a replica of U.S. neo-conservatism, as it combines beliefs in Russia’s uniqueness and messianic role in the world with calls for multilateralism and countering U.S. hegemony.

9. Conclusion. Imperialistic Nationalism: Old Wine in New Bottles?

The scholar who engages in the study of ideas – the ground stones that constitute the thread of the political life of a society, determine its values and orientations, form new ideologies, and often serve as an inspirational force behind decisions taken by politicians69 – enters a nebulous field that is neither categorized easily, nor conducive to systematic analysis. As a result, writing about intellectuals, who are the main “producers” of political ideas and ideologies and thus form a connecting link between the ideal world of reason and the empirical world of politics, is a veritable odyssey in a sea of overlapping trends and shifting allegiances. This paper delved into the thus far largely unexplored realm of contemporary Russian neo-conservative thought that constitutes an exotic blend of concepts and ideas that come from often opposing camps that transcend liberal and conservative, left and right, democratic and autocratic, nationalist and imperialist dichotomies. As such, Russian neo-conservatism stands apart and yet derives from all of the above as an eclectic and contradictory new proto-ideology.


The ideational palette in today’s Russia is composed of different hues of anti-democratic and imperialist-driven nationalism sprinkled with the waning remnants of increasingly unpopular liberalism. It is not only in Russia that post-Cold War, post-end-of-history nationalism precluded rather than coincided with the democratization of a formerly authoritarian society. As I have pointed out to the reader, the seemingly oxymoronic term “imperialistic nationalism” captures a set of ideas that inspires a group of intellectuals that represent a Russian version of neo-conservatism, which brings together what at first sight are opposing concepts of nationalism and imperialism and unites those who are otherwise adversaries. Similar to the Weimar Republic case witnessed by Max Weber, the Russian nationalism addressed in this paper is a conservative, imperialistic ideology. It is conservative in the sense that it is anti-modernizing, as opposed, for instance, to 18th century French civic nationalism. It is imperialistic in that it strives to expand Russia’s influence outside of its borders, explicating this drive by Weberian notions of common history and memories of certain political experiences shared with the peoples of the “Near Abroad.” During his last years, Weber has come to criticize the imperialistic nationalism of great powers, perhaps realizing that the “common destinies” argument is often used to justify expansionism and interventionism. Russia still awaits a comparable intellectual awakening to the somber reality of the forces of imperialist nationalism. In Vaclav Havel’s words, “there is always something suspect about an intellectual on the winning side”. Russian intellectuals have yet to re-embrace the tradition of the old intelligentsia and to assess their country’s foreign policy in critical and objective, not obsequious terms.

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THE SOURCES OF BANALITY IN TRANSFORMING TURKISH NATIONALISM

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Abstract

Turkish nationalism is a deep-rooted ideology which produced its own intellectual capital after the second half of the nineteenth century. Essentially, this ideology, as most of the others, had been based on the conventional dichotomy of ‘we and the other’, yet by the 1990s it disguised into another form of so-called banal nationalism, thereby deconstructing itself and leading to the emergence of new fractions which tended to conceptualize it from varied perspectives. This study primarily aims at discussing the general characteristics of the former and new forms of nationalisms in Turkey following a historical line highlighted with the incidents which can be taken as milestones in a process of nation-building, and which depict how ‘external’ and ‘internal’ others were deliberately chosen to steer the process of converting a traditional society into a modern Western-oriented one. The study also attempts to discuss how this process laid the foundations of the currently rising anti-Americanism and scepticism about so-called Europeanization.

1. Introduction

Nationalism is based on nation as a collective construction, in other words ‘the Self’, and ascribes it some sort of holiness through which it assumes that national values are superior, real and accurate only because they are owned by the nation. According to Smith, the national identity necessitates a symbolic or actual ‘other’ to emerge. In the same vein, the philosophical and historical discourses that gave birth to nationalism in the seventeenth and eighteenth century Europe procured the notion of sameness.\(^1\) This notion of sameness had been formulated into the realms of language, religion, culture, customs and played an outstanding role in the fabrication of ‘we-ness’ also. However, the indispensable factor for the existence of the ‘self’, is the co-existence of an ‘other’. In the reverse position, Barth also stressed that the ethnie is categorized from without, in other words, by the other as well.\(^2\)

Wendt also underlines that the identity construction process needs others and ‘the role of any given other can change during various phases of national

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identity construction and maintenance. According to Wendt, the identity construction process is continuous and along different phases the identity is strenuously produced and reproduced. During this process, political elite as the agent of identity construction invents and reinvents several others. Williams stressed that others can be categorized spatially-territorially in this process as internal and external others.

For instance Fontana holds that in the course of the construction of the European identity, barbarians, pagans, heretics, Turks and Muslims appeared rotatively as external and internal others as depended on the conjuncture in different times. As Hermans mentioned, the self can move from one spatial position to another in accordance with the changes in the conditions and time. Hence, the self as the vital ingredient in the construction of national identity can evolve as a subject to the others which are selected by the political elite in line with its political priorities. On the other side, the substitution of an internal for the external other, or vice versa, is time and space bounded. Turkish nationalism can not be exempted from what other nationalisms experienced in this context.

2. Determining the Internal and External Others for Turkish Nationalism

Turkish nationalism is a reflexive ideology that flourished along the process of the Ottoman Empire’s dismemberment. If one takes its roots, it was the Occidental paradigm that overshadowed its entire discourse. However it also contained the whole paradoxes of Occidentalism too in that it harbored the references to westernization and secularization along with antinomiously anti-westernization. Since its scratch point, the Turkish nationalism, as did the other nationalisms, had fabricated its first own external other. In the nineteenth century, Balkan nationalisms produced the concept of Turkokratia (a euphemism for five-century-long Turkish overlordship in the Balkans) as a motive serving to the nation-constructing process. Consequently, Turkish nationalism appeared as a reactive movement which channeled its energy from rebellious Balkan nationalisms and in the first hand chose “the Greek” and “Bulgar” as external others.

Although, the idea of deporting non-Muslim groups from the fatherland was inherited in the nationalist program of

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the Progress and Union, in reality deportation was a conventional policy which since their beginnings other Balkan nationalisms was widely employed in their nation-building schemes. It follows that the Armenian deportation of 1915, the deportation of Rums (Turkish Greeks) from Trabzon, and the Syrian deportation from Southeast Anatolia were the natural outputs of this program. The deportation of non-Muslims in Turkish lands can also be taken as a sign that Turkish nationalism had eventually found its first internal other, as Dundar mentioned. The reason why the former Ottoman subjects who were not Muslim or Turk were considered as the internal other was their nationalist projects with its implications i.e., massacres targeting Turkish communities, their forceful immigration, the circulation of news and rumors among Turks of Armenian or Rum brutalities in the mentioned regions. Similarly, the same factors played an important role in sustaining of hostilities towards non-Muslim elements in Turkish society after the establishment of the modern Turkish republic. For instance, in the 1920s the campaigns calling the citizens to speak Turkish obviously targeted the non-Muslim elements rather than Muslim non-Turkish speaking citizens.

The period of 1923 to 1939 is frequently called the Kemalist era; however it must be understood simply as a phase in the process of evolution of Turkish nationalism which took its start in the nineteenth century. As for the characteristics of this new version of Turkish nationalism, its strong anti-European overtone was distinguishable. The nationalist rhetoric of the period was dominated by the negative themes such as anti-imperialism and the call for vigilance against the great powers’ aspirations to invade the fatherland or destroy national unity. Ironically, this setting begetted another and controversial political stand, that I presume as a paradox of Occidentalism, once the fledgling Turkish state started to attempt to be accepted as an in-group member by the Westerners along the same period. Moreover, the outstanding internal other remained the non-Muslims citizens. With the Etabli Agreement on 30 January 1923 signed in Lozan, 1,200,000 Orthodox Christians from Anatolia, and 500,000 Muslims from Greece mutually defected for their homelands. This agreement was in reality a successful legal deportation and constituted an essential step in the nationalist program aiming for the Turkification and Islamization of Anatolia. Interestingly, since the criteria for enlistment in the groups to immigrate was religious affiliation, the Karaman Turks who were in reality ethnically Turk but religiously Christian had to leave the country.

7 Fuat Dundar, Ittihat ve Terakki’nin Müslümanları Iskan Politikası (1913 - 1918), (Istanbul: İletisim, 2001): 18.

By the 1930s ethnic nationalism held its sway in Turkey. Ethnic nationalism is a form of nationalism that defines the roots of identity on the basis of commonly shared ethnic, cultural, religious and blood bonds, and dictates an ethnically homogenous community of citizens. Ethnic nationalism considers the nation as a genealogical structure. In 1930s Turkey, the formal institutions that became the locomotive of restructuring the society in line with the requirements of ethnic nationalism were the Foundations for Turkish Language and Turkish History. The construction of Turkish identity required an elaborate definition of Turkness and both the institutions strove to construct philological and historical evidence proving its perennial character. Besides, the period is the starting point of the access of primordial symbols to Turkish nationalism. Primordialism derives from an idea of togetherness nested on the bonds of blood, race, language, religion, region and customs. In this period, the symbols such as Bozkurt, Asena and Ergenekon were selected deliberately to point out the existence of the nation since the timelessness which was solely narrated through myths and legends.

This time, the external other was drawn from the Muslim fellows, Arabs. Thanks to the development of a strong secular vision, the ethnic nationalism in Turkey along the 1930s entered into a new phase with the words of Berkes; in which Turkness came to be conceptualized as distant both to the Arabs and Islam. On the other hand, the desire for being perceived by the West as an in-group member buttressed the image of non-civilized and backward Arab. Discursively, Turkish society started to be cognized as a part of the civil world, and “Arab”, “fellah” (Arabian peasant), “bedevil”; actually the established stereotypes which had prevailed even during the Ottoman times, turned into the stressed negative prefixes almost always attached to whatever defined the geography of the south of Turkey thereby becoming a new external other for Turkish nationalism. Acceptance of Western style garments, the Latin alphabet and calendar can also be understood as a deliberate design to place distance between Turks and Arabs, an extension of the nationalist objective to incorporate Turkey into the West. This is the very reason why Turks still react angrily to scenes in Hollywood movies or Western media portraying themselves riding camels in the middle of desert.

The second half of the 1930s can be called the “Anatolianist” period of Turkish nationalism. Anatolianism as a cultural nationalism form had also modernist overtones. It was firstly coined by Halide Edip in 1918, and later gained a common parlance among the members of intellectual schools of the 1930s such as Ekrem Akurgal, Azra Erhat and A. Kadir. Anatolianism embraces the primordial themes, like autochthony, and presumes the genealogical linkage between the modern Turks and the ancient peoples whose civilizations are thought by the Westerners to have laid the foundations of the modern Western civilization.

According to Tachau, Anatolianism connotes that the crystallization of the Turkish identity among the peoples who resided in Anatolia since the antiquity, took its start with the Seljuk Turks, the Turkish state having undeniably organic bonds with the modern Turkish republic, and eventually today embodied in the Turkish nation.

However, the 1930s was the zenith of racist and fascist nationalisms in Europe, and the Turkish nationalists were inevitably imbued with it. The articles which were published in the journal of ‘The Turkish Review of Anthropology’ between 1925 and 1939, the physiognomic differences between Turkish and the so-called other races living in Turkey -Rum, Levanten, Armenian and Jewish- were examined. Maksudyan claimed that by fabricating a language Turkish intellectuals adhered to the ranks of Western racists striving to portray the studies of race as scientific. This scientific narration affected the other fields of social sciences and racism appeared as an ideology at the end of the 1930s. Hüseyin Nihal Atsiz, who is accepted as one of the pioneers of Turkish racist ideology of ‘Turanism’, developed an expansionist and irredentist rhetoric with his novels ‘Bozkurtlarin Olumu’ (The Death of the Grey Wolves, 1946) and “Bozkurtlar Diriliyor” (The Rebirth of the Grey Wolves, 1949).

Turanism harbored the well-known motives of primordialistic nationalism, staunchly opposed to Republican nationalism which saw Turkey as the sole Turkish land, and to communism which tried to annihilate the Turks in their original place, Central Asia. Despite his unpopularity among the state elite, Atsiz’s opinions were in line with, albeit in extreme fashion, state policies which perceived communists as both an internal and external other. Even though Atsiz was punished for his racist and Turanist thoughts by the regime, his anti-communist views were

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in reality accepted by the formal ideology.

On the other side, during this period, Turkish nationalism established a cognitive linkage between communism and Allawis (Shiate Turks) thereby creating another internal other with its unpredictable implications in the sectarian realm in Turkey. In the 1950’s, during the Democrat Party rule, the formal ideology accepted the Sunnite Islam as an officially recognized sect. Hence, Allawis tended initially to support the Republican People’s Party (RPP), solely for it was in opposition, but after the 1960 coup they established their own political party, Turkish Unity Party (TUP). Growing politicization and affiliation with socialist ideals raised the tensions between Allawis and Turkish nationalistic groups during the 1970s and led to massacres in the towns of Kahramanmaras and Corum in 1978.

The campaign for the Turkification of capital in Turkey, a vivid imitation of Nazi policies targeting Jews in Germany in the 1930s, was another aspect of the Turkish nationalism of the 1940s. Nazism had fabricated a legacy claiming that the Jewish capital was ruling the world economy and a group of Turkish ruling elite embraced the similar anti-semitic myth for varied reasons. For instance, the Capital Tax (Law No. 4305) in 1942 which was declared to have levied for once as a part of the economic measures during World War II swiftly disguised into an effective instrument of deliberate intimidation targeting non-Muslims. Accordingly, Muslim Turks had to pay a tax corresponding to 12.5 percent of their total valuable assets, whereas non-Muslims 50 percent and the Donmes (Sabetayists and others converted to Islam) 25 percent. Consequently, as intended, half of the property of non-Muslims and a quarter of Donme’s property was confiscated and transferred to Muslim Turks. In order to pay the tax in the predetermined time, non-Muslims had to sell their properties to Turk/Muslim capital owners on low prices. The others, who could not raise the required amount, were sent to the labor camps.

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The riots of 6–7 September 1955 demonstrated that along the 1950s non-Muslims retained their position of the internal other. During the incidents that lasted only four hours, thousands of shops and houses belonging to non-Muslim citizens were damaged, seventy-three churches were burned down and two Rum cemeteries were desecrated by Turkish rioters. The incidents began upon the news that the house of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the founder of modern Turkey, was bombed in Thessaloniki. According to Kuyucu, “one needs to situate these riots in the broader historical context of the emergence, development and crystallisation of Turkish nationalism and national identity that marked the non-Muslim citizens of the republic as the ‘others’ and potential enemies of the real Turkish nation.” On the other hand, behind the incidents there were some other reasons too. In Cyprus, the Greeks started to fight for liberating the island from the British government with the ultimate aim of enosis. Interestingly, the Greek assaults targeted the Turkish inhabitants of the island was perceived as a communist design to destroy the Turkish existence on the island. The rioters seemed to have forged, very naively, a linkage between the Greeks on the island, Rums in Istanbul and communists in general.

After the 1955 riots, increasing hostility towards Rums led to their migration in masses to Greece or the US. The Greek population in Istanbul was around 280,000 after the Etabli agreement. However their number dropped by 107,000 in 1960, and 76,000 in 1965 when the Cyprus problem reached at its climax. During the 1970s Greek migration continued, and the beginning of the 1980s saw another mass defection. The main factor of this new migration wave was the military coup in September 1980. During the period following the military rule, Turkish-Islam Synthesis (TIS) became tacitly accepted and promoted official ideology. The Islamist and naturally discriminative character of TIS inflicted the secular structure of the Turkish state and made life more difficult for non-Muslims in the country. In 1985 the number of Greeks Turkey dropped to 5000, and it is estimated today the number declined around 2000.

Kurds were also earmarked as another internal other. Laçiner ve Bal underlines that this hostility was derived from the resistance of Islamist Kurdish tribes to the new secular state. In January 1930, a secret document regarding Turkification of the Settled Peoples (İskana Tabi Tutulanların ‘Turkleştirilmesi Uygulamasına İlişkin Gizli Genelge) envisaged the Turkification of toponyms and names of

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the persons with Kurdish origin who would appeal for identity cards for the first time.\textsuperscript{24} In the 1950s the Democrat Party government continued to pursue the policy by renaming the lands where Kurds predominantly populated. For this objective, in 1956 an ‘Expert Commission on Name Change’ (\textit{Ad Degistirme Ihtisas Komisyonu}) was established under the auspices of the Ministry of the Interior.\textsuperscript{25}

After the 1960 coup the national Kurdish movement came to be dominated by a Marxist vision, hence this change buttressed the position of otherness in the eyes of the Turkish majority.\textsuperscript{26} 1984 is the year of metamorphosis for the Kurdist movement. One of the fractions in the movement, PKK (Parti Karkaren Kurdistan, Kurdish Workers Party) which was prone to use violence for the Kurdish cause mixed with Marxist objectives, eliminated the other groups and began terrorist attacks. As Kocher mentioned, the PKK killed not only soldiers and police but also mayors, schoolteachers, and tribal chiefs, and anyone whom it perceived as an actual or potential collaborator with the state.\textsuperscript{27} After 15 years of violence, in 1999, Ocalan, the leader of PKK was captured in Kenya and the dissolution process of the PKK began. Consequently, after the occupation of Iraq by the US, the Kurdist secessionists in Turkey established an organic tie with the Barzani fraction in Northern Iraq. This kin-state bond between Kurdish secessionists and Northern Iraq Kurds prompted, naturally, a vociferous reaction from ardent Turkish nationalists.

In sum, Kurds, Allawis and non-Muslims were earmarked by the Turkish nationalists as internal others. Cyclically, the Turkish nationalism perception of external “others” has changed across time. The first external “others” were the Balkan nations which rebelled against the Ottoman Empire, then UK and France appeared as external others as occupiers of Anatolia. Through the secularization process, Arabs and the Arabic way of life also became the external other. Moreover, the communists have been perceived as external others in the Cold War era. Currently, particularly after the invasion of Iraq, Northern Iraq Kurds and the US seemed to have become external others. One can conclude that, depending on the perceived threat, Turkish

nationalistic fervency shows ebbs and flows. In the advancing pages, I will dwell upon the new nationalistic wave in Turkey by handling the assault on the US on 11 September as the starting point.

3. European Union, Norm Diffusion and Rupture of Nationalist Movement

The EU, as a post-modern force in international relations, is the most significant actor in diffusion of norms which were constructed in the supranational level. Needless to say, democratization in the Eastern Europe during the 1990s owed considerably to the EU’s policies which aimed at creating a stability aura around the union. In Turkey too, full membership prospects since the 1999 Helsinki Summit accelerated the process of accommodating the political system with the norms promoted by the EU as well.

The Abolishment of the death penalty, abrogation of State Security Courts (Devlet Güvenlik Mahkemeleri), dropping the articles recognizing adultery as a crime from the civil code, relative freedom in the usage of minority languages and forming associations, developments in freedom of speech and so forth increased the quality of democratic life in the country. In the Progress Reports which were prepared after 2003, the problems were not turned a blind eye, yet, the Commission almost always expressed its satisfaction for the progress Turkish governments displayed in the relevant issues.

This speedy transformation of values which were inculcated by an external actor like the EU, rather than generated by the Turkish society itself naturally prompted social resistance. The concrete social stratum which we observe this resistance is mostly the Turkish nationalists. Canefe and Bora pointed out that, besides the speed of transformation, there were some intellectual roots of the anti-European movement in Turkish nationalism. The mainstream Turkish nationalists, who define the Turkish identity with TIS, produced a strong occidentalist narration against Europe. In the national anthem (İstiklal Marsı) [European] civilization was portrayed as a monster with a single remaining tooth. The words of Çemil Meric, a well-known Turkish nationalist intellectual reflects the deep Eurosceptism embedded in Turkish nationalism as such; “European ‘success story’ has come about thanks to pitiless barbarian and tyrannical acts of destruction and occupation of other nations”.

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31 Ibid: 141-142.
However, one should accept that at the roots of Eurosceptism of Turkish nationalism ‘Sevres Trauma’ lays down. The frequently used occidentalist slogan of Turkish nationalists defines the Turkish people as “the heroic nation who dashed the Sevres, the treaty dictated by the imperialist Europe to the nation in the end of the First World War”. The treaty had envisaged the sharing of Anatolia, the Turkish homeland between to-be-established Kurdistan, Armenia and Pontus Greek states. However, after the War of Liberation against Greeks, as the proxy of imperialist powers which intended to annihilate nation, Sevres became a dead-born document. The legacies of the liberation struggle left deep scratches on Turkish nationalists. Cooperation of non-Muslim minorities with occupiers, Islamist rebels in Bolu, Duzce and Hendek, and the Kurdish rebellion led by Seikh Sait and their resistance to the revolution after the war were all the traumas providing effective arsenal to the ardent nationalist groups.

Ironically, nationalist groups in Turkey which run a vociferous rejectionist policy against the process of integration of Turkey with the EU, the leaders of the major nationalist party, the Nationalist Movement Party (NMP), the junior partner of the ruling coalition before Justice and Development Party (JDP) government, put their signature on the Helsinki and Accession Partnership Documents, which turned Turkey into a candidate country for membership. This action of the NMP led to the incorporation of the term ‘betrayer’ into the jargon used by nationalist echelons and beyond it to the bifurcation in the nationalist flank in which particularly a fraction defining itself ‘ulusalci’ (nationalistic) became vocal.32 In reality, the concept of ulusalci had been a term which in the 1970s Maoist leftist fractions in Turkey employed to differ themselves from Marxist-Leninists. However in the 2000s, the concept is loaded with an anti-Islamist, even racist, meaning. On the other side, the NMP actually resisted to the encroachments of set of norms oriented from the EU. Kubicek stresses that the NMP disclosed its opposition by conducting a rejectionist campaign against the legislation allowing broadcast and education in Kurdish.33 Besides, Müftüler Baç reminds us that abolishing of death penalty disturbed the Turkish nationalists once they perceived the legislation as a rescue operation for Ocalan.34

32‘Milliyetçi’ and ‘ulusalci’ both means nationalist. The only difference between the two words is their etymological roots. Etymologically the word ‘milliyetçi’ is Arabic, the word ‘ulusalci’ is Mongolian. The groups which express themselves as ‘ulusalci’, uses the word to emphasize the difference in their attitude to the TIS nationalism of NMP.
Ulusalci’ movement organised itself in the Labour Party (İşçi Partisi, IP), Turkish Left Magazine (Türk Solu Dergisi), Associations of Ataturkist Thought (Atatürkçü Düşünce Dernekleri, ADD), Association of Turkish Lawyers Union (Türk Hukukçular Birliği Derneği) and NGOs that adopted the names of the prominent resistance organizations which were established before the formation of regular army in the 1920s, such as Protection of Law (Müdafaa-i Hukuk) and National Forces (Kuvva-i Milliye). Ulusalci movement played a pivotal role in the rejectionist camp during the process for Annan plan referendum in Cyprus, in the indictment Turkish intellectuals for violation of Article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code involving acts humiliating Turkness. On the other side, the ulusalci movement found a considerable support in some other Turkish elite who disturbed from a government under the rule of a party which they assumed to be pro-Islamist.

4. Islamist Challenge and Nationalist Resistance

Religion had been seen only as a folkloric motive in the secular structure of Republican revolution of Turkey. Fuller expresses that the state started to control and fought religion with revolution. However, as Tibi claims that this state project made even the Turkish secular elite to capitulate so that institutions could become secular, but not the society. Although, the traditional Turkish Islamism was a challenger to the regime, it contained a nationalistic character too. For instance, the leader of the time, of Islamic Salvation Party (SP) Necmettin Erbakan published a manifesto in 1975 so-called National Vision (Milli Görüs) carrying neo-Ottomanist motives. Yet, 1979 Iran Islamic Revolution transformed the general character of Islamist movements in the Muslim world, including those in Turkey as well.

Until the 1990s, the traditional neo-Ottomanist paradigm of Turkish Islamism and the the other fraction that Tibi defines as a part of global Islamist rebellion lived together as opposing parts in the Welfare Party. In the Nationalist Front Coalitions of the 1970s and before the 1991 elections, the parties sharing different versions of

37 Bassam Tibi, Bogazin Iki Yakası, Avrupa İle İslâmcilik Arasında Türkiye, translated by Sevinc Kabakçıoğlu, (İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2000): 63.
39 Tibi, Bogazin …, 73.
National Vision, made alliances with the NMP. However by the end of Cold War, the alliance of Islamists and nationalists drew to close. The traditional and rebellionist paradigms of Turkish Islamists broke off all communications with each other after the post-modern coup of 28 February 1997. Neo-Ottomanist traditionalists established Contentment Party (CP, Saadet Partisi), whereas the other flank which defined itself as transformists established the JDP. The party came to the rule after 2001 elections, thanks to the support of liberals and pro-EU.

As mentioned above, nationalist movement underwent a bifurcation in the 1990s. The Ulusalci movement swiftly became one of the harshest critics of the current pro-Islamist JDP government. However, JDP did its way as follows from its redefinition itself as ‘conservative democrat’ and not an Islamist political party. Nevertheless the JDP is still criticized very strongly by the statist elite as having a clandestine agenda which purports to turn the secular regime into a Islamist one. The Ulusalci movement runs a vociferous blackening campaign by accusing the JDP of betraying the nation hand in hand with liberals and pro-EU democrats. Furthermore, the strong emphasis of Turkishness in its political rhetoric gradually gained a racist overtone.

5. Northern Iraq Kurdistan Problem and the Demur of Turkish Nationalists

The US invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq impressed all the nationalist movements in the Middle East. Arab and Turkish nationalisms simultaneously perceived the military activities a threat posed by an already unreliable ally. On the contrary, the rise of Kurdish nationalism due to the new conditions in the wake of the Iraq war provided nationalists with considerable political ammunition.

The Northern Iraq Kurdish Federal region, which was established after the 1991 Gulf War, consolidated its autonomy particularly after the occupation of Iraq. When Ocalan was arrested his terrorist organization began to weaken, however, this time the separatist fraction of Turkish Kurds found a kin-state to themselves, and some sort of gravity-pull effect appeared between Iraqi and Turkish Kurds. Maull first defined the gravity-pull effect which was observed between the EU and its neighbours. Maull claims that the effect is “based on the weight of its (EUs’) markets, capital and technological resources, as well as on the attractiveness of the European way of life.” Similarly, the poverty, unemployment and human rights violations in the Southeast of Turkey constituted the assets enabling the parties to share a common cause. Due to its support of the US, the Kurdish


41 Maull, “Europe and …”, 779.
administration in Northern Iraq was allowed to benefit from the oil revenue of northern Iraq. This gravity-pull effect sprung from changes in northern Iraq is also taken by Turkish nationalists as a serious threat having domestic and external resources.

In order to deal with the threat, Turkish nationalism chose as its target the Kurdish administration in Iraq, began to play the card of Turkmens of northern Iraq. Like Barkey expressed, the Iraq Turkmens issue is a newly emerged issue in Turkish Foreign Policy after the 1990s. The foreign policy makers of Turkey brought to the surface the Iraq Turkmens issue, in reality a problem having a long past, due to using as a pretext to intervene into Iraq in case of the collapse of Iraq as a whole. Barkey claims that the Iraqi Turkmen Front has established as a part of that policy: “Turkey has been instrumental in the creation of the Iraqi Turkmen Front (ITF), an organization it wants the Turkmen to rally around.”42 The city of Kerkuk, in Northern Iraq was a region that the Turkmen population populated densely for centuries. Rich oil resources of the province made it vitally important for the survival of the Kurdish administration here. Concomitantly, the Kurdish administration in Kerkuk deliberately destroyed the official document regarding land ownership and the population’s ethnic composition right after the US occupation to prevent a possible Turkmen demand for holding a plebiscite for joining Turkey. In this posturing, Ulusalcs made a coalition with Kemalists and began to assault Iraq policy of the JDP by accusing its leading cadre of betraying the Iraq Turkmens who long waited for such an opportunity to embrace with their kins in their true homeland. That was a decisive moment in that ulusalci movement succeeded in gathering all anti-JDP groups under the same roof ranging from nationalists, elitists, statistos, racists and anti-non-Muslim indeed.

6. Global Anti-Westernization after 11 September and Banal Nationalism in Turkey

The occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan led to reawakening the East-West dichotomy. Nieuwkerk states that a new type of racism called Islamophobia spread rapidly; “Islam is not only perceived as the ‘ultimate cultural other’ but Islam as a cultural system and Muslims as believers are also constructed as an immutable category”.43 Similarly, Paz claims that anti-Americanism (and generally anti-Westernism) which emerged by the


1990s, gathered its pace after 11 September in Islamic world too.\textsuperscript{44}

As for the Turkish nationalism, it is anxious about Iraq and Afghanistan occupations, the general anti-Western tendency growing in the Islamic world after 11 September and a new version that Bilig defines as ‘banal nationalism’ came to the fore.\textsuperscript{45} Bilig observed that a shallow patriotic narration which was produced by media is very effective in political life of England. A new type of political movement which nourished by this narration leads to a shallow nationalism in western societies.\textsuperscript{46} Yumul and Ozkirimli too describe this new kind of nationalism after 1990’s as banal nationalism by drawing conclusion from what happened in Turkey along the 1990s.\textsuperscript{47} They analyze the debate in the columns in Turkish media by classifying them into topics of religion, internal and external enemies, cultural distinctiveness, past, present and future, prestige, economy, Cyprus issue and sports, and come to the conclusion that no matter what author discusses the mentioned issues, and what ideological background his/her approach, all them indiscriminately tend to use a shallow nationalist narration.

\textsuperscript{44} Reuven Paz , “Islamists and anti-Americanism”, Middle East Review of International Affairs 7:4 (December 2003).
\textsuperscript{45} Michael Billig, Banal Nationalism (London: Sage Publications, 1995).
\textsuperscript{46} Billig, Banal… 109.

The internal others of the banal nationalist narration which can be observed as having racist, antisemitic and anti-non-Muslim overtone, are mostly the Greek Patriarchate in Istanbul, Turkish Armenians, liberal intellectuals, Christian missionaries and pro-EU groups. The Banal nationalist approach adopts a narration, as observed in the Turkish media, which frequently claims that the minorities are in betrayal, liberals try to damage Turkish economy, and the pro-EU groups open the door to a looming threat of European occupation. Obviously, the most undesirable result of the rise of banal nationalism was the murder of Priest Andrea Santoro of Saint Mary Church in Trabzon on 5 February 2006 and Hrant Dink, the editor of Turkish Armenians’ Agos Newspaper in Istanbul on 19 January 2007. Turkish intellectuals Elif Safak and Orhan Pamuk who was awarded with prestigious Nobel, were also harassed in front of the court building they went to their trial on accusations of breaching Article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code entailing verbal assault to the honor of the nation. In another event, the members of TAYAD (Turkish Initials Stand for The Association of Solidarity with the Families of Prisoners) who ran a campaign to protest the conditions in prisons were encountered with a serious lynching attempt of radicals as well.

The banal nationalism also grasped the idea that the US occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan was a part of a new crusade campaign particularly after
President Bush made a faux pas when the word slipped off from his mouth during a press conference on 22 September 2001. It stressed that Turkey as a Muslim country was also selected one of the victims of this crusade campaign, and labelled the non-Muslims as the fifth-column inviting the invaders. The calls of these groups could be understood a futile attempt to create the atmosphere of the liberation war of the 1920s and particularly their constant references to the dead-born Sevres Treaty and legacies of occupation proved this thesis to be true indeed.

7. Conclusion

Recently, the Turkish political has begun to be dominated by two challenging flanks of political right, the one which defines itself conservative democrat with Islamic motives on the one hand, and banal nationalism which defines itself ‘ulusalci’ on the other. It follows that this confrontation is inherited in the complexities of the long history of the modernization of the Turkish state along with transformation of its formerly traditional society. After the crystallization of the ethnic/national differences within the former cosmos of Muslims, as in each national parcels of the declining empire, the Turkish intellectuals also embarked upon the business of carving up of a distinct Turkish identity firstly by dissolving or deconstructing it into its components, i.e., Islam and idiosyncratically Turkness, in parallel with the modernization and secularization of state.

On the other side, although the Western political institutions and even culture have been taken as model, ironically, the fear of colonization by the West seems to have remained intact, as understood from the conjunctural ebb and flow of the the so-called Sevres syndrome in Turkish political rhetoric. Cultural proselytization from Arabian influence continued with the process of proselytizing the nation as well; as in the case of elimination of other ‘alien’ (read non-Muslim) elements inside in the heyday of fascism on the eve of the Second World War. However, feeling of obligation to confess Turkness and act accordingly because of fear of looming Western or external plot remained at the local level as witnessed in the 1958 riots in Istanbul. What made the trauma much more debilitating was infiltration of socialist ideals in the 1960s and swift groupings with Islamist and nationalistic even racist overtone against them in the two decades to come. The period following the 1980 military coup reflected how the contents of the Islamic and nationalist ideologies actually overlap each other, as witnessed in the rise of the Motherland Party. However, the post-modern coup of 28 February indicated the limitations of the tolerance to the pro-Islamic encroachment inside the firmly preserved secular state structure and driving the latter to give a fresh start to cleansing fossilized cadres which are proud of maintaining respectable head of religious sects in the country.
Besides the economic reforms, mostly characterized by reforming the sector of finance and privatization, had to go hand in hand with political liberalization heralded a new and unprecedently dynamic process of integration with the global economy and the West, particularly Europe, as the most significant driving force behind. However, besides still unsolved problems ranging from PKK terror to Cyprus, the privatization and liberalization also flown into the same reservoir from which nationalist groups adeptly pick up and brandish the disturbing matters to the public. Ironically, right at this moment, the so-called Sevres syndrome gained the commonest parlance ever and the legacies of the Liberation War of the 1920s became much more circulating in the media particularly after the JDP came to power, mostly thanks to the incapability of the modernist flank to safeguard its unity. The center-left opposition also quickly adjoined the ranks of the marginal groups which resembled the conditions to those of the traumatic first years of the fledgling republic when the founding fathers had to deal as much with external foes as religious reactionism inside. The second Gulf War, adoption of decisions regarding so-called Armenian genocide in the European parliaments, rise of objections in Europe to Turkey’s membership to European Union, looming prospect of a Kurdish state in the northern Iraq, the mini crisis on the sacks over the heads of the Turkish soldiers in northern Iraq all contributed gradually to becoming formerly marginal groups, such as old Maoist now Kemalist Turkish Labor Party, more vocal in political arena. Media also followed the same suit thereby helping the escalation of this ‘saving regime’ crisis and its overshadowing the policies of economic and political liberalization in Turkey.

No suspect that, the last debate over the JDP’s candidacy for the presidential post has debilitated the situation. However, as some political observers with true sense stressed, the extent of integration of Turkey with the global economy and the Western world is the major factor preventing Turkish state to yield this domestic political turmoil which may lead to slow pedaling liberalization. It follows that Turkey also experiences along with the other nations throughout the world, the traumas of rising confrontation between the West and East, probably as a visible part of world systemic shift after the end of Cold War. As mentioned above, the ebb and flow of Turkish nationalism, with its most extreme form, banal nationalism, can not be insulated from external developments, and consequently, the changes in store may unfold its probable different versions in the decades to come.

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TOWARDS A NEW KIND OF LEGITIMACY? JAN GROSS’S NEIGHBORS AND POLAND’S RECKONING WITH THE PAST

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Abstract

This article discusses the controversy surrounding Jan Gross’ book *Neighbors – The Destruction of the Jewish Community of Jedwabne, Poland.* Rather than review arguments and protagonists of the debate in Poland, I concentrate here on its meaning as a source of state legitimacy. I argue that the Jedwabne issue has been employed by ‘Westernizing’ Polish elites to bolster Poland’s credentials as a modern democratic state and that it is an important part of a new kind of mnemonic legitimacy. While I contend that this discussion has overall had the positive effect of diversifying many Poles’ attitudes towards their history and enabling a more nuanced confrontation with the past, I also acknowledge that the instrumentalization of memory can lead to a serious backlash.

1. For Eastern Europeans the past is not just another country but a positive archipelago of vulnerable historical territories.¹

Discourses about the meaning of the past have multiple layers wherever they take place. However, in East-Central Europe (ECE), where the experience of communist rule is still fresh, these memories take on a particularly tangled form. Who may claim the mantle of victimhood or innocence is far from clear-cut, as mnemonic remainders of the period of German occupation and the Holocaust are both redefined and supplemented by the legacy of the communist regimes.

Thus, the debate over the correct interpretation and usability of the past, by now familiar to all European societies, has taken on a unique character in ECE. Here, this debate reflects a ‘duality of confronting the past:’ in contrast to most Western European states directly after the Second World War, ECE is not dealing with one temporally limited period of trauma which must continuously be renegotiated, but rather with this episode as seen through the prism of over forty years of communist rule. The citizens of these countries must not only come to terms with omissions and crimes committed by their compatriots which are now coming to light, but must re-evaluate how they have been thinking about these experiences for the last six decades. In particular, they must grapple with inevitable comparisons of

public behavior under fascist and communist totalitarianisms, and the unfavorable analogies which might be drawn between them.

This article’s topic is the ongoing discussion about the past in Poland and, more specifically, Jan T. Gross’s *Neighbors – The Destruction of the Jewish Community of Jedwabne, Poland*. The debate about this book usefully encapsulates a range of important issues which, though in some ways uniquely Polish, nevertheless are relevant to a host of European societies. Rather than launch into a lengthy review of arguments and different protagonists of the discourse in Poland, I want to concentrate here on its meaning as a source of state legitimacy. It is the contention of this article that ‘Westernizing’ Polish elites skillfully used the debate surrounding *Neighbors* to bolster their image of a modern democratic society worthy of joining international institutions. Poland is therefore a good illustration of the increasing importance of memory as a component of state legitimacy (and thus sovereignty) in the international arena, especially in the European Union (EU). The reprimanding and shunning of Austria after the right-wing Freedom Party under Jörg Haider joined the government, as well as pressure on Turkey to acknowledge the Armenian genocide as part of the accession process to the EU, are further examples. Thus, the local negotiation over memory in Poland should be regarded as both spurred by, and influencing, international relations.

I argue, then, that the debate over *Neighbors* has been employed by liberal Polish elites to enhance Poland’s credentials as a modern democratic state and is an important part of a new kind of mnemonic legitimacy. This legitimacy is based on projecting a particular image to an external audience. It contrasts with the type of mnemonic legitimacy that was fostered under the communist regime which harnessed a heroic past of resistance and innocence to enhance internal legitimacy and augment support from the Polish population. I contend that the use of Holocaust memory for external legitimation has had a positive effect in that it produced a more nuanced understanding of history in Polish society. The Jedwabne debate challenged the prevailing one-sided self-image of Poles as exclusively innocent victims. A gradual realization that Poles too have a complex past in which overwhelming suffering occurred simultaneously with the perpetration of

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3 By ‘Westernizing elites’, I mean those political and social elites who strive to orient Poland towards European and other Western institutions and who are commonly to be located in the left or center of the political spectrum. I would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing out this distinction.
shocking crimes is taking shape. I argue that this realization entails the potential for a very positive reflection on the need to honestly debate the past and to take responsibility: Poles, Jews, Germans, and Communists must no longer be relegated to one-dimensional historical categories but rather rethought in a non-relativizing dialogue. However, I also note that there are potentially negative consequences of this instrumentalization of memory by elites. Some scholars have argued that the Jedwabne issue has impeded a genuine reckoning with the past in local communities and has enabled populist forces to revitalize nationalist rhetoric for political mobilization.

The two-sided consequences of the Jedwabne debate speak to the dynamic between the individual memories and historical attitudes of Poles on the one hand, and official memory on the other. While state-driven memory discourse can transform the public’s interpretation of the past in a positive manner, it can also exist in contradiction to popular beliefs or even cause resentment. Before I discuss the use of the past under communism and post-communism in Poland, a brief explanation of individual and collective memory is in order.

2. Mémoire and souvenir – conflicting memories?

Processes of identity formation are inseparable from the individual and collective memories which are cultivated in a society. Jan-Werner Müller conceptualizes the interaction between identity and memory: “Identity – understood as a relational concept and as sameness over time – is established by what is remembered, and itself then leads in turn to certain pasts being remembered and others being forgotten: in this sense, and as Renan first pointed out, remembrance and forgetting depend on each other.”

Forgetting, or the privileging of certain memories over others, takes place at individual as well as collective levels. In the context of modern Poland, the formation of individual and collective memories and their impact on collective identity is important because it allows us to more fully understand a potentially new source of state legitimacy.

Müller makes a distinction between collective and individual memory. ‘Mass individual memory’ or souvenir denotes the recollection of events which people actually lived through. To this one can add the remembrances which are passed on through the generations, mainly in families. Collective memory or mémoire on the other hand, serves as the social framework through which individuals can organize their history. This framework can be actively

5 Ibid., 3.
6 Ibid., 3.
constructed by actors within the state and other elites.

Certain individual memories can be decisive in the formation of individual identity – this depends on many factors, most notably at which stage in life an experience takes place. More crucial here, however, is that collective memory and collective identity are mutually constitutive and that collective memory can conflict with mass individual memories. This is because collective memory often does not neatly correspond to or incorporate all individual remembrances. Rather, “collective memory is always the outcome of a series of ongoing intellectual and political negotiations; it is never a unitary collective mental act.”

Thus, political and social actors serve as ‘carriers’ of collective memory. If the carriers are powerful or have good communicative resources, the particular interpretation of memory is more likely to become dominant. In the case of communist societies, as discussed below, collective memory is the result not so much of negotiation but of control and manipulation by state elites. They are by no means neutral, but instead consciously and unconsciously shape memories, often to advance their special interests or views of history.

As Torsten Koch and Sabine Moller have demonstrated with respect to German expellees, individual remembrance is passed on mainly in the family, through the telling and re-telling of events of personal importance. These are called “acts of intergenerational negotiation” in which the past is constructed jointly. Those who had the experiences pass on their recollections to younger generations who rework them in the process. Thus, while individual and collective memories are certainly highly interactive, individual memories also have an independent dynamic which makes it possible for them to develop in ways that are at odds with the dominant collective memory at any given time. This might be called a “bifurcation of memory.”

It is also important to note that individual memories are not static – their meaning can and does change in reaction to mainstream and official narratives or events that may trigger new interpretations. As Margit Reiter has shown in the Austrian context, memories and attitudes within families are more likely to persist unchanged if the state and other ‘outside’ actors do not launch challenges. Thus, if private

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7 Ibid., 3.
8 Ibid., 21.
11 Kattago, Ambiguous Memory - the Nazi Past and German National Identity., 4.
12 Margit Reiter, Die Generation Danach: Der Nationalsozialismus In
and public narratives are consistent with and reinforce each other (as was mostly the case in post-war Austria and communist Poland), a change in attitudes towards the past is probably difficult to achieve.

However, mass individual memory is not unified but rather varied and conflicting. “Split into victim, perpetrator and bystander perspectives, such group accounts are replete with contradictory recollections, creating layers of often incompatible remembrances which highlight different lessons that refuse to produce a coherent sense of the past.”

Polish memory under communism generally has had at least the appearance of being more unified than under post-communism. I argue that this was so partly because different individual remembrances were mostly excluded from public discourses, but also because the idea of Polish victimhood and collective innocence was present in both individual and official narratives – they mutually reinforced one another. Individual memories of Jewish suffering and Polish collaboration existed of course, but they were marginalized in both private and official arenas. During the late communist and then post-communist periods, these marginal memories emerged gradually and helped to transform official memory. Narratives of collective memory changed as some post-communist elites recognized the utility of establishing a different memory discourse to support external legitimacy. This new official collective memory, in turn, does not correspond to many Poles’ views of the past as essentially tragic, innocent, and heroic. It thus entails the potential for disjuncture or even friction between mass individual and state-supported collective memory.

3. Memory and legitimation under communism

Poland’s collective memory has long been characterized by the exclusion of individual memories (of Jewish victims and Polish witnesses and perpetrators) which could have challenged the ‘monolithic’ collective memory of innocence. Polish poets and intellectuals have long fostered the myth of a people who were not only free of sinful historical episodes, but had suffered continuously while Europe’s Great Powers pursued objectives at its expense. Bound up in this myth is an image of Poland before its partition in the late 18th century as a model of multiculturalism and tolerance – an image that seems to have persisted despite the events of the interwar and war periods. Ilya Prizel lists the main

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elements of this persistent historiographical narrative: Poland was the first country to resist both Hitler and Stalin; it was without a collaborationist regime; the Holocaust was mainly a Polish tragedy and perpetrated exclusively by Germans; and Poles helped Jews where they could.\textsuperscript{15} “Thus, the Second World War affirmed within Polish historiography Poland’s self-image of victimhood, martyrdom, and righteousness, supporting Adam Mickiewicz’s view of Poland as ‘an apostle among adulterers’”,\textsuperscript{16} Further, as Adam Michnik has written, “there is no Polish family that was not wounded by the war […] – that is a simple Polish fact.”\textsuperscript{17} Of course, this narrative is closely aligned with the truth and for this reason was singularly effective and enduring. Challenging the myth of Polish innocence meant calling into question Polish suffering. The inseparability of these dual elements of the myth has persisted until recently.

Successive communist regimes employed the myth of Polish innocence and martyrdom for legitimation purposes. In fact, as Jan Gross argues in his most recent book, anti-Semitism and Polish nationalism were used in the immediate post-war period to gain acceptance from the Polish population for the new communist order. To this end, the authorities stood idly by when Holocaust survivors and their Polish saviors were persecuted and pogroms committed.\textsuperscript{18} Later, during the 1968 anti-Semitic campaign, three-fourths of the remaining Jews were compelled to leave Poland.\textsuperscript{19} Michael Steinlauf has examined in-depth the dynamics under which both oppositional forces and the government used anti-Semitism to revitalize nationalism for legitimation as communist ideology declined in effectiveness. The role of the Catholic Church as the only institutional counter-weight to the regime has been regarded as pivotal in reproducing the myth.\textsuperscript{20} Partly as a direct consequence of the replacement of Jewish scholars in government institutes, a narrative was constructed according to which Polish and Jewish suffering were not

\textsuperscript{15} Ibid., 279.
\textsuperscript{16} Ibid., 279.
distinguished. In history textbooks, the fate of the Jews was often not even mentioned, or Jews were described as passive in contrast to Polish active resisters.\textsuperscript{21} As William Miles outlines, this official narrative also entailed the sidelining of Jewish victimhood in national commemoration. Auschwitz-Birkenau was made into a national memorial for the martyrdom of Poles and other ‘brotherly nations’, in keeping with the communist internationalist line.\textsuperscript{22}

The instrumentalization of history and memory was a staple in the communist toolbox of rule. The past was evaluated in its usefulness to the present legitimation of the regime. Instances of airbrushed photographs, of formerly prominent revolutionaries suddenly disappearing from the annals of history after becoming inconvenient to communist regimes, are by now well-known. Further, as Rubie Watson argues in her introduction to a volume on memory and opposition in state-socialism, Marxist-Leninist theory necessitated a deterministic understanding of history which left little room for honest confrontations with the traumatic recent past.\textsuperscript{23} The role of Polish historians then, was to represent the Peoples’ Republic “as the logical and crowning conclusion of a thousand years of history.”\textsuperscript{24}

In this context, it was impossible to represent the Holocaust as a complex event in which communists and non-communists, Germans, Poles, and Soviets alike had committed atrocities. Instead, the Holocaust was constructed as a lesson about the dire consequences of monopoly capitalism.\textsuperscript{25} The Polish nation was depicted as one-sidedly righteous and pure, in an attempt to harness the overwhelming feeling of sacrifice and Polish nationalism for purposes of state socialist legitimation. This narrative was aimed primarily at the Polish population. As Michael Steinlauf argues, the memory of the Holocaust was driven underground to fester:\textsuperscript{26} Jewish experiences of suffering were almost entirely marginalized, but the witnessing and perpetration of crimes against humanity by Poles was also deleted from the public sphere. Private memories must have existed,

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
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\item[21] Steinlauf, "Teaching About the Holocaust in Poland.", 265-266, see also William F S Miles, "Post-Communist Holocaust Commemoration in Poland and Germany," \textit{The Journal of Holocaust Education} 9, no. 1 (2000), 45.
\item[22] Miles, "Post-Communist Holocaust Commemoration in Poland and Germany."
\item[25] Steinlauf, "Teaching About the Holocaust in Poland.", 264.
\item[26] Ibid., 264.
\end{thebibliography}
but they were not allowed to emerge, let alone pressured to.

In his introduction to a volume on the nexus between memory and power, Jan-Werner Müller points out that in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, all European societies constructed “foundational myths” about the war experience which necessarily entailed much forgetting and simplification. In essence, in both east and west, a dominant discourse was created in the name of social cohesion, reconstruction, and legitimacy. Thus, the Poles were not alone in ‘officially forgetting’ their difficult past.

However, the dynamics of this suppression of memory were decidedly different in the Soviet bloc than in democratic states. The state had an absolute monopoly on the public sphere so that marginalized memories could not even enter into a dialogue on the sidelines as was the case in the West. Further, in contrast to Western polities, the state encroached on the private realm through the regulation of social life and the always present fear of informers. Thus, an official culture of commemoration and history-writing was fostered and became instrumental in maintaining the regime. Dissenting memories could not find open expression. As Watson indicates, it is unclear how effective these “technologies of amnesia” were and how precisely they operated. However, it is likely that unofficial pasts were never entirely eradicated and that unsanctioned remembrances kept alternative memories and histories alive. In any event, it seems that memories of Polish complicity in the Holocaust were prominent neither in official nor in underground remembrances. “Emphasising the Jewish origins of (some of) the millions killed in the war was anathema to trans-communist ideology” as well as to the myth of Polish national innocence. This began to change with more general political liberalization.

Poles never freely examined the repercussions of their nation’s historical experience with

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30 Miles, "Post-Communist Holocaust Commemoration in Poland and Germany." 35.
antisemitism, much less acknowledged any measure of responsibility for the ensuing genocide committed on their territory. By the 1980s, they were, however, willing to deviate from the communist orthodoxy that obscured the specifically Jewish dimension to Nazi extermination policies.  

This development may have been encouraged by the fact that Jewish-Polish relations became an issue of intellectual debate among dissidents. Jack Kugelmass argues that Jewish memory became more significant precisely because of official suppression of it: “particularly so because – in the minds of many in the opposition – government maligning was almost a certificate of merit.” Thus, the first steps towards a more honest confrontation with the past, taken still during the communist period, included the recognition of Jewish suffering, the rethinking of official Holocaust memorials, and the granting of rights to Jewish organizations. Nevertheless, genuine ‘memory space’ was only made available with the end of the communist regime in Poland.

4. Memory in early post-communist Poland 

The period immediately following the fall of the Iron Curtain saw an upsurge of anti-Semitism – Jewish institutions and cemeteries were vandalized and anti-Semitic publications were openly promoted. However, while virulent nationalism and anti-Semitism were certainly not absent from politics (for example, Lech Walesa used anti-Semitism in the 1995 election campaign), initial fears were not confirmed. Most prominent politicians condemned racist slurs and ultra-right-wing parties were not successful. There was a gradual shift in public treatment of the Holocaust. Taboo subjects, such as pre-war anti-Semitism, post-war pogroms, and contemporary anti-Semitism, began to be aired, and the study of Polish-Jewish history became more common.

33 For a more in-depth discussion of anti-Semitism and Holocaust commemoration in Poland after 1989 see, Steinlauf, Bondage to the Dead - Poland and the Memory of the Holocaust, Chapter 7.

34 Ibid., 132.

blossoming of Jewish culture and the open declaration of Jewish identity, mostly by younger Poles. These were generally the children and grandchildren of so-called ‘hidden Jews.’ The series of 50th anniversaries during the 1990s (of the Warsaw uprising and the liberation of Auschwitz) offered politicians opportunities to publicize their new ‘progressive’ stance by way of highly ritualized ceremonies with international attendance. They seemed to have an effect: in polls after the Auschwitz ceremony those respondents associating Auschwitz exclusively with Polish suffering had dropped from 47% to 32%. This speaks to the effectiveness and importance of official symbolic politics in changing popular attitudes.

Despite all these positive moves, the most persistent myth of Polish society – that of the one-sided Polish identity of victim and resister – was not challenged. It was not truly questioned until Jan Gross’ book. One reason for this delay may be the mechanism by which the communist regime was dismantled in Poland. Since the Polish state was the first in the region to topple, the pathway to democracy was as yet uncertain. Therefore, the opposition opted for a Roundtable strategy or a “pacted transition” in which the old regime was involved in the transformation. The break with the past was thus not as radical as in other new democracies in ECE. As Leszek Koczanowicz has commented, members of the former opposition in Poland faced some embarrassment about inadvertently legitimizing the communist regime by briefly sharing power with it. Poland did thus not see an immediate confrontation with the communist past (or ‘lustration’) as was the case in Czechoslovakia and Germany. It is possible that the lack of such a precedent of reckoning with the ‘truth’ impacted the way in which memory is approached more generally in post-communist Polish political culture. In other words, the early post-communist period did not establish a societal consensus that the past must be dealt with honestly and thus delayed the confrontation with Holocaust, as well as other, memories. To some extent, this omission came back to haunt Polish society in late 2006 and early 2007, when new laws on secret police files

36 Steinlauf, Bondage to the Dead - Poland and the Memory of the Holocaust., 127.
37 Ibid., 142.

were passed and led to a high profile scandal involving the newly appointed archbishop of Warsaw, Stanislaw Wielgus.

The myth of the one-sided victim position of the Polish people, then, lives on in many arenas and wide-spread anti-Semitism is still to be bemoaned. However, during the late 1990s, the victimhood idea began to be challenged, and Neighbors has been instrumental in this context. Dialogue between Jewish and Polish scholars is on the increase and there seems to be a realization on both sides that a move beyond the rigid duality of victim and perpetrator can bring fruitful understanding about the experience of the Holocaust. As Janine Holc argues,

The construction of two separate ‘victimhood’ experiences situated as competitive and mutually exclusive has obscured the aspects of the occupations that resulted in a shared or common vulnerability to violence. It has also created a set of scripted categories that contribute to a sense of mutual exclusion: ‘pro-Polish or pro-Jewish argument,’ ‘collaborator or resister,’ and, more recently, ‘accept collective responsibility or contribute to anti-Semitism.’

With this recognition, there have been attempts to transcend the Polish myth and thus accept responsibility while continuing to honor the sacrifice made by Poles. The result seems to be a less monolithic memory discourse. Despite continuing efforts to utilize the myth of innocence in its well-worn function of political legitimation, the Jedwabne debate signaled significant strides to dismantle it.

5. Debating the Jedwabne events

Jan Gross’s book was published in Poland in May 2000, and has subsequently appeared in many languages, including English, German, and Hebrew. In Poland it had the effect of catapulting a discussion which had previously been confined to historiography into a broader public. As Gross points out in the afterword to the English Penguin Edition: “The story reached every nook and cranny of the Polish society – 92 percent of respondents in a nationwide survey could identify the name ‘Jedwabne’ by August 2001”. 41

Neighbors is the story of one day in 1941, just after the occupation by the Germans, when the majority of Polish inhabitants of Jedwabne either actively participated in or stood by and watched the brutal murder of 1600 Jewish town residents, without help or order from Germans. Gross meticulously establishes the context of this mass murder: he outlines the pre-war life in Jedwabne, discusses the alleged (but


mostly untrue) implication of the town’s Jews with the Soviets, and describes the fate of the community and some individuals in the event’s aftermath. He re-creates for the reader the brutal and desperate situation in which the Jedwabne Jews found themselves. It is truly a harrowing account, intensified by the irony of the title. As George Will writes, “a murderer in uniform can resemble a cog in a machine, but the last faces seen by Jedwabne’s Jews were the familiar faces of neighbors. It was, Gross says, ‘mass murder in a double sense – on account of both the number of victims and the number of perpetrators.’” Neighbors evokes questions about the extent of Polish participation in the Holocaust elsewhere. And more importantly, despite its specificity, or maybe because of it, the story of Jedwabne is an intensely personal and damning indictment of a Polish society in which these acts were not only possible, but silenced for over four decades.

The public reaction to the book covered the whole spectrum. Some outright denied any Polish involvement in the massacre, sticking to the familiar version of exclusively German guilt. They claimed Gross harbored “an ‘anti-Polish’ (i.e., pro-Jewish) bias, and probably communist sympathies to boot.” Despite an official Catholic Church apology, many anti-Semitic verbal slurs emanated from church members and institutions such as the nationalist radio station “Radio Maryja” run by Catholic priest Tadeusz Rydzyk. Observers point out that the official rejection of anti-Semitism does not go very deep. It seems however, that most interlocutors did not question the basic accuracy of the events. While there were instances of protest, for example by Jedwabne residents during the 2001 memorial service there, and some anti-Semitic pamphlets, Andrzej Tymowski argues that these activities were notable for their rarity and did not develop into organized movements.

In academic circles, the discussion revolved mainly around historiographical methods employed by

43 Brumberg, "Poles and Jews.", 180.
46 Zimmerman, "Introduction: Changing Perceptions in the Historiography of Polish-Jewish Relations. During the Second World War.", 11.
Gross, the details of the massacres (how many perpetrators and victims), the level of involvement of Germans, the significance of alleged Jewish collaboration with Soviet forces, and the socio-psychological context within which the killings took place. Rather than call into doubt Polish complicity then, discussants voiced disagreement over whether the context could explain (and some argue excuse) Jedwabne. In short, the debate revolved around questions that other European societies also faced: were these perpetrators ‘ordinary’ Poles and, if so, how much responsibility falls on Polish society, and what should its response be today? As Joshua Zimmerman has argued, the Jedwabne debate ended the “myth of Polish innocence” by stirring up issues in Polish history which had long remained undisturbed.

The knowledge of Polish crimes in the Holocaust and calls for confrontation with their legacy were not entirely new. Publications such as Emanuel Ringelblum’s eyewitness study of 1943 and the wartime diary of physician Zygmunt Klukowski vividly describe Polish crimes against Jews. In the late communist period, Jan Blonski’s 1987 article “The Poor Poles Look at the Ghetto” radically called for admission of guilt. However, as Jerzy Jedlicki demonstrates in a review of pre-Neighbors discussions of similar topics during post-communism, these received only limited attention.

Despite the preparatory discussions among intellectuals, the effect of Neighbors was to bring these concerns into the wider public domain and was as

48 Brumberg, "Poles and Jews.", 180.

50 Zimmerman, "Introduction: Changing Perceptions in the Historiography of Polish-Jewish Relations. During the Second World War.", 11.
such quite revolutionary.\textsuperscript{53} It received much support and acclaim for its impact on the public. One of the leaders of the Polish Jewish community, Stanislaw Krajewski said, “For the first time it doesn’t avoid anything, and it is public. It is tremendously positive.”\textsuperscript{54} Jan Gross’ work was hailed as a “shock to Polish public opinion like no other book in the last half-century.”\textsuperscript{55}

Part of the reason for this profound effect was the resonance of the book beyond public discourse: it provoked action by Poland’s political and religious establishment. On 27 May 2001, Polish bishops offered an official apology to Jedwabne’s and Poland’s Jews for any harm done to them by Poles and Catholics. A highly symbolic service was held in a church adjacent to the site of the Warsaw Ghetto. On 10 July 2001, the sixtieth anniversary of the massacre, President Kwasniewski led a government delegation to Jedwabne to inaugurate a memorial which states explicitly that Poles were the culprits. Significantly, according to surveys, half of the Polish population supported the President’s apology in their name.\textsuperscript{56} Further, some victims’ bodies were exhumed (though Gross and others have criticized a lack of professionalism in this undertaking and much controversy surrounded the exhumation)\textsuperscript{57} and in 2002, the Institute of National Memory (IPN), a government body, published a report which confirmed most of Gross’ findings and specifically asserted that no Germans were involved directly in the massacre.\textsuperscript{58} Overall then, the acknowledgement of crimes of Polish citizens and the realization that the myth of Polish innocence must be questioned has moved from the intellectual realm into the public, and from there to the highest levels of official state representation.

According to his introduction to Neighbors, this is precisely what Jan Gross intended to achieve with his work. He aimed to problematize what he called the “perpetrators-victims-bystanders axis”, demonstrate that these terms can be fuzzy, and show that a people (or even an individual) can suffer and inflict suffering at the same time.\textsuperscript{59} Or as Dan Stone puts it,

\begin{itemize}
  \item The books public exposure was aided by a critically acclaimed documentary about the same topic. For a useful review of the debate in the Polish press, see Agnieszka Klim, "Reaction of the Polish Press to the Book of Jan T. Gross, Neighbors" (Honors Thesis, Southern Connecticut State University, 2002).
  \item Economist, "It Wasn't Just Germans," The Economist 2001.
  \item Zimmerman, "Introduction: Changing Perceptions in the Historiography of Polish-Jewish Relations During the Second World War.", 11, quoting Father Stanislaw Musial
  \item Tymowski, "Apologies for Jedwabne and Modernity - Jan Gross. Neighbors: The Destruction of the Jewish Community in Jedwabne, Poland.", 301.
  \item Gross, Neighbors - the Destruction of the Jewish Community of Jedwabne, Poland.
  \item Brumberg, "Poles and Jews."
  \item Gross, Neighbors - the Destruction of the Jewish Community of Jedwabne, Poland., xxi, 96.
\end{itemize}
Gross has asked some uncomfortable questions that not only change the way in which we view the Holocaust (not simple ‘German’ and ‘Jews’) but, more importantly, explode the Polish mythical memory of pristine victimhood. It does not deny that Poles were victims, but forces us to encounter the psychologically and socially far more realistic scenario that people are never just this or just that, but take on many roles and identities.


6. Memory and post-communist state legitimacy

I believe that a new trend in Polish politics and public discourse was kick-started by Neighbors which offers a potentially different means of legitimation. In the wake of the publication of the book, the Western-oriented Polish cultural and political elite were using ‘honest confrontation with the past’ as a way of establishing legitimacy. My contention here is that a memory discourse, even if it is a response to a ‘pure’ urge to confront the painful truth, does not become powerful unless relevant societal carriers push it onto the political agenda. Assuming that most powerful political actors do not promote a particular interpretation of history for its own sake, one must ask which interests were served by the memory agenda encapsulated by Neighbors.

Timothy Snyder argues that after the end of the Cold War, many politicians in the newly independent states began to recognize the utility of treating memory as a political problem (rather than a moral imperative) which should be addressed with current national interests in mind. They sought to gain “sovereignty over memory” by establishing “European standards” for discussing history, thus enabling them to instrumentalize memory for the purpose of fostering amicable international relations. “Although the Polish eastern program of sovereignty over memory had originally been articulated as a means of securing Polish independence by eliminating grounds for Polish-Russian discord, it was attractive in 1989 as a method of showing west Europeans that Poland was a mature state ready for integration in Western institutions.”

Thus, liberal Polish elites proceeded to foster a more differentiated view of Polish history – in which the Polish role in the Holocaust was the most important component. As former dissident Adam Michnik remarked: “I believe […] that the ability to confront the dark episodes of one’s own heritage is for each nation a test of its democratic maturity. I
affirm that Poles have matured to democracy, which means they have the right to the full truth about their own past’. Thus, these Polish elites actively sought to promote the idea that Poland had complex history which was subject to debate. It is in this context that the Neighbors debate must be examined.

The most important example of the official effort to gain ‘sovereignty over memory’ was President Kwasniewski’s apology in Jedwabne. Similarly, in a speech at the Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington, D.C. in 2001, the then-Polish foreign minister Bartoszewski effectively used the Jedwabne debate as proof of the vibrancy of Poland’s democracy. The liberal Polish establishment overall has made pains to reconstruct the memory of the war and the Holocaust in a less binary way. Andrzej Tymowski argues that Kwasniewski acted out of desire to make Poland fully modern: “his decision was a political one, made against the background of similar decisions in other countries”. In essence, being seen to be critical towards the old myth, admitting Polish crimes, and making conciliatory gestures towards the Jewish community set Poland’s memory-work on one level with many Western European countries and received acclaim from that direction. This version of a nuanced ‘usable’ past presents a new way of employing memory for legitimation, albeit not in a one-sided discourse, but rather in an ongoing debate which allows many voices. Legitimacy in this sense is important for Poland’s international recognition and for EU participation. The centrality of legitimate memory politics for Poland compares to Germany’s need to prove itself to be mature and unthreatening after unification.

The intellectual debate over Jedwabne and official reactions to it has also had a significant impact on mnemonic attitudes in Polish society at large. First, the fact that Polish leaders have latched onto the debate over the past in a differentiated way means that a potentially ‘democratized collective

62 Steinlauf, Bondage to the Dead - Poland and the Memory of the Holocaust., 133. Originally published in Gazeta Wyborcza.
64 His address is reprinted in Polonsky and Michlic, eds., The Neighbors Respond - the Controversy over the Jedwabne Massacre in Poland., 130-132.
memory’ (one that includes many diverse voices) was being buttressed by powerful forces in Polish society. Its legitimating function only serves to strengthen the debate’s impact. The public discussion has already produced an effect – in a 2001 survey, 68% of young Poles said ‘yes’ to the question of whether or not it is necessary to expose the facts regarding the participation of Poles in the destruction of Jews.67

Second, the very possibility of the debate over Gross’s book itself is an indication of how times have changed. As Gross himself wrote, “we have reached a threshold at which the new generation, raised in Poland with freedom of speech and political liberties, is ready to confront the unvarnished history of Polish-Jewish relations during the war.”68 Further, “Neighbors benefited from a free press, a democratic political system, the reality of frequent travel and the cultural/information exchange through readily available media – all these made it possible, technically, as it were, to investigate and to discuss the implications of moments in history such as Jedwabne that had been overlooked […]”69 Thus, Neighbors was a product of democratic change in Poland as much as it was a catalyst. On a related point, Adam Krzeminski argues that the debate and questioning of Polish-Jewish relations which was triggered by Jedwabne was possible because with the transformation of 1989 came a change in political culture. No longer oppressed but rather sovereign, Poles began a process of ‘self-Europeanization’ and which made them less reliant on old national myths (although losers of modernization continue to be comforted by them).70

Third, the separation of innocence from suffering, the dismantling of the divide between victimhood and guilt can itself be a positive force for democracy because it delegitimizes one-sided narratives which are traditionally used by populist and undemocratic forces. While the ‘democratization of memory’ and the opening of the arena to many different life experiences is viewed here as a positive development however, collective memory is never inherently progressive. Taboos or ‘forgetting’ may sometimes function to protect democracy. Further, though the Jedwabne debate did much to transform Polish attitudes towards the past, such mnemonic change is by no means unequivocally positive or irreversible.

67 Zimmerman, "Introduction: Changing Perceptions in the Historiography of Polish-Jewish Relations During the Second World War.", 12.
68 Gross, Neighbors - the Destruction of the Jewish Community of Jedwabne, Poland., 116.
Destruction of the Jewish Community in Jedwabne, Poland.", 306.
Several scholars have argued that – far from being a positive force for change – the debate over Gross’ book prevented genuine ‘memory-work’ from taking place and even encouraged a backlash against westernizing reforms. Wlodzimierz Borodziej argues that through discussions about German-Polish, Ukrainian-Polish, and Jewish-Polish relations which had taken place since 1989, the myth of innocent Polish victimhood was already virtually dismantled by 2000, and that Neighbors interrupted this healing process by instrumentalizing a particular interpretation of history.71 Ewa Wolentarska-Ochman, in her study about the local responses of Jedwabne residents to the public debate, discusses the impact of state-sponsored memory politics and media treatment on local reconciliation. She argues that because liberal elites attempted to impose ‘acceptable’ memory from above, the debate did not have constructive effect on the formation of a new Polish national identity. Instead, locals reacted defensively and refused to participate in official commemorations.72 Similarly, Annamaria Orla-Bukowska believes that unfair pressure was exerted on Poles by elites and international actors to confront the complex legacies of history, just when Poles were beginning to heal the wounds created by Soviet domination.73

Some have claimed that through the sidelining of local processes and paces of coming to terms with the past, national identity has again become a focus of social mobilization which can potentially be exploited by populist political forces. Janine Holc contends that rising anti-Semitism and the pronounced activism surrounding the use of Christian symbols at Auschwitz in 1998/1999 came in response to the growing influence of Western political institutions and culture in the context of North Atlantic Treaty Organization and EU entry talks.74 Antony Polonsky has connected the nationalist backlash against the official apologies in Jedwabne to populist politicians’ rejection of Europeanization and Tomasz Szarota has gone so far as to claim that the Jedwabne debate was

responsible for the recent electoral successes of populist parties. The effect of Neighbors is therefore still being debated and it may just be too early to tell what its ultimate impact will be.

7. Conclusion

The official acknowledgement of the crimes committed in Jedwabne in 1944 and the confrontation with uncomfortable pasts has helped to create a new type of state legitimacy, which can potentially facilitate Poland’s dialogue with its neighbors and within the European community. The fact that this diversified memory discourse is supported by ‘hard’ state and elite interests for external recognition means it is a potentially powerful transformative catalyst for Polish attitudes toward history and historical responsibility. The promotion of nuance or even contradiction in collective memory as a source of legitimacy contrasts starkly with the legitimating narratives of national unity and innocence under communism. This article has argued that Neighbors’ most important effect in post-communist Poland has been to push the challenge to the Polish myth of innocence into the public domain. However, such a democratic memory discourse cannot be sustained merely through the pronouncements of some elites or prevent a backlash from anti-democratic or nationalist forces. A more permanent change in public attitudes to history must be supported by a strong foundation in civil society which is not easily swayed by the political currents of the day.

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TRAVERSING BORDERS: SUPRANATIONALISM, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE FRAMING OF UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRATION IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED KINGDOM

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Abstract

This paper examines the issue of how undocumented immigration is framed by comparing case studies of the United Kingdom and the United States. The role of the media and social construction are integral to this debate and this has, in part, led to more domestic bills aimed at tackling undocumented immigration. In the United Kingdom, the issue of undocumented immigration has led to the recent drafting of a bill by Home Secretary John Reid to address the issue. This bill has only served to polarize the population and energize the far-right. In the United States, rival bills in the House of Representatives and the Senate have also attempted to deal with the issue and this too has led to polarization. The debate at the domestic level then is ineffective and other options should be explored at the supranational level. The European Union (EU) and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) are considerably different, but each can be utilized to adequately settle the issue of undocumented immigration. The US should utilize NAFTA and create an EU-style cohesion fund to stem the flow of undocumented workers and the UK should limit mobility and then lobby the EU to fine countries whose people flood into the country. In sum, this debate has already been framed and the best way forward is to seek an amicable solution through supranational agreements rather than ineffective national public policy.

1. Introduction

The issue of undocumented immigration has become salient in the United States with significant interest coming from high level politicians in 2006. This issue is also significant in the United Kingdom and much of the Western world. I will, therefore, compare how this debate is framed in the United Kingdom and the United States and how the framing affects public policy and supranationalism in each country. The main public policy issues come from the national level; however, membership in an international organization (and everything this entails) should receive

1 The author would like to thank Dr Mark Cassell (Kent State University) and two anonymous reviewers for their critiques of earlier drafts of this paper.
greater consideration in this debate. From an organizational standpoint, I will make some introductory remarks which will introduce some of the major issues within the undocumented immigration debate before outlining the social construction of this issue. The theoretical and pragmatic implications in this paper constitute a literature review which assesses the current debate (it is not a full scale review of the immigration literature). I will then go into depth with the case studies and examine the similarities and differences between the two countries. I will conclude by contrasting national policies regarding undocumented immigration, and then argue that a possible solution might be provided by their respective supranational blocs.

Perhaps the reason why this debate has garnered so much attention in the United States is because of Congressman James Sensenbrenner (R-WI) and his attempt to crack down on an estimated 11.5-12 million undocumented immigrants in the country. The controversy created by him frames the debate on undocumented immigration. Many media outlets refer to undocumented immigrants either as illegal immigrants, illegal aliens, migrants or foreign workers. When I use the term “undocumented immigrants” my aim is to provide a sense of neutrality to the debate given the propensity of one side or the other to use terms that frame the issue in partisan manners rather than searching for ways to resolve it. If we start with a nonpartisan position at the domestic level, then we can proceed with a fair and just resolution at the supranational level.

Like the United States, the issue of undocumented immigration gained significant traction in the United Kingdom in 2006 as well. Conservative leader, David Cameron (who currently polls ahead of Tony Blair and Gordon Brown for the Prime Minister post), has recently stated his desire to reduce immigration as a whole into the United Kingdom and staunchly populist (almost racist) parties like the British National Party (BNP) have gained notoriety for their support of traditional British moorings with regards to religion, race and ethnicity. Labour has, in turn, modified their discourse on immigration, promoting a stricter approach. The issue is therefore becoming increasingly salient across the political spectrum in the United Kingdom.

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3 James Sensenbrenner is a Republican from the state of Wisconsin. For the non-US reader, a congressman is designated with their party (R,D or I) and the abbreviation for their state.
5 In the United Kingdom, undocumented immigrants are also referred to as “irregular immigrants”.
6 Conservative Party. [www.conservatives.com]
7 British National Party. [www.bnp.org.uk]
8 Labour Party. [www.labour.org.uk/asylumandimmigration 04]
Kingdom and the debate now centers on reducing immigration rather than increasing it in order to protect the identity of Britain’s population.

Aside from undocumented immigrants, there are other issues that have come up around this debate. In the United States, undocumented immigration raises fears of a porous border through which drugs and terrorists may pass. While the latter has not come true yet, the former is a significant issue that hurts some vulnerable parts of American society each year. Taxation is another significant issue because undocumented immigrants pay social security and state and local taxes on their paychecks, but do not pay federal income taxes. In the United Kingdom, undocumented immigrants also pay local taxes, but have the luxury of using the National Health Service (NHS) for free (in most cases) which burdens existing taxpayers. Another problem in the United Kingdom is the issue of prostitution; some people (mostly women) from Eastern Europe have almost become forced labor on the streets of Britain. Essentially, it was these issues that led to greater media attention and exposure.

2. Media Attention and Social Construction

The issue of undocumented immigration has, at times, generated considerable media attention in both the United States and the United Kingdom. In the United States the intellectual driver behind this has been Harvard political scientist, Samuel Huntington who describes the challenges to America’s national identity mainly through the vast migration of Spanish speaking people largely from Mexico and the rest of Central America. This has culminated in widespread attention to this subject on television shows like CNN’s Lou Dobbs, among others. Given this attention from the media, the issue of undocumented immigration has gained far wider notoriety than it would have otherwise outside of the states directly affected. The media focus on this issue raises the question of social construction: how is undocumented immigration shaped in this debate?

The social construction of undocumented immigration provides some insight into the lives of people that leave their respective homelands to come to a new country. The issue is highly politicized and the lens through which the immigrants are looked at depends on who is framing the issue. A

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10 Ibid.
member of the MinuteMen, for instance, may take the stance that an undocumented immigrant is an alien, a lawbreaker and someone that is taking away American jobs and reducing the pay of the average American worker.\textsuperscript{14} This view attempts to socially construct the undocumented immigrant in a particularly negative light.

In contrast, a member of the Latino Movement USA tries to socially construct the undocumented immigrant as a hard working person only seeking to make a decent wage to feed their families and, for the most part, a good person who obeys the law. A coalition of diverse supporters was responsible for the 1 May 2006 “Day without immigrants” boycott and this rally was an attempt to socially construct undocumented immigrants in a positive manner for an international audience.\textsuperscript{15}

Social construction is important because there is a desire, in the United States, for cheap labor to fill certain low wage jobs and this was part of the reasoning behind the creation of NAFTA. In this manner, the Mexican immigrants (albeit undocumented) fill this role and allow American business owners to continue profiting with the use of their labor. This, therefore, is a positive aspect of undocumented immigration for these business owners. It may irk many Americans, but for these business owners, it may be keeping them in business or providing them with substantial profits. In addition, the United States does not seem to have the political will to take on small business owners (with the exception of some Republican lawmakers). The risk, for the Republican Party, would be to further alienate small business owners, primarily in the south, in order to really clamp down on this issue. This is important because the Republicans will be attempting to regain control of Congress in 2008 and this is a vital constituency to them.

Similarly in the United Kingdom, the influx of cheap labor into the country allows businesses to do well financially by filling jobs with undocumented immigrants. Again, the government has little desire to get rid of these people and thus they remain. The United Kingdom differs in this regard as its undocumented immigrants mainly fill jobs in urban areas while undocumented immigrants in the United States who work mainly in construction and agriculture, both of which are more rural, or at least suburban. Nevertheless, the social construction of undocumented immigrants plays an important role for people in the United Kingdom and the United States. This also has implications on the theoretical level as to how undocumented immigrants are perceived and therefore treated.

\textsuperscript{14} The Minutemen Project. [www.minutemenproject.com]
\textsuperscript{15} This involved a number of groups ranging from the Roman Catholic Church to labor unions to the Mexican-American Political Association and others.
3. **Theoretical and Pragmatic Implications**

3.1 **Theoretical Implications**

In the political stream typology of John Kingdon whereby an idea becomes legislation, the issue of undocumented immigration has, seemingly, found its policy window. The solution, as proposed by James Sensenbrenner, has found its problem of “illegal immigration” and the issue has caught on like wildfire in the media. This open policy window does not mean, however, that Sensenbrenner’s solution will be viable or accepted by the public, but that it will receive its due attention. Sensenbrenner may also serve as the spokesman for this issue in the future even if his views are not salient at present. The name Sensenbrenner will likely be brought up in decades to come over the issue of undocumented immigration (if it remains an issue) because he was the primary lawmaker attempting to fill Kingdon’s policy window. We must, however, find out why the policy window opened up?

In Schneider and Ingram’s typology, the undocumented immigrant has traditionally been viewed as a deviant. However, in a number of circles, the undocumented immigrant is seen in much more of a favorable light, moving from deviant to contender, due to the support of the Roman Catholic Church, labor unions and small business organizations in the United States. Other groups including Hispanic support groups have framed the undocumented as being very helpful to society and “doing jobs that Americans refuse to do”. Some people will still be less than accepting of them and oppose them politically, but they have a place in society for now. As a result of this, the framing of undocumented immigration has caused an impasse and requires an amicable solution through policy since this debate has much to do with power.

John Gaventa’s model of power and powerlessness, at least on the first two dimensions, has significant implications for framing undocumented immigration. When an undocumented immigrant comes into a new country, he/she is at the natural disadvantage of having very little bargaining power (if any). Therefore, any given employer can hold a position of power over the undocumented immigrant because of legal status and likely information

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asymmetry (first dimension). The employer is able to take advantage of constructed barriers against the undocumented immigrant thereby keeping wages low and facing few complaints if working conditions are poor (second dimension). Undocumented immigration, therefore, has become institutionalized, but how did this happen?

Paul Pierson’s notions of punctuated equilibrium and path dependency are also of use in this debate. Punctuated equilibrium is essentially where an idea leads to substantial changes. This idea then gets positive feedback and becomes path dependent until it reaches fruition. The 2004 entrance of ten Central and Eastern European countries into the European Union served as punctuated equilibrium for the United Kingdom in terms of undocumented immigration. There has long been immigration into the United Kingdom, but the numbers are higher and from more specific locales. With regards to NAFTA, the punctuated equilibrium came in 1994 with the signing of the free trade agreement. Again, the United States has faced undocumented immigration before as the 1986 Immigration and Reform Act was supposed to alleviate this situation; however, the sheer volume of undocumented immigrants suggests a significant change here. Path dependency has resulted from the initial punctuated equilibrium which may serve as a lesson to the United Kingdom given the short amount of time since their focusing point.

3.2 Pragmatic Implications

Undocumented immigration occurs, Christian Joppke argues, in America because of a strong anti-populist sentiment norm that feeds upon the notion of America as a “nation of immigrants”; whilst, in Europe, legal and moral constraints keep states from pursuing rigorous zero-immigration policies. It is an interesting premise that in the United States the general feeling of sympathy towards immigrants comes from the thought that one’s ancestors also came to the country in search of a better life. In Europe, the shrinking fertility rate has also relaxed the negative sentiment towards undocumented immigration given some need to retain a given level of population.

Demography then is an important topic in this debate. It is relevant in the United States because its population just exceeded 300 million people. Therefore, its 11.5-12 million undocumented immigrants need to be taken into account, as they now make up around 4% of the population. The


United Kingdom, on the other hand, has 60 million citizens and a smaller number of undocumented immigrants will have as significant an affect on the country, most importantly on its economy. The latest figure for undocumented immigration in the UK is at 570,000 with most of these people coming from Eastern Europe (mainly Poland). Dealing with undocumented immigration in both countries represents a puzzle that needs to be solved by politicians, bureaucrats and laypersons alike.

Tamar Jacoby notes that in the United States, polling has consistently suggested that between two-thirds to three-quarters of Americans support tougher enforcement, but also a path to earned citizenship. Thus, the issue of undocumented immigrants is complicated and finding consensus will be extremely difficult. Again, the matter of framing is important to this debate. The MinuteMen Project was initiated in the United States to counter undocumented immigration and the MinuteMen have become, in a number of ways, the face of dissent against undocumented immigrants. In contrast, there are supporters of undocumented immigrants including a number of diverse and, interestingly, strange bedfellows ranging from business associations to labor unions to the Roman Catholic Church. The Roman Catholic Church has caused some grievances in the United States because some priests have chosen to support undocumented immigration.

Religion in the United States and the United Kingdom, therefore, has implications for this debate. Both have traditionally Protestant moorings and while religion may not be the deciding factor, it is an important part of the debate. The vast majority of undocumented immigrants coming into both countries are from the Roman Catholic faith (and in some cases Orthodox Christian in the United Kingdom). Does this change the debate? Samuel Huntington, in his book *Who Are We?*, examines that challenge to America’s national identity. Huntington argues that large scale immigration into the United States, both documented and undocumented, poses a challenge to American identity because it takes the country away from its traditional moorings of the English language and Protestantism. America’s very identity and future, Huntington notes, depend on how this issue is dealt with now so as to be an influence on the future. The argument is not a racist one; it rests upon assimilation rather than the retention of foreign culture.

The issue of religion in Europe, it should be noted, is quite different from the United States. With the exceptions

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24 Jacoby, 51.
26 Huntington, 2004b.
27 Ibid, 61.
of Ireland and Northern Ireland, Western Europe has the highest level of secularization in the world. This does not, however, mean that a country like the United Kingdom does not see itself as Christian or Protestant (at least historically). There are still many within the United Kingdom (and more broadly throughout Europe) that believe in keeping the racial and cultural moorings of the country and that the best way to do this is to limit immigration. This debate has been raging in Europe for some time given the low fertility rates and the need for some immigration to keep the respective economies moving forward. Perhaps, in part, this has led to the rise of far right nationalism in Europe which manifests itself as the BNP in the United Kingdom. This is not to say that any religious person is in any way affiliated with the BNP, just that this party has exploited the racial heritage of the country to advocate a racially, religiously and culturally homogenous country. The BNP, therefore, frames this issue in terms of identity and an external threat facing the United Kingdom.

On a purely theoretical level, the framing of undocumented immigration has serious implications. The undocumented have very few rights and are seen as deviants by groups already mentioned in this paper. It has significant ramifications for public policy which is notable under John Kingdon’s model. The theoretical model, however, is incomplete with further discussion of real cases. This is where some of the more pragmatic implications shed some light on undocumented immigration. However, we need to delve into the case studies to better understand this issue. It is, therefore, relevant to discuss the cases of the United Kingdom and the United States more thoroughly.

4. Similarities in the United Kingdom and the United States

The most basic similarity is that there are undocumented immigrants in each country and that they have become sizeable minorities. Given approximate population sizes in the United States (300 million) and the United Kingdom (60 million), almost 4% and 1% of the total population respectively is undocumented and this number may grow rapidly making them truly sizeable minorities (at least it is framed this way). The debate, therefore, has become widely documented in each country. In many parts of the United States, the issue of undocumented immigration is obvious as numerous villages, towns and cities now have strong Hispanic elements to them. In

29 British National Party. [www.bnp.org.uk]
the United Kingdom, undocumented immigrants are also relatively concentrated, mainly in the larger cities, especially London.

The concentration of undocumented immigrants is an issue for comparison because many undocumented immigrants congregate in certain areas, some expected, and others less so. Ultimately it is the availability of jobs that determine where people settle, but this has caused some increased attention to the subject given the high percentage of Hispanics in states like California, New Mexico and Arizona. These states have, for a long time, been home to sizeable Hispanic populations and, among others, used to belong to Mexico prior to the 1840s. The major change, however, has been the recent influx of undocumented immigrants into non-traditional states like North Carolina and Georgia.

On the supranational level, the United States and the United Kingdom each belong to an international organization which has influences on their respective economies. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the European Union (EU) are very different but there is some room for comparison here. While the blocs themselves do not articulate undocumented immigration, their very existence may well promulgate the movement of people from one country to another without documentation. At the outset of NAFTA in 1994, few scholars thought that free trade would have an impact on immigration into the United States. According to William Orme, “serious scholars of Mexican demography don’t expect NAFTA to have any noticeable effect on Mexican immigration over the next five to ten years”. In this regard, his assessment turned out to be incorrect and reality shows a relationship between NAFTA and the undocumented immigration issue in the United States. Similarly in the United Kingdom, after the 2004 enlargement of the EU, some people feared an upsurge in undocumented immigration from Eastern Europe with now shared membership in the international organization. It is clear that international organizations have an impact on immigration, but this is a secondary comparison in this paper. A more complete comparison of international organizations will be argued in a later section of the paper.

5. Differences

Given the sheer volume of undocumented workers in the United States, the problem is, at this point, much greater here. However, because of

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existing EU rules, the propensity for further undocumented immigration into the United Kingdom is possible. This has led to increased fears on the part of some constituencies in the United Kingdom and, as part of a greater debate in Europe, contributed to discussion on the issue of identity and what it means to be British. Perhaps the volume of undocumented immigration in the United States is a foreshadowing of what is to come in the United Kingdom.

The major difference, however, between the United States and the United Kingdom is the perception of immigration generally. This too is socially constructed, but is relevant to how this debate is framed in the respective countries. America prides itself on being a “nation of immigrants”; whereas, Britain has traditionally accepted immigrants, but largely characterized them as unwanted. This was the perception of postcolonial immigration that was largely accepted by the political elites. The British society has, at times, defined itself as highly culturally homogenous (as do most European countries) and this has caused problems with non-traditional British citizens.

Another major difference between the United Kingdom and the United States is the methods through which undocumented immigrants enter the respective countries. In the United Kingdom, many undocumented immigrants actually enter the country with legal visas to do specific work (even Eastern Europeans currently need a visa because of restrictions under the Schengen Agreement), but fail to return after their visas have expired. In the United States, many undocumented immigrants enter the country through the southern border with Mexico. These people often risk their lives to cross the border and make it through the desert conditions in the south-west of the United States.

The differences on this issue have led the United States and the United Kingdom to pursue different policies to deal with undocumented immigration. This is fueled, in part, by how this debate is framed and socially constructed. National public policy is a good place to examine how and why undocumented immigrants were framed and how each country will proceed in managing this issue.


In the United Kingdom, the 1948 British Nationality Act was the first piece of legislation designed to designate British citizenship with regards to immigration. This provided British citizenship to all people in the Commonwealth and, within a few months, numerous people from all over the world began moving to the United Kingdom. After decades of discussion and debate on the issue, the British Nationality Act was revised in 1981 to differentiate between British citizens.
and British citizens of overseas territories. The 1981 revisions served, in many respects, to reign in the 1948 Act as the economic recession of the late 1970s/early 1980s reduced the availability of jobs. This led to pressures for increased protectionism.

Since the rise of undocumented immigration has become a much more closely watched issue in the political process, the current Home Secretary, John Reid, has introduced a “Border and Immigration Bill” to tackle loopholes through which undocumented immigrants enter the country. The United Kingdom has also attempted to tackle undocumented immigration through a Workers Registration Scheme that registers immigrants with visas that enter the country to do specific jobs. Legislation, harking back to 1981, has been tabled to tackle the issue of undocumented immigration because it has been framed and accepted as a problem in the UK. It is proof, however, that public policy has been ineffective at the domestic level and the current proposals do not indicate that they will have much success either.

In the United States, the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act was also the first attempt to address the issue of illegal entry into the country; however, its critics argue that it amounted to nothing more than amnesty. This Act was supposed to stop the flow of undocumented immigrants, but, as the current statistics suggest, did little to stop it from increasing. The issue of undocumented immigration again received attention when President George W. Bush discussed reforming immigration law in his 2004 State of the Union address in response to the unsolved problems from the Immigration Reform and Control Act. More recently, James Sensenbrenner from Wisconsin initiated HR 4437, the “Border Protection, Antiterrorism and Illegal Immigration Control Act of 2005” which passed on 16 December 2005 by a vote of 239 in favor to 182 against it. The Act is now under review in the Senate. The Senate also passed its own piece of legislation initiated by Arlen Specter, a Republican from Pennsylvania, namely S-2611, the “Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act”. This piece of legislation provides undocumented immigrants with a path to citizenship. It passed on 25 May 2006 by a vote of 62 in favor to 36 against it, with wide support from Democrats. Specter’s legislation, too, is waiting for reciprocation in its opposite chamber - in this case, the House of Representatives. Regardless of the legislation, neither bill provides any effective mechanism that will change undocumented immigration. Only new proposals, such as resolving the issue through possible supranational

37 [www.govtrack.us]
38 Ibid.
mechanisms, will stop the tide of undocumented immigrants entering the United States.

The issue of undocumented immigration has, in the past year, become a volatile and recognized political issue. This short time frame, however, has yielded numerous attempts to change policy, but has, thus far, failed to change existing law. There are, in both the United States and the United Kingdom, changing political platforms that revolved around the issue of immigration specifically in response to the undocumented situation. Both countries are presently trying to address the situation through the legislative process in an attempt to update and modify existing policy. However, there is only so much that can be accomplished at the national level. National public policy has proven to be inefficient in dealing with undocumented immigration and a fresh approach needs to be taken. A possible solution might therefore be found at the supranational level.

7. European Union (EU)/ North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)

A common factor linking the situations in the United States and the United Kingdom is their involvement in supranational blocs. In addition, most of the undocumented immigration comes from inside these organizations with the majority of people moving into the United States from Central America\(^39\) (mainly Mexico) and the majority of people moving into the United Kingdom from Eastern Europe (mainly Poland). While this is not the primary cause of undocumented immigration, it is certainly a secondary factor that needs further exploration.

The EU is, in many regards, the most advanced supranational regional bloc in the world. Its institutions, therefore, have a great deal of power over national politics. Supranationalism in the EU has a great deal of legal crossover between the respective member states. Comparatively this must be kept in mind because the EU is a unique creation.

In contrast, NAFTA is largely an intergovernmental union between Mexico, Canada and the United States. NAFTA does not have any real power outside of economic, trade and environmental issues and even then, the agreement is often overlooked until dispute settlement mechanisms are instituted.\(^40\) Therefore NAFTA itself cannot be viewed in the same light as the EU. However, NAFTA can be evaluated as an economic agreement that affects the economies of the United States and Mexico and thereby

\(^39\) Central American countries do not belong to NAFTA; however, the United States is currently attempting to implement the Dominican Republic- Central American Free Trade Agreement (DR-CAFTA).

\(^40\) Frederick Abbott. “NAFTA and the Legalization of World Politics: A Case Study”, *International Organization*. (54).
necessitates interaction between the two countries. It may also, in part, lead to the undocumented immigration that has caused increased media attention on the issue and a resulting backlash in the United States.

The issue of undocumented immigration, however, should not be considered a surprise because it has been framed as favorable by numerous political elites in Mexico. Vicente Fox has, for much of his presidency, pushed the idea of Mexican emigration to the United States. One of Fox’s predecessors, Carlos Salinas de Gortari, argued for reducing trade barriers: “You must take our goods or our people”, but Fox himself urged the United States to take both. The role of the Mexican President, therefore, has become increasingly important to the United States (where noticed or not) because of the impact of their decisions. Given the close relationship of George W. Bush and Vicente Fox before they became Presidents of their respective countries (both were Governors of Border States), Fox can be forgiven for betting his administration’s fortune on a change in U.S. immigration policy. Unfortunately, he misread the situation as Bush found it politically dangerous to change immigration policy so early in his first term; and 9/11 only served to end the negotiation formally.

Regardless of the current view of undocumented immigration, Mexico and the United States will be of great importance to each other in the future. This has led some scholars to argue for an EU style “Cohesion Fund” through NAFTA to bolster the poorer parts of Mexico in an effort to keep its economic reforms moving. The literature and attention suggests that the vast majority of undocumented immigrants are Mexican and thus it is important to consider NAFTA and the possibility for an EU style cohesion fund to be put in place. By framing the issue as a supranational problem, both sides may be satisfied because less people will want to leave Mexico if the economy improves. In turn, the United States will receive fewer undocumented immigrants satisfying the furor of the MinuteMen and James Sensenbrenner. Small businesses can hire cheap labor but the market will dictate fairer wages for them.

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41 Carlos Salinas de Gortari was the Mexican President from 1988-1994.
42 Huntington, 2004b, 317.
This does not, however, remedy the situation in the United Kingdom. The EU and NAFTA are set-up differently to deal with undocumented immigrants and a direct comparison of the two blocs must be measured qualitatively because their mechanisms to deal with collective problems contrast significantly. For example, on the issue of mobility, the EU and NAFTA work quite differently with regards to controlling how people move. In the EU, citizens are able to move freely from one member state to another (provided that their country is part of the Schengen Agreement and that they are not a new member state); conversely, traditional borders still apply in the NAFTA countries. Undocumented immigration takes on different parameters when it comes to mobility; however, one member state could take up the issue and deal with it if it becomes an unbearable menace. Small business lobbyists are often reluctant to push the government in this direction given the benefits of a low wage work force. The issue then becomes one of mobility given that people have to enter the United Kingdom and the United States. In both the EU and NAFTA, there have been attempts to address this issue; however, it is important to examine the Schengen Agreement and how the United Kingdom can utilize the EU to better manage its undocumented immigration.

8. The Schengen Agreement

In 1985, the European Community signed the Schengen Agreement which essentially removed all border controls between the signatory countries. It was designed to create a unified approach to policing European borders and to control the amount of undocumented immigration coming into Europe. Brussels attempted to create a community that upheld mobility between members, but keep out people from outside the organization. The United Kingdom, however, decided not to enter into the Schengen Agreement because the anti-immigration lobby remains strong (although it did sign the declaration and cooperates on policing matters). Ironically, this has not halted the undocumented immigration that is prominent in many of the United Kingdom’s largest cities.

In addition to Schengen, there is a migrant visa application system in the EU. Upon entry into the EU, new countries face possible restrictions on worker mobility of up to 7 years (this is known as the 2+3+2 formula). The United Kingdom, with regards to the ten new accession members in 2004,

49 European Union. [www.europa.eu]
did not restrict access to the country. This has allowed hundreds of thousands of people from Eastern Europe to work in the United Kingdom. The problem, however, is not with legal migrant workers, but that many people overstay their visas. Undocumented immigration in the United Kingdom, therefore, is not created by illegal border crossings, but by migrant workers overstaying their visas in the country. The UK then can deal with this problem by restricting the mobility of new EU members and then lobby the EU to fine countries whose people disobey this request. Policing has proven to be quite difficult in the UK on matters of workers who overstay their visas, so bringing the EU into the picture may represent a viable way forward on this issue.

9. Conclusion

Both the United Kingdom and the United States have experienced increased exposure to undocumented immigration. The issue will continue to be relevant to all societies in North America and Western Europe who require immigration to maintain their current population levels. Many people are concerned that their national identity, values and history are being changed in the wake of an influx of immigration, yet their choices are limited given lowering fertility rates. This will continue to be a factor in the foreseeable future.

In the United Kingdom, the numbers are not yet alarming because undocumented immigrants only make up less than 1% of the total population. However, the issue has gained traction and has gained significant notoriety on the electoral fringes (the rise of the BNP has been especially alarming). The British Nationality Acts of 1948 and 1981 have played a role in the immigration debate in the United Kingdom, as have the changes to the EU. National public policy has proven to be ineffective at controlling undocumented immigration and fresh ideas are necessary. Despite a significant anti-EU lobby expressed through the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), the EU may provide a punishment mechanism which could help to stem undocumented immigration into a specific country.

In the United States, the sheer volume of undocumented immigrants is problematic because the government has to deal and account for an extra 11.5-12 million people. National public policy has similarly played an ineffective role in dealing with undocumented immigrants from Mexico. This has, in part, led to the problem of undocumented immigration and Americans will have to decide whether Sensenbrenner’s or Specter’s bill is better suited to dealing with this issue. Ultimately, neither piece of legislation will be effective because it is

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the interests of small business owners that have to be dealt with. By utilizing NAFTA and creating an EU style cohesion fund, the United States may best alleviate poverty in Mexico and thereby reduce the incentive for undocumented immigration.

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WORK IN PROGRESS SECTION

BIPOLAR WORLDS OF NATION AND STATE IN MONTENEGRO

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Abstract

Throughout centuries, state and nation building in Montenegro have been marked with constant identity shifts, defining the role and the position of the republic (i.e. sometimes a state/entity) amongst its Balkans neighbors/counterparts. After 1997, the political scene in Yugoslavia at the time faced the tendency of an augmentation of discourse concerning the statehood of Montenegro, which would lead to its eventual detachment from Serbia. Yet, due to the tensions within the country, and the potential ‘domino effect’ that an eventual referendum on Montenegrin independence might have caused, the EU sponsored Belgrade Agreement (2002) introduced a three years’ moratorium on the issue of independence. The 2006 referendum epitomized the long-standing fissure among the population over the questions of Montenegrin v. Serb nationhood, and independence v. union with Serbia, with the pro-independence bloc’s narrow victory. In the light of the aforementioned, this research seeks to outline how external and internal factors contributed to the conflict over national identity and statehood in Montenegro, and how this struggle was transposed to the popular level through the reinvention of tradition and the instrumentalization of national minorities. The paper presented here is only a small portion of the author’s research for MPhil and PhD degrees at the University of Cambridge.

1. Introduction

The conflict in the former Yugoslavia sparked a proliferation of academic debates on state and nation-building processes. Through such debates, the revivals of statehood were contextualized within the wider schools of nationalism. However, due to the small size of Montenegro and the absence of conflict on its territory, few scholars focused on the problems associated with the diverging nature of state and nation in the republic. Authors such as Lukic, Cross and Komnenitch analyzed the problems of identity and politics in Montenegro, while viewing it as a constituency of varying Yugoslav formations.¹ Although these scholars

provided very respectable analyses of Montenegrin position within the Yugoslav federal structures, their works did not entail a detailed account of the internal political struggles and their effect on national identity. Accordingly, the most noteworthy substantial publications dealing with Montenegro alone (as opposed to examining Montenegro as a part of Yugoslavia) are Bieber’s Montenegro in Transition, and Roberts’ Realm of the Black Mountain: A History of Montenegro.\(^2\)

While the book edited by Bieber provides an insightful analysis of the political, economic and identity milieu in contemporary Montenegro, the analysis is restricted to the period before 2002, thus lacking reference to the most recent events surrounding the quest for statehood. Conversely, Roberts’ book represents the first general history of Montenegro written in English language since 1912. As such, it contextualizes the contemporary vulnerability of Montenegrin identity within a historical narrative, which created enough ambiguity for the polarized interpretation of nationhood in recent years. That said, one of the aims of this paper is to contribute to the scholarly work on Montenegro through an analysis of the origins and the channels of the socio-political divide in the country. It will complement the major works in the field by a focus on recent events in Montenegro alone, by an analysis of the effect of external and internal factors in the process of identity change, and by the scrutiny of the underlying interplay between the statehood question and national identity.

As noted in Roberts’ book, throughout the history of Montenegro, the concepts of state and nation have adversely affected one another, resulting in the long-standing fissure among the population over the questions of Montenegrin v. Serb nationhood, and independence v. union with Serbia. In the period after 1997, power struggles among the ruling Montenegrin elite have caused the politicians to revive these older splits, drawing upon the rhetoric of earlier times to mobilize support for their contemporary conflicts with their rivals. The gradual disentanglement from the federal institutions, leading to the increased demands for independence by 2001, caused the transformation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) into the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro. While the resurgence of elements of Montenegrin statehood in the new common state augmented the demands within a portion of the population for full independence, within another portion, it invigorated the idea of the preservation of the union with Serbia.

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This rift, which rested in incongruent perceptions of the state and national identification in the country, was crystallized into two diametrically opposite socio-political camps: the pro-independence/pro-Montenegrin camp and the pro-unionist/pro-Serbian camp. This was subsequently confirmed by the narrow victory of the pro-independence bloc in the May 2006 referendum.

In the light of the aforementioned, this paper analyzes the origins and catalysts of the divide between the two camps, with an emphasis on the significance of internal political struggles and of external factors in the quest for Montenegrin statehood since 1997. It seeks to assert that both domestic elites and other countries affected the contestation of statehood and nationhood, and that consequently the divide was transplanted to the popular level through the reinterpretation of tradition and symbols, and the instrumentalization of minorities.

In a small community, such as Montenegro, domestic political and intellectual elites as internal factors have continually exerted substantial influence on the political and national orientation of the population. Consequently, the division of these elites into two camps – one stressing allegiance to Montenegro and the other commitment to the common state with Serbia – manifested itself through the emphasis on two different national identities, reverberating the historical divide among the population over Montenegrinness and Serbianness.

Similarly, economically and politically feeble Montenegro has historically been affected by the influences of wider geopolitical forces, given its position at the crossroads between Eastern and Western Europe. The predominant external factors, such as Venice, Austro-Hungary, Russia, Serbia, and more recently the US and the EU have perpetually shaped the orientation of the elites towards statehood and nationhood, and as such contributed to the rift in Montenegrin socio-political life. Usually, the domestic elites would associate their claims over statehood and nationhood to the support of these factors, in order to increase the legitimacy of their contentions in the eyes of the public. As a result, the elites and the external factor related to them would become antagonized with the competing portion of the population, thus deepening the divide in society. Far from being entrenched only in the elitist discourse, the debate over statehood and nationhood in Montenegro was catalyzed through the revival of tradition, yet interpreted in accordance with each camp’s claims. Accordingly, polarized tradition and political life resulted in the instrumentalization of minorities in the quest for independence and their antagonization in the attempts to preserve the common statehood. However, this study does not take a deterministic account on the nature of identity in Montenegro, and as such it does not seek to contextualize the recent socio-political rift throughout history in order to justify the existence of one camp or the other. Rather, it
focuses on the reasons behind the contemporary divide, and seeks to overcome any bias that might stem from this author’s interpretation of facts.

Consequently, state and nation are viewed through a multi-level prism, which allows for a more comprehensive analysis. The research approves Connor’s view of the state as the “major political subdivision of the globe, easily conceptualized in quantitative terms.” Through such a definition the state gains the dimension of a territorial unit, conceivable in terms of the “distribution of a national group.” In the context of Montenegro, “state” also refers to an institutional unit that exercises power over its subjects. Accordingly, the notion of state-building in Montenegro is perceived as a progressive propensity towards instituting rules, norms and procedures that enable the functioning of an autonomous administrative unit.

Furthermore, in accordance with the writings of Renan and Mazzini, nation is viewed in the context of “the will of the people,” so as to determine the level of congruity amongst the population in terms of establishing a nation through “actual consent.” In the case of Montenegro, the polarization of the political life was materialized through the evolution of two identity camps, in which common heritage was actualized through the daily hustle of politics, which continually attracted the population to one pole or the other. Consequently, the “actual consent” to belong to either the pro-independence or the pro-unionist camp became an essential ingredient of modern Montenegrin identity. Additionally, some of the recent developments related to the perceptions of nation in Montenegro take into account the writings of Anderson and Hobsbawm, where this concept is regarded as a social construct originating from a historical unity of people, an aspect of which is resurrected in the aestheticization of political discourse.

In particular, such an approach to the concept of nation in terms of this analysis proves useful when scrutinizing the revival of tradition and the impact of symbolic politics on the Montenegrin divide.

In terms of structure, the paper consists of several chapters, each dealing with a specific topic in order to outline the

factors and processes that contributed to the evolution of the bipolar worlds of nation and state in the country. While the first three chapters outline the factors that instigated the change in Montenegrin socio-political life, the last two sections of the paper aim to illustrate that how the process was felt among the population. The aim of the following chapter is to provide the contextual information on the position of Montenegro from the fall of the self-management until the split of the major political party in 1997, so as to illustrate that even in the preceding period nationhood and statehood have been affected by the orientation of the elites. This chapter also sets the stage for a more comprehensive analysis of domestic politics in the subsequent portion of the paper. The third chapter deals with internal power struggles, and the role of political parties in the gradual evolution of the quest for statehood, and its relation to the problems of national identity. The fourth chapter scrutinizes the impact of the external factors in deepening the divide in Montenegro, in order to enhance the argument that the process was not solely dependent on domestic political elites. Rather, the evolution of the two camps also entailed simultaneous identifications with and differentiations from Serbia, the US, and the EU as the major players at the various stages of the development of the divide. Chapter five examines the process of identity change and the instrumentalization of minorities in the rift. It is followed by the final chapter, focusing on the advancement of polarized interpretation of tradition, which contributed to the orientation of the respective portions of population either towards the pro-independence or the pro-unionist camp. Finally, this study employs qualitative methods in examining its variables. Thus, the analysis is conducted through the combination of context and limited discourse analysis, the former being used in the examination of the factual situation; the latter in reference to statements of political entrepreneurs.

2. Montenegrin Mists

In order to understand the socio-political change that took place in Montenegro after 1997, it is essential to outline the main characteristics of the politics in this republic during the process of Yugoslav disintegration. To that end, the following sections aim to provide for a background for the analysis of the vulnerability of the post-crisis Montenegrin identity and the status question. It is also important to note that the following text does not deal with differentiating or assimilating Montenegrin and Serbian national identity, since that would entail a longer historical survey, which has already been provided in detail in Roberts’ book. Rather, it systematically analyzes the questions of nationhood and statehood in the late 1980s and the early 1990s by reference to the internal political scenario and the relations with Serbia.

In 1988, during the “anti-bureaucratic revolution”, which installed Slobodan
Milošević in power in Serbia, the Montenegrin socialist leadership was faced with massive demonstrations. Although Montenegro initially resisted pressure from Belgrade by increased police intervention, the renewed protests in January 1989 gave rise to a new set of political elites led by Momir Bulatovic and Milo Djukanovic. Subsequently, the political scenery of Montenegro during the wars of Yugoslav disintegration was marked by the predominance of the Communist Alliance of Montenegro (Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS) since 1990). Since these elites initially remained loyal to Milošević’s politics, Montenegro was faced with distinct dynamics between nation and state, which gradually manifested itself as cleavages between political parties. In fact, two ethnić-dominated factions appeared in the republic: the Liberal Alliance of Montenegro (LSCG), a Montenegrin nationalist Movement; and the People’s Party (NS), which emphasised the Serbian origins of Montenegrins. Unlike most of the nationalist movements that had proliferated in Central and Eastern Europe - and especially in former Yugoslavia after the fall of Communism - the LSCG was oriented towards democratic principles and abstained from the use of force.7 The NS, conversely, while initially supportive of Milošević’s politics, gradually detached itself from Serbian nationalism, although it retained its premise on the Serbian descent of Montenegrins.

Accordingly, the internal polarisation in Montenegro led to a 300% increase in the portion of population declaring themselves as Serbs between 1981 and 1991.8 At the same time, the percentage of Montenegrins or Yugoslavs declined by a margin of roughly 10%. This, in part, is a sign of an important turn in how a part of the population was defining itself, rather than a manifestation of changes in common demographic trends (natality/mortality rates). Such census figures are also indicative of the effects of the collapse of Communism and the wars of Yugoslav disintegration on the popular understanding of national identity. Owing to the influence of the media, church and politics, the perception of nation in Montenegro during the disintegration of Yugoslavia developed predominantly under the umbrella of Serbian nationalism, encouraged both by the Belgrade and the local media.9 In effect, the collapse of Yugoslavia involved both the Montenegrin government and a vast share of the population in support of the operations of the Yugoslav Peoples’ Army (JNA)

9 Andrijaševic, Nacrt, 11-25.
on the territory of Croatia in 1991. Influenced by the media, Montenegrin soldiers in the JNA attempted to revive the myth of heroism. The “enthusiastic participation of Montenegrin soldiers”\textsuperscript{10} in the attacks on Croatia resonated back to the domestic political scene and resulted in a renewed display of the old tensions over whether Montenegrins were a separate nation or “Serbian Spartans”.\textsuperscript{11}

Similarly, Montenegrin statehood during the first stages of Milošević’s rule was dominated by the politics of Yugoslav disintegration. In line with the recommendations of the European Community Arbitration Committee for the former Yugoslavia (the Badinter Commission), Montenegro was granted the right to self-determination along with the other Yugoslav republics. Consequently, the referendum of 1 March 1992 was aimed at resolving its status, since Yugoslavia was “in the process of dissolution.”\textsuperscript{12} The plebiscite, on which 95.4 \% of the 66.04 \% turnout (the minorities and LSCG boycotted the referendum) voted “Yes” prompted the adoption of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) on 27 April 1992. One of the factors that contributed to such a result in the referendum, along with the outlined identity shift was also the nature of the referendum question. The wording of the 1992 question, “Do you agree that Montenegro, as a sovereign republic, should continue to exist within the common state – Yugoslavia, totally equal in rights with other republics that might wish the same?”\textsuperscript{13} was imprecise. At the time the referendum was conducted in Montenegro, the republics of Croatia, Slovenia and Macedonia had already held their referenda in which overwhelming majorities supported independence. Conversely, the plebiscite in Bosnia and Herzegovina was conducted simultaneously with the Montenegrin one, although this country had already submitted an Aide Memoire for recognition, and held the referendum in order to satisfy the Badinter criteria.\textsuperscript{14} Hence, the lack of clarity in wording implies that a portion of population associated the vote with the preservation of the former Yugoslavia, rather than with the establishment of the FRY. As such, the 1992 referendum was ambiguous, since by the time of the popular vote in Montenegro the perpetuation of Yugoslavia became a fiction.

In the light of the upcoming analysis, it is also important to note that even during the wars of Yugoslav

\textsuperscript{10} Bieber, “Montenegrin politics,” 16; Andrijašević, Nacrt, 16.
\textsuperscript{13} Lukic, “From Yugoslavia,” 56
disintegration, Montenegrin leadership made some minor attempts to preserve some elements of statehood. The outcome of such policies was the gradual eruption of tensions with Milošević and the following split among the ruling elites. In turn, this caused the open polarization of Montenegrin society, over the question of the status of the republic, and accordingly, over national identity. In fact, during the first round of elections in the new state, Milošević, disappointed in the DPS endorsement of the EC-sponsored peace talks in Geneva 1991 (where Croatian and Slovenian independence were recognised), supported Branko Kostić, Bulatović’s rival in the Montenegrin presidential elections.  

Likewise, Montenegrin elites supported Milošević’s reformist opponent Milan Panic in the Serbian elections, reflecting the tendency of preserving some elements of republican sovereignty during that period. However, the failure of Panic to win the elections, the military pressure from Belgrade, Bulatović’s fear of dismissal, and the economic difficulties at the time of hyperinflation and international embargo, all contributed to the temporary relapse of Montenegro into Yugoslavia.  

However, the non-sustainability of federal structures and occasional tensions between Belgrade and (a part of) the Podgorica leadership initiated a gradual “divorce” from Milošević’s Yugoslavia. Progressively, the struggles for power in Montenegro came to revolve around the isolationist politics of Serbia in the 1990s and the latter’s refusal to enter international institutions. This induced open attacks against Milošević by a faction of the DPS in Montenegro led by the Montenegrin Prime Minister - Milo Đukanović - and the Head of the Assembly - Svetozar Marović - early in 1997, causing confrontation within the DPS. The party split into two - Đukanović’s DPS, which remained in power; and Bulatović’s Socialist People’s Party (SNP) that was to become the main opposition party, promoting the preservation of the common state with Serbia.

As a consequence of the outlined events, the political life of Montenegro suffered a gradual polarization in which there was a revival of the old tensions between factions that pushed for an independent statehood and the ones who strove to preserve the union with Serbia. This polarization manifested itself through the internal power struggles that after 1997 became a battlefield over statehood and nationhood in Montenegro.

3. Internal Power Struggles and the Question of Sovereignty

The following analysis is aimed at illustrating how the internal power struggles gradually manifested

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16 Ibid. 24.
themselves through the quest for independent statehood with a portion of Montenegrin elites, while the preservation of the common state with Serbia remained the main focus of the other portion. This resulted in the crystallization of the pro-Montenegrin/pro-independence and pro-Serbian/pro-unionist camps in the period from 2000 until 2006.

The persistent pressure from the federal government spurred the demands for the sovereignty of Montenegro, which were manifested through a political struggle in mid-2000. Milošević’s introduction of changes to the Constitution in July 2000 entailed a shift from the delegation of deputies to direct elections to the Federal Parliament, as well as for the Federal Presidency. This reduced Montenegro to a mere electoral unit, due to its small size in relation to Serbia. Accordingly, such changes undermined Montenegrin equality within the federal institutions, a point accentuated by the DPS. By referring to the loss of status through these constitutional changes, the governing coalition refused to take part in the September 2000 elections, calling for a boycott among the population in Montenegro. In the international media, such a decision was often described as an “understandable,” yet “politically unwise” move of Djukanović, who was therefore not helping the demise of the regime in Serbia. The controversial elections, which eventually resulted in the ousting of Milošević after the October coup in Belgrade, foreshadowed the future realignment within Montenegrin political life. Owing to the discrepancies in the attitudes of political parties towards the new Belgrade government, the relationship with Serbia continued to be a catalyst for the internal divides in Montenegro.

The signing of the Belgrade Agreement on 14 March 2002 marked the decay of the FRY, and its replacement with the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro. For over a year and a half before the signing of the agreement, the restructuring of the last Yugoslavia was in a political deadlock caused by the discrepancies in the “federalizing” Platform of the Belgrade government and the Montenegrin opposition, and the “loose confederation” one proposed by the Montenegrin government. The new state, far from creating the framework for the redefinition of relations between the two constituents in the light of their transition to democracy, gave wider scope to the debate on the revival of Montenegrin statehood.

The Agreement on Principles of Relations between Serbia and Montenegro within a Framework of a Union of States (the Belgrade Agreement) 


Agreement) envisaged the change of the state name from “Yugoslavia” to “Serbia and Montenegro” as well as the possibility for a state constituent to initiate “proceedings for a change of the state status, that is, withdrawal from the state union after three years”. The former change was described by the Montenegrin government as the fulfilment of their promise of the “revival of statehood” by reiterating that, “this is the first time, after an entire century, that Montenegro will be internationally recognisable by its own state name.”

The temporary nature of the agreement for the Montenegrin government was an indication of the ‘ex ante acceptance of the outcome of the referendum [in three years].’ At the same time, the pro-unionist Montenegrin opposition “greeted the preservation of the joint state and the debacle of Djukanovic’s separatist policy”, believing that it would lead to an “ever closer union between Serbia and Montenegro”. Consequently, within the smaller constituency of the union, the status issue was given precedence over all other political issues over the next four years.

In a society as polarized along ethnic lines as the Montenegrin one, the outcome of the referendum on independence in 2002 would have been rather difficult to predict, which was an argument used by Djukanovic in signing the Agreement. Moreover, the interpretation of Articles 2, 117, 118 and 119 of the Montenegrin Constitution of 1992 (later abolished by the Constitutional Court decision of 26 February 2002) required the ratification of the referendum results by a 2/3 majority in the Parliament. Given the composition of the republic’s Assembly, this made it virtually impossible for any result to be approved, providing an additional impetus for Djukanovic to “decelerate and shortly delay the independence idea.”

This caused considerable frustration among the coalition partners of the Montenegrin government, who

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20 Sporazum o principima odnosa Srbije i Crne Gore u okviru državne zajednice (Beograd, March 14, 2002), 1.
26 “Djukanovic: Nakon,” 2.
based their support for the DPS on the promise of a referendum in 2002. Hence, the “painful birth of the new state,” proved to be a major point of friction in the political life within the republic, dividing the population into supporters and opponents of independent statehood and a separate Montenegrin national identity.27

4. Economy and External Intervention

Economic pressures stemming from the federal level pushed Montenegro towards adopting a series of economic policies leading to its gradual detachment from the FRY and its greater dependence on international financial aid during 1998-1999. Consequently, the support for westernization during the Kosovo/a crisis crystallized the attitudes of the two camps towards state and nation, leading to a deepening of the divides in Montenegro. Additionally, international concerns over regional stability played an important role for deferring the referendum in Montenegro in 2002, and in establishing the rules for the one in 2006.

The severe financial difficulties for Montenegro in the 1990s, followed by the increased pressures from Belgrade (aimed at keeping the “minor partner” obedient), resulted in the adoption of a series of economic policies through which Montenegro attained a de facto autonomy. The introduction of the Deutschmark as a parallel currency to the Yugoslav dinar in 1998, and its full adoption in 1999, points to an economic basis for the partial revival of the Montenegrin statehood by its disengagement from Yugoslav institutions. The cessation of transactions between the Montenegrin and the federal budget in 1998 was followed by an emphasis on the necessity for the formation of a separate Montenegrin monetary system.28 Accordingly, the ban on imports of goods from Serbia, enforced by the Serbian police during 1998 and 1999, drove the Montenegrin government towards the establishment of economic links with Slovenia and Croatia, progressively loosening its ties with the federal structures.29 As the dependence on imported goods required international financial assistance, the government increasingly shifted towards the West, which provided Montenegro with the financial means to counter Milošević’s policies. It also allowed for the switch to the Euro as the official currency in 2002 (the republic is not bound by the convergence criteria, owing to the

currency board), as an offset to the regime in Belgrade. The “spill-over” from this Montenegrin “westernization” in the late 1990s was the adoption of the policy of “creeping independence,” which entailed a progressive re-emergence of autonomous administration. Milošević’s threat of intervention in Kosovo and Montenegro in 1998 augmented tensions between the officials of Podgorica and those of Belgrade. The presence of the Yugoslav Army in the Montenegrin territory increased the fears of war in the republic, which led to the establishment of a Montenegrin police force of 20,000 men aimed at counterbalancing the presence of federal troops in 1998 and 1999. Such a political move of the government was an attempt to resist the “growing efforts of the Yugoslav Army to take control of the republic at the rise of a civil war,” since NATO was uneasy about interfering in Montenegro.

Despite the shift of the political discourse in Montenegro in favor of independence, after the departure of Milošević from power in Belgrade, the preservation of the joint state of Serbia and Montenegro had its implications for regional stability. Given the status of Kosovo/a under the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution 1244, and the conflict between ethnic Macedonians and Albanians in spring 2001, geopolitical concerns led to the involvement of the international community in post-communist Yugoslavia’s process of transformation. Since the independence of Montenegro was expected to “provide ammunition to Kosovar Albanians seeking self-determination for Kosovo and to Serb nationalists wishing to reunite the Bosnian Serb entity, Republika Srpska, with Serbia.” the international community pushed the Montenegrin government to remain within “a more devolved and democratic FRY”. The international involvement, headed by the EU, resulted in the Belgrade Agreement, which simultaneously led to an increase in claims and counter-claims regarding the question of statehood. As such, it exacerbated the identity problem in the republic, whereby the supporters of the common state with Serbia increasingly identified themselves as Serbs, and the proponents of independence as Montenegrins.

In an environment filled with disparagement between the two blocs, even the final political contest – 2006 referendum -- between the pro-independence and the pro-union camps

30 Roberts, Serbia-Montenegro, 6.
34 Elisabeth Roberts, “Memorandum,” 2.
occurred in a framework established by the international community, above all the EU. The EU mediation provided for an acceptable, yet complex formula for determining the statehood issue in Montenegro. The 55% threshold was a result of awareness of the deep polarization in Montenegrin society and means of avoiding the boycott of the opposition, which would thereby make any outcome difficult to legitimize. Subsequently, the 55% formula for independence initiated the debate on the “grey zone,” i.e. the case when the numbers of “Yes” votes would fall within 50 and 54.99%. Whereas in such a situation the pro-independence block claimed that the “majority could not be a minority” and that the restructuring Serbia and Montenegro into a union of independent states would be necessary, the opposition considered the “grey zone” as an outright failure of the referendum. Thus, the EU proposal resulted in a situation in which every single vote was of utmost importance, reflecting the divide in Montenegrin society.

Therefore, economic and political pressures from the external factors have played an important role in the Montenegrin divide. The orientation of the government towards the West during the Kosovo crisis instigated increased demands for independence, and as such antagonized the opposition which disapproved of the NATO intervention and supported Serbia. Moreover, in the process of transformation of the last Yugoslavia into Serbia and Montenegro wider regional concerns had to be taken into consideration, which, under the influence of the EU postponed the resolution of the status question. In turn, this further polarized the Montenegrin socio-political life. The major proof for such a claim was the 2006 Montenegrin referendum, which given the 55% threshold, outlined the significance of every vote in the divide over statehood and nationhood in the republic.

5. Identities, Symbols and Minorities

Surveys and public opinion polls indicate that attitudes towards statehood were often closely related to individuals’ political and national affiliation. The divide into two camps, which diverged only slightly in the number of their supporters, induced the instrumentalization of symbols and minorities in the conflict over state and nation in Montenegro. During the years when Montenegro was a part of the State Union, most of the government supporters affirmed the need for holding a referendum on independence after the expiry of the Belgrade Agreement, whereas the opposition was against it. A survey - on the bonds of the population towards

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Serbia and Montenegro versus towards Montenegro alone – showed that among the supporters of the pro-independence government the bond towards the State Union has suffered a decrease over 2002-2005, while the tendency among the pro-unionist opposition was to identify more firmly with the common state. The identity conundrum, which allowed for this shift, was in part a product of distinct interpretations of Montenegrin history and tradition. However, as discussed in the previous sections, such a clear polarization in recent years was catalyzed through the internal power struggles and through the impact of the external factors, which attracted the population towards two poles of the identity-statehood nexus.

The aforementioned was apparent in the 2003 census, according to which, 40.6% of the total population declared themselves as Montenegrins, whereas 30.02% were Serbs. Compared to the 1991 census, the data shows a decline in the portion of population defining themselves as Montenegrin by 30%, whereas the number of Serbs increased by 200%. The public opinion polls, conducted by the Centre for Democracy and Human Rights throughout 2002-2005 indicate the dependency of national affiliation on party politics and the statehood issue. Whereas 68.4% of the supporters of the government coalition tended to define themselves as Montenegrins, 73.8% of the opposition members defined themselves as Serbs. Accordingly, the majority of the supporters of the government endorsed the revival of Montenegrin statehood, as opposed to the lion’s share of the opposition who were against it, indicating that “political choice and national identity are closely intertwined in Montenegro, reflecting the complexity of Montenegrin identity”.

Moreover, as the “implicit meanings” of the aesthetic elements of the state, such as the flag, the coat of arms, or the national anthem, have been historically connected to the nation’s past, they proved to be important symbolic rallying points in the polemic surrounding state and nation in Montenegro. The discourse over these symbols showed the discrepant attitudes of Serbia and Montenegro towards the State Union. The officials of the two constituents of the Union disagreed over the historical

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40 See: Banac, The National Question; Roberts, Realm of the Black Mountain
43 Florian Biber, The Instrumentalization of Minorities in the Montenegrin Quest for Independence (Flensburg: ECMI, 2002), 2.
connotations of the shades of the colors on the flag, the shapes of the national emblem, and the choice of the song for the hymn, since the prevalence of the Serbian or the Montenegrin version would imply the dominance of that option over the other.\textsuperscript{46} Owing to the lack of agreement, the union remained without official symbols up to its dissolution in mid-2006. Instead, a separate law on Montenegrin national symbols was passed in 2004, indicating another push towards the revival of Montenegrin statehood. Consequently, supporters of the government endorsed the Montenegrin Law on State Symbols, whereas the opposition generally believed that there was no need for changing the existing symbols of Montenegro (i.e. the ones of FRY), emphasizing their commitment to the common state.\textsuperscript{47} Such tensions in the relation between the state and nation, accompanied by disagreements both at the union level and at the level of Montenegrin politics, encumbered the cohabitation of Serbia and Montenegro, and created strains within Montenegro itself.

In such an environment, the national minorities (Albanians, Bosniaks, Croats, Muslims, and Roma), which according to the recent census represent over a quarter of the population of Montenegro, became increasingly instrumentalized, owing to their support for the pro-independence cause. Although there was a general consensus that minorities in Montenegro were treated better than in the neighboring countries, the opposition tended to antagonize them by emphasizing that “any referendum won with the votes of minorities alone would not be considered legitimate.”\textsuperscript{48} Moreover, the pro-unionist newspapers (Dan, Glas Crnogoraca) often accused the Albanian minority of secessionism, and engaged in “hate speech towards minorities.”\textsuperscript{49} Such promulgations were appealing to the part of the population which supported the opposition bloc, as according to public opinion polls, the index of social distance towards the minorities (especially non-Christian, i.e. Albanian and Bosniak/Muslim) was considerably higher among the members of the pro-unionist opposition than among the supporters of the government.

Hence, the instrumentalization of minorities and state symbols became a part of the process through which the pro-independence and pro-unionist claims were transmitted to the population. Such transmission was facilitated by the fact that in the complex Montenegrin socio-political milieu individuals’ statehood and nationhood were entrenched in the

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\item Bieber, \textit{The Instrumentalization}, 4.
\item Bieber, \textit{The Instrumentalization}, 5.
\end{thebibliography}
cobweb of their political orientation, as outlined in the above surveys.

6. Epiphenomena of Politics: Revival of Tradition

Contemporary academic debates on Montenegro often make references to the epiphenomena of politics, i.e. the revival of tradition as a by-product of the political struggles. In order to understand the mechanisms through which these debates were transmitted, it is essential to revert to the role of religion and tribal life in contemporary Montenegro. Given the strong patriarchal tradition in the country, the post-communist revival of tradition crystallized into poles of attraction for the pro-independence and pro-unionist blocs.

The frictions between the Serbian (SOC) and Montenegrin (MOC) Orthodox churches served as a point of reference for the population in terms of displaying its national identity and attitudes towards the state. The MOC, which was taken over by the SOC after Yugoslav unification in 1918, was resurrected in the early 1990s. The restoration of the MOC was viewed by many as a political move. The tensions that existed between the two Orthodox Churches resulted in the SOC labeling the MOC as a “sect.” Similarly, while the Metropolitan of the Serbian Orthodox Church claimed that “Montenegrin identity is a historical fiction. Serbs and Montenegrins are the same people, the same nation,” the clergy of the Montenegrin Orthodox Church emphasized the distinctiveness of the Montenegrin nation.

The attitude of the SOC resonated strongly with the members of the opposition block who, according to the polls, identified primarily with this church, implying that the Metropolitan Amfulohije was the person of greatest confidence in Montenegro. Conversely, within the pro-independence camp, the role of the church was viewed in two distinct ways. The MOC was fully endorsed by the parties promoting the independence of Montenegro since the early 1990s, such as the social-democrats and liberals. Yet, the role of the church among the supporters of the pro-independence DPS was not emphasized to the same extent as among the opposition members, which points to the complex role of religion in constructing national identities.

University of Westminster, London, United Kingdom, March 06, 2006).
52 Metropolitan Amfulohije in Santoro, “From Baptism,” 8.
often identified themselves with the SOC rather than MOC. Since the opposite was highly unlikely among the pro-unionists who define themselves as Serbs, “the struggle for the church [became] essentially the struggle for statehood.”\textsuperscript{55}

Additionally, in Montenegrin society, where mentality is closely associated with the tribe, a concept historically grounded in the collective memory, the revival of a new form of tribalism also served as a channel for the political divergence over the notions of nation and state. According to Popovic, neo-tribalism in Montenegrin society was a means for Milošević’s followers to “build some new, alternative, however false, source of legitimacy” after their political defeats in the previous years.\textsuperscript{56} The reinvented tribes, subsequently, started affiliating with the Serbian ideology. In turn, this provoked the creation of pro-Montenegrin neo-tribes as a counterweight to the supporters of the Yugoslav idea.

Neo-tribalism also emphasized the geographical dimension of the struggle over statehood and nationhood. The southern tribes, associated with Old (dynastic) Montenegro, had a propensity to identify themselves with the idea of the revival of Montenegrin statehood and the separateness of Montenegrin nation, owing to their historical association with the struggle for preservation of independence against the Ottomans. Consequently, the number of supporters of the governments’ pro-independence policy was higher in the southern areas, as demonstrated by the elections results in recent years.\textsuperscript{57} Conversely, the northern tribes that bordered Serbia included a number of clans that had shifted from Serbia to Montenegro during Ottoman rule in the Balkans.\textsuperscript{58} As such, these tribes displayed the tendency to affiliate with the idea of the preservation of the common state with Serbia, and Serbian nationhood, endowing thus the opposition with their voters’ support.

Thus, in an environment of history and reinvented tradition, the strong patriarchal culture in Montenegro was revived in order to mobilize support behind the pro-unionist (pro-Serbian) and pro-independence (pro-Montenegrin) causes. Both religion and tribal life served as reference points and through them the two poles aimed at transmitting their ideas of nationhood and statehood.

7. Conclusion

By scrutinizing identity and politics, this paper provided for an interdisciplinary approach to

\textsuperscript{55} Dajkovic in Santoro, “From Baptism,” 8.
\textsuperscript{57} See: Bieber, “Montenegrin Politics”
understanding the origins, nature, and channels of the interplay between state and nation in Montenegro, with an emphasis on the significance of internal political struggles and of external factors in the quest for Montenegrin statehood in recent years. The antagonizing versions of statehood and nationhood ultimately stemmed from traditional divides, which reverberated in the contemporary discourse through the revival of tradition, and the instrumentalization of symbols and national minorities.

Given the economic and political instability in the country, external factors, such as the US and the EU affected the opportunities and the constraints for the actions of the domestic elites. Through the affiliation with a portion of the elites, a particular external factor became antagonized in the eyes of the other portion. Hence, external factors indirectly affected the division among the population on the questions of statehood and nationhood. Surveys and other opinion polls indicate that this was apparent at the level of the society as well, since there was a clear demarcation of the external factors that the supporters of the pro-independence and pro-unionist blocs would identify with. All of these issues gradually gained heightened importance, since individuals’ national affiliation became inextricably connected to their attitude towards the emergence of independent Montenegrin statehood.

After the crack within the DPS proper, the internal political struggles progressively triggered the creation of two political blocs: pro-independence and pro-union. In order to elucidate the process of how the two camps crystallized the study took into consideration several internal and external factors. Given the repressive nature of Milošević’s politics, the orientation of a portion of Montenegrin political elites towards the West after 1997 pushed the government towards the policy of “creeping independence,” leading to Montenegro’s gradual estrangement from the federal institutions. While such a policy acquired the dimension of the quest for statehood on behalf of the government, it also caused distress for those who strove to preserve the union with Serbia.

Additionally, since one faction of the domestic leadership oriented itself towards the western values after 1997, while the other remained a follower of Milosevic’s politics, the two overarching national identities became fairly affiliated with two diametrically opposed external centres – the West and Serbia. This discrepancy was most apparent during and after the NATO intervention in Yugoslavia in 1999, when one set of the elites was faced with economic and political pressures from the West (the US 1999-2001; the EU 2002-2006), while the other portion remained highly impacted by the Serbian political milieu. This rift was felt among the population, who identified the influence of the external factors in line with the ideas
proliferated by either the pro-independence or the pro-unionist bloc.

By 2001, the future of the Montenegrin relationship with Serbia came to the forefront of the political discourse after the demise of Milošević. Consequently, the internal Montenegrin debate was channeled through amplified demands for independence on behalf of the government, and increased interaction of the opposition with the new Serbian elites which sought to preserve the union. Given the level of discord, both within Montenegro itself and in its relationship with Serbia, the external factor, notably the EU, proved to be an important factor in the transformation of Yugoslavia into Serbia and Montenegro. Through the establishment of a transitory framework for the continuation of the State Union, the EU affected the dynamics of political polarization in Montenegro.

This fissure was channeled towards the population through the epiphenomena of politics, which revived tradition as a catalyst to the solidification of the internal divide. As such, religion and neo-tribalism transplanted the political struggle to the level of national identity. Owing to the prevalence of the discourse on the future of the common state, the internal divide put national minorities at the centre of the political debates, purporting their instrumentalization and antagonization in the quest for Montenegrin statehood. State and nation in Montenegro since 1997 have, therefore, been subject to and affected by a internal and external factors, and catalyzed through the reinvention of tradition and the instrumentalization of minorities. Subsequently, this essay contextualized and analyzed the multifaceted and complex factors that have affected, most recently, the formal creation of the state of Montenegro. As such, this research enriched an understudied area through a small contribution to the scarce literature on contemporary Montenegrin politics.

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BOOK REVIEWS


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In the last decades, a growing amount of academic resources on ethnicity, nationalism and minority rights can be noticed. Both politics and sociology are concerned with the debates on these issues. However, each discipline approaches these subjects within its own framework and most of these works are deprived of an overall picture. Political science concentrates on the impact of these subjects on state affairs. The ethnic and ethnonational movements mostly use the same merits supported by modern nation-states such as democracy, justice, equality and freedom in order to legitimize their claims. This gives rise to the reconsideration of these merits and directly affects the state attitude towards the ethnonational movements. In that sense, political science assumes the nature of ethnicity and nationalism as given and takes an interest in its consequences for the state.

For sociology the primary focus is the nature of ethnicity and nationalism rather than their relation with state. Questions of ethnic and national identity, focusing in particular on the constructedness and malleability of identities are more significant for the social theory. (p. 3) The distinction between the two disciplines results in different perceptions of the concepts within the context of nationalism and ethnicity studies. For instance, political theory assumes “multiculturalism” as state policy whereas social theory associates it with the changing nature of ethnic identities. (p. 8)

Ethnicity, Nationalism and Minority Rights offers an alternative for the weakness of the extensive literature on each of these three subjects, which lack an interdisciplinary perspective. The editors of the book conceive political and social theory as complementary; therefore they claim that the two disciplines should be taken concomitantly to understand the essence of ethnicity issues. Thus, they gather relevant articles for both cores of theories.

The structure of the book fulfills its claim of interdisciplinarity. On the one hand this reveals the differences of the two theories to evaluate those issues. On the other hand, it gives an opportunity to notice the common ground that exists between the two. The first part of the book is written by social theorists. This provides a conceptual analysis before moving to their consequences, which is more significant for political theorists. For example, Brubaker emphasizes a “group” concept and necessitates rethinking what we mean by ethnic group or ethnicity itself.
He claims that taking as a basic analytical category not the “group” as an entity but “groupness” as a contextually fluctuating variable. (p. 54) Then Pieterse problematizes the notion of “ethnic conflict”. He introduces two opposite positions in relation to ethnicity. In his disease model, ethnicity is perceived as “an evil politics stalking the Enlightenment world of growing modernization.” (p. 28) On the contrary, the emancipation model recognizes ethnicity rather than denying it.

The essays of the first part, intentionally or not, prove the success of social theory in examining the definitions of ethnic group, minority and ethnicity. The political theory is rather indifferent to analyze them deeply while it is too much interested in evaluating their consequences for social and political environment. The difference between the approaches of two disciplines can be realized in the second part more clearly. The second part concerns the state response to ethnic issues. Thus the political theory is more influential. In this part, claims of the ethnic groups are studied in relation with the state’s attitude towards them. A state can pursue an oppressive policy towards its ethnic groups whereas another can implement more liberal, multicultural policies. Kymlicka contributes to the volume by making a comparison between state responses to minorities in the Western democracies and in the postcommunist countries of Eastern and Central Europe. He claims that Western democracies perceive the minority rights in terms of justice, whereas the Eastern and Central European countries perceive them in terms of security. His argument is maintained by Iris Marion Young in another platform. She questions the self-determination right of minorities, which is perceived as a threat by the states. As it is seen in the essays, the main argument of the second part is that states and ethnic minorities form and display their patterns of behavior in relation to one another.

The last part of the book deals with the theoretical debates and tries to develop new directions. Parekh comments on politics of recognition and redistribution whereas Davis discusses politics of belonging and its effects on border and boundary constructions. Finally, Calhoun questions the efficacy of cosmopolitanism in both social and political theory. The essays in this part demonstrate a search for reconciliation between states and ethnic minorities and aims to find a middle ground.

The book presents a two-legged structure, which is intensified by a double conceptualization of overlapping themes. In that sense, it reaches its goal of presenting the points and arguments of social and political theory. It provides the aspects of both disciplines, which culminates in a general social science umbrella and exemplifies them by case studies. These can be counted among the strengths of the book. Thus it can be regarded as a recommended reading for those who want to reach a comparative perspective. The study also proves that some of the deficiencies of
political theory can be removed by the strengths of social theory or vice versa. The first part can be given as an example for this. It gives the definitions of basic concepts by using social theory because political theory underrates those definitions.

However, all chapters do not contribute in the same manner to the book. The essays of Pieterse, Brubaker and Oommen are more prominent in terms of their theoretical aspects. Pieterse’s classifications of ethnicities and multiculturalisms make an especially significant contribution to the book and to the literature. His tables and hypotheses are illuminating. The essays of Eriksen and Kymlicka can be underlined for their case studies. On the other side, Calhoun’s essay in the third part can also be taken into account because it questions the future of ethnicity and nationalism debates and develops a different understanding of cosmopolitanism.

Although a two-legged structure is presented in the book, leading to a social science umbrella, it lacks a thorough synthesis where differences and overlaps are discussed. Ten essays, which are written by different scholars, make it difficult to form such a synthesis. This can be viewed as the main weakness of the book. A general conclusion chapter apart from the conclusions of each essay could have solved this problem. Therefore, the task of developing a coherent, interdisciplinary theory on ethnicity, nationalism and minority rights is left to the readers.

In this sense, the editors could have benefited from Calhoun’s essay since his arguments on cosmopolitanism are more able to draw a general conclusion. As Calhoun mentioned, cosmopolitanism is usually perceived as the opposite to nationalism. This creates a sociological confusion and an obstacle to achieving both greater democracy and better transnational institutions. In fact, cosmopolitanism and nationalism are mutually constitutive and to oppose them too sharply is misleading. (p. 233)

A peaceful coexistence of diversities is very much related to the mutual respect and tolerance for each other. In this regard, cosmopolitanism can be assumed as the best alternative to resolve the conflict between states and minorities in democratic societies.


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Post-Soviet and, in general, post-Socialist transformation poses a variety of questions and since the early 1990s many have ventured to offer answers. A recent contribution to the debate by Ivan Katchanovski picks up the thread from the very beginning of this quest to explain—with the Fukuyama-Huntington debate.\(^1\) Francis Fukuyama himself wrote the foreword to Katchanovski’s monograph and this in itself would seem enough to guess with whom the book is aligned. Indeed, Katchanovski’s monographic study tries to prove Huntington’s stress on the “culture factor” wrong and opposes the notorious polarizing dividing line Huntington had drawn across Europe. Instead, he sponsors the term “regional political culture” to explain the problems of post-Soviet transformation and rejects Huntington’s singular stress of religion as the factor that divides. Katchanovski attempts to show that present differing political cultures are the product of different historical experiences. His two case studies are Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova, which he believes are “ideal cases”.

His focus upon the East-West cleavage within both countries is reflected in the book’s title—“Cleft Countries”—which is a phrase that the author borrowed from Huntington himself. Thus, Western and Eastern Ukraine as well as what he calls Western and Eastern Moldova (i.e. Transnistria) oppose each other in political culture. The author convincingly illustrates these differences with a series of surveys, elections and other statistical data. One among the many indicators is the inclination to vote for “Western” parties in the Western regions and vice versa. What he means by “Western” or “Western-oriented” parties remains unclear. While such a classification may fit the Ukraine, in Moldova, neither the Communist Party which has been in power for some time nor its previous alternative, the Popular Front, with its radical nationalist rhetoric, match democratic Western credentials without further elaboration. This is his first and main hypothesis—that the difference in support for pro-Western and pro-Russian parties are due mainly to regional political cultures. This hypothesis is developed in the second chapter (following an introductory chapter). Katchanovski’s third chapter then shows what political cleavage means in both countries. He discusses voting behaviours, the issue of separatism in the various regions (Transnistria, Gagauzia, Crimea as well as the Donbas region) and attitude variances across the regions towards issues such as privatization, market reform and foreign policy. In the fourth chapter we find a detailed exposition of his arguments on the historical evolution of regional political cultures. In his fifth chapter he then rounds off his discussion with an analysis of “Culture, ethnicity, economy and political leadership”.

As stated above, the main hypothesis rests upon the assumption that these regional political cultures are the product of different historical experiences. While he argues his case quite convincingly for Ukraine, there are some problems with his treatment of Moldova, especially in relation to the Gagauz and Transnistria. In general he is right, arguing that there is a difference in historical experience between what was formerly Bessarabia and Transnistria. Yet, the latter has not only not been part of Romania for a long time, as the author claims; in fact it has never been part of Romania. Indeed, that Transnistria is very much an artefact of Soviet nationalities’ policy and as such not a historical region at all, seems to escape the author.

He stresses the role of the Gagauz’ historical experience as the key to understanding conflict lines in Moldova time and again; yet, he does not seem not to be aware that we (Western as well as Gagauz Gagauzologists) actually know very little of the historical experiences of this group. He ascribes the political inclination of the Gagauz to vote for “Eastern” (Communist/pro-Russian) parties to the fact that they were forcibly expelled from the Ottoman Empire and found a safe haven in the Tsarist Empire. We have no proof of such a forced expulsion; it seems more plausible that the Gagauz migrated out of the Dobrudsha, because as a prime battleground of a series of Russo-Ottoman wars it was an area repeatedly devastated, offering only harsh living conditions. A visit to the Gagauz ethnographic museum in Besalma (in the autonomous Gagauz Yeri) betrays a similar reading of the past. The public memory of the Gagauz transports the belief that the forefathers who settled in Bessarabia were waiting to return to the Dobrudsha once it became peaceful again.

Given the strong focus on the historical genesis of political culture it is remarkable that Katchanovski does not rely more on the historians of/on the region and their work. He admits that there is a general deficit of research on how historical memory is transmitted from one generation to the next, yet he does not venture deeper into the literature on remembrance, memory and related fields (Erinnerungspolitik, history politics). He identifies many of the important times in history that we could deem responsible for producing a cleavage, yet conversely there are some important periods which are not discussed. World War Two as well as certain ‘non-divisive’ aspects of Soviet rule do not receive detailed discussion although they certainly are also part of

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the historical experiences which influence political culture.

However, even though Katchanovski’s prime argument rests upon the historical dimension and genesis of political culture and there are some flaws in his exposition of aspects thereof, his approach is nevertheless a promising one. The assumption of a historical genesis of current political behaviours is certainly right and this angle of analysis offers more insights than deterministic arguments à la Huntington, which mistakes cultural markers as cultural essence. Katchanovski’s monograph is an invitation to political scientists and historians to take up the argument and dig deep into historiography and research to prove or disprove the longevity of political culture. The book is very rewarding to all those interested in tracking the cleavages in both countries. It recounts the history of transition in a focused way and offers an immense range of data – the 28 tables and 15 graphs in the book testify to the range of material analysed by Katchanovski. His analysis enriches a field of country studies, where solid monographs on post-1991 developments are always in need.

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The hegemonic aspirations in the South Caucasus give a noticeable boost into political scientists' interest in the current reconfiguration of the region. This new configuration rises in the course of a complex transition process that outlines the impacts of social changes in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia on the regional cooperation strategies. Originally written in German, Vahram Soghomonyan’s “European Integration and Hegemony in the South Caucasus” is an attempt to identify what social forces and capital interests push forward the Europeanization of the
region, along with other hegemonic actors, such as USA and Russia. The study raises the question of Europe’s borders and emphasizes the role of the South Caucasus as a geopolitical bridgehead. Hence, the publication is actual and significant within the context of the elaboration and implementation of the European Neighborhood Policy Action Plans in the three states.

The originality of this research work lies in the systematically applied concept of the so-called “double integration” process: the regional integration itself and the transregional integration into Europe. Soghomonyan points out that the adopted European Neighborhood Policy in the South Caucasus is favorable specifically for the integration-oriented forces. Two main capital groups that encourage the regional transformation are the capitals of Diaspora and oil companies. Moreover, the author emphasizes the role of national social-political models and the productive capital in the scope of the creation of geo-economic advantages for the European common market in its Eastern dimension.

In the first part of the book, the author portrays the inner configuration of the South Caucasus by outlining the national economic models and the interconnections between the main transforming forces and regional actors. Considering the restructuring measures, he tries to show which paths of neoliberal policies or elements of the European social-state model occur in these three states. Special attention is paid to the productive capital investments in the region. Some factors and mechanisms in the process of deepening the regional interdependences are described, which reduce the existing conflict potential and create preconditions for institutionalization of the regional cooperation. As he notes the level of democratic consolidation of each state gives additional advantages to be flexible and resistant in its relations with regional and external players. E.g., the stable development of democratic institutions in Nagorno Karabakh is one of the key arguments for the legitimacy of this subregion's independence. This empirically well researched section serves as a solid base for the following examination of the integration perspectives and hegemonic relations in the South Caucasus.

Soghomonyan describes alternative hegemonic strategies of external players acting in the South Caucasus. Giving some theoretical background of hegemony and its possible instruments, the author discusses the role of the hegemonic actors in the domestic politics and points out the critical aspects of the so called "colour revolutions" as well as institutional reforms and their real impact on the changing system of values in this societies. The ’88 Karabakh movement in Armenia and the Rose revolution in Georgia are described as the important political factors of the transformation. This is very often linked to the different approaches of state and nation building.
According to the author, the European integration process acts predominantly with "soft power" elements, but creates hegemonic dependencies in a geopolitically important region. The anti-imperial character of Europe makes its policy more oriented on a cooperative, multilaterally oriented and legal-based controlling strategy. Soghomonyan describes this policy as the geopolitical dimension of the European integration process, which appears to be a test for the European Union with its claims of being a Global Player. Furthermore, he points out the Eastern direction of the European foreign policy has three main directions: firstly, the European strategy towards Russia; secondly, the negotiations about the EU entry of Turkey and, finally, the integration perspectives of the Ukraine and the South Caucasus. The slow Armenian-Turkish reconciliation in the context of the recognition of the Armenian Genocide and a broader modernization process in the region is one of the main obstacles for the EU and the USA to enter widely into the region. Being a part of the Wider Europe space, the South Caucasus lies on the borderline with the US defined Greater Middle East.

The European South Caucasus policy is relevant with regard to the initiated constitutional process, which stimulates the identity debate over the question of the borders of a political Europe. The issue whether Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia can become a part of a united Europe is linked by the author with the ability of these countries to confirm their claims of belonging to the European community by consequent policy making on the national level.

This thoroughly researched and cogent study builds on the vision of the functional approach, according to which the interdependencies, on the one hand, and the legal adjustment, on the other, form the integration framework in the South Caucasus. Nevertheless, the author is very optimistic when analyzing the future of the South Caucasus. In other words, there is a strong emphasis on economic factors and considerable neglect of security issues facing today’s Caucasus. For example, he states that “due to rational economic interests the cooperative parts of the elites and bilateral business unions gain ground [by] pushing forward a spill-over process in other policy areas”. Though the role of soft power instruments in regional politics is predominant in this research, it leaves questions of how different approaches in security issues are related to the cooperative strategies and national economic interests. However, the rich research material and the numerous sources used in the book are delivering the nuances of regional developments.

In contrast to the previous literature examining the transformations in the South Caucasus, this study develops a new perspective of the regional identity formation and brings the subregional integration process into the common European context. Theories of European Integration serve as a
methodological framework for the analysis. In this research work, different integration and hegemony approaches are used. Besides this, the integration theories overlap with the methodological aspects of hegemony understanding that helps to explore the existing hegemonic structures in this geopolitically important region.

Based on the characteristics of the national reform policies of each state, the book explores the regional configuration of the South Caucasus with its three dimensions – economic, social and integration. Thus, the book reveals the social forces and political actors, as well as their approaches, which support the European Strategy in the South Caucasus.

The book is of interest for audiences in the countries of the South Caucasus and Europe. It delivers a fair research of several particular areas, which helps to examine the structural advantages of the European Union and its role in a hegemonic environment.