

# **Revolutionary Change and the Prospects for Democracy: Appraising the Impact of Leninist Violence on Postcommunist Regime Outcomes**

Michael Bernhard  
University of Florida  
[bernhard@ufl.edu](mailto:bernhard@ufl.edu)

and

Jeffrey Kopstein  
University of California, Irvine  
[kopstein@uci.edu](mailto:kopstein@uci.edu)

## **Abstract**

Revolutionary violence has two distinct impacts that need to be theorized on different time horizons. Comparative historical research will benefit from recalling the distinction between the short-run, retarding effects of violence for democratic change and its sometimes unintended salutary long-run impact. Revolutionary change predicated on violence is by its nature highly anti-democratic. It destroys interpersonal trust and paves the way for dictatorial regimes whose behavioral and institutional legacies pose an impediment to future attempts at democratization. At the same time, it also creates forms of socio-structural, institutional, and cultural change that work in the long-term and whose impact on future attempts at democratization need not be only negative. Conceptualizing, disentangling, and illustrating these mixed legacies is the main contribution of this paper. We explicitly connect the two dimensions--short and long run effects--and tease out the conditions under which the second can have a positive impact on democratic regime building. The history of Western liberalism is inextricably caught up in violent transformation; where this violence is absent, revolutionary breakthroughs at the social level rarely occur. At the same time, violence on its own is no guarantor of long run democratic consolidation. The paper extends the empirical analysis from the West to that of the communist and post-communist world in order to illustrate how political development and violence relate to each in the wake of different pre-democratic legacies.

## **Introduction**

What is the contribution of revolutionary violence to democratic development? Our posing of the question this way came out of an earlier study in which we maintained that in several countries, the sociological impact of decades of violent Leninist rule ironically contributed to the emergence of democratic politics and made it more difficult for would-be authoritarians to stabilize their control once communism fell.<sup>1</sup> This effect was restricted primarily to East-Central Europe, but we hypothesized and illustrated its impact in the former Soviet Union. Our argument could be summarized as follows: violent

---

<sup>1</sup> Kopstein and Bernhard 2015.

modernization for whatever reason can contribute to democratic regime outcomes even if that is explicitly not the intention of those carrying out the violence.

Clearly violence is normatively undesirable, but who could deny that the United States would have been less democratic if there had been no bloody civil war? Barrington Moore boldly referred to this civil war as America's real revolution.<sup>2</sup> Would France have democratized without its revolution? Would England have become a democracy without its bloody civil war? At a minimum there is a short-run, long-run tradeoff. Democracy is about the peaceful change of government; revolution is about violent change. Without the latter, however, the European experience suggests that it is impossible to arrive at the former. Is that not the painful lesson of Germany in the 20<sup>th</sup> century? Would a democratic and pacific Germany be the predominant power in the European Union without two costly defeats in World Wars followed by occupation and partition?

These, of course, are all basic observations cribbed from Barrington Moore, his acolytes, and the broader literature on political development. The pioneers of comparative politics in the U.S. sought to understand just how the West became liberal and democratic. The answer was "modernization"—a syndrome of social changes that focused on the key variables of economic scarcity, social complexity, and individual efficacy. These three variables respectively formed the bases of political economy,<sup>3</sup> political sociology,<sup>4</sup> and political behavior.<sup>5</sup> Decreasing scarcity is associated with broadening of the basis of political rule, increasing social complexity created the demand for regulatory states run according to the rule of law, and a swelling sense of personal efficacy led to the decline of deference and constituted the psychological core of democratic citizenship. Comparative politics, in its original incarnation conceptualized and measured the relationship between these three variables as the correlates, if not the causes, of democracy.

Moore's critique was devastating to early developmentalist thinking. For one thing, Moore and others noted, it appeared to universalize the developmental sequence of the West without understanding that the West itself became democratic at the very height of its colonial domination of the rest of the world. The odds that former colonial countries could or would replicate the West's experience was minimal, especially since the West itself, through force, fraud, and money, did not cease to increase the disparities between itself and the rest of the world.<sup>6</sup> Violent revolution was the only way to escape this domination or "dependence" in the argot of the day. In fact, when considered more closely the experience of the West itself was drenched in blood and violence, not only in relation to the rest of the world but also internally.

Another crucial weakness of the political development approach, one pointed out by multiple students especially on the left, is that it largely ignored violence and conceptualized politics with a model of equilibrium, rather than as an affair revolving around the pursuit of interest through force. At a

---

<sup>2</sup> Moore 1966.

<sup>3</sup> Lipset, Przeworski et al.

<sup>4</sup> Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens 1992.

<sup>5</sup> Almond and Verba 1963, Ingelhardt 1977, Putnam 1993.

<sup>6</sup> We are far less sanguine about the impact of colonial violence. Earlier work shows that former Western overseas colonial possessions fare far worse in sustaining democracy compared to their colonizer, internal colonies that achieved independence, and countries that did not experience colonialism (Bernhard et al. 2004). This is despite the impact that different facets of colonialism had on the level of democracy among the post-colonial states (Woodberry 2012, Lankina and Getachew 2012, Lange 2004).

minimum, such an equilibrium could only be attained when the field of actors is simplified and their relative position to each other is clarified and simplified by violence. This was the message of the left, who were the first to abandon the developmentalist framework, mostly latching onto some version of revolutionary Marxism.<sup>7</sup> But even those who did not completely leave the developmentalist conversation could not but be keenly aware of a paradox: by telling countries around the world to “be democratic” and eschew violence, in effect, what political science was saying was “be like us but don’t do it the way we did.” That those blood soaked exercises in state-building, nation-building, and old-regime shattering revolution contributed to the outcomes of the West is something that is easily forgotten and certainly normatively odious. It is difficult to deny, however, “the contributions of violence to gradualism,” as Barrington Moore put it in his iconic discussion of English political development.

The literature on political development, then, foundered on the shores of revolutionary violence. But the developmentalist discourse is back. Perhaps it never really went away but was subsumed under smaller and more tractable questions. Yet Francis Fukuyama’s two volume synthetic masterpiece (itself a reconsideration of Huntington’s classic study in light of half a century of comparative politics research) and Sheri Berman’s forthcoming developmentalist history of how the West democratized remind us that whatever the pitfalls of master narratives, they do draw us into the big questions of the discipline.<sup>8</sup> Why are the countries of the world governed so differently? What accounts for the particular trajectory of the West and will others follow it? And are there other stable regime types that can compete with liberal democracy?

Our contention in this paper is that any revival of the developmentalist discourse has to accommodate both modernization and violence into its theoretical ambit. Failure to do so will inevitably replicate the pathologies of an earlier generation of writing, among liberals with an inattention to the violent bases of development, and among radicals with their desire to depart from liberal domination through the cleansing power of violence without any sense of where this might lead. Development and violence coexist in dialectical tension: this strikes us as both a core theoretical and empirical lesson of the century old field of comparative politics.

This brings us back to revolutionary violence as a constituent part of democratic development. Our purpose in this paper is to disentangle the lines of causality, to distinguish between short and long-term impacts of revolutionary violence, and to close in on its relationship to democratic development. Not all violence leads to democracy but it can when put to particular ends, and indeed it is extraordinarily difficult to establish durable and meaningful democracy without the background of violent displacement of the many impediments along the way.

In what follows we first highlight the impact of revolutionary violence on three modal developmental categories that occupy much of comparative politics: state-building, nation-building, and class formation. Students of comparative politics understand the importance of this developmental sequence but any consideration of real cases shows that states, nations, and social classes appear in different orders in different cases. Although what we are primarily interested in is regime-type, any approach that recognizes the centrality of revolutionary violence needs to consider its impact on all three master

---

<sup>7</sup> Fanon 1963, Roy 2011, Memmi 1991, Galleano 1983, Said 1993.

<sup>8</sup> Huntington 1968; Berman (forthcoming) and Fukuyama 2012 and 2014.

categories: state, nation, and class. We then illustrate our discussion with examples from the index case of political development, Western Europe, and also from the developing world. Our primary case, however, is the formerly communist world. It is here where the paradoxes of political development are most evident, for the Leninists were uninterested in democracy but that is where their revolutionary violence led many of the countries in which they ruled.

### **State-Building Violence**

Revolutionaries initially think much more about destroying states than building them. Rather than considering how to build effective state power, in their more utopian moments revolutionaries frequently consider dispensing with “uncharismatic” administration altogether. Revolutionary anarchism grows from a peculiar combination of idealism and the brutal encounter with state oppression. Compare the naïve Lenin of *State and Revolution* who in channeling Marx on the Paris Commune muses how executive power can be fused in a “commune” where the direct action of the people will oversee the construction of a communism in which the state will wither away, to the interlocking and subservient state, economic, party and security bureaucracies built by Stalin.<sup>9</sup> Thus, insurgent revolutionaries frequently envision a world where power is in the hands of “the people” rather than specialized bureaucracies. In getting the state so wrong, Lenin differed very little from the failed French revolutionaries of the Paris commune or from the Chinese revolutionaries who followed. Mao and his followers spent most of their mental energies on survival and conquest but very little on how they would retain their power, the hostile world in which they lived, or the social forces of their own societies that would inevitably resist their transformative plans.

Skocpol’s *States and Social Revolutions* helped political science understand how revolutionaries ended up, almost unwittingly, as violent state-builders. Whatever they thought about democracy, state power became the key question. Skocpol sees revolution as a two stage process.<sup>10</sup> It begins with the seizure of power, the conquest of the state by one of many competing factions after the collapse of a regime. As a form of regime change it entails the replacement of an institutionalized set of rules that specifies who may exercise state power and the means by which they exercise it. Once a monopoly of the use of physical force is established over a territory, a new set of rules is institutionalized that establishes new forms for the exercise of state power by a new set of actors. Both of these processes are inherently violent. Her theory of why ancien regimes collapse has received greater attention, but for our question, the legacies of revolution for future regime outcomes, the second half of her book matters more. It is devoted to the outcomes of the revolutionary process, which we understand as a transformation of the exercise of power -- who exercises it, the means by which it is exercised, and the ends to which it is directed. This is a crucial aspect of the transformative nature of revolution.

To understand the implications of what is entailed in processes of revolutions, it is useful to think in terms of the two modalities of state power discussed by Mann in his monumental *Sources of Social Power* – the despotic and the infrastructural.<sup>11</sup> The seizure of state power is a quintessential despotic power moment, when naked force and the ability to suppress competitors in the quest to acquire and reorganize the exercise of state power is central. Once control is consolidated, the construction of new forms of infrastructural power allows for institutionalized rule and the pursuit of revolutionary

---

<sup>9</sup> Lenin 1918, Marx 1973.

<sup>10</sup> Skocpol 1979.

<sup>11</sup> Mann 1986.

transformation. New structures, rules, and actors congruent with the aims of the revolutionary elite must be constructed. This not only transforms who controls the state and the rules by which they exercise power, but changes the very nature and capacities of the state itself. The pattern whereby diffuse traditional authorities cope with a panoply of tasks gives way to a hierarchically organized and ordered state that develops bureaucratic institutions staffed with specialists to see to important state functions.<sup>12</sup>

Revolutionary states not only do a better job of defending state sovereignty in the international system, but they also extend the reach of the state into society. Revolutionary states create bureaucracies that penetrate society and make the state part of the everyday life of populations for whom things like mail service and primary schooling were not mundane daily events. Whereas ancien regimes were often based on less-centralized piecemeal, conflicting, and undifferentiated forms of authority,<sup>13</sup> revolutionary states are masters of constructing modern infrastructural power in Mann's sense. They move beyond Weber's monopoly of the legitimate use of violence and build functionally specialized, differentiated sets of staffed institutions that also exercise "a monopoly of authoritative binding rule-making." It is this aspect of the state that allows it to penetrate and exercise authority over society "to implement logically political decisions throughout the society."<sup>14</sup> Revolutionary states are a special class of states in that they begin almost exclusively with high levels of despotic power that they then use to build infrastructural power. In doing so they are also much more effective in extracting surpluses from society to fund this enhanced state power than their predecessors.

Thus revolutionary states are almost always modernizing states that utilize force to generate infrastructural power that in other contexts may evolve gradually. Mann notes the centrality of the state apparatus in the Soviet Union in creating forms of communication, surveillance, and control of resources and populations that were previously underdeveloped under Tsarism.<sup>15</sup> Tarrow argues that even in the classically bourgeois case of the French Revolution, the most abiding accomplishment was not a particular regime outcome, but the construction of durable and modern bureaucratic state that persists to this day.<sup>16</sup>

What sets revolutionary states apart is the directed use of force to create infrastructural power, though of course, where revolution reduces constraints on productive forces such capacities may expand in a far more decentralized fashion through resources captured via the extractive capabilities of the state. Revolutionary states use power to extract and redistribute resources to pursue transformative social and economic goals by directly taking control of surpluses through administrative means.<sup>17</sup>

Constructing states and subjugating society to state authority is invariably violent. Even the intermediary states inherited by Bonaparte from the Jacobins, or Stalin from Lenin were relatively weak states. Bonaparte's and Stalin's desire to create strong modern states that extended throughout the territory and subjected the population without exception to the commands of the state itself was a bloody process. The revolutionary process of institution-building which extends administration

---

<sup>12</sup> Huntington 1968, Rokkan 1975.

<sup>13</sup> Rokkan 1975.

<sup>14</sup> Mann 1984, 112-3.

<sup>15</sup> Mann 1984, 118.

<sup>16</sup> Tarrow 2015.

<sup>17</sup> Mann 1984, 125; also see Konrád and Szelényi 1979, Verdery 1991b.

nationally, creates modern and powerful armies, institutes universal education, and knits together communities through transport and communication networks is also accomplished through violence. Social forces resisting these changes are dealt with brutally. Consider the human costs involved in collectivizing agriculture in the USSR or how many ill-conceived campaigns it took for Mao to assert control over the vast Chinese countryside. Violence was not confined to state actions against society, but in both cases the party itself and the experts that served it were also subjected to violence so they became compliant and deployable assets in the hands of the leadership. In this sense post-revolutionary institutionalization of binding authority resembles the conquest of society and the subjugation of the elite itself to the will of the revolutionary leadership.

What does revolutionary state-building have to do with democracy? While the defense of the boundaries of the state vis-à-vis international competitors, and the extension of comprehensive state power across society looks nothing like democracy in its construction, it is necessary to the future provision of democratic rule.<sup>18</sup> All these functions are essential prerequisites to democratic rule in the future. As Linz and Stepan remind us, there is no democracy without stateness.<sup>19</sup> Prerevolutionary states are so weak as to make the construction of democracy unfeasible. Successful revolutionary state-building, though violent, is the way that many polities establish comprehensive, national patterns of authority.

It is important not to view violent state-building through the moral lens of the Western democratic endpoint. Early state-builders did not want democracy but, in retrospect from the developmentalist perspective, their actions, it seems, were necessary. Seen this way, the actions of contemporary violent state-builders might not be subject to opprobrium that we hurl upon them today. Had Saddam Hussein's attempt to unify the Arabian peninsula succeeded or if ISIS's attempt to forcibly unify the post-colonial Levant succeeds, history may not only conceive of their actions as "irrationally" violent but as the repetition of an earlier (and no less violent) state-building process in Europe -- as the path by which the political "backwardness" of the weak post-colonial Arab state was overcome.<sup>20</sup> Is this not how most of the world views Kemal Ataturk today despite his record of nation-building violence?

### **Revolutionary Violence and Nation-Building**

Just as revolutionary violence may serve the interests of state-builders, even when they are more interested in changing regimes than state power, so too does it often serve the cause of nation-building. Revolutions in the modern world occur not only in geographically bounded locations but are made in the name of the "the people." Since Rousseau political theorists have understood that the most formidable challenge to democracy is pluralism. Modern rule only works if it is justified in the name of the people, whether that is constructed procedurally or substantively through an ideological definition of the people and who speaks in their name. A form of government based on popular sovereignty must define who the "people" are. In some parts of the West, the question of peoplehood, of nationhood, was solved before the advent of the modern state, but in many cases, it was revolutionary states that ultimately engaged in the exercise of nation-building. And they frequently engaged in the exercise with great force.

---

<sup>18</sup> Rokkan 1975.

<sup>19</sup> Linz and Stepan 1996.

<sup>20</sup> Lustick 1997.

Contemporary democratic theory has tended to view multiculturalism as either desirable or at least as manageable. But mass democracy creates new sources of division: control of the state and the exercise of its power becomes dependent upon either winning elections or making a legitimate claim of acting in the name of the people. Modern revolutionary ideology may be uninterested in establishing a cultural definition of political membership. However, establishing a community of common culture is a prerequisite for virtually any sort of rule based on popular sovereignty. Almost intuitively revolutionaries understand this and it is certainly no accident that over the course of the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> centuries, French, Russian, and Chinese revolutionaries universalized a particular version of Muscovite, Île-de-France, and Han Chinese culture throughout their realms. Revolutionary masses started out as classes but were forged into nations. Revolutionaries do this often out of expediency rather than principle, but there is no gainsaying that revolutionary states were no less “nationalizing” or covetous of their neighbors’ culturally related peoples than non-revolutionary states.<sup>21</sup>

Given the absence of moral restraint, the instruments available to revolutionaries intent on cultural homogenization are even greater. All states in the modern world are “gardening states” in that they view their societies as “objects of designing, cultivating, and weed-poisoning.”<sup>22</sup> Revolutionaries do an even “better” job in the imposition of standardized languages, the unification of symbols, the suppression of cultural particularisms, and, most crucially, violent demographic engineering.

The product of much of this violence is the consolidation of national communities. Ironically the creation of a unified national community, just as the creation of a modern state, is almost never at the top of the revolutionaries’ priorities. The existence of “the French” or “The Russians” (let alone the Soviets), the “Yugoslavs” and the “Chinese,” was more assumed than proven before 1789, 1917, and 1949. But if revolutionaries had not forged nations, in whose name would they have ruled? French revolutionaries understood this all too well, as Eugen Weber shows in his masterful study of the hegemonic rise of a single cultural identity in 19<sup>th</sup> century France.<sup>23</sup> Russian revolutionaries rejected a conventional procedural notion of democratic rule (a point we turn to below), but they did “organize” their realm into a number of more or less clearly identifiable cultural communities (“socialist in content, but national in form”). Democracy does not require the creation of cultural homogeneity but the “costs” of rule are lower when more than one cultural group is not claiming ownership of the state or demanding the state to nurture and universalize its high culture among the panoply of vernacular possibilities.

Revolutionaries do not need to create cultural homogeneity; there is nothing compelling them to do so and they can choose, for any number of reasons, to consolidate their power on the basis of multiple national communities. This indeed may be part of the Soviet story (even though this does ignore the significant and relentless Russification across the country for 70 years, particularly among elites). But democratic rule on the basis of multiple groups is not easy, and one legacy of revolutionary violence may indeed be the creation not only of states but also of “nation-states” that had not yet been “imagined” and otherwise would not have been viable or even existed.<sup>24</sup>

---

<sup>21</sup> Brubaker 1995.

<sup>22</sup> Bauman 1989, 18.

<sup>23</sup> Weber 1976.

<sup>24</sup> Anderson 1983.

Of course, neither state-building nor nation-building violence associated with revolutionary regimes gets us to the point of democracy, even if both are necessary conditions. Perhaps the most important legacy of revolutionary violence concerns the sociological engineering of classes. Indeed, this was Marx's original point in talking about revolutions, even if he did underestimate the sheer quantity of violence that would be needed to remove anti-democratic elements from the political stage after the revolution. It is to this question that we turn next.

### **Violent Social Transformation**

As noted in our introduction, to the extent that comparative politics has drawn the connection between revolutionary violence and democratic regime outcomes, the link is most intimately established on questions of class and inequality. From Moore through Acemoglu and Robinson, scholars have regularly (if not universally) noted the connection between hierarchy and dictatorship, on the one hand, and equality and democracy on the other.<sup>25</sup> Moore is perhaps most explicit in his focus on violence (though it is an aspect of his work not always highlighted by comparativists), but clearly either violence or the threat of violence lies at the core of all class-theoretic understandings of democratization. Democracy results either from removing or threatening to remove classes opposed to the broadening of political rule beyond small groups. Sometimes the threat alone is sufficient to stoke compromise or the adaptation of classes previously hostile to democracy to accept a new political reality.

The impact of revolutionary violence on social structure has both a destructive and a creative effect. First, it is violently destructive, clearing the field of previously powerful actors. Second, in altering the mode of economic reproduction, it remakes the social structure and repopulates the field with an altered mix of social actors. Both can have important ramifications for the future prospects for democratic development.

Revolutions, whatever their ideological character, weaken, cripple, or even destroy traditional aristocratic ruling classes, and with them that most committed roadblock to democratic development identified by Moore -- large estate agriculture based on intensive and repressive labor practices.<sup>26</sup> The French revolution broke the power and privilege of the French aristocracy. Russian and Chinese revolutionaries liquidated large landowners, confiscated their property and distributed it to peasants, before collectivizing it into large state controlled production units. The American Civil War similarly eliminated the political power of the plantation class and abolished slavery as a social institution (even if the battle over its social legacy remains a core feature of US politics today). And the Junkers of Germany were finally and definitively driven from the scene by the postwar partition of Germany and the conversion of their estates into state farms in Germany, Poland, Russia and Lithuania. Powerful social actors who posed long-term, persistent barriers to democracy disappeared. In this way revolutionary violence paved the way for the emergence of democracy.

Revolution also potentially prepares the stage for a democratic future by creating a new set of actors, perhaps more receptive to democratic development. The revolution in France and the English and American civil wars ushered in the ascendance of capital and enhanced the power of the bourgeoisie vis-à-vis their competitors. The prosperity that capitalism created in turn empowered working and middle class political actors who transformed liberal rule into democracy by expanding the scope of

---

<sup>25</sup> Moore 1966, Acemoglu and Robinson 2006.

<sup>26</sup> Moore 1966, also see Rueschemeyer et al. 1992.

social actors who participated in competitive politics. In Russia and China, the weak bourgeoisies of those societies met the same fate as the aristocracy. They were decimated as a class and their property was confiscated by the state. The fates of failed ruling classes illustrate one way in which violence potentially prepares the way for a democratic future. Given what Moore says about the bourgeoisie and its necessity for the rise of democracy, this could be seen as a potential complicating factor in the case of socialist revolution, but as we shall see later, democratizing violence displayed its own cunning historical dialectic even here.

Although we have outlined three different ways in which revolutionary violence may contribute to democratic development, in all cases violence influences states, nations, and classes in complex and interconnected ways. Consider, for example, the ways in which revolutionary violence can empower new social actors who are potentially democratic and how this in turn is connected to the growth of the infrastructural power of the revolutionary state. When social compliance moves out of the phase in which despotic power is paramount and infrastructural power becomes more important in securing compliance, the autonomy of newly unleashed or created social actors represents a source of democratic potential. As Boris Yeltsin once put it (channeling a thought which Talleyrand reputedly shared with Bonaparte) -- "You can build a throne with bayonets, but it's difficult to sit on it."<sup>27</sup> Repressive and transformative violence comes to be supplanted and complemented by other ways of securing compliance -- both moral suasion and rational incentives.

The essence of a revolutionary transformation is to turn despotic power, the power to coerce compliance via real or threatened violence, into infrastructural power, where obedience to authority becomes routine. At the onset of the process of the creation of infrastructural power, revolutionary cadres act in a highly rational and disciplined matter in response to the commands of the revolutionary center in pursuit of transformational change. The society as the object of revolutionary transformation faces the prospect of complying with the mobilization efforts of the center or becoming the victims of despotic power. When, however, the process of transformation is completed and a system of secure infrastructural power is put in place the dynamics change. The successful creation of infrastructural power endows the actors who staff the institutions and the transformed segments of society with both sets of interests within the system and new capacities.

These new interests may eventually come to be at odds with the intentions of the rulers of the system, and the growth of infrastructural power endows them with new capacities that allow them to assert those interests. When bourgeois revolution unleashed the productive potential of capital by removing traditional barriers to accumulation it also created new social actors that posed constraints on the power of the state. Ansell and Samuels show how the emergence of bourgeois and middle class actors in liberal European regimes created pressures to insulate newly acquired wealth from the grabbing hand of the state and that this was essential to the establishment of property rights, rule of law, and competitive elections.<sup>28</sup> Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens, looking at the same developments from a more global perspective, see the completion of democratization as an epiphenomenon of capitalist development.<sup>29</sup> Capitalist development creates new social forces, notably middle class and working class actors, with both material and organizational resources who demand a voice in who rules

---

<sup>27</sup> Murray 1995, 8.

<sup>28</sup> Ansell and Samuels 2015.

<sup>29</sup> Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens 1992.

and the policies which they pursue. The narrow liberalism that bourgeois revolution creates, also produces social forces that demand inclusion in the decision-making process in the long term.

The creation of state socialism generated similar, but not isomorphic processes, in Eastern Europe as well. When state socialism created large white collar and blue collar classes in its successful industrialization of formerly traditional peasant societies, it also created a potential set of antagonists endowed with control of infrastructural resources and the potential to dispute the resource allocations dictated by the center and eventually its power to make such decisions. This was observable on both the elite and mass level.

Violence changes the very nature of society itself. Revolution as a modernizing event<sup>30</sup> transforms largely peasant societies into modern, urban, and industrial ones. With modernity society begins to experience an appreciable improvement in the fulfillment of its human needs (adequate nutrition, housing, clean water, sanitation, education, medical care) and its consumption standards. As the consumption aspirations of a modernized urban society begin to grow, they potentially pose a challenge to the pattern of resource allocation that the post-revolutionary elite favors. The growth of urban society also reduces the costs of collective action, and we witness the birth of informally organized circles of critical opinion, both within the elite and society at large. Workers concentrated in urban areas in large factories also face far less formidable barriers to collective action than rural populations. The best example of this sort of post-revolutionary activist resistance in recent memory was observable in communist Poland where both strike waves in 1956, 1970, 1976, 1980, and 1988 and the development of pockets of heterodox thought challenged the hegemony of the state in repeated fashion before the fall of state socialism. Such challenges are inconceivable without the provision of universal education and concentration of large numbers of workers and intellectuals in factories and universities that facilitated collective action in pursuit of goals at odds with those of the state. Such challenges are only possible because state-led social transformation necessitates the transfer of a measure of infrastructural power to society. New actors with new capacities came into being and posed constraints the power of state itself, overcoming even the despotic power of the state to actively repress them.

The development of such autonomous interests and the capacity to pursue them as a product of violent revolutionary social transformation, opens up possibilities for the development of democracy. This is true of both bourgeois and Leninist revolutions. In the former case, liberal polities had to develop over time into democracies,<sup>31</sup> whereas in the latter case actors created within the confines of state socialism had to fight to introduce political competition and overturn the monopolistic political framework of party-state control.

Of course, the entire notion of political development comes out of the violent West European experience, where states supplanted diffuse patrimonial and feudal rule with centralized impersonal bureaucracies, forcibly drew diverse cultural communities together into “nations,” and in many cases violently drove groups most staunchly opposed to democracy from the political stage. But even in the West, these three processes unfolded in different sequences and with different degrees of intensity. And it is these differences that comparativists have drawn upon to explain the differences in regime

---

<sup>30</sup> Huntington 1968.

<sup>31</sup> Capoccia and Ziblatt 2010.

outcomes. The same goes for Africa and the Middle East, where colonialism inhibited state formation and nation-building, both tasks only undertaken after nominal independence, with pre-modern social classes remaining important political actors.

In what follows we turn our attention toward a case that received less attention from students of political development: the Leninist world. We say “less” attention for it was not ignored altogether. Huntington maintained that Leninism represented an alternative to liberal democracy with his well-known injunction that the important difference among countries is not the kind of rule but the degree of rule.<sup>32</sup> Others followed Huntington’s path in studying Leninism as an instance of “national development” before coming to understand the fatal flaws within the Soviet model.<sup>33</sup>

But even when this understanding set in, comparativists did not consider the impact of Leninist violence on democratic development except to say that it was bad. Only Moore speculated intermittently on what the revolution might mean over the longue durée. Well before the terminal crisis of Leninist regimes, political development as a concept itself had been discredited in the discipline, and with it any consideration of the long term impact of violence on the potential for democratic development. It is to this question that we turn next. Our argument is broadly consistent with what we have outlined above and can be stated as follows: in those cases where states and nations already existed, the social violence of Leninism opened a potential pathway to democratic development. Even where the ground was not made ripe for stable democratic contestation, the modernizing violence of Leninism made the job of would be dictators much more difficult.<sup>34</sup>

### **The Long-term Effects of Communist Revolution**

Revolutionary violence contributed to democratic pressures and sometimes democratic development throughout the communist world. In what follows, we examine its impact on state formation, nation-building, and the class bases of political power with illustrations from the communist world. Revolutionaries did not intend, want, or expect their projects to contribute to democratic development, but our discussion shows that this is exactly what occurred.

#### *The Communist State-building Project*

We turn first to the state under communism. Modern democracy is not merely about articulating and aggregating interests. Without a state that can implement the popular will, it makes little sense to speak of mass democracy.<sup>35</sup> The debacle surrounding the “democratization” of Iraq is only the most recent reminder of this lesson, which was already available to students of post-colonial Africa and the broader Middle East.<sup>36</sup>

The same held true for the states of pre-revolutionary Russia and China (both of which, it is often forgotten, held fairly democratic elections in the years before their revolutions). It is sometimes easy to forget that despite their reputation for despotism, neither the Russian nor the Chinese imperial states established clear borders, the monopoly of violence within the territory they claimed to rule, nor did

---

<sup>32</sup> Huntington 1968.

<sup>33</sup> Jowitt 1971 Motyl 1999, Verdery 1991a, Zwick 1983.

<sup>34</sup> Kopstein and Bernhard 2015.

<sup>35</sup> Stepan and Linz 1996.

<sup>36</sup> Fukuyama 2004, Diamond 2008.

they possess administrative apparatuses with clear procedures and subordination to central authority. Local governors and warlords commanded as much or more authority than capitals or imperial bureaucracies. In imperial Russia, students of 19<sup>th</sup> century pogroms note that their outbreak did not reflect an imperial design but rather imperial weakness and an inability to control local disorder.<sup>37</sup> And Skocpol notes that when agrarian reform removed landlords from direct oversight of the peasantry, the state could not fill the void of maintaining order in the countryside, which was made manifestly clear in the peasant uprising that were at the core of the revolutions of 1905 and 1917.<sup>38</sup> Andrew Walder's study of Mao's China similarly notes the failure of both the imperial and pre-1949 nationalist orders to overcome warlordism, establish clear national borders, or modern administrative states.<sup>39</sup>

Notwithstanding the desire of revolutionaries to overthrow the existing order and, once having done so, to "build communism," both Russian and Chinese revolutionaries quickly found themselves caught up in building upon the rudimentary and limited despotic states of their imperial and republican predecessors. If the short run impact of revolution was chaos, the long run result was order. But in constructing a new state order, communist revolutionaries had two tools available to them: party discipline and the remnants of the old order. Taken together, both provided enough raw material for the construction of much more powerful and administratively encompassing states than had even existed on either territory. For the first time officials were clearly connected to an apex of power in national capitals, now Moscow and Beijing. In the case of China, Walder notes "The enduring historical significance of 1949 was not the triumph of the proletariat over the bourgeoisie, nor was it the victory of communism over capitalism. Mao's declaration of the People's Republic promised a new, more powerful Chinese state..." And even more than the promise was the unintended outcome: "Mao and his comrades may have viewed the victory of the Communist Party in 1949 as part of the triumph of world socialism, but it marked the birth of China's first modern state."<sup>40</sup> The "organizational weapon" of the insurgent communist party could be redeployed, recast, and redirected to the monumental task of building a modern and unprecedentedly comprehensive state.<sup>41</sup>

The scope of Stalin's Russian communist state was unprecedented, even compared to that of the fascist competitors. For the first time in the history of mankind, the state gathered together a monopoly on political organization, economic activity, ideology, and coercive resources under centralized control. This project endowed the state with a high degree of both despotic and infrastructural power. The process of building a state with infrastructural power was highly coercive, both in compelling society to comply with the tasks defined by the state, and in periodically purging the ranks of the state-builders themselves as a way to assess blame for shortcomings and as a means for the dictators to insure their power over the apparatuses they built.<sup>42</sup>

The actual direction of this combined party-state apparatus was provided by the leader (Stalin, or Mao in the case of China) and a coterie of trusted lieutenants who held key positions in the various bureaucratic hierarchies.<sup>43</sup> The motivation for compliance at the elite level was provided by what Jowitt

---

<sup>37</sup> Klier and Lambroza 1992.

<sup>38</sup> Skocpol 1979.

<sup>39</sup> Walder 2015.

<sup>40</sup> Walder 2015, 2.

<sup>41</sup> Selznick 1952

<sup>42</sup> Mann 1986, volume 3, 351-2.

<sup>43</sup> Medvedev 1984, Fitzpatrick 2015.

called the “Leninist combat ethos” which combined a rational command structure and a series of overarching ideological goals to which the members of the apparatus would throw themselves into with discipline and enthusiasm, lest they fail and draw the special attention of the security apparatus. The micro-organizational environment of each bureaucracy was exceptionally hierarchical.<sup>44</sup> At the macro-level, things were a bit more chaotic with overlapping lines of responsibility to allow the center to apply pressure to meet goals from multiple points of attack, thus increasing the chance of success if one particular bureaucracy ran into roadblocks.<sup>45</sup> In the state-building phase, the party-state apparatus combined elements of a charismatic movement, a rational bureaucracy, and a highly coercive security apparatus.

These results were more a product of improvisation in practice than of rational design. They did prove to be effective. Both Stalin and Mao feared the rise of distinct, functional interests, e.g. a separate state or military apparatus that would ultimately favor its own corporate interests over the ideological goals framed by the Party. This threat was preempted with a series of bloody purges in both places, culminating in the Great Terror in the Soviet Union and the chaos of the Cultural Revolution in China. In the end, however, the party reconciled itself with “socialist legality” and bureaucratic specialization for the sake of economic development and international security. Despite the differences in the ideological “Begleitmusik,” these orientations and structures resembled those in the West in important ways, especially if the question was about the “degree” of order rather than the “kind” of rule.<sup>46</sup>

But the similarities were deceptive. Revolutionaries could use the ideological discipline of the combat ethos and imperial administrative structures on which to build their own states. These were powerful tools, in that they enabled revolutionaries to define and control borders, impose a monopoly of violence, and build a powerful encompassing administrative apparatus, but they were not exactly the same as that of the West. The result were bureaucracies that once the task of construction was complete most often became, as Kitschelt et al noted, highly patrimonial and infused with both revolutionary arbitrariness and a cartelistic personalism built around powerful figures in the party.<sup>47</sup> Jowitt labels the same phenomenon as neo-traditionalism, where the combat-ethos of the Leninist party is supplanted with the bureaucratic interests of routine administrators. In those countries that became part of the communist world after 1945, where modern bureaucracies had already taken shape or where such development was well underway, the result was a genuine bureaucratic authoritarianism which, although infused with an arbitrary revolutionary ethos for some years after World War II, could quickly readapt to administrative regularity once the call for violence had subsided.

What was the long-term impact of violent revolutionary state building for democracy? It was mixed. As many others have noted, communist states were rent-seeking machines. Once the combat ethos of Leninism was lost, party discipline faded and the patrimonial element dominated. At the same time, they were still states. The states of the communist regime-type went a good part of the way toward modernity. Law, the acceptance of proceduralism, and meritocracy all made significant inroads in both Russia and China in the 20<sup>th</sup> century. This, at any rate, was the impression of many visitors to the socialist world from the third world during the 1960s and 1970s.

---

<sup>44</sup> Jowitt 1992.

<sup>45</sup> Bialer 1980.

<sup>46</sup> Huntington 1968.

<sup>47</sup> Kitschelt et al. 1999.

Even so, the tools of revolutionary state building on their own, because they involved so much “principled particularism,” did not bequeath to the post-communist order an entirely modern state apparatus.<sup>48</sup> In Central Asia, personalism reigned supreme, and in Russia and China, too, the patrimonial element appears to have dominated over the procedural, but in points westward, the resulting states were not inhospitable to democratization—perhaps more so than before communism. Although incomes remained too low to allow for high levels of bureaucratic rectitude, even in Russia and China, the elements of normal statehood appeared and were nurtured by communist regimes for decades. In sum, if popular rule could be instituted in any sustained fashion, these states were much better equipped for translating the popular will into meaningful democracy than they were before the advent of communism.

### *Communism and Violent Nation-Building*

If communist elites did not anticipate the complexities of state-building, they were even more overwhelmed by the force of nationalism. Communist states espoused a spirit of Marxist universalism in which solidarities would be based on class rather than on ethnic or racial particularity, but the reality they faced was far different. In one of history’s crueler ironies this universalist ideology appeared at precisely the same moment when nationalism, perhaps the most powerful and enduring particularist ideology in history, reached its apogee. Even more so than the working classes, it was nations who cried out for freedom and self-determination. In the competition between class and nation, the latter consistently trumped the former.<sup>49</sup> This was true not only at the mass level but at the elite level as well.

Leninist parties had little choice but to come to terms with the popular victory of nation over class. Out of power, they played the nationality card, garnering the support of some of the losers of ethnic politics.<sup>50</sup> Once in power, their response was twofold: one part accommodationist and the other, brutally violent. Leninist theory summarized the accommodationist aspect under the rubric “national in form and socialist in content,” which was really a way of recasting imperial Russia into manageable units in which Moscow promoted or even created cultures anew but brutally crushed any and all attempts at genuine political independence. The Soviet imperial design made sense since the revolutionary objective was global in a world where national belonging would only slowly, if ever, diminish. Basic unity, however, required standardization. Russians and Russian culture occupied this position in what became quasi-colonial operations stretching from Siberia, through Central Asia and the Caucasus, the East Slavic peripheries, and ultimately into the Baltic states where Russian settlers fundamentally altered the ethnic demography in the years running up to and immediately following World War II.

Some of this project could be undertaken with mild administrative measures, but much of it faced stiff resistance and required a great deal of force to implement. Amir Weiner invokes Zygmunt Bauman’s conception of the ethnic gardening state in order to describe the Soviet nationality regime.<sup>51</sup> Rather than eliminate all nations, Stalin chose to make the entire project governable through labeling, cultivating, identifying, and, when needed, weeding out specific dangers. Nowhere was this approach more evident than in the “marches” of East-Central Europe, which only fell under Soviet control in 1944-45. There, the politics of ethnicity, irredentism, and territorial grievance dominated interwar politics.

---

<sup>48</sup> Walder 1986.

<sup>49</sup> Szporluk, 1986.

<sup>50</sup> Burks 1961.

<sup>51</sup> Bauman 1989, Weiner 1999.

The Soviet response as they moved into the region was to “resolve” the problem of ethnicity and borders once and for all in a way that rivaled the demographic engineering of the Nazis, if not in body count, then certainly in ambition. German minorities were expelled from every country in the region. The entire country of Poland was moved a couple of hundred kilometers westward and both Ukrainians and Poles (and others) were forcibly moved to the “correct” side of the new borders of their titular “countries” (the process had begun in 1943 during the mutual bloodletting between the two groups). As for the region’s Jews, Germany’s extermination effort had eliminated Jewish commercial and cultural weight from urban areas and communists expressed little interest in restoring the Jewish presence. Lvov, once heavily Polish and Jewish, now became a Ukrainian city, German Breslau became Polish Wroclaw, and Polish and Jewish Wilno was now Vilnius, the capital of Lithuania.

Communists may have meant to treat the national question in a new way but in East-Central Europe seen through the lens of the *longue durée*, the brutality of the Leninist gardening state produced rather familiar “nationalizing” results. They are illustrated in table one below:

Table one: Size of Titular Majorities before and after Communism in Selected Countries<sup>52</sup>

	Titular Majority (%-age)	
	Pre-Communist	Post-Communist
<b>East-Central Europe</b>		
Poland	65	97
Romania	71	89
Czechoslovakia	65	Czech R. 94 Slovakia 86
Bulgaria	87	85
Hungary	81	98
<b>Former Soviet Union</b>		
Latvia	75	61
Estonia	88	69
Lithuania	89	84
Ukraine	76 (1939)	77
Kazakhstan	58 (1926)	63 (2009)

Several features of this table are noteworthy. First and perhaps most momentous, in East-Central Europe the Leninist parties completed the process of demographic engineering begun by the Germans during the war, but altered the composition of the results. Through the adjustment of borders, forced population transfers, and renewed “nationalization” efforts, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Romania were transformed from multinational states into nation-states. The ethnic politics and intractable irredentism that made these societies in the interwar period almost ungovernable had been changed for good (so much so that in the post-communist period Jewish life could be reintroduced in Poland with a touch of astonishing nostalgia). The politics of coercive nationalizing modernism had been completed not by the

<sup>52</sup> CIA Factbook, Wikipedia, Rothschild 1974, Nationmaster

nationalists but by Leninist parties. In this way, they unknowingly made the transition to democracy easier in the region than it otherwise might have been.

Of course, the project was not equally successful everywhere. Most notably in the Soviet Union itself, Russification partially attenuated, partially altered, and partially reversed the nationalizing tendencies of the interwar period. In Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania, the immigration of Russians after the war decreased the size of the titular majority. In Ukraine, the effect of unifying western Ukraine with the central and eastern regions following the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact served as much to Russify and dilute Ukrainian identity in the West as it did to Ukrainianize the east. Not only at the level of language (which, with very few exceptions has not been a significant source of tension in Ukraine) but most clearly on questions of memory politics and differing views of the Nazi and communist past, Ukraine remains deeply divided. The communist era may have fostered a Ukrainian identity, but it did not settle it and in some ways may have even muddled it. Such ambiguous results did not in themselves preclude the possibility of democracy taking root, but the absence of a clear national community made matters more difficult and also made easier a new kind of politics of authoritarian diffusion from the East.

The process of nationalization picked up once again after the collapse of the Soviet Union in both the Baltic and East Slavic regions, but with a resurgent Russia under Putin, this became a source of significant tension. Stranded Russians or Russian speakers provided good raw material for political separatism. And in Ukraine the incomplete and intermittently ambitious nationalizing state has helped drive a civil war stoked from Moscow. The same may be in store for Kazakhstan and other locations in Central Asia if leaders there decide to embark on a significant ethnic gardening campaign of their own. In these cases, Soviet nationality policy has served to complicate, not facilitate postcommunist democratization efforts.

### *The Transformation of Society under Communism*

The dialectics of violence and progress associated with Soviet economic development impressed even critical observers. Isaac Deutscher, in his biography of Stalin, famously compared the brutality of collectivization and forced industrialization with that of the enclosure movement in 18<sup>th</sup> century England.<sup>53</sup> Students of communism never came to a consensus about the nature and purpose of the planned economy. Starting with Gerschenkron, however, a generation of scholars identified high rates of capital accumulation and classified the Soviet experience as an extreme form of state-led development, different in degree if not in kind from other historical antecedents of the same phenomenon.<sup>54</sup> Others, such as Janos, disagreed, and pointed to the subordination of the entire economy to the geopolitical and “external” projects of military power projection.<sup>55</sup> We do not need to take a stand on the question of the ultimate purpose of the communist economy—development or conquest—in order to identify several profound, long term effects of the entire project.

As Allen argues, while Soviet economic development ultimately did not lead to catching up or surpassing developed capitalist economies, they did outperform most other developing economies at least until the 1980s when there was a crisis of economic stagnation in the Soviet bloc (see the post-1980 period in

---

<sup>53</sup> Deutscher 1949.

<sup>54</sup> Gerschenkron 1961.

<sup>55</sup> Janos 2000.

Figure 1 below).<sup>56</sup> Janos documents the maintenance of the gap between Western and Eastern Europe. However where those states ended up at the end of the communist period was at a much higher level of absolute development compared to communism’s onset.<sup>57</sup>




Figure 1: GDP per Capita in Communist States, 1917-1990 (1990 Int. GK\$)<sup>58</sup>

Figure 1 charts the change in GDP/capita over time for a select set of Soviet-type economies. The most visible observation is the rate of increase in the period following the stagnation of the interwar years and destruction of World War II. After 1950, following the consolidation of communist rule (except in Russia where it consolidated much earlier), all countries except China, grew at a much faster clip than the world average. Poland, the country where the communist economic model began to stagnate early, initiated its relative decline in the 1970s.

Figure 2 illustrates the impact of this control on the pattern of growth in communist economies and their ability to modernize both the economy and society.

<sup>56</sup> Allen 2003.

<sup>57</sup> Janos 2000.

<sup>58</sup> From Bolt and Zanden (2014), missing values generated with lpolate command in Stata 13.




Figure 2: Relative Growth in Industry and Agriculture, 1965-1982 (1975=100).<sup>59</sup>

<sup>59</sup> Janos 2000, 345. Linear interpolation between points.

Communist developmental priorities were geared toward heavy industrial production and military procurement at the expense of consumer goods and services. Figure 2 shows the patterns of growth across industry and agriculture in terms of size relative output compared to 1975 as the index (1975=100). With the notable exception of Romania, agricultural output flat-lined, reflecting its low priority in the Soviet-type economies. The trend is especially striking compared to that of industrial output. Note the much steeper slope of the industrial curves between 1965 and 1975, a trend that continues for most countries, again with the exception of the stagnation evident in the Polish economy in the post-1970 period.

These differences reflected the preferences of communist planners. How did such concentrated industrial growth transform these societies over the long term? Despite all the weakness of the model, societies comprised in large part of illiterate peasants became urban and educated, and focused on the factory. Figure 3 shows the stark transition in employment structure. It plots the percentage of the workforce employed in agriculture and how this was transformed from 1930 (before the onset of the depression and World War II) until 1978.




Figure 3: Percentage of Labor Force in Agriculture, 1930-1978<sup>60</sup>

One is immediately struck by the rapid reduction in agricultural employment over this fifty year period. This is even true in Czechoslovakia, a genuinely industrialized country prior to communism. For countries

<sup>60</sup> Janos 2000, 344. Linear interpolation between points.

that had a high percentage of agricultural laborers in 1930 (Poland, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia), the decrease is between thirty to thirty-five percent. Three countries (the USSR, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia) had smaller but substantial falls in the size of the agricultural labor force compared to the others.

Growing industry meant growing cities. This is reflected in figure 4 below which shows rates of urbanization (percentage of population living in cities) across different communist regional groupings from 1960 to 1990. This figure also displays what the comparable figures are for the world and the European Union.




Figure 4: Comparative Levels of Urbanization (percent), Communist Regions<sup>61</sup>

This figure shows almost all communist regions outstripping the global mean in terms of urbanization, the one exception being China, which begins to catch up under Deng’s growth-oriented economic reforms. Russia even surpasses the EU and many other countries (the Baltics, Central Europe) attaining very high degrees of urbanization. The slope of the lines also indicates that rates of urbanization were

<sup>61</sup> World Bank Group, 2015. Based on available data averaged by country-year. Balkans = Albania , Bulgaria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Romania, and Slovenia. Former Soviet Union European = Belarus, Moldova, Georgia, and Ukraine. Central Asia = Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Uzbekistan, and Mongolia. Baltic States = Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia. Central Europe = Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovak Republic.

faster in communist areas compared to the globe as a whole, with the exception of Central Asia, which seems to lose steam in the 1980s.

Urbanization brought major changes in the lives of the populations who experienced communist social and economic transformation. For many the end of traditional rural life brought access to many of the material advances of modern life – access to health care, indoor plumbing, modern means of mass transport and communication, steady work, and universal education. Figure 5 plots the change in levels of education across the region in the period from 1950-1990. As older populations died off and were replaced by populations who experienced communist-era universal schooling, the average years in school increased dramatically.




Figure 5: Average Years of Schooling in Communist Regions, 1950-1990<sup>62</sup>

For three large groups of countries that averaged around four years of schooling or less in 1950, the effect of communist universal education policy led to a doubling of the average education level in the population (the Baltics, the other countries of the former Soviet Union, and the Balkans). Even in East Central Europe which had a higher mean of average years of schooling (>7) in 1950, there was an appreciable average increase between two to three average years. China and Mongolia, both of which begin very low, also show major increases, with average years quadrupling in China and sextupling in

<sup>62</sup> Barro and Lee, 2010. 5 year interval data, linear interpolation. Case selection based on data availability (Baltics=Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania; Balkans=Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania, Serbia, Slovenia; ECE=Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia; FSU=Armenia, Moldova, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, Ukraine).

Mongolia. China grew even faster in the period after 1990, and by 2010 had closed the gap, achieving ~7.5 years of average years of schooling (not on the figure).

Communism created a modern, urban, and industrial society, but it differed from societies in the capitalist West in fundamental ways. We need to start with the ruling class. Several major differences between Soviet-type systems and those based on market-based capitalism can help us to understand the nature of this ruling class. First, the realm of private property was strongly constrained. Essentially it was confined to household property. Citizens were limited in terms of owning productive property, except for small-scale cooperative and family enterprises.

Second market allocation of goods and services was replaced by direct administration for all intents and purposes.<sup>63</sup> This meant that allocative decision-making was the direct work of the ruling class and not the product of self-regulating market processes. Third, the system did not recognize social or political interests independent of the party state as legitimate and thus tolerated no independent representation of political or social interests. As Kolakowski noted, the essence of the Stalinist project was a mono-organizational hierarchical society, which denied the existence of an independent civil society.<sup>64</sup> There were no independent political parties,<sup>65</sup> and ascriptive and occupational social categories were “represented” by transmission belt organizations that monitored specific sectors of society, organized support for or compliance with party-state decisions, and rewarded obedience (trade unions, professional associations, nationality, gender, etc.).

Such unprecedented bureaucratic control over investment and other allocative decisions combined with the party-state’s dual monopolies of appointment to key position and over all forms of social organization led Hirszowicz to describe communism as the first example of a sovereign bureaucracy in the history of mankind.<sup>66</sup> Thus communism had a ruling class of a different nature – a sovereign party-state bureaucracy that controlled property, allocation of goods and services, political and social organization, and access to positions of power. Further it was connected to society itself and enforced its decisions through hierarchically organized bureaucratic control.

Having established who the rulers were, we now turn to the ruled. Communist society was composed of three large laboring classes – a white collar middle class, a blue collar working class, and a peasant class. In this regard communist society resembled other industrialized societies. One essential difference is that these were all service classes whose livelihood was dependent overwhelmingly on their labor rather than property. This difference is most important in comparison to capitalist society among the white collars who performed professional and routine non-manual labor. The professionals constituted the highest stratum of this class and included managerial and technical personnel, academics and teachers,

---

<sup>63</sup> Overwhelmingly capital and labor were allocated by the bureaucracy, as were intermediate goods between firms. One firm’s output was another firm’s inputs. The only area where there was partial market allocation was the consumer goods market. Here supplies to the market were constrained by planner preferences, and there was often surplus demand given the vast degree of monetary overhang under late socialism. To some extent this disequilibrium was balanced by grey and black markets which provided high compensation for desirable goods in short supply.

<sup>64</sup> Kolakowski 1974.

<sup>65</sup> In some countries historical parties were allowed to continue in name as representatives of social formations that would pass with the development of communism, e.g. peasants, small businessmen. Such parties were completely subservient to the ruling parties.

<sup>66</sup> Hirszowicz 1980.

and what in other societies are called the “free professions” (medical professionals, lawyers, and the like). The largest component of this class were clerical personnel who staffed the ubiquitous bureaucratic offices, the service sector, and retail and trade enterprises.

The blue collar class included those who did routine manual labor in factories, construction, transportation and the like. As is clear from the discussion above, the working class under communism was a product of the social transformation brought about by industrialization. The social origin of the working class was largely peasant-based – those who first experienced modern urban life through recruitment into industrial work by Leninist industrialization.<sup>67</sup> Finally, the peasantry itself was composed of those who remained on the land. This was no longer the small holding peasantry that existed when the communists came to power. Agricultural production was brought into the system of economic control through the creation of large collective and state farms under communism. In the case of the latter, smallholders were compelled to merge their holdings into collective farms which were managed by state appointees. State farms were created from the holdings of large landowners and were staffed by formerly landless peasants assigned to work in them. Even in those countries where collectivization was less successful like Poland and Yugoslavia, the peasants were highly dependent on the state for both procurement of their product (opportunities for private sales through peasant markets were limited and confined to food stuffs) and for the inputs needed to farm (fertilizer, seed, machinery, etc.).<sup>68</sup>

Having outlined the social actors produced by the violent Leninist transformation, we can take stock of what this means for future regime outcomes. There are two distinct ways to approach this. The first is to focus on what this class structure means in relation to the broad-based literature on comparative development and past democratic breakdowns. The second is to consider the social sources from which the push for democracy in these states stemmed. In the first case we approach the issue by trying to understand how violent social change removed previous structural barriers to democracy. And in the second we try to understand how violent social change creates new actors who have the potential to become agents of democratic change. And if that is the case we also need to address the conditions under which such change occurs.

These two perspectives on the long-term effect of Leninist social transformation for potential democratic outcomes could be seen in the first case as addition by subtraction and in the second case addition by augmentation. The addition by subtraction lies in the agrarian sector. One of the most persistent and durable findings of the comparative historical literature on regimes is the negative impact of large estate agriculture, based either on labor repressive or labor intensive production, on the emergence of democracy. Junkers, plantation owners, and other aristocratic landlords of large estates, in short latifundia agriculture, required unfree labor and a state monopoly on violence to maintain its way of life.<sup>69</sup> By outright destroying this social formation, by dispossessing them of their estates and either distributing them to the peasants (and later collectivizing them as in the USSR) or organizing state farms on them, by liquidating the nobility as a social class (sometimes literally, sometimes by driving them into exile, sometimes by forcing them to survive on the basis of their labor, or some combination

---

<sup>67</sup> Connor 1979.

<sup>68</sup> Magyar 1980.

<sup>69</sup> Moore 1996; Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens 1992, Bernhard 1991, Dahrendorf 1967, Paige 1975, Gerschenkron 1989.

of the three), violent communist social transformation assured that the aristocracy would never again be a barrier to democratization.<sup>70</sup>

Our point here is not to say that revolutionary violence is good. The human suffering in virtually every revolution is enormous. Instead we merely wish to establish the long-term effects of what are frequently reprehensible acts. The revolutionaries who did this did not act teleologically to bring about democracy. This was an unintended consequence of their revolutionary social engineering. And to take it a step further, revolutionaries not only consigned the aristocracy and its anti-democratic commitments to the scrap-heap of history, they made the agrarian question, one that was so central to struggles for modernity and democracy in places like Western Europe and the Americas, irrelevant to questions of democratization. The issue simply disappeared. In the events of 1989-91, the agrarian question was neither an issue in successful nor in failed attempts at democratization. In no case was mobilization on agrarian issues or peasant grievances a significant part of efforts to challenge the ancien regime.

The second contribution of violent Leninist social change to subsequent democratizing pressures occurred through a process of addition by augmentation. One persistent critique of Moore was that despite his contribution in plotting out three distinct paths to modernity (liberal democratic, fascist, and communist), was that he left the liberal-democratic movement prior to the point where it truly triumphed. A number of critics have raised this point and shown that the project of completing democracy involved a range of popular social actors beyond the bourgeoisie that Moore pinpointed as essential to opening that pathway.<sup>71</sup> In this regard, the so-called middle sectors of society, both the working and middle classes, played a decisive role. Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens have argued that democracy emerged in regions as diverse as Western Europe, the British settler ex-colonies, Latin America and the Caribbean as an epiphenomenon of capitalist development. The requisites of development gave rise to large working and middle classes and even though democracy was not a necessary condition for capitalism, capitalist social development gave rise to actors who demanded voice and to be included in the competitive political process. It is movements growing from these sectors who pushed liberal, competitive, representative government along the path to liberal democracy through struggles for enfranchisement.<sup>72</sup> Such a conceptualization of the path to democracy is also congruent with more historical institutionalist reinterpretations of democratization in Western Europe.<sup>73</sup>

Violent Leninist social transformation yielded two large urban classes discussed above, the white collar middle and blue collar working classes that populated the modern urban sector of communist societies. Surveying the events of 1989-91 in the communist world, it was actors from these classes that mobilized during the process of regime change. The democratization of Leninist regimes has its roots in urban based actors and movements, and here, once again, the product of Leninist modernization made its contribution. Again this is not to say that anti-democratic Leninist elites built these classes with any express intention of replacing their rule with liberal democracy, but as with democratization in the

---

<sup>70</sup> Quite often this involved finishing what the aristocracy had a strong hand in initiating. The Bolsheviks, the Socialist Unity Party, and the Chinese Communists delivered the fatal coup de grace following a substantial weakening of the coercive power and social prestige of the Russian nobility, the Junkers, and the Mandarins caused by their failures during the two World Wars.

<sup>71</sup> Rueschemeyer, Stephens, and Stephens 1992; Luebbert 1991; Collier 1999; Therborn 1977.

<sup>72</sup> Rueschemeyer Stephens and Stephens 1992.

<sup>73</sup> Capoccia and Ziblatt 2010.

capitalist world, the changes in social structure wrought by Leninist social transformation made such changes possible. Democratization was also an epiphenomenon of Leninist economic and social development.

Even so, the generalized failure of Leninist regimes in Europe and Central Asia did not lead to universal democratization. In many cases it has led to new forms of authoritarianism. Our next task is to distinguish the conditions under which it led to democratic outcomes and those where it did not. Here it is useful to return to the impact of the creation of infrastructural power in Mann's terms.

### **Infrastructural State, Modern Society and the End of Leninism**

Ultimately infrastructural power is a far more efficient way to exercise authority than despotic power. Despotic power is highly contingent on the application of violence or the credible threat to do so. Infrastructural power, rather than standing above society, infuses the very structures of society, extends the scope of the state, and creates social constituencies from the beneficiaries of state power. Obedience to authority becomes part of the social fabric rather than a consequence of coercion. The costs of establishing infrastructural power are large. In a material sense, it entails the physical extension of the state in multiple dimensions (police power, transport and communication, regulation of the economy, provision of public goods) across the whole of the territory it controls. It entails investment in the human capital of those staffing the state, otherwise why move away from the personalistic rule of satraps endemic to systems built on despotic power.

But the creation of infrastructural power also has costs in terms of the autonomy of centralized authority. Once specialized apparatuses of the state are built and proliferate, those who staff them begin to develop their own embedded sectoral interests based on their desire for career stability and security. The development of specialized interests among those who serve the state creates principal-agent problems for the rulers. The crucial moment for Leninism in this regard was the rise of Brezhnev, that gray organizational man of the apparatus, whose most famous slogan was "Trust in cadres." For Jowitt this process of "corruption" of the Leninist ethos was as inevitable as Weber's routinization of charisma.<sup>74</sup> The decline of the Leninist combat ethos empowered agents embedded in the state and allowed them to slip the discipline of their bureaucratic principals. The result was a withering of the state's infrastructural power. Jowitt was thus not talking about ordinary corruption, but the corruption of the apparatus of rule as a ready tool for the exercise of authority.<sup>75</sup> Militants had become oligarchs who ruled through side payments rather than terror or commitment.<sup>76</sup>

The other consequence of infrastructural power is the transformation of society in which it played a decisive role. By the 1970s literacy was universal, urban living standards exceeded the bare minimum for survival, and the population had a keen understanding of conditions in the outside world. The Leninist order created grievances and permitted no way to express them, giving demand for voice in the exercise of power an urgency that could only be addressed outside the bounds of the system.

---

<sup>74</sup> Weber 1978, 246-254.

<sup>75</sup> Jowitt 1992.

<sup>76</sup> Svolik 2012.

Such conditions did not inevitably lead to unrest. Security services and propaganda kept the lid on for a long time. Protests were sporadic but, when they did occur, were explosive: Berlin and other locales in the DDR in 1953, Plzen and other industrial centers in Bohemia and Moravia in the same year, the Hungarian Revolution (1956), Novocherkassk 1962, the Prague Spring (1968), and the Jiu Valley strikes of 1978. Poland was a special case, experiencing several months of turbulence from March to October 1956, the student uprising of 1968, and strike waves in 1970-1, 1976, and 1980, which culminated in the Solidarity movement of 1980-1. From 1976 until the regime's demise in 1989, resistance movements could not be suppressed. This list also omits the turmoil of the perestroika period in the USSR which was marked by intense national mobilizations and industrial unrest.<sup>77</sup> Leninism in the period after WWII may have been dull but it was hardly a model of domestic tranquility.<sup>78</sup>

So when the final crisis of Leninism came in 1989-91, a range of capable and autonomous actors were on the scene, both at the elite and mass levels. But what tipped the balance between a democratic and an authoritarian outcome? Here we think it is the relative powers of elite actors and autonomous movements arising from society. Gorbachev's radical reforms created a bureaucratic "bank run" on the system (Solnick 1998). For officials the question was one of survival and how to convert their positions of infrastructural power embedded in the state into private and financial power in the emerging system. Where this ambition was unchecked, they were able to do so in relatively unproblematic ways by grabbing the most valuable assets of the state.<sup>79</sup> This was their last act of redistribution, not in the service of communism but for the sake of its most "devoted" followers. Their interests as increasingly recalcitrant agents of the Leninist state carried the day, and they dismembered the state rather than fighting for it.

Where street demonstrators and mobilized civil society overthrew Leninism, however, the elite restrained itself out of fear of popular reprisal. Of course, many cases fell between the extremes of elite dominance and civic revolution. In some cases in the middle of the range of this relationship, the course of events was more protracted and decisive outcomes were elusive or subject to the intervention of outside forces. But the extent to which popular mass movements and waves of protest denied control of the course of extrication to the elite, the greater the propensity for democratic outcomes. In these cases the old elites found other ways to make their way under the new rules of the games, taking advantage of their social capital rather than by directly expropriating productive capital. By compelling the elite to adapt to a competitive political and economic environment, rather than by stacking the endgame to their naked advantage, democracy became possible.

The Leninist extinction produced not a single outcome but a broad range: more democratic in Central Europe (including Slovenia) and the Baltics where intense civic mobilization by democratic movements carried the day, even before the EU could register its interest, and overtly authoritarian in Central Asia. In Russia, the Western Republics of the USSR, the Caucasus, and the Balkans, things were much more ambiguous. Here regimes have tended to be competitive authoritarian, with the Balkans moving most strongly in a democratic direction, prodded by Western support. Some of the others have moved more decisively in an authoritarian direction (Russia, Belarus, Armenia), while others have undergone a more

---

<sup>77</sup> Beissinger 2002, Connor 1991.

<sup>78</sup> Bialer 1980.

<sup>79</sup> Ganev 2006, Solnick 1998.

protracted struggle alternating between weak democracy and weak competitive authoritarianism. Here Ukraine stands out as the most visible case.

Thus we come to the understanding that Leninism opened possible pathways to democracy as the distal effect of the state directed violence it used to construct nations, infrastructural states, and modern societies. It was by no means inevitable, but conditioned on the relationship between the mass and elite actors it ultimately empowered at the point of disintegration of the regime. Thus whether violent Leninist modernization leads to democracy is a contingent outcome, not an inevitable one.

## Conclusions

What, then, can we say about the impact of violence on regime outcomes? Comparative historical research remains torn. On the one hand violent resolution of social conflicts does little to promote democracy in the short run. The essence of democracy is the transfer of power between conflicting parties in a peaceful manner and the conduct of governments selected by electoral means according to a set of well-specified, codified, enforceable rules. Such outcomes receive little aid in the short term by the violent overthrow of governments and the reconstitution of authority by violent means. Violent revolution over the short run is no friend of democracy.<sup>80</sup>

But comparative historical research has always had a keen eye for the long-run. At least since Moore discussed the English revolution in terms of the “contributions of violence to gradualism” it has become clear that the long-term and short-term effects of revolutionary violence may diverge or may even co-exist in a dialectical relationship.<sup>81</sup> Dahrendorf too shared similar “morbid” thoughts when he postulated how the total defeat of Nazism has not only destroyed that scourge but helped to finish the job of ridding Germany of the problem of aristocratic reaction (something which was initiated by the Nazis themselves) thus opening the way to democracy in the Federal Republic.<sup>82</sup> We therefore must be alive to the potential for revolutionary violence to change the social and political environment in ways that open up the possibility for regime outcomes that seemed unlikely before.

We have used such a framework in this paper to consider the legacies of violent Leninist revolution. Let us be clear on its proximate effect – it is profoundly antidemocratic. However, successful Leninist revolution has three important effects which we think are relevant to the long-term potential for democratic success. We see this working through three different processes that turned out to be inherent to the project – state-building, nation-building, and social transformation.

For most of the areas that came under the control of Leninist revolutionaries, that juncture marked the first or, at least, the further extension of a comprehensive, bureaucratic state that established infrastructural power across society.<sup>83</sup> Quite clearly the prospect of making democracy without a functioning state is a doomed project. To the extent that elements of the Leninist state could be utilized

---

<sup>80</sup> Not all social revolution, violent revolution. There are cases where non-violent revolution have led to democracy in the short-term. See, e.g. Fernandes and Branco (2014) on the Portuguese case.

<sup>81</sup> Moore 1966, 3.

<sup>82</sup> Dahrendorf 1967.

<sup>83</sup> East Germany was a clear exception to this, and a case could be made for other locations as well, e.g. Bohemia and Moravia, Hungary.

by fledgling democracies, Leninist state-building, even though achieved by violent means, held the potential to assist in the construction of democracy.

In integrating large and diverse populations under a unitary authority structure, Leninist revolution forged national identities. In some cases the effect was to build multiple national identities, which needed to use a federal structure to integrate very diverse populations (the USSR, Czecho-Slovakia, Yugoslavia). Although the centrifugal effect of such segmental arrangements has been persuasively described in the literature,<sup>84</sup> once postcommunist secession was achieved, the impact was the same. A well-defined and shared national identity makes the process of democratic governance easier. In particular, it avoids the thorny problem of convergent class and identity cleavages that makes distributional politics so difficult to solve.<sup>85</sup> Where Leninism left an ambiguous legacy in this regard, the process of democratization has been much rockier (e.g. Ukraine, Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Caucasus, Moldova, and Macedonia).

The greatest contribution of Leninist revolution to the potential for long-term democratization comes from social transformation. The effects were both those of subtraction and augmentation. The first effect is destruction of the economic and political structures of latifundia agriculture and its well-known negative impact on the prospects for democracy. The second effect is the transformation of traditional peasant rural societies into modern urban, industrial societies dominated by two large laboring classes, white and blue collar. This change in the social structure created social actors, working and middle classes, associated with the rise of democracy in other societies which had been weak and underdeveloped previously in this part of the world.<sup>86</sup>

The question of what transpires after Leninism, at least in terms of regime outcomes, seems to hinge on the interaction between the specific impact of the state-building and social transformation processes. At the moment of the collapse of Leninist regimes in the period 1989-91, the role of two critical actors come into play in determining whether democracy or authoritarianism prevails. The Leninist state-building process left behind elite actors who wanted to convert their public bureaucratic power into private wealth and power if they wanted to continue to rule. Where they were able to do so on their own terms, the chances of authoritarian transition were much more likely. The one roadblock to neo-authoritarianism was the mobilization of the transformed agents of social change. Where substantial democratic, popular movements emerged among the blue and white collar classes in society, the ability of the elite to convert its power into new forms of authoritarian control was constrained by countervailing social power. Under such circumstances, the former elite had to adapt to the new forms of competitive politics that emerged and where they were successful, this helped to ease the transition to democracy.<sup>87</sup>

Ultimately, returning to Moore's insights on the impact of a violent past in setting the stage for future political outcomes has proved productive in identifying crucial turning points in the regime trajectories

---

<sup>84</sup> Roeder 2007, Bunce 1999.

<sup>85</sup> Hechter 1975.

<sup>86</sup> Luebbert (1991) in thinking about the prospects for the creation of liberal democracy, social democracy, or fascism in the context of interwar Europe, did not consider Eastern Europe to be a relevant part of his sample. He reduced the choice of outcomes in the new states of the region to be either traditional dictatorship or some sort of modernizing variant, emulating but not attaining fascism.

<sup>87</sup> For an excellent study of such adaptive processes, see Grzymala Busse (2002).

of countries that experienced violent Leninist revolution. It is important to distinguish between the proximate, negative effects of violence for democratic development and the transformational change it induces. Whereas the former is unambiguously negative for democratic development, the distal impact of the changes it induces may transform lost causes for democratic change into viable candidates.

For political development to return as a useful and foundational form of analysis within comparative politics, a deeply dialectical sensitivity to modernization and violence will be indispensable. "Good" effects are often the product of "bad" causes. It is all too easy to condemn or praise events of the day in terms of whether or not they are "good" for democracy. A list of such events would be easy enough to compile, but the scholarly shelf-life of these lists, the long run perspective teaches us, is probably limited. Focusing on the long run, therefore, may turn us away from the headlines, but it may also inject a much-needed dose of epistemological modesty about the conditions that produce either dictatorship or democracy.

## Citations

Acemoglu, Daron and James Robinson, 2006. *Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*. New York, Cambridge University Press.

Allen, Robert C. 2003. *From Farm to Factory: A Reinterpretation of the Soviet Industrial Revolution*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Almond, Gabriel, and Sidney Verba. 1963. *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Ansell, Ben and David Samuels. 2014. *Inequality and Democratization: An Elite-Competition Approach*. New York, Cambridge University Press.

Barro, Robert and Jong-Wha Lee. 2010, "A New Data Set of Educational Attainment in the World, 1950-2010." *Journal of Development Economics* 104: 184-198.

Bauman, Zygmunt. 1989. *Modernity and the Holocaust*. Cambridge: Polity.

Beissinger, Marc. 2002. *Nationalist Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet State*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Berman, Sheri. Forthcoming. Democracy and Dictatorship in Europe: From the Ancien Regime to the Collapse of Communism. New York, Oxford University Press.

Bernhard, Michael. 2001. "Democratization in Germany: A Reappraisal," *Comparative Politics* 33(4) :379-400.

Bernhard, Michael, Christopher Reenock, and Timothy Nordstrom. 2004. "The Legacy of Western Overseas Colonialism on Democratic Survival," *International Studies Quarterly* 48:225-50.

Bialer, Seweryn. 1980. *Stalin's Successors*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Bolt, Jutta and Jan Luiten van Zanden. 2014. The Maddison Project: Collaborative Research on Historical National Accounts. *The Economic History Review* 67 (3): 627–651.

Brubaker, Rogers. 1995. "Nationalizing States in the Old "New Europe—and the New." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 19(2): 411-437.

Bunce, Valerie. 1999. *Subversive Institutions: The Design and the Destruction of Socialism and the State*. New York, Cambridge University Press.

Burks, Richard V. 1961. *Dynamics of Communism in Eastern Europe*. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press.

Capoccia, G., and Ziblatt, D. 2010. "The Historical Turn in Democratization Studies: A New Research Agenda for Europe and Beyond." *Comparative Political Studies*, 43(8/9): 931-968.

Collier, Ruth Berins. 1999. *Paths Toward Democracy: The Working Class and Elites in Western Europe and South America*. New York, Cambridge University Press.

Connor, Walter. 1979. *Socialism, Politics, and Equality*. New York, Columbia University Press.

Connor, Walter. 1991. *The Accidental Proletariat: Workers, Politics, and Crisis in Gorbachev's Russia*. Princeton, Princeton University Press.

Dahrendorf, Ralf. 1967. *Society and Democracy in Germany*. New York, W. W. Norton.

Deutscher, Isaac. 1949 (1967). *Stalin: A Political Biography*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Diamond, Larry. 2008. "The Democratic Rollback: The Resurgence of the Predatory State," *Foreign Affairs* 87(2): 36-48.

Fanon, Franz. 1963. *The Wretched of the Earth*. Farrington, New York: Grove Weidenfeld.

Fernandes, Tiago and Rui Branco. 2014. "Long-Term Effects: Social Revolution and Civil Society in Portugal, 1974-2010," unpublished manuscript.

Fitzpatrick, Sheila. 2015. *On Stalin's Team*. Princeton, Princeton University Press.

Fukuyama, Francis. 2004. *State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century*. Ithaca, Cornell University Press.

Fukuyama, Francis. 2012. *Origins of Political Order: From Prehuman Times to the French Revolution*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux

Fukuyama, Francis. 2014. *Political Order and Political Decay: From the Industrial Revolution to the Globalization of Democracy*. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

Galleano, Eduardo. 1973. *Open Veins of Latin America*. New York, Monthly Review.

Ganev, Venelin I. 2006. *Preying on the State: The Transformation of Bulgaria after 1989*. Ithaca, Cornell University Press.

Gerschenkron, Alexander. 1989 [1943]. *Bread and Democracy in Germany*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Gerschenkron, Alexander. 1961. *Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective*. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.

Grzymala Busse, Anna. 2002. *Redeeming the Communist Past: The Regeneration of Communist Parties in East Central Europe*. New York, Cambridge University Press.

Hecter, Michael. 1975. *Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development, 1536-1966*. London, Routledge and Paul.

Hirszowicz, Maria. 1980. *The Bureaucratic Leviathan*. Oxford, Martin Roberts.

Huntington, Samuel P. 1968. *Political Order in Changing Societies*. New Haven, Yale University Press.

Inglehardt, Ronald. 1977. *The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles among Western Publics*. Princeton, Princeton University Press.

Janos, Andrew C. 2000. *East-Central Europe in the Modern World*. Stanford CA: Stanford University Press.

Jowitt, Kenneth. 1971. *Revolutionary Breakthroughs and National Development: The Case of Romania*. Berkeley CA: University of California Press.

Jowitt, Kenneth. 1992. *New World Disorder, The Leninist Extinction*. Berkeley, University of California Press.

Kitschelt, Herbert, Zdenka Mansfeldova, Radoslaw Markowski, and Gábor Tóka, 1999. *Post-Communist Party Systems: Competition, Representation, and Inter-Party Cooperation*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Klier, John D. and Slomo Lambroza. 1992. *Pogroms: Anti-Jewish Violence in Modern Russian History*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Kolakowski, Leszek. 1974. "The Myth of Human Self-Identity," in *The Socialist Idea: A Reappraisal*, edited by Leszek Kofakowski and Stuart Hampshire. New York, Basic Books. :18-35.

Konrád, Gyorgy, & Szelényi, Ivan. 1979. *The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power*. New York, NY: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich.

Kopstein, Jeffrey and Michael Bernhard. 2015. "Post-Communism, the Civilizing Process, and the Mixed Impact of Leninist Violence," *East European Politics and Societies and Cultures* 29: 379-390.

Lange, Mathew. 2004. "British Colonial Legacies and Political Development," *World Development* 32(6): 905-922.

Lankina, Tomila and Lullit Getachew. 2012. "Mission or Empire, Word or Sword? The Human Capital Legacy in Postcolonial Democratic Development," *American Journal of Political Science* 56(2): 465–483.

Lenin, Vladimir Illich. 1918. *The State and Revolution*. Collected Works. Volume 25. Moscow.

Linz, Juan and Alfred Stepan. 1996. *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe*. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press.

Luebbert, Gregory. (1991). *Liberalism, Fascism, or Social Democracy: Social Classes and the Political Origin of Regimes in Interwar Europe*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Lustick, Ian. 1997. "The Absence of Middle Eastern Great Powers: Political "Backwardness" in Historical Perspective." *International Organization* 51(4): 653–83.

Magyar, Balint. 1978. *A lengyel mezőgazdaság 1945 utáni történetét* (The history of Polish agriculture after 1945). Budapest. Institute of World Economy, Hungarian Academy of Sciences.

Mann, Michael. 1984. "The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanism and Results." *European Journal of Sociology* 25(2): 185-213.

Mann, Michael. 1986ff. *The Sources of Social Power*. 4 Volumes. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Marx Karl, 1973. "The Civil War in France." In Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *Selected Works*, Volume. 2, Moscow.

Medvedev, Roy. 1984. *All Stalin's Men*. New York, Doubleday.

- Memmi, Albert. 1991. *The Colonizer and the Colonized*. Expanded ed. Boston, Beacon Press.
- Moore, Barrington. 1966. *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World*. Boston, MA: Beacon.
- Motyl, Alexander. 1999. *Revolutions, Nations, Empires: Conceptual Limits and Theoretical Possibilities*. New York, Columbia University Press.
- Murray, Donald. 1995. *A Democracy of Despots*. Boulder, Westview.
- Paige, Jeffrey. 1975. *Agrarian Revolution: Social Movements and Export Agriculture in the Underdeveloped World*. New York, The Free Press.
- Putnam, Robert. 1993. *Making Democracy Work. Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Roeder, Philip. 2007. *Where Nation-States Come From: Institutional Change in the Age of Nationalism*. Princeton, Princeton University Press.
- Rokkan, Stein. 1975. "Dimensions of State Formation and Nation Building: A Possible Paradigm for Research on Variations within Europe," In *The Formation of Nation States in Western Europe*, Charles Tilly, ed. Princeton, Princeton University Press. Pp. 562-600.
- Rothschild, Joseph. 1974. *East-Central Europe Between the Two World Wars*. Seattle: University of Washington Press.
- Roy, Arundhati. 2011. *Walking with the Comrades*. New Delhi, Penguin.
- Rueschemeyer, Dietrich, & Stephens, Evelene Huber, & Stephens, John D. 1992. *Capitalist Development and Democracy*. Chicago, University of Chicago Press.
- Said, Edward. 1993. *Culture and Imperialism*. New York: Vintage Books.
- Selznick, Philip. 1952. *The Organizational Weapon: A Study of Bolshevik Strategy and Tactics*. New York: McGraw Hill.
- Skocpol, Theda. 1979. *States and Social Revolutions: a Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Solnick, Stephen. 1998. *Stealing the State*. Cambridge, Harvard University Press.
- Szporluk, Roman. 1986. *Communism and Nationalism: Karl Marx versus Friedrich List*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Svolik, Milan. 2012. *The Politics of Authoritarian Rule*. New York, Cambridge University Press.
- Tarrow, Sidney. 2015. *War, States, and Contention. A Comparative Historical Study*. Ithaca, Cornell University Press.
- Therborn, Goran. (1977). "The Rule of Capital and the Rise of Democracy," *New Left Review* 103:3-41.
- Verdery, Katherine. 1991a. *National Ideology under Socialism. Identity and Cultural Politics in Ceausescu's Romania*. Berkeley, University of California Press.

Verdery, Katherine. 1991b. "Theorizing Socialism: A Prologue to the 'Transition'," *American Ethnologist* 18: 419-39.

Walder, Andrew. 1986. *Communist Neo-Traditionalism: Work and Authority in Chinese Industry*. Berkeley CA: University of California Press.

Walder, Andrew. 2015. *China Under Mao: A Revolution Derailed*. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.

Weber, Eugen. 1976. *Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France 1870-1914*. Stanford CA: Stanford University Press.

Weber, Max. 1978. *Economy and Society*. Berkeley, University of California Press.

Weiner, Amir. 1999. "Nature, Nurture, and Memory in a Socialist Utopia: Delineating the Socio-Ethnic Body In the Age of Socialism." *American Historical Review* 104(4):1114-1155.

Woodberry, Robert D. 2012. "The Missionary Roots of Liberal Democracy," *American Political Science Review* 106(2): 244-274.

World Bank Group. 2015. World Development Indicators -- Urban population (% of total) [SP.URB.TOTL.IN.ZS]. <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.URB.TOTL.IN.ZS?page=6> Accessed 6/16/15.

Zwick, Peter. 1983. *National Communism*. Boulder, Westview Press.