What is a Historical Legacy?\textsuperscript{1}

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April 7, 2011

\textsuperscript{1}Thanks to Giovanni Capoccia, Zsuzsa Csergő, Valerie Morkevicius, Harris Mylonas, Tom Remington, Alfred Rieber, Daniel Ziblatt, participants at prior conference panels, and invited presentations at Yale University, Oxford University, Princeton University, and the University of California, Berkeley for comments on earlier drafts.
Introduction

William Faulkner once quipped, “[t]he past is never dead. In fact, it is not even past.” Faulkner was expressing a sentiment all too familiar to scholars who study how history matters in the world of politics, that however much we value political novelty, what we think of as political change masks deeper underlying continuities with the past. As Marx colorfully noted in the Eighteenth Brumaire, “[t]he tradition of all dead generations weighs like an nightmare on the brains of the living.” In fact Faulkner and Marx tap only half of the issue, for it is also the case that what we think of as political continuity masks deeper underlying change. Lowenthal (1993: 70) eloquently captures this idea: “[l]iving in ever new configurations of nature and culture, we must think and act de novo even to survive; change is as inescapable as tradition.” The more things change, the more they stay the same; the more they stay the same, the more they change.

The paradoxical simultaneity of both continuity and discontinuity is implicitly acknowledged but too little appreciated, especially (but not exclusively) among social scientists. The problem is in fact visible across a wide range of problems. It is at the root of the debate over whether history can repeat itself, of distinctions between “good” and “bad” historical analogies, of whether West European party systems were actually “frozen” for much of the twentieth centuries, and ultimately of whether any policy or crisis changed facts on the ground. In a less direct way the paradox emerges in discussion of transitional justice, historical institutionalism, and the politics of the past more generally. Nor is the paradox confined to qualitative assessment. We make ceteris paribus and unit homogeneity assumptions in statistical analysis, in full knowledge that all other things are never actually equal. In all these instances issue is how much or what kind of change tips the balance from a bad to a good historical analogy, from a frozen to a fluid party system, and more generally from continuity to disconti-
nuity. What is the dividing line between political continuity and discontinuity?

This paper explores how we ought to think about this question through an analysis of historical legacies, and in particular of the extent to which political outcomes in a regime can be said to be historical legacies of a prior regime. Historical legacies are an important component of many explanations of contemporary outcomes in politics attempting to democratize after a period of authoritarian rule. Democratic failure and more rarely success are often attributed to some legacy originating in a prior authoritarian regime. As we shall see, disagreements over what legacies are and how to identify them will help us understand how we should think about the dividing line between continuity and discontinuity.

For expository purposes the discussion will center mostly on the former communist world. This is not the only region where legacies have been hypothesized,\(^2\) but it is an area that has undergone numerous revolutionary upheavals whose consequences are being actively explored. Indeed, ever since state-socialism collapsed in Eastern Europe, scholars have sought to delineate the impact of historical legacies on post-communist economic, social, and political development. A widely held assumption has been that post-communist governments could not easily eradicate the “dead weight of the past.” The greatest challenge was seen as overcoming what Jowitt (1992) termed the “Leninist legacy.” He noted that “[w]hatever the results of the current turmoil in Eastern Europe, one thing is clear: the new institutional patterns will be shaped by the ‘inheritance’ and legacy of forty years of Leninist rule.” György Konrád was more pointed: “What will remain of socialism? All these socialist realist people. They are socialists because they have lived with the socialist reality for forty years; the majority for most of their lives. The lessons, traits, style, morality, and logic of these forty years cannot be dropped in the waste basket.”\(^3\)

The purpose of this paper is to explore the border between continuity and discontin-

\(^2\)Herz (1982) and Pinto (2010), for example, explores authoritarian legacies in western Europe. Hite and Cesarini (2004) and Collier and Collier (1991) expand the focus to Latin America.

\(^3\)Cited in Barany (1995: 177).
tinuity by examining what it means for a particular phenomenon to be a historical legacy. The argument proceeds as follows. Section 2 offers a brief review and evaluation of the legacies literature. It shows the despite a great deal of progress conceptualizing legacies, researchers have not fully grasped the differences between a legacy and a non-legacy. Section 3 introduces a new heuristic framework for thinking about different pathways between one regime and another, and makes an explicit distinction between “new” phenomena and those that are potential historical legacies. Section 4 examines what it means for a phenomenon to be “the same” in two different periods. Section 5 argues that it is not enough for a phenomenon to the same in two periods; it also matters how the phenomenon came about in the latter period. Following Stinchcombe, I distinguish between survivals from the past and replications of the past, and argue that these represent two very different notions of legacy. Section 6 concludes with a checklist of features of a historical legacy.

**Historical Legacies in Post-Communism**

Researchers of post-communism have identified a vast number of potential historical legacies. A major focus has been on what are termed communist legacies. Some of these can be labeled cultural, encompassing attitudes, beliefs, and knowledge inculcated during the communist period. Examples include a “ghetto” political culture, where the population views politics as dangerous and something to avoid (Jowitt 1992); the skills to successfully navigate politics (Grzymała-Busse 2002, Seleny 2007); the hybrid of nationalism and socialism that proved inimical to liberal values (Kubik 2003); and economic beliefs (Baxandall 2004); and trust in political parties (Pop-Eleches and Tucker, forthcoming 2011). Others might be termed material, such as the lack of infrastructure, the destruction of the environment, the dominance of the state sector, and excessive focus on heavy industry (Barany and Volgyes 1995). Still others could be called institutional, encompassing the persistence of old regime institutions, organiza-
tions, and elites throughout the economy, polity, and society. Examples include the bloated welfare system (Inglot 2003); weak party systems (Geddes 1995); communist-era constitutions (Stanger 2003), and centralized economic planning (Crawford and Lijphart 1995). This list is by no means meant to be exhaustive. Indeed, there have been some factors, such as ethnic fragmentation and natural resource endowment (Pop-Eleches 2007), that do not easily fit into the above categories, and there are certainly many other potential legacies.\footnote{LaPorte and Lussier (forthcoming) offer an excellent conceptual analysis and review of the literature. See also the contributions in Crawford and Lijphart (1995) and Ekiert and Hanson (2003). Older book-length studies focusing on communist legacies include Millar and Wolchik (1995), Hollis (1999), Kovács (1994), Klein et al. (1998), and Csanádi (1997).}

Another important research area has been on what are considered pre-communist legacies. For example, Kitschelt, Mansfeldova, Markowski, and Tóka (1999) note how the choice of post-communist political institutional arrangements across East Europe is conditioned, ultimately, by the level of social and administrative modernization before communism. Shugart (1995) illustrates how countries with a history of parliamentary governance tend to put greater authority in parliaments during the post-communist period than countries with no such history, which tend to center authority in the presidency. Pop-Eleches (2007) reports evidence of the importance of interwar statehood for post-communist democratic success. Wittenberg (2006) shows how in Hungary post-communist patterns in support for parties of the Right resemble patterns established before communism. For Bunce (2005) the power of post-communist nationalism is a legacy of imperial rule in the region.

Abstracting away from the particulars of individual studies, several issues become clear. First, the study of legacies is still pre-paradigmatic. What LaPorte and Lussier (forthcoming) argue for Leninist legacies is true write large: there is no consensus on what counts as a legacy, why kinds of legacies there are, or how to study them. LaPorte and Lussier’s typology classifying legacies according to their sectoral domain and the level of analysis at which they operate is an excellent step forward, but it elides...
the deeper question of what a legacy actually is, independent of its type or where it operates. Cesarini and Hite (2004: 3) identify two common conceptualizations, one that regards legacies as continuations of the past, and another that regards them as reactions to the past. Although the present study is focused principally on the first kind of legacy, it is worth noting in the case of the second kind, where a legacy is the outcome at the end of a causal chain, that it is difficult to know what would not count as a legacy. Any post-communist outcome is at some level a product of the past because there is nothing else it could be a product of. This is not to say that there is no value in identifying the causal chains associated with phenomena of interest. That is the stock and trade of social scientists. But then the matter is only about distinguishing among different possible legacies, and not the existence per se of a legacy.

Second, researchers have not adequately conceptualized the temporal dimensions of legacies. As noted above, a multitude of economic, social, cultural, psychological, institutional, political, and other types of legacies have been identified. I will refer to this as the functional dimension. But one of the things that makes an outcome a legacy is that it originated some time in the past. In the study of post-communism, communist (“Leninist”) and pre-communist legacies are by far the most commonly researched, but there is of course no reason the last several decades in the former communist world need necessarily be divided into pre-communist, communist, and post-communist periods. Neither this nor any other demarcation “cuts nature at its joints.” Another possibility would be to divide things into an authoritarian period (encompassing interwar dictatorships as well as communism) and a post-authoritarian period after 1989. Depending on which demarcation is used, the temporal identity of the legacies would change. Rather than communist legacies, say, we would refer to authoritarian legacies. It is also true that the temporal and functional dimensions of a legacy are at least in part mutually constitutive of one another. For example, if the issue were ideological legacies it might be more appropriate to consider dividing the immediate past into Stalinist, reform communist, and post-communist periods. Moreover, for any given
position on one dimension, there are typically multiple legacies on the other. For example, communist legacies come in both economic and social forms. By the same token, cultural legacies might be of the communist or pre-communist type.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, scholarly focus on identifying the historical antecedents of post-communist phenomena has produced an impoverished vision of the ways in which the past might or might not continue into the present. First, it has distracted attention from post-communist phenomena that might lack meaningful historical precedents, and thus do not qualify as possible legacies. Second, it has ignored phenomena that existed before the post-communist period but have not persisted into the post-communist period, that is, phenomena that might have been legacies but are not.

**Pathways to Post-Communism**

A richer menu of possibilities can be seen in Table 1, which illustrates the relationship between demarcations, the historical periods they define, and the variety of potential legacies they imply. The right-most three columns in this table represent the standard time periods from the post-communist legacies literature: pre-communism, communism, and post-communism. An “X” in a particular column means that the phenomenon of interest was present during that period. Each row represents a potential pathway to post-communism for a phenomenon of interest. Rows in which an “X” appears in post-communism and at least one prior period are labeled as potential legacy pathways because those are instances in which something that existed before post-communism continued into post-communism.

The top row, with an “X” only in the post-communism box, describes features of a post-communist polity that are new in the sense that they had never appeared before the fall of communism in that country. For most countries in the region one example of this would be having free and fair elections. With the exception of the for-
mer Czechoslovakia, no country in East Europe could boast of having had very many fully democratic elections before 1990. Constitutionally-guaranteed freedoms also appeared for the first time after 1989 in many countries of the region.

The second row (“Potential Communist Legacy”) describes phenomena that came into existence during the communist period and also exist in the post-communist period. For example, the steel factories in built during communism in agricultural countries such as Bulgaria and Hungary would qualify because they were built during communism and continued to exist right into the post-communist period. Another example is excessive popular expectation of the willingness and ability of the State to provide for social welfare. Such expectations surely did not exist before the communist period, when States were too weak and too poor to provide the cradle to grave welfare that came to be seen under communism as a right rather than a privilege.

“Potential Pre-Communist Legacy, A” in row three portrays features of the region that existed before communism, during communism, and after. One example of this “backwardness.” As Janos (1994) notes, Eastern Europe as a whole has been economically marginal vis-à-vis Western Europe for centuries. Another example would be ethnic fragmentation, which began with the fall of the Habsburg and Ottoman empires at the end of World War I and has continued, if more attenuated, until the present day. Some of the phenomena identified as Leninist legacies are in fact pre-communist phenomena of this type. For example, attitudes inimical to liberalism, a “ghetto” po-

Table 1: Pathways to Post-Communism

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litical culture, and deference to authority, while undoubtedly features of communism, were also prominent in pre-communist East Europe. The same might be said of Étatist developmental strategies.

The fourth row (“Uniquely Communist”) describes features of communism not present in either the pre- or post-communist phases. From the standpoint of the post-communist period this path does not even describe a potential legacy, since by construction the feature unique to communism has no historical precursors. But it is a possible trajectory from the past, representing a potential legacy that never appeared. Many such features can be identified depending on the country in question, including the fusion of Party and State (Bunce 1999), the soft budget constraint (Kornai 1992), and features of Stalinism such as the cult of personality.

The fifth row captures what is awkwardly termed pre-post-communist. This pathway represents a feature that is present until the collapse of state-socialism, but is extirpated under post-communism. Authoritarian rule and rigged elections would fall into this category for many post-communist countries, many of which experienced liberal democracy for the first time after 1989. Although this trajectory does not entail a potential legacy for post-communism, it does for the communist period.

The sixth row represents a “uniquely pre-communist” pathway. In this category would be features of pre-communist systems that were wiped out under communist rule and have not been revived. Examples for Eastern Europe include the political power of the land-owning class and the economic influence of the Churches. The communists relegated, seemingly permanently, both the large landowners and the Churches to a status far inferior to what they had enjoyed before the advent of communism.

The seventh row (“Potential Pre-Communist Legacy”) represents features of these polities that are present in both the pre-communist and post-communist periods but not during the communist period itself. Many such candidate legacies have been offered. One example are the so-called “frozen conflicts” that raged before the commu-
nists came to power and then reemerged after the fall of communism. Metaphysically speaking this is the most controversial pathway because it is not clear what it means for a phenomenon to disappear and then come back, and unless that can be established there is no difference between the “B” pathway and “A” pathway in which the phenomenon exists in all periods. I consider the added complications of this pathway further below.

The utility of Table 1 is that its categories are exhaustive. Its columns cover all periods of a former communist country’s history, and its rows cover all possible pathways to post-communism. As noted earlier, there is nothing sacred about the “pre-communist”–“communist”–“post-communist” categorization. With the entry of much of Eastern Europe into the EU and NATO and the even more recent return of Russia as a great power, we have arguably entered the post-post-communist era. However, for purposes of understanding the temporal dimension of legacies, nothing is gained by employing more than three periods. The three basic trajectories are those in which an outcome appears in only one period (those paths prefaced with “uniquely”), originates in one period and appears again in the successive period (“Potential Communist Legacy”, “Pre-Post-Communism”, and “Potential Pre-Communist Legacy A”), or originates in one period and reappears after an absence (“Potential Pre-Communist Legacy B”). More complicated trajectories resulting from the addition of additional periods can be broken down into one of these three fundamental pathways.

Table 1 highlights other important features of legacies. First, a necessary condition for a phenomenon to be considered a legacy is that it has to exist in at least two time periods. Thus, post-communist politics might feature communist or pre-communist legacies (i.e., legacies from preceding periods), but cannot feature post-communist legacies (legacies from the same period). Put differently, any phenomenon that is “new”, i.e. exists in only one period, cannot by definition be a legacy of the

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5I leave out the pathway in which no “X” appears anywhere. This pathway would identify those features that could have appeared at some point during history but never have.
past. Whether a particular outcome is a potential legacy is of course conditional on having chosen a demarcation between time periods, even if that choice is implicit. For example, one could argue that contemporary stability in East European party systems and partisan attachments is a legacy of party strategies from the early post-communist period. Everything is happening after the arrival of democracy, i.e. in the post-communist period. Yet there is also an implicit distinction between the early and recent post-communist periods.

Second, although the reference period of the literature (and of the present study) has been post-communism in the sense that that is the period where we have been most interested in predicting outcomes, other reference periods are also possible, and that can alter the way we view the legacy. For example, if the analytic focus were communism rather than post-communism, one could still identify potential pre-communist legacies. In Table 1 they would correspond to the “Pre-Post-Communist” and “Potential Pre-Communist Legacy” pathways. Moreover, what are legacies for one period may not be legacies for another. For example, in most countries in Eastern Europe, authoritarian rule is a possible legacy for the communist period but not the post-communist period (the “Pre-Post-Communist” pathway). Others, such as peripheral status in the world economy, are potential pre-communist legacies for both the communist and post-communist periods (“Potential Pre-Communist Legacy”).

Third, the number of time periods in which a phenomenon exists has a bearing on how the corresponding legacy should be temporally labeled. For phenomena that exist in only two time periods, there is no ambiguity about how to label a potential legacy. Suppose, for example, the historical record were divided into a post-1989 period and a pre-1989 period (that included the events of 1989 themselves). If there were historical legacies in post-1989 politics then those could (by construction) only be pre-1989 legacies. But if there are more than two periods in addition to the reference period, then it is important to identify in which period a potential legacy originated. If a legacy exists it should be labeled according to the period in which the phenomenon originated.
rather than the period that is temporally closest to the reference period. For example, consider the avoidance of political involvement (the “ghetto political culture”), which Jowitt (1992) argued as being an important communist (“Leninist”) legacy in post-communist politics. Avoiding political involvement is certainly not a phenomenon that originated in the communist period, but in the pre-communist period. Therefore if we believe that the ghetto political culture is a legacy, it should be labeled a pre-communist legacy rather than a communist legacy. In fact it is a pre-communist legacy for both post-communist and communist politics.

Fourth, we can see that scholarly focus on legacy pathways misses over half of the trajectories leading from pre- to post-communism. Of the seven pathways in Table 1, only three involve phenomena that exist in post-communism and were carried over from at least one preceding period. Three involve phenomena that historical precedent suggests might have existed in post-communism but never appeared (the “Uniquely Pre-Communist”, “Pre-Post Communist”, and “Uniquely Communist” pathways), and one pertains to phenomena new to post-communism. An interesting and relatively unexplored research question is why some outcomes become legacies whereas others do not.

Table 1 has heuristic value in that it illustrates different possible patterns of continuity and discontinuity, but beyond the requirement that there be demarcations identifying historical periods it tells us nothing about the criteria by which we determine that an X at one moment is the same X at another moment. This is important because we cannot claim that some X continued from the past into the present without unless the X in the present is in some sense the same X that existed before. Heraclitus famously opined that “No man ever steps in the same river twice, for it’s not the same river and he’s not the same man.” This restates what I already noted in the introduction, that some change is unavoidable. The question is whether there is a point at which the quantity or quality of change is sufficient that the X of the present is no longer considered the same X as the past.
Consider phenomena such as polluted lakes and rivers, distinctively “socialist” architecture, and technologically outmoded heavy industry in Eastern Europe. They were created during the communist regime and continued to exist, by and large, into the post-communist period. No one would argue that the state of any of these entities at some point during the post-communist period (say 1992) is identical to their state at some point in the communist period (say 1985). Rivers and lakes slowly cleanse themselves. Socialist architecture and outmoded industry get retrofitted, cleaned up, or decay even further through lack of attention. Yet despite such evolution few would claim that these entities thereby changed their fundamental identities, thereby ceasing to be the same river, lake, or whatever. If some change within sameness is permitted how, then how much? How different must a post-communist phenomenon be from prior phenomena to be considered “new”? How similar must a post-communist phenomenon be to a prior phenomenon to be considered “the same” phenomenon, and thus a potential historical legacy?

Identity over Time

Fain (1970: 75) terms the study of identity over time “philosophical quicksand,” and for good reason. Since antiquity scholars have debated the larger issues raised at the end of the last section, and there is still no consensus on what it means for an entity to persist even as it also changes. Any resolution of such philosophical conundra is far beyond the scope of this paper, but it is possible to lay out four different logics of persistence, each rooted in a different calculus by which temporal equivalence is established. The first, rooted in Hume (but reflecting also Heraclitus’ and others’ views), might be termed the skeptical approach to continuity. In this view persistence obtains only when the phenomenon in the reference period is exactly the same as that in the prior period. For a skeptic any change disqualifies an outcome as a potential legacy.

*For a concise summary of the relevant philosophical debates, see Hawley (2001).
This rules out virtually all the potential legacies I have discussed in this paper because all of them have undergone some evolution. This is true even for such throwbacks as the post-1989 communists of Czechoslovakia, who alone among communist parties did not transform themselves into social democrats. But they changed in other important ways, and had to, because they were compelled to address the reality of the emerging market economy rather than the problems of central planning. In the skeptical tradition there are no historical legacies and there is no continuity. Gerschenkron (1968:38) expresses this skepticism well: “[a]t all times and in all cases, continuity must be regarded as a tool forged by the historian rather than as something inherently and invariably contained in the historical matter.”

A second approach is rooted in Aristotle’s distinction between between essential and incidental attributes of a phenomenon. In this view a phenomenon can persist even as it changes as long as those changes do not involve any of its essential or constitutive features. This clearly applies to the infrastructural detritus of communism, which although deteriorating over time clearly remain bridges, factories, and so forth. But it also applies to political parties. Consider again the post-1989 communists of Czechoslovakia, who kept their ideology but had to change their platform to accommodate the new post-communist reality. In an Aristotelian view they could be historical legacies (of the pre-communist type “A” variety, to be exact) because Marxist-Leninist principles would be considered an essential feature of a communist party whereas such a party’s concrete policies can change with the circumstances and it can remain communist.

A third approach is what Fain (1970: 78) labels the “historical continuity theory” of identity. This view, which relies on an evolutionary logic, requires that there be “temporal overlap” of the characteristics of the phenomenon under consideration. In other words, for there to be persistence then at any given time a phenomenon must have at least some of its features from a prior moment of time in addition to the new features it gained at the given moment of time. Consider the former ruling communist parties in
(say) Hungary or Poland. With the fall of communism they changed their names, their symbols, their core ideologies, and their programmatic appeals. For example, the contemporary Hungarian Socialist Party, advocate of free markets, free speech, the right to property, and the inviolability of multiparty democracy, is as far removed from its dictatorial forebear as a party can possibly be. Yet the Socialists are not conceived of as at root a different party, and in fact are routinely counted among the most prevalent of communist legacies. Why? Neither the skeptical nor the Aristotelian logic would consider these parties as legacies, but it makes sense with an evolutionary logic. For the former ruling parties perhaps the slogans change first, then the name, then the symbols, and then the core principles. At any given time the new feature exists alongside the ones already there, and the new becomes the old with the passage of time. Even if a particular party had changed its name, symbols, and slogans at the same time, the same people would still be populating the updated party, providing the necessary temporal overlap.

The evolutionary logic may be better appreciated by considering the case of so-called “historic parties,” parties that existed before communism, were wiped out under communism, but after communism were resurrected with the same names, slogans, symbols, and rhetoric of the predecessor party. In terms of the pathways in Table 1, they are of the “Potential Pre-Communist Legacy B” variety. Examples include the Independent Smallholders Party and Hungarian Social Democratic Party in Hungary and the National Liberal and National Peasant Parties in Romania. Consider the Independent Smallholders Party. It had been one of Hungary’s best known and respected parties in the pre-communist period. Having survived various instances of government repression, it emerged after World War II as the most powerful center-Right force in the country. Like other parties, it was repressed by the communists. But when it became possible to form parties again in the late 1980’s a Smallholders Party reemerged using the same name, symbols, and slogans as the pre-communist version. It fought and won a lawsuit against other parties that claimed to be the “true” inheri-
tors of the original party. Despite the apparent continuities most scholars feel that the contemporary version was too different from its predecessor to be a continuation.

Why is it that former ruling communist parties can shed their names, symbols, slogans, and core principles, and yet be universally perceived as continuation of the earlier party, whereas “historic” parties preserve the very same things and are considered at best pale imitations of their putative pre-communist predecessors? The reason is that the evolutionary logic cannot be applied to “historic” parties. Despite continuities in names, symbols, and slogans, the “historic” parties have not enjoyed an unbroken existence. Consequently, unlike for the former communists, the new and old features were not able to coexist.

Finally, there is a pragmatic or hermeneutic view of persistence. In this approach continuity is about what counts as a given phenomenon in different time periods. Suppose we are interested in ideological cleavages rather than individual party organizations, and are interested in comparing the evolution of the Left from the pre-communist to the post-communist period. It is empirically indisputable that what counts as the Left under communism is significantly different from what counted as the Left in the 1930’s. The miniscule and politically irrelevant communist parties notwithstanding, the Left today is far more free-market oriented, more respectful of religion, and less protective of workers than its 1930’s predecessor. Yet we still speak of the Left in the same way we speak of the former communist parties, as merely radically different versions of its previous self. Although one might account for this also with an evolutionary logic, the persistence can also be understood with the pragmatic approach. We need only compare what counts as the Left in the post-communist period with whatever counts as the Left in the pre-communist period, regardless of the substantive differences between the two Lefts or any unbroken evolution of an entity we can identify as the Left.
Replications and Survivals

Suppose we have established that the phenomenon X in a reference period is the same X that occurred in a prior period. Should it matter why those X’s occurred in each period for X to be considered a historical legacy? Stinchcombe (1968) distinguishes between survivals, phenomena that continue even after the conditions that originally produced them have disappeared, and replications, which recur because there are underlying conditions continue to produce the same outcome over time. To see the difference between the two consider the problem of corruption that has characterized much of post-communist Europe. In the survival view the predilection for corruption continues under free market conditions in which there is at least in theory political accountability because it has been passed down from prior generations and has attained a status akin to a cultural practice. In essence that is simply how they do business, and those engaged in it may say as much. In the replication view corruption refuses to die because it is a response to the “objective” conditions individuals face as they attempt to get things done. People would not say they inherited corruption from the past, but that just like their forebears circumstances compel them to do it.

Most researchers would consider such corruption a legacy only in the case of a survival. If that is true, then to establish that something is a legacy it is not enough to identify the same phenomenon in at least two different time periods, but also that the phenomenon is not caused by any underlying conditions in the latter period. In cases such as corruption, where it is plausible that there is both cultural transmission and continuing causes, the question becomes empirical more than conceptual.

Observations

We have established a set of conditions for a phenomenon to be considered a legacy. First, it must exist in at least two time periods, separated by conventionally-defined demarcations. Second, it is necessary to establish that the phenomenon in the latter
period is really the same phenomenon that occurred in the prior period, where same-
ness can be understood as literal unchangingness, stability of key features, unbroken
existence, or pragmatic comparison of what counts as the phenomenon in each period.
Third, the phenomenon must have been carried over from the past rather than merely
replicated in the latter period. If these three conditions are met, a phenomenon may
be considered a historical legacy. To determine whether legacies matter for other out-
comes requires further empirical analysis, in which legacies and “new” phenomena
are pitted against one another as explanatory variables.
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