Resolution 1325 and post Cold-War Feminist Politics

Paper under review with the International Feminist Journal of Politics – please do not circulate or quote without consulting the author.

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ABSTRACT

Social movement scholars credit feminist transnational advocacy networks with putting violence against women on the UN security agenda, as evidenced by resolution 1325 and numerous other UN Security Council statements on gender, peace, and security. Such accounts neglect the significance of super power politics for shaping the aims of women’s bureaucracies and NGOs in the UN system. This article highlights how the fall of the Soviet Union transformed the delineation of ‘women’s issues’ at the United Nations and calls attention to the extent that the new focus upon ‘violence against women’ has been shaped by the post Cold War US global policing practices. Resolution 1325’s call for gender-mainstreaming of peacekeeping operations reflects the tension between feminist advocates’ increased influence in security discourse and continuing reports of peacekeeper perpetrated sexual violence, abuse and exploitation.

Key Words: Transnational advocacy networks, Cold War, New Wars, Democratization, Peacekeeping, Human Rights, Feminism, Violence against Women, United Nations.

In October 2000, the unanimous passage of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 linked gender, peace, and security and recognized the need to ‘mainstream a gender perspective in peacekeeping operations.’ The Resolution authorizes monitoring of peacekeeping operations by gender experts and condemns military sexual violence. As a policy artifact this Resolution gives evidence of startling tensions in the gender politics of mainstream international security discourse in the final years of the twentieth century. How did ‘gender’ and ‘violence against
women’ become mainstream security issues at this particular point in history? What does Resolution 1325 signify about feminist capacity to intervene in questions of international security?

Social movement theorists have answered such questions with celebratory accounts of how feminist activists inside and outside UN institutions managed to get the problem of violence against women onto the international security agenda. They argue that activists’ success in influencing international security discourse depended upon the leadership of ‘moral entrepreneurs’ and their formation of a ‘transnational advocacy network’ of insiders and outsiders that framed violence against women as a human rights issue. Moreover, a number of feminist scholars have argued that the intrinsic nature of the problem of violence against women as a violation of female bodily integrity forged unity in the previously divided field of women’s organizations active around the UN.

This article argues that such accounts fail to analyze how the collapse of the Soviet Union transformed discourse on both ‘women’ and ‘human rights’ as problems for international government. Since its foundation, women’s politics in the UN system formed a terrain of superpower struggle: the Soviets rejected the notion of ‘women’s issues’ and argued that women’s organizations should locate the problem of ‘women’s oppression’ within a broader analysis of international political economy. This stance proved attractive to many women’s organizations active in the UN. Consequently, representatives from mainstream US women’s organizations often felt isolated from other women’s groups while US officials tended to view women’s politics with suspicion. Thus, the sudden unity forged in the post Cold War UN field of women’s politics owes less to the intrinsic properties of the violence against women issue than to a sudden absence of superpower conflict. Furthermore, the significance of the human rights frame for the
success of the international feminist campaign on violence against women only makes sense when considered in the context of broader transformations in security discourse which followed the collapse of the Soviet Union. In the post Cold War world order the US adopted the pose of leader of the democratic world and defender of women and children against violent undemocratic men. Rape and other bodily ‘human rights violations’ form a rationale for new forms of peacekeeping intervention. Yet such interventions create extraordinarily sexist environments in which sexual violence, abuse and exploitation flourishes. Resolution 1325 speaks to these tensions within contemporary peacekeeping operations, proposing the technical solution of gender mainstreaming.

**Transnational feminist networks**

Scholarly accounts of how and why violence against women made it onto the mainstream security agenda build upon social movement theory to highlight transnational activists’ agency in bringing about change globally and locally. Social movement analysts use the concepts of ‘political opportunities,’ ‘mobilizing structures’ and ‘framing’ to explain both the achievements and failures of social reform efforts (Joachim 2003: 247). Keck and Sikkink combine social network analysis with the social movement approach to show how ‘transnational advocacy networks’ have achieved reform by working simultaneously at the international, national and local levels. They define ‘transnational advocacy networks’ as ‘those relevant actors working internationally on an issue, who are bound together by shared values, a common discourse, and dense exchanges of information and services (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 2).

One of Keck and Sikkink’s case studies analyzes how ‘violence against women’ came onto the international security agenda through the efforts of women active in the United Nations and women’s NGOs who held organizing meetings and events at the Center for Women’s Global Leadership at Rutgers University. In 1989, when she became founding director of the Center, Charlotte Bunch decided that given the increasing importance of ‘the human rights concept’ to
international politics women needed to ‘claim it and be in on it’ (Bunch, quoted by Friedman 1995: 25). She held a meeting of activists who agreed that violence against women would be the best point of intersection between feminism and human rights discourse as:

[t]he issue which most parallels a human rights paradigm and yet is excluded. You can see in violence all the things the human rights community already says it’s against: it involves slavery, it involves situations of torture, it involves terrorism, it involves a whole series of things that the human rights community is already committed to [fighting, but which] have never been defined in terms of women’s lives (Bunch quoted by Friedman 1995: 20).

Jacqui True emphasizes the specific capacity of transnational advocacy networks to achieve change within the major global governing institutions because they consist of ‘alliances of [institutional] insiders and outsiders,’ such alliances ‘work within the system with institutional actors and as a part of larger policy communities to bring about incremental change’ (True 2008: 7). The Center for Women’s Global Leadership’s location at Rutgers made it possible to gather women from all over the world located in the New York area and active in the UN or in NGOs that worked with the UN. Thus, transnational advocacy networks constitute a form of elite women’s politics closely integrated into the United Nations system.

Valentine Moghadam argues that changes in the global economy since the 1980s favored the formation of transnational feminist networks in particular, which she calls ‘structures organized above the national level that unite women from three or more countries around a common agenda, such as women’s human rights, reproductive health and rights, violence against women, peace and antimilitarism, or feminist economics’ (Moghadam 2005: 4). She argues that the increased salience of gender in international politics reflects increased global unity among women activists. In her account, the impetus for women’s global unity increased from the mid 1980s because of three related factors: the decline of welfare state in rich countries; a new international division of labour that relied on cheap female workers; and the emergence of patriarchal fundamentalist movements; surprisingly, she does not mention the collapse of the Soviet Union.
She suggests that ‘the worldwide expansion of a female labor force, the important (albeit exploited) role of paid and unpaid female labor in the global economy, and the persistence of social and gender inequalities underpin the rise of a women’s movement on a world scale’ (Moghadam 2005: 19). She also points to new information technologies that allow transnational networks to ‘retain flexibility, adaptability and nonhierarchical features’ (Moghadam 2005: 17).

Moghadam’s concept of transnational feminist network covers a wider range of political actors than Keck and Sikkink’s concept of transnational advocacy networks, which work for change in the mainstream institutions of international government. Moghadam traces links between transnational feminist networks and anti-globalization networks. She discusses feminist participation in mass protest activity against the World Trade Organization. Some feminists active in such networks eschew, or at least worry about, engagement with the internal process of global institutions of the United Nations, fearing an ‘NGO-ization’ of the women’s movement (Alvarez 2009). Thus, transnational feminist networks and transnational advocacy networks should be distinguished, although they overlap. Transnational feminist networks are likely to be less unified than narrower advocacy networks that form to achieve specific UN reforms, declarations or actions and involve institutional insiders.

While in Moghadam’s account gendered patterns in the changing global economy have driven international unity among women’s organizations, Keck and Sikkink emphasize the role of political leadership in forging unity in a divided movement; other authors have repeated this conclusion (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 184-188; Carpenter 2007; Joachim 2003). They discuss feminist leader Charlotte Bunch as an example of a ‘global moral entrepreneur,’ who cleverly framed various grievances women had about bodily violation as ‘violence against women’ and a human rights problem (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 184-185). According to their analysis, before
Bunch’s intervention women active on ‘women’s issues’ in UN conferences, organizations and debates had typically divided over the political questions of the day along north/south or east/west lines, along Cold War lines, over nationalist questions, and over the question of Israel/Palestine. Women could rarely agree on which topics should be at the top of the ‘women’s’ agenda at the UN. At the UN women’s conferences in Mexico (1975) and Copenhagen (1980) delegates divided, with women from poor countries accusing those from wealthy countries of focusing too much on sexuality and legal equality rather than economic and political questions (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 170; Moghadam 2005: 5). Keck and Sikkink contend that Bunch’s astute linkage of human rights with violence against women highlighted common experiences and interests of women from rich and poor countries and bridged the north south divide (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 195-198). They also argue that the reason women in the UN more readily united on violence, rather than other issues ‘is intrinsic to the issue itself’ since it concerns ‘the preservation of human dignity’ and ‘bodily integrity’ (Keck and Sikkink 1998:195).

Leadership at the UN Human Rights conference in Vienna in 1993 and the Women’s conference in Beijing in 1995 helped consolidate the slogan ‘women’s rights are human rights,’ the name of a publication by Amnesty International which came out that same year.

Accounts of feminist achievements in getting violence against women onto the global agenda for the most part neglect or minimize the significance of the end of the Cold War and emergence of the US as unrivaled global hegemon. Keck and Sikkink assume a UN context in which human rights discourse provides a master frame which feminists could appropriate but they and many other authors take for granted the importance of human rights to UN politics (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Joachim 2003:259; Carpenter 2007:101). Yet violence against women became a mainstream international issue at the very same time as human rights increased in salience at the UN. Jutta Joachim, who also works with social movement concepts, acknowledges the significance of the end of the Cold War but minimizes it as simply a ‘focusing event’ (Joachim 2007: 24-26). She provides September 11 2001 attacks the World Trade Center and the Pentagon in the US as another example of a ‘focusing event’ after which political actors could successfully claim ‘everything had changed.’ Thus, Joachim does not consider the specific significance of the fall of the Soviet Union for how the problem of ‘women’ could be discussed at the United Nations but simply the opportunity presented by the mood of change in the early 1990s.

As Joachim (2003) noted in an earlier article, the Cold War reduced the number of blocs in the UN from three (West/ East/ South) to two, now commonly referred to as ‘north/south,’ although the north may sometimes be referred to as the ‘west.’ She argued that the fall of the Soviet Union allowed the US to assume global leadership in the cause of violence against women, but fails to address why the US had never championed this issue in the international arena before. Nor does she question why the Soviets, who had previously advocated gender
equality and opposed sexual violence and harassment, had not brought this issue to the international table.

Women’s Politics at the UN during the Cold War

I argue that Cold War politics and the end of the Cold War profoundly affected which issues women could speak with authority on as women at the United Nations. Cold War politics exacerbated North/South divisions which other authors have commented upon as a barrier to unified action among women’s organizations active in the UN. These divisions isolated mainstream US women’s organizations and government officials from more radical and socialist feminist groups internationally and in their own country. While vibrant feminist anti-sexual violence politics developed outside the Soviet sphere during the 1970s Cold War politics kept such questions off the international women’s agenda at the UN.

The UN incorporated a separate women’s bureaucracy providing official sanction of the notion that some international issues counted as ‘women’s issues’ and fuelling superpower intervention in international women’s politics. As the Cold War intensified following the founding of the United Nations, the UN Status of Women Commission provided ‘a testing group of the respective programs and achievements of eastern and western attitudes,’ according to one US observer (Frieda Miller to the US Office of International Labor Affairs quoted in Laville 2002: 114). Cold War rivalry included the active intervention of agents of the US and Soviet states in international women’s non-governmental organizations. The UN made provision for NGOs to seek ‘consultative status,’ which gave them access to UN debates and resources, thus women’s NGOs emerged with the specific goal of intervening at the UN. After the Second World War, communist women of the French Resistance had called a women’s conference which founded the Women’s International Democratic Federation (WIDF). The Soviet Union supported this new international women’s organization, seeing it as an opportunity to propagate the socialist
program for women’s liberation and supporting its access to UN consultative status (Weigand 2001: 46-64).

Socialist commitment to gender equality and analysis of the connections between sexism and capitalism intrigued many feminists, although few outside the socialist bloc accepted the Soviet Union’s claim to have ended women’s oppression. Nevertheless, such intellectual interest in communism meant that even anti-communist feminists in the US came under investigation and suspicion during the McCarthy era (Weigand 2001; Laville 2002: 102-111). Walt Disney testified to the House Committee on Un-American Activities that the League of Women Voters was a communist front, although a few days later when he checked his documents he apologized and said he actually meant the League of Women Shoppers. In similar confusion, League of Women Voters activist Anna Lord Strauss often found herself confused with communist activist Anna Louise Strong. The American WIDF affiliate, which included leading international activists such as Susan B. Anthony (Jr), had to close in 1950 after being forced to register as ‘subversive’ (Laville 2002: 105).

Both the State Department and CIA found allies in American women’s organizations, anti-communist leaders of which eagerly impressed upon US officials the dangers of Soviet influence in the international women’s organisations (Laville 2002, 114). Many US women activists distanced from international women’s organizations in the 1940s and 1950s, for example the US branch of the IAW quit the international organisation in 1950, having expressed dissatisfaction with its ‘feminist angle’ since the end of the war (Laville 2002: 56-59; 200). League leader Anna Lord Strauss had told British activist Margaret Corbett-Ashby that the ‘feminist angel of the IAW put US women off, in a letter dated 8 March 1949 (quoted in Laville 2002, 57). In the early
1950s, concerned about Soviet hegemony on ‘the women question’ the CIA secretly sponsored the ‘Committee of Correspondence,’ an organization of patriotic American women which held international conferences to ‘emphasize the favorable position of women in the free world’ as compared to under communism (Committee memorandum quoted in Laville 2002: 175). However, the Committee’s efforts did not meet with much success. A member admitted that on a trip to Europe she ‘felt at once a certain distrust and resentment of our communications. The criticisms were too much US propaganda, too obvious a campaign against the USSR’ while on a trip to Japan she found women there ‘agreed with our European friends that US propaganda was just as abhorrent to them as Communist propaganda’ (quoted in Laville 2002: 178, 188). In 1967, media revelations broke about covert CIA activity in NGOs including women’s NGOs, discrediting American women’s organizations (Agee 1975; Willetts 1996: 33-43, 41-42; Laville 2002: 171–192).

Championing women’s rights was one of the ways the Soviets intervened in developing countries: their linkage of ‘the woman question’ with problems of capitalism, imperialism, and racism attracted large national women’s organizations in poor countries (Ghodsee 2010: 5-6). During the Cold War, ‘women and development’ proved a vibrant field for international women’s NGOs active in the UN. In the early 1960s, the Soviets successfully argued at the Status of Women’s Commission that women’s full integration into economic development would eliminate discrimination and inequality. In 1970 the Assistant Director responsible for the Commission on the Status of Women noted it had ‘recast its programme of work giving less emphasis to “rights” and more to the “roles” of women.’ (Margaret Bruce in Connors 1996: 158). This approach embedded questions of women’s status in an analysis of economic relationships and broader political economy. The ‘women and development’ issue area formed the main focus of the Women’s Commission and expanding international women’s bureaucracy
in the 1970s and 1980s. UNIFEM launched in 1976 and funded burgeoning numbers of women’s NGOs to implement women and development projects. The question of ‘women’ became so firmly linked with economic development in the UN that the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), although technically a human rights instrument found its home with the Center for Social Development and Humanitarian Affairs in Vienna rather than the UN’s human rights offices in Geneva (Berkovitch 1999: 142).

Thus until the end of the twentieth century, UN debates about women’s status revolved around a critique of capitalism and militarism. According to Leticia Ramos Shahini, who served on the UN Women’s Commission during the decade on women from 1975-1985: ‘A constant topic of debate in the commission between those who came from the East and their Western counterparts was the superiority of women’s status in the Socialist bloc as against the advantages of women in market oriented economies’ (Shahini 2004: 28). A delegate from communist Romania proposed the idea that the UN host a women’s world conference in 1975, Mexico volunteered to host the conference and the Soviets threw themselves behind both the formal UN conference and parallel NGO conference. (Ghodsee 2010: 5). They wanted the conference to be a forum where women could debate neo-colonialism, capitalism, apartheid, racism, Zionism, and poverty. The US wanted to limit the agenda to questions of women’s legal equality in education, politics and so forth, fearing ‘anti-American speeches and resolutions’ (Ghodsee 2010: 5).

The Soviets linked women’s oppression with militarism and argued that women’s participation in politics would facilitate world peace, attempting to mobilize women’s NGOs to condemn US military intervention As Kristen Ghodsee points out, in the year of US withdrawal from Vietnam
article 29 of the Mexico women’s conference document reads like a critique of US military intervention in states turning to communism:

Peace requires that women as well as men should reject any type of intervention in the domestic affairs of States, whether it be openly or covertly carried on by other States or by transnational corporations. Peace also requires that women as well as men should also promote respect for the sovereign right of a State to establish its own economic, social and political system without undergoing political and economic pressures or coercion of any type (World Conference 1975: Article 29)

The Soviet position on this, and economic questions, appealed to many women from countries in the developing world which had grievances against the US.

US women delegates felt isolated at the Mexico women’s conference and did no better at the mid decade Copenhagen conference or the end of decade conference in Nairobi. The isolation of US feminists at the 1975 conference was not helped by a dictate from the State Department that the US delegation at the official conference should not speak to women from the Eastern Bloc even informally (Ghodsee 2010: 5-6). After the Soviets again led resolutions at the 1980 international Women’s Conference in Copenhagen condemning Zionism as racism and praising centrally planned economies for their achievements in advancing women’s participation in economic development and public life, US government representatives put extra effort into their preparation for the 1985 Nairobi conference (Ghodsee 2010: 7-9). They worked hard to keep questions of Zionism, racism and socialism off the agenda in Nairobi, providing financial assistance to Kenya for the costs of hosting the conference and appointing the President’s daughter, Maureen Regan, as one of the US delegates. US delegates at the official conference managed to keep the word Zionism out of the final conference document but could not forestall resolutions and debates over the links between capitalism, imperialism, and women’s oppression (Ghodsee 2010: 8-9).
During the UN decade on women, international women’s organizations rarely discussed sexual violence as an issue for the UN and thus the final documents of these three conferences do not highlight it. Indeed, in March 1975 Diane Russell along with other anti-sexual violence feminists organized an International Tribunal on Crimes against Women in Brussels, involving two thousand women from forty countries, as a counteraction to the 1975 UN Conference in Mexico, in which superpower politicking had dominated (Joachim 2003:255-256). The Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), another project of the UN women’s bureaucracy, failed to explicitly address questions of sexual violence or violence against women although the text underwent wide discussion by international women’s NGOs before finalization. While communist countries supported women’s economic advancement and participation in public life they did not back feminist attempts to politicize violence against women or sexual violence at the UN. Formerly, the Soviets opposed sexual violence and exploitation as a manifestation of capitalist oppression. The Bolsheviks had linked public and private sexual violence and exploitation, criminalizing both workplace sexual harassment and rape within marriage as early as 1922 (Juviler 1977: 245; Attwood, 1997: 100). Nevertheless, by the 1970s and 1980s when feminists in the non-communist world started mobilizing around sexual violence communists tended to dismiss such concerns as ‘bourgeois,’ peripheral to the more ‘fundamental’ class struggle (Boxer 2007).

Although Susan Brownmiller’s seminal Against Our Will linked war time rape, peace time rape, and domestic violence feminist anti-sexual violence politics only had an impact on mainstream politics and policy at the national level outside the communist world. Protesters against the Vietnam War and against US bases in Japan, Korea and the Philippines condemned military sexual violence. Feminists also analyzed the links between the growth of sex tourism to Asia and the presence of US military bases (Brownmiller 1975; Enloe 1988; Moon 1997: 34-35; 47). Yet
these political issues never made it onto the mainstream ‘women’s’ agenda at the UN. Women’s organizations could get little traction on questions of violence against women or sexual violence in the UN system. When a women’s legal group put forward a proposal to study forced prostitution the Commission on the Status of Women cautioned them that the UN did not want to pursue that issue (Barry 1979: 65). The Soviets and ‘Third World’ opposed investigations into forced prostitution as a kind of western imperialist monitoring and argued that apartheid in South Africa presented a more serious instance of modern slavery (Barry 1979: 63). Women’s organizations in the UN did make an attempt in 1985 to get a resolution at the UN General Assembly condemning violence against women which did not pass until reformulated as ‘domestic violence’ (Pietilä and Vickers 1996: 143).

International women’s NGOs and women’s bureaucracies in the UN had few resources or political support to document or politicize sexual violence during the Cold War. The human rights NGOs and activists did sometimes document rape alongside other forms of torture, but did not develop a gendered analysis of human rights violations. Thus, in 1971, rapes committed by Pakistani soldiers on Bengali women in Bangladesh only got attention from international feminists as an issue of abortion rights since the topics of unwanted children and family planning fit into the development field where women’s organizations had a voice (Brownmiller 1975: 80). The fields of human rights and security provided no such space for women to speak as women, and made no response to the rapes. In the late 1970s, the Indonesian Army’s mass rapes of women and girls in East Timor barely registered in the UN system although human rights monitors did record these rapes along with other atrocities (Chomsky and Herman 1979: 166). The Soviets did not use sexual violence as an issue with which to attack US foreign intervention. In the 1980s, neither Soviet women’s leaders nor UN NGOs raised sexual violence issues as relevant when the US supported the patriarchal Afghan Mujahideen against a modernizing
regime which promoted women’s rights (Moghadam 2005: 45). Nor did the US or pro-US feminists seek to expose Soviet hypocrisy on women’s issues by raising violence against women in the Soviet Union, or perpetrated by the Red Army. They could have pointed out, for instance, that the USSR purported to defend the rights of Afghan women while members of the Red Army used prostitutes and perpetrated rapes during the conflict, and Soviet women who served in the armed forces suffered sexual harassment and violence (Galeotti 2001: 41-42, 72).

Yet following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the US emerged not only as global hegemon but posing as champion in fighting violence against women. Joachim’s argument that ‘the US government assumed leadership on the issue [of violence against women]’ because of domestic feminist lobbying and because it ‘fit the world views and beliefs of the Clinton administration which was generally supportive of women’s issues’ seems somewhat naive in neglecting to analyse how the issue fit within US foreign policy in the post Cold War era (Joachim 2003:259). The question remains as to why only after 1989 new problems such as ‘trafficking in women,’ wartime rape, and domestic violence, became important to the women’s sector of the UN under the global hegemony of the United States; to understand this we need to understand how the violence against women issue fit with the US security agenda in the post Cold War era.

**Violence against Women and US Global Hegemony**

International policing of sexual violence forms part of the global democratic policing stance adopted by the United States and its allies since the collapse of the Soviet Union, a stance which links security with democracy and a market economy. Since 1980, the UN, NATO, IMF, World Bank, EU, OSCE, and humanitarian NGOs have also linked security with democracy and capitalist development. Such consensus about the meaning of democracy had never before been possible at the UN, yet today the UN agrees that democracy requires ‘periodic and genuine elections’ and concerns itself with monitoring elections and providing electoral assistance (Paris
2003: 446). NATO and its allies support a democracy building approach to security and discuss their military actions as ‘peace support’ operations that secure broader ‘peacekeeping’ efforts, usually co-ordinated by the UN. This theory of democratic peace posits that democratic states do not go to war with each other and thus a democratic world would be a peaceful world (Bellamy, Williams and Griffin 2004: 30-31).

NATO security analysts criminalize their military targets in the post Cold War order with the concept of ‘new wars’ which pit alliances of democratic state and non state actors against militia that control populations through mass human rights violations including rape and ethnic cleansing (Chappell and Evans 1997; Kaldor and Vashee 1997; Kaldor 1999; Brahimi et al. 2000; Bellamy, Williams and Griffin 2004: 169-173). In new wars discourse, the notion of ‘women’s human rights’ typically refers to women’s right to bodily integrity, rather than broader notions of social or economic rights. UN agencies often speak of ‘human rights violations’ against women almost as a euphemism for sexual violence, harassment and abuse. For example, a training manual reminds military peacekeepers that in post conflict situations: ‘Women with the loss of their male family members, are vulnerable to discrimination and are subject to human rights violations’ (DPKO 2001: 20). In the other words, women have lost male protection and may suffer sexual violence, harassment, or abuse. Speaking of these new forms of conflict, Kofi Annan commented that ‘A disturbing characteristic of these conflicts is the practice of deliberately targeting civilian populations – the majority being women and children’ (Annan 2002). By the end of the twentieth century, scholars had criticized this ‘new military humanism’ as justifying extraordinarily intrusive foreign military and policing interventions (Douzinas 2003: 171; Ignatieff 2003: 59, 70; Chomsky 1999, 2000: 49-50). Peacekeeping operations have proliferated since 1989: between 1989 and 2010 more than forty new operations were deployed, compared with only sixteen between 1948 and 1988. These post 1989 operations attempt to
oversee fundamental economic and political transformation (Chappell and Evans 1997: table 1; Bellamy Williams and Griffin 2004: Appendix).

A theory of security as linked to democracy and human rights allows global and regional military powers to claim an interest in the domestic affairs of other countries, including how they conduct their gender relations. If ‘women’s rights are human rights’ then violations of women’s human rights become an international security concern, subject to international monitoring and intervention. The Security Council first mentioned sexual violence in December 1992, declaring itself ‘appalled by reports of the massive, organized and systematic detention and rape of women, in particular Muslim women, in Bosnia and Herzegovina’ (Res 798). This observation formed part of the case for military intervention; reports of rape now routinely accompany foreign military intervention or calls for intervention. The Clinton administration ordered that the State Department begin documenting violations of women’s human rights in their human rights reporting, a practice that continues (Joachim 2003:260). The UN also began monitoring violence against women, in 1994 the UN General Assembly created a new post of special rapporteur to research gender based violence and the UN system began producing information on violence against women around the globe (Pietilä and Vickers 1996: 142-145; United Nations 1993, 1994, 1996a; 1996b, 1996c, UNHCR 1993). Following this trend, regional powers now also monitor and intervene in the gender relations of their neighbours: in the Pacific, the Australian and New Zealand police run training programs for police from Tonga, Samoa, the Cook Islands and Kiribati on dealing with domestic violence and they include domestic violence as an issue in their meetings with police from the region (PPDVP 2010; AFP 2010).

The reemergence of ‘trafficking in women’ as a ‘violence against women’ issue facilitated policing of the new illegal trade and migration routes in Europe and Central Asia that opened after the
collapse of the Soviet Union. The US and EU began pushing for a new International Convention on Transnational Organized Crime in the early 1990s. In 1995 Hilary Clinton met anti-trafficking activists at the UN Beijing Women’s Conference and began championing the issue; with Madeleine Albright she co-chaired the President’s Interagency Council on Women which worked on making sure the new International Convention included a Protocol that would address trafficking in women (Harrington 2010: 148). At the same time as the UN developed its new Protocol the US passed the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act (2000) which required the State Department to produce regular country reports on Trafficking in Persons (TiPs reports).

Such interventions represent global and regional powers as protectors of women rather than perpetrators of violence. Yet, contemporary peacekeeping interventions produce remarkably sexist expatriate cultures given their aims. An Australian English language teacher in Timor Leste described how ‘within the first five minutes of my landing’ the expatriate head of the project told her that she had come to ‘a man’s world’ (Appleby 2005: 165) Another noted that the gender ratio in the expatriate Dili community seemed to be ‘nine men to one woman’ and even men in civilian positions, such as journalists and NGO workers liked to don ‘little military outfits’ (Appleby 2005: 168). She remembered her time in Timor Leste as

probably one of the freakiest experience of my life … the whole bar scene, the pick up in the bars, like those World War II movies. And men, those truckloads of soldiers looking like predators, looking at us like predators. They’d drive past and I’d just look at them and think, when I was by myself and I’d think, thank god I’m not in one of the villages that you’re liberating! (Appleby 2005: 169).

Likewise Ben Johnston, described the private military contractor scene in Bosnia as ‘such a boys’ club because these guys are making so much money,’ (Hearings 2002: 28). Australian women international police also talked of peacekeeping operations as a ‘boys club’, of displays of ‘male
ego and macho bull crap’ in rivalry between Australian state and territory policy and the Federal police (Harris and Goldsmith 2010: 302). One woman police officer said

Missions have a tendency to bring out ‘old’ culture that, in my experience, has been greatly reduced in the AFP [Australian Federal Police], but will never cease to exist. This old culture (jobs for the boys, pack mentality, don’t rat on your mates, if nobody else sees it, it didn’t happen and so on) is still very much alive’ (Harris and Goldsmith 2010: 302).

Studies of Nordic male military peacekeepers show that volunteers imagine going on a peacekeeping mission as a great male adventure away from ‘civvy street’ and the world of women and family (Tallberg 2007: 74). According to Teemu Tallberg the Finnish peacekeepers he worked alongside as participant observer sought ‘expatriation and detachment from personal domestic networks’ (Tallberg 2007: 74). Likewise, Swedish peacekeepers in Gusafsson’s research speak of peacekeeping as a place to forge and deepen lifelong bonds of respect and loyalty with other men while carrying out high risk manly activities and making a lot of money (Gusafsson 2006; Tallberg 2009: 113). Peacekeepers from rich countries usually get paid extremely well while all peacekeepers enjoy access to the illegal markets that flourish in zones of recent or on-going military conflict.

The hegemonic conflation of women’s equality with ‘Western’ (or Northern) civilisation, and women’s oppression with an undeveloped ‘rest’ obscures US and European led international agency in violence against women. Commentators frequently assume that the lack of democratic development at peacekeeping sites makes normally civilized men ‘revert’ to the patriarchal norms of the society they aim to democratize. Thus an interviewee in Afghanistan said ‘Afghan culture seemed to rub off on them [male expatriates], it also made it difficult for women expats at times whilst I worked in Afghanistan. Male arrogance’ (Barrow 2009: 59). Similarly, Harris and Goldsmith argue that ‘distance from gendered social norms in the home country, location within a society that has different gender-based roles and expectations, and a male dominated
international deployment’ produced the sexist behavior of International Australian Police. (Harris and Goldsmith 2010: 303).

Understood in this context, Resolution 1325 tacitly recognizes the problem of peacekeeping operations’ hegemonic masculine culture and represents gender mainstreaming as the solution. Gender mainstreaming, properly implemented, would require critical scrutiny of all policy and programs to assess potential impact on equality between men and women. Resolution 1325 has origins in joint research on ‘Gender and UN Peacekeeping’ conducted by the Lessons Learned Unit at the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations along with the Office of the Special Adviser on Gender Issues. The findings of their series of case studies formed the focus of discussion at a workshop in Namibia on 31 May 2000, resulting in the Windhoek Declaration and the Namibia Plan of Action on ‘Mainstreaming a Gender Perspective in Multidimensional Peace Support Operations’ of October 2000 (Carey 2001: 51). Following the Windhoek Declaration, an NGO Working Group on ‘Women, Peace and Security’ set about winning Security Council authority for the Namibia Plan by getting through a Security Council Resolution on the question (NGO Working Group 2010). Resolution 1325 passed the following October during Namibia’s one month term as president (Tryggestad 2009: 547).

Implementation of 1325 largely depends upon country-level commitment to making changes in the composition and conduct of their security services. International legal experts differ as to whether UN member states must abide by Security Council Resolutions, in practice states do not treat them as binding and it is up to feminist NGOs to hold their states to the commitments they make at the UN (Tryggestad 2009: 544). Since passing 1325 the Security Council has continued to remain, in the words of the Resolution ‘actively seized of the matter’ by issuing Presidential Statements requesting reports that review implementation. The Working Group for Women
Peace and Security also monitor implementation and publish shadow reports critiquing the pace and limitations of the process. In 2006 CEDAW began referencing compliance with 1325 in its country reporting sessions (Hudson 2009: 62-63). Such monitoring doubtless ensures that most peacekeeping missions now incorporate gender officer positions and have sexual exploitation and abuse reporting procedures. Furthermore, at the national level, troop contributing countries work, albeit with limited success, to recruit and retain women in the security forces as the UN repeatedly calls for more female peacekeepers. Feminists have developed gender training resources and numerous security officials involved in peacekeeping have attended gender training sessions. NGOs invoke the authority of 1325 in order to attract support for gender equality projects (Barrow 2009). Resolution 1325 reflects the tensions arising from the depth of feminist advocates’ engagement with new forms of global democratic policing.

CONCLUSION

Social movement theorists provide celebratory accounts of feminist transnational advocacy networks’ success in putting violence against women onto the mainstream security agenda. While not denying that activist efforts made a difference, the transformed agenda of UN women’s bureaucracies and NGOs in the late twentieth century largely reflects the end of Cold War super power rivalry and the emergence of the US as unrivaled global hegemon. The US stance as global champion, defending women against violence, obscures the extent to which super power and regional power interventions allow new forms of violence against women to flourish at sites of military and political intervention in the name of democracy and human rights. Resolution 1325 reflects the tensions arising from the depth of feminist advocates’ engagement with new forms of global democratic policing.

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