

**Dovish Presidents and Hawkish Prime Ministers?
Elite Accountability and the Use of Force**

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1. Introduction

The existence of a democratic peace, that is a difference between the conflict behavior of democratic and non-democratic states, is a widely accepted empirical fact.¹ But while a literature of monumental size has investigated the difference in the willingness of democracies and autocracies to fight, only a handful of studies examine variation within the democratic community. Considering that democracies show a great degree of variation, which may influence their conflict behavior (Manin et al. 1999, 19; Maoz and Russett 1993), this appears to be a serious omission. The few studies that examine the conflict engagement or war-proneness of democracies suffer from a lack of careful conceptualization of democratic regime type and systematic thinking on how institutional variables relate to each other. Unsurprisingly, the literature is ridden with contradictory results.

Therefore, any studies that would wish to meaningfully contribute to the debate on the possible variation in the conflict behavior of democracies must canvass and build on the comparative literature to a much greater degree. As most previous research, this study captures variation among democracies along the concept of accountability. But unlike other studies, this paper uses O'Donnell's (1998, 2003) differentiation between vertical and horizontal accountability as a starting point. While I do not wish to dispute the importance of elections or vertical accountability in crisis behavior, I will concentrate on the effect of horizontal accountability. I first adapt the idea of horizontal accountability – i.e. the control of some state agents over other state agents – for use beyond presidential democracies and, thus, introduce the concept of 'elite accountability'. Then I differentiate between two types of elite accountability – constitutional and political – on the basis of how institutions relate to electoral accountability. In this process, I use the constitutional dimension of elite accountability to call attention to the importance of intra-executive relations besides the more frequently discussed executive-legislative relations.

I assume that chief executives are the main actors for whom staying in power is an important motivation. While electoral accountability ensures in democracies that leaders do not fight out of whim as autocratic leaders may do, constitutional and political constraints will differentiate between the war-proneness of democracies. I posit that united and collegial executives are the most likely to fight, because chief executives in such systems face a constant threat to their jobs. I also argue that political constraints have different effect under different constitutional arrangements.

In this paper I only test the influence of the constitutional dimension, examining the effect of separation of powers and monocratism on the use of force. Using logit analysis, I find that examining the whole period of 1945-1994, neither variables are significant determinants of the use of force. However, when examining the 1945-1974 and the 1975-1994 periods separately, both variables are significant determinants of conflict behavior. However, the direction of the relationship of the variables are different in the two periods. In the pre-1975 era, monocratism has a positive influence on the use of force as expected, but effect of the separation of powers is negative. In the post-1975 years, separation of powers is positively related to the use of force as predicted, but monocratism is negatively related to the use of force. Thus between 1945-1974, the most war-prone regimes are separated-collegial while in 1975-1994 united-single headed regimes are most likely to use force.

The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature. Using the concept of political accountability, section 3 offers a new conceptualization of democratic regimes. Section 4 outlines the hypothesis, by specifying the mechanism that links accountability to foreign policy outcomes. Sections 5 and 6 discuss the data and the results, respectively. Section 7 concludes.

2. Democratic Regime Types and War

There is an almost unanimous agreement about the validity of the democratic peace proposition – at least in its dyadic form (e.g. Leeds and Davis 1999, Maoz and Russett 1993, Oneal

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et. al. 1996; Goldsmith 2006; Levy 1994, 452). That is, democracies are more peaceful *vis-à-vis* each other although not necessarily more peaceful than autocracies.

No such clear agreement has come forth about the causal mechanism that links regime type to conflict behavior (Prins 2003, 68; Maoz and Russett 1993, 791; Starr 1997, 154; Morgan and Campbell 1991, 188; Layne 1994). So far, research has validated two explanatory mechanisms to account for the peacefulness of democracies: a structural (e.g. Bueno de Mesquita et. al. 1999; Weitsman and Schambaugh 2002; Prins 2003; Prins and Sprecher 1999; Morgan and Campbell 1991) and a normative one (e.g. Owen 1994; Dixon 1994). While not wishing to contest the validity of the normative explanation, because of the very subject of this inquiry – the influence of institutional mechanisms – this paper belongs with and contributes to the structural literature.

Development of a more nuanced structural explanation so far has been hindered by a simplistic conceptualization of regime type. The difference among political regimes has often been depicted to be uni-dimensional in nature (see e.g. Mansfield and Snyder 1995, Barbieri 1996; Oneal et. al. 1996; Leeds and Davis 1999; Dixon 1994). More crucially, regime type has been viewed as a dichotomous distinction between democracies and autocracies (or free and non-free polities) (Reiter and Tillman 2002, 812). Consequently, even studies that allowed for a scale measure of regime type could only see regimes as having either more or less of some basic feature(s), such as competitiveness or freedom.

In other words, the normative drive to find out whether democracies are qualitatively different from autocracies in their international behavior came at the price of lumping all democracies together (Reiter and Tillmann 2002, 812). The assumption of uniformity has effectively cast a veil over the empirical reality, that is, that in-class variation among regimes is at least as large as within class variation (Manin et al. 1999, 19). However, if democracies are different, their war-proneness may also differ (Maoz and Russett 1993; Manin et al. 1999, 19).

The few conflict studies that have recognized and also set out to investigate the variation among democracies base their structural account on differentiating between states on the bases of variation in accountability mechanisms (Auerswald 1999, 469-71). While this is a fruitful starting point, past studies suffer from an inappropriate canvassing of the accountability literature and the hasty application of the concept. The result is the investigation of a great number of variables: the degree of consensus (i.e. majoritarian vs. consensus democracies, Schjølset 1996), separation of powers (or presidentialism vs. parliamentarism, Reiter and Tillman 2002; Leblang and Chan 2003; Clark and Nordstrom 2005), legislative parity (Morgan and Campbell 1991), and the size of popular participation at elections (Reiter and Tillman 2002; Clark and Nordstrom 2005). Research (Prins and Sprecher 1999; Ireland and Gartner 2001) that concentrates on a subgroup of democracies – parliamentary systems – add government type (single-party vs. multi-party; see also Clark and Nordstrom 2005), the size of the government's majority (including minority governments i.e. negative majorities and electoral system), government polarization or the number parties in the coalition, and the electoral system (see also Leblang and Chan 2003) to the list of variables studied.

Yet, the relationship of these variables to each other has not been made clear before their effect on conflict behavior has been hypothesized. The best effort belongs to Clark and Nordstrom (2005) who, similarly to my argument below, recognize the difference between structural (constitutional) and dynamic (political) factors. However, when drawing their hypothesis they do not consider that the latter may be dependent on the former. Furthermore, they do not distinguish between elite and popular accountability and while they make much out of executive-legislative relations, they do not account for variation within the executive as they elaborate on their constitutional features.

The outcome of the failure of studies to adequately canvass the relationship of variables to each other is what Schedler (1999) warns against in using the concept of accountability for research: in the absence of a conceptual anchor, this research program downs in the sea of variables. Findings are confusing to the extent that they are not easily comparable. When compared, they

outright contradict each other. Discussing what Clark and Nordstrom (2005) called constitutional accountability, Reiter and Tillman (2002) conclude that mixed regimes are more war prone than pure presidential and parliamentary democracies that behave similarly. Auerswald (1999) finds that domestically strong presidents are the most likely to use force. Contradicting both, neither Leblang and Chan (2003) nor Morgan and Campbell (1991) find the separation of powers/legislative parity to be related to conflict involvement.

Political factors lend themselves to similarly contradictory results. According to Prins and Sprecher (1999) coalition governments are more likely to reciprocate conflict than single-party governments. Auerswald (1999) argues for the opposite and others (Ireland and Gartner 2001; Leblang and Chan 2003) do not find meaningful difference between single-party and coalition governments. Minority governments may (Prins and Sprecher 1999) or may not (Ireland and Gartner 2001) be more war-prone than majority governments. Finally, the electoral system has been found to be related (Leblang and Chan 2003) and unrelated (Ireland and Gartner 2001) to conflict behavior. Combining these two dimensions, Clark and Nordstrom (2005) concludes that the most war-prone government is the least constrained that is, single-party majority cabinets.

Only a few results have not been contested and often because no other studies have investigated the same variables. First, consensus democracies appear to be more peaceful than majoritarian democracies (Schjølset 1996). Second, increasing participation at the elections (Reiter and Tillman 2002; Clark and Nordstrom 2005) and the increasing number of parties in the governing coalition (Prins and Sprecher 1999) decrease the likelihood of conflict.

Using O'Donnell's (1998, 2003) concept of horizontal accountability, the literature that has been built around it, as well as Clark and Nordstrom's (2005) differentiation between constitutional and political accountability, I continue with the definition of elite accountability and its constituting elements.

3. A Classification of Democratic Accountability Structures

3.1. Elite Accountability

Similarly to earlier studies, I use the concept of accountability in order to distinguish between democracies. Here accountability is understood as a mechanisms of control, that is, a relationship in which one agent is able to exercise control over another (Lupia 2003). Such control does not only include an assessment about the appropriateness of both substantive policies or the policy-making process, but it also brings judgment on the personal qualities of political actors – most notably chief executives (Schedler 1999, 22).

For a long time, democratic accountability was identified with elections or electoral accountability. This is understandable. When seen in contrast to non-democracies, a distinguishing feature of democracies is that rulers are selected through (free, fair and competitive) elections (Manin et al. 1999, 4-5). However, elections happen only periodically, which leaves officials quite a wide latitude to act in between elections (O'Donnell 1998; 2003).²

It is precisely this that O'Donnell (1998; 2003) identified as the basic problem of new democracies. Similarly to old or established democracies, they hold regular elections. But unlike established democracies, mechanisms that would control those in power in between elections are non-existent or ineffectual. That is, there are means other than electoral accountability to make the government act in a representative manner in between elections (O'Donnell 1998, 2003; Manin et al. 1999, 19). O'Donnell (1998, 2003) summarizes these mechanisms under the term, horizontal accountability. Horizontal accountability denotes the control of state agents by other state agents in order to screen out unlawful omissions by the means of sanctions, oversight and impeachment (O'Donnell 1998, 2003; Kenney 2003).

² As this paper focuses on elite accountability, it does not discuss the effect of elections on the use of force, which has been subject to a large body of research (see e.g. Auerswald 1999; Gaubatz 1991; Morgan and Bickers 1992; Wang 1996; James and Oneal 1991).

Elite accountability is rooted in the idea of one group of the political elite overseeing another, but in many ways it is a much broader concept than horizontal accountability. First, it makes the notion of horizontal accountability applicable beyond presidential democracies. Horizontal accountability has been developed with presidential democracies in mind and is not easily applicable to other democracies (Kenney 2003; Schedler 1999, 24). As opposed to this elite accountability can be applied to all democratic regime types. Second, it also differs from horizontal accountability in that it does not wish to imply a lateral relationship of quasi-equal actors. State agents controlling one another are not necessarily equally strong (Schedler 1999; Strøm 2003). In addition, while O'Donnell (1998, 2003) limits horizontal accountability to screening out illegal behavior, the notion of elite accountability also pertains to the legal *albeit* often politicized arena of elite interaction. Accountability has an inherently political dimension where agents limit each other because of diverging opinion about the appropriate nature of the substance of policies. However, this is not only true for parliamentary democracies, as Kenney (2003) argues, but also for presidential ones. To see the point, it is enough to think of presidential impeachment, which has been instituted to screen out unlawful behavior but is a highly political process in many countries (Baumgartner and Kada 2003).

All in all, I prefer the term elite accountability to describe sanctioning mechanisms by which one part of the political elite controls another in order to make it act according to what they believe is the proper policy to pursue. While this definition includes both legally and politically motivated control, it does not presuppose a division of executive and legislative powers as horizontal accountability does (Schedler 1999). Thus, it also leaves open the door to a framework in which one executive agent holds accountable another (cf. Kenney 2003) as opposed to O'Donnell's (1998; 2003) conceptualization of horizontal accountability that only pertained to one branch of government controlling another. This is crucial in order to move beyond the examination of elite control in presidential democracies. Finally, an important limitation is in order. Elite accountability stops short at the boundaries of government, encompassing executive, legislative and possibly judicial politics (not discussed here), but not pertaining to the bureaucracy (cf. Schedler 1999, 22).

Elite accountability has two constitutive dimensions: one constitutional – one political. Breaking elite accountability down this way is similar to Clark and Nordstrom's (2005) categorization of accountability. Clark and Nordstrom (2005) asserts that institutional constraints should be differentiated on the basis of flexibility. Thus, they develop the constitutional and the dynamic dimensions of constraints. The former depicts “constitutional constraints that shape the rules and structures of decision making” and the latter is “the outcomes of the constitutionally defined political process” (Clark and Nordstrom 2005).

While this is a useful point of departure, several modifications are in order. First, Clark and Nordstrom (2005) define both electoral and elite (legislative) accountability as part of these dimensions. In the present framework, the constitutional and political dimensions strictly relate to elite control. Second, even though flexibility distinguishes between these the constitutional and political aspects, flexibility is not a very useful conceptual anchor.

Instead, these dimensions differ in their relationship to electoral accountability. I argue that political accountability is related to both constitutional and electoral accountability. The *constitutional* dimension lays down the basic decision making structure of a state and is independent of the electoral dimension. It does presuppose the existence of an electoral dimension – that is, democracy – and defines where the public has a say in political issues, but its existence or its variation does not depend on the outcome of electoral accountability. The *political* dimension of elite accountability varies in the short run, because institutions only define the broad framework and leave much space for variation as a result of public preferences. Thus, the political dimension is based not only on popular preferences about who should govern, but also constitutional features.

Finally Clark and Nordstrom (2005) appear to suggest that the *political* dimension is an outcome of electoral accountability and does not consider the interaction of constitutional and

political features. As I will discuss it below, the effect of the same political constellation is expected to produce different outcomes in different constitutional configurations.

3.2. *Constitutional Accountability*

The constitutional dimension has two constitutive elements: executive-legislative relations, which has already been considered in defining foreign policy behavior (e.g. Reiter and Tillman 2002; Leblang and Chan 2003; Clark and Nordstrom 2005), and the internal structure of the executive. Regarding executive-legislative relations, the spectrum runs from separated to united regimes. Accountability in political systems that lack separation of powers take the form of a chain, where the assembly is accountable to the public, and the executive, to the assembly (Strøm 2003, 71). In separated systems, both branches are independently elected by the people and elite accountability is made possible by the existence of mechanisms of checks and balances.

In addition, the hands of the chief policy-maker may be tied by his/her colleagues, as well. Executives based on collegiality institute a mechanism of intra-executive control where cabinet members and the chief executive can mutually sanction each other with job loss. This necessitates that the chief executive seeks the consent of the cabinet for policies – especially for very risky ones such as the use of force. At the other end of the spectrum stand systems lacking collegial control. In other words, the chief executive's power is unrivaled in the executive branch, because members of the cabinet depend on him for survival, but they cannot endanger the survival of the chief executive.

Such conceptualization of democratic regimes touches upon an unresolved debate in comparative politics about the differences between presidential and parliamentary democracies. Researchers agree in that separation of powers distinguish between presidential (separated) and parliamentary (united) regimes. However, there is a dispute as to whether intra-executive relations or monocratism should (Lijphart 1999, 117; Rockman 1997, 48, 51) or should not (Shugart and Carey 1992, 21; Cheibub 2007) be part of the classification. Democratic peace (Reiter and Tillman 2002; Leblang and Chan 2003; Clark and Nordstrom 2005) research so far followed Shugart and Carey's (1992) recommendation. My hypotheses follows Lijphart (1999) and Rockman's (1997) position and I use the term 'presidential' to refer to single-headed and separated regimes while 'parliamentary' is a synonym for collegial-unitary regimes in the rest of this paper. Nonetheless, statistical testing allows for examining the effect of either and both of these dimensions on conflict behavior and contribute to this debate.

3.3. *Political Accountability*

Some scholars (Prins and Sprecher 1999; Ireland and Gartner 2001) consider factors beyond constitutional accountability, including coalition type, majority size, and the number of parties in the government. These belong to what I have called the *political* dimension of elite accountability. On the one hand, this dimension mediates the outcome of elections, turning it into a political configuration. That is to say, while the people have a say as to what party or parties they prefer, the political dimension captures how public preferences have been transformed into a governing reality. On the other hand, the effect of the political dimension is mediated through the *constitutional* dimension of accountability, which suggests that they will yield different results under different constitutional mechanisms.

The dimension of actual political constraints is closest to Haggard and McCubbins' (2001) concept of the separation of purpose, that is, the idea that “different parts of the government are motivated to seek different goals” (2001, 3), which may, for example, be the case in separated regimes in the form of divided government or in united regimes as minority governments (Haggard and McCubbins 2001, 3-4). However, political accountability differs from Haggard and McCubbins' (2001) understanding of separation of purpose in that the latter is dynamic in theory, but static in the actual categorization of regimes.³ In my conceptualization, political constraints

³ For instance, Haggard and McCubbins' (2001) describe the United Kingdom as united with respects to both the

remain dynamic, which changes following the actual political situation. Figure 1 visualizes the elements of elite accountability and their relationship to electoral accountability.

FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE

4. Hypotheses

4.1. Background Assumptions

Before hypothesizing about what kind of foreign policy behavior these accountability structures are likely to lead to, it is necessary to explicate the two background assumptions that the typology of accountability above, the following mechanisms and, consequently, propositions rest upon. First, since foreign policy – especially the kind that may result in the use of force – is primarily in the domain of the executive, the effect of institutional features are construed from the perspective of the chief executive officer. Second, I subscribe to the notion (e.g. Shugart and Carey 1992, 14; Reiter and Tillman 2002, 812; Auerswald 1999, 470) that office-seeking is an ever present political motivation: even politicians who primarily wish to realize a political program must successfully compete for and maintain power if they are serious about achieving their preferred policies.

However, as opposed to the democratic peace literature (e.g. Auerswald 1999; Maoz and Russett 1993; Reiter and Tillman 2002), I do not assume that democratic leaders would engage in risky foreign policies, such as uses of force, if they face less accountability. Instead, chief executives are treated as profit-maximizers. Besides fighting wars of survival that any governments are likely to fight regardless of regime type, chief executives are only expected to use force if they see it as a way to enhance their political standing or at least not worsen it. That is to say, they are not expected to risk a fight just because they are not entirely restrained from doing so. They are likely to view the use of force favorable under certain conditions, namely when they are unpopular and the likelihood of job loss is high prior to a foreign policy situation. In such situations, chief executives are likely to become risk-acceptant.⁴

4.2. Explaining the Effect of Accountability

Of course, peacefulness requires some level of constraints in order to inhibit state behavior and distinguish between democracies and non-democracies. It is popular or electoral accountability that makes this distinction. Politicians act under the scrutiny of the public and are penalized at elections if they step over the line. As opposed to this, elite accountability is expected to increase conflict behavior in the international arena.

This suggests that presidents, who in the field of foreign policy (but not necessarily at other policy areas) only face popular accountability, are expected to be the more peaceful in their conduct. In ideal type presidential regimes, presidents are masters of their own house, having unquestionable authority over the cabinet. Because they are elected directly, they enjoy a fixed term of office and because the legislature cannot remove presidents easily and only with much delay, presidents enjoy great freedom to act. The power of the legislature is mainly limited to functions, such as ratifying treaties,⁵ which are rarely the solutions to conflicts of the magnitude that carry at least the threat of the use of force (Wallensteen and Sollenberg 2000). This conceptualization of presidential power – but not behavioral patterns drawn from them – is consistent with that of Maoz and Russett (1993, 626) and Auerswald (1999, 477) but is contrary to Reiter and Tillman's account (2002, 815).

Since parliamentary democracies face both electoral accountability and strict elite control,

separations of powers and purpose at all times.

⁴ This proposition is based on prospect theory that differentiates between risk-behavior in the domain of losses where people are risk-takers (~the use of force here) and the domain of gains where they are risk-averse (Kahneman and Tversky 1979, 1984).

⁵ Declaration of war could be another legislative prerogative, but it has long gone out of fashion.

they are expected to be more war prone. Unlike presidents, prime ministers face much stricter constraints, because they are accountable to the political elite not just the electorate. Not only prime ministers but also their whole cabinet are responsible to the assembly, which even under strong – prime ministerial – parliamentary government makes the game different from presidential ones. Unlike presidents, prime ministers cannot survive without maintaining the support of the parliament and their colleagues. If prime ministers do not please their parliamentary majority, they can lose the confidence of the assembly.

Ensuring and maintaining the support of cabinet colleagues is also crucial for prime ministers i.e. collegial executives. Dissatisfaction among ministers can fuel and provide leadership for parliamentary revolt. More importantly, cabinet members can unseat the prime minister even without endangering the party's or coalition's majority in parliament. All they have to do to outfox the prime minister is to build an alliance among themselves and in opposition to the premier. All in all, prime ministers need some measure of agreement (be it simple majority, consensus, or simply no explicit disapproval) within the executive branch and, thus, are required to bargain with their cabinet the way presidents are not (Rockman 1997, 48; Peters 1997, 69).

The enhanced job uncertainty of prime ministers predestines them to seize opportunities that could help prove their leadership abilities. Using force or being at war is typically a situation where chief executives can (hope to) demonstrate their qualifications and their ability to perform under pressure. In other words, they are more likely to divert attention from domestic politics to enhance their standing among the elite and the population than presidents.

This explanation of how accountability constrains or propels state behavior departs from the conventional conceptualization of the effect of democratic constraints on the use of force (e.g. Reiter and Tillman 2002, Prins and Sprecher 1999, Ireland and Gartner 2001, Schjølset 1996, Leblang and Chan 2003; Auerswald 1999; Clark and Nordstrom 2005). That is to say, some level of constraints is necessary to inhibit the behavior of states. However, when decision-makers face too much control from other members of the political elite, i.e. when the possibility of being ejected from office drastically increases, the use of force becomes more attractive. Thus, use of force appears as an opportunity to demonstrate the resolve of the chief executive as a decisive and capable leader, rally the public – and, thus the elite – behind him and, therefore, relieve uncertainty over his job for a short time.⁶

4.3 Hypotheses on the Constitutional Aspect of Elite Accountability

The mechanism outlined above and the conceptualization of regime types along a scale suggests that presidential democracies are the most peaceful. Taking into account that constitutional accountability has been defined along two dimensions, I expect to find the following:

H1 (separation of powers): The more separated a regime, the less likely it is to use force.

H2 (monocratism): The less collegial intra-executive relations, the less likely the use force.

4.4. Hypotheses on the Political Aspect of Elite Accountability

The political dimension of elite accountability has been conceptualized as the institutional outcome of popular preferences expressed at elections – legislative elections, in particular. It has also been described as dependent on constitutional accountability. In other words, I anticipate that they have diverging effect under single-headed separated (presidential) and collegial-united (parliamentary) democracies.

⁶ The rationale behind this is similar to the argument of the political use of force literature that advances the argument that politicians use force in order to rally the public behind them and, thus, increase their (fading) political support (e.g. Pickering and Kisangani 2005; Davies 2002; DeRouen 2000; Morgan and Bickers 1992; Ostrom and Job 1986; Stoll 1984). However, the present framework may be able to explain, why the testing of political use of force hypothesis with regard to almost only presidential systems has produced unconvincing results.

Temporary variables are only expected to insert influence when they increase the threat of job loss for the chief executive. No matter what the dynamics is in the assembly, the job security of presidents will not be affected between elections. Besides initiating the arduous process of impeachment, assemblies cannot democratically remove presidents. As opposed to this, for prime ministers, it is vital that parliamentary dynamics runs in their favor. Having a majority in the assembly – and the bigger the better – is, thus, crucial for prime ministers but only useful for presidents. Therefore, I expect that the political dimension only affects the use of force under parliamentary regimes.

H3: The smaller the majority of the government (chief executive) in parliamentary democracies the more likely it is to use force.

However, even a large majority might mean a threat to the position of a prime minister in case of a divided parliamentary coalition. In other words, one-party parliamentary majorities are less likely to threaten the survival of the prime minister in office. At the minimum, the deputies of the governing party have a larger vested interest to stay in power than minor coalition partners.

H4: A single party government in parliamentary democracies is likely to be more peaceful than multi-party coalition governments.

5. Research Methods

This article covers the 1945-1994 period. The outer limit was determined by data availability, as the monocratism variable runs only until 1994. I will run tests not only for the whole period, but also for the periods of 1945-1974 and 1975-1994. My argument is that by 1975 important changes occurred in factors that may influence conflict behavior. It was around 1975 that most colonial struggles ended and colonies won their independence, which introduces a systemic change that may be important in determining conflict behavior especially, because colonial powers tended to be unitary and collegial democracies (on imperialism and war, see e.g. Goldsmith and He 2008). At the same time, there was a huge growth in the number of democracies. By the end of the third wave of democratization in 1975, Huntington (1991, 12) counts 30 stable democracies. The Polity data I use puts this number to 35.⁷ This meant a doubling of democracies, which – given systemic change – might have given rise to democracies with different outlook and approach to conflict than what stable democracies owned in earlier periods.

I use directed and politically active dyads (Quackenbush 2006) in which democracies were the initiators of the use of force. Variables were extracted with the help of the *EUGene* 3.202 software (Bennett and Stam 2000).

The data is arranged as time-series (year), cross-section (dyad). Since the dependent variable is binary, I use logit analysis with random effects model.⁸ I follow the recommendation of Beck, Katz, and Tucker (1998) and, in order to avoid bias due to autocorrelation, add peace years and three cubic spline variables when estimating my model.

5.1 Dependent Variable

The dependent variable is binary: use of force (=1) vs. no use of force (=0). In conceptualizing

⁷ Of which 6 are separated; 4, mixed; 25, united. In contrast with this in 1945 the total number of democracies are 16 (2, 3, and 11, respectively).

⁸ Although fixed effects model is recommended in order to deal with the non-independence of observations within dyads, it also leads to dropping important variables that (almost) invariant within cross-sections (i.e. contiguity). In order to preserve these variables, and thus, make my findings comparable to other studies in the literature, I use the random effects model (Green et al. 2001; Beck and Katz 2001; King 2001; Kristensen and Wawro 2007).

this variable, I rely on the overall dispute hostility level (MZHOST) variable of the *Correlates of War* (COW) dataset where the use of force equals crisis intensity levels 4 and 5 (Ghosn et al 2004; Ghosn and Bennett 2003).

5.2 Independent Variables

5.2.1 Democracy

Democracies are defined on the basis of the POLITY2 score of the Polity IV database. The POLITY2 variable was recoded into a dummy: democracies (=1) and non-democracies (=0). I use the conventional cut-off point suggested in the codebook: democracies are polities with a seven or greater POLITY2 score (Marshall and Jaggers 2006).

5.2.2 Separation of Powers

Separation of powers is an ordinal variable where three categories have been defined: separated (=1), mixed (=2), and united (=3). Categorization is based on Derbyshire and Derbyshire (1996, 39-86) with a few minor exceptions. I treat Austria and Bulgaria as mixed regimes rather than parliamentary (~united) and Switzerland, South Africa and Botswana are also coded as mixed instead of being categorized as presidential (~separated). Furthermore, as Derbyshire and Derbyshire (1996) records regime type at one point in time, coding was expanded to cover the whole 1975-1994 period, which caused changes in the coding of a few countries that switched from one configuration to another over time (France, Sri Lanka, Nigeria, Uruguay and Gambia).

5.2.3 Monocratism

Monocratism measures the degree of independence of the chief executive within the executive branch. The measure for monocratism (MONO) is extracted from the Polity III database (Jaggers and Gurr 1996). Monocratism is a scale variable running from pure individual executives (=1) to collegial executives (=5), where 3 represents 'qualified individual' and 2 and 4 are intermediate categories.

5.3. Control Variables

To control for spuriousness, I include control variables most often used in the democratic peace literature: power status, capabilities, geographical contiguity, alliance patterns, and economic prosperity (Goldsmith 2006, 534; Maoz and Russett 1993, 626-627).

5.3.1 Power Status

Major powers are more likely to fight (e.g. Small and Singer 1982; Russett and Oneal 2001). Major power status is assigned on the basis of the MAJPOW variable of the COW database (Ghosn et al. 2004). This dummy takes the value of 1 if at least one party in the dyad is a major power.

5.3.2 Capabilities

Democracies are likely to pick weaker opponents (Peceny et al. 2002; Werner 2000). I use the Composite Index of National Capabilities (CINC) of COW (Ghosn et al. 2004). I take the difference between the capabilities of the initiator and the target state. The variable is lagged with one year.

5.3.3 Geographical Contiguity

Neighboring polities are the most likely to fight (e.g. Bremer 1992; Goldsmith 2006). The data on geographical proximity of states is based on the CONTIG variable of COW (Ghosn et al. 2004). I follow Goldsmith (2006, 540) in recoding CONTIG into a dummy variable (1 = shared land border or closer than 150 miles by sea; 0 = everything else).

5.3.4 Alliance Patterns

While alliance patterns seem an important determinant of conflict behavior, the influence of alliances on using force is disputed. Bueno de Mesquita (1981), Bremer (1992) find that allies are more likely to fight each other than pure chance would predict. However, this relationship often turns into a negative one in a multivariate environment (Bremer 1992; Vasquez 2000). Alliance patterns, i.e. whether the two parties in a dyad were allied, are measured by the dummied ALLIANCE variable of the COW database (Ghosn and Bennett 2003) where 1 equals ALLIANCE categories 1 (=defense pact), 2 (=neutrality), and 3 (entente). Zero equals ALLIANCE category 4 (=no agreement) (e.g. Russett and Oneal 2001, 101-4).

5.3.5 Economic Prosperity

Economic prosperity is measured as real GDP per capita. I use the RDGPL variable of the Penn World Table 6.1 (Heston et al. 2002). The data is in USD and the base year is 1996. Economic prosperity measures the difference between the GDP per capita of the initiator and the target state. The logic behind this is the same as the one behind capabilities. The greater the difference between the economic strength of a democracy and another state, the more likely a democracy is to attack.

5.3.6. Regime Type of the Target

The dyadic version of democratic peace predicts that democracies are more peaceful than autocracies *vis-à-vis* each other but not when they face autocracies. As in case of the democracy variable, I use the POLITY2 variable and the same cut-off point to dummy the regime type of the target state. The target state is coded 1 if it is a democracy ($POLITY2 \geq 7$) and 0 if the target state is an autocracy ($POLITY2 < 7$).

6. Results

I test only H1 and H2 in this paper for three time periods: 1945-1994, 1945-1974, and 1975-1994. In each period model 1 tests the the effect of separation of powers on the use of force. Model 2 test the effect of monocratism on the use of force, and model 3 includes both the separation of powers and the monocratism variable. Results are shown in tables 1 (1945-1994), 2 (1945-1974), and 3 (1975-1975).

6.1. Control variables

In general the sign of the relationship between control variables and the use of force is as expected. Larger differences in capabilities results in a greater statistical likelihood of fighting wars across time-periods and models, which provides further evidence for the findings of Peceny et al. (2002) and Werner (2000). As could be expected, contiguity is positively associated with the use of force and is significant in almost all of the models regardless of the time period examined. In line with Bueno de Mesquita (1981) and Bremer's (1992) findings, I find that allies are more likely to fight each other than non-allied states. However this result only gains significance in half of the models and, notably, in the 1975-1994 period (but not in the 1945-1975 period). While dyadic democratic peace, i.e. that democracies are less likely to fight other democracies than autocracies, finds support for the whole period under examination and in the 1945-1974 era. In the post-1975 period, p values are relatively close to the .05 level of significance ($p=.06$ and $p=0.61$ for models 2 and 3), but remain insignificant. Major power status is positively associated with the use of force, but remains an insignificant determinant of the dependent variable. Economic prosperity shows the least consistency. The relationship with the use of force is only in the predicted (positive) direction in the 1945-1975 period, but only gains significance for 1975-1994, when the relationship turns into a negative one.

6.2. Constitutional Features

Before turning to the results, it is important to note that levels 4 and 5 (purely collegial executives) of the monocratism variable has very few or no cases at all. This is a serious problem, in the whole 1945-1975 and particularly acute in the post-1975 years. Therefore, I decided to drop the few cases that exist and draw conclusions for regimes ranging from single-headed to qualified leaders on the monocratism scale.

While the lack of truly collegial regimes may be unfortunate for statistical testing, it suggests one thing: ideal type Westminster democracies with united executive and legislative branches and purely collegial cabinets have disappeared. The extinction of truly collegial governments is only logical: with the growth of government functions and the shrinking of the globe, no government can afford to elaborate on decisions as long as pure collectivism would find it prudent. Thus, the presidentialization of parliamentary (e.g. Poguntke and Webb 2006; Foley 1993) democracies, at least with regard to the organization of executive leadership, is a fact that is clearly reflected in the Polity data.

Results of tests about the effect of separation of powers and monocratism reveal several interesting and unexpected findings. First, neither separately nor together are separation of powers and monocratism significant when tested for the whole period. Contrary to expectations, both affect the use of force negatively.

TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE

However, when we look at the two sub-periods, an interesting story develops that provides an explanations for (the lack of) findings in the whole period. The sign of the relationship of separation of powers and monocratism with the use of force changes from the 1945-1974 period to the 1975-1994 period. While in the former era, monocratism is positively associated with the use of force as expected, separation of powers demonstrate a negative effect on war-fighting. After 1975, separation of powers behaves according to theoretical expectations, but monocratism becomes negatively related to the use of force. These findings are consistent across models.

TABLES 2 AND 3 ABOUT HERE

Equally interesting is that when the effect of the separation of powers (models 1) and monocratism (models 2) are tested separately, neither variable achieves statistical significance in either sub-periods. Only separation of powers is marginally significant in the pre-1975 years ($p=.054$). However when these two variables are put into one model (models 3) both become significant. In 1945-1974, separation of powers is significant at the .01 ($p=.005$) level and monocratism at the .05 level ($p=.047$). In 1975-1994 both variables are significant at the .01 level ($p=.003$ and $p=.005$, respectively). In other words, it appears that prior to 1975 separated regimes with qualified individuals are the most war-prone while after 1975 it is unified regimes with pure individual executives that are most likely to use force.

Tables 4 and 5 show the magnitude of the relationship between separation of powers and monocratism for 1945-1974. Results are for major power initiators (table 4) and non-major power initiators (table 5) in dyads where both states are contiguous and non-aligned and the target state is non-democratic.⁹ The suggested finding that separated regimes with qualified individual leadership is the most likely to fight only holds for non-major power initiators. Results are generally not significant for major powers.

TABLES 4 AND 5 ABOUT HERE

Tables 6 and 7 show the magnitude of the relationship between separation of powers and

⁹ All other variables were set to their mean.

monocratism for the post-1975 period. Results are for major power initiators (table 6) and non-major power initiators (table 7) in dyads where both states are contiguous and non-aligned and the target state is non-democratic.¹⁰ In this periods the relationship is significant for both major and non-major powers: single-headed united executives are the most likely to go to war. They are at least three times as likely to go to war than separated regimes with pure individual executives and almost three times as likely to fight than unified regimes with the most collegial executives in the sample.

TABLES 6 AND 7 ABOUT HERE

Findings with respect to the separation of powers support hypothesis 1 for 1975-1994 and contradict the findings of Reiter and Tillman (2002), who find mixed regimes the most war prone in the separation of powers dimension, and those of Leblang and Chan (2003) and Morgan and Campbell (1991), who find that separation of powers is insignificant. Results presented in this paper also suggests that Legblang and Chan's (2003) and Morgan and Campbell's results may be due to chosen time period of 1946-2000 and 1816-1876 and the ignorance of the organization of the executive as a determinant of war.

Even though results about the effect of monocratism in 1975-1994 contradict the hypothesized nature of the relationship, it supports the importance of this variable for conflict behavior. Results supplement Weitsman and Shambaugh's (2002) findings. Testing the difference in the international risk-taking of democracies and non-democracies, they conclude that single-headed executives – i.e. dictatorships and principalities – are more likely to risk war. The present results suggest that, when combined with united executive and legislative branches, single-headed democratic executives are also more likely to trigger the use of force.

7. Conclusion

Based on the comparative literature about accountability, I hypothesized about the nature of elite control in different types of democracies. I posited that two constitutional dimensions are separation of powers and monocratism, which influence the conflict behavior of democracies. I hypothesized that united and collegial regimes are the least likely to fight. I also suggested that the behavior of political variables may be conditioned by the constitutional dimension, but I did not test this hypothesis in this paper.

I find that the relationship of the variables differ according to the time-frame used for analysis. The findings are strongest in the 1975-1994 period, where united regimes are the most war prone as expected especially when combined with pure individual executives.

These results are suggestive in several ways. First, the result that single-headed and united regimes appear to be the most war prone, suggest that the move toward more and more single-headed variants of unitary (parliamentary) government may not be desirable if peace is a valued norm for these regimes. It appears that while the separated-collegial executives are the least likely to engage in war, ideal-type presidential (separated-pure individual) and parliamentary democracies (united and more collegial) are cases where the organization of the executive and the relationship between the executive and the legislative branches are effective structural compromises that help reduce war fighting.

Second, at first the conclusion that united (~presidential) democracies were more likely to fight in what I characterized as the colonial period seem appalling. After all, one would expect colonial powers to fight more, and most retreating colonial nations (Britain, France, the Netherlands, Belgium) were united regimes. However, after considering the ratio of conflicts and the uses of force, it becomes clearer: united democracies faced a considerably larger number of

¹⁰ All other variables were set to their mean.

militarized disputes or crises, but were more restrained in escalating these conflicts into open fights. This is particularly true for non-major powers. This corroborate the results of Goldsmith and He (2008).

Third, the lack of significance of separation of powers and monocratism when tested separately allows for the conclusion that constitutional variables in models 1 and 2 were insignificant because each variable took up the effect of the other. In other words, it appears misleading to characterize democracies and test their conflict behavior on solely on the role of the separation of powers dimension. As Lijpharts (1999) claims, the organization of the executive is an important characteristic of these regimes at least when it comes to their conflict behavior.

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
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Figure 1. The constitutive elements of elite accountability and their relationship to electoral accountability



REGIMET TYPE TABLES

Table 1. Time-series cross-section logit results for use of force by democracies, 1945-1994

Independent Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Separation of powers	-0.149 (.135)		-0.014 (.193)
Monocratism		-0.193 (.131)	-0.183 (.188)
Major power status	.549 (.324)	.579 (.325)	-.575 (.326)
Capabilities	4.430 (2.479)	4.035 (2.509)	4.047 (2.516)
Contiguity	3.365 (.257)	3.410 *** (.259)	3.379 *** (.259)
Alliance	.073 *** (.249)	.047 (.247)	.057 (.250)
Economic prosperity	-0.000 (.000)	-.000 (.000)	-0.000 (.000)
Type of target	-.895 *** (.259)	-.907 *** (.259)	-.905 *** (.260)
Peace years	-.285 *** (.836)	-.280 *** (.083)	-.287 *** (.084)
Constant	-6.630 *** (.457)	-6.526 *** (.451)	-6.519 *** (.470)
Chi-square	244.02 ***	247.80 ***	244.61 ***
Log-likelihood	-712.041	-716.379	-711.577
N	64681	64865	64681

Note: *p < .05 **p < .01, ***p < .001

Standard errors are in parenthesis.

Dependent variable: use of force (0 = no; 1 = yes)

REGIMET TYPE TABLES

Table 2. Time-series cross-section logit results for use of force by democracies, 1945-1974

Independent Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Separation of powers	-.430 (.223)		-.920 ** (.324)
Monocratism		.019 (.261)	.827 * (.417)
Major power status	.432 (.574)	.236 (.542)	.395 (.577)
Capabilities	2.948 (3.876)	5.789 (3.912)	5.572 (4.137)
Contiguity	3.969 *** (.389)	3.822 *** (.363)	3.827 *** (.394)
Alliance	-.795 (.464)	-.585 (.443)	-7.000 (.469)
Economic prosperity	.000 (.000)	.000 (.000)	.000 (.000)
Type of target	-1.650 *** (.507)	-1.680 *** (.489)	-1.705 *** (.508)
Peace years	-.250 (.130)	-.292 * (.127)	-.238 (.131)
Constant	-6.360 ** (.764)	-6.977 *** (.862)	-7.339 *** (.988)
Chi-square	131.81 ***	152.16 ***	133.44 ***
Log-likelihood	-276.025	-283.114	-273.930
N	30301	30393	30301

Note: *p < .05 **p < .01, ***p < .001

Standard errors are in parenthesis.

Dependent variable: use of force (0 = no; 1 = yes)

REGIMET TYPE TABLES

Table 3. Time-series cross-section logit results for use of force by democracies, 1975-1994

Independent Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Separation of powers	.195 (.151)		.590 ** (.202)
Monocratism		-.146 (.148)	-.548 ** (.196)
Major power status	.558 (.391)	.565 (.402)	.684 (.400)
Capabilities	8.606 * 3.622	7.009 (3.705)	7.246 (3.708)
Contiguity	2.910 *** (.294)	2.963 *** (.297)	2.300 *** (.296)
Alliance	.855 ** (.320)	.707 * (.316)	.842 *** (.320)
Economic prosperity	-.000 ** (.000)	-.000 ** (.000)	-.000 ** (.000)
Type of target	-.514 (.296)	-.556 (.296)	-.561 (.300)
Peace years	-.344 ** (.123)	-.348 ** (.123)	-.356 ** (.123)
Constant	-6.749 *** (.569)	-6.070 *** (.538)	-6.528 *** (.571)
Chi-square	173.80 ***	170.54 ***	180.99 ***
Log-likelihood	-432.063	-432.714	-428.388
N	34380	344472	34380

Note: *p < .05 **p < .01, ***p < .001

Standard errors are in parenthesis.

Dependent variable: use of force (0 = no; 1 = yes)

Table 4. Predicted probabilities for the use of force of major powers 1945-1974

Level of monocratism	Separation of Powers			Difference [†]
	United regimes	Mixed regimes	Separated regimes	
Pure individual executives	.006	.013	.025	-.019
Intermediate category	.012	.023	.048	-.036
Qualified individual	.025 *	.048 *	.090	-.065

† Difference is computed between United and separated systems

* Significant at the $p < .05$ level.

Table 5. Predicted probabilities for the use of force of non-major powers 1945-1974

Level of monocratism	Separation of Powers			Difference [†]
	United regimes	Mixed regimes	Separated regimes	
Pure individual executives	.005	.011	.021 *	-.016
Intermediate category	.011 *	.021 *	.040 *	-.029
Qualified individual	.020 *	.040 *	.076 *	-.056

† Difference is computed between United and separated systems

* Significant at the $p < .05$ level.

Table 6. Predicted probabilities for the use of force of major powers 1975-1994

Level of monocratism	Separation of Powers			Difference [†]
	United regimes	Mixed regimes	Separated regimes	
Pure individual executives	.035 *	.020 *	.011 *	.024
Intermediate category	.021 *	.012 *	.007 *	.014
Qualified individual	.013 *	.007 *	.004 *	.009

† Difference is computed between United and separated systems

* Significant at the $p < .05$ level.

Table 7. Predicted probabilities for the use of force of non-major powers 1975-1994

Level of monocratism	Separation of Powers			Difference [†]
	United regimes	Mixed regimes	Separated regimes	
Pure individual executives	.019 *	.011 *	.006 *	.013
Intermediate category	.012 *	.007 *	.004 *	.008
Qualified individual	.007 *	.004 *	.002 *	.005

† Difference is computed between United and separated systems

* Significant at the $p < .05$ level.