

PUBLIC ATTITUDE AND MUTUAL PERCEPTIONS: JAPAN AND RUSSIA

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Abstract

In an increasing globalized world, knowledge and perceptions of neighboring states has become of vital importance. The research proposed here is a preliminary attempt to investigate Japanese/Russian students' image of Russia/Japan. Of prime interest are university students, due to their potential income, capacity in policy formulation, and their resultant influence on general public opinion. The empirical data are based on polls conducted in 2007 and 2012 at the Universities of Japan and Russia, with the support of the Japan Foundation – Fellowship Program. The survey facilitates the identification of what are the main news topics and stereotypes students hold of their counterparts, and offer answers on how Japanese and Russian public opinion towards each other has changed within recent years. The popularity of an opinion, however pervasive it may become, as well as what sorts of opinions are formed, depends partly on the individual's immediate situation, socio-environmental factors, and partly on preexisting knowledge, attitudes and values.

Key words: image of the country, the opinion poll, students' representations, and changes

1. Introduction

In modern politics and business, knowledge about neighboring states and global events is increasingly important, and even necessary.¹ Public opinion in Japan and Russia has a strong influence in shaping bilateral policy in both countries.² It is highly believed that one of the main reasons for strained relations between Moscow

¹See Michael Kunczik, *Images of Nations and International Public Relations* (Mahweh, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1997); *Regional Communication Programme 2012-2014 (EU Neighbourhood area)* [database on-line]; available at <http://euneighbourhood.eu/>; Jaroslaw Cwiek-Karpowicz, *Public opinion on fears and hopes related to Russia and Germany* [database on-line]; available at <http://pasos.org/wpcontent/archive/Public+Opinion+Russia+and+Germany.pdf>

²See Yoshikatsu Suzuki, *Prospects for Japan-Russia Relations After Putin's Return to Power*. [database on-line]; available at www.nippon.com/en/genre/politics/I00006/; *Russians about Japan* [database on-line]; available at <http://www.ru-jp.org/iab12.pdf>; *View from Japan* [database on-line]; available at http://www.eri-21.or.jp/russia/treaty/100qa/100qa_7.shtml; Larisa V. Zhilina, "Japan and Russia: Ways of the Creation of Public Opinion on the Counterpart Country," *Annual Japan* (2013): 135-153.

and Tokyo is the long-standing territorial dispute³, however the real reason seem to lie much deeper⁴: relations between the two countries rest on a mutual mistrust that has been inherited from previous generations. The history of bilateral Russo-Japanese relations provided much empirical evidence in the construction of historical narrative, which constituted an integral part of the “othering” discourse.⁵ The “other” is perceived as fundamentally different from “us”. The concept of the “other” appears in cases where there exist linguistic and cultural differences involved in the definition of one’s identity. In most everyday relationships, we do not perceive the “other” as “evil.” The “other” can simply imply the “foreigner,” or the “outsider,” that is, the “other” is spoken about in neutral terms.⁶

In recent years, bilateral cooperation between Russia and Japan have been maintained at the level of visits by foreign dignitaries, exchange meetings and contacts on security, in particular between the Security Council of the Russian Federation and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. Regular contacts at these level serves as a platform for generating dialogue on bilateral cooperation as well as finding solutions to a number of issues, including the problem of a peace and security. With Russia and Japan establishing partnerships in the Asia- Pacific region, the conclusion of a peace agreement will contribute to the strengthening of peace and stability in the region, and would give a new impetus to regional diplomacy, including the development of relations with other regional powers such as China, India, and Republic of Korea, etc.⁷ The history of relations between the two countries has ranged from periods of cooling down to even direct confrontation.⁸

³ See Jōji Harano, *Relations with Russia: Remembering the Past*. [database on-line]; available at <http://www.nippon.com/en/column/g00094/>; Yoshikatsu Suzuki, Putin and the Northern Territories—A Reality Check. [database on-line]; available at www.nippon.com/en/column/I00023/

⁴ Vasilij Molodyakov, *The image of Japan in Europe and Russia in the second half of XIX - early XX centuries*. M.: Tokyo, 1996; Alexander Bukh, “Russian Perceptions of Japan and China in the Aftermath of the Bolshevik Revolution: A Comparative Case Study of Boris Pil’niak’s Travelogue,” *Journal of Borderlands Studies* Vol. 26, Issue 3 (2011): 345-355.

⁵ Alexander Bukh, Japan’s National Identity and Japan-Russia Relations. [database on-line]; available at

www.eisa-net.org/be-bruga/eisa/files/events/turin/Bukh-RusJapan-Turin.pdf

⁶ Alben V. Simeonova, “Japan through Russian eyes (1855-1905): Intellectuals’ viewpoints” (Ph.D.diss., Waseda University, 2007).

⁷ See Alexandr Ilyshev, *On Some Approaches to Solving Problems in Russian-Japanese Relations*. [database on-line]; available at

http://japanstudies.ru/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=341&Itemid=72

⁸ Akaha, Tsuneo, “A Distant Neighbor: Russia’s Search to Find Its Place in East Asia.” *Global Asia*, June 20, 2012. [database on-line]; available at www.globalasia.org/Issue/ArticleDetail/206/a-distant-neighbor-russias-search-to-find-its-place-in-east-asia.html

Yet each time, both sides managed to bridge the gaps and restore interaction.⁹ Moreover, a strong commitment to mutual understanding and trust apparently prevails among the peoples of the two countries. In this connection it seems that the use of “soft power” may make it easier to find solutions to difficult issues in Russian- Japanese relations rather than reliance on pressure or of any kind of force.

The research project “Student’s Representations of neighboring countries - Russia and Japan. Comparative studies,” was supported by the Japan Foundation – Fellowship Program in 2012 and 2007.¹⁰ The main aim of the project was to examine the changes in public attitude and perceptions of Japanese/Russian students towards Russia/Japan over the past five years.

This study does not concentrate on political developments, but rather on changes and variations in Japanese/Russian students’ perceptions, images, and attitudes towards Russia/Japan from 2007 to 2012, as well as on the latest events that provoked these perceptions and reactions. While most studies of Russo-Japanese relations from that period focus mainly on the history of diplomacy or the naval history of wars¹¹, this study explores the evolution of Japanese/Russian perceptions of Russia/Japan at a non-formal level. In so doing we have not ignored the fact that globalization raises other issues when trying to answer the question of world representation and of the feeling of belonging¹². In this situation, geopolitical orientations represent a relatively volatile element of political culture and identity and can change under the influence of media. It is equally important to note that other factors such as mass culture, communications and social mobility, all contribute to political socialization.¹³

The past decade has seen a growing recognition of the importance of youth’s¹⁴ participation in decision-making. Efforts by governments to engage youth have also

⁹Shigeki Hakamada, *Relations with Russia: An Economic Upper Hand for Japan*. [database on-line]; available at www.nippon.com/en/currents/d00084/

¹⁰The author is grateful to Prof. Kira Yoshie (Japanese Women’s University, Japan), Prof. Petr Podalko (Aoyama Gakuin University, Japan) and Reiko Oomura (Instructor of Inter-Cultural Institute, Japan), Manga Bessem Elizabeth (Counsellor Embassy of Cameroon in Paris); Tafawa Williams (Political Affairs Adviser at Commonwealth Secretariat, London, United Kingdom) for constructive comments during the writing of this article.

¹¹Rotem Kowner, “Becoming an honorary civilized nation: Remaking Japan’s military image during the Russo-Japanese War, 1904-05,” *The Historian* 64 (2001):19-38.

¹²Vladimir Kolosov, “High and low geopolitics: the images of foreign countries in the eyes of Russian citizens,” *Geopolitics* 5 (2003):121-148.

¹³See Kirill G. Kholodkovsky, “Some questions of the development of political mass consciousness,” *World Economy and International Relations* 6 (1979): 125–35.

¹⁴There is no generalized definition of the term “Youth”. According to the United Nations definition (United Nations, 1992), youth comprises young people aged between 15 and 24 years - in general terms, youth can be defined as the stage in the life cycle before adult life

led to better policy formulation, implementation and evaluation. Youth are not a homogenous group as they confront diverse realities. Differences in age, sex, experience, marital status, interests and preferences, family background, income, and religion to list a few, create a wide gap between the needs, aspirations and expectations of youth all over the world. In this study, University students will be of interest to us because of their opinions and values, which constitute a vital element of political culture that can be compared with interest in mainstream politics, media consumption and action.

Taking into consideration that popular usage and universal confidence are the main qualities of public opinion stereotypes, the understanding of values attributed to stereotypes would be simple, clear and easily perceived by people of varied educational levels, cultural and social backgrounds, are but part of the several contributory reasons why our questionnaire/opinion poll was conducted at the Universities.

University level education for Japanese and Russian students represents an all-round fundamental and cultural edification. Communication skill is an important factor that is improved through university education. Persons with more formal education are expected to have higher reading and comprehension abilities necessary to occupy public offices or attain scientific knowledge on diverse issues. More so, it maintains relevant social networks. Education generally indicates a broader sphere of everyday activity, a greater number of reference groups and more interpersonal contacts, which increases the likelihood of discussing public affairs topics with others. In the case of my study, a public opinion poll was used to ascertain the possibility that views and opinions may have been specific to certain groups – university students. In addition, University attendance has been shown to lower prejudice levels and increase global issue awareness. For these reasons, the opinions of University students must be an important consideration for the research.

Conducted twice with an approximate five years interval using a similar questionnaire, the opinion poll outcomes were useful in discerning the changes in public attitude towards Russia/Japan relations. The standard length of studies for the bachelor study program at the University in Japan and Russia is 4 years. The time period allowed us to see how new a new generation of students' views and opinions might have changed with time. We wanted the students to challenge what they see and hear with valued judgments, solid arguments supported by sound evidence. This ability required the consideration of a broad range of perspectives and sources of knowledge.

begins. The definition that countries adopt is probably affected by factors such as the average age at which people are expected to play adult roles in the community, as a result of the progressive acquisition of civil, economic and social rights.

2. Methodology, Sample Composition, Size and the Questionnaire

To represent the possibility that views and opinions may have been specific to certain groups, a stratified random sample was considered the most logical choice for this study. Further, having the enrolment list of the university, for practical purposes, it was easier to implement a quota system in determining the sample for enquiry. The method of random stratification essentially allocates quotas to specific identifiable characteristic groups and is very convenient for small population sets. For research on large populations, the sample size averages 400-600 respondents. If we needed to form credible conclusions with plus or minus 5% margin of error or a 0.95 "level of confidence" - from general population of 5000 – the sample size should be at least 370 persons, 10,000 persons – a sample of 385 persons is needed and, any population above 10,000 – 400 person sample size is needed.¹⁵

The opinion survey on Russia was conducted in June 2007 at JWU and June 2012 at AGU (Tokyo, Japan), and on Japan in June 2007 and 2012 at F.M. Dostoevsky State University (Omsk, Russia). Following established methodological principles, the optimal sample size for research was determined to be 400 students. We selected respondents within given parameters on each faculty and year of program. The method of quotas was convenient for small population sets. Although the age variance range within the universities is relatively small, it is deemed important to attempt to chronicle how students' views and opinions may evolve throughout the time spent at university. In other words, how education affected their views of the world, more specifically, Russia and Japan.

The face-to-face interviews, conducted in 2007 and 2012, followed a similar scheme.

The questionnaire was divided into two groups as follows:

A: Questions- Multiple Choice answers. There were three questions in this group.

1) What is your main source of information about Russia/Japan?

Response Choices:

1 - Newspapers 2 - Journals 3 - Radio 4 - TV 5 - Books 6 - Lectures 7 - Speaking with friends 8 – The Internet

2) Do you think the available information on Russia/Japan is sufficient (enough for you)?

Response Choices:

1 - Yes 2 - No 3 - Difficult to answer

3) Do you know about an improvement of the economic situation in Russia/Japan?

¹⁵Vladimir I. Dobrenkov and Albert I. Kravchenko, *Methods of sociological research* (Moscow: MSU, 2004).

Response Choices:

1 - Know 2 - Heard something 3 - Hearing for the first time 4 - Difficult to answer

We did not want closed ended questions by asking, "Are you "in favor" of or "against", rather we included open ended questions in our questionnaire.

B: The open-ended questions assumed the original narrative answer in the form of a word, or several words. The answers to open-ended questions have a natural character. It gives a maximum of the information on the theme of research that is very important for our research. These questions allowed respondents to state their opinions in their own words. There were 3 questions in this group:

- 1) What words first come to your mind that you would associate with Russia/Japan?
- 2) What characteristics or traits would you say accurately define the Russian/Japanese people (the national character)?
- 3) Can you explain why there has been an improvement of the economic situation in Russia/Japan over the last few years?

With regards to this topic, the diversity of words chosen by the students was quite large and the ranking of the words was analyzed according to their frequency, in order to classify the content. In order to understand the visions of the students we analyzed the questionnaire, whose questions gave the explanation of the Japanese/Russian students' representation of neighboring countries and its people.

We suggested that although all individuals, irrespective of cultural group, are able to form stereotypes as previously described, those who are part of cultural groups that appears specially likely to perceive groups as social agents (i.e., collectivist cultures) may develop and apply stereotypes more readily, compared to societies in which social groups are perceived as less argentic (i.e., individualistic cultures). Stereotypes take on special importance to the degree that cultural norms require individuals to behave in ways that are consistent with group expectations.¹⁶ Thus, perceived images of nations can be identified as the pictures of other nations in the minds of people from the perspective of social psychology. Such an image is inextricably linked with the attributes of the object, and those of its beholders.

As previously mentioned, in order to understand the visions of the students we analyzed the questionnaire. The analysis proposes to demonstrate that the difference of perception of countries has to do with the student's socioeconomic status and personal experiences.

¹⁶Melissa J. Williams and Julie Spencer-Rodgers, "Culture and Stereotyping Processes: Integration and New Directions," *Social and Personality Psychology Compass* Vol. 4, Issue 8 (Aug., 2010): 593.

3. Sources of the information and its sufficiency

The mass media is the main channel through which people perceive the world and impose their own construct on a series of perceived attributes projected by a remote country.¹⁷ As active participants in the global information flow, media audiences are heavily exposed to messages accruing directly or indirectly from varied amounts of images, sounds and news bites. So much so that, very little of what media consumers believe constitutes the global social reality of people, events, and issues.


By examining the impact of news sources on Japanese/Russian students' knowledge about respective countries, we could deduce that television emerged as the dominant source of information for 48.2% of Japanese students in 2012 (see Fig.1). Approximately half of the Japanese students got information on Russia mainly from TV rather than publications, and this trend is by far more evident than ever in the present.

If we compare findings of 2012 and 2007 - it is clear that the Japanese youth prefers TV and other media with video-images rather than printed materials like newspapers or books. Television remains the most widely used source for international news for 48.2% of Japanese students, but that is up from 42.1% five years ago.

Thus the role of TV in the Japanese students' everyday life is quite large, but we cannot always say that the position of it is likewise high in the social information environment of Japan - currently, 17.4% of Japanese students get most of their news about Russia from the Internet, which has changed over the past five years (2007-12 %). The Internet is slowly closing in on television as main source of international news for Japanese respondents - it is easier to keep up within a world where news is updated constantly and easily accessed.

As for the Russian students, in comparison with 2007, when the Internet took only fifth position (after TV, journals, newspapers and books), in 2012, the Internet became the most popular source of information about Japan (35.43%) and the preferred choice for news ahead of television, newspapers and books. One of the newer realities of this environment is that Russian students have greater ability to get material on the subjects that most matter to them and not bother with those they don't. The next significant source of information on Japan for 28% of Russian respondents is TV (2007- 42.8%).

¹⁷Don D. Smith, "Mass communications and international image change," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 17 (1973): 115-129.

Figure 1. Main source of the information about Russia/Japan for the students (2007, 2012)

In 2012 8.69% of Russian students chose Newspapers as the third source of information on Japan. Of course it is a good thing that the newspapers are read by so many students, however, that number declined (2007-11.3%).

For Japanese students, the information about Russia obtained from “lectures” was at the penultimate position (2012-13.2%). More Japanese students continued to cite newspapers rather than journals as the main source of information about neighboring countries, but we can indicate the decline in newspaper readership from 31% (2007) to 7.9% (2012).

These findings reveal that the Japanese students don’t read as many newspapers when compared to the time spent watching TV. The number of the students watching TV for news has not changed so much for the past five years – TV-news coverage of foreign countries exerts a greater influence on Japanese public opinion about Russia than the Internet and newspaper coverage.

In 2012 "Talking with the friends" shared the fifth positions as a source from which 5.94% of Russian and 5.5% of Japanese students learned about countries (2007: 4.6% and 2.8% respectively). Here we can see that social talk is actually likely to be one of our most important sources of social information. This means that social talk is instrumental in keeping track of the behaviors of the individuals and groups in our social environment¹⁸ and will thus form the basis of many of our social beliefs.¹⁹ In other words, social information that is particularly communicable will tend to be shared repeatedly through communication chains, thereby becoming part and parcel of a society's beliefs about individuals and groups.

The number of Russian students, who named TV as a main source of information on Japan, dramatically declined from 42.8% (2007) to 28% (2012). At the same time, we should emphasize that the number of Russian students who mentioned the Internet as a main source of information drastically increased from 5.6% (2007) to 35.43% (2012). Trust and confidence seems to be one of the reasons why they choose the Internet as the most reliable source of information about Japan. For most Russian students, the media provide the primary source of information about Japan, although there is some evidence of skepticism about its nature. So they try to get the information from sources they most trust. The Internet allows the students to seek information from thousands of blogs, aggregators and social networks. The information received may originate from the same old media, but it is wrapped in designer packaging that matches personal tastes and ideologies. It is however impossible to know how much of the independents' attitudes are based on how they interpret what they see in the media. News and information environment is changing in ways that most young people believe makes it easier for them to get information they want when compared to five years ago. With its ability to sort data quickly and assimilate large numbers of consumer reviews, the Internet is gaining as a way to give students information that is personal and particular. Most of the young people of both countries who get news online forage widely, exploring a variety of different news topics online. But in 2012: 36.2% of Russian (2007-55.5%) and 77.5% of Japanese students (2007-73.7%) said that available information on respective countries had been insufficient for them (See Fig.2).


However, 43.5% of Russian students (2007-17.9%) are satisfied with the volume of information available on Japan. And only 6.3% of Japanese students (2007-3.3%) are satisfied with volume of information on Russia. This nonetheless clearly suggests that Japanese students are interested in

¹⁸Francis T. McAndrew & Megan A. Milenkovic, "Of tabloids and family secrets: The evolutionary psychology of gossip," *Journal of Applied Social Psychology* 32 (2002):1064–1082.

¹⁹Ralf D. Sommerfeld, Hans-Ju"rgen Krambeck, Drik Semmann, & Manfred Milinski, "Gossip as an alternative for direct observation in games of indirect reciprocity," *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 104 (2007): 17435–17440.

learning more about Russia, and this lack of information represents an opportunity for policy makers to address.

Figure 2. Sufficiency of the volume of information for the students (2007, 2012)



4. Words associated with "Russia" / "Japan"

If asked to name the things associated with Japan and Russia, what are the first words that come to mind? A variety of elements will probably be pointed out depending on who is asked. Official and non-official, propagandistic and stereotyped, linguistic and cultural symbols play an important role in formation of a country and a nation's image - they build up its **recognition**. The visual representation of a State and its national culture is interesting not only to professionals, but also to ordinary people. Creating these vivid symbols and images, and its perception is not an objective process, but, a social construction, "we are taught to see, so that what is known is mediated through a series of cultural filters (social, political, academic) which refract reality and condition or pre-condition what we see. The result is that sight and knowledge, perception and conception are interwoven and determined by the value or belief system into which we are born, spend our formative years and to which we subsequently subscribe."²⁰ A country's image can be defined as "a representation of a country's positive

²⁰Douglas Charles David Pocock, "Sight and knowledge," *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*. N.S. Vol.6 (1981): 386.

or negative standing in media, in terms of historical, political, economic, military, diplomatic and religious context.”²¹ In journalistic terminology, “image of a country can be defined in the terms of political, economic, military, diplomatic and religious relations in the changing domestic, regional and international scenario and its effects on the thoughts, behaviors, feelings, and inclinations of the owners of the media organizations.”²²

A country's image develops from the stereotypes that people hold. Stereotypes of an image or place develop over time and extend from the premises of the familiarity with images of instance of famous people and knowledge with products of a given country etc. However, it is widely argued that the images held by a group of people might differ from stereotypes, as an image is more of a personal interpretation. Thus, the images held by different groups of people about the exact same place can differ depending on the person's own needs, motivation, prior knowledge and preference.²³ As we could see, globalization raises other problems for the question of world representation. The ranking of the words was analyzed according to the gaps between frequencies in order to classify the issues.

In 2012 Japanese and Russian students indicated the respective countries through *geographical associations' key words*: 13.8% - Japanese and 8% - Russian students (2007: 9.7% and 6% respectively). The world geopolitical vision is created in the process of socialization by the national system of education but especially by TV and media. Russian respondents described Japan as “islands in the ocean”, “isolated archipelago”, and “closest neighbor”, just to name a few.

Russia's image for Japanese students is one of “the biggest country in the world”, “It occupies a huge territory”, “Northern country”, “Siberia” and “Country near Hokkaido”. Students mentioned not only in terms of civilization but also politically and economically that Russia - “distant neighbor” (it's opposite to Russian students' imaginations), “neither European nor Asian”, “Geographically, Russia is very much a part of East Asia.” As we could see geopolitical imaginations were the prevalent images for Japanese respondents. Such geopolitical orientations represent a relatively volatile element of political culture and identity that can change under the influence of media and other factors of conjuncture and “with the development

²¹Ahmad Mian Hanan, “The media-foreign policy relationship: Pakistan's media image and U.S. foreign policy” (Ph.D. diss., York University, 2006), 8.

²²Saleem Noshina, “Editorial treatment of U.S. image in the two English dailies, “The Pakistan Times,” and “the Dawn”, with special reference to the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan 1979-88” (Master's of Philosophy thesis, Punjab Lahore, 2000), 6.

²³Asuncion Beerli & Josefa D. Martin, “Factors influencing destination Image,” *Annals of Tourism Research*, Vol. 31:3 (2004): 653.

of mass culture, communications and social mobility, the importance of political orientations is growing, worked out through the process of socialization.”²⁴ Students’ perception of places and regions is not uniform. Rather, their view of a particular place or region is their interpretation of its location, extent, characteristics, and significance as influenced by their own culture and experience. It is sometimes said that there is no reality, only perception. In geography there is always a mixture of both the objective and the subjective realms, and that is why the geographically informed person needs to understand both realms and needs to see how they relate to each other.

The ranks of other values associated to respective countries are also quite similar. Students associate *national cuisine* with the image of the country: 11.7 % - Russian and 7.1% - Japanese students (2007: 13.5% - 6.3% respectively). In general, many words used by the students are related to national cuisine. Some national foods and drinks are familiar stereotypes. They are actually more tied to the general area instead of a country; so calling foods national icons is a bit misleading. But people will continue to think of countries based on their culinary offerings. The Japanese students named – “alcohol”, “caviar”, “pies” and “borsch”. In connection with national cuisine 47.5% of Japanese students mentioned “vodka” (2012). It naturally leads to the conclusion that for Japanese students, image of Russia and the Russians is closely connected with vodka.

The Russian students on the other hand listed - “sushi”, “sashimi”, “rice”, “miso soup”, “green tea”, “sake” in their perception of Japan and the Japanese. In Russia nowadays, Japan’s popularity is rising in the areas of food and culture, including a sushi boom. Alcohol features high for both Japanese and Russian students perceptions and may yet be another subject of more pleasurable study.

Every nation has a number of symbols or emblematic elements associated with it that are intrinsic to its identity and heritage. The students: 4.4% - Japanese and 2.7% - Russian (2007: 5.7% and 12.9% respectively) associated the countries with *national symbols*. The Japanese respondents often mentioned “Matryoshka”, “Hats” and “Caps made from fur” as ~~associative~~ words with Russia.

Japan is a country with a long history, rich culture and varied topography. Therefore, many symbols of Japan have developed over the years and are recognized worldwide. One of the most popular “mount Fuji” was declared by Russian respondents. “Red sun” (Japan's flag), “Cherry blossoms”(“cherry trees”) are also well known among the Russian students. Cultural items such as “kimono”, “tea ceremony”, “geisha”, and “temples” - traditional symbols of Japan were mentioned by 2.7% of Russian students (2007 - 12.9%).

²⁴ Kirill G. Kholodkovsky, “Some questions of the development of political mass consciousness,” *World Economy and International Relations* 6 (1979):125–35.

Russian students associated Japan with historical *events and facts* (2012-7.4%, 2007- 2%). They mentioned: “the Second World War - Hiroshima, Nagasaki”, “Meiji restoration”, “and Meiji revolution,” “the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905”. Students also named “shogunat Tokugawa” and “bushido”. Here we could see that the national image of Japan for Russian students is essentially a *historical* image, which extends through time, backward into a supposedly recorded or perhaps mythological past and forward into an imagined future. The more conscious a people are of its’ history, the stronger the national image is likely to be. Wars and hostilities among nations also formulate national images as do geographical space. We can note that this research provides a base for a further discussion on Russia’s images of Japan since historical memory and stereotypes turn to be persistent through generations unless challenged by grand historical events.

Japanese students associated Russia with *historical and political figures* of Russia (2012-7.2%, 2007- 8.9%). In this context, respondents recalled the names of President Putin, Gorbachev, Lenin, Stalin, Yekaterina-II and Tsar Romanov. A large majority of students surveyed answered “Putin”. Vladimir Putin was mentioned by 70.7% of respondents, thus associating political figures with Russia. Russia’s images began to improve however, following Putin’s election as president. The personification of the official emblem of a nation has widely been recognized as was observed, special part in the overall image of the country and the nation as declared by the Japanese students played political and historical roles. In fact, the majority of Japanese students paid greater attention to Russia’s historical and political figures’ position associating them with Russia.

Taking into consideration that understanding the “other” nation stems from the individual, and group visions and attitudes towards both it and the Fatherland, this study reviews Japanese and Russian students’ perceptions of Russia and Japan. What is different?

Firstly, Russian students indicated Japan as “a developed country” with “perfect automobiles” (2012- 8.2%, 2007-9.4%), “High quality of life and the economy” (2012-4.2%, 2007-3.6%), “high-quality video equipment,” “excellent technique” “high-quality computers” (2012-2.1%, 2007-6.9%) and “high-tech” (2012-9.3%, 2007-6.6%). In the economic realm, confidence in Japanese makers of automobiles and household electrical goods is quite high. In this context, respondents recalled the names of leading Japanese manufacturers such as “Lexus”, “Toyota”, etc. Here we can see that country-of-origin associations may refer to the economic stage of the country (macro) or products produced in the country (micro). Country image (similar to brand image) is a set of country-of-origin associations organized into groups in a meaningful way”.²⁵ In particular, a country’s equity is believed to be

²⁵Kevin L. Keller, “Conceptualizing, measuring and managing customer-based brand equity,” *Journal of Marketing* 57(1) (1993): 1–22.

derived from the association of the product with a country. For example, brands such as Toyota, could share certain associations for Russian students, such as 'reliability', because of their common home country of Japan. The positive macro and micro country images of Japan observed in the present study suggest that the performance of Japanese brands might have contributed to Japan's positive country images, and support the findings from previous research in 2007.²⁶ In other words, the majority of Russian students sensed Japan's great development compared to the "West" and even to Russia - Russian students seem to have significantly more positive views than Japanese in some aspects.

By contrast with Russian students, Japanese students linked their representations about Russia with "USSR, socialism, Communism and CPSU²⁷" (2012 -7.9%, 2007- 8.3 %) – "The strong image of socialism and the collapse of the Soviet Union", "The image of the country where the background of the socialism remains", "The Former Soviet Union". Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russian images in Japan underwent transformation – relatively positive in the early stage, they became more negative towards the end of 2000's and reached the negative peak. This indicates a strong association between Russia and the USSR - Japanese students sensed Russia's complicated political position, as paying more attention to Russia's domestic than international position.

Secondly, strongest association with Japan for Russian students is that of a cultural space, based on a "long history" and "culture and traditions" (2012 - 5.2%, 2007 - 18.3%). Also respondents mentioned some nonverbal customs such as "gift-giving", "greetings", "introductions", etc. Japan was described by respondents as "a country with beautiful nature and old cultural traditions", "different customs and mental habits", but also mentioned "manga" and "anime". This means that instead of emphasizing the exotic aspects of Japanese culture, Japan had to present itself as a pioneer of postmodern culture. Anime, manga began to occupy an important role in Japan's international cultural activities and became a part of image of this country for Russian students. Russian images of Japan were refracted through their creators' cultural prisms, educational background and accumulated life experiences. For Russian students Japan is not only an economic superpower, but also as a nation with a unique culture.

But the strongest association with Russia for the Japanese students (2012-16.1%, 2007-25.9 %) is "cold climatic conditions", "image of cold country", "it's always cold", "severe, terrible winter", "low temperature", "strong cold", "snow country", "image of cold country, where the people wear fur caps and many clothes". Here we could see, that in light of climate and nature, this attributes influence the

²⁶Larisa V. Zhilina, *Representations of neighboring countries at the beginning of 21st century - Russia and Japan in students' imaginations* (Omsk: Omskblankizdat, 2008).

²⁷CPSU – Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

creation of country image, to a large extent depending on the background of the person in question.

Thirdly, it is interesting to note that Japanese students associate Russia with a particular color “white-blue -red” (2012 - 2.6%, 2007 - 2.7%). Most countries have national colors that are used to represent the country outside of standard icons like the flag. Sometimes national colors are frequently part of a countries’ set of national symbols. As for Russian students – there was not one “color association” with Japan. What is striking is that the different point in Japanese student responses was the association with “the beautiful people with a white skin”(2012- 6.1%, 2007- 4.6%) and “show - performances” - national dances, ballet (2012- 1.7 %, 2007- 4.6%). Only Japanese students have such original visual perceptions of Russia.

In an era that is increasingly dominated by the flow of images, contemporary Japan has a high profile, producing manga, anime, video games, etc. This “visual culture” is formed by numerous relationships between people and images. Here it is important to emphasize Japan’s unique cultural identity. Russia, which might have been defined by their visual orientations and means to interact with their society in comparison to the opposite in Russia.

Lastly, but not the least, Japanese students associate Russia with “Sports and sportsmen”- (2012 - 3.7%, 2007 - 6.6%). But it is interesting to note that respondents have associations with Russia through the image of CSKA (Russian football-club), the Japanese football player Honda Kesuke and Russian football player - Arshavin. Obviously, these names were mentioned in connection with EURO-2012.²⁸ This Championship is one of the most popular and most watched events in Japan. It seems it was the main reason why Japanese students mentioned these names. These images of Russia function in combination with the individual preferences of students.

Some negative Japanese images of Russia were replaced by new positive images and vice versa, while some negative stereotypes remained unchanged. The number of Japanese students who associate Russia with “Negative incidents and facts” has decreased from 7.5% (2007) to 6.1% (2012). But negative Russia’s images were viewed by Japanese students as a serious threat to Russian security. According to the findings, it can be stated that Russia has been found to bear mixed image. Mixed image implies a country being perceived with positive and negative image which might derive through two or more contradicting factors, mainly positive and negative.²⁹ Despite the fact that Russia is renowned for its

²⁸Survey 2012 was carried out in June.

²⁹Mixed image implies a country being perceived with positive and negative image which might derive through two or more contradicting factors, mainly positive and negative.

touristic attractions, aspects such as crime are argued, to have perplexed the image of Russia. Notably, with the alarming increase of terrorist activities in most parts of the world, the issue of safety is ranked important when tourism is under discussion.

Also we should emphasize that the number of Japanese students who linked Russia's associations with the territorial disputes in the "Northern territories" has marginally increased from 2.8% (2007) to 5.2% (2012) – although the figure has doubled, it is too soon to extrapolate a trend and may warrant further investigation in 2017. In the Japanese press, which has come to serve as a lobby of sorts, certain continuing themes are heard in discussions of the Russian government's policy. The media's view is that the struggle between Japan and Russia revolves around two competing scenarios: the simultaneous return of all four island territories, or the return of only two islands. The media is focusing on what common ground Japan might find to resolve the Northern Territories issue, whether some sort of "quiet dialogue" could resolve the dispute, and also whether it would be better to accept a "two islands plus" compromise.³⁰

In 2012 5.2% of Russian students associated Japan with "Fukushima, catastrophe, explosion, radiation" and 1.5% - with "earthquake". It was quite predictable to see such answers in process of this poll. One year ago it was the first range news in all TV-channels and media of the World - almost twenty thousands lives were lost and many forever changed following a devastating earthquake and tsunami off the north coast of Japan.

5. What features are proper for Japanese / Russian people

National image can be defined as the cognitive representation that a person holds or believes to be true about a nation and its people. Of special importance to political action is the benevolence or malevolence imputed to other nations in the images, as well as the historical component of the image. In this context feelings about a country's future are important too.

As a measure of attitudes toward the Russians/Japanese, we followed the classic method by asking respondents for traits that they thought were typical of Russians/Japanese – that is, respective national characters. The responses were open ended free from any interview bias or leading suggestions. The reported characterizations are entirely those of the respondents.

Let us turn your attention to the fact that in 2012 there were zero instances were Russian students offered "no response" to any question on the questionnaire

³⁰Yoshikatsu Suzuki, *Prospects for Japan-Russia Relations After Putin's Return to Power*. [database on-line]; available at www.nippon.com/en/genre/politics/100006/

whereas in 2007 there was a 6.6% failure to respond. Whereas in 2012, 23.7% (2007 - 30.5%) of Japanese students did not answer the same question. Regarding this topic, the diversity of words chosen by the students was quite large and therefore the ranking of the words was analyzed according to its frequencies, in order to classify the content. In order to understand the visions of the students we analyzed the questionnaire, whose questions gave the explanation of the students' representation of neighboring countries' people. In assessing the students' knowledge of national traits or characteristics of citizens of neighboring countries, the following was found:

Based on responses of Russian respondents, it is plausible to conclude that most students consider the main character trait of the Japanese to be "diligence", "workholism" and "persistence" (2012-22.8%, 2007- 23%). Among the positive associations with Japanese people, students listed: "hardworking", "disciplined", "organized and highly efficient".

In 2012 11.7% of Japanese students named Russian people within the descriptive or explanatory context - "they are drunkards, like to drink, dipsomaniac" – here we can indicate dramatically increasing (2007 - 3%).

The ranks of other values associated to national character are also quite similar:

Both: the Japanese and Russian students indicated such features as "hospitality and friendliness". 3.1% of Russian respondents mentioned "kindness" and "goodwill". 8.7% of Japanese students characterized the Russians as "kind, friendly, light" people. The popular students' belief is that cruel climatic conditions in Russia make its inhabitants more "hospitable and cordial". Here we could see, that Russian national characteristics, which are interchangeably referred to as national identity, or political culture, or patterns of behavior, are presented as historically consistent and static. Russian national character is seen as being shaped by the forest and the steppes, a geopolitical location that lacks natural barriers, the harsh climate and the history of invasions and conquests.

Japanese and Russian students noted such feature as "collectivism". Russian students mentioned Japanese "collectivism, unity, the prevalence of the social over the personal" (2012-1 %, 2007-3.3%). Japanese students defined the Russians as people of "socialistic formation" (2012- 4.5%, 2007- 3%), more reason for "Russian collectivism": they argue that "Russians are collectivists by nature", "they like to be in tight communities".

Both nations are seen as sharing certain cultural similarities, like the spirituality, prevalence of the communal interests over the individual, uniformity and harmony in the community as the ultimate values. However, these similarities are used to underlie the difference between the national essences of the two nations.

5.1 Positive traits

In 2012 78% of Russian students noted positive features of the Japanese and described them as: "diligent", "work-holics" (2012- 22.8%, 2007 - 23%); people with "mind and intellect" (2012-11.4 %, 2007 -5.3%); "disciplined, punctuality"- 9.1% ;"wise" people - 7.1% ; "polite" people - 6.5% ; people who "esteem traditions" - 4.7%; "purposeful" people - 4.6%; "hospitable and friendly"- 3.1%; "patient, humility, meekness" (2012-2.7%, 2007 -7.3%). It is the fact that images and attitudes tend to be formed at an early stage of encounter between two nations is also taken into account. Here we can see that for Russian students' images of Japanese as "workaholics" turn into stereotypes. Impressions usually have a strong power of preservation.

In 2012 20.6% of Japanese students noted positive features of the Russians and described them as: "kind, friendly, light" - 8.7% (new); "gentle and calm"(2012-3.2%, 2007 - 2%); "COOL" people (there is no single concept of cool: one of the essential characteristics of "COOL" is its mutability—what is considered cool changes over time and varies among cultures and generations) - 3% (new); "strong", "of great spirit" (2012-2.5%, 2007 -6%); "patriots " - 2.2% (new); "patient and enduring" (2012-1%, 2007 - 2%).We have been surprised by new definition of Russian national character - 3% of Japanese students found interesting national trait of the Russians - "resistant to cold"(2012). Also Japanese students named the Russians "beautiful people (girls) with white skin" listing this definition as a national feature. Here we can see that Japanese respondents pay more attention than Russian respondents to physical attractions which might be also attributed to Japanese culture that is more concerned with visual images.

5.2 Negative traits

It is well known that Russia and Japan had entertained for a long time a variety of images of each other—from neutral, to highly positive or negative.

In 2012 we could indicate that 27.8 % of Japanese students listed "conditionally" negative character traits of the Russians (2007- 18.3%): "drunkards, dipsomaniac"(2012-11.7%, 2007 - 3%); "coolness, composure"(2012-4.2%, 2007-8.25%); "strict, severe" (2012-3.7 %, 2007-10.5%); "uncommunicative, sullen and they don't laugh"(2012-3%,2007 - 4%); "persistent, resolute, categorical"(2012-2.5%, 2007 - 5.75%); "cock their noises" - 1.7% (new); "roughness, hardness, nervousness"(2012-1%, 2007-3.5%). For Japanese respondents the Russians are "too dominant", "too impatient", and "a know-it-all attitude, cold and egocentric". It means that Japanese students' images of the Russians varied at times, their negative images of the Russian people prevailed.

By contrast with Japanese students in 2012 only 3.1% of Russian students considered negative character traits of the Japanese to be “secretiveness”, “stealth”, “hypocrisy”, “tendency to suicide” and “personal isolation”. Other negative national traits, like innate aggression and cunningness are still a common feature of the images of the Japanese in Russian students’ imaginations.

In examining students’ knowledge about national features of peoples of neighboring countries, one clear conclusion cannot be ignored: 78% of Russian students assume that three forth of the Japanese are positive, whereas only 20.6% of the Japanese students perceive Russian as positive. The majority of positive features of the Japanese people as perceived by Russian students are traditional values (respect for traditions, politeness, diligence, national pride, patriotism). Furthermore, many students refer to the Japanese as “clever” and “well-educated” people with “great intellectual potential”.

To sum up findings mentioned above, the fact is that the Russians and the Japanese have traditionally entertained highly contrasting and volatile images of each other. Images of a nation are those stable enough, stratified, and dynamic images, which refer to the culture, history, politics, and economy of that nation. Those images comprise within themselves a set of symbols and social visions on the perceived nation’s position in the world, and its foreign policy orientation.

6. Discussion

Knowledge on foreign issues made available by the media brings close to reality what happens elsewhere in the world. Images of foreign countries, issues and happenings in a particular country abroad are likely to be influenced by the media to a much larger scale when impressions are created of a healthy or strained bilateral relation, for instance. Due to factors such as ‘cultural assumptions’ and ‘political beliefs’, it is believed that news carves out images and impressions of the world some of which are preferred over other images. Through informing and educating the citizenship on foreign policy issues, news media shapes mass perceptions and particular evaluative implications of how audience members judge other nations.³¹ International news can impact foreign policy³² and shape the

³¹Robert Albritton & Jarol Manheim, “News of Rhodesia: The Impact of a Public Relations Campaign,” *Journalism Quarter*6 (1983): 622–8; Christiane Amanpour, “Television’s Role in Foreign Policy,” *The Quill*,3 (1996): 16–17; David Perry, “The Mass Media and Inference about Other Nations,” *Communication Research* 4 (1985):595–614.

³²Bernard Cohen, *The Press and Foreign Policy* (Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1963); Christiane Amanpour. “Television’s Role in Foreign Policy,” *The Quill*, 3(1996): 16–17.

public's knowledge, perception and attitude towards foreign countries, as large-scale public opinion surveys indicate.³³

Table1. Generations divide on Russia – source <http://www.pewglobal.org>

| | % Favorable | | | <i>Youngest-oldest gap</i> |
|-------------|-------------|-------|-----|----------------------------|
| | 18–29 | 30–49 | 50+ | |
| | % | % | % | |
| Japan | 46 | 27 | 21 | +25 |
| Canada | 59 | 45 | 34 | +25 |
| Turkey | 33 | 15 | 10 | +23 |
| Philippines | 46 | 34 | 24 | +22 |
| Brazil | 47 | 32 | 25 | +22 |
| Germany | 51 | 27 | 29 | +22 |
| U.S. | 49 | 38 | 29 | +20 |
| S. Korea | 67 | 52 | 47 | +20 |
| Italy | 46 | 32 | 27 | +19 |
| Spain | 48 | 42 | 30 | +18 |
| Senegal | 46 | 46 | 29 | +17 |
| Tunisia | 42 | 35 | 27 | +15 |
| Bolivia | 31 | 17 | 18 | +13 |
| France | 44 | 40 | 31 | +13 |
| Malaysia | 55 | 44 | 42 | +13 |
| Mexico | 32 | 28 | 22 | +10 |
| Lebanon | 38 | 52 | 49 | -11 |

Only countries with a significant, double-digit age gap shown.

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According to the latest survey on the image of Russia in the World – Global Opinion of Russia Mixed - done in 2013 by The Pew Research Center's Global Attitudes Project³⁴, young people are more favorable toward Russia. Views of Russia vary significantly by age in many of the countries surveyed, with young people aged 18-29 often more likely to express positive views of Russia than people 50 and older (see Table 1).

The differences in views of Russia between the youngest and the oldest age groups is 20 percentage points or more in eight countries surveyed, including Japan,

³³David Perry, "News Reading, Knowledge About, and Attitudes toward Foreign Countries," *Journalism Quarterly* 2 (1990): 353–358.

³⁴Pew Research Center conducted public opinion surveys around the world on a broad array of subjects and important issues of the day. [database on-line]; available at www.pewglobal.org

Canada, Brazil, Germany, the U.S. and South Korea. Generational differences in views of Russia may reflect shifting perceptions of Russia's place in the world.

One cannot overestimate the importance of a country's image abroad. Our study seeks to assess peoples' perceptions of another country – whether they like, respect it, are interested in it and whether they wish to visit. This will affect the daily decisions they take about that country – be they of a political nature, business-related or more leisurely activities like tourism. These perceptions based on an image may thus have considerable positive or negative consequences for a given country. Russia's image abroad is very mixed - with the negative traits dominating. Of course, Russia's image varies from one set of countries to another suggesting the varying impact of the media and even the possibility to manage these external perceptions. What we should notice here is, however, that many of the responses are culturally specific: Japanese associations of "dark image" apparently connected to Russian-Soviet images that Japanese society of the 1980s held. Japanese respondents indicated Russia like "former Soviet Union", "CPSU", "Socialistic State", "The collapse of the USSR" (2012-7.9%, 2007 - 8.3%). Some young Japanese have image of Russia as "controlled daily life and social practice". It is therefore conceivable that, on the one hand, for young Japanese who has little concern about Russia, it is likely to be difficult to think of any words or phrases that would be connected to the Russians without contemplation. On the other hand, associations with Russia within a restricted number of words that appears relatively frequently in historical and/or media context. Both geographical and sociological factors define the vision of the world (in general) and Russia (in particular) for Japanese students.

It's difficult to ignore the fact that the percentage of respondents that associated Russia with "territorial dispute" has increased among the Japanese students from 2.8% (2007) to 5.2% (2012). As was predicted in this survey, there was an increase in the number of respondents who said that Russia was associated with the "Northern Territories Problem". I can't see any reason why for the past two years this problem has been actively discussed - Russia suddenly made her act of presence there in 2010 November.³⁵

³⁵President Medvedev's bold action was perceived in Japan as an unheard of provocation: on the 1 November 2010, Medvedev undertook a three-hour long visit to the island of Kunashir. This was indeed a highly symbolic move as Medvedev was the first Russian head of state ever to set foot on these territories. His calls to make living conditions in the Islands "like those in the very heart of Russia", as we will see later, hinted at something more than just a symbolic act. Japan's reaction, as it could have been expected, was vitriolic: the Japanese ambassador was temporarily recalled prompting the reaction of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which considered such a measure unacceptable given that Kunashir was considered Russia' territory (Asahi 02.11.2010). Japan again recalled her ambassador when she considered that explanations given by the Russian side regarding the visit were not satisfactory. (Vedomosti 23.12.2010).

Results indicated that Japanese students acquire knowledge about the characteristics of Russia from hot-news in cosmopolitan print media and from attention to news from TV (often negative news) but the number of respondents mentioned "negative incidents and facts" has decreased from 7.5% (2007) to 6.1% (2012). Almost all of Japanese students mentioned "terrorism", "Chechen terrorists in Chechnya", "high crime situation" and "mafia" ("criminals", "crime", just like in most every city in the world). Such stereotypic beliefs can simply be added to the information that is otherwise available, or they may serve as a heuristic cue that provides a quick basis for making the type of judgment that is required given the situation. Respondents mention that Russian society is devoid of what we call "political freedoms": "people couldn't say and write what they were thinking", "time of troubles", "political instability". Japanese students often mentioned the "Chernobyl" incident in 2012! However this was quite predictable due of the problems caused by the March 2011 radiation tragedy in Japan.

It is worth recognizing that national image is not solely dependent upon media reports or policy speeches, but is also associated with a country's products and services. In this connection it should be mentioned that alcohol features high for both Japanese and Russian students' perceptions. The percentage of those students who said that Russians were "drunkards" or "dipsomaniac" dramatically increased from 3% (2007) to 11.7% (2012). Heavy drinking is well a recognized problem by the Russians themselves since traditionally it is considered to be a very bad behavior. Japanese students however tried to give explanations to this habit - "Here is the reason for drinking in Russia - not to catch cold"- it's not a national sin, it's not really a mood enhancer, it's simply an element of culture, working towards survival.

We also found out that a minority of Japanese students who have little or no contact with Russians or those who are studying Russian language already have a considerable knowledge of the country's geography, history and politics. However, they know very little about its literature and traditions. They may have had little or no chance to live in Russia, but they communicate with others who have been there or have Russian friends. They may be definitely weak on a vital factor in understanding character: namely, personal contact with the people, however, on an individual level, these students have the more favorable impressions towards Russia and Russian people. For description of national traits of the Russian people, these students used words such as "friendly," "honest," "kind," or "cheerful" to describe Russians, as opposed to those who only know Russians from the media, who more often use negative descriptions such as "roughness," "hardness," and "nervousness".

Thus, here we could see that a stereotype change may occur following the presentation of new category of social information (e.g., through intergroup contact), although the positive effects of contact depend on specifiable

conditions.³⁶ Intergroup (and, in our case, international) contact per se led to a change in the mutual attitudes held by the interacting groups and improved their relationships. Thus, we can conclude that, contact among individual members of different groups (Japanese and Russian students) creates conditions conducive to mutual acquaintance and positive attitude change. This approach has provided the foundation for policy decisions and applied projects in the areas of housing, work and education. On the international scene it fostered various international meetings within the frameworks of student exchanges, sport contests, conventions, etc.

Although positive attitudes of Japanese students towards their Russians counterparts have declined somewhat in the past few years, it should be noted that the image of the Russians as "COOL" people, "patriots who love their country", "kind, friendly, light people" has got relative advantage in its public image. Here we could see that some negative Japanese images of Russian people were replaced by new positive images and vice versa, while some negative stereotypes remained unchanged.

It is worth paying attention to the significance of a more positive general image of Russia - it is associated with the following characteristics: "National symbols"- but it has fallen from 5.7% (2007) to 4.4% (2012); "Shows-Ballet- Performances" –this has decreased from 4.6% (2007) to 2.6% (2012); "Sport and sportsmen" – has decreased from 6.6% (2007) to 3.7% (2012). Based on these findings we can suggest, that Olympic Games 2014 (in Sochi) may be a good opportunity to improve Russia's image. It is evident that most host countries use the Olympics for cultural, social, political and national image promotion. The Olympic Games have become one of the most large-scale profitable global media events. That is why such newsworthy events have been used by many governments for the purpose of enhancing their national images as seen by foreign public.³⁷ The host countries became more visible in the international media, and the tone of the reports about them became more positive over time. Stories about the host countries published after the games depicted them as less threatening to the global status quo and to common values. Thus it can be assumed that media coverage will have a significant influence on how people build their image of the 2014 Olympics host country - Russia.

³⁶See Amir Yehuda, "The role of intergroup contact in change of prejudice and ethnic relations," in *Towards the elimination of racism*, ed. P. A. Katz (New York: Pergamon, 1976). 245-308.

³⁷Jarol Manheim, & Robert Albritton, "Changing national images: International public relations and media agenda setting," *The American Political Science Review* 78 (1984): 641-657.

It is difficult to explain the steady reduction of the negative and positive evaluation of people by means of situation factors that were mentioned by Japanese students. Stereotypic beliefs concerning social groups and categories often entail a high level of consensus in their contents. Likely sources of this concordance include social learning from parents, peers, and mass media.³⁸ Nevertheless, aggregation across a large sample of rates yielded a highly reliable rating that corresponds to the perception that is shared by the group as a whole (by University students). These might be considered implicit national character stereotypes, because they are accessible only by aggregating across multiple rates, many of which might not explicitly endorse the cumulative profile. Many prejudices about nations are carried forward through the generations, i.e. historical events of long ago can still be decisive to a nation's image. This way social information that is particularly communicable will tend to be shared repeatedly through communication chains, becoming a part of a society's beliefs about individuals and groups.³⁹ But the influence of novels, films in forming images of foreign nations and countries should not be underestimated.

Among Russian students the group that is well informed about Japan and interested in politics seems to be more optimistic than the less informed and less interested groups in Japanese Universities. Russian students see Japan as a "successful country" with "high quality of life as well as economy", associating Japan with "old customs and traditions". The percentage of those who responded that "the image of Japan was a harmonious combination of a unique culture and tradition combined with a modernized society, high technology" as well as an "image of a high-tech country" has increased from 6.6% (2007) to 9.3% (2012). Russian students consider the Japanese character to be the main factor of Japan's economic success.

The present research is an illustrative explanation - stereotyped images are long-lasting and durable. They are difficult to change and can be passed on as heritage from the past. It is fair to suppose that Japanese students' attitudes toward the Russians and Russia can be easily marked by the changing nature of the popular stereotype associated with Russians from Soviet epoch. The historical legacy is still strong and little has been done or reported on in the media to change these stereotypes.

For some Japanese students, their attitudes towards Russia is influenced by their fear of war and military aggression during the Soviet era and the suppression of human rights in Russia – popular opinion tends to view the Russian Federation as

³⁸Minoru Karasawa, Nobuko Asai and Yoshiko Tanabe, "Stereotypes as Shared Beliefs: Effects of Group Identity on Dyadic Conversations," *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations*, Vol. 10(4) (2007): 515–532.

³⁹Yoshihisa Kashima, "Maintaining cultural stereotypes in the serial reproduction of narratives," *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 26 (2000):594–604.

the imperial successor to the Soviet Union. However, there exists a general perception of Russia as a political actor, which is influenced by historical relationships with some countries. As for Russian students – their attitudes about Japan have some changes over the past years. So we could see that on average, views of Russian students have moved to positives-neutral.

On the one hand - images of a nation are those stable enough, stratified, and dynamic images, which refer to the culture, history, politics, and economy of that nation. Those images comprise within themselves a set of symbols and social visions on the perceived nation's position in the world, and its foreign policy orientation.

On the other hand, Japanese students still have limited knowledge about Russia. Here I would like to cite President Putin: "Russia is beginning to fulfill the task to use "soft power" to improve its image abroad and promote its interests. The main efforts will focus on increasing the number of Russian science and culture centers and work with compatriots and foreign youth."⁴⁰ As students read, hear, observe, and think more about the world around them, they can add more detail and structure to their maps. As students get older, their mental maps accumulate multiple layers of useful information and this growth in complexity and utility can provide them with a sense of satisfaction as more places and events in the world can be placed into meaningful spatial contexts.

7. Conclusion

So far, in this research we have tried to analyze and trace the evolution of Japanese and Russian students' perceptions of their respective countries from 2007 until 2012, identifying those images, attempting to determine how they originated, why students shared them and why they differed.

This study attempted to examine the various sources of information from which students from Russia and Japan get the necessary information on problems they are interested in, the perception of the respective countries and their citizens as well as the various opinions about these countries. Important developments in this area of research over the last five years have witness significant changes amongst which are, firstly: the level of students' knowledge of other countries and cultures has been increasing. Secondly, through the Internet, television and other media, it has been easier to learn about other countries and cultures. Nowadays, the mass media plays a crucial role in the creation of stereotyped images of other nations and cultures.

⁴⁰ Russian press review (16.01.2013) Russia to improve image abroad. [database on-line]; available at www.itar-tass.com/c142/622415.html

Television is a medium of visual images. TV-news may also have a greater influence (in affecting the general evaluations of countries) than print coverage, but the Internet penetration rates continue to rise throughout the world, digital divides in the Internet access persist as central public policy challenges of the digital age. All these stereotypes are representations of groups, often used to describe, interpret, evaluate, and predict actions of individuals.⁴¹ As we can see, such standardized conceptions are held in common by the members of groups such as university students in Japan and Russia. Popular stereotypes are images that are shared by those who hold a common cultural mindset - they are the way a culture, or significant sub-group within that culture, defines and labels a specific group of people. The students have many narrow images of people, places, or things that are unique to their personal outlook. Students' opinions and values, as element of political culture can be compared with interest in politics, media consumption and action. The presented issues must be considered, to determine how they could help in creating of positive images of the neighboring countries and in turn it will help to improve relationships between our countries. It is not possible to extrapolate conclusions of the general population from the examination of University students, however, this study also serves as a window to an understanding of the process of forming of public opinion about neighboring countries and has highlighted some areas of opportunity where foreign policy may be directed to best cultivate positive attitudes and views that would rebound to closer economic and political ties. Moreover, a strong commitment to mutual understanding and trust apparently prevails among the peoples of the two countries.

Due to the significance of national images in this era of information which confer a form of soft power upon a State, greater emphasis in the study of it will be quite helpful to build a State's international reputation, and facilitate improved understanding and constructive relationships between Japan and Russia. The goal, as suggested is based upon the promotion of the idea that the youth are most affected by policy decisions, and therefore, active youth participation in policy formulation process represents an assured basis for improved relations and future dialogue between our countries.

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⁴¹See Daniel Bar-Tal, Carl F., Graumann, Arie W. Kruglanski, & Wolfgang Stroebe, ed. *Stereotyping and prejudice: Changing conception.* (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1989).

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ETHICS, MORALITY AND POLITICS IN NIGERIA: A NORMATIVE APPROACH

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Abstract

Opponents of political ethics criticise the whole enterprise of political ethics, while the proponents claim that ethics and morality are indispensable in political life. The practice of making moral judgement about political actors permits the scholar to understand the connection between democratic theory, practice and political ethics/morality. This work evaluates the extent to which politics in Nigeria is conducted according to laid down rules and principles recognized internationally as best known practice in democratic process. Nigeria's democratization process has been so complicated and yet so important in determining the progress of its democratic practice, and the ongoing second revolution after a long period of military interregnum. The democratic progress achieved can be measured by the conduct of the political actors and how the polity allow for free, fair and credible election.

Key words: Ethics, Morality, Politics, Political Ethics, Nigeria.

1. Introduction

A realistic analysis of the problems of human society according to Niebuhr¹ reveals a constant and seemingly irreconcilable conflict between the needs of society and the imperative of a sensitive conscience. This conflict in his view can be defined as the conflict between ethics and politics which is made inevitable by a double focus on the moral life. The moral life viewed from the perspective of society and of highest moral ideal is justice. Any non-rational instrument of justice cannot be used without great peril to society

Politics we must understand operates in an environment and in a particular situation which involves the search for values and ideals. Hence political activities involve disagreements and the resolution of such disagreements. Thus politics majorly draws individuals and groups into political activity. Politics can thus be assumed to be concerned with public goals and desires². It is in this light that Lipson's³ view

¹ Niebuhr Reinhold "The Conflict Between Individual and Social Morality," in *Documents of Modern Political Thought*, ed. Thomas Edwin Utlely, & John Stuart Maclure, J. S. (London Cambridge; Cambridge University Press. 1976). 257.

² Gauba, *An Introduction to Political Theory*. (India: Macmillan Publishers. 2004)

³ Leslie Lipson, *The Great Issues of Politics; An Introduction to Political Science* (New Jersey: Prentice – Hall, Inc. 1976), 22

becomes trite. In his view since the core of politics consists of choice, the orderly analysis of data forms the prelude to an act of judgement. Hence in politics there is a perennial argument of pros and cons, debating the merit and demerit of alternative policies, disputing the wisdom of ultimate goals, and weighing the efficacy of possible means. Lipson(1976)⁴ concludes by stating that:

“The political process –not only as discussed in philosophical treatises but also as actually conducted in daily life- abounds with invocations of ideals. People dedicate their governments to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, to equality, justice, peace and good order, and similar noble purposes.”

This in itself should be seen as the confluence between politics and ethics. Politics should take into cognizance the values and ethics of the environment in which it operates. This is because government policies have a society-wide impact. Most political affairs, whether domestic or international involve some level of moral judgement. As Lipson⁵ rightly noted, theorizing about values, though a speculative activity or endeavour is not independent of reality.

It is trite to thus state that political doctrines do not hover weightless in a sealed chamber removed from political actuality. They should be an integral part of the living reality of society and its government. They form the template upon which to understand the state, individual relationship and to render them intelligible to reason. Ethics, values and morals do inject into politics a purpose and a rationale which could create a peaceful environment and a harmonious relationship in which the political actors would be forced to play the game according to the rules while developing a unique political culture.

Aristotle captures it by his claim that a good citizen is possible in a good state and a bad state makes bad citizens. In his view there cannot be a good state where wrong ethical ideals prevail⁶. This is where the democratic option becomes imperative. The democratic arrangement constitutes an approach in connecting the rule-ruler-ruled relationship which dominates most political science postulations. According to Oluwu⁷ democracy is not necessarily the best but it is the one that is regarded as the least problematic in constituting modern political systems. The collapse of such systems as theocracy, monarchy etc has left democracy as the only option. Arguably, democracy has become all things to all men. Several scholars advanced

⁴Ibid 22

⁵Ibid 23

⁶Vidya D.Mahajan, *Principles of Political Science*. (New Delhi. S. Chand and Company LTD. Reprint 2011), 77.

⁷Oluwu, D. Transition to Democratic Governance in Africa. In Oluwu, Soremekum, K and Williams, A (Eds) *Governance and Democratization in Nigeria*. Benin-city. Spectrum Books Limited. 1995/ 1999, 18

various and often contradictory meanings to the word democracy. However Dahl's⁸ contribution is widely accepted. His concept of polyarchy has been most celebrated and perhaps successful.

Polyarchy is not only a system of government but a rigorous attempt to view democratic process as a function of several features which include; (1) freedom of speech (2) freedom of association (3) the supremacy of the will of the electorate (4) regular elections and (5) accountability.⁹ In essence the system is defined by certain important attributes; competition for public office by individuals or political parties at periodic intervals without the use of force, inclusive level of political participation in the selection of leaders and policies and a level of civil and political liberties. These three attributes should exist in a polity, sufficient to guarantee the integrity of political competition and participation. They thus form the template for evaluation the conduct of elections and the actions/activities of politicians in Nigeria's democratisation process.

Most African countries since the 1990 have experienced one form or other of democratic renaissance and probably awakening. Unfortunately, they have failed to consolidate on and deepen democracy. A fundamental drawback is the nature of their political culture or lack of it. Partisan politics suffer from certain defects which include politics without principles. Politics without ethics and morals happen to be the bane of partisan politics in Africa. This has been the reason for the numerous crises in the African continent. This work examines ethics, morality and politics in Nigeria, using the normative approach.

In political ethics there is usually an impulse toward the general even when judgements are directed toward the particular. However as the popular remark states, when political mechanism is devoid of moral consideration it is often prone to abuse, misuse of power and other negatives not associated with democratic ethos. Normative theory is concerned with the norms, standards or principles of human behaviour upon which judgement could be made. This is the thrust of the work. While examining the actions and activities of politicians in the electoral process, the work endeavours into how these actions and activities touched on the question of ethics and morality.

⁸ Dahl, R *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition*. New haven, CT: Yale University Press. 1971.

⁹Williams, A *The Fractionalization of Democratic Struggle in Africa: The Nigerian Example*. In Oluwu, Soremekun, K and Williams, A (Eds) *Governance and Democratization in Nigeria*. Benin-city. Spectrum Books Limited. 1995/ 1999, 66.

2. Ethics and Morality

Ethics and morality are often used interchangeably. In Amstutz's¹⁰ opinion the two terms represent distinct elements of normative analysis. He posit that while morality refer to values and beliefs about what is right, wrong, good, bad, just and unjust, ethics can be explained in terms of examining and justifying the critical analysis of morality. Ethics can also be explained as a philosophical thinking about morality, moral problems and moral judgements¹¹.

Amstutz¹² identified three distinguishing features of moral values; command of universal allegiance, demand impartiality and self-enforcing. The claim to universality means that moral norms are binding on all people. The impartiality of norms on the other hand help to ensure that morality is not simply a means to cloth and advance self-enforcing feature but to explain the voluntary actions of persons on moral issues. Explaining further Amstutz¹³ opine that although morality is pervasive in human life, it is concerned mainly with a particular dimension of human affairs namely, individual and collective judgements involving moral values. It is however not concerned with choices and actions in the nonmoral realm.

The word morality derives from the Latin word "Mores" meaning, custom, habit, and way of life, It describes what is good, right and proper. These concepts can be associated with such notions as virtue, integrity, goodness, righteousness and justice. Morality is viewed as a social enterprise for which the individual is inducted into it and becomes more or less of a participant in it. Morality as an instrument of society as a whole is for the guidance of individuals and groups. It makes demands on individuals. Consequently, considered from the period a social system for regulation, it is like law on the one hand and convention or etiquette on the other¹⁴.

The above claim notwithstanding Frankena¹⁵ is of the view that morality can be distinguished from convention by certain features that it shares with law. In the same vain though morality and law overlap, they are distinguished by certain features which it shares with convention. For instance, it is not created or changeable by deliberate legislative, executive or judicial act. In addition its sanction is not physical force or the threat of it but praise or blame, or verbal signs of favour or disfavour.

¹⁰Mark Amstutz, *International Ethics; Concept, Theories, and Cases in Global Politics*. (U. S. Rowman & littlefield Publishers, Inc. 2005), 8.

¹¹See William K Frankena, *Ethics* (2nd solution.) (New Jersey: Prentice – Hall, Inc. 1973) 4

¹²Mark Amstutz, 8

¹³ Ibid

¹⁴ See William K. Frankena, K. W. 1973:6

¹⁵ Ibid

Morality is equally used to refer to a system of principles and judgements shared by cultural, religious and philosophical communities with common beliefs of what constitute right and wrong.¹⁶ It is presumed that some actions are antithetical to man's nature and at the same time militate against his well-being. Some other actions also promote his well-being and lead to happiness and self-fulfilment. Man is therefore expected to engage in such actions considered morally right.

Morality in the sense of the above explanation encompasses a wide variety of areas related to the field of ethics. For Kant the basic ethical question is how one "ought" to conduct himself. Kant's ethical theory places emphasis on duty and justice before the idea of good.¹⁷ It is therefore taken that there is a connecting relation between the moral life of the individual and that of the society. The moral insights and achievements of the individual conscience are relevant and necessary to the life of society. The highest moral ideal of the individual should be justice. Hence society must strive for justice using any means. It is thus of note that justice cannot be established if moral imagination of the individual does not seek to comprehend the needs and interests of his fellow.¹⁸ It is in this light that Aristotle's claim that "a good citizen is possible in a good state and a bad state makes bad citizens" can be understood.

The prescriptive and normative theories of morality are apt in this discourse. For instance, the ethical prescriptive terms of "good" and "bad" are used to prescribe a course of action. Hence moral statements can be evaluative and prescriptive. Normative theory is concerned with norms, standards or principles of human behaviour.

Yet, an important aspect of this discourse is on cultivating traits of character or disposition based on moral principles. According to Frankena¹⁹ morality throughout history has been concerned about the cultivation of certain dispositions, or treats, among which are character or such virtues as honesty, kindness and conscientiousness. Virtues in his view are dispositions or treats that are not wholly innate, but acquired at least in part by teaching and practice or perhaps by grace. They are treats of character rather than of personality intended to carry out certain kinds of actions in certain situations. He further posits that they are not just abilities or skills which one may have without using. They have to be put in use constantly.

¹⁶Okorie Okomba, quoting Joseph Omoregbe The Ethical Implication of Separating Morality from Politics Taking A Cue from Machiavellian Political Ideas and the Nigerian Political Experience.(2006) www.dira.portal.org/smash/get/dixe full text. retrieved 15/9/2014

¹⁷Ibid

¹⁸Reinhold Niebuhr, "The Conflict Between Individual and Social Morality".

¹⁹William Frankena, 62

Based on this it is suggested that morality is or should be conceived primarily with the cultivation of such dispositions or traits of character. This happens to be the line of Plato and Aristotle's thought for they both speak of virtue and the virtuous rather than what is right or obligatory. Stephen captures it by stating that morality is internal and the only mode of stating the moral law must be as a rule of character.²⁰ The next section thus considers the relationship between ethics and politics or what has been referred to as political ethics.

3. Political Ethics

The debate on the possible relationship between morality, ethics and politics has been a long standing one. The crux of the debate centres on the place of ethical and moral concepts such as; right, good, virtue, wrong, evil etc in politics. Girardin²¹ mapped out and identified what he considers as the various positions of the schools of thought on ethics in politics. They are:

- (1) Scepticism: Although the sceptics do not outrightly reject the place of ethics in politics, there is a strong hesitation on their part to apply ethics in politics. It is amoral in their view.
- (2) Cynicism: Cynicism declares that ethics as a principle is not only irrelevant but damaging in politics. It is immoral.
- (3) Moralism: Moralism projects ideal ethical values as goals for any politics and considers them as normative, or at least inspiring.
- (4) Pragmatism: pragmatists consider ethics as a possible added value for politics and check case by case whether or not this is true.

These schools of thought can be collapsed into two for simple and better understanding of the position of the schools of thought. They are those against and those in support. For those against Machiavelli's views explain their position. Machiavelli noted that the ultimate goal of politics was to grab political power and retain same. Machiavelli while stating he was being practical and realistic, remarked that men were naturally bad, hence a ruler should be prudent, shrewd, practical and swift in action. A ruler needs not to be morally upright, religious, honest, compassionate or humane.²² Machiavelli argued that if men were all good, this precept would not be a good one, but as they are bad and would not observe their faith with you, so you are not bound to keep faith with them.²³

²⁰Ibid 63.

²¹Benoit Girardin, *Ethics in Politics*. (Geneva: Globethics.net, 2012) www.globethics.net

²² Joseph Omeregbe, *Simplified History of Philosophy: Ancient and Medieval Philosophy*, (Nigeria. Jopa Press LTD. 1991) 189.

²³ Vidya Mahajan, *Principles of Political Science*. (New Delhi. S. Chand and Company LTD. Reprint 2011) 78.

Aristotle and Kant's views explain the position of the proponents of political ethics. Aristotle was of the view that what is morally wrong cannot be politically right. He claimed that there cannot be a good state where wrong ethical ideals prevail. Since human beings are political animal justice should be a combination of good, right and useful. Kant stated that true politics cannot take a single step forward unless it has first done homage to morals.

Catlin, Gattel and Gandhi contributed to the debate. Catlin pointed out that from ethics a statesman can learn which course among several that is desirable. In Gattels view the proper form and function of government must be determined in the last analysis on the basis of the ethical compromise at securing the greatest good to the individual and at the same time promote the greatest common welfare²⁴. Gandhi's in support of political ethics preached non-violence claiming that non-violence is not a cloistered virtue to be practiced by the individual for his peace and to find salvation, but a rule of conduct for society if it is to live consistently with human dignity²⁵. The society has the right to enforce public morality, hence there is the ultimate need for norms of behavior. Standards of behavior or values constitute the norms of a system which must be generally recognized. Rourke and Boyer²⁶ observe that systems develop norms for two reasons; first, that various psychological and sociological factors prompt humans to adopt values to define what is ethical and moral. Secondly, that human, tend to favour regularized patterns of behavior because of the pragmatic need to interact and to avoid the anxiety and disruption caused by the random or unwanted behavior of others.

Chandra's²⁷ view supports the above by the claim that there are indispensable principles of equity and justice and, a universally accepted principle of instruction. Amstutz²⁸ will although argue that personal morality and political morality are not identical, he acknowledges the fact that they are related. For this reason Amstutz²⁹ opine that the autonomy of states can be quantified by moral claims of individuals, since the right of states ultimately depend on the right of persons. Consequently, the fundamental choice of statesmen is rooted in moral values. It is a fact that individual morality governs the actions of individuals hence the need to judge

²⁴Ibid quoting Catlin and Gattel in *Principles of Political Science*. (New Delhi. S. Chand and Company LTD. Reprint 2011) 78

²⁵see Gratin, 2012

²⁶John Rourke, & Mark Boyer, *International Politics on the World Stage*. (New York: McGraw Hill Publishers 9th Edition. 2003) 85.

²⁷Prakash Chandra, *Theories of International Relations*. (New Delhi. Vikos Publishing House LTD. P. 2004) 199.

²⁸Mark Amstutz,. 2005 10.

²⁹Ibid

individual office holders by such moral standards as recognized by the society. Moral principles are absolutely essential in the affairs of state. According to Gilchrist³⁰ political ideals cannot be divorced from the ethical ideal. Ivor Brown³¹ aptly sums it up;

“Politics is but ethics writ large. Ethical theory is incomplete without political theory because man is an associated creature and cannot live fully in isolation. Political theory is idle without ethical theory because its study and its result depend fundamentally on our scheme of moral value, our conception of right and wrong”

Government functions must in the last analysis be determined on the basis of the ethical compromise at securing the greatest good to the individual and promote the greatest common welfare. Due to the complexity of public affairs and the competing moral values that are involved in specific political issue area government decisions may not lend themselves to single moral verdict. Yet this cannot constitute a problem in relating ethics, morality with politics. This is the platform or template upon which this work examines politics in Nigeria with particular focus on the use of the impeachment tool in its political process.

Proponents of political ethics have argued that examining the decision and character of individual politician can help identify the structural constraints on their action, and point the way toward reform.³² In general, political ethics though recognizes structure, it emphasis the concept of human agency that operate and tries to change the structure. This explains the importance of human being within the field of politics and governance. Politics in Nigeria affords us the opportunity to evaluate political ethics and morality in politics.

4. Politics in Nigeria

The Nigerian state is made up of peoples with diverse ethno-linguistic background, assuming a broad even insipiently pan-Nigerian form, long before the creation of political Nigeria in 1914. The Ibadan school of history argued that colonial rule itself was an episode in the long historical march of the Nigerian peoples towards the formation of a political system. The new political system was faced with certain challenges.

³⁰Vidya Mahajan, quoting Gilchrist

³¹Vidya Mahajan 78

³²International encyclopaedia of Ethics: Political Ethics
Scholarcharrard.edu/files/dft/files/political.ethics.revised_10-11.pdf

Balogun³³ commenting on the challenges facing the Nigerian state remarked that in an underdeveloped society with stunted economic growth and with relatively few opportunities for rewarding investment in the industrial sector, government patronage inevitably becomes a major source of benefit in trade and in other commercial activities. Consequently, with the departure of the British the Nigerian leadership group settled down to share the "national cake". Even at that though the leadership group may share same language or possess certain common traits, it did not result in common political action³⁴.

Nigeria's attainment of independence in 1960 inaugurated a new era when Nigerians began to assume the responsibility of governing themselves. The first experience in democratic rule was short lived as the republic was cut short by a military coup in January 1966. As has been rightly observed post-independence political history of Nigeria is largely that of military intervention in politics. There were coups and counter coups. The military ruled the country for twenty seven years, hence it contributed much to shape the political, economic and social formation of post-independent Nigeria.³⁵ Military rule is authoritarian. Consequently, the non-democratic character of the military renders suspect the efforts of military regimes at democratising societies in which they held sway. Hence, Nigeria's latest democratic experience since the military handed over power in 1999 can be said to exhibit features inherent in a military regime³⁶.

In view of these fundamental realities the contest for power according to Balogun³⁷ was primarily a contest for economic survival as a group to which the struggle developed into naked confrontation in which the rival groups were less willing to respect the outward forms of restraint and conventional chivalry associated with democratic tenets on which Nigerian political structure had been modelled³⁸. In the struggle to seize larger shares of the national cake, each contending group displayed virtually no limit to the method it was prepared to employ to gain power³⁹.

³³Ola Balogun, *The Tropic Years – Nigeria in Crisis*. (Benin City: Ethiope Publishing Corporation. 1973) 14.

³⁴See Obaro Ikime, "In search of Nigerians: Changing Problems of Inter-group Relations in An Evolving Nation State". Presidential Inaugural lecture delivered at the 30th congress of the Historical Society of Nigeria at the University of Nigeria, Nnsukka, 1st may 1985: 31.

³⁵Osaghae. Eghosa, *Nigeria Since Independence: the Crippled Giant*. Ibadan: John Avchers publishers. 2002.

³⁶Adesina. Sambo. *Transition to Democracy in Nigeria Possibilities ana Limitations*. In Omo Omoruyi, Dirst. Berg. Schlosset and Ada, Okuosa. (Eds) *Democracy in Africa: Nigeria perspectives* Volue one. Hima Hima LTD: Benin City, Nigeria.

³⁷see Ola Balogun, O.1973

³⁸ Ibid 14

³⁹ Ibid 21

The concept of morality and ethics had no roots in the minds of the Nigerian politician. Parties in power were prepared to use the police and the courts to inflict punitive sanctions on their opponents and the suspecting opposing electorate. Elections were rigged, opponents were assassinated, thugs were employed and the ruling party acted with impunity. These were the picture of politics in Nigeria right from the first republic. All of these acted as a potential explosive situation which gave politics a negative image for which the military ventured into politics. This account for the various crises in Nigeria's democratization process since independence.

Analysing the cause for the hobbesian nature of politics in Nigeria, the absence and lack of morality and ethics in politics can be identified. Military President Ibrahim Babangida observed that what went wrong in the past was not lack of ideas but the absence of guiding principles and practice on which genuine political parties could operate⁴⁰. The struggle for the control of the centre and the regions/states dominated politics in Nigeria. The elections and post-election periods revealed the fragility of the Nigerian State. All the organs and structure of government exhibited weakness. Hence, the entire political system and those who operated it in Falola's⁴¹ view had become discredited. This happens to be so because of the high rate of corruption, indiscipline and impunity within the system.

In comparism with the western world, empirical evidence indicate that policies and priorities may change, if one government takes the place of another but appointments, and existing interest, covering most aspect of the nations activities remain unaltered and for those individuals and bodies, it is important not just who wins the political battle, but that the rules of the game which preserves all their areas of influence, their position and practices, are observed.

The Fourth Republic in Nigeria witnessed a turbulent relationship between the executive and the legislature in the new democratic dispensation after the period of military dictatorship. President Obasanjo's fourth Republic witnessed the interference of the presidency in the affairs of the legislature. The presidency was instrumental in the removal/impeachment of four senate presidents within a period of five years. The Nigerian Vanguard⁴² aptly captured the situation when it wrote that Evans Enwerem the first president of the senate did not spend as much as one year in office before he was removed. His successor, Chuba Okadigbo was only

⁴⁰ Emmanuel Ezeani, "Electoral Malpractice in Nigeria," in *Elections and Democratic Consolidation in Nigeria*, eds Godwin Onu. & Abubakar Monoh, A. (Lagos, Nigeria political Science Association. 1994) 82

⁴¹ Toyin Falola, Abdullahi Mahadi, Martin Uhomobhi, and Ukachukwu eds. *History of Nigeria: Nigeria in the Nineteenth Century*. Nigeria: Longman. 1991: 107.

⁴² The Nigerian Vanguard April 5, 2006

weeks on the seat before the impeachment drums started beating. Anyim who succeeded Okadigbo did not fare better, staying only weeks before a combination of the bruised loyalist of Okadigbo and the presidency supporters in the senate moved against him.

The presidency was virtually above the law in Nigeria. The Nigerian Vanguard in its editorial titled, "living above the law" drew attention to the comment of the Chief justice of Nigeria Justice Mohamend Lawal Uwais in respect to breaches of the rule of law and the constitution by the Obasanjo presidency. The Chief Justice was exasperated over the disobedience of court orders by the Federal Government and state governments. Justice Mohammad Uwais speaking at the opening ceremony of the 2005 all Nigerian Judges Conference in Abuja lamented the gross abuse of court orders by the presidency. He saw it as an affront to the constitution and clear evidence of bad governance. He thus observed that an act that was rampant under the past military regimes had reared its ugly head.

Some of the constitutional breaches amongst others were;

(a) the refusal of the president to release the Lagos council funds as directed by the nation's highest court, the Supreme Court in its judgement of December 10, 2004.

(b) The ruling party the P.D.P. ignored court order and went ahead to hold a none-elective congress.

(c) The Independent National Electoral Commission ignored court order stopping it from holding a referendum in the recall of the Plateau State House of Assembly.

(d) The Independent National Electoral Commission also disobeyed court order of 16th March, 2006 that it has no right to disqualify candidates under the provision of the 1999 constitution.⁴³

The impeachment process of State Governors, Deputy Governors, and Speakers of the State Houses of Assembly make for an interesting reading in executive lawlessness. An impeachment according to Dare⁴⁴ (2014) should be the ultimate political sanction a country that has the tradition of the rule of law should apply. It is the punishment of last resort for high officials of state who betray the public trust or fail egregiously to live up to its stipulations. Dare⁴⁵ thus note that in Nigeria where politics is vengefulness and vendetta by another name impeachment is for reasons that cannot stand legal scrutiny. He concludes by observing that Nigerian politicians have perverted impeachment and given it a bad name. For instance, under Presidents Jonathans watch the Enugu state deputy governor Sunday Onyebuchi

⁴³See Laz Etemike, "Globalization and Democratization in Nigeria". (A Ph.D Thesis, Ambrose Alli University, Ekpoma, unpublished 2009)

⁴⁴Olatunje Dare, "Chicken Impeachment: Matters Arising" *The Nation Newspaper*. Nigeria September 2nd 2014

⁴⁵See ibid

was impeached by the Enugu state House of Assembly for rearing chickens in his official residence.

Other impeachments during the period under discussion were the Taraba deputy governor, whom the courts later reinstated describing the impeachment process as faulty and vengeful, the governor of Adamawa Governor Nyako and the Speaker of Ekiti State House of Assembly where seven legislators out of a house of 25 members impeached the Speaker with the assistance of the police force. Imo state deputy governor did not escape the impeachment harmer of the state legislature for a trump up charge of corruption for which the court later exonerated him. During President Obasanjo's period the polity witnessed greater numbers of impeachments of State Governors, for being "disloyal" to the presidency; they include Bayelsa, Ekiti, Oyo, Anambra, and Plateau states.⁴⁶

It was clearly obvious that the process of impeachments were being short circuited. The impeachment processes usually played itself out in this form; the Economic and Financial Crime Commission(EFCC) instigated by the presidency or the state governor accuses the target to be impeached of one thing or the other. The minority members within the state house of assembly sets a 'kangaroo panel' made up of loyal party members to investigate. It takes the panel two days or less to conduct the investigation and send its report to the House. The House with no debate pronounces the impeachment. During the process the police offered protection to the minority members' shouting out the majority members from the House.⁴⁷

The EFCC and the police both federal agencies sustained by the tax payers money simply acted as agents of state terrorism. Both facilitated, instigated and emboldened the State of Assembly minority law makers to willingly and wilfully trample upon the constitution with share impunity.

5. Evaluating Ethics and Morality in Nigerian Politics.

In deontic judgement or moral obligation rules, principles, ideas and virtues can be expressed in more general judgement form. It can be referred to as normative ethics or theory. Normative ethics is therefore about norms, standards or principles of human behaviour. Judgements of normative nature are regarded as moral obligation (deontic) or moral value (aretic) judgements. Frankena⁴⁸ regard normative judgements as "evaluative" judgements or "value" judgements. Most political office holders pay little or no attention to the moral implication of their

⁴⁶Laz Etemike,

⁴⁷Ibid

⁴⁸William Frankena, 1973.

actions. Hence there is the danger of turning the act of politics and governance into Machiavellianism. According to Okomba⁴⁹ Machiavellianism encourages over exaltation of power above every other consideration, despotism, corruption and abuse of power. It emphasis ends with means inconsequential. Kant admonish that every human action should be such that is not only acceptable to us but also to others who are affected by such action.

The historical and empirical study of politic in Nigeria is instructive in evaluating ethical and moral actions of politicians using the normative approach. The nature and character of politics in Nigeria is defined in the liberal pretension of an elite buccaneer ruling class. It displays a blatant abuse and misuse of power by the ruling class. The enormous powers granted the president and the ruling class by the system prompt its description as 'Presidential Monarchism' It thus explains the connection between democratic theory and political ethics. Hence political ethics in a democracy examines the actions and policies within certain fundamental questions: What circumstances should democratic politics make? Such circumstances should include the need to make collective decisions that are binding on all citizens and the diversity of moral and political view in modern societies.⁵⁰

Consequently, as captured in the previous section there are ample evidence to show that politics in Nigeria lack ethics and morals. The abuse and misuse of power has shown that politicians assume power to be the ultimate goal of politics. This work therefore amongst others use the following template in carrying out its normative evaluation; rule of law, corruption, disobey of court injunctions, constitutional breaches, rule of impunity, violence, electoral fraud, political assassination, and the use of police force against opponents and citizens. While few remarks and observations would be made as regard previous civilian regimes or republics as it is generally referred to in Nigeria, emphasis will be more on Nigeria's Fourth Republic.

President Obasanjo's leadership witnessed the successful emasculation of the legislature. The presidency was able to manipulate the impeachment of five Senate presidents within a period of six years and four Chairmen of his party the P.D.P. for what it presumed to be "disloyal."

As regard electoral fraud the report of the European Union Election observation Mission (EUEOM) of 2003 election in Nigeria is a representation of all previous elections except for the annulled June 12, 1993 ELECTION.⁵¹

⁴⁴ Okorie Okomba,

⁵⁰International encyclopaedia of Ethics: Political Ethics
Scholarcharrard.edu/files/dft/files/political.ethics.revised_10-11.pdf

⁵¹See *Vanguard* Newspaper, Nigeria, May 26, 2003.

"EUEOM observers witnessed and obtained evidence of widespread Election fraud in certain states, many instances of ballot box stuffing, Changing of results and other serious irregularities were observed in Cross River, Delta, Enugu, Kaduna, Imo, and Rivers. The elections in these states lack credibility and appropriate measures must be taken by relevant authorities."

Gauba⁵² summed it up by explaining opposition reaction, that the mandate of the people was stolen in a manner reminiscent of one-stone-age politics, here the size of the foot of the master determined the length of the foot. He noted that in 2003 the political class did not even have any respect for the sensibilities of the Nigerian people to rig intelligently. Side by side with the electoral fraud was the disturbing issue of political killings and assassinations. Some of the high profile personalities murdered are listed below;

Table 1. High profile personalities murdered

| Name | Potfolio | Date assassinated |
|-------------------|---|--------------------|
| Chief Bola Ige | Minister of Justice | December, 23, 2001 |
| Ahmed Pategi | Kwara State P.D.P Chairman | August 15, 2002 |
| Alhaji Isyaku | National Vie-Chairman, UNPP, Opp Party | September, 2002 |
| Dele Arojo | Gubernatorial Candidate PDP, Lagos state | Nov 25, 2002 |
| Ogu Ibobo | Local Government Chairman, ANPP, Opp Part | |
| December, 2002 | | |
| Harry Marshal | PDP, Stalwart. Defected | March 5, 2003 |
| Chief Kala Dikibo | PDP Chairman, South-South | February, 2004 |
| Funsho Williams | Governorship Aspirant Lagos State | 2006 |
| Uzadinma Okpara | Governorship Aspirant, Abia State | 2006 |

Source⁵³

Ogundiya & Baba⁵⁴ commenting on politically motivated assassinations observed that political motivated killings have continued to hunt Nigeria's democratic project. In this and other related crisis, it is estimated that over 10,000 Nigerians have lost their lives; hundreds of thousands have been displaced, while properties worth billions of naira have been destroyed. Both authors thus describe Nigeria's political climate as hostile and unstable. They argued that though conflict is the essence of social and political life and that while democracy allows for competition

⁵²O P Gauba, *An Introduction to Political Theory*. (India: Macmillan Publishers. 2005).

⁵³Laz Etemike

⁵⁴Ilufoye S Ogundiya, & T K Baba, "Electoral Violence and the Prospect of Democratic Consolidation in Nigeria" in *Election and Democratic Consolidation in Nigeria*, eds Gowin Onu, And Abubakar Momoh (Eds) (Lagos; Nigeria Political Science Association (NPSA) 2005) 375

among the various ideological interests, democracy becomes an illusion when conflict becomes endemic, persistent and insolvent.

The observation of politics in Nigeria by Iredia⁵⁵ is apt on this issue. In his opinion politics which in other climes operates as a game, is war in Nigeria in which the end justifies whatever weapon employed. There is thus nothing wrong with electoral violence in the form of snatching of ballot boxes or the misuse of law enforcement operatives to clinch electoral victory. Opponents can be silenced by any means because there is nothing the politician cannot do. The use of law enforcement agencies such as the police against opponents explains the Machiavellian nature of politics in Nigeria.

On the aspect of corruption, transparency international perception index captured it thus, out of 175 countries, Nigeria was ranked in 2011- 143, 2012- 139, 2013-144 and 2014-136⁵⁶. Animasaun⁵⁷ writing in the same column, noted that Nigeria operate a system that is open to bribery and corruption, because its institutions are built on corruption. She concluded by observing that efforts to stop corruption fads when leaders and high level officials abuse power and appropriate public funds for personal gains. The fallout is that they undermine justice and economic development and destroy public trust in government and leaders.

The Nigerian polity has continued to witness the reign of impunity. Not only were court orders disobeyed but the various governments were involved in constitutional breaches. For instance, Soyinka⁵⁸ (2014) While commenting on President Jonathan's administration on impunity likened it to the biblical Nebuchadnezzar, citing instances of the presidents impunity. Amongst which are the barring of opposition governors by policemen from entering Ekiti State to campaign for Governor Kayode Fayemi of Ekiti state election of June 2014. Another was the barring of the speaker of the Federal House of Representative and other Honourable members from entering the legislative complex, presumable because of orders from above as a result of his defection to the opposition party.

An apt picture of the nature and character of politics in Nigeria is the event in the Lagos State governorship Peoples Democratic Party (P.D.P) primaries for the 2015 elections, as reported by a newspaper. It was reported that an aspirant wore a bullet proof vest to the venue of the primaries. In his answer to a reporter's question as to why he had to wear a bullet proof vest. He remarked that he was protecting himself from stray bullet. This explains the nature of politics in Nigeria.

⁵⁵Tony Iredia, "Now that Our Senate is Shivering, Whither Nigeria?" In Vanguard Newspaper, Nigeria. December 7, 2014

⁵⁶see Denrele Animasaun, Vanguard Newspaper Nigeria, December 7, 2014

⁵⁷see Denrele Animasaun, Vanguard, December 7, 2014

⁵⁸Wole Soyinke's comment in the *Vanguard* Newspaper December, 2014.

The Vanguard Newspaper⁵⁹ December, 23, 2014 in its editorial captioned: "Jonathan's N21billion naira donation: Impunity taken too far" queried the nature and outcome of the fund raising dinner organized by the ruling party the PDP, to boost the President's campaign war chest for the 2015 election. The process which did not comply with the extant laws could also not pass the integrity test.

First, Nigerian laws are unambiguous on campaign expenses and funding. It stipulates 1billion naira as the maximum election expenses to be incurred by a presidential candidate. The fund raising which had sectoral donors, state governors, government parastatals/agencies, business people and their anonymous friends donated a whopping sum of 21.27billion. This was a brazen display of impunity raising questions of transparency and morality. On moral grounds, the paper opined that leveraging on power to raise campaign funds is corrosively anti-democratic. Such toxic donations of doubtful origin would further poison the electoral process and shore up the system of patronage.

Kant's moral theory is centred on his principle of deontology. He posits that any human action that places wealth and power at par with human being is an immoral one.⁶⁰ Hence, Kant places much importance on duty and justice in human actions. He thus advocates that every human action should be evaluated in line with his three categorical imperatives:

- (a) To act on the maxims which we can will to be universal laws of nature
- (b) To always treat humanity in a person as an end and never as a means merely and
- (c) To act as if we were members of an ideal kingdom of ends in which we are both subject and sovereign at the same time.

Aristotle had in his "Nicomadian ethics" emphasised on the importance of virtue to our understanding of the nature of morality. For him, reason and understanding should be the bases upon which we should act. It is imperative to note that political ethics as a free subject writers can work with mid-level concept and principles such as those that political agents take into consideration in making decisions and policies.⁶¹

Consequently, even though it has been argued that in evaluating politics we may not as a necessity apply foundational moral theories, that notwithstanding, the concepts adopted by political agents in making decisions and policies cannot be

⁵⁹Vanguard Newspaper, Nigeria December, 23, 2014)

⁶⁰See Okorie Okomba, O.O.2006

⁶¹see International Encyclopaedia of Ethics

devoid of foundational moral principles, which should be the bedrock upon which those concepts are built.

This is the normative angle from which politics in Nigeria can be judged. Politics in Nigeria underscores contempt for the masses. It imposes legitimacy on the ruling party and its political elites who in the presumed equal legal status of subjects, carry out the duty of governance with impunity. Lacking moral and ethical stands politicians assume the state as their turf and fief. They continue to keep it so by manipulation, intimidation, violence, reward and punishment.

In the opinion of Adejumbi⁶² callousness characterised the politics of Nigeria's political process. Adejumbi⁶³ quoting Adekanye,(1984) rightly observed that post-military civilian regimes in Nigeria are usually very frail and susceptible to the praetorian instincts of the military. The political leaders socialized in the military tradition mostly behave like military administrators, repressing the people, squandering public resources and rigging elections. All of these according to Adekanye are well dramatized in the Nigerian experience. Hence, Nigeria's democracy has been described as "garrison democracy" or "guided democracy". The paper thus concludes that Nigeria was faced with a crisis of value and a total collapse in political morality.

6. Conclusion

Nigeria is made up of myriads of groups some of which speak variant of the same language and possessed certain common traits. Ikime⁶⁴ observed that the identity or similarity of language and culture did not result in common political action. The colonial period witnesses the attempt by these socio-political units to forge larger units and establish certain identity. The colonial period was an episode in the long historical march of the Nigerian peoples towards the formation of a political system. The new government after independence in Nigeria had to face the challenges and problem from the colonial period all of which impacted on future elections and the democratisation process of the civilian regimes. Balogun⁶⁵ commenting on the challenges remarked that in an underdeveloped society with stunted economic growth and with relatively few opportunities for rewarding investment in the industrial sector, government patronage inevitably becomes a major source of benefit (in trade and in other commercial activities). In view of these fundamental realities the contest for power was primarily a contest for economic survival.

⁶²Said Adejumbi, S. "Elections in Africa: A Fading Shadow of Democracy" *International Political Science Review*. Vol 21 No 1(January 2000): 59-73

⁶³Ibid quoting Adekanye(1984) 2000

⁶⁴Obaro Ikime, 1985: 31.

⁶⁵see Ola Balogun, O.1973

The military incursion into politics introduced yet another challenges in Nigeria's democratisation. The military had been in power for twenty seven years out of fifty years of independent Nigeria. It is therefore no wonder that Nigeria's democratisation process shows lack of ethics and morality. The political actors and the policies they make fall short of internally recognized rules and principles of democracy.

The narrative presented by Thabo Mbeki during his lecture at the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs⁶⁶ captures the picture of politics and democracy in Nigeria. Quoting from the work, "Imagining Insiders" Mbeki narrated the story of a fight between Truth (big and strong) and Falsehood(skinny and weak). Both were enemies and in an ensuing fight falsehood with a hidden cutlass cut-off Truth's head. This jolted and enrages Truth who began to scramble around for his head. He then stumbled on Falsehood and with his awesome strength he yanked off the head of falsehood which he took to be his. This he placed on his own neck. From that day what we have was this grotesque and confusing mis-march: the BODY of Truth and the HEAD of Falsehood. This is the picture of politics and democracy in Nigeria; The body of democracy and the head of un-democratic forces.

Nigeria could do better if ethics and morality is given a place in the decisions, policies and actions of the ruling elites. Adopting Kant's admonition is instructive, human actions should be in conformity with the universal standard, acceptable to us and to others who are affected by the action.

It is recommended that there should be a change in a system and structure that encourages impunity and a Hobbesian type of politics. Consequently, Nigeria should consider the devolution of power, that would reduce the magnitude of power at the federal level and that would at the same instance recognize the various nationalities in building the new system. Empowering the lower levels of government would reduce the inordinate struggle for the control of the centre. At which point Nigeria would have domiciled and domesticated democracy. This structural change will encourage adherence to traditional and cultural values and ethics which is evidently absent in politics in Nigeria.

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⁶⁶NIIA, Lecture series, 81, Lagos, Nigeria

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THIRD WAVE DEMOCRATIZATION IN POST-COLD WAR AFRICA: THE RISE OF ILLIBERAL DEMOCRACY IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

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Abstract

Hopes that “third wave” transitions in sub-Saharan Africa in the early 1990s would usher in a new era of liberal democracy vanished fairly quickly when new forms of liberalized authoritarianism emerged. Illiberal democracy has taken hold as the political trajectory shifted from an opening to a closure when the wave of regime transitions lost steam by the end of the decade. Unlike a relatively steady process of democratic consolidation and a renewed democratic awakening in post-Communist Europe, the region saw continued democratic erosion or breakdown of democratically elected governments and the institutionalization of various illiberal, semi-authoritarian regimes by the turn of the century. Contrary to presumptions of a rebirth of liberal democracy prevalent among some scholars and policy-makers, third wave democratization in Africa predominantly ended up in illiberal democracies and stable semi-authoritarian regimes. Based on a cross-regional analysis and new data made available only recently, this article examines the levels of institutionalization of three main features of democracy: elections, liberal democracy, and the rule of law. It employs a path-dependent institutional approach that focuses on political institutions—both formal and informal—both as causal explanations for the democratic deficit of the transitions and as objects of study in the analysis of democratic consolidation or lack thereof.

Keywords: third wave transitions, illiberal democracy, liberal authoritarianism, informal institutions, consolidation

1. Introduction

Democracy had been an empirically challenging, and more often than not a theoretically reprehensible, proposition in the political experience of post-colonial Africa. African politics for the best part of the post-independence period was dominated by every political system other than democracy, particularly before the “third wave” transitions began in the early 1990s. Most of the political regimes were characterized as neopatrimonial as informal institutions of personal rule, patronage and corruption were central to the political functioning of these regimes to the extent that “a single domineering” leader personified the regime and in effect, the state.¹ The effect of these institutions on third wave democratization in Africa

¹Larry Diamond, “Introduction,” in *Democratization in Africa*, ed. Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999). x.

appear to be highly pronounced and lasting than the institutional legacies of other political systems such as communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and the former Soviet republics or the technocratic-military “bureaucratic authoritarianism” that dominated Latin America up until the 1980s.

The supremacy of these regimes was challenged when the winds of the third wave began to blow on the continent in the late 1980s. Greeted as the harbinger of “political renewal” or a “second liberation”² the unprecedented extent of political openness and competition represented a sea change in a hitherto authoritarian terrain. Yet the trajectory of majority of the transitions became clear by the closing of the decade, shifting from ‘*abertura*’ or political opening to a closure³ and even retreat to renewed authoritarianism. Like the CEE, some parts of South Asia and the MENA region that were swept by the final tides of the third wave with the conclusion of the Cold War, the achievements of the speedy transitions in Africa were only “partial and incomplete,” with a large number of the experiments “stalling, reversing, or failing to consolidate”⁴. Authoritarianism stubbornly lingered in the region, quickly transforming itself to survive in a new, liberalized post-Cold War global setting. Elections remained deeply flawed, civil liberties restricted, and liberal institutions immensely weak in most post-transition regimes. Hence, contrary to the Afro-optimism and claims of a rebirth of liberal democracy prevalent among some scholars and policy-makers,⁵ illiberal democracy rose on the altars of liberalization reforms that initially triggered the wave of transitions in Africa.⁶

This article seeks to explain the rise of illiberal democracy in Africa in the 1990s from a comparative perspective. It argues that the much-touted transitions predominantly resulted in illiberal regimes than contemporaneous process of

²Larry Diamond, “The second liberation,” *Africa Report* 37(Nov. - Dec. 1992).

³Richard Joseph, “Africa 1990-1997: From *Abertura* to Closure,” *Journal of Democracy* 9(April 1999): 3-17.

⁴Christopher Hobson, “Liberal Democracy and Beyond: Extending the Sequencing Debate,” *International Political Science Review* 33(September 2012): 1.

⁵These optimistic observations in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War represent Fukuyama’s (1992) “end of history” in Africa and the triumph of liberal democracy. Legum (1990) predicted the arrival of Africa’s “Second Independence,” while Joseph (1991) anticipated that, as early as 1992, the continent would be “overwhelmingly” democratic. Lancaster’s (1992) claim in *Foreign Policy* that “three-fourths of the 47 countries south of the Sahara are in various stages of political liberalization” similarly reflected the upbeat among the policy community.

⁶Salih Nur, “The Rise of Illiberal Democracy in Africa: An Exploration of Semi-Authoritarianism in Post-1991 Ethiopia” (MA Thesis, University of Osnabrueck, 2013).

democratization in other regions.⁷ There are several reasons to look back at this historical episode, which is particularly crucial in understanding recent democratization in the region. For most, recent scholarly progress and extensive data collection⁸ in the area of democratization studies offer useful theoretical insights and analytical tools that were previously absent. Furthermore, studies assessing Africa's recent experience from a regional perspective are largely absent. Comparative studies of democratization in Southern Europe and South America, and often post-Communist Europe, dominated this type of cross-regional analysis dealing, among other issues, with the transition processes, authoritarian legacies and problems of democratic consolidation.⁹ This article intends to serve a similar purpose without claiming comparable levels of analytical depth and breadth in exploring issues of democratization in Africa and, to a lesser extent, post-Communist Europe. It focuses on the politics of illiberal regimes and the institutional factors responsible for the rise of illiberal democracy in post-Cold War Africa in comparison to post-communist Europe —two regions that simultaneously underwent regime transitions following the fall of the Berlin Wall.

Even though the discussion pays a secondary attention to causal factors, it underlines, through a path-dependent approach, that democratization in the region was adversely conditioned by two sets of informal institutions: (1) "big man" rule, clientelism and corruption (the legacy of neopatrimonial politics) and (2) the authoritarian political culture and institutions of liberation movements (legacy of liberation politics) in about half a dozen others. Political institutions—both formal and informal—are the focus of analysis, both as causal factors in explanations of democratic deficit in the transitions and as objects of scrutiny in the failure of democratic consolidation. Unlike in post-communist Europe where democratization

⁷ In a recent study of competitive authoritarianism by Levitsky and Way (2010), Africa supplies the largest regional sample (14) from a total of 35 such regimes from five different regions.

⁸ Premier among these efforts is the Varieties of Democracy Institute that provides a massive dataset on historical and contemporary democracy since 1900 and has ventured a new approach to the measurement and conceptualization of democracy.

⁹ Notable works include Adam Przeworski, *Democracy and the market: Political and economic reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996); John Higley and Richard Gunther, eds, *Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Gerardo L. Munck and C. S. Leff, "Modes of Transition and Democratization: South America and Eastern Europe in Comparative Perspective," *Comparative Politics* 29(April 1997): 343-362.; Katherine Hite and Paola Cesarini, eds, *Authoritarian Legacies and Democracy in Latin America and Southern Europe* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2004).

processes were shaped by the legacy of communism, informal institutions were primarily responsible, but less accounted, for the rise of illiberal politics in Africa. The second set of informal institutions associated with liberation movements and former insurgent groups has even rarely received attention from democratization scholars. Examined as main indicators are levels of institutionalization of main features of liberal democracy: electoral fairness, political and civil liberties, and institutions safeguarding the rule of law. An "expanded procedural minimum" definition of democracy is applied, which, in addition to regular, free, and fair elections and universal adult suffrage, requires:

- (a) protection of civil liberties, including freedom of speech, press, and association;
- (b) absence of "reserved domains" of power that constrain elected officials; and¹⁰
- (c) presence of "horizontal" accountability of officeholders to one another in addition to "vertical" accountability of rulers to the ruled.¹¹

I also rely on a more nuanced, maximalist interpretation of democratic consolidation.¹² Besides the institutionalization of elections and absence of veto powers over elected officials, a maximalist conception sees consolidation as a state of affairs in which no organized political actors and interests consider any other "alternative to democratic processes to gain power"¹³. An expanded definition, as used here, instead requires a higher degree of institutionalization of party, legislative and judicial institutions, and civil society and mass media. In this sense, consolidation involves a multitude of "behavioral, attitudinal, and constitutional dimensions;" and a democracy is consolidated only when "a complex system of institutions, rules, and patterned incentives and disincentives has become, in a phrase, 'the only game in town'"¹⁴.

Social science concepts and theories are always prone to contextual relativism, bound by spatial and temporal limitations. When it comes to African political

¹⁰ For the "procedural minimum" measure of the four dimensions, see Dahl (1971, 17), Huntington (1991: 5-13), Schmitter and Karl (1991), Collier and Levitsky (1997), Diamond (1996, 23), and Levitsky and Way (2010, 5-6).

¹¹ Larry Diamond, "Is the Third Wave Over?," *Journal of Democracy* 7 (July 1996): 23.

¹² The notion of democratic consolidation still remains a contentious concept among students of comparative democratization. Various scholars employ it in various empirical and normative senses. Schedler (1998), for example, distinguishes five different concepts of democratic consolidation: the avoidance of democratic breakdown; the prevention of democratic erosion; the organization of democracy; the completion of democracy; and the deepening of democracy. Also refer to Schedler (2001) for an expanded discussion of the various approaches to the conceptualization, operationalization and measurement of consolidation.

¹³ Juan Linz in Guillermo O'Donnell, "Illusions about Consolidation," *Journal of Democracy* 7 (April 1996): 37.

¹⁴ Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation*, 15.

contexts, the rule of law and the adjoining institutions of accountability need to be emphasized in analyzing consolidation. The rule of law has historically been weak and many of the new democracies suffered from the weaknesses and violations of institutions that check the exercise of arbitrary power. The rule of law or a *rechtsstaat*, as Linz and Stepan explicitly stress, is a fundamental requirement that a regime fails to be democratic “[if] freely elected executives [...] infringe the constitution, violate the rights of individuals and minorities, impinge upon the legitimate functions of the legislature, and thus fail to rule within the bounds of a state of law”.¹⁵ Besides the institutionalization of a competitive multiparty system, measuring democratization in Africa thus unequivocally requires careful assessment of institutionalization of the rule of law, a separation of government powers, and the protection of basic liberties of expression, association, faith and property—a bundle of freedoms known as “constitutional liberalism”¹⁶. This becomes particularly significant because democratically elected governments not only deprive basic rights and liberties to their citizens, but also routinely ignore constitutional limits on their powers. The latter is characteristic of semi-democratic regimes, but it is more salient in much of Africa given the tradition of law-unfettered “big man” rule that pervaded its postcolonial politics.

2. Third Wave Democratization in Africa

Like in communist Europe, the dramatic fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the subsequent demise of Soviet socialism provided the catalyst for dramatic political change in Africa. Two historic events in February 1990—the peaceful ouster of one-party regime in Benin and the release of Nelson Mandela in South Africa—opened the floodgates of third wave transitions. Benin held in 1991 its first multiparty elections that peacefully transferred power to an opposition party. In the next five years, over two-thirds of forty-seven countries held multiparty elections. Only four states remained in 1997 without multiparty transition elections.

Broadly speaking, third wave transitions in Africa were distinct in four major ways that bore adverse implications for consolidation. This stems from the fact that the success of transitions and subsequent democratization are significantly influenced by the identity and relationship of the main actors contesting change—anti-reform regime elites, pro-reform regime elites and the liberal opposition—and the modalities of change—sluggish reforms or radical change, accommodative or confrontational.¹⁷ First, transitions were triggered by mass protests from the bottom, but directed mostly by incumbents from above. As such, in contrast to the elite “pacts” that characterized most third wave transitions from bureaucratic

¹⁵Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation*, 15.

¹⁶Fareed Zakaria, “The Rise of Illiberal Democracy,” *Foreign Affairs* 76 (Nov./Dec. 1997): 22.

¹⁷Munck and Leff, “Modes of Transition and Democratization,” 343.

authoritarian regimes in Southern Europe, Latin America,¹⁸ and communist Europe to some extent, political pacts and compromise between regime hardliners and reformists were minimal or entirely absent in transitions from Africa's neopatrimonial regimes. Incumbents and their opposition were often polarized that transitions unfolded "along a path of escalating confrontations until one side or other loses decisively"¹⁹. Such modes of change allowed incumbents to make few concessions and preempt chances for a balanced "elite competition" conducive to consolidation through the normalization of interelite relations.²⁰

Second, the transitions commonly unfolded in a pattern of economic protests over declining living standards followed by gradual escalation to politicized demands for regime change.²¹ Demands for democracy initially took a backseat, and the momentum for drastic political change flagged when demands for economic reforms were met or were cautiously assuaged by versatile incumbents. These two patterns of transitions had several decisive implications for democratization in Africa in the long run. Regime transitions produce fairly "durable legacies" that not only determine the chances of democratic consolidation, but also the success of the transition in the first place.²² Except in a minority of such cases as Zambia, Benin, and South Africa, the great majority of the transitions did not constitute an institutional rapture with past regimes. The transitions were rather "managed transitions" that allowed a great majority of erstwhile authoritarians to exert a relatively high degree of control on the transition agenda and timetable, forcing a quid pro quo on oppositions to accept overly undemocratic deals.

Third, external influence in the form of adjustment conditionalities and pressure for multiparty elections tied to development assistance played a significant role in the transitions.²³ In retrospect, transitions in Kenya (1992) and Malawi (1994) were, for example, hard to conceive without donor suspension of aid and demand for multiparty elections in reaction to Moi and Banda's suppression of pro-democracy protests.²⁴ In the contrary, transitions in the CEE and former Soviet sphere were

¹⁸Guillermo O'Donnell and Philip Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies* (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 1986).

¹⁹M. Bratton and N. van de Walle, "Popular Protest and Political Reform in Africa," *Comparative Politics* 24(July 1992): 465.

²⁰Munck and Leff, "Modes of Transition and Democratization," 345.

²¹Michael Bratton and Nicholas van de Walle, *Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997): 98.

²²Munck and Leff, "Modes of Transition and Democratization," 344.

²³Bratton and van de Walle, *Democratic Experiments in Africa*, 103.

²⁴Danielle Resnick and Nicolas van de Walle, "Democratization in Africa: What Role for External Actors?" in *Democratic Trajectories in Africa: Unravelling the Impact of Foreign Aid*, eds., Danielle Resnick and N. van de Walle (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2013). 35.

primarily driven by internal dynamics culminating from a long and slow political fusion against the economic malaise and political suffocation under communist rule.²⁵ These varying patterns of external influence on democratization traded sides during the post-transition years. Whereas the consolidation phase in post-communist Europe came under greater foreign influence—emanating in particular from the democratic threshold to be met for accession to EU membership²⁶—external leverage on democratization dwindled in Africa after transitions.²⁷ Recent research attributes regional variations of democratic performance to these differing experiences.²⁸ New democracies in the CEE countries deepened, with several illiberal, post-communist regimes being swept away by the Color Revolutions in the late 1990s and the early 2000s. Absent the twin factors of international linkage and leverage that appeared crucial for democratic deepening in Central and Southeastern Europe, the majority of democratic experiments in Africa were stalled, eroded or broke down, paving the way for the rise of stable illiberal and electoral authoritarian regimes. The increasing engagement of external donors in democracy promotion on the continent often undeniably enhanced democratization through the routinization of elections as well as strengthening of legislatures, independent media and civil society.²⁹ However, foreign aid has also provided authoritarian elites with much need patronage resources or it has failed to help “remold informal institutions that pervert or retard attitudinal, behavioral, and institutional patterns essential to consolidation”³⁰.

Finally, transitions in the region lacked the modularity and diffusion that characterized the sweeping anticommunist revolutions in the CEE and the former Soviet states. Evidently, in part due to the drastic transformations prompted by the overwhelming speed and broad sweep of the modular transitions, ten CEE countries

²⁵Paul Lewis, “The ‘Third Wave’ of Democracy in Eastern Europe: Comparative Perspectives on Party Roles and Political Development,” *Party Politics* 7(Sep. 2001): 543-565.

²⁶See Geoffrey Pridham, *Designing Democracy: EU Enlargement and Regime Change in Post-Communist Europe* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005); Paul Kubicek, ed., *The European Union and Democratization* (London: Routledge, 2003); and A. Dimitrova and G. Pridham, “International Actors and Democracy Promotion in Central and Eastern Europe: The Integration Model and its Limits,” *Democratization* 11(Dec. 2004): 91-112.

²⁷Resnick and van de Walle, “Democratization in Africa,” 37.

²⁸See, for instance, Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, “Linkage versus Leverage: Rethinking the International Dimension of Regime Change,” *Comparative Politics* 38(July 2006): 379-400; Susan Hyde, *The Pseudo-Democrat’s Dilemma: Why Election Observation Became an International Norm* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011); S.S. Regilme Jr. “Bringing the Global Political Economy Back In: Neoliberalism, Globalization, and Democratic Consolidation,” *International Studies Perspectives* 15 (2014): 277-96.

²⁹Resnick and van de Walle, “Democratization in Africa,” 28-55.

³⁰Salih Nur, review of *Democratic trajectories in Africa: Unraveling the impact of foreign aid*, *African Affairs* 0/0, 1.

had relatively liberal constitutions and quickly met the formal requirements of democracy in 1997, with some even redefining the post-1989 constitutions and political institutions to achieve higher levels of democracy.³¹ Absent the power of example and emulation that drove the modular uprisings in the transitions from communism and the Color Revolutions in post-communist Europe later,³² transitions in post-Cold War Africa were rather slower, mostly discrete, and more spontaneous political phenomena that spanned an entire decade, albeit most being clustered in the first half of the 1990s. The period from 1990-1995 was the high watermark of the transitions in the region, with twenty-nine countries holding first multiparty elections followed by four others in the second half of the decade. Unlike in post-communist Europe, this protracted and irregular process left behind “authoritarian enclaves” within the new regimes and pockets of repressive regimes punctuating the new political landscape, often protecting other authoritarians or inspiring anti-democratic forces.

The transitions, nonetheless, have dramatically altered African politics. The regional Freedom House indices for political rights and civil liberties improved by an average of 1.0 and 1.28 between 1988 and 1994 and 1988 and 1992, respectively.³³ This improvement of more than a point on the seven-point scale exceeds the average global score for the expansion of freedom since the beginning of the third wave.³⁴ Compared to just three countries that held elections in the late 1980s, forty-two countries saw between 1990 and 1998 over sixty presidential and some seventy legislative elections.³⁵ New constitutions were adopted formally guaranteeing basic liberties, limits on executive powers, and hitherto unprecedented political contestation.³⁶ Have these changes led to consolidation? The new levels of political competition and expanded liberties notwithstanding, the majority of transitions never paved a solid path of democratization in order to achieve greater levels of political and civil liberties, a freer media and respect for the rule of law. In most cases, democratic consolidation was protracted, and the new “democracies” became vulnerable to democratic breakdown, stagnation, or erosion.³⁷ Some even did not survive long enough to meet Huntington’s minimalist “second electoral

³¹Mary Kaldor and Ivan Vejvoda, “Democratization in Central and East European Countries,” *International Affairs* 73(Jan. 1997): 64.

³²Mark Beissinger, “Structure and Example in Modular Political Phenomena: The Diffusion of Bulldozer/Rose/Orange/Tulip Revolutions,” *Perspectives on Politics* 5(June 2007): 259-276.

³³Bratton and van de Walle, *Democratic Experiments in Africa*, 287.

³⁴Diamond, “Introduction,” xiv.

³⁵Nicolas van de Walle, *African Economies and the Politics of Permanent Crisis, 1979-1999* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). 243.


³⁶Bratton and van de Walle, *Democratic Experiments in Africa*, 91.

³⁷J. Gros, ed., *Democratization in Late Twentieth-Century Africa: Coping with Uncertainty* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1998); R. Sandbrook, “Transitions without Consolidation,” *Third World Quarterly* 17(March 1996): 69-88.

threshold” for consolidation,³⁸ succumbing to civil wars or military takeovers. These developments signaled the beginning of a reverse wave of authoritarian restorations or a surge of semi-authoritarian regimes amid erosion of political and civil liberties, civil society, the rule of law and institutions of accountability.

3. The Rise of Illiberal Democracy

Figure 1a: Political regimes in the world, 1972-2012³⁹



By the mid-1990s, the third wave “cooled down” worldwide⁴⁰ or came to an “end” when judged for its “liberal content” of democracy.⁴¹ Far short of the initial optimism for the triumph of liberal democracy, an “illiberal” form of democracy sprung up on the ashes of authoritarianism in most countries. This global trend was corresponded by the flagging of the initial wave in Africa. The speedy transitions

³⁸Samuel Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991). Also referred to as the “two turnover test,” a consolidated democracy by this measure requires two post-transition elections in which incumbents are voted out and surrender office peacefully to victorious opponents. The rules of the democratic game can be said to have taken root when all participants in the political process accept that new governments can only be installed by open electoral procedures.


³⁹Figure 1 adopted from *Source: Moller and Skaaning (2013) “The Third Wave: Inside the numbers,” pp. 99, 103.*

⁴⁰Thomas Carothers, “The End of the Transition Paradigm,” *Journal of Democracy* 13(Jan. 2002): 5-21.

⁴¹Diamond, “Is the Third Wave Over?,” 1996.

materialized, as Hobson puts it, “only in a partial and incomplete manner, with a large number of attempted democratizations stalling, reversing, or failing to consolidate”⁴². Figure 1 below on the distribution of political regimes shows growing global trends in liberal democracies and polyarchies, but sub-Saharan Africa witnessed a proliferation in electoral autocracies and façade democracies since the transitions. The trajectory in Africa shifted from a political opening to a closure in the second half of the decade.⁴³ Authoritarianism stubbornly lingered, transforming itself to survive in a new, liberalized political setting. While the third wave was still unfolding, illiberal democracy began to rise on the altars of liberalization reforms that triggered the transitions.

Figure 1b: Political regimes in sub-Saharan Africa, 1972-2012



As some scholars began to caution by the late 1990s,⁴⁴ the future of liberal democracy became bleak and the experiments were extremely fragile and difficult to consolidate. Multiparty elections proliferated, but progress in democratic consolidation—a process involving the institutionalization and routinization of

⁴²Hobson, “Liberal Democracy and Beyond,” 1.

⁴³Joseph, “Africa 1990-1997,” 1998.

⁴⁴The rising pessimism was echoed in the subtitles of some studies: Marina Ottaway, ed., *Democracy in Africa: The Hard Road Ahead* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997); Gros, *Democratization in Late Twentieth-Century Africa: Coping with Uncertainty*, 1998; and Joseph, “Africa 1990-1997, From Abertura to Closure,” 1998.

“democratic norms and values” in a multi-party system—was very limited and highly protracted. Compared to elections, for instance, progress in political rights and civil liberties was slow and prone to abrupt reversals or slow erosion. While some new regimes broke down, several others saw erosion of civil liberties, press freedoms, and key institutions of liberal democracy. The deepening of vertical and horizontal institutions of accountability like legislatures, judiciaries, and civil society was arrested in a great majority of transition countries. Moreover, regular elections became a norm of earning public mandate, but party systems were far less competitive. As Bratton aptly sums up the contradictions:

“Regular, competitive multiparty elections [were] held, thereby qualifying the country as an “electoral” democracy, but the day-to-day practices of the state [were] marked by abuses. Political freedoms and civil rights may be formally recognized but they [were] imperfectly observed in practice, particularly between electoral exercises when they [were] more likely to be flouted [...] A nominally free press [was] harassed in myriad ways, and the government retains a radio monopoly. Certain groups, notably key members of the executive branch and the military, [might], in effect, be above the law. The judiciary [was] officially independent, but it [was] poorly trained, overworked, and easily compromised.”⁴⁵

As Karl (1990) observed in Latin America, the new democracies fed a “fallacy of electoralism” whereby largely cosmetic elections were regularly held for the sake of international “presentability”⁴⁶. The heady optimism for “second liberation” faded as elections began to quickly reproduce old autocrats disguised as new-born democrats.⁴⁷ In retrospect, it was Africa’s illiberal democracy in the surge. In order to contextualize this trend, two questions are raised: first, how liberal were the new democracies? And second, were the gains of the transitions eroded over time? These can be answered by examining the extent of institutionalization of the main features of liberal democracy: fair and free elections, political and civil liberties and, more relevant in Africa, the rule of law and institutions of accountability.

a. Founding and Second Elections

Elections are an essential element of democracy. Nevertheless, the correlation between elections and democracy has been a subject of intense debate. While some view elections as an integral instrument of democracy, others consider them as a

⁴⁵Michael Bratton, “Deciphering Africa’s Divergent Transitions,” *Political Science Quarterly* 112(Spring 1997): 243.

⁴⁶Terry Karl, “Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America,” *Comparative Politics* 23(Oct. 1990): 1-21.

⁴⁷Said Adejumo, “Elections in Africa: A Fading Shadow of Democracy?” *International Political Science Review* 21(Jan. 2000): 65.

minimal procedural requirement of democracy.⁴⁸ Even though I disagree with the procedural minimal conceptions of democracy, I also do not fully endorse the reductionist view of elections. Treating elections as indicators of democratic consolidation is based on the premise that elections “do not, in and of themselves, constitute a consolidated democracy,” but remain a “fundamental” means to form democratic governments and a “necessary requisite” for consolidation. They are a necessary, but hardly a sufficient, variable in measuring democratic consolidation. Their “regularity, openness, and acceptability” indicate whether behavioral, attitudinal, and constitutional foundations were laid down for a consolidated democracy.⁴⁹

Two indicators are used to measure the democraticness of elections. The first indicator concerns the *quantity* of elections. Were elections, particularly second elections, held in the first place? If yes, were they held in time? These help to discover whether officeholders accept constitutional term limits. The second, and more crucial, measure concerns the *quality* of elections. How free and fair were second elections? In measuring quality, scholars often rely on three indicators: political participation, competition, and legitimacy. *Political participation* entails the participation of all eligible citizens through universal voting suffrage. It is measured here by voter turnout and opposition participation in elections. *Political competition* implies a free contestation of all public positions by all eligible citizens and political groups.⁵⁰ It is measured by four indicators: winners’ share of votes, winners’ share of seats, second party’s share of seats, and alteration of power.⁵¹ *Legitimacy* is the third variable in assessing the quality of elections. Elections are legitimate when the actors involved in the process (political parties and their candidates) consent to the procedures of elections and accept their results.

⁴⁸The discourse on democracy, especially its libertarian form, deems elections a core variable bearing an organic linkage with democracy. Indeed, earlier conceptualizations of democracy equate it with elections. Joseph Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy* (Reprint, London: Allen and Unwin, [1947] 1976) argued democracy is about conducting elections and choosing political leaders. Huntington, *The Third Wave*, 1991 proposed a “two-turnover test” where democratic consolidation is deemed to occur whenever the winners of a founding election are defeated in a subsequent contest and the latter abide an electoral turnover (266-7). Against such an approach, Karl (1986) has raised the specter of a “fallacy of electoralism” or the illusion that elections can coexist with systematic abuse of civil liberties. In spite of the declining emphasis on elections after the transitions paradigm, Lindberg (2006) has recently demonstrated the significance of elections in democratization. Elections, he argues, not only “have a self-reinforcing power that promotes increased democracy,” but also “facilitate the institutionalization of and deepening of actual civil liberties” (2-3).

⁴⁹Michael Bratton, “Second Elections in Africa,” *Journal of Democracy* 9 (July 1998): 52.

⁵⁰Robert Dahl, *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1971).

⁵¹Lindberg, *Democracy and Elections in Africa*, 43.

Legitimacy can be gauged by voter turnout, absence of violence, losers' acceptance of results, and survival of the electoral regime after elections.⁵²

Table 1:
Trends in Founding Elections in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1989-99

| Chronology of Election | No. of Countries | No. of Elections | Opposition Boycott ¹ | Free and Fair ² | Leadership Alternation ³ | Losers Accepted ⁴ | Voter Turnout ⁵ (% Reg. Voters) (mean) | Winner's Vote Share (Pres. Elecs.) (mean) | Winner's Seat Share (Pres. & Leg.) (mean) |
|------------------------|------------------|------------------|---------------------------------|----------------------------|-------------------------------------|------------------------------|---|---|---|
| Early (1989-94) | 29 | 54 | 6 (11.1%) | 30 (55.5%) | 11 (37.9%) | 32 (59.2%) | 63.3% | 61.4% | 62.7% |
| Late (1995-97) | 11 | 15 | 11 (73.3%) | 0 (0.0%) | 1 (6.6%) | 0 (0.0%) | 66.8% | 69.1% | 72.0% |
| Very late (1998-99) | 1 | 2 | 0 (0.0%) | 2 (100%) | 1 (100%) | 1 (100%) | 47.2% | 62.78% | 56.7% |
| All | 41 | 72 | 17 | 32 | 13 | 33 | | | |
| All (Percent) | | | (23.6%) | (44.4%) | (48.1%) | (45.8%) | 64.1% | 63.4% | 65.3% |

Notes: 1. An opposition boycott occurs if any party withdraws in protest from the election. In most cases, boycotts are partial with some parties participating and others standing back. 2. The "free and fair" determination is based on the preponderance of judgments reported by international election observers and domestic election monitors. 3. Leadership alternation refers to electoral turnover of chief political executives. 4. Loser acceptance is established when minority parties do not mount a legal challenge to the election of a president, or when they accept parliamentary seats following a legislative election. 5. Wherever possible, turnout is measured as total valid votes as a percentage of registered voters.

Sources: Data on very-late founding elections were obtained from African Elections database. All other data on early founding elections are replicated from Michael Bratton, "Second Elections in Africa" *Journal of Democracy* 9 (1998).

Bratton and van de Walle (1997) had well documented the nature of "early" founding elections⁵³—a total of fifty-four elections from 1990 to 1994 (Table 1). More than half of these elections were "free and fair" and marked by relatively high voter turnout (average 64.1 per cent) and convincing victories (63.4 per cent of votes in presidential elections). Most importantly, these elections resulted in the democratic unseating of presidents in eleven countries.⁵⁴ Late founding elections (fourteen in total) between 1995 and 1997 resembled the early founding elections in some respects including, for instance, relatively high turnout (averaged 66.8 per cent). In other respects, however, these elections revealed some worrisome trends. Opposition boycotted eleven elections; and observers endorsed none as "free and fair" and none accepted by the losers. Late founding elections also did not result in leadership alteration except in Sierra Leone. Incumbents not only won elections, but winners also widened their "margins of victory," with vote and seat shares averaging 69.1 and 72 per cent in presidential and legislative elections, respectively. Incumbent leaders became "adept at accommodating the international norm for competitive elections, while at the same time learning to manipulate them to their

⁵²Bratton, "Second Elections," 1998 and Lindberg, *Democracy*, 2006.

⁵³These are "founding" in the sense that they marked a transition from an extended period of authoritarian rule to multiparty systems. A founding election occurs when "for the first time after an authoritarian regime, elected positions of national significance are disputed under reasonably competitive conditions" (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986, 57). In the context of personalistic rule in Africa, Bratton (1997, 77) adds a requirement that "the top office of chief political executive must be open to multiple candidates."

⁵⁴Bratton, "Second Elections," 53, 55.

own ends"⁵⁵. In general, the later the elections were held, the poorer their quality had become and the higher the likelihood that incumbents would win the vote.

Table 2: Second Elections in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1995-1997⁵⁶

| Country | Date ¹ (Type) ² of Election | Held on Time ³ | Opposition Boycott | Free and Fair ⁴ | Quality Trend ⁵ | Leadership Alteration ⁶ | Losers Accept | Voter Turnout (% Reg. Voters) | Winner's Vote Share (Pres. Elec.) | Winner's Seat Share (Leg. Elec.) |
|---------------|---|---------------------------|--------------------|----------------------------|----------------------------|------------------------------------|--------------------|-------------------------------|-----------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| Namibia | 12/7/94 (G) | Yes? | No | Yes | unchanged | No | Yes | 76.1 | 74.5 | 73.6 |
| Niger | 1/12/95 (L) | Yes | No | Yes | unchanged | Yes? | Yes | 35.0 | -- | 34.9 |
| Benin | 3/28/95 (L) | Yes | No | Yes | unchanged | Yes | Yes | 75.9 | -- | 24.1 |
| | 3/3/96 (P) | Yes | No | Yes? | worsened | Yes | Yes | 86.8 | 52.5 | -- |
| Côte d'Ivoire | 10/22/95 (P) | Yes | Yes | No | worsened | No | No | 56.2 | 95.2 | -- |
| | 11/26/95 (L) | Yes | No | No | worsened | No | Yes? | 48.9 | -- | 84.0 |
| Cape Verde | 12/17/95 (L) | Yes | No | Yes | unchanged | No | Yes | 76.5 | -- | 69.4 |
| | 2/18/96 (P) | Yes | No | Yes | unchanged | No | Yes | 43.4 | 80.0 (est.) | -- |
| Comoros | 3/6/96 (P) | Yes? | Yes | Yes? | unchanged | Yes? | Yes | 62.0 | 61.2 | -- |
| | 12/1/96 (L) | Yes? | No | No | worsened | No | No | low | -- | 85.7 |
| São Tomé | 6/30/96 (P) | Yes | No | Yes? | improved | No | Yes? | 67.5 | 52.2 | -- |
| Mauritania | 10/11/96 (L) | Yes | No | Yes? | unchanged | No | Yes? | 30.0 (est.) | -- | 88.6 |
| | 12/12/97 (P) | Yes | Yes | No | worsened | No | No | 74.0? | 90.2 | -- |
| Madagascar | 11/5/96 (P) | Yes | No | Yes? | worsened | Yes | Yes? | 49.7 | 50.7 | -- |
| Zambia | 11/18/96 (G) | Yes? | Yes | No | worsened | No | No | 58.7 | 72.6 | 87.3 |
| Ghana | 12/7/96 (G) | Yes? | No | Yes | improved | No | Yes | 77.9 | 57.4 | 66.0 |
| Gabon | 12/15/96 (L) | No | Yes | No | unchanged | No | No | not available | -- | 76.6 |
| Mali | 4/30 & 7/20/97 (L) | Yes | Yes | No | worsened | No | No | 21.0 | -- | 88.4 |
| | 5/11/97 (P) | Yes | Yes | No | worsened | No | No | 28.4 | 95.9 | -- |
| Burkina Faso | 5/11/97 (L) | Yes? | No | No | worsened | No | No | 44.0 | -- | 90.9 |
| Cameroon | 5/18/97 (L) | Yes | No | No | unchanged | No | No | not available | -- | 60.6 |
| | 10/12/97 (P) | Yes | Yes | No | worsened | No | No | 81.0? | 92.6 | -- |
| Kenya | 12/29/97 (G) | Yes | No | No | unchanged | No | No | 67.0 | 40.4 | 51.4 |
| All (n=16) | 23 | 22 | 8 | 7 | | 2 | 8 | | | |
| All (Percent) | (95.6%) | (34.8%) | (30.4%) | | (8.7%) | (34.8%) | 55.8% ⁴ | | 70.4% | |

Notes: 1. For two-round elections and for elections that last more than one day, the date of the election refers to the first day of polling. Dates are given as month/day/year. 2. G stands for general election, P for presidential, and L for legislative. Elections are dubbed "general" if a presidential and legislative poll are held concurrently on the same day or days; otherwise, elections are listed separately. 3. Elections that are called early or held on time according to the electoral timetable are scored as "Yes." If elections are only slightly delayed, i.e., held within three months of the scheduled date, the score is "Yes?" This category is included in the calculation of the total number and percentage of elections that were timely. 4. "Yes?" refers to qualified "free and fair" judgments by observers or cases where observers did not agree on the quality of the election. This category is not included in totals. 5. Quality trend is measured by change, if any, between founding and second contests in reported judgments by observers on whether the elections were free and fair. 6. Leadership alteration refers only to presidential elections. "Yes?" indicates instances in which a new party (or party coalition) took over control of the national legislature as the result of a second election. This category is not included in totals. 7. Excludes questionable official turnout figures for presidential elections in Mauritania and Cameroon. 8. This list excludes countries where democratic transitions were reversed by military coup between second elections could take place. By the end of 1997, four of Africa's 17 new democracies (Burundi, Congo-Brazzaville, Niger, and Sierra Leone) and one longstanding multiparty regime (Gambia) had succumbed to military takeovers.

Source: Data and notes for second elections from 1995-1997 are from Michael Bratton (1998) "Second Elections in Africa."

During the 1995-1997 period, African countries that embarked early on political reforms entered a second round of elections. From 1998 to 2000, fourteen others held second elections,⁵⁶ both presidential and parliamentary. While most elections were conducted in a "timely fashion" among the first group, only Gabon failed to adhere to the electoral schedule. Did the quality of elections decline? The statistics are affirmative, with performance worsening in most while improving in only two cases (Table 2, column 6). *Participation* appeared better, because incumbents, who had reluctantly accepted citizens' political rights to participate in policymaking, refrained themselves from tampering with the electoral rules. There were irregularities like vote suppression in opposition strongholds, but most were results of the state's fiscal and administrative weakness and growing voter apathy. The quality of second elections, however, clearly deteriorated in terms of political *contestation*. In only two of seventeen elections had incumbents lost power--a sharp decline from eleven in founding elections. In the "very late" second elections, all incumbents survived except Nelson Mandela who decided not to run for reelection, but his ruling ANC party won majority seats. There was a marked rise in

⁵⁵Bratton, "Second Elections," 55

⁵⁶These are Seychelles, Madagascar, Lesotho, Togo, Burkina Faso, CAR, Gabon, Guinea, South Africa, Malawi, Niger, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, and Nigeria.

the vote share and seat share of winners as well, indicating unequal competition between incumbents and their opposition. In thirteen countries, as Table 2 (column 10) shows, the winners decisively “beat their rivals by a margin of two to one in no less than seven cases”⁵⁷. In the fourteen countries that held second parliamentary elections prior to 1997, ruling parties enjoyed two-thirds majorities in nine (last column). In the “very” late second elections, however, ruling parties lost majority seats only in the CAR and Guinea-Bissau.

Second elections were not marked by leadership alteration except in Benin and Madagascar (column 7). Incumbents more often weathered polls through fraud, manipulation and other electoral irregularities. Even more incumbents survived in the cluster of late second elections. Why contestation of second elections declined sharply? First, incumbents began to manipulate electoral laws while maintaining the trappings of competition. Such systematic change of rules usually involved the disqualification of principal rivals. In Cote d’Ivoire and Zambia, the very incumbents elected in founding elections revised electoral laws to exclude their main rivals.⁵⁸ Despite a much more promising start after a model founding election, Zambia is “the starkest and most unfortunate example” of the retreat from democratic consolidation.⁵⁹ It encapsulates many of the trends including the abuse of state resources in elections, and hostility toward watchdog groups. Second, elections became unequal contests of well-organized, dominant ruling parties against fragmented, fledgling opposition parties with meager resources. While the opposition struggled for access to communications, ruling parties received extensive and favorable coverage and often exploited other state resources. The continuity of incumbent parties in many countries signals absence of competitive party systems as a benchmark for democratic consolidation.⁶⁰

As a result of the decline in contestation, most second elections obviously had little or no *legitimacy*. Indeed, there were fewer acceptable elections (30.4 per cent) during 1995-1997 than in founding elections (55.5 per cent).⁶¹ As Table 2 (column 4) shows, opposition parties boycotted nearly a third of second elections, a higher rate (24.6 per cent) than in founding elections. There was an increase in the frequency of opposition boycotts, usually to protest incumbent attempts to bend electoral rules or monopolize electoral resources. Opposition protests could be politically motivated, but most boycotts were also accompanied by unfavorable reports by election observers and monitors (Table 2 column 5).


⁵⁷Bratton, “Second Elections,” 63.

⁵⁸Bratton, “Second Elections,” 63.

⁵⁹Diamond, “Introduction,” 6.

⁶⁰Bratton, “Second Elections,” 60.

⁶¹Bratton, “Second Elections,” 59.



The declining quality of second elections (Figure 2), along with late founding elections with which they coincided, clearly shows a rise of liberal autocracy. This decline was sharp since the mid-1990s, precisely at a time when the early transition countries began holding second elections and the most reluctant regimes began to liberalize. The half-hearted democrats, mostly onetime military dictators donning civilian attire, have learnt what Schedler calls the “menu of manipulation”⁶². In particular, late and reluctant democratizers took lessons from the electoral defeats of a few precedents. Participatory politics was an irresistible force of the time, but had to be tamed. Only those who faced the heat of change early on or those clumsy to master the rules of manipulation lost the new game. Second elections resulted in the alternation of power among diverse opposition parties or coalitions in the CEE through relatively freer, fairer and more regular elections.⁶³ In contrast to this remarkable electoral volatility and incumbent turnovers in Eastern Europe and Latin America, the trend in Africa at the end of the decade was towards entrenchment of incumbent presidents and ruling parties. The institutional legacy of “big man” rule in Africa was lingering and the unseating of incumbent leaders becoming an “abnormal” practice again,⁶⁴ which attests to deficiencies in the institutionalization of other indicators.

b. Political Rights and Civil Liberties


The fact that a political system is multiparty says very little about the degree of freedoms it guarantees. Elections are the minimal procedural requirement of democracy that is much more than the routine conduct of regular and competitive

⁶²Andreas Schedler, “The Menu of Manipulation,” *Journal of Democracy* 13(April 2002): 36-50.

⁶³Kaldor and Vejvoda, “Democratization in Central and East European Countries,” 66.

⁶⁴Bratton, “Second Elections,” 65.

Figure 3. Electoral democracy in sub-Saharan Africa and CEE countries, 1989-2014



elections. Liberal democracy also requires, among other conditions, respect of civil liberties including freedoms of speech, association and assembly; due process of law; an independent press and civil society. Several post-Cold War African democracies easily met the minimal conditions of electoral democracy by holding fairly free and fair elections, but failed to meet measures of fundamental freedoms and institutional practices of liberal democracy. Very rarely could these governments care to respect basic liberties while overseeing electoral systems marred by massive fraud, rigging, and violence.

The relationship between relatively competitive elections and poor levels of civil liberties is thus striking. While the number of elections continued to grow with the spike in political contestation and participation, progress in electoral democracy, as figure 3 above shows, was quickly arrested in most countries while it eroded in several others like Mozambique, Madagascar and Mali. As one substantive measure for the quality of democracy, the stagnation or decline in political rights, civil liberties, and popular sovereignty in the majority of post-transition regimes is a significant indicator of the growing trend towards electoralism. By Freedom House measures, thirty-one multiparty systems were illiberal in 2000 veering towards authoritarianism, while three other electoral democracies (Ghana, Mali, and Namibia) failed by a margin of 0.5 to qualify as liberal democracies. Nineteen multiparty systems classified as "not free" were electoral authoritarian regimes or more accurately "pseudodemocracies" failing the litmus test of democracy--the minimal condition of free and fair elections. The disparity between democratic ideals and the actual practice of the regimes in their administration is so wide in these systems.

Some argue that a majority of the countries that underwent real transitions had retained the achievements or never experienced significant democratic reversals.⁶⁵ However, the above figure for early transitions shows that the achievements in the early 1990s were eroded or remained stagnant after 1995 for an overwhelming number of countries. A closer examination of Freedom House's annual indices for the decade also shows erosion or stagnation of political and civil liberties in most and a very protracted process of consolidation in few countries. Between 1993 and 1998, political rights improved in just twelve countries, remained unchanged in twenty, and worsened in another fifteen. From a comparative perspective, too, Africa experienced the lowest progress in political rights and freedoms in the 1990s.⁶⁶ With

⁶⁵See for instance Diamond , "Introduction," 1999; van de Walle, "Presidentialism and Clientelism in Africa's Emerging Party Systems," 2003.

⁶⁶According to Lewis (2001, 553) "The 'Third Wave' of Democracy in Eastern Europe," these trends in Eastern Europe in 1998/99 were roughly balanced. Four countries (Czech, Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia) had average scores of 1.5, three (Bulgaria, Slovakia and

an average score of 17.1 per cent for political rights and civil liberties from 1991 to 1999, it had the lowest score of “free” countries in the world except the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). The number of “free” countries grew from just two in 1989 to eight in 1991 and then stagnated until it peaked at nine in 1996 before it began to decline in 1999. During this same period, the number of “free” countries in Eastern Europe and former Soviet republics progressively grew from zero in 1989 to ten (37 per cent) in 1999. After the general global slowdown of the third wave in the mid-1990s, while the number of “free” in Eastern Europe and former Soviet Union grew from seven in 1994 to ten in 1999, it declined in Africa from nine in 1996 to six in 1999. In general, therefore, stagnation or decline of freedoms marked the majority of African countries in the aftermath of the third wave.

In the reverse, the number of “partly free” countries in Africa jumped from twelve (or 26 per cent) in 1989 to nineteen (40 per cent) in 1991; it then doubled to twenty-four (50 per cent) in 1999. During roughly same period, the number of “partly free” countries in Eastern Europe and former Soviet republics declined from fifteen (60 per cent) in 1992 to eleven (41 per cent) in 1999. In this measure of democratic consolidation, Africa also excelled the MENA region where average score of “partly free” regimes declined from 55.5 per cent in 1993 to 17 per cent in 1999. The average score of “partly free” for Africa during the first decade (1991-99) was 38.2 per cent, which is second only to Eastern Europe and former Soviet republics. Africa had arguably faced the greatest expansion of hybrid regimes and breakdown of democratic regimes or erosion of norms and institutions of liberal democracy.


c. Institutions of Accountability and the Rule of Law

Apart from competitive elections and the protection of political-civil liberties, democratic consolidation requires the institutionalization of a broad range of rather more functional structures, processes, and behavioral norms. Liberal democracy entails a strong rule of law that guarantees the protection of extensive individual and associational freedoms and minority rights against the potential “tyranny of the majority” or arbitrary state power broadly. It also requires the presence of various means of “horizontal accountability” (e.g., legislative oversight of the executive) and the absence of “reserved domains” of power (e.g., the military) not directly or indirectly accountable to the electorate.⁶⁷ Arguably, the most substantive measure of liberal democracy in Africa is thus the institutionalization of rule of law and separation of powers, institutions of vertical accountability (e.g. political parties, civil society, mass media, etc.) and horizontal accountability (e.g. the legislature, judiciary, etc), a competitive party system and the socialization of all actors to democracy as “the only game in town.”

Macedonia) scored between 2.0 and 3.0, three (Croatia, Bosnia and Albania) fell in the score range from 4.0 to 5.0, and the former Yugoslav Federation had a score of 1.0.

⁶⁷Diamond, “Is the Third Wave Over?,” 1996.

Figure 4. Liberal democracy in sub-Saharan Africa and CEE countries, 1989-2014



Yet, most of these institutions and norms of liberal democracy⁶⁸ remained frail and fragile. Rule of law in this discussion narrowly refers to the behavior of elected officials (i.e. presidents and the executive body) and other actors like political parties and the military versus the law. Do, for example, presidents respect constitutional term- and power-limits? Do other political actors view the law as the only means to play with in pursuit of their interests and drive for power? The first indicator is all the more crucial given the tradition of neopatrimonial rule in which a "big man" rules more by personal decree than by rule of law.⁶⁹ Inescapably, the concentration of power in the executive, along with weak institutions of vertical and horizontal accountability, and violations of presidential term limits is a distinguishing mark of the challenge to democratic consolidation in Africa. The principle of separation of powers between government branches was firmly established in the CEE countries towards the end of the decade. Seizing an upper hand, legislatures successfully set constraints on executive powers and took the center stage of the new polities.⁷⁰ Presidencies were predominantly term- and power-limited: while the legislative branch even dominated in Latvia, presidential powers were rendered "weak" in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Albania and "medium" in Slovenia and Bulgaria.⁷¹ In contrast, the rule of law continued to be Achilles' heel of third wave democracy in Africa.

Compared to the one-party and military regimes dominant before the third wave, the rule of law and government checks and balances remarkably improved in the aftermath of the transitions.⁷² Yet this progress should not shroud the considerable weakness and persistence of informal political institutions that circumscribe formal rules. As Bratton aptly sums it:

"...the institutional landscape of the plebiscitary one-party state remained largely intact. While cabinet government is now more common than before (for example in Zambia), decision making remains concentrated in the hands of powerful presidents and inner circles of confidants. While legislatures and judiciaries have sometimes acted independently (notably in Congo and South Africa respectively), these institutions generally remain[ed] weak in relation to

⁶⁸V-Dem's "liberal democracy index", in addition to electoral democracy, measures three mid-level indices: rule of law, judicial constraints on the executive, and legislative checks on the executive. See Coppedge et al, "Measuring high level democratic principles," 3-4.

⁶⁹Robert Jackson and Carl Rosberg. *Personal Rule in Black Africa* (Berkeley, CA: University of California, 1982).

⁷⁰Kaldor & Vejvoda, "Democratization in Central and East European Countries," 64.

⁷¹Kaldor and Vejvoda, "Democratization," 66; Lewis, "The 'Third Wave' of Democracy in Eastern Europe," 553.

⁷²Daniel N Posner and Daniel J. Young, "The Institutionalization of Political Power in Africa." *Journal of Democracy* 18(2008): 126-140.

the executive branch.”⁷³

With the transitions, most countries promulgated liberal constitutions guaranteeing formal constraints on executive powers, checks and balances, and most importantly, limits on presidential powers. The “rebirth of African liberalism” was manifested in a renewed zeal for constitutionalism, a “resurrection” of parliaments and other institutional innovations like power-sharing and (ethnic) federalism in Ethiopia and consultative bodies of statesmen and traditional rulers.⁷⁴ Nevertheless, the achievements in constitutionalism were shallow and scarce leaving much to be desired. In the majority, constitutions were at best vulnerable to arbitrary exercise of power or, at worst, served as instruments of semi-authoritarian leaders to limit political competition. This in large part stemmed from the overriding concern of the transitions to “opening up” closed political systems for pluralistic representation and participation, and not constitutionalism or the delineation of “constitutional limits” on executive power. The transitions wrought a few reforms into an order that remained largely unreformed:

“Despite these precedent-setting changes to Africa’s political and constitutional landscape, a notable feature of the ancien regime survives [...] the imperial presidency. [...] presidents may be term-limited, but by all accounts they have not yet been tamed. In fact, the modal African presidency has emerged from the recent round of democratic reforms with its extant powers substantially intact. In general, presidential rule in “postauthoritarian” Africa has become less repressive, and the climate for personal liberty and rival political activity has improved appreciably in Africa’s democratizing states. Still, power within the African state, and with it control of resources and patronage, continues to rest with the president...”⁷⁵

Rife with what Linz called the “perils of presidentialism,” the new constitutions gave broad decree powers to presidents at the expense of legislatures and judiciaries, with even incentives for personalization of power.⁷⁶ The immediate institutional outcome is a want of checks and balances or “little or no” horizontal accountability and widespread attempts by incumbents to override or roll back formal institutions. By dint of their parliamentary majorities, semi-authoritarian leaders began to push for constitutional amendments and legislation that run counter to democratic principles. Eighteen leaders of “the class of 1990” who went to transitional elections

⁷³Michael Bratton, “Deciphering Africa’s Divergent Transitions,” 93.

⁷⁴E. Gyimah-Boadi, “The Rebirth of African Liberalism,” *Journal of Democracy* 9 (Mar. 1998): 20-21).

⁷⁵Kwasi H. Prempeh, “Presidents Untamed.” In *Democracy in Africa: Progress and Retreat*, eds. L. Diamond and M. F. Plattner (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010), 19.

⁷⁶Juan J. Linz, “The Perils of Presidentialism,” *Journal of Democracy* 1 (Winter 1990): 51-69.

in 1990 still remained in power in 1997 while two others made a comeback.⁷⁷ From 1991-2008, incumbent leaders relinquished power just eight times after losing to the opposition,⁷⁸ with elections meant no power turnover in many electoral democracies.⁷⁹ In Malawi, Nigeria, and Zambia, elected presidents unsuccessfully sought to overturn constitutional term limits through constitutional manipulations.⁸⁰ Incumbents in Kenya and Zimbabwe held unsuccessful referendums to expand their own powers.⁸¹ In many other cases like Namibia and Burkina Faso, presidents succeeded at extension of tenures or personalization of power. Overly “broad” libel and sedition laws used against critics left several “closed” arenas of authoritarianism immune to the rule of law. The “liberalized autocracies” respected constitutions merely in the most “minimal way” and operated in disregard of their “democratic spirit”⁸².

Except in a few cases, this institutionally degrading legacy of personalist rule had a paralyzing effect on institutions of accountability. As figure 4 above shows, Legislatures and judiciaries remained overshadowed by executive dominance.⁸³ Apart from the dangers posed by the executive, the role of these institutions as key agents of consolidation was severely undercut by decades of neglect and marginalization. Parliaments were at the forefront of the struggle for greater democracy. But without fair competition, they were more likely often acting as agents rubber-stamping the decrees of powerful presidents.⁸⁴ The biggest threat, as Gyimah-Boadi saw it, to the fledgling parliaments was an indelible legacy of personal power—elected presidents saw legislatures as “rubber stamps or safety valves” for venting popular discontent and not as “arenas for real policy” deliberation or serious checks on executive power.⁸⁵ Notwithstanding the rebirth of constitutionalism, therefore, legislative supremacy, judicial independence, and civilian control over the military were all under severe test over the past two decades. Parliaments and judiciaries struggled not only from the lingering “autocratic culture” of executives, but also from

⁷⁷Bruce Baker, “The Class of 1990: How Have the Autocratic Leaders of Sub-Saharan Africa Fared under Democratization?” *Third World Quarterly* 19 (Jan. 1998): 117.

⁷⁸These are Madagascar (1996), Ghana (2000), Senegal (2000), Guinea-Bissau (2000), Benin (2001), Cape Verde (2001), Kenya (2002), and Mali (2002).

⁷⁹ Simone Dietrich and Joseph Wright, “Foreign Aid and Democratic Development in Africa,” in *Democratic Trajectories in Africa*, eds. Danielle Resnick and Nicolas van de Walle (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 56.

⁸⁰Prempeh, “Presidents Untamed,” 19.

⁸¹R. Joseph, “Challenges of a “Frontier” Region,” *Journal of Democracy* 19(April 2008): 99.

⁸²Prempeh, “Presidents Untamed,” 21.

⁸³Joel Barkan, “Democracy in Africa” in *Democratic Reform in Africa: Its Impact on Governance and Poverty Alleviation*, ed. M. Ndulo (Oxford: James Currey, 2006) and Prempeh, “Presidents Untamed,” 2010.


⁸⁴Bratton, “Deciphering Africa’s Divergent Transitions,” 46.

⁸⁵Gyimah-Boadi, “The Rebirth of African Liberalism,” 26.

administrative ineffectiveness, meager financial resources, and low professional capacity.⁸⁶

This unfavorable institutional terrain also undermined the consolidation of institutions of vertical accountability. Political parties and civil societies in post-communist Europe suffered from a social apathy to party politics and associational life that marked communist rule.⁸⁷ However, this drawback was generally not a major hindrance to consolidation; in fact, some countries like Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia saw very active civil society groups monitoring state activities.⁸⁸ In comparison, the weakness and fragmentation of non-state institutions rendered democratic consolidation “difficult and exceptional” in Africa. Contrary to the vital role civil society and opposition parties played in the transitions from communism, the transitions of the early 1990s in Africa were surprisingly hardly products of opposition and civil society power, but largely results of weakness of ailing regimes.⁸⁹ Opposition political parties had to grapple with enormous social diversity, resurgence of ethnicity,⁹⁰ lack of internal party democracy, and meager resources in the face of long-ruling parties in control of state coffers.

Figure 5. Institutionalization of parties and party systems, 1989-2014




⁸⁶Diamond, “Introduction,” 1999; Bratton, “Deciphering Africa’s Divergent Transitions,” 1997.

⁸⁷Kaldor and Vejdova, “Democratization,” 1997.

⁸⁸Kaldor and Vejdova, “Democratization,” 77.

⁸⁹Jeffrey Herbst, “Political Liberalization in Africa After Ten Years,” *Comparative Politics* 33(April 2001): 362.

⁹⁰Jennifer Widner, “Political Parties and Civil Societies in Sub-Saharan Africa,” in *Democracy in Africa: The Hard Road Ahead*, ed., Marina Ottaway (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997); Alex Thompson, *An Introduction to African Politics*, Third edition (New York: Routledge, 2010).



Even though political parties in the CEE also suffered from some similar setbacks,⁹¹ personal dominance, social heterogeneity and corruption on the growth of parties were pernicious to Africa's nascent parties. Differing much more along personal identities and parochial constituencies than on policy platforms, the budding parties often served as vehicles for power attainment and preservation, failing their traditional mandate as "transmission belts" for citizen interests, representation and policy articulation. If any similarity, reformed communist parties retained state power largely through success in the ballot box, but a great majority of parties that weathered the transition in Africa clung to power through denial of free vote and manipulation of the ballot box. In the absence of a "reasonably institutionalized party system," not only vertical accountability falls in jeopardy, but also the future of democracy at large gets bleak.⁹² With the media (broadcast media in particular) largely remaining a state monopoly, the newly (re)born civil society was also rendered quite feeble by constraints on freedom of association, and was highly fragmented and often co-opted to be a major force of consolidation.⁹³ In Eastern Europe, civil society mushroomed partly in response to extensive support by Western governments, donors and democracy promotion agencies like the Soros

⁹¹Kaldor and Vejevoda, "Democratization," 73.

⁹²Scott Mainwaring and Timothy Scully, "Parties and Democracy in Latin America--Different Patterns Common Challenges," in *Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America*, ed., Scott Mainwaring and Timothy Scully (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995), 475.

⁹³Widner, "Political Parties," 1997; Thompson, *An Introduction*, 2010; C Monga, "Eight Problems with African Politic," *Journal of Democracy* 8(July 1997): 156-170.

and Open Society foundations. It was able to serve as a third pillar monitoring elections, human rights, minority rights, etc.⁹⁴

The maturation of institutions of vertical and horizontal accountability is vital for democratic consolidation. Yet, even in the face of consolidation of these institutions, democracy could face a serious threat or abrupt end when the military and other coercive forces do not see it as “the only game in town.” In post-communist Europe, the control of civilian authorities over the military was relatively quickly achieved,⁹⁵ but the armed and security forces in Africa remained largely under the behest of the executive and influential in civilian politics. The role of the military was decisive given its history of intervention and being “an institutional pillar” of most authoritarian regimes.⁹⁶ Where the military remained neutral or pro-reform, there were better chances of avoiding democratic breakdown and of enhancing slow democratic deepening. Democracies, which inherited a legacy of military takeovers or support to autocrats, faced not only democratic erosion (e.g., Ethiopia, Zimbabwe and Angola) but also a risk of takeovers (e.g., Comoros, CAR and Mali) or toppling elected governments (e.g., Burundi, Gambia, Sierra Leone, and Niger). Successful consolidation is thus associated with more cohesive opposition parties, roust civil society, and non-politicized militaries willing to remain neutral or defend the constitution.

4. Liberal Authoritarianism Unchallenged

The foregoing discussion sought to answer two questions: how third wave democratization has unravel in sub-Saharan Africa in comparative perspective, and given its distinctive structural conditions and institutional heritage, which institutions posed major obstacles to democratic consolidation. While substantive aspects of democracy steadily consolidated in a few countries, the great majority faced democratic stagnation, breakdown or a “reverse wave” of democratization. Several of the transitions resulted in relatively easy institutionalization of regular and often free elections, reproducing several electoral democracies and electoral autocracies. Yet, like in other illiberal democracies, elections increasingly turned into political rituals with which incumbents periodically showcase their “democratic” credentials rather than procedures to serve citizens as genuine democratic tools to freely choose from an array of representatives and policy preferences. Several regimes consolidated as illiberal systems wherein electoral systems were perverted by rigging, violence, and falsification of vote results; civil liberties were violated; and the playing field rendered unequal.

⁹⁴Kaldor and Vejvoda, “Democratization,” 77.

⁹⁵Kaldor and Vejvoda, “Democratization,” 66.

⁹⁶Eboe Hutchful, “Militarism and Problems of Democratic Transition,” in *Democracy in Africa: The Hard Road Ahead*, ed. Marina Ottaway (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997), 43-64.

Thus, against immense popular and scholarly optimism at the outset, the first decade of democratization in Africa was arguably marked by mere “survival” rather than advance of democracy. This checkered experience sets third wave democratization in Africa fairly apart from, and patently trailing, contemporaneous transitions in post-Communist Europe, which made remarkable strides in consolidating liberal democracy following the great transformations of 1989. While elections and other procedural elements of electoral democracy institutionalized fairly easily like in post-Communist Europe, Africa’s new and fragile democracies faced relatively formidable challenges in ensuring free and fair elections and to a greater extent, in deepening basic liberties, institutions of vertical and horizontal accountability, and the rule of law. From a comparative institutional perspective, a major obstacle to quick institutionalization of competitive party systems and civil liberties in post-Communist Europe was arguably the authoritarian legacy of communism that lurked in the political fabric of post-transition societies. In post-Cold war Africa, by contrast, given a large sway informal institutions still hold in African politics,⁹⁷ neopatrimonial institutions and violence-prone liberation politics were primarily responsible, but less accounted, for the rise and resilience of illiberal democracy.⁹⁸ The unrivalled levels of stagnation break down or erosion of democratic institutions and the consequent persistence of semi-authoritarianism were in large part caused by the strong influence of these informal institutions in political life.

Moreover, the different modes of transitions and the institutional platforms on which they unfolded produced significantly varying challenges to long-term democratic consolidation, setting the two regions in divergent paths of democratization long after the critical junctures of transitions. Consolidologists widely believe that third wave transitions that mainly coincided with the demise of Soviet communism invariably produced electoral authoritarian regimes worldwide. Nevertheless, the foregoing comparative analysis showed that there are wide variations between post-Communist Europe and post-Cold War Africa --both in terms of consolidation and the institutional factors that conditioned it. While the former experienced steady and unprecedented levels of democratic expansion, the

⁹⁷M. Bratton, “Formal Versus Informal Institutions in Africa,” *Journal of Democracy* 18 (July 2007): 96-110; G. Hyden. *African Politics in Comparative Perspective* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006); P. Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz. *Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument* (London, UK: James Currey, 1999).

⁹⁸On the institutional obstacles of liberation politics, see Salih Nur, “The Rise of Illiberal Democracy in Africa,” 2013; Levitsky and Way, “Beyond Patronage: Violent Struggle, Ruling Party Cohesion, and Authoritarian Durability,” *Perspectives on Politics* 10 (Dc. 2012): 869-89. The scant attention consolidologists generally pay to informal institutions has been underscored by Helmke and Levitsky (2004) “Informal Institutions and Comparative Politics: A Research Agenda.”

latter faced contradictory trends of “democratic progress and retreat” during the last decade.⁹⁹ The political disparities began to widen since the late 1990s when the effects of the dynamic interaction of various institutional and external factors that bear on democratization began to crystallize. Integration into the EU offered an external incentive for democratic deepening in several post-Communist European countries. The modular Color Revolutions also generated a renewed momentum for democratization even though many failed to meet promises. While most succeeded in cementing the course of democratization in Central and Southeastern Europe others challenged the postcommunist authoritarian status quo in most former Soviet republics. The absence of comparable events, in particular since the Arab Spring uprisings, which could have shaken up the post-Cold War status quo in Africa, has rendered the region a bastion of illiberal democracy.

A comparative investigation of what led to the defeat of semi-authoritarianism in several postcommunist states can partially help understand the future challenges and prospects of democracy in Africa. Such endeavor could focus on two fronts. First, given the ever-expanding influence of China and other autocratic powers like Russia in the region, the role of external “leverage and linkage” and the internal factors that condition the effectiveness of democracy promotion requires greater inquiry. A vibrant literature explores the effectiveness of linkage to the West, foreign aid and democracy promotion on democratization in the CEE and Eurasia; yet comparable studies in Africa are wanting. More is required to carefully appreciate democracy promotion efforts, integration into the global political economy, and the threats of China’s presence in the scene. Another area that yearns for persistent attention is the place of informal institutions both as impediments to consolidation and as facilitators of semi-authoritarian regime resilience. There is a laudable work on personal influence, political corruption, party clientelism, and other forms of political transactions among political elites and the masses. However, little or no attention has been paid to an even pernicious form of informal institutions –i.e., the camaraderie political culture and institutions of former liberation fronts-in-power. Nowhere else have been the vicissitudes of democracy more daunting or democratic prospects bleaker than in places under the overbearing powers of liberation fronts such as Ethiopia’s EPRDF, Zimbabwe’s ZANU-PF, and Angola’s MPLA or to some extent former rebel groups like the RPF in Rwanda and the NRM in Uganda. Not only have these regimes proved to be durable autocracies like the PFDJ regime in Eritrea or agile semi-authoritarians like Zimbabwe capable of weathering mounting external pressure and recurring regime-threatening internal crises through a combination of brute force and political manipulation. But the former visionary rebels have also managed to dominate national politics—as in South Africa and Namibia—even when they live

⁹⁹Larry Diamond and M. F. Plattner, ed. *Democratization in Africa: Progress and Retreat* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010).

up to their promise of freedom and democracy. Yet little has been done to better understand these strange bedfellows of democracy.

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... TO BE CONTINUED? CHALLENGING THE CULTURAL LEGACY ARGUMENT IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE¹

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Abstract

According to Nations in Transit 2016, many countries in Central and Eastern Europe are still not considered fully 'consolidated democracies'. One of their features is that political participation is weaker and less developed than in established democracies. In the literature, the 'post-communist heritage' is treated as one of the most important explanations for the lack of political participation in the region. In a first step, the paper disentangles the post-communist heritage. In contrast to the widely held beliefs in large parts of the literature, the post-communist heritage is not as monolithic as it is portrayed. With respect to the variety across countries and over time, this paper breaks down positive and negative facets of the post-communist heritage. Secondly, it is argued that the effects of the transformation are still underplayed in research on political participation in Central and Eastern Europe. By mainly focusing on cultural explanations, scholars therefore tend to lose sight of present explanations for weak political participation in the region.

Keywords: Central and Eastern Europe, cultural heritage, transformation, political culture, political participation

1. Fuzzy and Ambiguous: Political Participation in Central and Eastern Europe

In comparison to established democracies, Central and Eastern European societies are characterized by weak civic engagement in politics. In the literature, the weakness is located in different spheres of citizens influencing politics. Central and Eastern European civil society is considered to be 'weak'², civic traditions are 'less salient'³ and in terms of political participation citizens just participate less.⁴ According to past research, the so-called post-communist heritage is adduced for being the most important explanation for the supposed lack of political participation in Central and Eastern Europe. In this context, Barnes states that

¹ The paper was presented at the conference "(Dis)Satisfaction with Democracy and Citizens' Involvement in Post-Communist Europe", at Södertörn University, 2-3 October 2014. The author is grateful for the received constructive feedback.

² Marc Morje Howard, "The Weakness of Postcommunist Civil Society," *Journal of Democracy* 13:1 (2002): 157-69.

³ Jan Germen Janmaat, "Civic Culture in Western and Eastern Europe," *European Journal of Sociology / Archives Européennes de Sociologie* 47:3 (2006): 363-93.

⁴ Natalia Letki, "Socialization for Participation? Trust, Membership, and Democratization in East-Central Europe," *Political Research Quarterly* 57:4 (2004): 665-79.

citizens share 'a lack of participation due to the long authoritarian experience'.⁵ Similarly, Pop-Eleches and Tucker contribute that the 'pervasive distrust of the public sphere under Communism' caused an attitudinal legacy that is responsible for citizens' abstention from participation.⁶ In essence, such contributions strongly refer to the cultural legacy, caused by citizens' negative experiences before 1989, which still influences political participation nowadays negatively. However, bearing in mind the contemporary history of Central and Eastern Europe, several social movements, demonstrations or other forms of citizen participation had a great influence on crucial political and societal developments in socialist times such as the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, the Prague Spring in the late 1960s, Solidarność in Poland in the 1980s, the Baltic independence movements, the Monday demonstrations in East Germany in the late 1980s as well as the large-scale demonstrations in Serbia led by the Zajedno coalition from the mid-1990s onwards.

According to Schäfer, Central and Eastern Europe is different from Western Europe in terms of other factors that seem to have an influence on political participation there.⁷ The purpose of this paper is to discuss those differences and the respective branches of the literature on weak political participation in the region. Before the part of the literature is presented, which portrays the cultural heritage in Central and Eastern Europe as a rather negative and unified phenomenon, the paper draws on general research on political participation. By developing a definition and reflecting on the scope of political participation, it becomes clear that various variables have influence on political participation. Subsequently, the 'cultural heritage theory' is confronted with emancipatory forms of citizens' participation in socialist times. It will be shown that the picture of the socialist past is not as black and white as the widely held beliefs in the literature suggest. Therefore, the purpose of the section is to demonstrate that political culture under socialism shows a greater variety than it is mainly introduced. Furthermore, attention is drawn to the post-socialist time. Regarding the comparatively low level of political participation, it will be demonstrated that the impact of the transformation is not mirrored adequately in the literature on political participation in the region. In 1989 the great and widespread transformation towards democracy and capitalism began and had a great influence on Central and Eastern European politics, economies and societies. Therefore, the year 1989 marks the starting point of the great

⁵Samuel H. Barnes, "The Changing Political Participation of Postcommunist Citizens," *International Journal of Sociology* 36:2 (2006): 79.

⁶Grigore Pop-Eleches and Joshua A. Tucker, "Associated with the Past?: Communist Legacies and Civic Participation in Post-Communist Countries," *East European Politics & Societies* 27:1 (2013): 46.

⁷Armin Schäfer, "Consequences of Social Inequality for Democracy in Western Europe," *Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft* 6:2 (2012): 27.

transformation⁸ and likewise the beginning of a 'cultural and civilizational break'.⁹ Following Sztompka's diagnosis, political culture in Central and Eastern Europe is at least twofold, shaped by the socialist and the transformation heritage. The paper will illustrate that those two heritages vary over time and across countries. In the light of the multifaceted nature of political participation, it is argued that only focusing on the socialist past is too narrow and appears rather simplistic. Additionally, by mainly referring to the socialist heritage - hence the past - such an approach underplays the effects of the transformation and hampers new insights regarding recent developments.

2. Preconditions for Political Participation and Its Multifaceted Nature

Before elaborating on preconditions for political participation, it is necessary to define this crucial term. The challenge any definition of political participation faces is to capture the dynamic character of the phenomenon. A too static and predetermining approach would not sufficiently take into account the vibrant and diverse character of political participation. Therefore the definition of the paper emphasizes citizens' 'telos'¹⁰, meaning their intention to influence political decisions or people who make those policies. Here, political participation is defined as 'actions of private citizens by which they seek to influence or to support government and politics'.¹¹ Kaase and Marsh add to the definition that 'all voluntary activities by individual citizens' can influence political decisions either 'directly or indirectly'.¹² Additionally, Norris contributes that any dimensions of activity should count as political participation that 'are either designed directly to influence government agencies and the policy process, or indirectly to impact civil society, or which attempt to alter systematic patterns of social behavior'.¹³ Therefore the proposed definition of political participation is:

⁸Adam Przeworski, *Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

⁹Piotr Sztompka, "Looking Back: The Year 1989 as a Cultural and Civilizational Break," *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 29:2 (1996): 115-29.

¹⁰Iasonas Lamprianou, "Contemporary Political Participation Research: A Critical Assessment," in *Democracy in Transition*, ed. Kyriakos N. Demetriou (Heidelberg: Springer, 2013), 21-42.

¹¹Lester W. Milbrath and Madan Lal Goel, *Political Participation How and Why Do People Get Involved in Politics?* (Chicago: Rand McNally College Publ. Co., 1977), 2.

¹²Max Kaase and David Marsh, "Political Action. A Theoretical Perspective," in *Political Action: Mass Participation in Five Western Democracies*, eds. Samuel H. Barnes, Max Kaase and Klaus R. Allerbeck (Beverly Hills: Sage Publ., 1979), 42.

¹³Pippa Norris, *Digital Divide: Civic Engagement, Information Poverty, and the Internet Worldwide, Communication, Society, and Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 16.

Any voluntary action of private citizens by which they seek to directly or indirectly influence any political outcome, representatives, civil society's stakeholders or like-minded people.

Furthermore, the history of research on political participation is a story of enlarging the scope of participatory tools. As a reaction to the branching out of political participation in the 1970s, Hirschman prominently proposes the differentiation between exit-based and voice-based political participation.¹⁴ Thereby he stresses the intention to participate, either directly through voting or indirectly through party membership. Teorell et al. specify the typology (see Fig. 1) and add to Hirschman's dimension a second one - 'representational' and 'extra-representational' participatory channels.¹⁵

Fig. 1. Typology of Different Forms of Political Participation¹⁶

| | | Channel of expression | |
|-------------------------|-------------|-----------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| | | Representational | Extra-representational |
| Mechanisms to influence | Exit-based | Voting | Consumer participation ¹⁷ |
| | Voice-based | Associational participation | Protest |

Thereby it is not only essential whether citizens intend to influence any political outcome directly or indirectly. It is equally crucial whether citizens choose representational or extra-representational channels. The underlying assumption is that any form of political participation beyond the scope of classic representation such as protest results in an additive expression of opinion in public. However, the figure should not give the impression that citizens have to choose between different channels. Extra-representational channels or direct participation are not a 'strict

¹⁴Albert Otto Hirschman, *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1970).

¹⁵Jan Teorell, Mariano Torcal and José Ramón Montero, "Political Participation: Mapping the Terrain," in *Citizenship and Involvement in European Democracies: A Comparative Analysis*, eds. Jan Van Deth, José Ramón Montero and Anders Westholm (London: Routledge, 2007). 340-44.

¹⁶The figure is taken from Jan Teorell, Mariano Torcal and José Ramón Montero, "Political Participation", 341.

¹⁷By applying political consumerism citizens participate through boycotting large supermarket chains or favoring certain products such as fair trade or organic products. See Michele Micheletti, *Political Virtue and Shopping: Individuals, Consumerism, and Collective Action* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003)/ Dietlind Stolle, Marc Hooghe and Michele Micheletti, "Politics in the Supermarket: Political Consumerism as a Form of Political Participation," *International Political Science Review* 26:3 (2005): 245-69.

alternative to political representation'. It rather serves as a complementation of classic representation.¹⁸

According to Verba et al., participation is a 'complex field where various variables have impact on. No magic bullet would do the trick'.¹⁹ Correspondingly, political participation depends on socio-economic resources such as income and education²⁰ as well as on biographical conditions such as age, socialization, gender, and previous participatory experience.²¹ However, citizen participation in politics does not do not take place in isolation: variables such as the intensity of citizen mobilization or institutional environment need to be taken into account, too. Examples for the latter are the electoral system or the level of decentralization.²² According to Brady et al.²³, many citizens are not engaged in politics because simply nobody asked or mobilized them. Additionally, mobilization is equally crucial for all forms of political participation such as becoming a member of a party, voting, or protesting.²⁴ Figure 2 provides an overview of the most influential variables regarding political participation.

¹⁸Archon Fung, "Varieties of Participation in Complex Governance," *Public Administration Review* 66 (2006): 66.

¹⁹Sidney Verba, Kay Lehman Schlozman and Henry E. Brady, "Political Equality: What Do We Know About It?," in *Social Inequality*, ed. Kathryn M. Neckerman (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2004). 658.

²⁰Sidney Verba, Norman H. Nie, and Jae-On Kim, *Participation and Political Equality: A Seven-Nation Comparison* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978)/ Henry E. Brady, Sidney Verba and Kay Lehman Schlozman, "Beyond Ses: A Resource Model of Political Participation," *The American Political Science Review* 89:2 (1995): 271-94/ Christopher J. Anderson and Pablo Beramendi, "Income, Inequality, and Electoral Participation," in *Democracy, Inequality, and Representation. A Comparative Perspective*, eds. Pablo Beramendi and Christopher J. Anderson (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2008). 278-311.

²¹Norman H. Nie, Sidney Verba and Kim Jae-on, "Political Participation and the Life Cycle," *Comparative Politics* 6:3 (1974): 319-40/ Daniel A. McFarland and Reuben J. Thomas, "Bowling Young: How Youth Voluntary Associations Influence Adult Political Participation," *American Sociological Review* 71:3 (2006): 401-25/ Daniela F. Melo and Daniel Stockemer, "Age and Political Participation in Germany, France and the UK: A Comparative Analysis," *Comparative European Politics* 12:1 (2014): 33-53.

²²Daniel Treisman, *The Architecture of Government: Rethinking Political Decentralization* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007)/ Kateřina Vrábliková, "How Context Matters? Mobilization, Political Opportunity Structures, and Nonelectoral Political Participation in Old and New Democracies," *Comparative Political Studies* 47:2 (2014): 171-202.

²³Henry E. Brady, Sidney Verba and Kay Lehman Schlozman, "Beyond Ses", 271-94.

²⁴Philip H. Pollock III, "Organizations as Agents of Mobilization: How Does Group Activity Affect Political Participation?," *American Journal of Political Science* 26:3 (1982): 485-503/ Jeffrey A. Karp and Susan A. Banducci, "Party Mobilization and Political Participation in New and Old Democracies," *Party Politics* 13:2 (2007): 217-34/ Laura Morales, *Joining Political*

Fig. 2. Preconditions for Political Participation

| | | Focus on | |
|---------|----------|---------------------------------------|---------------------------|
| | | Actors | Structures |
| Feature | Direct | Mobilization | Institutional environment |
| | Indirect | Socio-economic resources, age, gender | Political culture |

In the light of the insights presented above, it is surprising that weak political participation in Central and Eastern Europe is mainly linked to the cultural legacy of communism. Political culture impacts on political participation, but it is just one out of various preconditions for political participation. In the following sections the arguments of the 'cultural legacy approach' will be outlined and subsequently confronted with other branches of the literature that are dealing with political participation and political culture in Central and Eastern Europe.

3. The Socialist Legacy and Its Negative Influence on Political Participation

Past scholars widely agreed on that democracy requires a supportive culture, the acceptance by the citizenry and political elites of principles underlying essential freedoms, rule of law, and human rights.²⁵ However, it takes time before all relevant actors of democracy internalize such norms and values. They do not 'evolve overnight'.²⁶

Regarding political culture in Central and Eastern Europe, past research treated the socialist period as the main influential factor and it served as a starting point of most inquiries about weak political participation. The debate on the political culture of communism started long before the collapse of the Soviet Union. For instance, the discussion contained the argument that the official 'Marxist-Leninist' ideology has

Organisations Institutions, Mobilisation and Participation in Western Democracies (Colchester: ECPR Press, 2009).

²⁵Gabriel A. Almond, "Comparative Political Systems," *The Journal of Politics* 18:3 (1956): 391-409/ Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba, *Political Culture and Political Development, Studies in Political Development* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1965)/ Robert A. Dahl, *Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition*. (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1971)/ Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz and Seymour Martin Lipset, "Introduction: What Makes for Democracy," in *Politics in Developing Countries: Comparing Experiences with Democracy*, eds. Larry Jay Diamond, Juan J. Linz and Seymour Martin Lipset (Boulder, Colo.: L. Rienner Publishers, 1990).

²⁶Seymour Martin Lipset, "The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited: 1993 Presidential Address," *American Sociological Review* 59:1 (1994): 1-22.

failed in mobilizing people despite 'communist propaganda' in schools and the media. People rather ignored than adopted the ideology.²⁷

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the debate about political culture in the region changed. The shift was from which impact does communism have on people to what is the legacy of this period? Therefore, post-socialist political culture was linked to the legacy stemming from people's experiences under communism that is supposed to have left people 'incompetent'²⁸ for the transformation. Sztompka highlights in a very drastic way the 'civilizational incompetence' of Central and Eastern European societies; speaking of a lack of democratic and economic culture in terms of norms, rules and values which is portrayed as the result of the socialist experience.²⁹ Crawford and Lijphart identify six 'key legacies' of communism and their influence on post-socialist societies: 'the absence of successor elites', 'weak party systems', 'the interrupted process of nation building', 'command economic systems', 'the persistence of institutions established under the old regime', and 'the history of backwardness, victimization, and intolerance'.³⁰ Just to outline the last legacy, the backwardness in economic terms refers to the peripheral status in the world economy of post-socialist Europe after 1989. Victimization in contrast, hints at the political helplessness in a way that the vigorous exercise of power created a widespread aversion to politics and intolerance for opposing views.³¹ Moreover, the monopoly of a single elite, namely the Communist party, is adduced for stifling autonomous counter-elites under communism³² and therefore intolerance towards democratic politics of negotiation. Ceka adds that the transformation from a one party system to a multi-party system overstrained the newly empowered electorate.

²⁷Robert C. Tucker, "Culture, Political Culture, and Communist Society," *Political Science Quarterly* 88:2 (1973): 173-90/ Gabriel A. Almond, "Communism and Political Culture Theory," *Comparative Politics* 15:2 (1983): 127-38/ Mary McAuley, "Political Culture and Communist Politics: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back," in *Political Culture and Communist Studies*, ed. Archie Brown (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1984). 13-39.

²⁸Piotr Sztompka, "Civilizational Incompetence," *Zeitschrift für Soziologie* 22:2 (1993): 85-95.

²⁹Ibid. 88.

³⁰Beverly Crawford and Arend Lijphart, "Explaining Political and Economic Change in Post-Communist Eastern Europe: Old Legacies, New Institutions, Hegemonic Norms, and International Pressures," *Comparative Political Studies* 28:2 (1995): 179.

³¹See Ken Jowitt, "Weber, Trotsky and Holmes on the Study of Leninist Regimes," *Journal of International Affairs* 45:1 (1991): 31-48.

³²Beverly Crawford and Arend Lijphart, "Old Legacies, New Institutions: Explaining Political and Economic Trajectories in Post-Communist Regimes," in *Liberalization and Leninist Legacies: Comparative Perspectives on Democratic Transitions*, eds. Beverly Crawford and Arend Lijphart (Berkeley, Calif.: International and Area Studies, 1997). 1-39.

Therefore citizens were not adequately prepared for pluralism and political competition.³³

In order to address weak political participation in the region, two further features of the legacy shall be mentioned: democratic norms and values in post-socialist societies as well as post-socialist civil society. In comparison to Western Europe, civic traditions are considered to be less salient. Due to the authoritarian experience, people's perception of the state and the public sphere is different because of the negative bias stemming from the legacy. Therefore, the rift between the private and the public is wider in Central and Eastern Europe. Citizens prefer informal social networks 'with minimal links to the state'.³⁴ This caused one of the most important features of the legacy – over time citizens developed an extensive distrust in the state and its institutions.³⁵ However, the realm of the socialist legacy is not limited to trust in state authorities. It also affects interpersonal trust negatively.³⁶ Furthermore, the supposed low level of trust impacts on peoples' attitudes towards democracy in general. Therefore, peoples' interest in politics is relatively low as well as their satisfaction with the democratic order.³⁷ In addition to that, the weakness of civil society in the region has drawn tremendous scholarly attention in particular. The already mentioned features of the socialist legacy such as mistrust in the state and its organs or the persistence of private network friendships cause citizens' abstention from politics and low levels of organizational membership.³⁸ Furthermore, the authoritarian regime smothered any space for independent civil society.³⁹

³³Besir Ceka, "The Perils of Political Competition: Explaining Participation and Trust in Political Parties in Eastern Europe," *Comparative Political Studies* 46:12 (2013): 1611.

³⁴Jan Germen Janmaat, "Civic Culture in Western and Eastern Europe", 377.

³⁵Roger Sapsford and Pamela Abbott, "Trust, Confidence and Social Environment in Post-Communist Societies," *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 39:1 (2006): 59-71/ Rebecca McKee, Adrianna Murphy, Erica Richardson, Bayard Roberts, Christian Haerpfer and Martin McKee, "Do Citizens of the Former Soviet Union Trust State Institutions, and Why?," *East European Politics* 29:4 (2013): 377-96/ Zsolt Boda and Gergő Medve-Bálint, "Does Institutional Trust in East Central Europe Differ from Western Europe?," *European Quarterly of Political Attitudes and Mentalities* 3:2 (2014): 1-17.

³⁶Wayne DiFranceisco and Zvi Gitelman, "Soviet Political Culture and "Covert Participation" in Policy Implementation," *The American Political Science Review* 78:3 (1984): 603-21.

³⁷Irene Martin, "Interest in Politics and the Political Culture Approach: The Case of the New Democracies of Southern and Eastern Europe," in *Political Culture in Post-Communist Europe. Attitudes in New Democracies*, eds. Detlef Pollack, Jörg Jacobs, Olaf Müller and Gert Pickel (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003). 71-90.

³⁸Marc Morje Howard, "The Weakness of Postcommunist Civil Society, 160-62.

³⁹Anna Grzymala-Busse and Pauline Jones Luong, "Reconceptualizing the State: Lessons from Post-Communism," *Politics & Society* 30:4 (2002): 529-54.

To sum up, the socialist legacy arises from the time before 1989. The long authoritarian experience is used in order to explain low support for democracy, low level of trust and weak civil society in the region. Moreover, weak political participation is portrayed as a direct effect of the socialist past; in particular electoral and associational forms are highly affected.⁴⁰ In the next step, different forms of political participation before 1989 will be discussed in order to counterbalance the first approach.

4. Emancipatory Forms of Political Participation Before 1989

Over decades scholars debated forms of political participation beyond the official channel, especially in the Soviet Union.⁴¹ As outlined at the very beginning of the paper, Central and Eastern Europe experienced several large-scale social movements, demonstrations or other forms of citizen participation such as the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, the Prague Spring, Solidarność in Poland, Sąjūdis in Lithuania, and the Zajedno coalition in Serbia. On a general level, DiFranceisco and Gitelman state that most emancipatory form of political participation under communism had to be 'covered'.⁴² Such forms either took place within official institutions in partly concealed ways or outside of the existing political apparatus. Regarding the former, Segert shows by using the example of the SED in East Germany that the socialist party was not as homogenous as sometimes perceived. For instance, the loyal 'Intelligentsia' was part of the existing power structures in society but they were not identical with the top-level elite. The Intelligentsia gained more influence after the 1960s and contributed to a less oppressive regime.⁴³

The range of participation beyond the Communist party spans from writing letters to newspaper editors or contacting those who hold positions in policymaking

⁴⁰Alexander C. Pacek, Grigore Pop-Eleches and Joshua A. Tucker, "Disenchanted or Discerning: Voter Turnout in Post-Communist Countries," *The Journal of Politics* 71:2 (2009): 473-91.

⁴¹Jerry F. Hough, "Political Participation in the Soviet Union," *Soviet Studies* 28:1 (1976): 3-20/ Theodore H. Friedgut, *Political Participation in the USSR* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979)/ Aryeh L. Unger, "Political Participation in the USSR: YCL and CPSU," *Soviet Studies* 33:1 (1981): 107-24.

⁴²Wayne DiFranceisco and Zvi Gitelman, "Soviet Political Culture and "Covert Participation" in Policy Implementation", 603.

⁴³Dieter Segert, "Loyalitäten im späten Staatssozialismus und ihr Wandel am Beispiel der intellektuellen Dienstklasse der DDR," (Loyalties in Late State Socialism and Their Change Using the Example of the Intellectual Dienstklasse of the GDR) in *Loyalitäten im Staatssozialismus. DDR, Tschechoslowakei, Polen* (Loyalties in State Socialism. GDR, Czechoslovakia, Poland), eds. Volker Zimmermann, Peter Haslinger and Thomás Nigrin (Marburg: Verlag Herder-Institut, 2010). 205-18.

institutions to organizing protests.⁴⁴ There is no doubt that the vast majority tried to keep a low profile in order to avoid sanctions.⁴⁵ Additionally, those who were active despite the prevailing threat showed both high amounts of motivation and higher levels of education.⁴⁶ However, emancipatory forms of political participation existed and have to be mentioned in order to describe the time before 1989 in an adequate and differentiated way. Two prominent cases of this type of political participation are selected and will be outlined to illustrate autonomous political participation. Those are the dissent movements in Soviet Russia and the workers' movements in Yugoslavia.

In the case of Yugoslavia, the working class had a great influence on the Communist party after the Second World War. The majority of the small socialist cadre for instance had a working class background. However, shortly after they came to power the party turned into a rather clientelistic party.⁴⁷ Despite the development of the Communist party, the workers' self-management continued to exist as an official part of the Yugoslav socialist ideology.⁴⁸ All employees elected workers' councils for a period of two years. In order to enable an independent development of self-managed companies, enterprises and factories were free from any external influence.⁴⁹ Certainly, channels existed through which the Communist party had the possibility to influence the workers' councils, such as having members elected to the Workers' boards or via trade unions.⁵⁰ However, the self-managed companies shared a great amount of rights and duties including real autonomous decision-making. In this context, Pateman prominently highlights the spillover effect of small-scale participation in the workplace as a school of democracy. Therefore it is not surprising that especially the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia experienced many workers' strikes such as the first reported mining strike in Trbovlje in 1958 or large dockers' strike in Rijeka in 1969 where more than 1500

⁴⁴Wayne DiFranceisco and Zvi Gitelman, "Soviet Political Culture and "Covert Participation" in Policy Implementation", 609-12.

⁴⁵Matt Killingsworth, *Civil Society in Communist Eastern Europe: Opposition and Dissent in Totalitarian Regimes* (Colchester: ECPR Press, 2012).

⁴⁶Wayne DiFranceisco and Zvi Gitelman, "Soviet Political Culture and "Covert Participation" in Policy Implementation", 609.

⁴⁷Marija Obradović, "From Revolutionary to Clientelistic Party: The Communist Party of Yugoslavia, 1945–1952," *East European Politics & Societies* 27:3 (2013): 376-79.

⁴⁸Goran Musić, "Yugoslavia: Workers' Self-Management as State Paradigm", in *Ours to Master and to Own: Workers' Control from the Commune to the Present*, eds. Immanuel Ness and Dario Azzellini (Chicago, Ill.: Haymarket Books, 2011).

⁴⁹Naidan Pašić, "Self-Management in Yugoslavia: Some Impending Problems," in *Self-Management: New Dimensions to Democracy*, eds. Ichak Adizes and Elisabeth Mann Borgese (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 1975).

⁵⁰Carole Pateman, *Participation and Democratic Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), 89-93.

workers took part. Overall, more than 3000 strikes have been reported by the end of the 1970s.⁵¹ Thus, workers' self-management in Yugoslavia is an example for comparatively free participation within the socialist system.

One could argue that Yugoslavia has always been a special case both before and after 1989. Therefore, the following section focuses on independent forms of participation in the Soviet Union. Voronkov and Wielgohs state that resistance against the socialist regime has existed since the very beginning of the Soviet Union.⁵² Michnik contributes that 'the communist system contains protest in its ideological nature'.⁵³ Thereby revisionism and dissidence was a common feature of trying to influence the public sphere.⁵⁴ However, any form of protest was perceived as internal threat to the regime and was immediately held down by the regime. One of the most well-known forms of distributing protest communication is the 'Samizdat'.⁵⁵ In order to avoid censorship, dissents published flyers, letters, or essays themselves. The purpose of those letters was not only limited to communication between dissents; several were directly addressed to the Communist party and its leaders.⁵⁶ In essence, the demands of the heterogonous group of dissents emphasized individual rights and a rather democratic understanding of socialism.⁵⁷ According to Bahry and Silver, in the late 1970s 6.5 % of Soviet immigrants to the US belonged to a permanent discussion group, 4.1 % distributed samizdat.⁵⁸ Moreover, the impact of samizdat can be demonstrated by comparing claims made by dissents in the 1960s and 1970s to speeches of Gorbachev in the late 1980s. Many claims made by dissents can prominently be found in the latter.⁵⁹ Therefore the discourses of samizdat had great influences on the political elite of the Soviet Union but with a certain delay. Although the dissidents were a rather small group of

⁵¹Goldie Shabad, "Strikes in Yugoslavia: Implications for Industrial Democracy," *British Journal of Political Science* 10:3 (1980): 300-01.

⁵²Viktor Voronkov and Jan Wielgohs, "Soviet Russia," in *Dissent and Opposition in Communist Eastern Europe: Origins of Civil Society and Democratic Transition*, eds. Detlef Pollack and Jan Wielgohs (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004).

⁵³Adam Michnik, *Letters from Prison and Other Essays, Society and Culture in East-Central Europe* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985).

⁵⁴Christian Joppke, "Revisionism, Dissidence, Nationalism: Opposition in Leninist Regimes," *The British Journal of Sociology* 45:4 (1994): 543-61.

⁵⁵Robert Sharlet "Dissent and the "Contra-System" in the Soviet Union," *Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science* 35:3 (1984): 135-46.

⁵⁶Serguei A. Oushakine, "The Terrifying Mimicry of Samizdat " *Public Culture* 13:2 (2001): 202-03.

⁵⁷Ann Komaromi, "Samizdat and Soviet Dissident Publics," *Slavic Review* 71:1 (2012): 76.

⁵⁸Donna Bahry and Brian D. Silver, "Soviet Citizen Participation on the Eve of Democratization," *The American Political Science Review* 84:3 (1990): 831.

⁵⁹Serguei A. Oushakine, "The Terrifying Mimicry of Samizdat", 213-14.

counter elites, they contributed to more controversial understanding of socialism and the communist regime.

The given examples show that different forms of political participation existed under socialism. Workers' self-management in Yugoslavia might be an extreme case but it illustrates that citizens were encouraged to participate at their workplace. In turn, the dissent movement of the Soviet Union was mainly working in the underground for a long time. However, dissidents created 'a new horizon of expectations that had not existed in Central and Eastern Europe since the Prague Spring'.⁶⁰ Particularly at the end of the Soviet Union many bystanders could be activated to raise their voices in public and protested on the streets. The end of the Soviet Union as well as the revolutions in its satellite states were heavily shaped by large-scale demonstrations and forms of protest beyond dissident networks.⁶¹ The human rights movement, strikes of more than 400 000 coal miners in the summer of 1989 or the environmentalist movement⁶² demonstrate in the Soviet Union the range and scope of citizen participation at that time. Therefore, the heritage stemming from the time before 1989 is not as black and white as other parts of the literature portray it. It rather incorporates negative and positive features at the same time.

5. Political Culture in Central and Eastern Europe – Rather Dynamic than Monolithic

According to the last section, the socialist heritage consists of diverse facets. So far, emancipatory forms of political participation before 1989 have been discussed. Such forms that mainly took place beyond the Communist party are one piece of the puzzle of the cultural heritage in Central and Eastern Europe. Another one consists of the political elite itself, speaking of their understanding of state socialism and interpretation to govern or rule. As this understanding changed over time, political culture in Central and Eastern Europe consequently changed in the 20th century in many regards.⁶³ In the following paragraph, the former Soviet Union is used to very

⁶⁰Vladimir Tismăneanu, "The Moving Ruins," *Journal of Democracy* 25:1 (2014): 151-53.

⁶¹Rasma Karklins and Roger Petersen, "Decision Calculus of Protesters and Regimes: Eastern Europe 1989," *The Journal of Politics* 55:3 (1993): 588-614.

⁶²Geoffrey A. Hosking, "The Beginnings of Independent Political Activity," in *The Road to Post-Communism. Independent Political Movements in the Soviet Union, 1985-1991*, eds. Geoffrey A. Hosking, Jonathan Aves and Peter J. Duncan (London: Pinter Publishers, 1992). 1-28./ Theodore H. Friedgut and Lewis Siegelbaum, "Perestroika from Below: The Soviet Miners' Strike and Its Aftermath," *New Left Review* 181:1 (1990): 5-30/ Olaf Corry, "The Green Legacy of 1989: Revolutions, Environmentalism and the Global Age," *Political Studies* 62:2 (2014): 309-25.

⁶³Stephen White, "Soviet Political Culture Reassessed," in *Political Culture and Communist Studies*, ed. Archie Brown (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1984). 77.

briefly give an example of different forms of socialism and the respective political culture.

In regard to the first phase of the Soviet Union, Janos highlights the 'transfer culture' at that time⁶⁴; meaning the intention of the political elite in the 1920s and 1930s to transform society into a communist one, which is linked to Lenin and his vision. The vision includes the goal of modernizing the economy in terms of education, industrialization, or urbanization and later to catch up with Western economies. In 1927 Stalin came to power. Out of his understanding of leading the Soviet Union, a new official political culture emerged shaped by Prussian military discipline and a high level of state power. Furthermore, political opponents to his ruling were either sent into exile or were eliminated.⁶⁵ After Stalin's death in 1953 a more pragmatic, less radical political elite filled the political vacuum. In order to improve the standard of living and to increase their own legitimacy, the new political elite tried to develop a less authoritarian form of socialism; in particular in Hungary in the 1960s as a reaction to the crisis of 1956 and in Czechoslovakia in the 1970s as a reaction to the crisis in the years 1962 - 1968. However, in the late 1970s and 1980s political stagnation and economic deficits of the system became more and more visible. Gorbachev's attempts to reform the political and economic system failed as they could not prevent the collapse of the Soviet Union.⁶⁶

In addition to the different approaches to governing and ruling the country, Almond distinguishes between three different types of political culture before 1989⁶⁷:

1. The official 'Marxist-Leninist' political culture, which is identical with the official ideology and was represented by the political elite.
2. The 'operational' political culture that is what the regime was willing to tolerate, speaking of moderate forms of disobedience.
3. The 'real' political culture, which refers to people's attitudes towards the regime.

Almond's three different types of political culture should be understood as ideal types, which hint at an even further differentiation, in particular when it comes to the third type - citizens' diverse attitudes. Moreover, all three types of political culture influenced people's perception of politics and the Communist party in

⁶⁴Andrew C. Janos, "What Was Communism: A Retrospective in Comparative Analysis," *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 29:1 (1996): 6.


⁶⁵Ibid. 9.

⁶⁶Christian W. Haerpfer, "Post-Communist Europe and Post-Soviet Russia," in *Democratization*, eds. Christian W. Haerpfer, Patrick Bernhagen, Ronald F. Inglehart and Christian Welzel (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). 311-12.

⁶⁷Gabriel A. Almond, "Communism and Political Culture Theory", 131.

particular.⁶⁸ As mentioned above, in the second part of the 20th century Central and Eastern European states were characterized by a growing diversity when it comes to the type of regimes, e.g. such as state power or societal autonomy.⁶⁹ Mungiu-Pippidi's graph⁷⁰ shows two crucial features of nine post-socialist countries in 1989 – state power and societal autonomy. Thereby, she illustrates the great variety of political regimes within the region, which supports the presented argument; political culture in Central and Eastern Europe appears rather dynamic than monolithic. The outlined differences regarding the socialist regimes illustrate the great heterogeneity over time and across countries, which breaks down the different facets of the cultural heritage. The variety within the region caused different starting points for the transformation.

Fig. 3



6. The Transformation and Its Implications for Political Participation

On a rather abstract level, Welzel and Inglehart claim that political culture and mass beliefs in particular play a crucial role when it comes to ‘realizing the goals of

⁶⁸Samuel H. Barnes and János Simon, *The Postcommunist Citizen*. (Budapest: Erasmus Foundation, 1998).

⁶⁹Joseph Rothschild and Nancy M. Wingfield, *Return to Diversity: A Political History of East Central Europe since World War II*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).

⁷⁰Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, "The Other Transition," *Journal of Democracy* 21:1 (2010): 120-27.

transformation' and 'translating them into actions'.⁷¹ In the case of Central and Eastern Europe, Kornai points out why the transformation heritage in Central and Eastern Europe is so influential, in particular regarding political culture. The transformation was a 'complete transformation, parallel in all spheres'⁷² which is also known as the 'dilemma of simultaneousness'.⁷³ Additionally, Kornai highlights the non-violent and peaceful proceeding as well as the incredible speed of ten to 15 years during which the transformation took place.⁷⁴ However, this very optimistic point of view is overshadowed by the fact that these processes caused many challenges.

At the very beginning, the old regime (the nomenclature) partly played an ambiguous role after 1989,⁷⁵ which strongly depends on the type of transformation of the elite. Thereby the range is from immediately replacing the old regime to a transformation of the Communist party into a social democratic one⁷⁶. Therefore and in accord to the type of elite change, the transformation of the political elite after 1989 was more or less mirrored by a change of politicians and therefore more or less visible for citizens. In general, the influence of the elite on the transformation was a very dominant one. Therefore the elite had the possibility to 'manipulate the transformation process in order to safeguard their individual interests'.⁷⁷ Additionally, the establishment of constitutions, free elections, independent courts of justice, pluralistic party systems, and free media did not proceed easily.⁷⁸ At this point of the transformation, problems appeared in two ways. First of all, media, courts as well as political parties require independent journalists, judges, and politicians. Due to the widespread power of the Communist party, it was almost

⁷¹Christian Welzel and Ronald F. Inglehart, "Political Culture, Mass Belief, and Value Change," in *Democratization*, eds. Christian W. Haerpfer, Patrick Bernhagen, Ronald F. Inglehart and Christian Welzel (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). 128.

⁷²János Kornai, "The Great Transformation of Central Eastern Europe. Success and Disappointment," *Economics of Transition* 14:2 (2006): 217-18.

⁷³Claus Offe, "Das Dilemma der Gleichzeitigkeit. Demokratisierung und Marktwirtschaft in Osteuropa," (The Dilemma of Simultaneousness. Democratization and Market Economy in Eastern Europe) *Merkur* 45:4 (1991): 279-92.

⁷⁴János Kornai, "The Great Transformation of Central Eastern Europe. Success and Disappointment", 217-18.

⁷⁵ Michael Burton and John Higley, "The Study of Political Elite Transformations," *International Review of Sociology* 11:2 (2001): 187.

⁷⁶Wolfgang Merkel, *Systemtransformation: Eine Einführung in die Theorie und Empirie der Transformationsforschung* (System Transformation: An Introduction to the Theory and Empirics of Transformation Studies) (Wiesbaden: VS Verl. für Sozialwiss., 2010).

⁷⁷Michael Albertus and Victor Menaldo, "Gaming Democracy: Elite Dominance During Transition and the Prospects for Redistribution," *British Journal of Political Science* 44:3 (2014): 577.

⁷⁸Herbert Kitschelt, "Formation of Party Cleavages in Post-Communist Democracies: Theoretical Propositions," *Party Politics* 1:4 (1995): 447-72.

impossible to fill the vacuum with people free of any former engagement in the Communist party. However, over the course of the transformation, at one point a new elite replaced the old one in all post-socialist countries. One could argue that peaceful changes of government are essential for any democratic system. However, in almost every case of change of government, the reputation of the political elite remains very low. Just because the political elite is free from any engagement in the Communist party before 1989, does not seem to make them trustworthy automatically. Thus, scholarly attention should be drawn to the performance of the current political elite, speaking of clientelism and corruption. Citizens' attitudes towards politicians might be similar in comparison to the socialist times but the phenomenon cannot only be explained by focusing on the past.

Moreover, the transformation of the economic system brought negative consequences for certain parts of society.⁷⁹ Neoliberal reforms and unequal points of departure of different societal groups caused an unequal distribution of former state property, a high level of unemployment, and subsequently distrust in political and economic elites and in particular in institutions.⁸⁰ Jacobs points out that individual success during the transformation process has significant negative influence on people's thinking on democracy.⁸¹ Furthermore, international organizations such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund or the EU tried to guideline the Central and Eastern European states on their path to democracy and capitalism.⁸² For instance external knowledge and financial support fostered the emergence of a myriad of new NGOs. However, many of those NGOs show a certain dependency on external funding which hampered an independent development of domestic civil society.⁸³ Therefore, parts of Central and Eastern European societies perceive this external influence negatively and consider it to be

⁷⁹Erik Allardt "The Questionable Blessing of the Modernization Concept," in *Structural Change and Modernization in Post-Socialist Societies*, eds. Wladyslaw Adamski, Pavel Machonon and Wolfgang Zapf (Hamburg: Krämer, 2002). 308/ Ivan Szelenyi, "Making Capitalism without Capitalists: Revisited," *International Political Anthropology* 1:1 (2008): 139-48.

⁸⁰David W. Lovell, "Trust and the Politics of Postcommunism," *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 34:1 (2001): 31-32.

⁸¹Jörg Jacobs, *Tücken der Demokratie. Antisystemeinstellungen und ihre Determinanten in sieben post-kommunistischen Transformationsländern* (Perils of Democracy. Anti-System Attitudes and Their Determinants in Seven Post-Communist Transformation Countries) (Wiesbaden: Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2004), 284-86.


⁸²Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, "The Other Transition", 73-74.

⁸³Adam Fagan, "Promoting Democracy in the Western Balkans after the Global Financial Crisis: Good Intentions Badly Executed?," *Southeastern Europe* 37:3 (2013): 283-311/ Nikolaos Tzifakis and Asteris Huliaras, "Hegemonic Relationships: Donor Countries and Ngos in Western Balkan Post-Conflict Reconstruction," *Southeastern Europe* 37:3 (2013): 312-29.

illegitimate or 'foreign agents'.⁸⁴ In the light of this, liberal democracy appears as something brought in from the outside. Correspondingly, it is weakly rooted in society and therefore less supported.

In addition, at the beginning of the transformation great expectations sprouted both in political and economic terms; expectations that have been mostly disappointed over time.⁸⁵ Frustration and disillusionment are essential, when it comes to political participation in general. With respect to electoral participation in particular, turnout rates are comparatively high at the very beginning of the transformation (see Fig. 4). For instance electoral turnout of the first national election after 1989 in the Czech Republic is 96.3 %, in Romania 86.2 % or in Croatia 84.5 %. Since 1989, electoral turnout has decreased, partly in a drastic way. By comparing the turnout of the first election after 1989 and the latest one, the range of decline is from 16.8 % (Russia) to 36.8 % (Czech Republic) or 44.4 % (Romania).

Fig. 4. Turnout of Parliamentary Elections in Five Central and Eastern European Countries (1989 - 2015)⁸⁶



Scholars of the cultural legacy approach could argue that citizens were still used to participate in elections in the early 1990s, although voting was not mandatory anymore in most of the cases. Correspondingly, it took a while before citizens realized that they are not forced to participate anymore. Other explanations refer

⁸⁴Jovanka Matić, "(Too) High Expectations of Democracy in Serbia? Interpretation of Empirical Research Results," *Southeastern Europe* 36:3 (2012): 304-27.

⁸⁵Ivan Krastev, "Deepening Dissatisfaction," *Journal of Democracy* 21:1 (2010): 113-19.

⁸⁶Data obtained from: Wolfram Nordsieck, *Parties and Elections in Europe*, (Düsseldorf, 2016), available at <http://www.parties-and-elections.eu/> (accessed on 02-15-2016).

to the great enthusiasm or the 'democratic honeymoon' at the early stage of the transformation. In this context, Ulram and Plasser show that the beliefs in democracy and its capability of solving the most salient problems diminishes constantly in Central and Eastern Europe after 1989.⁸⁷ Additionally, unfulfilled expectations are the source of great potential for frustration, disappointment and apathy.⁸⁸ The latter enabled fruitful possibilities for populist or nationalist parties and more (empty) promises.⁸⁹ Moreover, the socialist period appears for some societal groups, at least in retrospect, in a positive way. Particularly the losers of transformation are prone to such nostalgic attitudes.⁹⁰ Out of their negative perceptions of current burdens and day-to-day problems, the socialist times appear positive in comparison to the present.⁹¹ In the light of this, the proceeding of the transformation and the implementation of democracy in particular have heavily influenced the decline in political participation.

To conclude, the transformation brought many changes to the region in political, economic, societal as well as cultural terms. Regarding political culture, the differentiation between effects stemming from the socialist times or from the transformation is intricate. Certainly the socialist heritage had great influence on the time after 1989, e.g. the persistence of the nomenclature. However, explaining weak political participation by only focusing on the socialist past appears too narrow. The discussed effects stemming from the transformation are proper ones and partly independent from the time before 1989. Furthermore, White points at the danger that legacy arguments tend to explain present phenomena by interpreting the past in a way that the past is blamed for current recent developments. Moreover, White claims that by mainly focusing on the past, researchers tend to lose sight of present explanations.⁹² In this vein, Meyer-Sahling

⁸⁷ Peter A. Ulram and Fritz Plasser, "Political Culture in East-Central and Eastern Europe: Empirical Findings 1990-2001," in *Political Culture in Post-Communist Europe. Attitudes in New Democracies*, eds. Detlef Pollack, Jörg Jacobs, Olaf Müller and Gert Pickel (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003). 34-35.

⁸⁸ Mihai Varga, and Annette Freyberg-Inan, "The Threat of Selective Democracy. Popular Dissatisfaction and Exclusionary Strategy of Elites in East Central and Southeastern Europe," *Southeastern Europe* 36:3 (2012): 352.

⁸⁹ Dieter Segert, "Populismus in Ostmitteleuropa: Stimme der Transformationsverlierer oder Gefährdung der Demokratie?," (Populism in Central and Eastern Europe: the Voice of the Losers of the Transformation or a Threat to Democracy?) *Berliner Debatte Initial* 22:1 (2011): 61.

⁹⁰ Mitja Velikonja, "Lost in Transition: Nostalgia for Socialism in Post-Socialist Countries," *East European Politics & Societies* 23:4 (2009): 538.

⁹¹ Irina Gigova, "The Good Life and Post-Communist Nostalgia," *East European Politics* 29:4 (2013): 536-42.

⁹² Stephen White, "Soviet Political Culture Reassessed", 63-64.

adds that regarding the socialist legacy, respective authors are prone to emphasize negative elements of the socialist past.⁹³

7. Future Prospects: More Differentiated Perspectives and Shifting the Focus of Analysis

The post-socialist legacy and its implications for political participation in Central and Eastern Europe are puzzling at first glance. In order to approach the puzzle, three relevant branches of the literature have been discussed. The first group of scholars perceives socialism in a negative way by emphasizing forced participation and negative attitudes towards politics stemming from the long authoritarian experience. However, the danger of selecting only 'aspects of a previous political culture which support one's hypothesis about the present' is imminent.⁹⁴ Therefore, the literature on citizen' participation and political activism under socialism has been considered in order to counterbalance the first branch. It has been shown that political participation beyond the official channels existed. Furthermore, the presented example of dissent movements in the Soviet Union illustrated that a small share of the population participated in an 'covert' way but that the dissident discourse had great influence on the top level of the political elite in the end. Moreover, it has been demonstrated that the alleged socialist heritage consists of many facets and varies across countries and over time. Therefore it is not as monolithic as parts of the literature present it.

Additionally, the variation is not limited to the time before 1989; it also applies to the time of transformation. In this context, Mishler and Rose argue that the effects of the latest economic and political performance are at least equally crucial for citizen' participation than the socialist past.⁹⁵ In this vein, Tanasoiu proposes the 'Homo Post-communistus' in order to highlight the frustration stemming from the transformation and the deepening of disappointment about the political elite, flourishing corruption or simply high but unfulfilled expectations.⁹⁶ Correspondingly, Segert points out that both the 'state socialist legacy' and the 'legacy of the radical transformation processes' have a great impact on current

⁹³Jan-Hinrik Meyer-Sahling, "Varieties of Legacies: A Critical Review of Legacy Explanations of Public Administration Reform in East Central Europe," *International Review of Administrative Sciences* 75:3 (2009): 513-14.

⁹⁴Stephen White, "Soviet Political Culture Reassessed", 65.

⁹⁵William Mishler and Richard Rose, "Trust, Distrust and Skepticism: Popular Evaluations of Civil and Political Institutions in Post-Communist Societies," *The Journal of Politics* 59:2 (1997): 434.

⁹⁶Cosmina Tanasoiu, "Homo Post-Communistus: Portrait of a Character in Transition," *Perspectives on European Politics and Society* 14:4 (2013): 601-04.

phenomena in Central and Eastern Europe.⁹⁷ Hooghe and Quintelier even claim that the effect of socialization under socialism is 'rendered non-significant'.⁹⁸ Therefore, this paper can be understood as a theoretical underpinning of authors such as Segert or Hooghe and Quintelier who argue that the times of the transformation needs to be taken more into account.

To conclude, what are the future prospects of research on political participation in Central and Eastern Europe? In the light of this paper, three conclusions can be drawn from the analysis: Political culture plays an essential role when it comes to explain weak political participation in the region. However, it is just one out of various preconditions for political participation. Explaining weak political participation in Central and Eastern Europe by mainly referring to the socialist times and the respective negative experiences citizens does not take into consideration the complexity of the situation. The 'magic bullet' does not exist in the case of Central and Eastern Europe just as it does not exist in any other region in the world. By comparing political participation in Western and Central and Eastern Europe, it is crucial to include factors such as mobilization of people by the political elite and the institutional and socio-economic environment, for instance speaking of access points into politics and other excluding mechanism. Research on such factors in Central and Eastern Europe is slowly increasing but it is important to shift the focus of analysis to such crucial and established preconditions for political participation beyond the cultural argument.

When it comes to political participation in Central and Eastern Europe, Teorell et al.'s typology allows drawing a more differentiated picture of the region. With respect to different forms of political participation, associational and electoral forms are supposed to be relatively low. Under socialism most of the citizens tried to keep a low profile, due to low levels of trust in the political elite, forced party membership and threatened by sanctions. At the beginning of the transformation in turn, electoral turnout was comparatively high. However, it has declined more or less steadily over time. It is argued that the outlined effects of the transformation are at least equally crucial for representational channels as the socialist legacy is. In contrast to that, voice-based, extra-representational forms of political participation were autonomously applied under socialism. Firstly, direct forms of political participation such as demonstrations or protest have a long tradition and seem to be more tangible. Secondly, it seems to be the case that Central and Eastern European citizens prefer collective forms of political participation to individual ones

⁹⁷Dieter Segert, "*Transformationen in Osteuropa im 20. Jahrhundert*" (Transformations in Eastern Europe in the 20th Century) (Wien: Facultas, 2013), 15.

⁹⁸Marc Hooghe and Ellen Quintelier, "Political Participation in European Countries: The Effect of Authoritarian Rule, Corruption, Lack of Good Governance and Economic Downturn," *Comparative European Politics* 12:2 (2014): 209-32.

such as voting.⁹⁹ The latest examples for such collective actions are the widespread protests in Bosnia (2014), Bulgaria (2013), the protest on Maidan in Ukraine (2013-2014), anti-government protests in Romania (2015) or the protest against Putin in Russia (2011-2012). However, future research on political participation needs to intensify the debate on what it actually means when people favor channels beyond classic representation. Thereby, the transformation and its aftermath need to be considered properly. It raises the essential question of how to assess the transformation. How deeply rooted are democratic norms and values in society? Do citizens perceive democracy as 'their' system or just as an arena for the political elite that is far remote from people's level?

Past research showed that major social change such as the transformation or the financial and economic crisis affect people's attitudes towards democracy and correspondingly their level of political participation. However, the experiences citizens have made in Central and Eastern Europe since 1989 are very heterogeneous just as they perceived the socialist times differently: dissimilar starting points at the beginning of the transformation, increasing social inequality due to neoliberal reforms as well as the effects of the economic and financial crisis since 2008 have caused major changes, in particular in terms of individual availability of socio-economic resources. According to the vast literature on preconditions for political participation, such major social changes are considered to affect people's political behavior in a drastic way. One future task for research on political participation in Central and Eastern Europe is to identify relevant patterns stemming from the transformation as well as the economic crisis.

Moreover, it has been argued that by mainly focusing on the past, the danger of losing sight of present explanations is incorporated. The socialist past has still great impact on the Central and Eastern Europe. However, shifting the scholarly focus to the transformation and to more recent developments might offer new insights beyond cultural explanations. Carothers' mile stone contribution emphasizes that the beginning of any transformation does not automatically guarantee a steady path towards democracy.¹⁰⁰ Thus, scholarly attention should be drawn to the performance of the current political elite, speaking of clientelism. Furthermore, a new regime type - 'competitive authoritarianism', a hybrid political system consisting of democratic and authoritarian elements - becomes more and more

⁹⁹Tsveta Petrova and Sidney Tarrow, "Transactional and Participatory Activism in the Emerging European Polity: The Puzzle of East-Central Europe," *Comparative Political Studies* 40:1 (2007): 74-94/ Ondřej Císař, "The Diffusion of Public Interest Mobilisation: A Historical Sociology Perspective on Advocates without Members in the Post-Communist Czech Republic," *East European Politics* 29:1 (2013): 69-82.

¹⁰⁰ Thomas Carothers, "The End of the Transition Paradigm," *Journal of Democracy* 13:1 (2002): 5-21.

salient in Central and Eastern Europe. In addition to that, at the same time, any assessment of political participation in Central and Eastern Europe should take the variety of preconditions for political participation into account. Citizens' abstention from representational channels in particular might be explained by their negative experiences with the state and its bodies before 1989. However, it might also be a symptom of a crisis of representative democracy in Central and Eastern Europe, which is rather rooted in the transformation and which might not be solved by simple generational change.

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THE NATURAL RESOURCE CURSE IN XINJIANG

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Abstract

Natural resource abundance may have political or economic consequences. Some argue that natural resource abundance can have a negative effect on democratic transition and the consolidation of democracy. Such effect is conceptualized as "natural resource curse" in political aspect. But the mechanism through which natural resource stock leads to a less democratic regime with more authoritarian features is not yet fully clarified. In this paper I will use a case study about Xinjiang to test my theory. That is, distributional inequality between Han Chinese and the ethnic minorities over the resource revenue results in more resistance from the Uyghurs, thus the government responds with a stricter social control. This paper is aimed at offering both a theoretical creation and an explanation for the current instability in Xinjiang.

Key Words: Natural Resource Curse, Xinjiang, Uyghurs, Political Economy

1. Introduction

The Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region has never been such a hot topic among scholars and politicians as it is now. Previously famous for its splendid scenery and delicious fruits, the region is now one of the most dangerous places in China under the threat of terrorist attacks. When President Xi Jinping was visiting Xinjiang and emphasizing a hardline policy against any terrorists and separatists in April 2014, he might not have been expecting another terrorist attack in Urumqi, the capital of the region, soon after he left the city. If someone is looking for any violent resistance that is directly targeted at the rule of the Chinese Communists in this country, Xinjiang can hardly be excluded.

The Chinese Communist Party after the Cultural Revolution upholds a creed that economic development is the best and final solution to all political and social problems, the so-called "Development is the Absolute Principle" (*fazhan jiushi ying daoli*). In contrast to the impression that Xinjiang's economy falls far behind from coastal areas, its economic development has been very impressive since the 1990s. Oil and gas production is the pillar industry of Xinjiang,¹ and in the opinion of the

I would like to thank Professor Takahara Akio, Iida Keisuke, Hiwatari Nobuhiro for their guidance and comments on early drafts. I would also like to express my gratitude towards Miao Shuo for his assistance in logistic affairs.

authority and many people as well, it is supposed to bring prosperity and stability to the region. Obviously this is not true. We can't help but wonder whether there are some political consequences of resource abundance and the ongoing resource exploitation in Xinjiang.

Both economists and political scientists have been studying the so-called "natural resource curse" for years, as they observe in many Middle Eastern and African countries that natural resource may not necessarily be a good thing for political or economic development. The second largest oil producing country in 2014, Saudi Arabia, along with her oil-rich neighbors, cannot be counted as democracies.² The largest oil producer today, Russia, is more of a hybrid regime than a mature democracy. Another resource-dependent country Nigeria is not only suffering from political instability but also from economic downturn, high government debt rate, poverty, pollution, etc. In the field of political economy, the argument that natural resource has a negative impact on either political democratization or economic growth, or to both simultaneously, is conceptualized as the "natural resource curse". If we are to find out whether the natural resource also has some negative effects in Xinjiang, the natural resource curse may serve as a good theoretical framework for causal analysis.

This paper argues that the natural resource curse also exists in Xinjiang. Following this introduction, the second section will provide a literature review about theories and empirical studies of natural resource curse. The third section of this article will begin with a brief introduction to the contemporary politics, economy and society of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, with a focus on Xinjiang's energy development in recent years. I will then employ both quantitative and qualitative methods to present a causal link between resource abundance and authoritarian rule: natural resource abundance and resource exploitation generate distributional inequality, since many Uyghurs youth who cannot speak Mandarin Chinese fluently are disadvantaged in the job market; then the Uyghurs have an incentive to challenge the current regime, by means of mass protests and violence, including terrorist attack; the government responds with more repression, thus strengthening the authoritarian rule. The conclusion section will offer some further discussions and the possible solution to the resource curse in Xinjiang, based on the causal link

¹ "Energy Industry of Xinjiang is Playing a More Important Role in National Economy [xinjiang nengyuan gongye zai guomin jingji zhong de diwei tuxian]," Xinjiang Statistical Bureau, available at: http://dss.gov.cn/Article_Print.asp?ArticleID=244017. Last accessed: April 5th, 2014.

² According to *Regime by Type 2013, Polity IV Project*, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, UAE, Oman, and Iran are categorized as "autocracy", while Egypt and Jordan are categorized as "closed anocracy". Iraq and Yemen are considered being "open anocracy", but these two countries are currently suffering from civil war.

provided in Section Three.

2. Literature Review

A large body of scholarship has been studying the so-called “natural resource curse”. The traditional thought is that natural resource abundance has a negative effect on political democratization. Ross starts this stream of literature. He points out that there exist three causal mechanisms through which oil does have anti-democratic effects: a “rentier effect”, which suggests that resource-rich governments use low tax rates and patronage to relieve pressures for greater accountability; a “repression effect”, which argues that resource wealth retards democratization by enabling governments to boost their funding for internal security; and a “modernization effect”, which holds that growth based on the export of oil and minerals fails to bring about the social and cultural changes that tend to produce democratic government. He tests all these explanations and finds them robust.³ Many other scholars also employ statistical methods to support the existence of such a curse effect. For example, Jensen and Wantchekon wrote one of the most cited papers in this field, and presented empirical evidence suggesting a robust and negative correlation between the presence of a sizable natural resource sector and the level of democracy in Africa.⁴ One can also find similar conclusions (though the explanations may be slightly varied) made by a number of authors.⁵ Interestingly, Ross later rejects two of the three explanations given earlier using improved empirical estimation strategies—only the “rentier effect” remains plausible.⁶

However, in recent years, more and more empirical researches cast doubt on the traditional thought. They believe that the negative effect of natural resource abundance does not exist, or even that resource stock helps to promote democratization. Among this stream of literature, Haber and Menaldo’s work is

³Michael Ross, “Does Oil Hinder Democracy?” *World politics* 53 (Apr. 2001): 325-361.

⁴Leonard Wantchekon, “Why Do Resource Dependent Countries Have Authoritarian Governments?” *Journal of African Finance and Economic Development* 5 (2, 2002): 57–77.

⁵See Wantchekon, “Why Do Resource Dependent Countries Have Authoritarian Governments?” Benjamin Smith, “Oil Wealth and Regime Survival in the Developing World, 1960–1999,” *American Journal of Political Science* 48 (Mar. 2004): 232–246. Ellis Goldberg, Erik Wibbels and Eric Mvukiyeh, “Lessons from Strange Cases Democracy, Development, and the Resource Curse in the US States,” *Comparative Political Studies* 41 (Apr. 2008): 477–514. Catherine Norman, “Rule of Law and the Resource Curse: Abundance versus Intensity,” *Environmental and Resource Economics* 43 (Aug. 2008): 183–207. Michael Ross, “Oil and Democracy Revisited,” Unpublished paper, 2009. Silje Aslaksen, “Oil and Democracy: More than a Cross-country Correlation?” *Journal of Peace Research* 47 (Jul. 2010): 421–431. Kristopher Ramsay, “Revisiting the Resource Curse: Natural Disasters, the Price of Oil, and Democracy,” *International Organization* 65 (Jul. 2011): 507–529.

⁶Ross, “Oil and Democracy Revisited.”

worthy of mentioning in detail. They point out that previous empirical tests that have been used to test the resource curse hypothesis do not tend to employ time series–centric methods, nor specify counterfactual paths of political development; after improving the estimation strategy, they find that increases in resource reliance are not associated with authoritarianism. In fact, in many specifications they generate results that suggest a “resource blessing”.⁷ Similarly, Wacziarg finds strictly no evidence in favor of the so-called “First Law of Petropolitics”, using a variety of time series and panel data methods over a wide range of country subsamples and time periods.⁸

The major problem of these empirical researches is that they can only report the effect of natural resource on average, but fail to explain why the resource curse occurs in certain countries while resource blessing is existent in others, like Norway. These countries’ varied paths from resource wealth to political and economic outcomes suggest the need for conditional theories of the resource curse.⁹ Ross himself also agrees with Dunning at this point, and admits that the empirical analysis tells us something about the average effect that oil wealth has on democracy, but surely the ultimate effect of oil wealth will vary under different conditions—and identifying these conditions lies at the frontier of research on this problem.¹⁰ Obviously, large-n regression is not a very useful method to identify such conditions. Therefore, we must also have a close look at relevant propositions made by formal modelers, who have been contributing to our understanding about the causal mechanisms.

Much work has been done to explore the mechanisms through which resource stock has a negative effect on the endurance of democracy. Wantchekon shows that when the state institutions are weak so that budget procedures either lack transparency or are discretionary, resource windfalls tend to generate and consolidate incumbency advantage in democratic elections; such an advantage could incite the opposition to resort to political violence in competing for political power, thereby generating political instability and authoritarian governments.¹¹ Similarly, Caselli argues that countries with large amounts of natural resources experience power struggles, in the sense that potential challengers have a stronger incentive to seek to replace the existing government by means of *coup d’etats*, or other forms of forced change in leadership. As a result, “the greater probability of

⁷Stephen Haber and Victor Menaldo. “Do Natural Resources Fuel Authoritarianism? A Reappraisal of the Resource Curse,” *American Political Science Review* 105 (Feb. 2011): 1-26.

⁸Romain Wacziarg, “The First Law of Petropolitics,” *Economica* 79 (Oct. 2012): 641-657.

⁹Thad Dunning, “Resource Dependence, Economic Performance, and Political Stability,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49 (Aug. 2005): 451-482.

¹⁰Ross, “Oil and Democracy Revisited.”

¹¹Wantchekon, “Why Do Resource Dependent Countries Have Authoritarian Governments?”

losing power to a successful challenger reduces the effective rate of return to investing in the country's development for the existing elite, and may induce them to undersupply human capital, infrastructure, contractual enforcement, and the rule of law."¹² These formal models are aimed at explaining why resource curse happens in some country but not others, and they do contribute much to our understanding on this topic. However, it doesn't mean that students of petropolitics have nothing to do any more. First, I would argue that treating leaders (or elites) as resource holder and the masses as challengers in the competition over resource revenue may result in a fallacy of oversimplification. In countries enjoying resource blessing, leaders still enjoy much more than the masses. Drawing a sharp line between leaders and masses may obfuscate who is the real challenger and who have the incentive to rebel. As Rosser suggests, existing explanations for the resource curse do not adequately account for the role of social forces or external political and economic environments in shaping development outcomes in resource abundant countries.¹³ Among these social forces or political environment, ethnic tension is an important intermediate variable. Sudan, for example, is marked by tribal strife over oil; and in Aceh, Indonesia, regional separatism has been fanned by secrecy about oil payments and public misunderstanding about their scale.¹⁴ If distributional inequality over resource revenue exists between different ethnic groups, the negative effect of resource abundance may become much more significant. The second criticism against these deductive models (and also formal models used widely in many other topics) is that although they are always perfectly self-consistent, empirical support is far from sufficient. Therefore, in this paper I will not only incorporate ethnic tension in the theoretical framework, but also try to provide an empirical case to present the observable causal process.

A case study about Xinjiang would be intellectually beneficial. In order to "test" a theory by using the method of case study when we have only one case at hand, "congruence procedures" and "process tracing" are needed. When using congruence procedures, the investigator explores the case looking for congruence or incongruence between values observed on the independent and dependent variable and the values predicted by the test hypothesis.¹⁵ For example, in our case, if distributional inequality over resource revenue truly causes more resistance from the Uyghurs and the government responds with more repression as our hypothesis

¹²Francesco Caselli and Tom Cunningham. "Leader Behaviour and the Natural Resource Curse," *Oxford Economic Papers* 61 (Jul. 2009): 628-650.

¹³Andrew Rosser, *The Political Economy of the Resource Curse: A Literature Survey* (Vol. 268). Brighton, UK: Institute of Development Studies, 2006.

¹⁴Thomas Palley, "Lifting the Natural Resource Curse," *Foreign Service Journal* 80(Dec. 2003): 54-61.

¹⁵Stephen van Evera, *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1997), 58-63.

predicts, we should observe the increase, or at least, variation in these key variables: resource production, distributional inequality, minority resistance (measured by the frequency of mass protests and terrorist attack, etc.), and government repression (using proxies like security budget, Internet access control, etc.). However, correlation is different from causality. We should also present how these variables are connected with each other, and that's why process tracing is needed. In process tracing, the investigator explores the chain of events or the decision-making process by which initial case conditions are translated into case outcomes.¹⁶ Therefore, in our case we should present how resource abundance in Xinjiang leads to a strengthened authoritarian regime step by step.¹⁷

Some may also criticize that Xinjiang—a provincial unit but not a nation—is not a proper case, as almost all other works about this topic are based on the analysis of national variations. This is not true. For example, Goldberg et al. point out that the American states look a lot like “contemporary accounts of many mineral economies: economic decisions were driven by the prospect of huge returns in oil, rent seeking was prevalent, and state governments colluded with private firms and each other to maximize the rents they might extract from the oil industry.”¹⁸ If we consider the fact that almost half of the total value-added of the industrial sector in Xinjiang is from the oil industry (Xinjiang Statistical Yearbook, 2013),¹⁹ and that oil and gas

¹⁶Van Evera, *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science*, 64.

¹⁷Jensen and Wantchekon argue that executive discretion over resource rents leads to both less political liberalization (transition of democracy) and a greater likelihood of democratic breakdown (consolidation of democracy). They use various “proxies” to measure different dependent variables. In this paper, the likelihood of democratic transition rather than the likelihood of democratic breakdown is more relevant, as China is clearly not yet a liberal democracy like many western countries, but under a typical authoritarian regime. Besides, they treat the likelihood of democratic transition (the level of democracy) and the likelihood of being an authoritarian (the level of authoritarianism, or the endurance of authoritarian rule) as the same indicator, as they are on the same regime type spectrum. Similarly, I am not going to differentiate the level of democracy with the level of authoritarian rule, following the tradition in resource curse literatures. See Nathan Jensen and Leonard Wantchekon. “Resource Wealth and Political Regimes in Africa,” *Comparative Political Studies* 37 (Sep. 2004): 816-841.

¹⁸Goldberg et al., “Lessons from Strange Cases Democracy, Development, and the Resource Curse in the US States,” 477-514.

¹⁹In the year of 2012, the total value-added of the industrial sector was 285.006 billion RMB in Xinjiang. Among them oil industry contributes 138.617 billion, coal mining contributes 14.161 billion, production of electric power (which is indirectly related to resource exploitation) contributes 25.762 billion. See “Statistical Communiqué on the 2012 National Economic & Social Development of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region,” in *Xinjiang Statistical Yearbook 2013*, p.10.

exploitation represents almost half of Xinjiang's fiscal revenues,²⁰ there is no reason why we should exclude such a provincial unit in our discussion on the resource curse. Therefore, there's no substantial difference between studying a nation-state and a provincial unit.

3. The Natural Resource Curse in Xinjiang

In this section I will elaborate how natural resource abundance, distributional inequality, ethnic tensions, and tighter authoritarian control are related in the case of Xinjiang. Before we go into causal analysis, a brief introduction to contemporary Xinjiang with a focus on the development of the energy industry is provided.

3.1. Natural Resource Abundance in Xinjiang

The Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (also called XUAR for short),²¹ one of China's five autonomous regions for ethnic minorities, situated in the border area of northwest China and the hinterland of the Eurasian Continent, occupies an area of 1.6649 million sq km, accounting for one sixth of Chinese territory. As an important section of the ancient Silk Road, it has a land border of 5,600 km bounded by eight countries.²² In 2012, Xinjiang has a resident population of 22.32 million. Among them 8.47 million are Han Chinese, the majority ethnic group in China, and 10.52 million are the Uyghurs, the most populated ethnic group in the region.²³ If we compare the Sixth National Population Census conducted in 2010 to the Fifth Population Census conducted ten years ago, Han Chinese population increases by 16.77%, while the increase rate for minorities is 19.12%.²⁴ Besides the Uyghurs and Han Chinese, there are many other ethnic groups in Xinjiang as well, mainly the Kazak, Hui, Mongolian, Kirgiz, Xibe, Tajik, Uzbek, Manchu, Daur, Tatar and Russian.

²⁰Nicolas Becquelin, "Staged development in Xinjiang," *The China Quarterly* 178 (Jun. 2004): 358-378.

²¹Independence activists also use "East Turkistan" to refer to the region. I agree that both "East Turkistan" and Xinjiang (which means "new territory" in Chinese) are linked with politics. But in this paper I will follow the mainstream in official documents and academia, which is Xinjiang.

²²"History and Development of Xinjiang," Information Office of the State Council of the PRC, May 2003, available at: <http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/20030526/>. Last accessed: April 5th, 2014.

²³Statistical Bureau of Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, *Xinjiang Statistical Yearbook 2013* (Beijing: China Statistics Press, 2014).

²⁴"Main Data Bulletin about the 2010 Sixth National Census in Xinjiang [xinjiang weiwuer zizhiqu 2010 nian diliuci quanguo renkou renkou pucha zhuyao shuju gongbao]," Xinjiang Statistical Bureau, May 6th, 2011, available at: http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/tjgb/rkpcgb/dfrkpcgb/201202/t20120228_30407.html. Last accessed: April 5th, 2014.

The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of Xinjiang in 2012 is 7505.31 million RMB, and the GDP per capita is 33796 RMB in that year.²⁵

Xinjiang is important for China not only because of its geographical position but also its abundance of coal, crude oil, and gas. Xinjiang has 40% of coal reserve, 22% of petroleum reserve, and 28% of gas reserve in the country.²⁶ Besides, the coal deposits in Xinjiang are of higher quality compared to deposits in other provinces, as it contains less sulfur, while the oil deposits are more accessible because most of them are located in shallow and middle strata oil-reservoir. Oil-gas fields in Xinjiang are concentrated in Karamay, Tarim Basin, and Turfan Basin. They are 3 of China's 17 major gas-oil fields on the land, and are among the most productive ones.²⁷ Energy development is no doubt a growth engine for Xinjiang's economy (See Figure 1). Ever since the 1990s, in the effort to boost the provincial economy—in part to attract and support a larger population—an economy strategy was devised to “rely on two pillars”, “one black, one white” (*yi hei yi bai*): oil exploitation and cotton cultivation.²⁸ This is the so-called “Twin Strategy”, which China's plans to “Develop the West” (*xibu dakai fa*) are built on.²⁹ Becquelin also indicates that “by far the two most critical projects designated as part of Xinjiang's campaign to Open Up the West are the west to east natural gas pipeline and the comprehensive rehabilitation of the Tarim River,” both of them are energy related projects.³⁰ The West-East Gas Pipeline is now not only transferring 12 billion cubic meters of natural gas annually from Xinjiang to coastal areas where demand for energy is the highest, but also connected to the gas field in Turkmenistan, and possibly Iran in the future. As a result, oil and gas exploitation represents almost half of Xinjiang's fiscal revenues.³¹ We can't help but wonder what social and political consequence of

²⁵Statistical Bureau of Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, *Xinjiang Statistical Yearbook 2013*.

²⁶“The Blowout-type Development of Energy Industry Has Taken Up in Xinjiang [xinjiang nengyuan chanliang de jingpen dashi yicheng],” available at: <http://www.musilin.net.cn/2010/0805/47075.html>. Last accessed: April 5th, 2014. “Xinjiang's Oil Reserve is as much as 22% of the Country [xinjiang shiyou ziyuanliang zhan quanguo 22E%],” available at: <http://oil.in-en.com/html/oil-08270827182117453.html>. Last accessed: April 5th, 2014.

²⁷“Location of Oil Reserve in China [zhongguo shiyou fenbu],” CNPC, available at: http://www.cnpc.com.cn/News/zxwx/sybk/syys/sysh/201310/20131011_C191.shtml?COLLCC=7320640&COLLCC=2517866373&. Last accessed: April 5th, 2014.


²⁸Nicolas Becquelin, “Xinjiang in the Nineties,” *The China Journal* 44 (Jul. 2000): 65-90.

²⁹Graham Fuller and Frederick Starr, *The Xinjiang Problem* (Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, 2004), 69.


³⁰Becquelin, “Staged development in Xinjiang,” 358-378.

³¹“Xinjiang Enticement,” *Energytribune*, available at: <http://www.energytribune.com/5028/xinjiang->

natural resource abundance would be in such a region.



Crude Coal (10000 tons)



Crude Oil (10000 tons)

enticements#sthash.BMnWbjsu.8A4ZIX2B.dpbs. Last accessed: April 5th, 2014. Also see: Nicolas Becquelin, "Staged development in Xinjiang," 358-378.




Figure 1. Output of Major Energy Products in Xinjiang since 1990

Source: Xinjiang Statistical Yearbook 2013

3.2. Distributional Inequality over Resource Revenue

The development of energy industries leads to a rapidly growing economy in Xinjiang (See Figure 2). But the local residents in Xinjiang, particularly, the Uyghurs, may not enjoy the benefits of oil and gas exploitation. Some activists claim that those involved with the development of energy wealth are mainly Han Chinese, rather than the Uyghurs, and the profits go mainly to Beijing.³² But the fact that the profits go mainly to Beijing cannot explain the anger of the Uyghurs. As Xinjiang's "public economy" (*gongyou jingji*) is in a dominant position,³³ particularly in resource related industries, it would be a strange thing if the profits were not "going to Beijing" and into the pocket of big oil companies like CNPC and Sinopec. But in fact, you can hardly find any Han people complaining about that, even though many of them are also ordinary people like the Uyghurs. The problem does not lie in how much the central government or state-owned companies gain from Xinjiang's abundance in coal, oil and gas, but in how little the Uyghurs receive compared to their Han neighbors in Xinjiang. The key point is, resource exploitation brings a large number of migrants from other provinces, and these migrants deprive the Uyghurs (and also many local Han people who have lived in Xinjiang since early 1950s) of employment opportunities. All these happen mainly because of an irreversible process of marketization: no one can get a job for sure in a relatively

³² Fuller and Starr, *The Xinjiang Problem*, 69.

³³ Heavy industry contributes almost two-thirds of the XUAR's GDP, and over 80 per cent of its industrial assets are under the management of state-owned enterprises. See Becquelin, "Staged development in Xinjiang," 358-378.

free market. In this section, I will first provide some empirical evidence on the correlation between energy development and migration boom in Xinjiang, then show why the newcomers have annoyed the Uyghurs.




Figure 2. GDP of Xinjiang (100 million RMB)

Source: Xinjiang Statistical Yearbook, 2013

Human rights activists have been criticizing that the oil industry is now completely run by Han, and resource exploitation has brought most of its workers from other parts of China, thus deprived local minorities of employment opportunities.³⁴ If we compare the ethnic minority proportion in areas where either oil or gas production is reported with areas without significant resource production, we do find that the minorities are usually outnumbered by the Han people in oil or gas-rich prefectures (see Table 1).³⁵

³⁴“Uyghur Homeland, Chinese Frontier: The Xinjiang Work Forum and Centrally Led Development,” available at: <https://uhrp.org/press-release/new-report-uhrp-uyghur-homeland-chinese-frontier-xinjiang-work-forum-and-centrally-led>. Last accessed: April 13th, 2015.

³⁵The *Xinjiang Statistical Yearbook of Energy Development 2007*[xinjiang nengyuan tongji nianjian 2007] is the only source that we can know about the geographical allocation of resource production. In Table 1 I also exclude the four cities directly under the jurisdiction of XUAR government, as they are under the control of Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC) that is a semi-military organization. See the following discussion about XPCC.

Table 1. Ethnic Minority Rates and Energy Production

| | Percentage of Ethnic Minorities in 2010 | Oil or Gas Output Reported in 2007 |
|---|---|------------------------------------|
| XUAR | 59.52 | Not Applied |
| Urumqi City | 25.09 | Yes |
| Qaramay City | 18.35 | Yes |
| Turpan Administrative Offices | 74.98 | Yes |
| Hami [Kumul] Administrative Offices | 30.65 | No |
| Changji Hui Autonomous Prefecture | 24.69 | No |
| Bortala Mongolian Autonomous Prefecture | 35.04 | No |
| Bayangol Mongolian Autonomous Prefecture | 40.71 | Yes |
| Aksu Administrative Offices | 77.11 | No |
| Kizilsu Kirgiz Autonomous Prefecture | 93.22 | No |
| Kashgar Administrative Prefecture | 92.00 | No |
| Hotan Administrative Offices | 96.41 | No |
| Ili Kazak Autonomous Prefecture | 64.78 | No |
| Tacheng [Tarbagatai] Administrative Offices | 34.27 | No |
| Altay Administrative Offices | 61.45 | No |

Source: The Sixth National Population Census and Xinjiang Statistical Yearbook of Energy Development 2007

In order to confirm whether the natural resource industry has brought too many workers from other provinces, I make use of the demographic information at the county level in the fifth and sixth national population censuses conducted in 2000 and 2010,³⁶ respectively, and estimate simple “first-differenced equations”.

³⁶The seven municipalities directly under the jurisdiction of the Autonomous Region Government are excluded, as they are under the direct control of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC). Thus these municipalities are more of a semi-military organization where migration registration is much stricter than in other administrations. Moreover, missing data problem also occurs to these samples.

Table 2. Variable Descriptions

| Dependent Variable | |
|-----------------------|---|
| $\Delta mipop$ | = migration population from other provinces in 2010 – migration population from other provinces in 2000 |
| Independent Variables | |
| $\Delta segdp$ | = GDP of secondary sector of Xinjiang in 2010 – GDP of secondary sector of Xinjiang in 2000, billion RMB |
| Δgdp | = GDP of Xinjiang in 2010 – GDP of Xinjiang in 2000, billion RMB |
| $\Delta enpop$ | = population working in energy industry of Xinjiang in 2010 – population working in energy industry of Xinjiang in 2000 |

Sources:

Xinjiang Statistical Yearbook, 2001, 2011.

National Population Census, 2000, 2010.

Table 3. Estimation Results

| | Model 1 | Model 2 | Model 3 | Model 4 |
|------------------------|------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|--------------------------|
| $\Delta segdp$ | 3167.94*** (315.47) | | 3000.14*** (237.67) | |
| $\Delta enpop$ | | 151.28*** (28.21) | 132.93*** (16.54) | 73.16*** (13.04) |
| Δgdp | | | | 2151.68*** (115.48) |
| Constant | -3520.29 (2695.18) | 6051.86 (3321.539) | -1707.492 (2035.16) | -5589.19*** (1582.11) |
| Number of Observations | 84 | 84 | 84 | 84 |
| Prob>F | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| R-square | 0.55 | 0.26 | 0.75 | 0.86 |
| Adjusted R-square | 0.55 | 0.25 | 0.74 | 0.86 |

Note: The numbers in parentheses are standard errors. * $p < 0.05$. ** $p < 0.01$. *** $p < 0.001$.

Although the data on the output of the energy industry is not available at county level, the population working in energy-relevant industry can be the proxy of the development of the energy industry. From Model 1, we can tell that industrialization

in general significantly affects the increase of migrants from other provinces: a one-billion increase in the GDP of secondary industry in ten years is associated with approximately 3200 more migrants in the local area. From Model 2, we can tell that the development of natural resource industry alone can also attract migrants, even though these newcomers may not necessarily directly involved in the production of oil or gas. It is reasonable that energy exploitation may have some positive spillover effect, like attracting migrants to open restaurants or providing other services around, or these people are simply the family of employees working in the energy industry. Controlled for different economic indicators (Model 3 and 4), the positive effect remains highly significant, even though it is less salient, since many other economic activities can also attract migrants. Thus, it is evident that between 2000 and 2010, the development of the energy industry, along with the industrialization in a broad sense, is responsible for the migrant flood in Xinjiang.

Concerning the question whether such migration flood has changed local ethnic compositions, I use the same data set and calculate the correlation between the absolute change of minority rates and the change of migrant rates as a percentage of local population. The correlation is -0.64, which indicates that migrants from other provinces did largely reduce the rate of ethnic minorities in Xinjiang as is expected.

Many scholars have also been studying the difference between the Han people and the Uyghurs in terms of income level in an effort to assess the impact of migration boom, and they do have a similar conclusion that in fact, looking at the so-called high-status jobs, particularly, the administrative jobs in the government and other public sectors, one could hardly find any ethnic differences in terms of salary level. Minorities are not discriminated by receiving a lower salary in these positions, if we examine various data sets spanning from the 1980s till present day.³⁷ The problem is, most minorities are not working in the public sectors where the salary level is basically the same across different ethnic groups. According to Layne and Liang's studies, Han Chinese occupy 71% of the high-end jobs such as officials and managers and 57% of professional jobs, while Uyghurs only comprise 17% of government officials.³⁸ Han people are particularly overrepresented in two major

³⁷ Emily Hannum and Yu Xie, "Ethnic Stratification in Northwest China: Occupational Differences between Han Chinese and National Minorities in Xinjiang, 1982-1990," *Demography* 35 (Aug. 1998): 323-333. China Layne and Zai Liang, "Migration, Occupational Attainment, and Han-minority Relations in Xinjiang, China," Paper presented at the American Sociological Association Annual Meeting, Boston, 2008. Xiaowei Zang, "Uyghur-Han Earnings Differentials in Urumchi," *The China Journal* 65 (Jan. 2011): 141-155. Xiaogang Wu and Xi Song, "Ethnic Stratification amid China's Economic Transition: Evidence from the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region," *Social Science Research* 44 (Mar. 2014): 158-172.

³⁸ Layne and Liang, "Migration, Occupational Attainment, and Han-minority Relations in Xinjiang, China."

economic sectors: the oil industry and the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC),³⁹ which together had Han Chinese as over 95% of their labor force.⁴⁰ The preference of XPCC is not a secret. According to materials posted on the XPCC's Personnel Testing Authority, the Corps would hire 840 civil servants from the Xinjiang through its 2006 recruitment exam, of whom 38 would be ethnic minorities and the remainder all Han Chinese.⁴¹ Therefore, it would be meaningless if we only look at the salary level of the Uyghurs in high-end positions. We should instead pay more attention to those working as construction workers, farmers, etc., as these jobs are directly the target of migrants from other provinces.

But I would disagree with Ilham Toxti, who firmly believes that the migration boom mainly is the result of political consideration, which is to assimilate the Uyghurs through encouraging more Han people to work and live in Xinjiang.⁴² Instead, I would argue, based on the estimation results above, it is the market that is responsible in the end. Though some label this type of migration "ethnic genocide" or "demographic annihilation," Zhu and Blachford believe it is the self-initiated/market-driven migration that has a very direct impact on both demographic and employment situations in ethnic minority areas.⁴³ As they suggest, "the real problem is, market mechanisms do not provide solutions to deal with the negative outcomes of economic competition but may in fact exacerbate problems." And the difficulty for government is that "its intervention and regulatory power is constrained because of market mechanisms and private ownership domination in investment and business projects": many jobs demand certain skills and education levels that many Uyghurs do not have, and many Han employers prefer hiring

³⁹The XPCC is a semi-military governmental organization that has its own administrative and judicial system in certain cities and settlements in Xinjiang. It was founded in 1954 by Wang Zhen, and has been playing a key role in maintaining the stability in Xinjiang. In 2012, XPCC has a population of 2648636, with an agricultural population of 1192468. See Statistical Bureau of Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, *Xinjiang Statistical Yearbook 2013*.

⁴⁰Yuchao Zhu and Dongyan Blachford, "Economic Expansion, Marketization, and Their Social Impact on China's Ethnic Minorities in Xinjiang and Tibet," *Asian Survey*, 52 (4, 2012): 714-733.

⁴¹"Civil Servant Recruitment in Xinjiang Favors Han Chinese," Congressional-executive Commission on China, July 25th, 2006, available at: <http://www.cecc.gov/publications/commission-analysis/civil-servant-recruitment-in-xinjiang-favors-han-chinese>. Last accessed: April 5th, 2014.

⁴²Ilham Toxti, "Is There no Need to Rethink about China's Policy towards Ethnic Minorities [zhongguo de minzu zhengce bu xuyao fansi ma]?" available at: <http://chilanbagh.wordpress.com/2010/10/28/%E4%B8%AD%E5%9B%BD%E7%9A%84%E6%B0%91%E6%97%8F%E6%94%BF%E7%AD%96%E4%B8%8D%E9%9C%80%E8%A6%81%E5%8F%8D%E6%80%9D%E5%90%97%EF%BC%9F/>. Last accessed: April 5th, 2014.

⁴³Zhu and Blachford, "Economic Expansion, Marketization, and Their Social Impact on China's Ethnic Minorities in Xinjiang and Tibet," 714-733.

people with whom they find it easier to communicate.

In a relatively free market where companies, including state-owned ones, emphasize efficiency, Han Chinese do have more advantages simply because they can speak Mandarin Chinese more fluently than the Uyghurs, for whom Mandarin is a completely different language. According to a survey, only 19.88% of the Uyghurs have the ability to speak Mandarin, ranking the 50th among the 54 minorities surveyed.⁴⁴ The difficulty for the Uyghurs to master Mandarin also has a negative effect on their education level, which directly reflects an employee's human capital. That is the reason why the ADB report of 2001 identifies language policy in Xinjiang as one of the most fundamental obstacles to the upward mobility of the Uygur.⁴⁵ More than a skill indispensable for job-hunting, language also matters for building connection with government in a "state-capitalism" country like China. Vicziany and Zhang's case studies examine how Han Chinese businessmen and ethnic minority businessmen differ in terms of the connection with government officials inside and outside Xinjiang. As they suggest, language serves to be an obstacle for Uyghurs businessmen in developing good relationships with government officials, thus talented Uyghurs can only turn to private sectors like opening a restaurant. On the other hand, Han businessmen in Xinjiang like Sun Guangxin who is now one of the richest men in China can earn much more in a state-capitalism system, as they can use their influence in the government to participate in the highly profitable oil drilling or real estate business. Besides, Sun's experience in the army is also very helpful for his business. The result is, some Uyghurs businessmen even decide to shift their investment away from Xinjiang to foreign countries like Turkey, and they do believe that they will face less constraints abroad.⁴⁶

Unfortunately, this situation is not going to change in the short term. Zhu and Balchford say that in the end there are few policy options available to the government: restriction of migration to Xinjiang and Tibet will not be a viable policy option, for both normative and practical reasons.⁴⁷ In addition to the unemployment problem, the larger and larger income gap between the two ethnic groups in Xinjiang also contributes to increasing distributional inequality. Wu and Song analyze a sample from the 2005 mini-census of Xinjiang to examine ethnic

⁴⁴Enze Han, "External Cultural Ties and the Politics of Language in China," *Ethnopolitics: Formerly Global Review of Ethnopolitics* 12 (Mar. 2013): 30-49.

⁴⁵*Asian Development Bank. The 2020 Project: Policy Support in the People's Republic of China—Final Report and Policy Directions* (Manila, 2002), 276-277.

⁴⁶Marika Vicziany and Guibin Zhang. *The Rise of the Private Sector in Xinjiang (Western China): Han and Uygur Entrepreneurship*. In the 15th Biennial Conference of the Asian Studies Association in Canberra, 2004.

⁴⁷Zhu and Blachford, "Economic Expansion, Marketization, and Their Social Impact on China's Ethnic Minorities in Xinjiang and Tibet," 714-733.

stratification in China's labor markets, with a special focus on how ethnic earnings inequality varies by employment sector. They find that the Han-Uyghur earnings gap was negligible within government/public institutions, but increased with the marketization of the employment sector; it was the largest among the self-employed, followed by employees in private enterprises and then employees in public enterprises.⁴⁸ Considering the fact that most Uyghurs are not working in public sectors or administrative positions of state-owned companies, we can conclude that the majority of Uyghurs has a lower income level compared to the Han Chinese, which exacerbates the distributional inequality between the two ethnic groups in addition to the unemployment problem among the Uyghurs. As marketization continues irreversibly, it is possible that the income gap will become larger, and the future is not very optimistic.

In this section, we can see that the natural resource abundance in Xinjiang is not improving the life of the Uyghurs. Instead, it brings too many migrants from other provinces in China who have more advantages in looking for jobs when they compete with the local minorities—the fluency in Mandarin makes migrants (including floating workers) more favorable in the job market.⁴⁹ Indeed, against the background of marketization, the era when minority graduates could be offered a job for sure by the government is gone forever.⁵⁰ We now see natural resource doesn't necessarily lead to a better life. But how does it turn out to be a “curse”? How are the dissatisfactory and anger of the Uyghurs related to the strengthening of an authoritarian regime? The next section will continue to trace the causal link and lay out the whole picture of the causal mechanism.

3.3. Challenges from the Uyghurs and Strengthening of the Authoritarian Rule

As we mention in the literature review about the natural resource curse, natural resource itself provides an incentive for “losers” in oil or gas exploitation to rise and challenge the position of those who benefit most from energy industry. This sort of rebel incentive has been treated as the link between natural resources and civil

⁴⁸Wu and Song, “Ethnic Stratification amid China's Economic Transition: Evidence from the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region,” 158-172.

⁴⁹Migrants can be categorized into two groups: permanent migrants and floating migrants (floating workers). While the former have local household registration status (*hukou*), the latter is living without it. According to population census conducted in 2000, Xinjiang has 1.917 million floating migrants, approximately 10.4% of the provincial population. The share of floating population in Xinjiang is the highest among all western provinces, and one of the highest across the nation. See Zai Liang and Zhongdong Ma, “China's Floating Population: New Evidence from the 2000 Census,” *Population and Development Review* 30 (Sep. 2004): 467-488.

⁵⁰This can partly explain why many people in the minority ethnic groups miss Mao Zedong's era, when there was no need for graduates to look for a job in a planned economy.

war.⁵¹ If ethnic tension is relevant to this issue, in other words, if one can draw a sharp line between ethnic groups that enjoy most revenue from natural resources and those that almost gain nothing, it is predictable that the conflict over the resource revenue will be more severe than in places where ethnic tension is not existent.

Table 4. Major Terrorist Attacks in Xinjiang since the 1990s⁵²

| Year | Date | Place |
|--------------------|---------------------------|---|
| 1990 | April 5 th | Akto County, Kizilsu Kirgiz Autonomous Prefecture |
| 1992 | February 5 th | Urumqi |
| 1993 | June 17 th | Kashgar |
| 1997 | February 5 th | Yining City, Ili Kazak Autonomous Prefecture |
| | February 25 th | Urumqi |
| 2008 | August 4 th | Kashgar |
| 2009 | July 5 th | Urumqi |
| 2012 | February 28 th | Yecheng County, Kashgar |
| | July 18 th | Hotan |
| 2013 | April 23 rd | Bachu County, Kashgar |
| | June 26 th | Shanshan County, Turpan |
| | August 20 th | Yecheng County, Kashgar |
| | November 16 th | Bachu County, Kashgar |
| | December 15 th | Shufu County, Kashgar |
| 2014 ⁵³ | December 30 th | Shache County, Kashgar |
| | January 24 th | Xinhe County, Aksu |
| | February 14 th | Wushi County, Aksu |

This is exactly what's going on in Xinjiang, and we have a good indicator to measure the strength of "resistance" of the dissatisfied Uyghurs—the frequency of terrorist

⁵¹Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler. "Greed and Grievance in Civil War," *Oxford Economic Papers* 56 (Aug. 2004): 563-595. Päivi Lujala, "The Spoils of Nature: Armed Civil Conflict and Rebel Access to Natural Resources," *Journal of Peace Research* 47 (Jan. 2010): 15-28.

⁵²Source: Wenmu Zhang, "The Silk Road and Security in West China [sichou zhilu yu zhongguo xiyu anquan]," *World Economics and Politics* (shijie zhengzhi yu jingji) 403 (3, 2014): 4-27.

⁵³The data was collected until March, 2014. In fact, since 2014, the Chinese authority has imposed more restrictions on the report on violence in Xinjiang, thus the information has become less available and the validity is also more questionable thereafter. See "US anti-terrorism report criticizes CCP [mei fankong baogao zhipi zhonggong]," Uyghur Human Rights Project, available at: <http://chinese.uhrp.org/article/1272325244>. Last accessed: February 19th, 2016.

attacks. The Chinese government has been accusing the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) of being responsible for terrorist attacks inside Xinjiang, and in recent years, outside the autonomous region. It is reported that the ETIM has close connection with the fundamentalists from the Taliban, who has been offering the Xinjiang separatists with training programs, weapons, and financial support. ETIM has also been listed as a terrorist organization by the U.S. government since 2002. Although the terrorists in Xinjiang are mainly driven by religious fanaticism, the larger and larger income gap between the Han people and ethnic minorities also attracts many young Uyghurs to resort to violence. Then, we must clarify whether ethnic tensions in China are on the rise in recent years, in particular, whether they are on the rise in Xinjiang along with the ongoing energy development. The answer is yes, but only in Xinjiang.⁵⁴ The following table shows the frequency of terrorist attacks in Xinjiang since the 1990s.

From Table 4 we can see that since 2008 there has been an increasing tendency in terrorist attacks. Most of these attacks happened in Southern Xinjiang, where most residents are the Uyghurs rather than Han Chinese. Besides, in recent years, the threat of terrorism is not limited in Xinjiang. For example, the crash incident in Tiananmen in 2013 and the Kunming massacre in March 2014 both show that any place in China can be the target of terrorists. Therefore, using the frequency of terrorist attacks as a “proxy” to measure the strength of resistance of Uyghurs, we can conclude that the ethnic tensions are on the rise in Xinjiang, and the challengers will not easily give up their ambition in the revenue generated by oil exploitation. Confronted by the challenges from ethnic minorities, what kind of policy the government is likely to adopt? As is mentioned above, political scientists and economists have contributed much to our understanding about the political “curse” of natural resources, and they have generalized some important concepts. Among them the widely discussed ones include the so-called “rentier effect” and “repression effect”. The “rentier effect” means that resource-rich governments use low tax rates and patronage to relieve pressures for greater accountability. In contrast, the “repression effect” argues that resource wealth retards democratization by enabling governments to boost their funding for internal security.⁵⁵ We can say that almost all debates in this field originate from these two concepts. They are not only useful for theoretical discussion, but can also help us explain the reaction of the Chinese government—both central and local—when the situation in Xinjiang deteriorates because of the challenges from the Uyghurs. “Patronage” and “Repression” are just like “Carrot and Stick”. Indeed, this has been

⁵⁴“Are Ethnic Tensions on the Rise in China,” A ChinaFile Conversation, available at: <https://www.chinafile.com/are-ethnic-tensions-rise-china>. Last accessed: April 5th, 2014.

⁵⁵Ross, “Does Oil Hinder Democracy?” 325-361.

the approach the Chinese government adopts to govern this resource-rich region.⁵⁶ On one hand, it is not a strange thing that an authoritarian regime will choose to impose more control over the society when the stability is threatened, and the Chinese government is no exception. Sometimes such social control methods may do harm to the rights of citizens. The best indicator to measure accurately how much the Chinese government has strengthened its control in Xinjiang is the budget for “managing the stability” (*weiwen*): according to official statistics released in January 2013, regional authorities allocated 9.34 billion RMB to the public security sector in 2012, a 23-percent increase over 2011.⁵⁷ Besides, we can also see some other evidences that directly reveal a harder policy in Xinjiang. One of them is the information blockade that was introduced after the street riots on July 5th, 2009. The SMS system was completely shut down for almost 7 months, while it took 10 months to restore the very basic access to the Internet. Before the restoration, Xinjiang was almost isolated from the outside world.

Another good measurement of the level of authoritarian is the frequency of mass protests that broke out in Xinjiang. I have to emphasize that the number of mass protests in Xinjiang, and in many other provinces of China as well, is *negatively* related to the strength of authoritarian rule. The reason is that collective activities are most worrisome for the Chinese government, whose censorship program is aimed at curtailing collective action by silencing comments that represent, reinforce, or spur social mobilization, regardless of content.⁵⁸ According to a report by Li and Tian, Guangdong, which is supposed to be the most “open” and “freest” province partly because of its proximity to Hong Kong, has nurtured more mass protests in the past 13 years than any other province. There have been 267 mass protests with more than 100 participants in the past 13 years in Guangdong. In contrast, at the same period, the number is 5 in Xinjiang.⁵⁹ Bovingdon gives his explanation in this way: officials and public security personnel have kept a tight lid on public protest in Xinjiang; as a consequence, most protest has been individual or private. He also notices that the frequency of protests in Xinjiang was declining

⁵⁶“Xinjiang Enticement,” Energytribune, available at: <http://www.energytribune.com/5028/xinjiang-enticements#sthash.BMnWbjsu.8A4ZIX2B.dpbs>. Last accessed: April 5th, 2014.

⁵⁷ “Report on Xinjiang 2012 Budget Implementation Situation and 2013 Draft Budget [xinjiang 2012 nian yusuan zhixing qingkuang he 2013 nian yusuan cao’an de baogao],” available at: http://www.gov.cn/gzdt/2013-02/19/content_2334747.htm. Last accessed: July 8th, 2014.

⁵⁸Gary King, Jennifer Pan, and Margaret E. Roberts, “How Censorship in China Allows Government Criticism but Silences Collective Expression,” *American Political Science Review* 107 (May 2013): 326-343.

⁵⁹Lin Li and He Tian. *Annual Report on China’s Rule of Law 2013* (zhongguo fazhi fazhan baogao 2013), (Beijing: Social Science Documentation Publishing House), 2014.

while they were on a dramatic rise in the rest of China.⁶⁰ Thus, it is reasonable to interpret the declining frequency of mass protests in Xinjiang as a sign of strengthening social control and authoritarian rule. Besides, we can also see many other implications for “repression”.

When more “repression” is introduced, one can see more authoritarian features in the regime. But that is not the whole story. No regime can survive without any support from the people. In the case of Xinjiang, the Chinese government not only suppresses the resistance of the Uyghurs, but also uses patronage to improve the situation and appease the anger. Less than one year after the July 5th riots, in May 2010, top central government and Communist Party leaders held a “work forum” to set state economic and political objectives for Xinjiang. The meeting marks the first work forum directed at the XUAR (authorities have held five similar work forums to date addressing the Tibet Autonomous Region and, recently, other Tibetan autonomous areas of China). The forum stresses development and stability as dual goals.⁶¹ In terms of economic and social development, some reform methods are raised. First, 19 provinces and municipalities, places in the rest of China that get particular benefits from Xinjiang’s oil and gas, have been designated as Xinjiang partners. They are required to contribute 0.3 to 0.6 percent of their fiscal revenues from 2011 to 2020 to support Xinjiang’s development. Starting in 2011 the region will receive more than \$10 billion in financial aid from this program. Second, producers of crude oil and natural gas in Xinjiang will be levied a new 5 percent tax. This new tax system will be based on sales price instead of volume as it was before. The new tax system, which went into effect on June 1st, 2010, is aimed at increasing revenue for the local government and is part of the support package unveiled at the central work forum held in Beijing in May.⁶² CNPC’s annual crude oil production in Xinjiang are 18 million tons, while Sinopec produces 7 million tons each year. If the resource tax is collected at 5 percent, CNPC and Sinopec, China’s top two oil companies, will add 5 billion RMB (\$732 million) in tax revenue to the region annually as oil prices stabilize at \$80 per barrel.⁶³ The central government expects that by increasing fiscal transfer and resource taxes, the local governments in

⁶⁰Gardner Bovington, *The Uyghurs: Strangers in Their Own Land* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 21-22.

⁶¹“Central Leaders Hold Forum on Xinjiang, Stress Development and Stability as Dual Goals,” Congressional-executive Commission on China, available at: <http://www.cecc.gov/publications/commission-analysis/central-leaders-hold-forum-on-xinjiang-stress-development-and>. Last accessed: April 5th, 2014.

⁶²“Xinjiang Enticement,” Energytribune, available at: <http://www.energytribune.com/5028/xinjiang-enticements#sthash.BMnWbjsu.8A4ZIX2B.dpbs>. Last accessed: April 5th, 2014.

⁶³Li Woke, “Xinjiang Reportedly to Pilot 5% Tax on Gas, Oil,” available at: <http://www.globaltimes.cn/business/china-economy/2010-05/535762.html>. Last accessed: April 5th, 2014.

Xinjiang will have more funding to provide public goods, like education, medical service, low-rent housing, etc. As a report by the Uyghur Human Rights Project comments, the work forum has slightly realigned the previous Great Western Development Drive (GWDD in short, *xibu dakaifa* in Chinese) policies when viewed from the grassroots. The new policies' small shift has been toward more investment in human development and more spatially dispersed infusions of capital, which differs from the GWDD large-scale investment in natural resources predominately located in the north of the region.⁶⁴ What's more, the Xinjiang government also tries to tackle the unemployment problem directly. For example, in state "redistributive agencies" like public institutions and work units (*danwei*), ethnic differences in employment and job attainment have become very limited and actually favors ethnic minorities. This situation reflects the fact that the state's affirmative action policy continues to benefit local ethnic minorities in certain parts of the state sector.⁶⁵

This is the "rentier effect" approach that generates the political natural resource curse. Supporters for patronage approach assume that taxpayers tend to care less about democracy and political rights as the government can offer good subsidies. But more field research is still needed to explore the political attitude and political culture in Xinjiang, particularly among the Uyghurs, when they are offered so many good deals.

4. Conclusion and Further Discussions

In Section Three I developed a causal theory in order to explain why a political

⁶⁴"Uyghur Homeland, Chinese Frontier: The Xinjiang Work Forum and Centrally Led Development," available at: <https://uhrp.org/press-release/new-report-uhrp-uyghur-homeland-chinese-frontier-xinjiang-work-forum-and-centrally-led>. Last accessed: April 13th, 2015.

⁶⁵Xiaowei Zang, "Uyghur-Han Earnings Differentials in Urumchi," 141-155. Patronage may have some positive effect. Fiscal transfer from other more prosperous provinces and investment from the central government have mitigated the negative effect of natural resource abundance on economic development. One of the major causes of an "economic curse" is the crowd-out effect of resource exploitation: resource abundance attracts too much governmental investment that is supposed to be used in promoting the development of private sectors and long-term economic growth, see: Andrew Rosser, *The Political Economy of the Resource Curse: A Literature Survey* (Vol. 268) (Brighton, UK: Institute of Development Studies, 2006). Xinjiang can avoid the economic tragedy of Nigeria because it has the financial support from the central government. Moreover, those "patronage" methods that are aimed at improving the lives of poor Uyghurs may also generate some "positive externality": an economy can always benefit from a higher education level of employees. Therefore, there is no economic curse in Xinjiang at this moment, but there is indeed a political curse of natural resources instead.

natural resource curse exists in Xinjiang. The whole logic can be generalized as follows: natural resource abundance and resource exploitation attracts so many migrant workers from other provinces that local minorities, in particular, many Uyghurs youth, are deprived of employment opportunity, since they cannot speak Mandarin Chinese fluently and are disadvantaged in the job market; the unemployment problem is actually a form of distributional inequality, which serves as an incentive for the Uyghurs to resist and challenge the current regime, by means of mass protests and violence, including terrorist attacks; the government responds with “carrot and stick”, imposing strict control over the society as well as offering patronage; these methods will strengthen the authoritarian rule, but more field research is needed to clarify whether the Uyghurs will give up their appeals when patronage is offered. The whole framework can be simplified as the following path graph (see Figure 3).




Figure 3. Path Graph of the Conclusion

A case study on Xinjiang can not only consolidate the theory of political natural resource curse and extend the literature to a wider empirical pool, but also invite more research on the political and economic outcomes of resource exploitation. Specifically, future researchers could consider to work on the following directions that this paper is unable to cover because of length or methodological limits. First, since the causal chain is generalized through studying only one case, it may not be able to explain other cases, thus at this stage should not be regarded as being decisive or universal. More large-n empirical work or formal modelling is needed before we can fully understand how factors like resource abundance, distributional inequality, regime type, and ethnicity interact in leading to a resource blessing or resource curse. Second, this paper does not examine the so-called “modernization

effects" that holds that growth based on the export of oil and minerals is not likely to bring about the social and cultural changes that tend to produce democratic government.⁶⁶ To capture the causal mechanism of such effects, anthropological field research is indispensable even though it is expected to be restricted by the authority. Third, I do not address exclusively the economic effects of energy industry development here,⁶⁷ but hypothesize economic factors as the intermediate variable in the causation theory. Whether Xinjiang can continue to be one of the growth engines of China is worthy of further investigation that may lead us to more progress in theorization in this field.⁶⁸

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⁶⁶Ross, "Does Oil Hinder Democracy?" 325-361.

⁶⁷See, for example, Richard M. Auty, *Sustaining Development in Mineral Economies: The Resource Curse Thesis* (New York: Routledge, 1993).

⁶⁸Despite the lowering growth rate of China in recent years, the GDP growth rate of Xinjiang in 2014 is still as high as

10%, much higher than the national average of 7.3%. The official data of 2015 is not available yet, but it can be expected that, in addition to the so-called "new normality" in which China's economy is shifting from investment-led to consumption led-growth, the low oil price in the international market can also have a negative impact on the energy industry in Xinjiang. Under this new scenario, resource abundance may turn out to be a curse. More empirical observation is still needed before we can reach a conclusion on this aspect.

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BOOK REVIEWS

***Explaining Post-Conflict Reconstruction.* Desha M. Girod. United State of America: Oxford University Press, 2014.**

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Explaining Post-Conflict Reconstruction by Desha M. Girod logically tackles the question of why post-conflict reconstruction works in some countries but is unable to function efficiently in others. The author's main arguments throughout the book are that post-conflict countries with low strategic value and minimal resources often do better with foreign aid for reconstruction and have less chance of coup than countries with high strategic value and resources. The book is well organized and put in a coherent structure that clearly presents and supports Girod's arguments through sufficiently analyzing data from a diverse spectrum of information. Overall, I found this book extremely interesting and relevant at this time as international organizations around the world are struggling to find more effective ways of performing post-conflict reconstruction and are often left without ends meeting.

The book begins with an in-depth introduction to the topic and the author's primary two arguments. In the first two chapters, the author also introduces and provides rationale for the chosen case studies of Mozambique, Angola and Uganda to help reinforce the given hypothesis. Chapter three is laid out as a statistical analysis of the author's first argument suggesting that countries with low strategic value and minimal resources often do better with foreign aid for reconstruction. Chapter four provides a statistical analysis for her second argument that countries receiving foreign aid with low strategic value and minimal resources have less chance of coup. Chapters five and six take into account the statistical data from chapters three and four and add the qualitative data from the case studies of Mozambique, Angola and Uganda to solidify the presented arguments. Lastly in chapter seven, the book examines abnormal situations that defy her findings and provides possible suggestions and research for improvement in post-conflict reconstruction.

Girod's first argument in this book is that countries with low strategic value and minimal resources often do better with foreign aid than countries in the opposite situation. She indicates that these types of countries are often left in a state that leaves them desperate and cooperative with any outside help possible. These countries often follow the guidelines presented to them by foreign donors because they are aware that if they do not comply, they will cease to receive future aid and will be left in the same devastated condition as before. Countries that have a high strategic importance to foreign donors and possess a vast array of resources are often more hesitant to comply with donors guidelines because they have more

opportunities and financial means of their own. The second argument that Girod presents is that countries receiving foreign aid that have low strategic importance and limited resources often avoid coup attempts. She states that the reason why these countries experience less frequency of coups is because they pay little attention to making ties with opposition groups and diminishing hostilities. Countries with low strategic importance and minor resources follow donor's guidelines more closely which usually involves inviting the opposition groups to negotiations in an effort to sustain peace. In addition, countries with high strategic importance and resources tend to spend less foreign aid money towards proper institutions of security which also leads to increased chances of coup.

Over the last several decades, civil wars across the globe have both popped up and diminished leaving extensive damage and human suffering. As a result, donor countries and international organizations such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank have stepped in to pick up the pieces. Unfortunately, the strategies for reconstruction presented and instituted by these donor countries and international organizations are often not met with success and occasionally can make the situation even more severe than it was previously. For example, post-conflict reconstruction has been taking place in both Iraq and Afghanistan for the greater part of the last decade and has been wrought with massive problems stemming from aid disbursement and proper management of these funds. The problems related to these reconstruction failures can be seen from the donor and the receiving parties in these countries. Much of these problems have to do with effectively working with the leaders and people, dispersing aid accordingly, corruption and proper usage of funding in these post-conflict zones.

Girod does an excellent job of attempting to prove her two main arguments by extensively examining and analyzing various countries that have emerged from civil conflicts from 1970 to 2009. Specifically she chooses Mozambique, Angola and Uganda as her primary case studies to help solve the phenomena of properly instituting post-conflict reconstruction. She effectively chooses Mozambique after 1992 and Angola post 2002 as examples because both countries were extremely similar after their civil wars in terms of socioeconomic aspects and prior history. The major difference between these two countries is that Mozambique had little resources and low strategic importance while Angola had recourses for sale in the form of diamonds and oil and was receiving strategic funding from donors. Uganda is used as a third example because originally after its first ceasefire in 1986 it was considered a low-windfall country but in the mid-1990's this changed when they discovered newly found resources.

The case studies of Mozambique and Angola are perfect because they clearly illustrate and prove her proposed arguments. In the situation of Mozambique, which has miniscule resources and low strategic importance, aid offered by institutions

such as the IMF and the World Bank proved to effectively help turn around the situation in Mozambique. The author suggests that the reasons for this are because the leaders of Mozambique at the time properly followed the guidelines presented by the donors and allocated the received funds effectively to perform reconstruction. She states that the reason for this is because the leaders had little other options if they wanted to continue receiving aid. And without other sources of income they would have been stuck in the same devastated situation without proper and due compliance. In addition, Girod states that Mozambique was successful in avoiding coups due to the fact that by following the guidelines presented to them, they were able to ensure a proper degree of security and stability. Also, the guidelines required that the government at the time also included representation from the opposition party which furthered diminished the chances of a potential coup.

Angola on the other hand had both resources and strategic value after its civil war. In addition, Angola also received both strategic and non-strategic funding from foreign donors. However, because Angola had access to other sources of internal income, they diligently chose to not follow the guidelines presented by donors and instead chose to use the extra funding for the desires of the elite in their country instead of helping those suffering. And due to their strategic importance and resources, donors still continued to fund their supposed reconstruction plans because they were left in a position where they had already invested too much. Also, by poorly allocating their receiving funds for proper sufficient security and making peace with the people suffering, they became at a far greater risk to potential coups. In Uganda's unique situation, they began in a situation much like Mozambique but due to their newfound resources they ended up in the same situation as Angola.

In the final section of the book, Girod introduces a few cases such as a Rwanda and Cambodia that did not follow the norm and defied her findings among Mozambique, Angola, Uganda and several other countries. These countries, for various reasons that were explicit to their situations, did not follow the same pattern of the primary case studies presented. Many of the reasons for these abnormalities came from leadership decisions and surrounding external factors that included sanctions imposed by foreign governments on specific resources. In addition to these extreme cases, the author also provides a myriad of suggestions for better implementation of post-conflict reconstruction and provides several ideas for further research into this topic.

The specific ways in which I have judged this book have been how well the author has presented her desired arguments, how relevant are the chosen case studies, how relevant is this material at this time, how accurately are the arguments analyzed and proven and what additional material if any could be included to add to this book. In

my opinion, Girod has done a very good job of clearly presenting her two arguments. She provides an adequate amount of background information about the subject and then clearly explains the rationale of why she has chosen this particular topic for research. In addition, she shows that she has spent ample time examining this topic by providing the case studies of Mozambique, Angola and Uganda. Although, it would have been more effective if she also examined more closely the countries that she mentions briefly at the end of the book that did not follow her hypothesis. The case studies that were provided fit very well to support her arguments but a more in-depth side by side comparison to a country that did not follow her argument at all would have been helpful in strengthening her point.

The structure of the book was well laid out and for the most part clear to understand. However, chapters three and four detailing the statistical analysis of the author's primary two arguments would have been difficult for someone without a background of statistics and an ability to understand complex mathematical models. Though, the author helps to supplement this material with some simplified terminology and through presenting the qualitative data from the case studies in chapters five and six. The material presented is very prevalent for this time period because the question of how to use foreign aid correctly in post-conflict countries is an ongoing problem and is costing large amounts of money on a daily basis. The additional material that I believe would have been interesting to add would have been more information regarding the current situation in Afghanistan and Iraq's reconstruction and a clearer picture of how they compare to the aforementioned case studies. In addition, I believe it may have been interesting to hear about additional causes for post-conflict reconstruction failure.

Overall, this book provided great new insights into this field of study and I have only had a few issues in regards to how it was structured and its message in general. The author did a very nice job of covering the majority of all of the bases to support her arguments and left very little untied. The book was clearly laid out and covered both quantitative and qualitative aspects to help reinforce the presented hypotheses. However, the quantitative portion would have likely been difficult for someone not familiar with statistics. I also really enjoyed this book because of its prevalence to this current time period. With so many errors and problems occurring today with post-conflict reconstruction, this book comes at a perfect time and provides very interesting perspectives on ways to improve the situation such as paving the way for stronger degrees of transparency and bypassing governments in post-conflict countries to deliver aid. I would highly recommend this book to anyone interested in post-conflict reconstruction and would definitely look forward to reading any additional material from Girod on this topic in the future.

David P. Auerswald and Stephen M. Saideman. *NATO in Afghanistan: Fighting Together, Fighting Alone*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014, 280 pp., \$24.50 / £17.47.

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David P. Auerswald and Stephen M. Saideman are no strangers to matters of national security, intra-state conflict, foreign policy, civil-military relations, or conflict and state building. Their previous work, which engages with intra-alliance debates during military interventions not to mention deterrence and terrorism, provides a searing background for a succinct book that is both theoretically conversant and empirically deep. Despite the claim that warfare in the contemporary period is almost always a multilateral affair, successful interaction between actors involved in a coalition or alliance during wartime is not always an efficacious matter. The war in Afghanistan was a complex undertaking that revealed many dismal and dreary sides of multilateral initiatives of this nature. Agreement across the board was not always present, efforts to defeat the Taliban, as a common enemy, were not always so collective, and willingness to assume the responsibilities and burdens of modern warfare were anything but consistent, or even predictable. Auerswald and Saideman examine the nitty-gritty of the war in Afghanistan showing that the events and outcomes of the war were not only decided on the battlefields, but were also products of government structures and party politics within the NATO alliance and member-state politics.

This book is divided into nine chapters. The first part offers a theoretical basis for the subsequent empirical examinations. It problematizes the very practice of warfare, particularly when it is fought by coalitions. Yet, an interesting and overlooked aspect of coalitions or alliances like NATO, are the issues that initially bring nations together in a collective security organization; those issues, however, do not necessarily bring and keep them together when an organization or alliance goes to war. "The Americans and Italians," write Auerswald and Saideman, "disagreed over how to proceed in Somalia in 1993, and the French seemed to confound the Americans in Bosnia in 1998" (p. 2). Afghanistan offers no exception to the risks of policy formation and implementation disagreement, even in light of conspicuously imbalanced pecuniary contributions to, in this case, NATO. Budgetary dimensions speak directly to the authors' views of the roots of resentment within coalitions. In this vein, they discuss the problem of "[s]ome countries [...] withholding their full effort" (p. 3). Given the historical background provided in this book and its deep examination of NATO in Afghanistan, it presents readers with multiple case studies but also discusses "the broader dynamics involved whenever countries seek to cooperate in combat" (p. 3).

Numerous angles from which to view the role of countries in NATO and their relationship with one another during the war in Afghanistan are on offer within this book. For example, each NATO member (as well as non-members like Australia and New Zealand) made different financial, material, and human contributions to the war effort. This data is situated clear from imbalance and underscores the challenges (even recurring problems) “inherent in multilateral warfare” (p. 5). Some countries, as discussed, are just not able to contribute to the same degree as others. Thus, we observe *unwillingness* within and amongst the willing in both ad hoc coalitions and institutionalized alliances. A very interesting caveat (many are discussed) is the terrorism threat within countries that form part of an alliance. NATO members each faced different terrorist threat levels that acted as restraints, compelling countries to hold back on troop commitments, and yet it was actual terrorist attacks that shaped and formed the role and limits of NATO country forces on the ground. Looking at domestic imperatives, the authors move beyond the analytical borders established by realists in International Relations (IR) theory. Domestic politics and public pressure at home are critical to seeing how the war in Afghanistan was fueled from afar.

Breaking the black box of states, Auerswald and Saideman analyze presidents in charge of different countries. In chapter 4, the authors look at politicians leading the United States, France, and Poland with the aim of identifying behavioral impacts on military agents deployed. Political actors are not just examined on their own. Auerswald and Saideman attempt to exhibit specific patterns of behavior by comparing and contrasting key players within administrations: “Rumsfeld versus Gates” during the years of the Bush-Cheney-Rumsfeld administration, “Chirac versus Sarkozy,” two key figures in French politics that presented France with two very distinct administrations during the war in Afghanistan, and the “Kwasniewski versus Kaczynski” presidencies from 1995 until 2010. The findings are convincing that the current and decision-making that goes on in domestic politics heavily impacts individual decision-makers outside of the country and particularly within context of multilateral missions. Single-party parliamentary governments take readers beyond the initial empirical chapter of this book in order to show how the political orientations of governments influence agent selection and behavior.

This book delivers a very robust overview and indeed deep analysis of different governments that comprised (at different points during the war in Afghanistan) NATO over approximately a 10-year period. In the latter chapters, Auerswald and Saideman look beyond membership to two countries that played significant roles in the war. Whereas in the previous chapters the authors investigated NATO members and governments developing different models of “principle-agent (PA) relations to depict possible configurations of states during multilateral interventions” (p. 177), the chapter on Australia and New Zealand focuses on “contingent delegation, patterns of oversight, and patterns of promotion” (p. 179) and their effect on

commanders operating on the ground. It is difficult to summarize the complexity of this single chapter, but in essence, responsibility shares a mysterious relationship with historical character of a nation and its people, where size might be expected to matter does not at all, and troop restrictions could hardly be seen as restrictive, especially when comparing Australia and New Zealand's troop performs with that of other NATO countries.

The risks involved for countries, their soldiers, their publics, and their politics are central components of this book. The core of politics at home and their impacts on warfighting in distance places and in the context of multilateralism is the essence of this intensively researched and brilliantly articulated study. One should not see this as a military examination, or a history of a military campaign. In fact, one cannot escape the interdisciplinary character of a study that attempts to touch on so many different aspects of a war that affects, in turn, so many different levels of societies. This is perhaps one of the most admirable traits of this book. Its intricate empirical side matches its theoretical dimension. Employing both qualitative and quantitative methods of research, there is a very noticeable eclecticism through the chapters. The book, through its investigation of the NATO alliance and its members and non-member partners, pays further attention to the dynamism of a politico-military organization that has repeatedly been said to have outlived its usefulness and becomes disconnected in terms of its original conception, with the evolving nature of geopolitics in contemporary times. There is no clear indication of bias in any of the chapters nor have the authors fallen short of providing equitable focus to the many countries involved in the Afghanistan war. Auerswald and Saideman's book has established a useful vantage point for further studies of the two-way effects of the war and its participants on several analytical levels, and is an important resource for members of military institutions in addition to scholars, and people in politics.

Hloušek, Vít (ed.) *Presidents above parties? Presidents in Central and Eastern Europe, Their Formal Competencies and Informal Power* (Brno: Muni Press, 2013).

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The presidencies of Central and Eastern Europe and their incumbents have attracted the attention of a number of political scientists since the region's transition to democracy over twenty years ago. Although over time Prime Ministers and their governments have established themselves as the dominant executive actors, presidents still play an important role in the functioning of these political systems and possess the power to exert significant influence over political decision-making. The volume *Presidents above parties? Presidents in Central and Eastern Europe, Their Formal Competencies and Informal Power* takes the recent change of the

mode of presidential election in the Czech Republic as an occasion and starting point to explore the activities of the presidents of Central and Eastern Europe – defined as the ten countries that joined the EU in 2004/2007. In particular, it focusses on instances in which presidents attempted to overstep their constitutionally defined powers or managed to influence political decisions informally. Hereby, the contributors also aim to shed light on the role played by presidents' personal characteristics and ambitions, and argue that they are key to explaining attempts to "accrue more power" (p. 25) and "strengthen the role of the president" (p. 291).

The book is organised as a collection of ten case studies framed by an introduction and a concluding chapter that set the topic into a comparative perspective and sum up individual findings. The individual chapters, written by country experts, each give an overview of the historical predecessors of the current presidential institutions and their incumbents to date and discuss the way in which presidents have tried to influence political decisions formally and informally, and attempted to extend their powers. The broad historical overviews given in each chapter, often going back to the creation of the first presidencies after WW I and discussing the practice of presidential politics in the inter-war years, provide a very useful contribution to the existing literature. In particular, they illustrate the connotations associated with the institution of the presidency by the drafters of the new constitutions after 1989 well as by the first office-holders during the early years of democratisation. After comparable volumes had previously almost exclusively focussed on popularly elected presidents, the case studies in this book also explicitly include chapters on indirectly elected presidents, thus allowing for comparisons across regime types. Particularly the presidencies of Latvia and Estonia have not yet been featured in this form in other English language publications. Even though Elgie and Moestrup's *Semi-presidentialism in Central and Eastern Europe*⁶⁹ was only published six years ago, the book thus presents a welcome expansion of the literature and also provides updates on the developments of presidencies covered in previous publications.⁷⁰ Furthermore, all chapters include at least some data on how often presidents used their formal powers (vetoes, legislative initiatives, judicial review requests etc.) to date and use this information to assess the influence of different factors on presidential activity. Although this data is not always presented in a form that would make it suitable for cross-country comparisons (e.g. by reporting the number of vetoes also as a percentage of all legislation passed), it still presents an improvement over previous publications on Central and East European presidents where such numbers have only rarely been included systematically.

⁶⁹ Robert Elgie and Sophia Moestrup, eds. *Semi-presidentialism in Central and Eastern Europe* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2008).

⁷⁰ In fact, the chapters on Lithuania and Slovenia are at least partly based on those in *Semi-presidentialism in Central and Eastern Europe* written by the same authors.

Irrespective of these unquestionably valuable contributions and overall usefulness of this volume, there are also a number of weaknesses, both with regard to overall form and in terms of content. First and perhaps least important, the individual country chapters differ with regards to overall length and internal structure. While all chapters address the main points mentioned above (historical overview, incumbents, attempts to influence political decisions and extend presidential power), the emphasis placed on each varies between chapters and the chosen focus is not always justified by its relative significance for the eventual conclusions. Hereby, it should be noted that the chapter on Bulgaria does generally not address the topic of informal presidential power. Rather, it consists of an analysis of presidential veto use and presidents' public approval between 2002 and 2012 which – albeit insightful – does not fit in with the rest of the volume. Another point of critique is the fact that apart from the chapter on Hungary, all other chapters lack an overview table of governments (and/or Prime Ministers) and their respective tenure, making it difficult for readers less acquainted with a particular political system to follow the discussion. The odd number of spelling errors and awkward grammatical constructions (likely resulting from too literal translations from the authors' native languages) do not generally inhibit the understanding of arguments but unnecessarily slow down the flow of reading. Unfortunately, there are also about half a dozen sources referenced in the text which do not appear in the bibliography.

The greatest limitation of the volume at hand concerns how it addresses the issue of presidential personality. The editor is clear to point out in the introduction that the aim of the book is not to provide a “comprehensive explanation of the role played by a strong political personality” (p. 27) and that it therefore refrains from adopting a unified theoretical approach, focussing on the explanation of individual cases rather than “stimulating a shift [...] towards a more general explanation” (p. 27). However, the lack of such a general framework means that the author(s) of each chapter follow a different understanding of what ‘personality’ means and how its influence on presidential action can be demonstrated (in fact, a similar divergence exists with regard to the term ‘informal’). Only few authors refer to concepts from the established literature on political psychology or political leadership and evidence of presidents' individual character traits/ their importance often remains anecdotal or extremely vague (sometimes even bordering the tautological, e.g. the description of Hungarian president László Sólyom as a “more active personality” than pre-predecessor Árpád Göncz; p. 90). Thus, the conclusion that – in addition to conflicts caused by cohabitation between president and government – “attempts to strengthen the role of the president are also dependent upon his/her personality and charisma” (p. 291) should be seen as a hypothesis in need of further systematic investigation, rather than as a definite conclusion.

In sum, the book at hand presents a useful resource for students and scholars interested in presidential politics in Central and Eastern Europe as well as a welcome update to and expansion of the existing literature. It provides a wealth of examples in which presidents have overstepped their constitutionally defined role, many of which have not yet been described in the English language literature. Despite the weaknesses mentioned above, the volume still lays the basis for a potentially fruitful avenue for future research on the role of factors related to presidents as individuals, situated at the intersection of comparative politics and political psychology.